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File Folder USSR (12/4/82-12/7/82)

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F03-002/5

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171075	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE ENGAGING THE SOVIETS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-1-8	2	12/4/1982	B1
171076	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO ADM. HOWE AND R. PERLE RE SOVIET STATEMENTS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-2-7	1	12/6/1982	B1
171077	CABLE	MOSCOW 14371 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-3-6	3	11/30/1982	B1
171078	MEMO	C. LORD, S. KRAEMER ET AL. TO R. MCFARLANE RE SOVIET DISINFORMATION	1	12/1/1982	B1
171079	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE ANDROPOV STATEMENTS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-5-4	1	12/6/1982	B1
171080	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-6-3	1	12/6/1982	B1
171081	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S DEC. 6 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-6-3	1	ND	B1

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171082	CABLE	070115Z DEC 82 (W/NOTATIONS) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-7-2	3	12/7/1982	B1
171084	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE SHULTZ'S DEC. 6 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	12/7/1982	B1
171085	CABLE	LENINGRAD 3053 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-9-0	3	12/7/1982	B1
171086	CABLE	070115Z DEC 82 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-21-10-8	3	12/7/1982	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES:
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ID 8291022

RECEIVED 14 DEC 82 14

TO PRESIDENT FROM CLARK

DOCDATE 04 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: ENGAGING SOVIETS IN SERIOUS EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
PRESIDENT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

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FROM/LOCATION/

THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK

TOR: 041924z DEC 82

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

ATTACHED:

SITTO

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CLASSIFICATION

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No copies.

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

171075

NLRR 748-23-21-1-8

December 4, 1982

~~SECRET~~BY 608 NARA DATE 12/7/15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William P. Clark

Subject: Engaging the Soviets In a Serious Effort to Make Progress--Is Now the Time?

A number of factors justify our asking ourselves whether or not the time has come to try to engage the Soviet leadership in a serious effort to put our relationship on a more stable footing, moving--if you will--from confrontation to serious negotiations toward reaching solutions to the major areas of disagreement between us. After two years, you have established clearly that the United States has reversed course from being a nation in decline to one which has both the will and capability to defend its interests and once more, play a leading role in international affairs. Your defense modernization program has provided the solid foundation for this broader commitment. In regional issues--from Latin America to the Middle East--you have engendered the respect among the local leaders essential to checking the Soviet advance. In Europe the forthcoming multilateral effort to chart a new course in East-West economic relations promises for the first time in a decade to turn the tide of detente toward a more sober basis for limiting Soviet expansion at Allied expense.

Furthermore, problems within the Soviet Union have worsened. If our economic problems are bad, their's are worse. As tenuous as our relations are with some allies, their problems are even more severe as Poland makes clear. Added to these are their looming problems with their ethnically diverse nationalities. To relieve their domestic economic problems it would be attractive to them to find a way to limit their expenditures on the military and although history gives us little basis for confidence or optimism in this area, it is not out of the question.

From another point of view, whether or not it makes sense for us to take an initiative, it is extremely likely that the Soviets will try some kind of initiative--probably in arms control--to put us off guard, appeal to our allies' peace movements and further drive a wedge between us. Thus, at a minimum we must be ready to counter an anticipated propaganda ploy in the days or weeks ahead.

For my own part, I believe an initiative, conveyed through an extremely private channel, would be worthwhile. The risk is, of course, that they might perceive it as a sign of weakness engendered with the increasing trouble we may have in carrying your programs with the Congress and broader national uncertainty

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over the continued military buildup. All things considered however, they have very strong incentives for trying to reach agreement with us in some area--enough to make a try worthwhile in my judgment.

If this is true, the next question is, in what area--regional issues, arms control or human rights--should we focus our attention? The attached staff paper done for me goes into that question and concludes that the best opportunity is in arms control and specifically the INF talks in Geneva.

If you were to conclude that an initiative of some kind is worth trying, an important question will be whether it is feasible in terms of avoiding subversion from within. This is perhaps too strong, however, it is very clear that some of your appointees--well meaning and well-grounded in history--have a very deep conviction that because past dialogues have been flawed and have damaged US interests, that we ought not try and cannot do better. I disagree. The flaws of detente in the early 70's centered in part on the weakened ability of the US (deriving from Vietnam and Watergate) to wield the sticks as well as the carrots and in part from less than realistic understanding of Soviet/Marxist doctrine--a tendency to impute good will and western values where they don't exist. We don't suffer those liabilities.

But the question remains--if an initiative is worthwhile, can we put it together. It seems to me that that question, along with the possible agenda ought to be aired by your principal advisors (The Vice President, the Secretary of State, Defense, Bill Casey and perhaps others) and a recommendation given to you. If they believe that a serious effort is worth a try then we can go on to think of how to put it together. If you agree, I recommend that I convene a meeting in the Situation Room tomorrow to discuss the matter with the principals.

Go ahead ☒ Other ☐

mtg held
12-5-02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR Admiral Jonathan T. Howe
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

Mr. Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy
Department of Defense

748-23-212-7

BY 1903 NARA DATE 12/7/15

SUBJECT: Soviet Statements Concerning Launch on Warning (U)

The November 29 Novosti statement threatening adoption of a launch on warning policy by the Soviets in response to Pershing II deployments in Western Europe appears to represent the opening salvo of a propaganda/disinformation campaign that could do considerable damage to our INF modernization plans (and MX as well) if not countered promptly and effectively. (S)

I have asked the Working Group on Active Measures to do an analysis of this and related Soviet initiatives. It would be very helpful if the START and INF IG, in conjunction with that group, could develop a set of talking points placing the Soviet effort in its proper context (covering, for example, relevant Soviet doctrine, historic US concerns for crisis stability, and the President's recent CBM proposals) that could serve as the basis for our public affairs efforts in this matter. In addition, a demarche should be developed for use by Ambassador Nitze protesting the Soviet statement and inter alia citing our CBM proposals. The Soviets should be put on notice that irresponsible propaganda/disinformation actions of this kind cannot be divorced from the negotiating process, and in fact undermine the very confidence that our proposals are attempting to build. (S)


Robert C. McFarlane

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171077
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14371

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: NOVOSTI STATEMENT ON INF -- MORE SCARE
REFS: (A) COURTNEY/VERSHBOW TELCON, 29 NOV 82
- (B) MOSCOW 10724
- (C) GENEVA 11577 (NOTAL)
- (D) MOSCOW 8443
- (E) MOSCOW 9699

1. (C) SUMMARY: NOVOSTI SAYS THE USSR WILL RETALIATE IMMEDIATELY AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN TARGETS IF U.S. EUROMISSILES APPROACH SOVIET TERRITORY. THE NOVOSTI STATEMENT IS: 1) THE SHARPEST ILLUSTRATION YET OF THE TREND IN RECENT MONTHS OF HEIGHTENED INTIMIDATION IN SOVIET INF PROPAGANDA, AND 2) THE MOST DIRECT, PUBLIC ASSERTION TO DATE THAT THE USSR WOULD EMPLOY LAUNCH-ON-

TACTICAL-WARNING (LOTW) IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER. TO FRUSTRATE THIS SOVIET TACTIC OF INTIMIDATION, THE ALLIANCE CAN SEEK TO REASSURE PUBLICS THAT SOVIET THREATS: REPRESENT NOTHING NEW, ARE BEST DETERRED THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT, OR REVEAL INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET DECLARED POLICIES (E.G., BETWEEN NO FIRST USE AND LOTW). END SUMMARY. THE NOVOSTI STATEMENT

2. (U) FOLLOWING ARE KEY EXCERPTS FROM THE UNSIGNED NOVOSTI APN COMMENTARY, ISSUED NOVEMBER 29 TO WESTERN NEWS ORGANIZATIONS IN MOSCOW (OUR SOURCE IS UPI):

-- "SOVIET MILITARY CIRCLES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT A SITUATION IS SHAPING AT PRESENT WHEN A NUCLEAR MISSILE APPEARING AT THE APPROACHES TO SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD INEVITABLY CAUSE IMMEDIATE RETALIATION ON THE SOVIET UNION'S PART."

-- "THE PENTAGON INTENDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO DEPLOY IN WESTERN EUROPE PERSHING IIS AND CRUISE MISSILES (THE LATTER, DESPITE SLOWER SPEED, CAN PENETRATE TO TARGET BY STEALTH AND STRIKE A SURPRISE BLOW)."

-- "THE FACT THAT IT WOULD TAKE A EUROMISSILE SEVERAL MINUTES TO REACH THE SOVIET BORDER EXCLUDES A POSSIBILITY TO AVERT A CONFLICT - IF IT IS LAUNCHED - BY ANY NONMILITARY METHOD."

-- "DUE TO THE INFINITESIMAL TIME LEFT FOR WARNING, THE ONLY POSSIBILITY LEFT IS A NUCLEAR RETALIATORY STRIKE OF RETRIBUTION. THERE IS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE."

-- "MISSILES SHALL HIT, APART FROM U.S. LAUNCHING PADS, THE HEADQUARTERS, COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS, AND ARSENALS, MANY OF WHICH AS IS KNOWN ARE LOCATED IN THICKLY POPULATED AREAS OF WESTERN EUROPE."

-- "U.S. EUROMISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS MAY BE LAUNCHED AS A RESULT OF HUMAN BLUNDER OR TECHNICAL FAILURE."

COMMENT
BT

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NLRR 748-23-21-3-1

BY 6473 NARA DATE 11/1/05

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AL SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14371

3. (C) FOR SEVERAL MONTHS THE SOVIETS HAVE PERCEPTIBLY HEIGHTENED THE INTIMIDATION ELEMENT IN THEIR INF PROPAGANDA (REFS B, C). THE NOVOSTI STATEMENT -- WHILE NOT SO AUTHORITATIVE AS, FOR EXAMPLE, A PRAVDA STATEMENT -- IS THE SHARPEST ILLUSTRATION YET OF THIS TREND. THIS STATEMENT IS ALSO THE MOST DIRECT, PUBLIC ASSERTION TO DATE THAT THE USSR WOULD EMPLOY A LAUNCH-ON-TACTICAL-WARNING (LOTW) RESPONSE AGAINST TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE IF U.S. INF WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE USSR (REF D). THIRD, EVEN THOUGH IT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AS TARGETS, THE NOVOSTI STATEMENT IS AN UNUSUALLY EXPLICIT THREAT TO RESPOND WITH A "STRIKE OF RETRIBUTION," THAT IS, A PUNISHING STRIKE LACKING SPECIFIC MILITARY OR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

4. (C) THE INCREASED SCARE ELEMENT IN INF PROPAGANDA MAY REFLECT SOVIET FRUSTRATION THAT: 1) NATO EUROPEAN BACKING FOR THE ZERO OPTION REMAINS FIRM, DESPITE

SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO EXPOSE IT AS REQUIRING UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT BY THE USSR, AND 2) THE CONTINUED MOMENTUM OF THE INF MODERNIZATION TRACK, DESPITE EUROPEAN PUBLIC PRESSURES AGAINST IT. IN RECENT MONTHS THESE SOVIET FRUSTRATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE GROWN ALSO FOR TWO OTHER REASONS: THE OUTWARD APPEARANCE OF SOVIET CHEATING ON THE SS-20 MORATORIUM, AND GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES IN THE FRG AND THE NETHERLANDS.

5. (C) INF SCARE PROPAGANDA, AND ESPECIALLY THE NEW NOVOSTI STATEMENT, APPEARS DESIGNED TO PERSUADE EUROPEANS THAT:

-- THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. INF IN EUROPE COUPLED WITH NATO'S REFUSAL TO RENOUNCE NUCLEAR FIRST USE IS ESPECIALLY DESTABILIZING.

-- THE USSR REJECTS NUCLEAR FIRST USE, BUT THE SPEED OF THE PERSHING II, THE STEALTH OF GLCMs, AND THE HIGH ACCURACY OF BOTH SYSTEMS, TAKEN TOGETHER, LEAVE THE USSR NO CHOICE BUT TO LAUNCH-ON-WARNING.

-- THE EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. INF IN WAR WOULD ASSURE THE DESTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THEREFORE, AMOUNTS TO A STRATEGY OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION IF NATO ESCALATES TO EMPLOYMENT OF INF.

-- THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL U.S. EMPLOYMENT IS HIGH.

6. (C) BY INCREASING THE SCARE ELEMENT IN INF PROPAGANDA THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING RISKS. THE TACTIC MAY BACKFIRE. NEVERTHELESS, AS DECEMBER 1983 APPROACHES THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO SEEK TO HEIGHTEN EUROPEAN FEARS, BY THREATENING, FOR EXAMPLE, LOTW, COUNTER-

DEPLOYMENTS TO U.S. INF, HARM TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND WITHDRAWAL FROM INF NEGOTIATIONS IF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE.

(C) TO FRUSTRATE THIS SOVIET TACTIC, THE ALLIANCE CAN SEEK TO REASSURE PUBLICS BY PUTTING THREATS IN BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 14371

THE PROPER CONTEXTS. WE CAN POINT OUT THAT LOTW THREATS REPRESENT NOTHING NEW: THE USSR HAS MADE THESE THREATS BEFORE, AND SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE REMAIN DESIGNED AROUND A POWERFUL PREEMPTIVE CAPABILITY. SECOND, SOVIET THREATS OF COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT AND HARM TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS IF U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS GO FORWARD ARE BEST DETERRED, THE ALLIANCE CAN ARGUE, BY THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THUS, THE USSR MUST BE BROUGHT TO REALIZE THAT A SOLUTION TO ITS PERCEIVED SECURITY PROBLEMS CAN BE FOUND ONLY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THIRD, THE ALLIANCE CAN EXPOSE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET DECLARED POLICIES (E.G., OF WHAT VALUE IS THE NO-FIRST-USE PLEDGE IF THE USSR RESPONDS BY RELYING ON A LOTW DOCTRINE?). (REF E) PREPARING PUBLICS IN ADVANCE FOR PROPAGANDA SHOCK TACTICS WHICH THE USSR MIGHT USE IN THE YEAR AHEAD WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO REASSURE PUBLICS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET TACTICS ONCE THEY EMERGE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council 448
The White House

Package # 8274

82 DEC 2 P 1: 56

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John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	1	my	A
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
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171078 MEMO

1 12/1/1982 B1

C. LORD, S. KRAEMER ET AL. TO R. MCFARLANE
RE SOVIET DISINFORMATION

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO MCFARLANE FROM LORD
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DDO DATE 01 DEC 82
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KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
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SUBJECT: SOVIET DISINFORMATION RE LAUNCH ON WARNING

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MEMORANDUM

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December 6, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Andropov Statements

WPC HAS SEEN

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NLRR 78-23-25-4

BY CCJ NARA DATE 12/7/05

FBIS has analyzed a number of Andropov statements made over a number of years. They point up several basic points which recur through his public utterances:

-- Need for a strong Soviet defense capability, but signalling that military strength alone will not maintain peace. He has warned that a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences.

-- While optimistic over the long-range prospects for detente, he blames Washington for the deterioration of East-West relations since the late 1970's. His remarks have been distinguished by a sensitivity to the diversity of opinion among Western leaders.

-- He has consistently maintained Moscow has a duty to assist "national liberation" struggles in the Third World. Detente does not restrain either side from supporting conflicts in Third World conflicts. He defends the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

-- He is outspoken in his statements about external and internal threats to the Soviet system. He has stressed the need for internal vigilance against Western-inspired subversion and discounts the validity of Helsinki CSCE accords in terms of actions against Soviet dissidents.

WR Comment. Andropov is for "detente" in classical Moscow terms. Short of nuclear war, East and West are engaged in an all points ideological-political conflict. He will practice strict internal discipline, engage in foreign subversion--particularly in the LDCs--and will seek to split the Western Allies. In this regard, he will undoubtedly judge the INF-TNF deployment question and the Allied issue of "nuclear freeze" as prime opportunities to advance his strategic objectives.

Attachment

Tab I FBIS Special Memorandum 82-10027 dated 16 November 1982

cc: Dr. Pipes
D. Boverie
N. Bailey

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16 November 1982
FB 82-10027

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E.O. 12812, Sect. 3.3(c)
BY NARA CPB DATE 12/7/15

Special Memorandum

Andropov on Major International Issues:
The Public Record



Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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Special Memorandum

Andropov on Major International Issues:
The Public Record



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F O R E W O R D

Yuriy Andropov has made relatively few public statements during the 25 years he has served in the central leadership in Moscow. For the most part, his remarks have reflected prevailing leadership positions on major issues. Between his promotion to the CPSU Secretariat at the May 1982 Central Committee plenum and his elevation to General Secretary on 12 November, he met with several foreign delegations but did not speak on policy issues. His last major address was in connection with the Lenin Day ceremonies last April.

This report, which draws on FBIS files dating back to Andropov's first tour of service in the Secretariat in the 1960's, highlights some of his significant public remarks on selected foreign policy issues.

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ANDROPOV ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES:

THE PUBLIC RECORD

DETENTE, ARMS CONTROL, AND MILITARY POWER

Andropov has emphasized the need for a strong Soviet defense capability, but he has also said that military strength alone will not maintain peace. He has warned that a nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences and has spoken out in favor of the reduction of international tensions, East-West detente, and arms control.

15 November 1982: Eulogy of Brezhnev (TASS, 15 Nov)

In the complicated international situation when the forces of imperialism are trying to push the peoples onto the road of hostility and military confrontation, the party and state will firmly uphold the vital interests of our homeland and maintain great vigilance and readiness to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt at aggression. They will redouble their efforts in the struggle for the security of the peoples and strengthen cooperation with all the peace forces of the world. We are always ready for honest, equal, and mutually beneficial cooperation with any state that is willing to cooperate.

12 November 1982: Central Committee plenum speech (PRAVDA, 13 Nov)

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev will live forever in the memory of thankful mankind as a consistent, ardent, and tireless fighter for peace and the security of the peoples and for removing the threat of world nuclear war looming over mankind.

We know well that one cannot obtain peace from the imperialists by begging for it [chto mir u imperialistov ne vyprosish]. It can be defended only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces. As the leader of the party and state and chairman of the Defense Council, Leonid Ilich constantly paid attention to ensuring that the country's defense capability meets present-day requirements.

22 April 1982: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

All of our post-October experience shows that one cannot obtain peace from the imperialists by begging for it--we remember Lenin's behest, that the revolution must be able to defend itself. Following this

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behest, our party and the Soviet people have created the glorious armed forces and the invincible defense might of our country.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has never taken as its premise that firm peace can be ensured only by military strength and a policy founded on it. Such a policy would lead not to peace, but to an arms race, to confrontation, and, in the final analysis, to war. It is for this reason that our party and the Soviet state stand up so purposefully for the principles of peaceful coexistence and so steadfastly follow the course of peace and international cooperation.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Under the prevailing conditions, we are obliged to pay paramount attention to consolidating the might and defense capability of the Soviet state. As long as the forces prepared to jeopardize the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and our allies are actively operating, firm and reliable defense is vitally necessary. . . . At the same time, our party proceeds from the premise that peace and international security cannot be strengthened through military rivalry.

The arms race undermines trust among states, poisons the international atmosphere and increases the likelihood that crisis situations will develop into military conflicts. It is for precisely this reason that our party and state attach paramount significance to the limitation and then to the reduction of armaments, to the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts, to the consolidation of the relaxation of international tension, and to the development of mutually advantageous international cooperation. We are firmly convinced that there is no sensible alternative to this policy.

22 April 1976: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

The question of the basis on which relations between the socialist and capitalist world should be built has not lost its meaning and gravity--for it is a question of war and peace. . . . This remains the chief question of contemporary times . . . , due to the emergence of weapons of enormous destructive force that make the consequences of war truly catastrophic. This creates practical preconditions, on the one hand, and the inevitable necessity, on the other, to reduce and eventually eliminate altogether the

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16 NOVEMBER 1982

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danger of a new world war and, if I may say so, to expand the limits of peaceful coexistence. The goal that the party now sets for itself is not to gain a peaceful respite but to establish a just and durable peace on earth. . . . In the nuclear era there is no sane alternative to peaceful coexistence.

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PROSPECTS FOR EAST-WEST DETENTE

Like other Soviet leaders, Andropov has blamed Washington for the deterioration of East-West relations since the late 1970's while professing optimism about the long-range prospects for detente. His remarks have been distinguished by a sensitivity to the diversity of opinion among Western leaders. He has cited the contribution of "realistic" elements to the establishment of detente and warned of persistent efforts by "hawks" to complicate East-West relations.

22 April 1982: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

Our people are convinced that a new world war can be averted. . . . The party of the communists has always proceeded from the fact that the road to stable peace is a difficult and thorny one. We must not expect easy victories, and every step is taken with great effort. And it is precisely because we know all this that our heads have never been turned by success and we have never been idle when we come up against difficulties.

Leonid Ilich Brezhnev has likened the present international situation to a fork in the road, thereby emphasizing the great responsibility of the choice now facing mankind. It can either take a long step along the road leading away from war toward peace or it can move along the road toward a continued arms race and confrontation.

We made our choice a long time ago. For us this is a question of the vital interests of the people and the country, a question of principle. It would appear that not only we but also the major countries of the capitalist world, including the United States, made this choice too. They took this fork as early as the beginning of the 1970's, guiding themselves by the experiences of the preceding decades, experiences that clearly showed that there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence, that the cold war and the arms race have no prospects, and that a hot war would bring victory to no one.

However, certain governments as well as individuals are inclined, as is apparent, to forget the experiences and lessons of history. It would seem that this is now happening to the Washington administration, which is trying to steer the entire development of international relations onto a dangerous path. Of course, the United States will not be successful in this. But we must not ignore the fact that such policies on the whole worsen the situation and increase the danger of war.

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11 February 1980: Election speech in Gorkiy (PRAVDA, 12 Feb)

We frequently hear voices in the West speaking of the "crisis" and virtually the "collapse" of the relaxation of international tension. People ask how the world situation will further develop and whether the positive elements achieved in the 1970's in relations between states with different social systems will be discarded and lost to mankind. It must be said frankly that anxiety about the future and the destiny of detente and peace has real foundations. The reason for the complication of the international situation is well known: it is Washington's irresponsible and dangerous policy. To all appearances it is the most reactionary forces, aligned with the military-industrial complex, that are now setting the tone--the forces that would like to bring back the old times when the imperialist powers imposed systems upon other countries and peoples to suit themselves. The sources of this "political nostalgia" lie in the fact that certain circles in the United States have been unable to interpret sensibly the social and political changes taking place in the world and have been unable to understand their objective essence. . . .

Events in Afghanistan . . . are made out to be the basic reason for the deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations and of the entire international situation. There is nothing more absurd than such assertions. It is not in the events in Afghanistan or in the Soviet Union's actions that the true reasons for the present turn in Washington's course should be sought. They lie in the U.S. ruling circles' fear in the face of the wave of social changes and in their desire to return the world by force to the "blessed times" of imperialist domination. . . .

We will not yield to provocations from across the ocean. As before, we advocate detente. For us detente means above all overcoming the mistrust and hostility of the cold war period and resolving differences and disputes, not by force or by the threat of weapons, but by peaceful means around the negotiating table. Detente, which reflects the objective, underlying changes in the world arena, is too deeply rooted, it means too much for the destiny of mankind to allow any forces to toy with it.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Detente has many opponents who have been noticeably active recently. It is they who are inciting the arms race, intimidating people with the alleged "Soviet threat." It is they who, interfering in the internal

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affairs of other states, are worsening the general international climate. It is they who are trying to depict detente as some sort of agreement to freeze and preserve obsolete social relations and reactionary political regimes. And if the peoples break these relations and overthrow these regimes, heartrending cries are heard about the notorious "hand of Moscow," and there is a ballyhoo about KGB agents allegedly organizing social upheavals throughout the world. . . .

The complex and sometimes contradictory nature of events in the world do not change our approach to foreign policy. On the contrary, with every passing year the Soviet people are increasingly convinced of the correctness of the course chosen by our party and of the importance of continuing to wage a consistent and resolute struggle for the relaxation of international tension, for arms limitation and disarmament, and for the development of international cooperation.

5 August 1978: Speech in Petrozavodsk (PRAVDA, 6 Aug)

The fact is, comrades, that U.S. imperialism; by all appearances, is having difficulty restructuring its policy in relation to the new realities of international life. . . .

Of course, different strata and different groups of the bourgeoisie react in different ways to these objective demands of the time. Some, occupying realistic positions, proceed from the premise that with the present correlation of forces in the world arena, there is no acceptable alternative to detente and that therefore capitalism must adapt to the new situation. They recognize the need for peaceful coexistence with socialist countries and even for cooperation with them, revise the nature of relations with developing countries, and show greater flexibility on the fronts of the social struggle. Others--the so-called hawks, who represent the interests of the military-industrial complex--oppose this with all their might. They propose gripping the cudgel a little more firmly and brandishing it until the world finds itself in the grip of a dangerous East-West confrontation and returns to the trenches of the "cold war."

Finally, there is a third type. They are aware in general of the catastrophic consequences of a global thermonuclear conflict. They are even ready to achieve limited agreements reducing the level of international tension. But they are afraid of the changes that detente brings in international and domestic affairs. Hence the instability and hesitation in policy, the increasing gulf between

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words and deeds, the desire to appease the right flank and to make concessions to overtly militarist, highly reactionary forces. . . .

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government are following the development of the situation and the maneuvers of the opponents of detente attentively. We take into account the hesitations in Washington's policy. At the same time, our strategic line remains unchanged. Our country, the Soviet Union, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev has said, sees its most important goal in international affairs as "preventing mankind from sliding toward war and defending and consolidating peace--a universal, just, long-lasting peace.

5 June 1974: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 6 Jun)

In working out the peace program, our party is guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching. It clearly realized that the fierce counter-action of forces interested in preserving a cold war atmosphere has to be overcome on the path toward accomplishing this program. The process of relaxation is going in an indirect manner. Various turns and zigzags are encountered along the way. The champions of militarism and adherents of ideological subversion against socialism raise their heads first here, then there.

In our time it is not as simple in the west to act openly against a policy of peace. Public opinion forces the ruling circles to heed the desire to eliminate the threat of war and to adjust to normal relations among states. Everyone who wants to engage in politics in our time has to deal with these sentiments. It must also be said that many political figures of capitalism display a certain realism in their approach to foreign policy problems. Those among them who think most soberly realize that peaceful coexistence is the only possible and necessary basis for relations among states of opposite systems. . . .

It stands to reason that there are also many in our enemies' camp who, in spite of common sense, do not wish to view the world realistically. Using various pretexts, they attempt to disrupt the process of relaxation, in particular the improvement in Soviet-American relations. Some seemingly do not oppose a relaxation; they suggest "going slowly." Others simply are driven into a rage just at the thought of relaxation. There are also those in the capitalist world who attempt to depict matters in such a way that only the Soviet Union and the socialist countries stand to win from relaxation and cooperation, whereas the West will just bear losses. The reactionary, aggressive circles of imperialism even

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attempt in places to take the counteroffensive to undermine the basis of relaxation. But the future is not for those who attempt to draw the world again into a dangerous confrontation. It is not they who now determine the main line of world development.

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POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Andropov has consistently maintained that Moscow has a duty to assist "national liberation" struggles in the Third World, particularly when they are opposed by Western nations. He argued in the 1970's that East-West detente did not restrain either side from supporting clients in the Third World conflicts. He has defended the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as fraternal assistance to the Afghan revolution and as a legitimate measure to protect the USSR's southern borders.

11 February 1980: Election speech in Gorkiy (PRAVDA, 12 Feb)

As for the events in Afghanistan, it is not hard for any unbiased person to understand them. Under conditions in which the Afghan Revolution has encountered flagrant outside interference, which one can only call intervention, when a dangerous hotbed of tension has been created on the USSR's southern borders to which long arms were extended from across the Atlantic, our country responded to the Afghan Government's repeated requests and introduced a limited contingent of troops into Afghanistan to help the people's power to suppress the aggression. This step--not a simple one for us--was taken in full accord with the Soviet-Afghan treaty and with the spirit and letter of the UN Charter. It was a lofty act of loyalty to the principle of proletarian internationalism, essential to the defense of our motherland's interests.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

It is not the "hand of Moscow" but the bony hand of hunger, not the "intrigues of communists" but deprivation, oppression, and suffering that force people to take up arms and take them to the streets, that make radical changes inevitable. This is how it was in Vietnam and Angola. This is how it was in Afghanistan and Cambodia. And that is what is now taking place in Iran. And nothing, I repeat, nothing can stop the invincible forces of history that in the final analysis pave the way for themselves in spite of the Pinochets, Pol Pots, Smiths, and the like, despite the attempts of reactionary forces to stifle social progress.

It would be extremely unwise and dangerous for disagreeable Western politicians and ideologists to endanger detente or the strengthening of peace each time this or that internal political change occurs in some country.

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22 April 1976: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

In conditions of relaxation of tension, we do not expect the monopoly bourgeoisie and the governments carrying out its will to side with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat or the national-liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples. The Soviet Union does not present such demands to the West. But then, let them not present demands to the Soviet Union to renounce solidarity with those fighting against exploitation and colonial oppression. The Soviet Union is not going to interfere in the affairs of other countries, is not going to "export" revolution. Revolution is a result of internal development of society, Lenin says. It "cannot be made to order or by agreement." Each people determines its own destiny, but if it chooses a road of struggle, if it is forced to fight the colonialists, repel attacks from foreign invaders and hired killers, our sympathies have been and will be with it.

4 March 1967: Election speech in Novomoskovsk (Moscow domestic radio, 4 Mar)

Any people who rise up to fight for their national liberation are confronted with direct or indirect aggression by U.S. imperialism. That is what happened in Korea, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic, and finally, as everyone knows, that is what is happening in Vietnam. The party Central Committee, the Soviet Government, and all Soviet people see their international duty in rendering aid and support to the Vietnamese people in their liberation struggle.

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CHINA

Andropov's comments on China over the years have followed the dominant leadership line. His most extensive statements came in the 1960's while he was serving as CPSU secretary with responsibility for party relations with other communist countries. Then, as during his more recent tenure as KGB chairman, he criticized Beijing's policies but expressed Moscow's interest in normalizing relations. He has not spoken on China since returning to the Secretariat--a period that has coincided with conciliatory Soviet gestures toward Beijing.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

Speaking of factors deteriorating the international situation, it is impossible not to mention Beijing's foreign policy. Today there is no other large state in the world that has so demonstratively sabotaged all efforts on limiting the arms race, put forth such extensive territorial pretensions toward neighboring countries, and attempted to undermine relaxation of international tension. The manifestation of the great-power, hegemonic nature of the foreign policy course of Beijing's present leaders is betting on a "policy of force," on the threat of force in relations to its neighbors.

Recently, the world witnessed the treacherous armed attack on Vietnam, organized by the Beijing leaders. The invasion of Chinese troops is real evidence of Beijing's hegemonic aspirations, evidence of how false and hypocritical are the discussions of the Chinese leaders on the struggle against some kind of mythical "hegemonism" concerning which they have talked so much recently. The aggression against Vietnam is the logical extension of the entire foreign policy of Beijing's leaders, who against the interests of their people are most candidly placing reliance on war.

5 August 1978: Speech in Petrozavodsk (PRAVDA, 6 Aug)

Peking is now shouting for NATO to be strengthened, trying to push Japan into anti-Soviet positions, and encouraging the Washington "hawks." The treacherous stab in the back against socialist Vietnam is a shameful but completely logical manifestation of the utterly cynical hegemonist policy of the Chinese leaders, who are not averse to supporting the most reactionary forces, such as the Pinochet regime.

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5 June 1974: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 6 Jun)

With regard to our position on China, it is clear and consistent. While resolutely defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the interests of our socialist motherland and rebuffing the hostile intrigues of the Maoist leadership, the CPSU and the Soviet state at the same time are for a normalization of relations between the USSR and China and for a restoration of friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. Here we invariably follow the line of the 24th congress.

4 March 1967: Election speech in Novomoskovsk (Moscow domestic radio, 4 Mar)

Rebuffing the anti-Soviet policy of the present Chinese leadership, our party has fully taken into consideration that it is not struggling against the communists of China. It is struggling for the Chinese communists, for the CPC, for the return of the CPC to correct Marxist-Leninist positions. The Soviet people have always regarded the Chinese working people as their friends and allies in the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of society.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVIET DISSIDENTS

As KGB chairman, Andropov spoke at greater length than most leaders about external and internal threats to the Soviet system. He maintained that human rights pledges signed by Moscow in the 1975 Helsinki CSCE accords did not restrict Soviet actions against dissidents. He has stressed the need for constant vigilance against the threat of Western-inspired subversion.

22 February 1979: Election speech in Stupino (LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, 23 Feb)

The agents of Western intelligence services and the emissaries of foreign anti-Soviet organizations try to penetrate our secrets, take part in organizing acts of ideological subversion, and condition and corrupt certain unstable, weak-willed people. Therefore, as the party Central Committee points out, constant vigilance on the part of all Soviet people remains an important and topical requirement of the day. Within the country we have no social basis for anti-Soviet activity. At the same time, it would be wrong to close our eyes to the fact that cases do occur of antistate crimes, anti-Soviet actions and deeds committed under hostile influence from abroad. There are still various renegades who embark on the path of malicious slander of Soviet reality and sometimes in direct complicity with imperialist special services. Some people in the West call this "activity" the "defense of human rights."

But Soviet people have never given and never will give anyone the "right" to harm socialism, for the triumph of which they have given so many lives and contributed so much labor. To protect society against such criminal actions is just and democratic. This fully accords with Soviet citizens' rights and freedoms and with the interests of society and the state. Of course, this does not accord with the interests of socialism's enemies. In the West we sometimes hear hypocritical lamentations about alleged infringements of democracy in our country, and allegations are heard that the KGB makes life impossible for certain "champions of rights." In fact, they are worried not only and not so much by the fact that the Soviet state security organs, acting in strict accordance with our laws, intercept the criminal activity of renegades. They are worried by the fact that these renegades met with resolute condemnation from the entire Soviet people.

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9 September 1977: Dzerzhinskiy birth centenary speech in Moscow
(PRAVDA, 10 Sep)

The enemies of socialism are unwilling to give up attempts to undermine the new system, or at least to make its development more difficult. While it has become impossible for them to liquidate it by military force, they are still waging a struggle against socialism in the sphere of politics and economics and in the specific sphere where intelligence services are active and where espionage and subversion, including ideological subversion, are employed. The special services of imperialism are shamelessly attempting to distort the aims and the very essence of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state in an attempt to denigrate Soviet reality and carry out in the field of ideology other essentially subversive actions that have properly been called ideological subversion. They are striving to erode and impair the communist conviction of the Soviet people and foist upon us customs and views that are alien to socialism, and, in the final analysis, attempting to bring about political and social changes in Soviet society that would be of benefit to imperialism. All this, unfortunately, is an inseparable part of the reality of the stern world in which we live. For this reason, at the present time also we must show high vigilance and take the necessary measures to render harmless the subversive intrigues of socialism's enemies. The party sees this as the duty not only of the state security organs but also of state and public organizations, of all communists, and of all citizens of our country.

22 April 1976: Lenin Day speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr)

It goes without saying that relaxation of tension presupposes extension of cultural relations, expansion of contacts between individuals, and exchange of information. On these issues, our country signed many agreements and is going to carry them out scrupulously. But the content and the purpose of these agreements must be borne in mind. It was a matter of steps designed to strengthen mutual confidence and mutual understanding, to serve the cause of consolidation of peace and development of mutually advantageous cooperation. We did not agree, however, to facilitate actions designed to harm socialism. Plans of reactionary quarters, connected with this, have no bearing on the relevant sections of the document signed in Helsinki.

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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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COMMENTS

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BY [CDD] NARA DATE 12/7/15

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INTELLIGENCE

ANDROPOV, YURIY

SUBJECT: ANALYZING VARIOUS ANDROPOV STATEMENTS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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BY 6025 NARA DATE 2/7/15

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: George Shultz's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
on December 6

On December 6, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on George Shultz to present a Soviet demarche on the means of "improving" U.S.-Soviet relations (Tab A). The demarche contained six points which can be conveniently summarized under two headings:

1. The Soviet Union would like to broaden the range of political relations between our countries by greatly expanding diplomatic contacts and maintaining continuous communications between Shultz and Gromyko either directly or through the respective embassies; however, they are in no hurry to arrange a summit.

2. In order for such a broadening of relations to occur the United States must take several concrete steps:

- eliminate polemical attacks on the Soviet Union such as charging it with the use of chemical weapons;
- stop meddling in internal Soviet affairs; and
- adopt a different position on arms negotiations.

What does this add up to? Moscow is willing to talk to us on a whole range of topics provided we stop accusing it of violating international agreements and criticizing its internal policies. We must also modify our negotiating positions in Geneva to show that we really have a "desire to reach an understanding". With this demarche they are attempting to put us in a position of supplicant who must pay for the right to negotiate. The question is: What are they willing to pay for our consent?

Attachment:

Tab A USDel Secretary Aircraft, December 7, Msg. No. 0002

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

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SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE
I MET BRIEFLY WITH SOVIET AMB DOBRYNIN THIS MORNING
AT HIS REQUEST TO HEAR A DEMARCHE ON THE STATE OF OUR
"DIALOGUE" AND HOW IT MIGHT BE IMPROVED. READING FROM A
PAPER, DOBRYNIN MADE SIX POINTS:
FIRST, HE SAID THAT AS ANDROPOV HAD TOLD THE VICE
PRESIDENT IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS WANT TO "RECTIFY" THE
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP THROUGH TALKS ON
CONCRETE TOPICS AND ARE READY TO PROCEED IF YOU ARE.
BUT TO MOVE FORWARD DOBRYNIN SAID WE NEEDED TO "ELIMINATE
ARTIFICIAL IRRITANTS" LIKE OUR COMMENTS ON SOVIET CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE. THE SOVIETS, HE ADDED, DO NOT WANT POLEMICS
PER SE, BUT AS THE "PRAVDA" RESPONSE TO YOUR NOV 22

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0002 DTG: 070115Z DEC 82 PSN: 026177

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MESSAGE MADE CLEAR, THEY WILL NOT LET ATTACKS PASS WITHOUT ANSWER.

SECOND, HE SAID THE SOVIETS THINK IT IS UNPRODUCTIVE TO MEASURE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES ON THE U.S. - SOVIET AGENDA BY "SUBJECTIVE NOTIONS," ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY PERTAIN TO INTERNAL JURISDICTION. (DOBRYNIN LATER SPECIFIED TO ONE OF MY STAFF THAT THIS POINT "REALLY" REFERRED TO EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.)

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THIRD, THE SOVIETS FAVOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND THE SEARCH FOR CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, BUT HE SAID THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THE RESULTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY, ESPECIALLY IN ARMS CONTROL. DOBRYNIN SAID MOSCOW HOPED YOUR STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR BETTER RELATIONS WILL BE REFLECTED IN U.S. POSITIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT MOSCOW DID NOT SENSE A DESIRE TO REACH UNDERSTANDING IN THE UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD IN GENEVA AND ON THE EVE OF THE MADRID CSCE MEETING. HE ADDED THAT THE CURRENT RECESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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FOURTH, HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED FOR BROADER AND MORE ACTIVE CONTACTS THROUGH THE EMBASSIES AND BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS ALWAYS READY FOR DISCUSSION WITH ME, AND THERE WOULD BE "NO DIFFICULTIES" FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO SEE GROMYKO AND FIRST DEPUTY KORNIYENKO. HE ALSO PROPOSED MUTUAL VISITS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES AT OTHER LEVELS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF DEPARTMENT OR DESK.

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FIFTH, HE SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT WITH ME THROUGH THE AMBASSADORS IN THE TWO CAPITALS AND PERSONALLY, INCLUDING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH EXCHANGES HAVE PROVED "GOOD WAY TO GO" IN THE PAST, HE OBSERVED. DOBRYNIN ALSO SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS READY TO TAKE A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MEETING WITH ME BEFORE THE NEXT UNGA SESSION.

SIXTH, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT: DOBRYNIN SAID

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SOVIET VIEWS ARE KNOWN AND ARE SIMILAR TO OURS,
I.E., THAT ANY SUCH MEETING MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED.
I REPLIED THAT I REGARDED THE MESSAGE AS SIGNIFICANT;
THAT I WOULD BRING IT TO YOUR ATTENTION; AND THAT I WOULD
RESPOND IN DUE COURSE. THE NOTION OF ENRICHING OUR
DIALOGUE IS A GOOD ONE, I SAID, AND WITH RESPECT TO ARMS
CONTROL, I CONCURRED THAT THE RECESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS IS
PERHAPS A GOOD TIME TO EVALUATE WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHERE
WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE. I SAID I WAS ALSO GLAD TO HEAR
GROMYKO'S STATEMENT OF READINESS TO KEEP UP CONTACT WITH
ME EITHER THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS OR PERSONALLY, AND
I NOTED THAT OUR POSITIONS ON A SUMMIT APPEAR TO BE
SIMILAR.

END OF TEXT. SHULTZ

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
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12/7

National Security Council
The White House

Package # _____

EYES ONLY

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1		_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>PIPES</u>	2	_____	A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
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COMMENTS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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171082

PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0002 DTG: 070115Z DEC 82 PSN: 040264
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FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE
I MET BRIEFLY WITH SOVIET AMB DOBRYNIN THIS MORNING
AT HIS REQUEST TO HEAR A DEMARCHE ON THE STATE OF OUR
"DIALOGUE" AND HOW IT MIGHT BE IMPROVED. READING FROM A
PAPER, DOBRYNIN MADE SIX POINTS:
FIRST, HE SAID THAT AS ANDROPOV HAD TOLD THE VICE
PRESIDENT IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS WANT TO "RECTIFY" THE
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP THROUGH TALKS ON
CONCRETE TOPICS AND ARE READY TO PROCEED IF YOU ARE.
BUT TO MOVE FORWARD DOBRYNIN SAID WE NEEDED TO "ELIMINATE
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Back & Dick Pipes: 34
What is their position (USSR) on Summit?

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PER SE, BUT AS THE "PRAVDA" RESPONSE TO YOUR NOV 22 MESSAGE MADE CLEAR, THEY WILL NOT LET ATTACKS PASS WITHOUT ANSWER.

is it "similar"?

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SECOND, HE SAID THE SOVIETS THINK IT IS UNPRODUCTIVE TO MEASURE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES ON THE U.S. - SOVIET AGENDA BY "SUBJECTIVE NOTIONS," ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY PERTAIN TO INTERNAL JURISDICTION. (DOBRYNIN LATER SPECIFIED TO ONE OF MY STAFF THAT THIS POINT "REALLY" REFERRED TO EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.)

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FIFTH, HE SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT WITH ME THROUGH THE AMBASSADORS IN THE TWO CAPITALS AND PERSONALLY, INCLUDING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH EXCHANGES HAVE PROVED "GOOD WAY TO GO" IN THE PAST, HE OBSERVED. DOBRYNIN ALSO SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS READY TO TAKE A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MEETING WITH ME BEFORE THE NEXT UNGA SESSION.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0002 DTG: 070115Z DEC 82 PSN: 040264

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SIXTH, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT: DOBRYNIN SAID
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ME EITHER THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS OR PERSONALLY, AND
I NOTED THAT OUR POSITIONS ON A SUMMIT APPEAR TO BE
SIMILAR.
END OF TEXT. SHULTZ
BT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

454

Package # 8411

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
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SOVIET DEMARCHE

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171084 MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE SHULTZ'S DEC. 6 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	12/7/1982	B1

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FROM PIPES

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DOCDATE 07 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: SHULTZ 6 DEC MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN / DEMARCHE

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 10 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

CLARK

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SIT628 DATE 12/10/82 TOR: 341/1608Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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R 070642Z DEC 82

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9371

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9445

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PINT, UR, US

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH LENINGRAD PARTY

HEAD AND POLITBURO MEMBER, GRIGORIY VASIL'YEVICH
ROMANOV

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. IN AN HOUR AND 20 MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, ROMANOV SHOWED HIMSELF REASONABLY WELL-VERSED IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA. HE STUCK CLOSELY TO ANDROPOV'S PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, ENDORSING DETENTE BUT REJECTING PRECONDITIONS. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF THE MX DECISION, COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE MOSCOW TALKS BETWEEN ANDROPOV, THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND THE SECRETARY. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE CONTINUED SOVIET BUILD-UP AFTER SALT I. AFTER FURTHER EXCHANGES OVER START AND INF, ROMANOV SAID HE HOPED THE AMBASSADOR WOULD HAVE PRODUCTIVE TALKS IN HIS WORK IN MOSCOW SO THAT THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SUMMIT MEETING COULD BE WELL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PREPARED. ROMANOV AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION FOR MORE CONTACT AND DID NOT CONTEST THE HOPE THAT IT BE APPLIED IN PARTICULAR TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER OPENING PLEASANTRIES, ROMANOV BEGAN READING A PREPARED STATEMENT. HE NOTED THE "SACRED" SIGNIFICANCE OF SMOLNY AS LENIN'S HEADQUARTERS DURING THE REVOLUTION. HE CHARGED THAT A CRUSADE WAS BEING WAGED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD IN FACT BEEN DECLARED ANATHEMA. HE CLAIMED THAT SOME FOREIGN SPOKESMEN HAD PREDICTED A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEATH. ANDROPOV HAD MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STICK TO DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, AND WORK TO LESSEN THE THREAT OF WAR THROUGH MUTUAL COOPERATION WITH ALL WHO DESIRED

IT.

4. AS FOR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THEY WERE "COMPLEX". "WE MUST SEEK A WAY OUT" OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE, ROMANOV SAID. THE SOVIETS WANTED NORMAL, STABLE RELATIONS WITH U.S. AS ANDROPOV HAD SAID, THE EROSION IN OUR RELATIONS MUST BE STOPPED AND A PRODUCTIVE LAYER OF COOPERATION FOUND.

5. ROMANOV CHARGED THAT WE WERE USING THE START TALKS AND THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AS A SHIELD FOR DEPLOYING NEW WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON MX HAD STRENGTHENED THIS IMPRESSION. PROGRESS WOULD HINGE ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL SECURITY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE REALISTIC, HOWEVER, IN THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT "TRUST" ON BOTH SIDES TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS.

6. ANOTHER SORE POINT IN OUR RELATIONS WAS HUMAN RIGHTS WHERE WE WERE INTERFERING IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE U.S. OFTEN REFERRED TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT IT OMITTED MENTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHICH WAS ALSO IN THAT DOCUMENT. IN SHORT, WE MUST MOVE TOWARD EACH OTHER. THE SOVIETS WERE READY FOR HONEST MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION WITH ANY COUNTRY, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THE U.S.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. ROMANOV FELT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO GO INTO DETAIL ON THE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID WISH TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE AND WORKED TO OUR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS. THERE COULD BE ONLY ONE CONCLUSION, THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. THE RESULT OF THE TALKS IN GENEVA HAD BEEN "ZERO", JUST LIKE OUR "ZERO OPTION".

8. AT THIS POINT ROMANOV RUFFLED THROUGH THE THREE OR FOUR PAGES REMAINING IN HIS INITIAL STATEMENT AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO GO INTO THE MATTER FURTHER. HE FELT THE AMBASSADOR UNDOUBTEDLY KNEW THE ISSUES BETTER THAN HE DID ANYWAY. HE SEEMED READY TO START READING ONE OF THE OTHER TYPED STATEMENTS IN FRONT OF HIM, WHEN THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HOPED ROMANOV WOULD GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO REPLY.

9. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT NEXT YEAR WOULD MARK THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. DURING THIS PERIOD THERE HAD BEEN MANY

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9446

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EXDIS

UPS AND DOWNS. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT WE WERE RIVALS SINCE WE HAD DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, THE MAIN DIFFICULTY WAS HOW TO AVOID ALLOWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR SYSTEMS TO SPILL OVER INTO MILITARY CONFRONTATION. BOTH SIDES SEEMED TO DESIRE A MEASURE OF CONTROL IN THE MOST IMPORTANT AREA OF NUCLEAR ARMS. THERE HAD BEEN SOME SUCCESS IN OUR TALKS, BUT AFTER SALT I, WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT, EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS A CEILING IN CERTAIN AREAS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED THEIR OVERALL BUILD-UP OF FORCES. IN GENEVA WE WERE TRYING TO STOP THE TREND OF ACTION AND REACTION. BOTH SIDES WERE STILL OBSERVING SALT II EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED. IT GAVE US A FRAMEWORK FOR REDUCTIONS. IN OUR VIEW THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD ADVANCED OVER THE LAST YEAR.

10. WHEN ROMANOV DISPUTED THIS LAST POINT, THE AMBASSADOR DEFENDED IT BY POINTING TO THE AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS. AT LEAST WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME THINGS IN GENEVA AS OPPOSED TO VIENNA WHERE, IN MBFR, WE HAD NEGOTIATED FOR EIGHT YEARS WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NO AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS. HE FELT THERE WERE GOOD PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN GENEVA.

11. ROMANOV COMPLAINED THAT AFTER THE TALKS WITH ANDROPOV IN MOSCOW, WHERE BOTH SIDES HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO SEEK A SOLUTION IN GENEVA, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD PUSHED AHEAD ON MX AND THEREBY THREATENED A NEW ARMS SPIRAL.

12. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT SALT II PERMITTED ONE NEW SYSTEM. ROMANOV COMPLAINED THAT WE WANTED TO BAN ICBM'S WHICH WERE THE MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE SOVIETS' NUCLEAR FORCES. IN THE INF TALKS WE HAD LEFT OUT BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. THERE HAD BEEN A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF SALT II BUT IT HAD BEEN PUT ASIDE. ROMANOV SAID

HE HOPED THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN MOSCOW WOULD PAVE THE WAY TO A POSSIBLE SUMMIT MEETING BY MAKING CAREFUL PREPARATIONS FOR IT.

13. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ROMANOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF OUR RELATIONS AS "COMPLEX" WAS ONLY A POLITE WAY OF SAYING THEY WERE "STRAINED". WE WOULD BENEFIT BY MORE COMMUNICATION. ROMANOV RECALLED THAT 50 YEARS AGO OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMS WERE ALSO DIFFERENT, BUT WE ACHIEVED MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND FOUGHT TOGETHER IN WORLD WAR II. HE HOPED WE WOULD MARK THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH GOOD DEEDS (POSITIVE ACTIONS). HE RECALLED BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE U.S., THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT, AND THE SIGNING OF SALT II IN VIENNA. BUT, HE SAID, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE RECENT SHARP EXCHANGES. EVEN OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WERE WORSE. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN LENINGRAD FELT IT. THEY HAD NOT PLANNED TO MAKE THE TURBINE COMPRESSORS FOR THE GAS PIPELINE AS SOON AS HAD BEEN NECESSARY BECAUSE OF OUR SANCTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STRONG, HOWEVER, THEIR RESOURCES HAD BEEN MOBILIZED AND THE TURBINES WOULD BE MADE THIS YEAR.

14. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS, ASIDE FROM STRATEGIC ARMS, WERE IMPORTANT

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT IF THE STRATEGIC PART WAS NOT WELL HANDLED, OR IF THINGS WERE NOT GOING WELL IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD, THE ECONOMIC PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WOULD SUFFER. WE COULD NOT ISOLATE IT. WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, POLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SOVIET BORDER.

15. ROMANOV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREEMENTS WITH ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INCLUDING POLAND. THEY HAD A TREATY WITH AFGHANISTAN INTO WHICH PAKISTAN, WITH U.S. HELP, WAS SMUGGLING U.S. ARMS. THE AMBASSADOR ANSWERED THAT MANY PEOPLE HAD LEFT AFGHANISTAN AND WERE LIVING IN PAKISTAN BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT IMPOSED BY SOVIET FORCES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD TALKED ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AT LENGTH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. OUR PROBLEM WAS REGULATING COMPETITION. IF THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS CONTINUED SUPPORT OF WORLD REVOLUTION, THEN WE ARE GOING TO BE IN FOR A CONFRONTATIONAL AND DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIP.

16. ROMANOV POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT GIVEN ANY ULTIMATUM WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD GONE TO LATIN AMERICA AND MADE "PROVOCATIVE" STATEMENTS AT THE BORDER OF NICARAGUA. THE SOVIETS

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OF OUR CONSULATE IN LENINGRAD. HE REALIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CERTAIN IMPROVEMENT IN THIS SITUATION, BUT HE HOPED THAT MORE ACCESS COULD BE GRANTED TO SOVIETS. ROMANOV INDICATED HIS GENERAL AGREEMENT AND ON THIS NOTE THE MEETING ENDED. SHINN

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R 070842Z DEC 82
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9373

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EXDIS

ALSO COULD COMPLAIN ABOUT VIET NAM, LAOS, AND KAMPUCHEA. HE REPEATED HIS STATEMENT ABOUT FINDING MUTUAL POINTS OF CONTACT STEP-BY-STEP. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. IN FACT, THE NEXT DAY HE AND A DEPARTMENT COLLEAGUE WOULD HAVE TALKS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT AFRICA.

17. ROMANOV SAID THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S INSCRIPTION IN THE BOOK AT THE PISKAREV CEMETERY HAD BEEN A GOOD ONE, BUT WE SHOULD PUT THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH WOULD HELP AVOID NUCLEAR WAR INTO EFFECT. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS FAIR AND STABLE. ANDROPOV SAID, "WE ARE FOR DETENTE."

18. TURNING TO ROMANOV'S SPEECH ON DECEMBER 3, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS INTERESTED IN HOW VARIOUS REGIONS SOLVED THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. ROMANOV OBSERVED THAT HIS SPEECH HAD BEEN PATTERNED AFTER ANDROPOV'S CALL FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND AN IMPROVED STANDARD OF LIVING. THIS WAS THE OFFICIAL LINE. ALL SOVIETS WERE IN AGREEMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH IT. REITERATING THE MAIN POINTS HE HAD MADE, ROMANOV STRESSED THE EFFICIENCY OF PRODUCTION, THE NEED FOR MORE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND ITS INTEGRATION INTO THE PRODUCTION PROCESS, BETTER ADMINISTRATION, MORE AUTOMATION, AND, IN SHORT, GREATER PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR. ON THE AGRICULTURAL FRONT, THE STRESS WAS ON "LARGE COMPLEXES", IMPROVED IRRIGATION, AND FERTILIZATION. HOUSING WAS BEING BUILT AT A HIGH RATE. THREE NEW METRO STATIONS HAD JUST OPENED. ANDROPOV PERSONALLY HAD SUPPORTED ROMANOV'S PROPOSAL FOR FLOOD CONTROL PROJECTS IN THE Leningrad AREA.

19. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD ONE LAST REQUEST. AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED, THERE WAS NEED FOR MORE CONTACT. HE HOPED THIS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE WORK

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E. O. 12065: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: U. S. - SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: U. S. - SOVIET DIALOGUE: DEC 6 DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE
I MET BRIEFLY WITH SOVIET AMB DOBRYNIN THIS MORNING
AT HIS REQUEST TO HEAR A DEMARCHE ON THE STATE OF OUR
"DIALOGUE" AND HOW IT MIGHT BE IMPROVED. READING FROM A
PAPER, DOBRYNIN MADE SIX POINTS:

FIRST, HE SAID THAT AS ANDROPOV HAD TOLD THE VICE
PRESIDENT IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS WANT TO "RECTIFY" THE
U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP THROUGH TALKS ON
CONCRETE TOPICS AND ARE READY TO PROCEED IF YOU ARE.
BUT TO MOVE FORWARD DOBRYNIN SAID WE NEEDED TO "ELIMINATE
ARTIFICIAL IRRITANTS" LIKE OUR COMMENTS ON SOVIET CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE. THE SOVIETS, HE ADDED, DO NOT WANT POLEMICS

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NLRR 748-23-21-10-8

BY KDD N A ATE 12/24/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PER SE, BUT AS THE "PRAVDA" RESPONSE TO YOUR NOV 22 MESSAGE MADE CLEAR, THEY WILL NOT LET ATTACKS PASS WITHOUT ANSWER.

SECOND, HE SAID THE SOVIETS THINK IT IS UNPRODUCTIVE TO MEASURE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES ON THE U.S. - SOVIET AGENDA BY "SUBJECTIVE NOTIONS," ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY PERTAIN TO INTERNAL JURISDICTION. (DOBRYNIN LATER SPECIFIED TO ONE OF MY STAFF THAT THIS POINT "REALLY" REFERRED TO EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.)

THIRD, THE SOVIETS FAVOR EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND THE SEARCH FOR CONCRETE SOLUTIONS, BUT HE SAID THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THE RESULTS TO DATE HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY, ESPECIALLY IN ARMS CONTROL. DOBRYNIN SAID MOSCOW HOPED YOUR STATEMENT OF READINESS FOR BETTER RELATIONS WILL BE REFLECTED IN U.S. POSITIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT MOSCOW DID NOT SENSE A DESIRE TO REACH UNDERSTANDING IN THE UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD IN GENEVA AND ON THE EVE OF THE MADRID CSCE MEETING. HE ADDED THAT THE CURRENT RECESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

FOURTH, HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED FOR BROADER AND MORE ACTIVE CONTACTS THROUGH THE EMBASSIES AND BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS ALWAYS READY FOR DISCUSSION WITH ME, AND THERE WOULD BE "NO DIFFICULTIES" FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO SEE GROMYKO AND FIRST DEPUTY KORNIYENKO. HE ALSO PROPOSED MUTUAL VISITS AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE MINISTRIES AT OTHER LEVELS: ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF DEPARTMENT OR DESK.

FIFTH, HE SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT WITH ME THROUGH THE AMBASSADORS IN THE TWO CAPITALS AND PERSONALLY, INCLUDING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH EXCHANGES HAVE PROVED "GOOD WAY TO GO" IN THE PAST, HE OBSERVED. DOBRYNIN ALSO SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS READY TO TAKE A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MEETING WITH ME BEFORE THE NEXT UNGA SESSION.

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SIXTH, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT: DOBRYNIN SAID
SOVIET VIEWS ARE KNOWN AND ARE SIMILAR TO OURS,
I.E., THAT ANY SUCH MEETING MUST BE CAREFULLY PREPARED.
I REPLIED THAT I REGARDED THE MESSAGE AS SIGNIFICANT;
THAT I WOULD BRING IT TO YOUR ATTENTION; AND THAT I WOULD
RESPOND IN DUE COURSE. THE NOTION OF ENRICHING OUR
DIALOGUE IS A GOOD ONE, I SAID, AND WITH RESPECT TO ARMS
CONTROL, I CONCURRED THAT THE RECESS IN THE GENEVA TALKS IS
PERHAPS A GOOD TIME TO EVALUATE WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHERE
WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE. I SAID I WAS ALSO GLAD TO HEAR
GROMYKO'S STATEMENT OF READINESS TO KEEP UP CONTACT WITH
ME EITHER THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS OR PERSONALLY, AND
I NOTED THAT OUR POSITIONS ON A SUMMIT APPEAR TO BE
SIMILAR.

END OF TEXT. SHULTZ

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