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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 1/2/2009

File Folder CHINA, PRC AUGUST 1981 (1 OF 3)

FOIA

F02-025/1

Box Number 6

COHEN, WARREN

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
60068	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CHINA PAR 3/12/2013 M386/1	1	8/5/1981	B1	B3
60069	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR RE. CHINA [COPY OF DOC. 60068] PAR 3/12/2013 M386/1	1	8/5/1981	B1	B3
60070	CABLE	BEIJING 8240 R 10/18/2013 M386/1	10	8/6/1981	B1	
60072	MEMO	LILLEY TO BUD NANCE [W/BRIEFING PAPER]	4	8/10/1981	B1	
60073	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN RE. MTG. [W/NOTATIONS] R 10/18/2013 M386/1	1	8/11/1981	B1	
60074	BIO	R 8/28/2012 M386/1	3	ND	B1	B3
60075	CABLE	BEIJING 8538 R 10/18/2013 M386/1	5	8/13/1981	B1	
60076	CABLE	BEIJING 8538 [COPY OF DOC. 60075 SECT 1] R 10/18/2013 M386/1	4	8/13/1981	B1	
60079	CABLE	BEIJING 8674 R 10/18/2013 M386/1	1	8/17/1981	B1	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
60082	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN	2	8/17/1981	B1	
60086	CABLE	BEIJING 8538 R 10/18/2013 M386/1	4	8/13/1981	B1	
60090	CABLE	BEIJING 8707 R 10/18/2013 M386/1	1	8/18/1981	B1	
60092	MEMO	ALLEN TO CASEY RE. CHINA [W/ROUTING FORM] R 3/12/2013 M386/1	2	8/24/1981	B1	B3
60296	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN RE. CHINA R 5/7/2013 M386/1	1	8/18/1981	B1	B3

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 AUG 81 12

TO

PRES

FROM ALLEN

DOC DATE 05 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

TAIWAN

DENG XIAOPING

SUBJECT: DENG XIAOPING STRONG OPPOSITION TO US TWO - CHINA POLICY

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES W/ COMMENT

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION TO STAFF PER COLSON

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4980

60068
The President has seen 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL-SENSITIVE~~

August 5, 1981

*Do we now have contemplated
"recognition" - but we'd - in
will going to maintain
friendly relations as
always.
A R*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Aut*

SUBJECT: Deng Xiaoping's Strong Opposition to U.S.
Two-China Policy

During meetings with U.S. petroleum company officials since late June, Deng made strong, pointed statements on the U.S. two-China policy:

- o There cannot be a two-China policy.
- o There is no objection to the U.S. being friendly with Taiwan, but it cannot recognize the Taiwan government. This would result in the immediate termination of relations between the U.S. and China, with full cognizance on China's part of what this break in relations would mean for its stated position of reliance upon Western technology for its advancement.

13586
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3.5(1)

Three Chinese Americans in the delegation agreed on the forcefulness and uncompromising tone of Deng's statements.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVIEW ON AUGUST 4, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY CIA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M11-386 #60068
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4980

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL-SENSITIVE~~

August 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Aut*

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Two-China Policy

*Do we now have contemplated
"recognition" - but we'd - in
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*E.O. 12958
13524
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)*

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(C)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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REVIEW ON AUGUST 4, 2001
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NLRR 111-386 #60069
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4980

25 AUGUST

This item needs logging. It has just been returned from Calif. by Darman's office. I made copies for Janet & RVA and, according to Janet, no further distribution is needed. Log for record purposes only. (Sit Room received a DACOM cy back bearing the P's remarks some time ago.)

60070 5

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE277
STU7988
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #8240/01 2180822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060738Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4250
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIJING 8240

NODIS

E.O. 12065; RDS-3 - 8/5/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, CH, TW, US

SUBJ: BEIJING AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE SINCE THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT

1. / - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. SINCE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BEIJING, DENG XIAOPING HAS BEEN PURSUING VARIOUS TACTICS DIRECTED AT EXPANDING POLITICAL SUPPORT AT HOME FOR HIS US AND TAIWAN POLICIES AND AT THE SAME TIME INCREASING US RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH TAIWAN. WHILE SEEKING TO EXPAND US-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONS AND UNDERSCORING THE OVERALL CONVERGENCE OF OUR VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HE HAS CONTINUED TO RAISE THE SPECTER OF A DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE. OTHER CHINESE STATEMENTS SINCE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT SEEM DESIGNED TO CONVINCE THE US OF CHINA'S LONG TERM STRATEGIC COMMITMENT TO RESISTING SOVIET HEGEMONY. DENG CLEARLY HOPES THAT THE US WILL PUT OFF ANY DECISION OF THE SENSITIVE NATIONALIST ISSUE OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN UNTIL AFTER THE CCP'S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS EARLY NEXT YEAR. DENG IS GAMBLING THAT BY THAT TIME WE CAN TOGETHER BUILD UP ENOUGH MOMENTUM TO SAIL THROUGH A CRISIS OVER TAIWAN WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE DAMAGE TO THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF OUR RELATIONS.

FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, WE CAN BEST MANAGE A SAFE PASSAGE BY:

--MOVING QUICKLY TO CONSOLIDATE RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY BY APPROVING SOME IMPORTANT CLEARLY DEFENSIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PRC.

--DELAYING NEW TRANSFERS OF ARMS TO TAIWAN AS LONG

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M386/1 #60070
BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AS THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT AFFECTING THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE STRAIT, PREFERABLY DELAYING NEW SALES UNTIL AFTER THE CCP 12TH PARTY CONGRESS.

-- LIMITING SUCH TRANSFERS TO TAIWAN TO ADDITIONS OR RELATIVELY MINOR ENHANCEMENTS OF CLEARLY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ALREADY IN THE ISLAND'S INVENTORY, WHILE SPLITTING THEM UP AND SPACING THEM OUT TO KEEP THE DOLLAR VALUE OF ANY GIVEN "PACKAGE" AS LOW AS POSSIBLE.

--CITING POLICY RATHER THAN LEGISLATION AS THE BASIS FOR OUR ACTIONS, AND FINDING OCCASIONS PUBLICLY TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO ONE CHINA, OUR INTEREST IN PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION, AND OUR POSITIVE VIEW OF ANY MOVES BY BEIJING OR TAIPEI TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN THEM, END SUMMARY.

3. SINCE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BEIJING, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN TACKLING ON SEVERAL COURSES IN THEIR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC COMMENTS ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPAND U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC RELATIONS BY PUSHING FOR CONCRETE AND EARLY FOLLOW-THROUGH ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO APPROVE MILITARY SALES TO THE PRC ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE RAISED THE SPECTER OF A DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONS OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE, STRESSING THAT U.S. DECISIONS ON TAIWAN REMAIN KEY TO DETERMINING WHETHER OUR RELATIONS ADVANCE, STAGNATE OR RETROGRESS. SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY, THESE TWO THEMES ARE BOTH DIRECTED IN LARGE MEASURE TO EXPANDING DENG'S OWN POLITICAL SUPPORT AT HOME FOR HIS U.S. AND TAIWAN POLICIES AND INCREASING U.S. RESTRAINT IN DEALING WITH TAIWAN.

4. AS NOTED IN BEIJING 7400, THIS STRATEGY IS A BOLD GAMBLE BY DENG, WHO MUST DEAL WITH TAIWAN AS A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE INVOLVING CHINESE NATIONALISM. ELEMENTS IN THE CHINESE MILITARY REPRESENT PROBABLY THE MOST MILITANT VIEW REGARDING TAIWAN AND MANY PLA COMMANDERS ARE SKEPTICAL OF THE WISDOM, IF NOT THE IDEOLOGICAL CORRECTNESS, OF THE OPENING TO THE U.S. AND THE WEST. THUS, BY RESPONDING SHARPLY TO "SLIPS OF THE TONGUE" BY U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND TO OUTRIGHT CHALLENGES BY RESPECTED U.S. INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (BEIJING 7174), DENG SEEKS NOT ONLY TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION IN THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY OF CHINESE COMPLACENCY ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE, BUT ALSO TO PROTECT HIS FLANK ON THIS

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QUESTION DOMESTICALLY.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE278
STU8086
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #8240/02 2180845
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060738Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4251
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIJING 8240

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5. DENG TRIED TO PUT SUCH CHINESE COUNTERBLASTS IN PERSPECTIVE WHEN HE RECENTLY TOLD FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BRZEZINSKI THAT HE WAS NOT "GREATLY WORRIED" BY OFFICIAL LAPSES OF THIS SORT (BEIJING 7895). CHINESE REACTIONS TO COMMENTS IN THE U.S. HAVE IN FACT BEEN SELECTIVE. SELECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAS BEEN NO MENTION IN CHINESE MEDIA OF THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE IN HIS CHICAGO SPEECH LAST MONTH TO MAINTAINING OUR COMMITMENTS TO TAIWAN. LIKEWISE, IN RECENT WEEKS, BEIJING REPORTS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS HAVE CITED ONLY POSITIVE ENDORSEMENTS OF U.S. TIES TO THE PRC.

U.S./CHINA STRATEGIC COOPERATION

6. IN PUSHING FOR U.S. APPROVAL OF SIGNIFICANT SALES OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TO THE CHINESE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT, DENG HOPES TO BROADEN THE MILITARY CONSTITUENCY FOR CONTINUED MODERATE AND PRAGMATIC POLICIES (INCLUDING HIS CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO TAIPEI) BY SHOWING THAT THERE IS A CONCRETE PAYOFF FOR THE PLA IN THE U.S. TIE. AT THE SAME TIME, DENG VERY LIKELY EXPECTS THAT AN EXPANDED AMERICAN DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH BEIJING WILL INCREASE THE U.S. STAKE IN STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH CHINA, AND FURTHER CONSTRAIN WASHINGTON'S WILLINGNESS TO RISK A DETERIORATION IN U.S./CHINA RELATIONS OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

7. MEANWHILE, DENG HAS CONTINUED TO UNDERSCORE FOR AUDIENCES IN BOTH THE U.S. AND CHINA THE COMMUNITY OF STRATEGIC INTEREST THAT BIND THE PRC AND THE U.S. AND THE GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS LINK. FOLLOWING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, BEIJING HAS NOTICEABLY INCREASED ITS EMPHASIS ON THE OVERALL CONVERGENCE OF SINO-AMERICAN VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

8. IN PART TO COUNTERBALANCE THIS RAPPROCHEMENT, THE

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHINESE ARE DISTANCING THEMSELVES MORE CLEARLY FROM U.S. POSITION ON THE MID-EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (BEIJING 7180). GIVEN CHINA'S VERY LIMITED INFLUENCE IN BOTH THESE AREAS, THE CHINESE MAY WELL CALCULATE THAT THEIR RITUAL ENDORSEMENTS OF THIRD WORLD POSITIONS BUY THEM POINTS INTERNATIONALLY WITHOUT COSTING THEM MUCH IN WASHINGTON. ADDITIONALLY, THEY PROBABLY HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL APPRECIATE THAT BY SHOWING THAT THEY HAVE NOT EMBRACED EVERY ASPECT OF EVERY WASHINGTON POLICY, THE CHINESE CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE ON THIRD WORLD-RELATED ISSUES ON WHICH THEY DO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE.

9. THE CHINESE HAVE MANAGED TO STATE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH US IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT IMPUGN FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN MOTIVES OR THEIR OWN ASSOCIATION WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S GLOBAL STRATEGY. DESPITE STRONG CHINESE PRESS STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUES UNDERLYING THE SITUATION IN THE MID-EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, CHINESE MEDIA NOTABLY REFRAINED FROM REPLAYING THE RECENT DAU SUMMIT MEETING'S CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF COUNTERING THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN, EUROPE, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND ELSEWHERE, BEIJING HAS CONTINUED STRONGLY TO BACK U.S. LEADERSHIP AND, IN WELCOME CONTRAST WITH THE PAST, NOW CREDITS U.S. RESOLVE IN THESE AREAS.

10. LIKEWISE, CHINESE TREATMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT (THOUGH MISREAD BY SOME AMERICAN NEWSMEN) SEEMS DESIGNED TO CONVINCE THE U.S. OF CHINA'S LONG-TERM STRATEGIC COMMITMENT TO RESIST SOVIET HEGEMONY AND TO UNDERScore CHINA'S RELIABILITY AS A U.S. PARTNER IN THIS EFFORT. FOLLOWING UP DENG'S INSISTENCE IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY THAT CHINA DID NOT INTEND TO PALY A "SOVIET CARD," CHINESE MEDIA HAVE CARRIED SEVERAL ARTICLES DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY REITERATING TOUGH CHINESE CONDITIONS FOR BORDER SETTLEMENT TALKS THAT BEIJING IS WELL AWARE ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW. (BEIJING 6299).

BT

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PAGE 1 - 60

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE280
UTS0421
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #8240/03 2180912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060738Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4252
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 BEIJING 8240

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TAIWAN

11. U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL CONTINUE TO BE A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUE AS LONG AS THEY APPEAR TO THE PRC AS AMONG THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS ENCOURAGING THE KMT TO SPURN ANY STEP, HOWEVER MINOR, TOWARD RECONCILIATION. TAIPEI OFTEN SEEMS TO CORROBORATE BEIJING'S SUSPICIONS IN ITS OWN PUBLIC HANDLING OF ARMS SALES, JUSTIFYING THEM LESS IN TERMS OF MILITARY NECESSITY THAN AS A SYMBOL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE KMT IN ITS CONTINUING CIVIL WAR WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. LONGSTANDING U.S. POLICY AND THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT BOTH MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH U.S. WEAPONS ARE PROVIDED TO TAIWAN. BUT BOTH CHINESE PARTIES APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT OUR TRUE INTENTION IS TO PRESERVE EVERY ASPECT OF THE STATUS QUO UNCHANGED AND TO FRUSTRATE THE REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN WITH THE REST OF CHINA, EVEN IF THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS THAT PRESERVE TAIWAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITIES.

12. DENG KNOWS THAT THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO HELPING TAIWAN TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLE DEFENSES AGAINST REINCORPORATION BY FORCE, AND THAT SOONER OR LATER THERE WILL BE SOME NEW U.S. SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN. WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY AND OTHER HIGHLY NATIONALISTIC GROUPS IN MIND, HE HOPES THAT WASHINGTON WILL DELAY LONG ENOUGH FOR HIM TO STRENGTHEN HIS HAND AT HOME. IN THE MEANTIME, HE HOPES THAT HE CAN PERSUADE THE U.S. TO LIMIT THE TYPES OF ARMS WE SELL TO TAIPEI TO REPLACEMENTS OR MINOR ENHANCEMENTS OF CURRENT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT NEITHER INCREASE THE "TAIWAN THREAT" PERCEIVED BY THE CHINESE MILITARY NOR BOLSTER WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS TAIPEI'S "COCKINESS"

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SITUATION LISTING

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND OBSTINANCE. IN PARTICULAR, DENG SEEKS TO PERSUADE THE U.S. TO REFRAIN FROM SELLING TAIWAN OFFENSIVE ITEMS SUCH AS SOPHISTICATED NEW AIRCRAFT. HE HOPES -- AS HE SAID AT THE TIME OF NORMALIZATION -- THAT SALES OF LESS IMPORTANT ITEMS, WHEN THEY DO OCCUR, WILL BE AS QUIET AND INVISIBLE AS POSSIBLE.

13. IF WE ARE RIGHT IN OUR JUDGMENT OF THE SOURCES AND EXTENT OF DENG'S FLEXIBILITY, SALE OF CLEARLY DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT DO NOT MARKEDLY ENHANCE TAIWAN'S THEORETICAL OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL AGAINST THE MAINLAND -- IF DELAYED UNTIL THE RIGHT MOMENT AND THEN CARRIED OUT AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE -- WOULD RESULT IN MUCH CHINESE OPERA BUT NO CONCRETE RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST THE US OR SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION. SALES OF MAJOR NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A DIFFERENT MATTER. THE PLA FEELS BADLY OUTCLASSED BY THE FORMIDABLE AMERICAN EQUIPMENT ALREADY POSSESSED BY TAIWAN'S MILITARY. MAJOR NEW INCREMENTS TO TAIWAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS THE PLA OR HIGHLY VISIBLE SALES OF LARGE DOLLAR VALUE WOULD VERY LIKELY DRAW CONCRETE RETALIATION, RATHER THAN JUST THE BEATING OF GONGS.

14. IT IS WORTH NOTING IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE CHINESE HAVE REFRAINED FROM ANY COMMENT ON THE EXISTING F/5-E CO-PRODUCTION LINE IN TAIWAN, ALTHOUGH THEY WELL KNOW THAT TWO OR MORE NEW F/5-E'S, SUPERIOR TO ANYTHING THEY HAVE, OR ARE LIKELY IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO HAVE IN THEIR OWN AIRFORCE, CONTINUE TO ENTER TAIWAN'S SERVICE EACH MONTH.

15. EARLIER THIS YEAR, DENG SPECIFICALLY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THEUS WOULD PUT OFF NEW DECISIONS ON SIGNIFICANT ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN UNTIL AFTER THE CCP'S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS EARLY NEXT YEAR. HE EXPECTS THEN TO PASS AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN HIS EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE POWER IN THE HANDS OF HIS PRAGMATIC SUPPORTERS.

16. AT THIS POINT, IT APPEARS THAT THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN A MORE DENGIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO AND IN OTHER FAVORABLE CHANGES AMONG KEY PROVINCIAL AND MILITARY PERSONNEL. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THESE SHIFTS SHOULD BE THE INSTALLATION IN POWER OF YOUNGER MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE IDEAS HAVE BEEN FORMED LESS BY THE PRE-LIBERATION STRUGGLE AGAINST THE KMT THAN BY THE POST-LIBERATION COMMITMENT TO MODERNIZATION. IF

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE SUCCEEDS AT THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS, DENG SHOULD
HAVE GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO LIMIT CHINA'S RESPONSE
TO US ACTIONS REGARDING TAIWAN.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE283
STU8189
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #8240/04 2180933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060738Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4253
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 4 OF 4 BEIJING 8240
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17. HE ALSO SEEMS TO HOPE THAT A DELAY IN NEW US SALES (DESPITE CONTINUING DELIVERIES UNDER EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS) COULD INDUCE CHINE ON TAIWAN TO THINK MORE POSITIVELY ABOUT ENHANCING THE ISLAND'S SECURITY BY EXPLORING RECONCILIATION WITH CHINESE ACROSS THE STRAIT. UNLIKELY AS THIS MAY BE, ANY DEGREE OF SUCCESS ALONG THESE LINES COULD PROVIDE DENG WITH A CONVINCING REJOINDER TO DOMESTIC SKEPTICS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF A CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO REUNIFICATION SUCCEEDING OVER TIME.

18. IN ESSENCE, DENG RECOGNIZES THAT A FEW SQUALLS, IF NOT STORMS, LIE AHEAD IN SINO-US RELATIONS ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE. HE HOPES THAT TOGETHER WE CAN BUILD UP ENOUGH MOMENTUM TO SAIL THROUGH WITH AS LITTLE DAMAGE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF OUR RELATIONS.

19. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, THE US CAN BEST MANAGE A SAFE PASSAGE BY:

-- RESPONDING FAVORABLY, TO THE EXTENT OTHER US INTERESTS ALLOW, TO BEIJING'S EVIDENT DESIRE TO ADVANCE SINO-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION, BY INSTITUTING MORE HIGH LEVEL DIPLOMATIC AND DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS AND APPROVING SOME IMPORTANT, CLEARLY DEFENSIVE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PRC THAT DO NOT THREATEN TAIWAN;

-- DELAYING NEW TRANSFERS OF ARMS TO TAIWAN AS LONG AS THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON THE EXISTING MILITARY BALANCE ON THE TAIWAN STRAIT, PREFERABLY DELAYING THEM UNTIL AFTER THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS;

-- SPACING OUT SUCH SALES CAREFULLY TO KEEP THE DOLLAR VALUE OF ANY SINGLE TRANSACTION DOWN, AND

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PAGE 1 - 59

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/11/81//223

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

INSISTING ON THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF
CONFIDENTIALITY FROM BOTH THE CONGRESS AND TAIPEI;
-- LIMITING ITEMS EVENTUALLY APPROVED FOR SALE TO
TAIWAN TO ADDITIONS OR RELATIVELY MINOR ENHANCEMENTS
TO ITEMS ALREADY IN TAIWAN'S INVENTORY THAT ARE
CLEARLY WITHOUT MAJOR OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL;
-- TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE AVOIDING CITATION OF THE
TRA AS THE BASIS FOR OUR ACTIONS REGARDING TAIWAN,
INCLUDING ARMS SALES, STRESSING INSTEAD THE POLICIES
UNDERLYING BOTH THE UNILATERAL US STATEMENT AT THE
TIME OF NORMALIZATION AND THE TRA, I.E. OUR ABIDING
CONCERNS FOR THE CONTINUED WELLBEING OF THE CHINESE
ON TAIWAN AND FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN
PROBLEM BY THE CHINESE THEMSELVES;
-- FINDING OCCASIONS PUBLICLY TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT
TO ONE CHINA, OUR INTEREST IN PEACEFUL RECONCILIATION
AMONG THE PARTIES TO THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR, AND OUR
POSITIVE VIEW OF MOVES BY EITHER OR BOTH SIDES TO
BRING ABOUT A FURTHER REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN THE
TAIWAN STRAIT.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY OF STATE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
SECRETARY OF LABOR
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
SECRETARY OF ENERGY
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISOR
PRESIDENT OF THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE
INVESTMENT CORPORATION
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT:

Establishment of the U.S.-PRC Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade

The President has proposed to the Chinese the establishment of a new U.S.-PRC Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade to be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. The purpose of this new commission is to give emphasis to the development of our commercial and trade relations with China and our commitment to begin a major effort on industrial cooperation.

The responsibilities of the new commission correspond to the responsibilities of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade, and will be as follows:

- a) trade practices and procedures
- b) export control policy
- c) import control policy
- d) industrial cooperation and major projects
- e) business facilitation issues
- f) patent and industrial property rights protection
- g) commercial law issues
- h) direct investment issues
- i) trade development and export development activities

The U.S.-PRC Joint Economic Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, will continue to be responsible for:

- a) economic policy issues
- b) financial issues

- c) Eximbank activities with China
- d) OPIC matters
- e) CCC credit programs
- f) U.S. aid policy
- g) U.S.-China claims settlement
- h) IMF and IBRD issues
- i) tax issues
- j) portfolio investment issues

The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury will coordinate the activities of their respective commissions to insure a proper division of responsibilities and coordination of activities.

The Secretary of Commerce is to propose to the proper authorities in the People's Republic of China, as soon as possible, an agenda of topics and a time and place for the first meeting of the new commission.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



EDWIN MEESE III
Counsellor to the President

cc: James A Baker III

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DOCDATE 10 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR ALLEN MTG ON 12 AUG

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*allen briefed Nance
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CHINA, PRC AUGUST 1981 (1 OF 3)

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 11 AUG 81 19

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TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOCDATE 11 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: TAIWAN

MILITARY POSTURE

SUNG, CHANG-CHIH

AA

SUBJECT: MTG W/ ADMIRAL SUNG ON 12 AUG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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Done 9/12/81

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 11, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Admiral Sung at 9:10 a.m.,
12 August

Admiral Sung "Chris" is here to push Taiwan's cause for more military support from the U.S. -- he does this quietly and persuasively. He is a charming and likeable man and his English is excellent. He is likely to raise these issues:

-- Taiwan's priority need for advanced aircraft to deal with a growing PRC threat. He will say the F5E is only equivalent to the MIG-19, and the F5E is not an all-weather fighter. It also lacks air-to-air armament. He will say Taiwan needs a decision soon for its own advanced planning.

-- Taiwan's need to modernize its navy (second priority to advanced aircraft) -- ship-to-ship missiles (harpoon) and ASW, also possibly some new frigates. These are on Taiwan's shopping list but not yet approved.

-- Taiwan's need for professional training of its officer corps. They need exposure to the more up-to-date doctrines of modern warfare. Now they only get technical training in the U.S.

-- The need for joint planning between the U.S. and Taiwan to deal with future contingencies. This planning was dropped after normalization.

-- The need for a general upgrading of contacts and relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. (C)

Sung has just visited Central and South America and, in addition, spent time with his old friend, Admiral Mickey Wiesner (former CINCPAC) in southern U.S. He has also seen his friend, Admiral Hayward, CNO. (U)

I don't think I have to advise you on how to handle this one. Suffice to say, Sung needs assurances of our strong stand on honoring our obligations to Taiwan and our support of the Taiwan Relations Act, the President's personal involvement. We cannot, however, get ahead of the decision-making apparatus on specific commitments to him. (C)

Tab A is a biography of Sung. Note that his son is currently serving in Taiwan's office in Washington as the naval representative. (U)

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Review on 8/11/87

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13



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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

NLRR MU-386#60074
BY AW NARA DATE 8/28

(U) NAME: Fleet Admiral SUNG Chang-chih (1345/7022/1807), (pronounced soong), Chinese Navy (CN).

(U) POSITION: Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Ministry of National Defense (MND), since 1 July 1976 and member, Kuomintang (KMT) Central Standing Committee, since November 1976.

(C/NOFORN) SIGNIFICANCE: Admiral Sung is the highest ranking military officer on active duty in the ROC and as such is likely to have an influence on ROC defense and foreign policy. During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, Sung has emphasized and is in a position to enforce the development of an operational coordination capability between the ROC Navy and Air Force. He has vigorously sought to upgrade Taiwan's defenses through the purchase of more advanced weapons.

(C) POLITICS: Admiral Sung ranks tenth among members of the 11th Kuomintang Central Standing Committee. He believes that the revolution against the PRC leadership will be based on communist attempts to destroy the traditional importance of the family in Chinese culture. The Admiral's foreign travel includes orientation tours of the US (1959, 1965, 1971), training in Great Britain (1944-46), and official visits to the Philippines and Thailand (1973), Singapore (1973, 1977) and the Republic of Korea (1973, 1977). Friendly toward the US, Sung has been disappointed with its refusal to fulfill the ROC's weapons requests.

(U) PERSONAL DATA: Admiral Sung was born on 10 June 1916 in Liaochung, Liaoning Province, China. He is dignified, approximately 5'10" tall (179 cm); weighs about 180 pounds (82 kg); wears reading glasses; enjoys golf; does not smoke. Married to Fang Cheng-ying (a.k.a. Helen, Fang Cheng-pin, Fang Cheng-yin), born in 1922 in Anhwei Province, China; she speaks some English. The Sung's are Protestants and have six children: four sons -- Ta-wan (born 1939), Ta-wei (born 11 March 1948), Ta-jen (born

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Fleet Admiral SUNG Chang-chih
October 1978

2 May 1953), and Ta-yung (born 28 April 1954) -- and two daughters -- Ta-yen (born 1942) and Ta-mei (born 16 December 1957). Besides his native Mandarin, Sung speaks English fluently. He attended Shenyang Primary School in Liaoning Province (1927-28) and Tungchih Middle School in Shenyang Province (1928-34). His awards include the Order of the Precious Tripod, Order of Loyalty and Diligence (1957), Army, Navy, and Air Force Medal (1949), Glory of China Medal (1951), Naval Achievement Medal (1961), Naval Merit Medal (1961), Naval Deeds Medal (1961) and Naval Wind Medal (1958). He has also received the US Legion of Merit (1971) and an Ecuadorian award (1978).

(U) CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

- 1937-1938 - Cadet, 4th Class, Chinese Naval Academy (CNA).
Tsingtao, 1936-Jul 37. Commissioned Ensign, 1 Jan 37.
Asst Navigation Officer, 3d Fleet, Jul 37-Jun 38.
Promoted to Ltjg, 1 Jan 38.
- 1938-1941 - Instructor, CNA, Jul 38-Jul 39. Promoted to Lt, 1
Jan 39. Dep Chief, Communications Section, CNA,
from Jul 39. Promoted to Lt Cdr, 1 Jul 39.
- 1941-1944 - Section Chief, Bureau of Intelligence, CN HQ, Oct 41-
Mar 44. Promoted to Cdr, 1 Jan 43.
- 1944-1947 - Student, Staff Course, Royal Naval College, Greenwich,
England, 10 Mar 44-20 Oct 46. Dept Head, Second
Bureau, CN HQ, Oct 46-31 Mar 47. Promoted to Cdr,
1947.
- 1947-1949 - Chief, Superintendent's Office, CNA, Apr 47-Nov 48;
concurrently, Dir, Officers Training Course, CNA,
15 Jul 47-20 Aug 48 and Cdr, Destroyer 21, Aug-Nov 47.
Cdr, Frigate I Hsien, 20 Nov 48-16 Jul 49. Promoted
to Capt, 16 May 49.
- ~~1949-1952~~ - Superintendent, Rate Training Ctr, Tsoying, Taiwan,
16 Jul 49-1 Sep 52. Promoted to Commo, 1 Sep 52.
- 1952-1955 - Senior Staff Officer, Office of the Pres, 1 Sep 52-1
Apr 54. Cdr, Landing Craft Squadron, 1 Apr 54-15 Mar
55.

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Fleet Admiral SUNG Chang-chih
October 1978

- 1955-1962 - Student, Joint Warfare Course, Nat'l Defense College, Taipei, 16 Mar-21 Nov 55. Promoted to Rear Adm, 10 Apr 56, retroactive to 1 Jan 55. Superintendent, CNA, 1 Dec 55-Jan 62. Official visit, US military training facilities, 28 Mar-6 May 59. Promoted to Vice Adm, 1 Jan 60.
- 1962-1965 - Commndt, 1st Naval Dis; concurrently, Commndt, Tsoying-Kaohsiung Harbor Garrison Command, 1 Feb 62-Jan 65. Orientation tour, US Navy installations, San Diego, CA, 13-16 Jan 65.
- 1965-1967 - Chief of Staff, CN (HQ), Feb 65-Aug 67.
- 1967-1970 - DCdr in Chief (Administration), CN, Aug 67-Jun 70. Student, special strategic course, Armed Forces Staff College, Taiwan, 1969.
- 1970-1976 - Promoted to Adm, 1 Jul 70. Cdr in Chief, CN, 1 Jul 70-Jun 76. Orientation tour, US naval, air and space facilities, 24 Oct-10 Nov 71. Official visit to Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, Mar 73. Official visit to the Republic of Korea, 23-26 Oct 73.
- 1976 to Present - Promoted to Fleet Adm and appointed Chief of the General Staff, MND, 1 Jul 76. Elected mbr, KMT Central Standing Committee, Nov 76. Official visits to Singapore, 23-26 Jun 77 and to the Republic of Korea, 20-25 Sep 77.

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DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4463

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NDDIS
PLEASE PASS DOD/OSC/ISA/EAP
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 - 8/13/81 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) DR-
PRPR, MASS, CH, TN, US
SUBJECT: LIU HUANGING VISIT: CHINESE SECOND THOUGHTS?
REF: (A) BEIJING 7400, (B) BEIJING 8240

1. ~~/~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. OVER LUNCH AUGUST 13 VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN TOLD ME THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEARER ANSWERS THAN WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE TO HIS TWO QUESTIONS ON THE LIU HUANGING VISIT, THE CHINESE WERE IN A QUANDARY ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSED SEPTEMBER DATES, AND THAT THE VISIT MIGHT END UP HAVING TO BE POSTPONED. END SUMMARY.

3. ZHANG REHEARSED THE CHINESE "NEED" FOR A CLEARER INDICATION OF OUR RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS ITEMS THEY HAD REQUESTED. I AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH WAS NECESSARY UNDER OUR LAWS AND PROCEDURES. I NOTED THAT THIS HAD NOT PROVEN A BARRIER TO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO BOTH THE US AND CHINA DEVELOPING A SATISFACTORY MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP WITH US. I STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF OUR MAKING ANY DECISION UNTIL

BEIJING 8538

DTG:130815Z AUG 81 PSN: 007291
TOR: 225/1008Z

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE HAD CLEAR INDICATIONS OF QUANTITY, END-USE, AND WHETHER PURCHASE OF END ITEMS OR PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY (OR BOTH) WAS INTENDED. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR DIFFICULTY, BUT THAT THE CHINESE HOPED WE COULD INDICATE OUR ATTITUDE ON SUCH QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO AT LEAST SOME KEY ITEMS SOON.

A. ZHANG'S MAJOR CONCERN WAS NOT, HOWEVER, THE MILITARY TRANSFER ASPECTS OF LIU'S VISIT. HE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT -- IN HIS MIND -- THE PRINCIPAL IMPEDIMENT TO AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTED DATE WAS CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO NEW WEAPONS SALES TO TAIWAN. HE INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT WANT TO BECOME COMMITTED TO A MAJOR NEW ADVANCE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ONLY TO FIND THAT IT WAS SHORTLY THEREAFTER INVALIDATED BY "INTOLERABLE" US INITIATIVES VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN. HE ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE COULD CLARIFY TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHAT OUR APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN WOULD BE. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR WE UNDERSTOOD CHINESE SENSITIVITIES ON THIS QUESTION AND WOULD BE PRUDENT AND RESTRAINED.

B. CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIFIC THAN THEY ARE WITH THE EMBASSY IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN VISITORS. THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY SAID IN SUCH PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY FEAR THAT THEIR OWN PURCHASES FROM US COULD SET OFF DEMANDS IN THE US FOR EARLY SALES TO TAIWAN AS WELL. THEY ARE THEREFORE REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN THE ABSENCE OF CLARIFICATION OF THE TIMING AND LIMITS THAT WILL GOVERN OUR ARMS SALES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN. THEY ALLEGEDLY EXPECT SUCH CLARIFICATION IN THE BILATERALS AT TH CANCUN SUMMIT AND ARE SAID TO BE THINKING OF PUTTING LIU'S VISIT OFF UNTIL AFTER IT HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

C. COMMENT: AS REPORTED IN REFTELS, THE POSITIVE CHINESE REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON ARMS SALES TO CHINA, SPECIFICALLY THEIR QUICK ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO LIU, SUGGESTED THAT DENG XIAOPING'S STRATEGY

BEIJING 8538

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DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WAS TO BUILD UP THE AMERICAN TIE AS RAPIDLY AS
POSSIBLE IN ORDER BOTH TO RESTRAIN US DECISIONS
REGARDING TAIWAN AND TO PROVIDE HIM MORE MANEUVERABILITY
ON THE ISSUE AT HOME.

BEIJING 8538

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TOR: 226/1008Z

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DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4464

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7. IN HIS JULY 15 MEETING WITH FORMER CHARGE ROY, ZHANG WENJIN SAID THAT THE CHINESE NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE US HAD IN MIND REGARDING ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN (REF A). ZHANG APPEARED AT THAT TIME ESSENTIALLY TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCE THAT NEITHER LIU NOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EMBARRASSED DURING THE VISIT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IN HIS COMMENTS TO ME ON AUGUST 13, HOWEVER, AND EVEN MORE SO IN DISCUSSIONS BY HIS SUBORDINATES WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY APPEARS TO BE SEEKING GREATER CLARIFICATION OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN THAN THAT PROVIDED DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

8. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THIS IS A BARGAINING TACTIC, THE CHINESE MAY BE RE-THINKING THE WISDOM OF RUSHING INTO THE LIU VISIT EVEN IF WE INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO BE RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING ON THEIR REQUESTS. THE MFA, AT LEAST, SEEMS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, THAT BRITING WAIT UNTIL IT HAS MORE CLARIFICATION OF THE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF PUTRUE US ARMS PACKAGES FOR TAIWAN AND IN WHAT TIMEFRAME THEY WILL BE ANNOUNCED,

BEIJING 8538

DTG:130815Z AUG 81 PSN: 007293
TOR: 225/1009Z

DATE 08/13/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEIJING BEIJING COMMITS ITSELF TO ANY ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE US. THE MFA MAY WELL BE ARGUING THAT SINCE THE US HAS SOUGHT TO POSTPONE THE LIU VISIT UNTIL SEPTEMBER, IT MIGHT AS WELL BE PUT OFF UNTIL AFTER THE CANCUN SUMMIT, AT WHICH TIME THE CHINESE WOULD HOPE TO OBTAIN FROM THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE US APPROACH TO ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

9. WHAT THE CHINESE ACTUALLY EXPECT IN THIS REGARD IS OF COURSE A MATTER OF SPECULATION. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LIKE SOME COMMITMENT THAT NO US ARMS SALES FOR TAIWAN WILL BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL SOMETIME NEXT YEAR.

10. AS WE NOTED IN REF 8, DENG SPECIFICALLY IS BREXING DELAY UNTIL AFTER THE CCP'S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS EXPECTED IN EARLY 1982. IN TERMS OF THE PARTICULAR ITEMS THAT WE SELL TAIWAN, THE CHINESE MAY BE ANGLING FOR SOME FURTHER ELABORATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO BE PRUDENT AND TO SELL ONLY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. THEY MAY HOPE FOR HIGH LEVEL ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL NOT SELL ANY MAJOR NEW SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM TO TAIWAN AND THAT WE WILL SELL ONLY ADDITIONS OR RELATIVELY MINOR ENHANCEMENTS TO ITEMS ALREADY IN TAIWAN'S INVENTORY. WHETHER SUCH A CLARIFICATION OF OUR POSITION IS A SINE QUA NON FOR PROCEEDING WITH THE LIU VISIT IS UNCERTAIN. BUT OUR GUESS IS THAT THE CHINESE ARE LOOKING FOR ASSURANCES ON THE TIMING OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, REAFFIRMATIONS OF PRUDENCE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH SALES, AND SOME CLARIFICATION, ALTHOUGH STILL IN GENERAL TERMS, OF OUR APPROACH TO THE LIST OF DEFENSE ITEMS REQUESTED BY THE PRC.

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4463

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PLEASE PASS DDD/DSC/ISA/EAP

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 - 8/13/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) OR-.
PEPR, MASS, CH, TW, US

SUBJECT: LIU HUANQING VISIT: CHINESE SECOND THOUGHTS?

REF: (A) BEIJING 7400, (B) BEIJING 8240

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SIT: RVA NAN COL VP JP
EOB: LILLEY
WHSR COMMENTS:

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SOON.

4. ZHANG'S MAJOR CONCERN WAS NOT, HOWEVER, THE MILITARY TRANSFER ASPECTS OF LIU'S VISIT. HE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT -- IN HIS MIND -- THE PRINCIPAL IMPEDIMENT TO AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTED DATE WAS CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO NEW WEAPONS SALES TO TAIWAN. HE INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT WANT TO BECOME COMMITTED TO A MAJOR NEW ADVANCE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ONLY TO FIND THAT IT WAS SHORTLY THEREAFTER INVALIDATED BY "INTOLERABLE" US INITIATIVES VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN. HE ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE COULD CLARIFY TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHAT OUR APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN WOULD BE. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR WE UNDERSTOOD CHINESE SENSITIVITIES ON THIS QUESTION AND WOULD BE PRUDENT AND RESTRAINED.

5. CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIFIC THAN THEY ARE WITH THE EMBASSY IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN VISITORS. THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY SAID IN SUCH PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY FEAR THAT THEIR OWN PURCHASES FROM US COULD SET OFF DEMANDS IN THE US FOR EARLY SALES TO TAIWAN AS WELL. THEY ARE THEREFORE REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN THE ABSENCE OF CLARIFICATION OF THE TIMING AND LIMITS THAT WILL GOVERN OUR ARMS SALES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN. THEY ALLEGEDLY EXPECT SUCH CLARIFICATION IN THE BILATERALS AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT AND ARE SAID TO BE THINKING OF PUTTING LIU'S VISIT OFF UNTIL AFTER IT HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

6. COMMENT: AS REPORTED IN REFTELS, THE POSITIVE CHINESE REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON ARMS SALES TO CHINA, SPECIFICALLY THEIR QUICK ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO LIU, SUGGESTED THAT DENG XIAOPING'S STRATEGY WAS TO BUILD UP THE AMERICAN TIE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER BOTH TO RESTRAIN US DECISIONS REGARDING TAIWAN AND TO PROVIDE HIM MORE MANEUVERABILITY ON THE ISSUE AT HOME.

BT

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PAGE 473

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

Q 130815Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4464

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIJING 8538

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7. IN HIS JULY 15 MEETING WITH FORMER CHARGE ROY, ZHANG WENJIN SAID THAT THE CHINESE NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE US HAD IN MIND REGARDING ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN (REF A). ZHANG APPEARED AT THAT TIME ESSENTIALLY TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCE THAT NEITHER LIU NOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EMBARRASSED DURING THE VISIT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IN HIS COMMENTS TO ME ON AUGUST 13, HOWEVER, AND EVEN MORE SO IN DISCUSSIONS BY HIS SUBORDINATES WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY APPEARS TO BE SEEKING GREATER CLARIFICATION OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN THAN THAT PROVIDED DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

8. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THIS IS A BARGAINING TACTIC, THE CHINESE MAY BE RE-THINKING THE WISDOM OF RUSHING INTO THE LIU VISIT EVEN IF WE INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO BE RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING ON THEIR REQUESTS. THE MFA, AT LEAST, SEEMS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, THAT BEIJING WAIT UNTIL IT HAS MORE CLARIFICATION OF THE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF FUTURE US ARMS PACKAGES FOR TAIWAN AND IN WHAT TIMEFRAME THEY WILL BE ANNOUNCED, BEFORE BEIJING COMMITS ITSELF TO ANY ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE US. THE MFA MAY WELL BE ARGUING THAT SINCE THE US HAS SOUGHT TO POSTPONE THE LIU VISIT UNTIL SEPTEMBER, IT MIGHT AS WELL BE PUT OFF UNTIL AFTER THE CANCUN SUMMIT, AT WHICH TIME THE

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TOR:2251009

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PAGE 474

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/31/81//243

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CHINESE WOULD HOPE TO OBTAIN FROM THPPRESIDENT HIMSELF FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE US APPROACH TO ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

9. WHAT THE CHINESE ACTUALLY EXPECT IN THIS REGARD IS OF COURSE A MATTER OF SPECULATION. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LIKE SOME COMMITMENTW THAT NO US ARMS SALES FOR TAIWAN WILL BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL SOMETIME NEXT YEAR.

10. AS WE NOTED IN REF B, DENG SPECIFICALLY IS SEEKING DELAY UNTIL AFTER THE CCP'S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS EXPECTED IN EARLY 1982. IN TERMS OF THE PARTICULAR ITEMS THAT WE SELL TAIWAN, THE CHINESE MAY BE ANGLING FOR SOME FURTHER ELABORATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO BE PRUDENT AND TO SELL ONLY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. THEY MAY HOPE FOR HIGH LEVEL ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL NOT SELL ANY MAJOR NEW SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM TO TAIWAN AND THAT WE WILL SELL ONLY ADDITIONS OR RELATIVELY MINOR ENHANCEMENTS TO ITEMS ALREADY IN TAIWAN'S INVENTORY. WHETHER SUCH A CLARIFICATION OF OUR POSITION IS A SINE QUA NON FOR PROCEEDING WITH THE LIU VISIT IS UNCERTAIN. BUT OUR GUESS IS THAT THE CHINESE ARE LOOKING FOR ASSURANCES ON THE TIMING OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, REAFFIRMATIONS OF PRUDENCE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH SALES, AND SOME CLARIFICATION, ALTHOUGH STILL IN GENERAL TERMS, OF OUR APPROACH TO THE LIST OF DEFENSE ITEMS REQUESTED BY THE PRC.
FREEMAN

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PAGE 1 - 64

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4561

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/17/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MASS, CH, TW, US

SUBJECT: LIU HUAQING VISIT

REF: SECTO 0802

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I CONVEYED ASSURANCES OF REFTEL PARA 2, TO MFA DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS, HAN XU, LATE ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 17. (HAN BROKE OUT OF HIS PROGRAM WITH THE VISITING CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO RECEIVE ME AND BGEN WEBB. ZHANG WENJIN WAS UNABLE TO DO SO.)

3. HAN SEEMED IMPRESSED BY THE POSITIVE TONE OF OUR PRESENTATION. HE SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT IT TO VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA AND "OTHER CHINESE LEADERS."

4. HAN THEN NOTED THAT MY "REMARKS HAD NOT COVERED VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN'S SECOND QUESTION." I RESPONDED WITH LANGUAGE OF REFTEL PARA 3. HAN SAID HE WOULD ALSO REPORT THIS TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP.

5. AT MND SUGGESTION, BGEN WEBB WILL MAKE HIS PRESENTATION TO ZHANG BINGYU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MND'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU THE EVENING OF AUGUST 17, WHEN ZHANG WILL ATTEND AN EMBASSY RECEPTION FOR CODEL LONG AT THE RESIDENCE. ANY SIGNIFICANT REACTION WILL BE REPORTED SEPTTEL. FREEMAN

BT

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NLRR M386/1 #60079

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

RECEIVED 18 AUG 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOCDATE 17 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

TAIWAN

ARMS SALES

VISIT

SUBJECT: STATUS OF PLAY ON CHINA / TAIWAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

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CHINA, PRC AUGUST 1981 (1 OF 3)

FOIA

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ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
60082	MEMO LILLEY TO ALLEN	2	8/17/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4463

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIJING 8538

NODIS
PLEASE PASS DOD/OSC/ISA/EAP
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 - 8/13/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) OR-
PEPR, MASS, CH, TW, US
SUBJECT: LIU HUANQING VISIT: CHINESE SECOND THOUGHTS?
REF: (A) BEIJING 7400, (B) BEIJING 8240

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. OVER LUNCH AUGUST 13 VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN TOLD ME THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEARER ANSWERS THAN WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE TO HIS TWO QUESTIONS ON THE LIU HUANQING VISIT, THE CHINESE WERE IN A QUANDARY ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSED SEPTEMBER DATES, AND THAT THE VISIT MIGHT END UP HAVING TO BE POSTPONED. END SUMMARY.

3. ZHANG REHEARSED THE CHINESE "NEED" FOR A CLEARER INDICATION OF OUR RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS ITEMS THEY HAD REQUESTED. I AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH WAS NECESSARY UNDER OUR LAWS AND PROCEDURES. I NOTED THAT THIS HAD NOT PROVEN A BARRIER TO MANY OTHER COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO BOTH THE US AND CHINA DEVELOPING A SATISFACTORY MILITARY SALES RELATIONSHIP WITH US. I STRESSED THE DIFFICULTY OF OUR MAKING ANY DECISION UNTIL WE HAD CLEAR INDICATIONS OF QUANTITY, END-USE, AND WHETHER PURCHASE OF END ITEMS OR PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY (OR BOTH) WAS INTENDED. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR DIFFICULTY, BUT THAT THE CHINESE HOPED WE COULD INDICATE OUR ATTITUDE ON SUCH QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO AT LEAST SOME KEY ITEMS SOON.

4. ZHANG'S MAJOR CONCERN WAS NOT, HOWEVER, THE

SIT: RYA NAN COL VP JP
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PAGE 01

BEIJING 8538

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MILITARY TRANSFER ASPECTS OF LIU'S VISIT. HE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT -- IN HIS MIND -- THE PRINCIPAL IMPEDIMENT TO AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTED DATE WAS CHINESE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO NEW WEAPONS SALES TO TAIWAN. HE INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT WANT TO BECOME COMMITTED TO A MAJOR NEW ADVANCE IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ONLY TO FIND THAT IT WAS SHORTLY THEREAFTER INVALIDATED BY "INTOLERABLE" US INITIATIVES VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN. HE ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE COULD CLARIFY TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHAT OUR APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN WOULD BE. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR WE UNDERSTOOD CHINESE SENSITIVITIES ON THIS QUESTION AND WOULD BE PRUDENT AND RESTRAINED.

5. CHINESE MFA OFFICIALS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIFIC THAN THEY ARE WITH THE EMBASSY IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN VISITORS. THEY HAVE REPORTEDLY SAID IN SUCH PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THEY FEAR THAT THEIR OWN PURCHASES FROM US COULD SET OFF DEMANDS IN THE US FOR EARLY SALES TO TAIWAN AS WELL. THEY ARE THEREFORE REPORTEDLY RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN THE ABSENCE OF CLARIFICATION OF THE TIMING AND LIMITS THAT WILL GOVERN OUR ARMS SALES POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN. THEY ALLEGEDLY EXPECT SUCH CLARIFICATION IN THE BILATERALS AT THE CANCUN SUMMIT AND ARE SAID TO BE THINKING OF PUTTING LIU'S VISIT OFF UNTIL AFTER IT HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

6. COMMENT: AS REPORTED IN REFTELS, THE POSITIVE CHINESE REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON ARMS SALES TO CHINA, SPECIFICALLY THEIR QUICK ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO LIU, SUGGESTED THAT DENG XIAOPING'S STRATEGY WAS TO BUILD UP THE AMERICAN TIE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER BOTH TO RESTRAIN US DECISIONS REGARDING TAIWAN AND TO PROVIDE HIM MORE MANEUVERABILITY ON THE ISSUE AT HOME.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIJING 8538

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7. IN HIS JULY 15 MEETING WITH FORMER CHARGE ROY, ZHANG WENJIN SAID THAT THE CHINESE NEEDED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE US HAD IN MIND REGARDING ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN (REF A). ZHANG APPEARED AT THAT TIME ESSENTIALLY TO BE SEEKING ASSURANCE THAT NEITHER LIU NOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EMBARRASSED DURING THE VISIT OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. IN HIS COMMENTS TO ME ON AUGUST 13, HOWEVER, AND EVEN MORE SO IN DISCUSSIONS BY HIS SUBORDINATES WITH PRIVATE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY APPEARS TO BE SEEKING GREATER CLARIFICATION OF OUR OVERALL APPROACH TO SALES OF WEAPONS TO TAIWAN THAN THAT PROVIDED DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

8. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THIS IS A BARGAINING TACTIC, THE CHINESE MAY BE RE-THINKING THE WISDOM OF RUSHING INTO THE LIU VISIT EVEN IF WE INDICATE A WILLINGNESS TO BE RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING ON THEIR REQUESTS. THE MFA, AT LEAST, SEEMS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND, IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, THAT BEIJING WAIT UNTIL IT HAS MORE CLARIFICATION OF THE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF FUTURE US ARMS PACKAGES FOR TAIWAN AND IN WHAT TIMEFRAME THEY WILL BE ANNOUNCED, BEFORE BEIJING COMMITS ITSELF TO ANY ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE US. THE MFA MAY WELL BE ARGUING THAT SINCE THE US HAS SOUGHT TO POSTPONE THE LIU VISIT UNTIL SEPTEMBER, IT MIGHT AS WELL BE PUT OFF UNTIL AFTER THE CANCUN SUMMIT, AT WHICH TIME THE CHINESE WOULD HOPE TO OBTAIN FROM THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE US APPROACH TO ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

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PAGE 01

BEIJING 8538

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9. WHAT THE CHINESE ACTUALLY EXPECT IN THIS REGARD IS OF COURSE A MATTER OF SPECULATION. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LIKE SOME COMMITMENT THAT NO US ARMS SALES FOR TAIWAN WILL BE ANNOUNCED UNTIL SOMETIME NEXT YEAR.

10. AS WE NOTED IN REF B, DENG SPECIFICALLY IS SEEKING DELAY UNTIL AFTER THE CCP'S 12TH PARTY CONGRESS EXPECTED IN EARLY 1982. IN TERMS OF THE PARTICULAR ITEMS THAT WE SELL TAIWAN, THE CHINESE MAY BE ANGLING FOR SOME FURTHER ELABORATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO BE PRUDENT AND TO SELL ONLY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. THEY MAY HOPE FOR HIGH LEVEL ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL NOT SELL ANY MAJOR NEW SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEM TO TAIWAN AND THAT WE WILL SELL ONLY ADDITIONS OR RELATIVELY MINOR ENHANCEMENTS TO ITEMS ALREADY IN TAIWAN'S INVENTORY. WHETHER SUCH A CLARIFICATION OF OUR POSITION IS A SINE QUA NON FOR PROCEEDING WITH THE LIU VISIT IS UNCERTAIN. BUT OUR GUESS IS THAT THE CHINESE ARE LOOKING FOR ASSURANCES ON THE TIMING OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE, REAFFIRMATIONS OF PRUDENCE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH SALES, AND SOME CLARIFICATION, ALTHOUGH STILL IN GENERAL TERMS, OF OUR APPROACH TO THE LIST OF DEFENSE ITEMS REQUESTED BY THE PRC.
FREEMAN
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The SITRM (Denise) DACOM'd
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PAGE 1 - 63

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 8/18/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, CH, TW, US
SUBJ: LIU HUAQING VISIT
REF: A) BEIJING 8674; B) SECTD 0802
1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. DEFENSE ATTACHE BGEN. BILL WEBB MET WITH GENERAL ZHANG BINGYU ON THE EVENING OF AUGUST 17 TO PASS THE CONTENTS OF REFTEL B. GENERAL ZHANG WAS BRIEFED ON THE CHARGE'S EARLIER PRESENTATION (REF A). HIS RESPONSE TO BGEN WEBB'S RECAPITULATION OF IT WAS ENTHUSIASTIC. HE PROMISED TO FORWARD THE INFORMATION TO GENERAL CHAI CHENGWEN AND LIU HUAQING. HE FURTHER STATED THAT HE VIEWED OUR RESPONSE AS VERY POSITIVE.
3. WHILE THE ROLL CALL IS YET INCOMPLETE, AND ZHANG MAY HAVE READ TOO MUCH BETWEEN THE LINES, DATT SENSED A TONE OF RELIEF AND ENTHUSIASM ON AT LEAST THE CHINESE MILITARY SIDE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE SIGNAL THEY NEEDED TO REGAIN THEIR MOMENTUM.
4. WE CAN EXPECT THE CHINESE TO BE WAITING BY THE PHONE SEVEN TO TEN DAYS FROM MONDAY, AUGUST 17.
FREEMAN
BT
#8707
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NLRR M386/1 #60090

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

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RECEIVED 18 AUG 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOC DATE 18 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

TAIWAN

DENG XIAOPING

ARMS SALES

INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF CHINA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 20 AUG 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

SCHWEITZER

KIMMITT

GREGG

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NLRR ml-386 #60092

BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

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ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

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JF, SG, J, RK, Index

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FILE

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This is a PA file
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Thanks for the
help.

J.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49

THE WHITE HOUSE

4902

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Analyses of China (U)

DOD has already requested a Community analytical effort to define Taiwan's defense needs in the 1980s. This would include an analysis of the threat to Taiwan and the various ways to deal with this threat. I understand that this effort is to be concluded by 1 November 1981. We would also welcome any departmental studies of this important subject. (C)


In addition to the paper requested by DOD, I would like to ask for an additional paper to prepare us for critical decisions to be made by the end of this year. (U)

It would be useful to have an updated analysis of Deng's vulnerability on the U.S. connection. How stable is Deng's leadership, what is the nature and strength of threats to him, and how would these affect the reaction to various levels of arms sales to Taiwan? (C)

It would also be useful to include in this study an analysis of the role of the Chinese military, including its influence on Deng and his policies. (C)

I would also like to have this second paper by 1 November 1981. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: Secretary Haig
Secretary Weinberger

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Review Aug 18, 1987

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JIM LILLEY

[Signature]

SUBJECT: Analyses of China (U)

The memorandum to Bill Casey at Tab I requests a Community analysis of the stability of Deng's leadership as well as the role of the Chinese military. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SIGNED

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Casey

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review Aug 18, 1987

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BY KmL NARA DATE 5/7/13~~CONFIDENTIAL~~