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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 3/22/2010

File Folder CO054-02 (GERMANY, WEST) (017721-018569)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 75

SYSTEMATIC

405

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
88179	MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO RICHARD ALLEN, RE: VISIT OF BERLIN GOVERNING MAYOR HANS-JOCHEN VOGEL R 10/28/2022 DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER	1	3/9/1981	B1
88180	PAPER	BIO	1	2/19/1981	B1 B3
88181	PAPER	BIO	1	2/19/1981	B1 B3
88182	MEMCON	EDWIN MEESE AND MANFRED LAHNSTEIN, MARCH 6, 1981 R 10/28/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	2	ND	B1
88183	PAPER	TALKING POINTS MEETING WITH FRG CHANCELLOR OFFICE CHIEF MANFRED LAHNSTEIN R 10/28/2022 DEPT. OF STATE WAIVER	1	ND	B1
88184	PAPER	BIO	2	1/30/1981	B1 B3
88185	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #88182 R 10/28/2022 NSC/DEPT. OF STATE WAIVERS	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

88177

017732

8107353

1084

C.F.

3300



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 9, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CO054-02
PR007
FG006-12

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Berlin Governing Mayor Hans-Jochen^{*} Vogel

Hans-Jochen Vogel, Governing Mayor of Berlin since the fall of the Stobbe government in January, plans to visit the United States March 19-20. Vogel will be accompanied by his deputy, Guido Brunner, the Mayor of Berlin.

Vogel wants to pay a brief call upon the President, in accordance with the customary practice of all Berlin's Governing Mayors. Vogel's predecessor, Dietrich Stobbe, called on President Carter in April 1980. Vogel will also visit Secretary Haig.

The USG has a particular interest in giving Berlin friendly exposure now. In the face of Polish events, which could have a damaging psychological and practical impact on the city, a White House visit by the Governing Mayor would help reaffirm our commitment to Berlin and the Berliners. For Vogel, an outsider and former Mayor of Munich, the visit would greatly add to his leadership image in Berlin. The visit is also important because Vogel is widely regarded as the current heir-apparent should Schmidt decide to step down.

John H. Kelly
L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biography of Hans-Jochen Vogel.
2. Biography of Guido Brunner.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL
GBS, 3/9/87

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: State Waiver
BY: *ds* NARA DATE: 10/26/2022

NSC #8101084

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 MAR 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

db 3/19/10

DOCDATE 09 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

VISIT

VOGEL, HANS+JOCHEN

AP

BRUNNER, GUIDO

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR MAYOR VOGEL W/ PRES DURING US VISIT MAR 19 - 20

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 12 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8107353

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>DB</i>	<i>Vogel cancelled his trip</i>	<i>NAR</i>	<i>3/12/81</i>	
	<i>C 3/12</i>	<i>OBE/No action Required</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(WA) (C) A

UNCLASSIFIED with
CONFIDENTIAL attachment

0362
add-on

C.F.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

cls 3/19/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1981

017736
3300
RY! C0054-02
FG006-01
FG006-12

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT: MemCon of your meeting with Manfred Lahnstein

Attached for your information is a memorandum of conversation which summarizes the March 6 meeting you and Jim Baker had with FRG State Secretary Manfred Lahnstein.

cc: James Baker

*3/10/81 memo + cc:
dispatched / JCP*

NSC # 8100362

UNCLASSIFIED with
CONFIDENTIAL attachment

db
3/19/10

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JIM M. RENTSCHLER

*Jeb
for*

SUBJECT: MemCon of Meese - Lahnstein meeting

Your memo to Ed Meese at Tab I transmits a memorandum of conversation (Tab A) covering his March 6 meeting with FRG Chancery State Secretary Manfred Lahnstein.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Ed Meese at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

3/9/81

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC/State Waiver
BY dm PARADISE 10/26/2022

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Memorandum of conversation between Edwin Meese III and Manfred Lahnstein (U)

Time and Place: March 6, 1981; 3:00-3:45 p.m., West Wing, White House

Participants: US: The Hon. Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President
The Hon. James Baker III, White House Chief of Staff
James M. Rentschler, Senior NSC Staff

FRG: The Hon. Manfred Lahnstein, State Secretary, Federal Chancery
The Hon. Peter Hermes, FRG Ambassador to the US
Mr. Peter Basing, Political Counselor, FRG Embassy

Mr. Meese welcomed Mr. Lahnstein and recalled with pleasure his encounter with Ambassador von Staden during the transition period. He described the relationship between himself and Mr. Baker and emphasized the closeness of their teamwork, with the Counselor concentrating on policy formulation and the Chief of Staff responsible for implementation. He pointed out that both he and Mr. Baker sat on the National Security Council and were thereby better positioned to carry out a major Presidential determination, i.e., to make more effective use of the various Government agencies and departments. Mr. Meese added that the Federal Republic was well represented by Ambassador Hermes; Mr. Meese enjoyed his contacts with the Ambassador, as did Secretary Haig and National Security Advisor Allen. (U)

Mr. Lahnstein thanked Mr. Meese for his time, recounted his Washington program (which included an excellent briefing by CIA Director Casey and his associates), characterized both himself and Chancellor Schmidt as "renowned Americanophiles despite some of the press comment one might see," and expressed the very favorable impression the FRG Government had of this country's new leadership; it seemed to be both clear and reliable. (U)

Mr. Meese said he was pleased to hear Mr. Lahnstein's initial assessment and emphasized that this Administration intended to avoid surprises. In response to a question concerning Presidential travel plans, Mr. Meese and Mr. Baker asserted the President's priority concern with his economic program and the need to work closely with Congress over the coming months. This meant that there would probably be no Presidential travel in prospect before the Fall; the President does not believe that he personally needs to go everywhere to make a point and will therefore make much more use of his Ambassadors, who will be his personal representatives in foreign capitals. They added that they expected a new Ambassador to be appointed to Bonn very shortly, which they considered a high-priority post and which had been much sought after. (U)

Mr. Lahnstein stated that the new Administration can count on the support of his government. The Federal Republic has some problems with public opinion, the result of certain societal developments over which the government itself could exercise little control. People in Western Europe seem to have forgotten that they live under the shadow of Soviet missiles targeted on them, and this is a problem in terms of ensuring adequate defense contributions. In that connection, he added, the German government saw the economic situation as a major factor in Western strategy and would welcome a relatively early and rapid discussion of this subject. The Federal Republic itself was experiencing its worst period of unemployment since the end of the war (1.3 million Germans were unemployed, representing 4½ percent of the national population). For this reason, the FRG viewed the Economic Summit in Ottawa as very important; economic growth and development were critical agenda topics, as was the question of oil supply and pricing. ~~(C)~~

Ambassador Hermes raised the question of US policy concerning nuclear reprocessing, to which Mr. Meese responded that the Administration will soon be issuing some signals with which the German government was likely to feel quite comfortable. Mr. Meese went on to assert that the US considers the Federal Republic one of the mainstays of the Western Alliance. In that regard, the President has talked a great deal about the benefits of private diplomacy. We intend to deal with our friends in a quiet and reasonable manner. ~~(C)~~

Concerning Mr. Lahnstein's earlier allusion to a trip by former Vice President Mondale and the "unfortunate locomotive theory" which later characterized US policy *vis-à-vis* its European partners, Mr. Meese said that we were cognizant of the stop-and-go nature of previous US - German relations. We cannot rewrite history. There may still be issues on which we may not fully agree, but the Federal Republic can count on us for consistency in our conduct of policy and consultation. The main thing he would like to get across is that this government knows what it is doing, that American interests are not antithetical to Western European interests, and that we intend to cooperate. ~~(C)~~

Mr. Lahnstein expressed his appreciation for Mr. Meese's remarks and pledged that his government will do its utmost to stick to all aspects of the December 1979 NATO decision on theater nuclear forces. The FRG, he said, will also help the US convince its other European partners, notably Belgium and the Netherlands, of the need to persevere with that decision. It was essential from the German point of view that deployment go forward in Italy so that the Federal Republic is not the only continental power which deploys TNF. A big asset for US interests in Europe is the fact that the Federal Republic has a centrist government and is animated by politics of the center; the US need not worry about the extreme sides of the political spectrum in West Germany: the Schmidt coalition is a reliable coalition; there is no Moscow wing. ~~(C)~~

The meeting concluded with an exchange of reminiscences concerning Bohemian Grove activity. ~~(U)~~

10 MARCH

RE: 0362 addon

KAY,

Do you feel there is any special reason why a cc: of the memcon is not going to Mr. Baker, especially in view of the fact that he was a participant in the meeting?

Please advise.

Jean

I'm sure it is just an oversight.

RECEIVED 09 FEB 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 06 FEB 81

BREMER

14 MAR 81

BLAIR

05 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

LAHNSTEIN, MANFRED

MEESE, E

BAKER, J

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ WH STAFF FOR FRG OFFICE CHIEF 5 - 9 MAR 1981

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 05 MAR 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

FARRAR

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8103145

8103144

LOG 8100363

NSCIFID

(L / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
-C	3/9	Allen send memo to Meese		RE, CF

DISPATCH

By IP 3/10

W/ATTCH

FILE

644 (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JM*

SUBJECT:

Your meeting with Manfred Lahnstein
(Monday, March 9, 1981; 10:00 a.m.)

The material at Tab A, which we put together for Ed Meese's Friday meeting with Lahnstein, should be useful for your exchange as well.

Specifically, I recommend you emphasize Talking Points Numbers 2, 3, and 5 in this material, which Meese did not get into directly. The Schmidt visit, and the kinds of things the Germans want to discuss, might be the most productive terrain on which to engage Lahnstein from our point of view.

In addition, you will find at Tab B a copy of the MemCon I did for the Meese meeting.

Talking Points

Meeting with FRG Chancellor Office Chief
Manfred Lahnstein

1. Explain the President's economic policies: It is worthwhile to convey what the President is trying to accomplish with the economy. Lahnstein is a trained economist and should be receptive to this information. Emphasize that unless the US is economically strong, it cannot play the active role it should in foreign affairs.
- ✓ 2. Strong relationship with Germany: There has been some speculation in Germany that the early Washington visits of French and British officials signaled a decrease in German prestige within the Alliance. You as the President's Chief of Staff can emphasize to Lahnstein that the scheduling does not have significance; it is simply the way the calendar worked out.
- ✓ 3. El Salvador: In his meetings at State, Lahnstein was briefed on our policy toward El Salvador and the importance of German support and cooperation. Emphasize again that while our military assistance received most of the press attention, we share German concerns for political and economic development there.
4. Consultations: As the President's Chief of Staff and personal friend, you are in a position to assure Lahnstein that the President does not surprise his friends.
- ✓ 5. Schmidt Visit: It is worth probing Lahnstein on what Chancellor Schmidt's specific objectives will be when he visits. President Reagan's objectives are clear -- he is interested in taking the measure of the Chancellor and in a frank exchange of views.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State waiver
BY ds NARA DATE 10/26/2012

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Authority NSC/State Waiver
BY dh NRADATE 10/26/2022

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James M. Rentschler, Senior NSC Staff

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RECEIVED 09 FEB 81 11

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 06 FEB 81

BREMER

14 MAR 81

BLAIR

05 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

LAHNSTEIN, MANFRED

MEESE, E

BAKER, J

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ WH STAFF FOR FRG OFFICE CHIEF 5 - 9 MAR 1981

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 05 MAR 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

FARRAR

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8103145 8103144 LOG 8100363 8101135 NSCIFID (L / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 3/13 Note by Allen

RE

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 11, 1981

017841
1110
CO 054.02
FO006
FG006-12
RVA HHS STS

INFORMATION

CH

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: RICHARD PIPES R
SUBJECT: Statement by FRG Defense Minister

I thought I would bring to your attention a statement (see attached) made by Dr. Hans Apel, the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the 18th International Wehrkunde Conference held in Munich on February 21-22, 1981. Our government may wish to raise this matter with him and question the seriousness of his proposal.

|||
I'd say!
He's coming to
see me this
week!
I'll ask
date?

cc: Jim Rentschler

RECEIVED 12 MAR 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 11 MAR 81

017841

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

APEL, HANS

SUBJECT: STATEMENT MADE BY FRG DEFENSE MINISTER

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C *3/25* *LVA note w/comment* *RP, PK, RE*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

WIN *(9) dom*

Federal Chancellor Helmut SCHMIDT emphasised this point quite clearly when he said, and I quote,

"This dual decision of the Alliance is an indispensable part of Western strategy militarily, and a test of Alliance solidarity politically. Whoever calls in question the dual decision or either part of it in the present world situation, calls the Alliance itself in question." End quote.

Let me stress one point in particular:

Establishing and maintaining political stability on the basis of a military equilibrium has top political priority. It is the firm political resolve of the German Federal Government to reach this goal not through the expansion of military arsenals, but by way of mutual and balanced force limitations and, wherever possible, a reduction of military force levels.

14. The same applies to the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR) currently taking place in Vienna. It is essential that stagnation be overcome. The

...

3

This dual nature of the...
is an important...
strategic...
alliance...
however...
decision...
question...
All... in question...

Let us start...
Establishing...
in the...
political...
political...
Government...
operation...
and...
however...
force level...

The...
and...
...
...