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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/10/2015

File Folder USSR - DEATH OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV (NOVEMBER 1982) (1)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

295

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171157	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE DEATH OF BREZHNEV <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-1-6</i>	3	7/14/1982	B1
171158	STATEMT	RE DEATH OF BREZHNEV <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-1-6</i>	1	ND	B1
171159	LETTER	REAGAN TO KUZNETOV (SHORT VERSION) (PROPOSED DRAFT) <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-1-6</i>	1	ND	B1
171160	LETTER	SHULTZ TO GROMYKO (PROPOSED DRAFT) <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-1-6</i>	1	ND	B1
171161	SPEECH	RE EAST-WEST RELATIONS POST-BREZHNEV (PROPOSED DRAFT) <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-2-5</i>	10	7/7/1982	B1
171162	LETTER	REAGAN TO NEW SOVIET LEADER (PROPOSED DRAFT W/EDITS) <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-3-4</i>	5	7/9/1982	B1
171163	REPORT	<i>D</i> 1/26/2012 <i>CREST NLR-748-23-32-4-3</i>	13	8/1/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171164	CABLE	STATE 318360 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-5-2	3	11/12/1982	B1
171165	CABLE	MOSCOW 13590 (PAGES 1-2) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-6-1	2	11/11/1982	B1 B3
171166	CABLE	MOSCOW 13590 (PAGES 3-4) PAR 10/28/2009 CREST NLR-748-23-32-7-0	2	11/11/1982	B1 B3
171167	CABLE	LENINGRAD 2807 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-8-9	1	11/11/1982	B1
171168	CABLE	141230Z NOV 82 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-9-8	1	11/14/1982	B1
171169	CABLE	140945Z NOV 82 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-10-6	1	11/14/1982	B1
171170	CABLE	LENINGRAD 2808 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-11-5	1	11/12/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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295

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171171	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON DEATH OF BREZHNEV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-12-4	2	11/11/1982	B1
171172	ATTCHMTS	RE DEATH OF BREZHNEV (PROPOSED STATEMENT AND Q-AND-AS) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-12-4	4	ND	B1
171173	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO ALLIED R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-13-3	1	11/11/1982	B1
171174	MESSAGE	SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-13-3	4	ND	B1
171175	LETTER	REAGAN TO ZHAO ZIYANG (DRAFT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-32-13-3	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RCM HAS SEEN

But
This is the memo
which Larry asked I
get to you privately.
It is a Draft.

LM
7/11/4

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748 23-321-6

BY EDB NARA DATE 12/10/19

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
WASHINGTON

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has seen
8/28

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7/14/82

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171157

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM : George Shultz

SUBJECT : Death of President Brezhnev: Funeral Arrangements and Interim U.S. Objectives

Summary: President Brezhnev's death will be marked by a Soviet state funeral. We recommend that a delegation headed by Vice President Bush attend the funeral and that additional steps be taken by us in the interim period to demonstrate continuity in U.S.-Soviet relations and to establish our intention of working constructively with the new leadership.

Impact on Soviet Policy

It may be some time before the power equation within the Politburo stabilizes. We expect that a caretaker regime will be set up, led either by Yuriy Andropov, who is rapidly establishing himself as a leading succession contender, or by Konstantin Chernenko, a long-time Brezhnev associate. For the time being, Nikolay Tikhonov is likely to remain Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Andrey Gromyko will probably stay on as Foreign Minister. V. V. Kuznetsov is likely to assume some of the protocol responsibilities of head of state as acting Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

We expect no major changes in Soviet foreign or domestic policy in the near term. The immediate period will be a time of internal adjustment as the new leaders maneuver for power. Issues which were muted when Brezhnev was alive, including economic stagnation and foreign policy problems such as Afghanistan may become matters of contention. However, there will be a strong initial impulse toward continuity and conservatism, as contenders for power legitimize their claims by wrapping themselves in the mantle of ideological orthodoxy. The new leaders are unlikely to move boldly toward new initiatives until their own positions are more secure.

U.S. Objectives

In seeking to maintain continuity in our policy toward the Soviets, we should continue to pursue the following broad objectives:

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GDS 7/9/82

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-- work for a more stable and constructive relationship by holding open the prospect of enhanced cooperation when this is warranted by Soviet behavior;

-- base our relations with the Soviets on restraint and reciprocity, emphasizing that Soviet aggression or attempts to exploit potential crisis situations for unilateral advantage will have an adverse effect on our bilateral relations.

In the immediate interim period our objectives with the new leadership should be to:

-- avoid actions which needlessly raise tensions or convey the impression that we are seeking to take advantage of the Soviets at a time of instability and uncertainty;

-- emphasize points of continuity in our relations, such as cooperation on INF and START;

-- seek an early opportunity to make clear to the new leadership our policy on issues affecting our relations.

We can work toward these goals in a number of ways. The most important initial signal to the new leadership, however, will be provided by our actions in response to Brezhnev's death, including in particular the composition of the U.S. delegation to the funeral.

U.S. Response to Brezhnev's Death:

In keeping with the U.S. objectives outlined above, we recommend the following actions:

Immediate:

1) White House public statements: A statement by the White House press spokesman would set the tone of U.S. response to Brezhnev's death and signal our desire for correct relations with the new leadership. A suggested statement is at Tab 1.

2) Messages of Condolence: Condolence messages will be studied closely for signs of our attitude to the new leadership. A draft message of condolence from you to First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov is at Tab 2. I am also sending a condolence message to Foreign Minister Gromyko, at Tab 3.

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3) U.S. Delegation to Funeral: We recommend sending a high-level U.S. delegation headed by the Vice President. This would demonstrate the importance of the relationship and would be seen by Soviets of all levels as a significant gesture to the new leadership. We expect that Chancellor Schmidt will lead the FRG delegation, and we will want to give our Allies an early signal of our own plans. In addition to the Vice President, we recommend that the delegation include Secretary Shultz, a representative of U.S.-Soviet World War II cooperation, and prominent Congressional, business and scientific leaders representing a full range of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. A suggested delegation list, with the background and rationale for including proposed members, is at Tab 4.

Near-Term

4) Other High Level Visits: There currently are no high level visits to Moscow planned and we would not advocate changing our post-Afghanistan restrictions on such visits pending indications of positive changes in Soviet policy.

5) Major Presidential Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations: We should consider the possibility of your making a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations, which would set the tone for our relations with the new leadership.

6) Presidential Letter: In lieu of, or as a supplement to, the proposed Presidential speech, we might consider a letter from you to the new leader which could serve further to set the proper tone at the outset.

7) Consultations with Allies: We will, of course, consult closely with our NATO Allies and others on succession issues. In particular, we may wish to coordinate the timing of our high-level visits in the coming period.

Attachments:

1. Suggested White House statement.
2. Condolence message to Kuznetsov.
3. Condolence message to Gromyko.
4. Proposed delegation list.

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Statement by the White House Press Spokesman

17658

NLRR 7482332-1-6

BY CDB NARA DATE 12/10/05

The President has expressed his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the death of Soviet President Brezhnev. A high-level delegation will represent President Reagan at the memorial ceremonies in Moscow.

As head of the Soviet Union for nearly two decades, President Brezhnev was one of the world's most important and powerful leaders. President Brezhnev played a very significant role in the shaping of U.S.-Soviet relations during his presidency, and President Reagan regrets that he did not have the opportunity to meet and work personally with President Brezhnev on the problems and issues of U.S.-Soviet relations.

President Reagan has conveyed to the Soviet Government the strong desire of the United States to continue to work for a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and to maintain an active dialogue between our societies on all important issues. The President looks forward to a constructive relationship with the new leaders of the Soviet Union.

DECLASSIFIED (RE/MSD)

SHORT VERSION

NLRR 748-2332-1-6

3Y LCDR NARA DATE 12/18/15

171159

From President Reagan to Kuznetsov

Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President Brezhnev was one of the world's most important leaders for nearly two decades. I regret that I never had the opportunity to meet personally with President Brezhnev and work directly with him toward improving U.S.-Soviet relations. May I ask you to convey our sympathies to the President's family.

I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet Government and people the strong desire of the United States to work toward a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to constructive relations with the new leadership in the Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the areas where our two nations can cooperate to mutual advantage.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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NLRR748-2332-1-6

BY CDB NARA DATE 12/10/15

From Secretary Shultz to Gromyko

171160

Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can appreciate your sense of loss at the death of a colleague who played such a leading role in your nation and in relations between our two nations. We hope to continue efforts to improve these relations in the future, and I look forward to working with you toward this end.

Sincerely,

George Shultz

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POSSIBLE MEMBERS,
U.S. DELEGATION TO
BREZHNEV FUNERAL

Head of Delegation: Vice President George Bush

Members of Delegation:

Secretary of State George Shultz

US Ambassador to USSR

Governor Averell Harriman---most prestigious senior figure on Soviet-American scene, former Ambassador to USSR, met with Brezhnev in December of 1978

General Maxwell Taylor---no direct USSR tie, but appeal for strong WWII sentiments of Soviet people; symbol of earlier allied cooperation

or

John Eisenhower or Milton Eisenhower, same as Taylor

The Honorable William Verity---Chairman, US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, represents desire for continuing limited economic and commercial relations

or

David Rockefeller---Chairman, Board of Directors, Chase-Manhattan Bank, also frequent visitor to USSR; well-regarded in Soviet political circles

Frank Press---President, National Academy of Sciences, visited USSR in 1978; represents desire for continuing limited scientific contacts

Other Members of Delegation, may be drawn from following Congressional leaders as appropriate:

(R) Senator Howard H. Baker---Senate Majority Leader, has visited USSR

(I) Senator Robert Byrd---Senate Minority Leader, major visit to USSR in 1979, also bipartisan symbol

(R) Senator Charles H. Percy---Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, major visit to USSR in 1981, met with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov

- (D) Congressman Clement J. Zablocki---Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee
- (R) Senator Richard G. Lugar---Chairman of European Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- (D) Congressman Lee H. Hamilton---Chairman, European/Middle East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee
- (D) Senator Claiborne Pell---Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ranking minority member
- (R) Congressman William S. Broomfield---House Foreign Affairs Committee
- (D) Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill---Speaker of the House
- (R) Congressman Robert Michel---House Minority Leader

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12/10/82 (008)

EUR/SOV:GLRUECKERT:RMS
7/09/82 EXT. 20821
THE SECRETARY

P:LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR:JDSCANLAN

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

IMMEDIATE USNATO

N/A

PSDC, UR, US

CONDOLENCE MESSAGE

AMH

GR

LSE

JDS

1. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
SECRETARY SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF
PRESIDENT LEONID IL'ICH BREZHNEV. I CAN APPRECIATE YOUR
SENSE OF LOSS AT THE DEATH OF A COLLEAGUE WHO PLAYED SUCH
A LEADING ROLE IN YOUR NATION AND IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR TWO NATIONS. WE HOPE TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
THESE RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO
WORKING WITH YOU TOWARD THIS END. SINCERELY, GEORGE
SHULTZ. END TEXT. ==

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NLRR 748-2332-2-5

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BY GDS NARA DATE 12/10/13

171161
DRAFT 4/5/82(0042A)
REVISED 7/7/82

Presidential Speech on East-West
Relations Post-Brezhnev

The death of Leonid Brezhnev marks the passing of a major figure in world affairs, and the closing of a long and memorable chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations. I have sent my condolences to the Soviet government, together with a reaffirmation of my sincere hope that we can work together with the Soviet leadership in Moscow to build a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Tonight, as we contemplate the opening of a new chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations, I would like to set forth my views on this vital relationship.

The United States and the Soviet Union have maintained diplomatic relations for almost 50 years, since 1933 to be exact. Over this half century, during which the American people have experienced nine different presidents, the USSR has been ruled essentially by three men: Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev. During that time we have witnessed extraordinary achievements in the economic and military development of the Soviet Union, as well as extraordinary suffering on the part of the Soviet people -- in part as a consequence of the policies of its own leaders.

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To our profound regret, the US-Soviet relationship throughout too many of these 50 years has been dominated by conflict and tension. We managed to overcome our fundamental differences during World War Two, in the face of a common enemy. But in the post-war period our respective approaches to democracy, peace and security proved to be irreconcilable.

The United States and its Western Allies sought to build peace through self-determination, economic cooperation, controls on armaments, and collective efforts at removing the danger of new aggression. The Baruch and Marshall Plans, as well as the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter, exemplified the Western vision of the post-war order.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, evidently felt that the only reliable road to security lay in holding and controlling the territories it had occupied in the course of defeating Nazi Germany, and in imposing a regimented, totalitarian Soviet system on the occupied nations in defiance of the USSR's commitments to sovereignty and self-determination.

Out of this divergence in aims came the Cold War, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, and crises over Berlin. Out of these deep differences came tension and endemic instability within Eastern Europe that prompted the USSR to use force to

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suppress the yearnings for freedom of its own Allies. Out of this East-West conflict also came the enormously wasteful competition in arms, which continues to this day, which has absorbed much of the wealth of our two countries, and has kept our two countries, indeed, all of the world -- near the brink of nuclear destruction.

In his eighteen years as leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev made a lasting impact on the US-Soviet relationship. He represented the USSR at several important U.S.-Soviet summit meetings; he also presided over the massive build-up in the Soviet Union's military strength beginning in the late 1960s, which brought the USSR from a position of inferiority in intercontinental weapons to the threshold of strategic superiority.

Under the years of Leonid Brezhnev's tenure in office, the Soviet Union transformed itself into a global power, increasingly willing to take risks in remote parts of the world with the aim of promoting the fortunes of radical forces and threatening vital Western interests. We cannot overlook the fact that during Leonid Brezhnev's reign, the USSR brutally suppressed the democratic strivings of the people of Czechoslovakia, used Soviet troops to prop up a regime in Afghanistan which its own people opposed, backed Cuban

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-4-

interventionism in Africa and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and, most recently, precipitated the ongoing repression of the Polish people.

In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that it was under Leonid Brezhnev that the Soviet government stepped up the suppression of human rights in its own country, flouting the obligations to protect individual liberties which the USSR undertook when Mr. Brezhnev personally signed the Helsinki Final Act. Despite its international commitments, the Soviet government continues to treat as political pawns those Soviet Jews who wish simply to emigrate to Israel. And Moscow has stubbornly refused to permit hundreds of Soviet citizens to join close relatives in the United States. For the Soviet people, perhaps one of Leonid Brezhnev's most unfortunate legacies is the fact that under his rule many of the USSR's finest writers, artists and musicians either defected to the West or were forcibly exiled for daring to challenge official dogma.

Against this somber backdrop, Leonid Brezhnev sought to identify himself and the Soviet Union with a policy of relaxing tensions in relations between East and West. I believe he was sincere in his efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear war, as he understood that danger. Although Mr. Brezhnev was no less committed than his predecessors to promoting the cause of

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Communism worldwide, he recognized that the competition of ideas must not be permitted to bring a global catastrophe. As a result, the 1970s saw a concerted effort by the nations of East and West to negotiate agreements to reduce the risk of military confrontation and ease the heavy burden of the arms competition, as well as a tremendous expansion of East-West trade and other contacts.

Unfortunately, the great promise of the detente era proved to be illusory. East-West relations deteriorated for a very simple reason: because of the Soviet policies I cited earlier. The Soviet Union apparently believed that it could obtain the benefits of arms agreements and East-West cooperation without relaxing its arms build-up or altering its destabilizing policies in the developing world. Perhaps this is the sad epitaph for Leonid Brezhnev's reign as Soviet leader: he sincerely desired peace and East-West reconciliation, but did not appreciate how Soviet policies created the principal barrier to achieving these goals.

The change in leadership in Moscow offers an opportunity for both sides to pause and reflect on the future of our relationship. For our part, we have made clear to the Soviet government since I took office that we seek improved relations in all areas: arms control, trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, and citizen-to-citizen contacts. There is no item

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✓ on the US-Soviet agenda -- be it reducing the size of our nuclear arsenals or reuniting divided families -- that cannot be resolved to both sides' mutual satisfaction through negotiations.

The path to such an improvement in our relationship lies in mutual respect for each other's interests, and a responsible, restrained approach to conflicts in other parts of the world. East-West relations can prosper if both sides refrain from trying to solve international problems by force, and accept peaceful change as the essential basis of the international order. Conversely, without restraint -- restraint in the expansion of military power, restraint in the export of violence and revolution to the developing world -- progress in trade or in arms control will be impossible to achieve.

Let there be no doubt that the United States is prepared to defend Western interests against Soviet challenges by whatever means are needed. But our preference is to work out our differences across the bargaining table. It is up to the Soviet Union to choose whether competition and confrontation will continue to be the hallmarks of our relationship, or whether cooperation and negotiations will play an increasing role in the 1980s.

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We are prepared to deal constructively with the new Soviet leadership on the full range of issues -- and the US-Soviet agenda does not lack for urgent ones. There are, of course, several important arms control negotiations either in progress or about to begin:

- In the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States has offered to cancel entirely its plans to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, if the USSR agrees to dismantle its own intermediate-range missiles. This is not a recipe for unilateral Soviet disarmament, but a balanced offer to eliminate the weapons the other side finds most threatening. An objective look at the current balance in intermediate-range forces shows that this is the case.
- We also remain committed to reaching an agreement in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. We are prepared to reduce our forces in Central Europe as part of a verifiable agreement, but this will require a more forthcoming Soviet stance in clarifying the numbers of Soviet troops presently deployed in the region.

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-- And we have begun new talks on strategic arms. As I have stressed before, our objective in these talks is an agreement imposing equal ceilings on the two sides' forces and providing for substantial reductions in the numbers of weapons now deployed. I call upon the new leadership in Moscow to work with us to achieve early progress toward this ambitious goal.

Arms control is an important aspect of the US-Soviet relationship, but it cannot be the only area where there is a constructive dialogue. We and the Soviets have come into conflict in numerous regions of the world. The American people cannot accept Soviet encroachments on vital Western interests, nor can the world's people accept the risks of wider conflict posed by Moscow's adventurist policies. We have sought Soviet cooperation in defusing regional tensions, but thus far Moscow's response has been disappointing:

-- Soviet troops have now occupied Afghanistan for over two years, but have been unable to crush the Afghan people's desire for freedom and the right to chart their own future. The time has come for a serious effort to negotiate an end to the ruinous conflict in Afghanistan. The United States remains ready to discuss in any forum the interrelated questions of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and international guarantees of Afghanistan's

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borders. The European Community's proposal for an international conference offers the basis for an honorable solution to the Afghanistan crisis, and I urge the new Soviet leadership to give it a second look. At the same time, we are prepared to continue our private US-Soviet exchanges on Afghanistan in search of a common approach to ending the crisis.

- In Southern Africa, we have made substantial progress in cooperation with several of our European Allies and the African "Front Line" states toward the twin goals of independence for Namibia and Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The Soviet Union has not done all it could to aid this collective search for regional stability. I urge the new Soviet leadership to join in this effort.
- Central America is a dangerous source of tension in the US-Soviet relationship. The Soviet Union, because of its massive arms shipments into the region and its support for Cuba's efforts to back radical insurgencies, bears a heavy responsibility for the violence and suffering in El Salvador and the rest of Central America. The time has come for an end to Soviet-backed subversion in this hemisphere, and a peaceful solution to the region's internal problems. But let no one doubt that the United States will defend Western interests and

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Western values whether or not the Soviets and their proxies choose the path of negotiations.

-- In Poland, martial law continues, with no indication that the regime has any intention of releasing political prisoners and beginning a dialogue with its own people. Continued oppression in Poland cannot solve that country's economic problems, but can only breed further degeneration and instability. The Soviet Union helped bring about the imposition of martial law, in violation of its commitments under the Helsinki accords. The Soviet leadership thus bears part of the responsibility for bringing about an end to martial law and the start of national reconciliation in Poland. Real progress in US-Soviet relations will be impossible without progress in Poland.

Apart from these specific problem areas, the United States has set forth an ambitious agenda for addressing the underlying causes of instability in the developing world. I call upon the new leaders of the Soviet Union to join with the industrial democracies in aiding the economic development of the world's have-not countries. Let us open a new chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations, a chapter that features realism, responsibility and restraint, as well as genuine cooperation that benefits our two peoples, and all peoples of this earth.

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NLRR 748-23-32-3-4

BY CCDB NARA DATE 12/19/82

DRAFT 4/7/82(0056A)

REVISED 7/9/82

171162

Letter to New Soviet Leader

Dear Mr. _____:

✓ Let me express my sincere condolences to the entire Soviet people on the passing of Leonid Brezhnev. Although our two nations have had their differences during his incumbency as General Secretary of the CPSU, we have always had genuine respect for Mr. Brezhnev's leadership. I hope to continue, indeed, to intensify the search for a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship with you and your colleagues.

✓ During Mr. Brezhnev's term as head of the Soviet Communist Party, the United States has had five different Presidents. If ✓ there was one thing that all these presidents shared with Mr. Brezhnev, it was a sense of duty to reduce the threat to the survival of mankind posed by nuclear weapons. I regret to say that, despite these good intentions, our joint efforts over the past decade to reduce nuclear weapons and create a more stable military balance have yielded rather meager results. Moreover, the great hopes of the American people and other Western nations for a relaxation of tensions and increased East-West cooperation unfortunately have not been realized.

While our side may not be entirely free of blame for the disappointments of the detente era, it is our strongly held view that it was principally the policies of the Soviet Union that lay the seeds for the deterioration in East-West relations beginning in the late 1970s. In particular, the expansion of

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Soviet military capabilities to a level far exceeding the needs of defense, and your country's disturbing preference for the use of force to steer events in unstable regions of the world, undermined the basis for greater East-West cooperation in arms control, trade, and other areas.

But I do not want to dwell on the past. Changes in leadership offer both sides a unique opportunity to surmount past differences and set our two countries on a new course toward more stable and constructive relations. This is the major task of our era. The United States has no intention of using the present period of transition in the Soviet Union as a time for testing your country's resolve. On the contrary, we stand ready to work with you to find mutually beneficial and honorable solutions to the thorny regional disputes that have so seriously eroded the basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and to negotiate substantial reductions in the size of our nuclear arsenals.

The agenda before us is a formidable one. In the area of strategic arms reductions, we must do much better than previous efforts to reduce the overall numbers of weapons on both sides, and to achieve substantial reductions in the most destabilizing systems. I therefore propose that we reach the earliest possible agreement on contributing to strategic stability by reducing both sides' potential for a surprise attack.

Progress in START should help us to achieve an early agreement in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Let me reaffirm the willingness of the United States to cancel the planned deployment in Western Europe of 572 Pershing and cruise missiles if the USSR agrees to dismantle its intermediate-range ballistic missiles. I should add that while our preference is to eliminate this class of systems

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- 3 -

entirely, the "zero option" is not our final offer. We will consider all reasonable approaches, but we cannot accept the current Soviet proposals, which are based on a misrepresentation of the existing balance in INF systems, and which would attempt to impose obligations on sovereign states not party to the negotiations.

Progress is both possible and essential on the numerous regional issues on our agenda. Real progress toward resolving contentious regional issues would have a most beneficial impact on all aspects of our relationship.

Given sufficient political will on both sides, I think our ongoing bilateral exchanges on Afghanistan should be able to develop a mutually acceptable framework for withdrawal of Soviet forces in conjunction with international guarantees of Afghanistan's security. In working toward such a framework, we are fully prepared to take account of the Soviet Union's strategic interests in the region. Such a solution will help pave the way for an end to the civil war within Afghanistan and will create the peaceful conditions necessary for the Afghan people to truly exercise their right to self-determination.

In Poland, now is the time for the Soviet Union and the Polish authorities to bring an end to the paralysis that has gripped that country since December 13, and to create the conditions for an authentic process of national reconciliation. If internationally recognized rights are restored in Poland, a major stumbling block to improved East-West relations will have been removed. As I have said before, the United States and its Allies are prepared to provide substantial economic assistance to Poland once martial law is lifted and a natural dialogue is initiated.

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- 4 -

Let me add that we are not attempting to dictate a complete restoration of the status quo as it existed before the alliances or its political system. Rather, we are simply pointing out the political reality that the American people will not support efforts to expand U.S.-Soviet cooperation as long as the repression in Poland continues, just as they refused to continue business-as-usual following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, many months of martial law have shown that repression has not brought real stability or economic recovery; on the contrary, Poland's economic situation is even more precarious, and social tensions, now suppressed, could erupt at any time, with violence a real possibility in the near term. There is no chance of improvement while the government continues to treat Polish working people as adversaries rather than as partners. Therefore I call on you to use your influence in Poland to bring about a dialogue among the authorities, the Church, and free trade unions. This is the sole path to long-term stability in Poland and, by extension, in Europe as a whole. There are other volatile areas where there are opportunities for the Soviet Union to foster peace and regional stability. Soviet efforts to this end will enhance the prospects for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. In Southern Africa, let us work together to complete an agreement encompassing Namibian independence, guarantees of Angola's security, and withdrawal of Cuban troops. In Central America, the time has come to halt Soviet military aid to terrorist and guerrilla groups seeking to effect change through violence. The conflicts in Central America threaten not only the stability of the region, but U.S. security interests. We will defend those interests by whatever means are necessary, but our first choice is to promote a peaceful, negotiated solution. Your actions will determine which path we follow.

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4/7/82, ext. 28040 (0056A)
Revised 7/9/82
Cleared:EUR/SOV:Grueckert
EUR/SOV:TWSimons
EUR:JDScaulian
PM/

[add conclusion]

Progress on these and other regional issues will enable us
to achieve rapid progress toward new arms reductions
agreements, and will help ensure that those agreements are
supported by the American people and the U.S. Congress.

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USSR - DEATH OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV (NOVEMBER 1982) (1)

FOIA

F03-002/5

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171163	REPORT	13	8/1/1982	B1 B3

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
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BT

SECRET STATE 318360
NOBIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PPDC, PEPR, UR, US, NATO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENT ON DEATH OF BREZHNEV

ISLAMABAD FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, TOPOL

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSIES (WITH EXCEPTION OF ISLAMABAD) SHOULD
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TEXT OF FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HEAD OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ADDING
APPROPRIATE SALUTATION AND CLOSE. NATO POSTS SHOULD
INCLUDE PARAGRAPH ON NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.
THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE DELETED FROM LETTERS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JAPANESE AND ANZUS LEADERS.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR,

THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV BRINGS TO A
CLOSE AN EVENTFUL EIGHTEEN-YEAR PERIOD IN SOVIET
HISTORY. WHETHER HIS DEPARTURE WILL OPEN A PERIOD
QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS REMAINS
TO BE SEEN. IN THE NEAR TERM WE EXPECT LITTLE CHANGE
IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR, EITHER AS REGARDS THE SOVIET
UNION'S RELATIONS WITH OTHERS, OR THE INTERNAL ORDERING
OF ITS OWN SOCIETY.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 948-23-32-5-2
BY LCDB NARA DATE 12/12/15

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PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 83600001 DTG: 120302Z NOV 82 PSN: 002498

OVER THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION OF A SORT WHICH COULD PRESENT THE WEST WITH NEW OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS NEW CHALLENGES. THE DIRECTION OF SUCH CHANGE CAN BE INFLUENCED, FOR BETTER OR WORSE, BY THE MANNER IN WHICH WE WESTERN LEADERS CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COMING MONTHS. AT THIS IMPORTANT JUNCTURE, THEREFORE, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE PATH AHEAD.

OUR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN PREMISED UPON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ONE MUST HOLD THAT GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS ACTIONS, AND BASE ONE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IT ON THE REALITIES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THIS MEANS WE MUST STAND READY TO IMPROVE THESE RELATIONS, AND ADD NEW CONTENT TO THEM, WHEN SOVIET ACTIONS SO MERIT, JUST AS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPRESS IN RECENT YEARS THROUGH A COOLING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, DISAPPROVAL OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, AND INDOCHINA. AS THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP LOOKS INTO THE FUTURE, AND A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS EMERGES TO TAKE ITS PLACE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST WILL DEPEND UPON THE WAY THEY CONDUCT SOVIET POLICY.

UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE WE, AS WESTERN LEADERS, SHOULD, IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRONOUNCEMENTS DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,

SECSTATE WASHDC 83600001 DTG: 120302Z NOV 82 PSN: 002498
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFFIRM THE OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD STRESS THAT SUCH IMPROVEMENT MUST REQUIRE SOLID EVIDENCE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN KUZNETSOV IN THIS SPIRIT. SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS WRITTEN IN A SIMILAR VEIN TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WILL LEAD OUR DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL, AND COMMUNICATE THE SAME MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

CONTINUITY WILL MARK THE NATURE OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. WE WILL CONTINUE ALL THE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE PRESENTLY UNDER WAY, INCLUDING THOSE BEING CONDUCTED IN GENEVA, VIENNA, AND MADRID. WE WILL BE ALERT TO ANY POSSIBILITY OF FORWARD PROGRESS AND WILL MAINTAIN OUR REGULAR CONTACTS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE READY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO FOR ANOTHER IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE WHEN MUTUALLY CONVENIENT.

I THINK IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME THAT WESTERN CONDUCT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BE MARKED BY UNITY OF PURPOSE. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC INDEED IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WERE TO PERCEIVE DIVISIONS IN THE WEST, EITHER AS REGARDS OUR WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO POSITIVE STEPS FROM MOSCOW OR WAVERING IN OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP BE BASED UPON SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE NORMS OF RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT IN THE DAYS AHEAD OUR GOVERNMENTS CAN MAINTAIN AN INTENSIVE EXCHANGE AS REGARDS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, ANALYSES OF THEIR POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, AND INTENTIONS REGARDING OUR RESPECTIVE POLICY STATEMENTS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS NEXT MONTH OFFERS AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE EXCHANGE OF WESTERN VIEWS ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, AND ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN POLICIES. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEND THE SORT OF POSITIVE, FIRM, AND CONCERTED MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHICH I TRUST WILL MARK ALL OUR ACTIONS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THROUGHOUT THIS IMPORTANT PERIOD.

IN THE DAYS AHEAD, WE WILL BE FOLLOWING EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE CLOSELY. WE SHALL SHARE OUR INFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS WITH YOU AND WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR DOING THE SAME WITH US. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THE APPROACH OF A UNITED WEST DURING THIS PERIOD WILL HAVE UPON THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP THE EFFECT WE ALL DESIRE.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. SHULTZ

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RHFBAAB/USMLM BERLIN PRIORITY

RUFDAAA/CINCUSARFUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

RUWMFGA/HQ ADCOM CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN COMPLEX CO PRIORITY

RUDOBDA/TFC BOERFINK MTK GE PRIORITY

RHFPAAAA/USAFECN RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY

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RUWTEKF/HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY

RUFTIAA/DIRNSA FGGM MD PRIORITY

RUSNNOA/USCINCFUR VATHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 13590

SUBJECT: IR 6 901 0735 82/USSR/MONARCH MAKER SITREP 1/(U)

DIA FOR DC-1(CCF), DC-4, DC-4A, JSI-2, AT-4; CIA FOR

RES/RSG, DDO, SCN, NT-4; USAREUR FOR AEAGB-C(RE); ADCOM

FOR J-20; USAFE FOR INRMH; HQ SAC FOR IN; DIRNSA FOR

T5321; CINCEUR FOR ECJ2-W; CINCPAC FOR J2

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVAL INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: USSR (UR)

2. (U) IR NO: 6 901 0735 82

3. (U) TITLE: MONARCH MAKER SITREP 1

4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 821111

5. (U) ORIG: USDAO MOSCOW, USSR

6. (U) REQ REFS: U-GEN-49403X

7. (U) SOURCE: MEMBER OF USDAO MOSCOW, USSR

8. (C) SUMMARY: NO UNUSUAL MILITARY REACTION HAS BEEN NOTED AS OF 1600 HRS LOCAL TO THE DEATH OF LEONID ((BREZHNEV)). MOSCOW TV ANNOUNCED AT 1100 LOCAL 11 NOV THAT BREZHNEV HAD DIED AT 0830 LOCAL 10 NOV. EMBASSY WAS ALERTED TO RUMORS OF HIS DEATH BY LOCAL CORRESPONDENT ON EVENING OF 10 NOV AND DAD COMMENCED MONARCH MAKER COVERAGE AT 0830 HRS 11 NOV.

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BY CNL HARA DATE 1/10/13

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9A. (C) DETAILS: THE FOLLOWING I AND W TARGETS WERE COVERED AT LOCAL MOSCOW TIMES AS INDICATED WITH RESULTS AS NOTED:

(1) KREMLIN, 1110-1130, 1230-1400 HRS 11 NOV: NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY, THREE ZIL LIMOUSINES ENTERED THE SW VEHICLE GATE. NO UNUSUAL SECURITY WAS IN EVIDENCE AND NO INDICATIONS OF BREZHNEV'S DEATH WERE SEEN UNTIL SOMETIME BETWEEN 1230 AND 1330 HRS WHEN BLACK-BORDERED FLAGS WERE PLACED AROUND RED SQUARE AND THE KREMLIN. 7 NOV PARAPHERNALIA WAS BEING REMOVED FROM THE SQUARE. NO CROWDS OR CONCENTRATIONS NOTED. NO EMOTION WHATSOEVER DETECTED.

(2) CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU HQ, 1315 HRS 11 NOV: TWO CHAIKA LIMOUSINES AND A HUNGARIAN EMBASSY CHAIKA WERE PARKED AT THE MAIN ENTRANCE, BUT NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY OR SECURITY MEASURES WERE OBSERVED.

(3) KGB HQ, 1140-1200 HRS 11 NOV: NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY NOTED.

(4) MVD HQ, 1400 HRS 11 NOV: PARKING LOT WAS FULL OF SEDANS, NO TROOPS WERE SEEN AND ACTIVITY APPEARED NORMAL.

(5) MMD HQ, 1030-1100 HRS 11 NOV: NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY.

(6) MFA, 1000-1030 HRS 11 NOV: NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY NOTED. EMBASSY OFFICER CALLING ON MFA AT SAME TIME OBSERVED NOTHING ABNORMAL.

(7) CENTRAL AFLO, 1430 HRS 11 NOV: NO ACTIVITY NOTED.

(8) PAVLETSKIY TRAIN STATION, 1230 HRS 11 NOV: A MILITARY KOMMANDANT JEEP WITH AN MR/RED OFFICER AND THREE MR/RED SOLDIERS WAS PARKED OUTSIDE THE MILITARY KOMMANDANT'S OFFICE. NO OTHER ACTIVITY WAS NOTED.

(9) MOSCOW CENTRAL VOYENKOM, 1300 HRS 11 NOV: FOUR BUSES PARKED NEARBY, SEVERAL OFFICERS WITH RED ARMBANDS STOOD NEAR THE GATE AND SEVERAL PROBABLE DRAFTEES WERE LOITERING IN THE AREA. NO INDICATIONS OF A RESERVE CALL-UP WERE NOTED. OTHER LOCAL RAYON COMMISSARIATS WERE QUIET.

(10) MOSCOW MD HQ, 1215 HRS 11 NOV: NORMAL ACTIVITY LEVELS OBSERVED.

(11) WP HQ, 1415 HRS 11 NOV: QUIET, ONE ARTY GEN-MAJ EMERGING FROM FRONT GATE.

(12) BELORUSSIAN TRAIN STATION, 1400 HRS 11 NOV: NORMAL ACTIVITY.

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INFO WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

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RHFPAAL/USAFCEHC RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY

RULWTOC/SACINC OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY

RUWTFKF/HQ SAC OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY

RUFTIAA/DIRNSA FCGM MD PRIORITY

RUSNMQA/HQSCINCPAC WAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 13590

(13) OTHER ACTIVITY: NO SIGNS OF TRAFFIC REGULATORS OR MOVEMENT BY MVD TROOPS ALONG SHOSSE ENTUSIASTOV WERE OBSERVED 1200-1300 HOURS. A VAI (MILITARY POLICE) VOLGA SEDAN WAS OBSERVED BOTH ON GERTSENA STREET AND KAMENNY MOST. DURING THE EARLY AFTERNOON HOURS SOVIET FLAGS WITH A BLACK STRIP ALONG THE EDGE BEGAN TO APPEAR AROUND THE CITY. MOST PEOPLE QUESTIONED ON THE STREET WERE STILL UNAWARE OF BREZHNEV'S DEATH.

9B. (C) ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: MONARCH MAKER COVERAGE WILL CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS WITH TWICE-DAILY IP REPORTING. SPOT REPORTS WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY IF ANY ACTIVITY OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE IS OBSERVED.

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE

12. (U) SPEC INST: DIRC-NC

13. (U) PREP BY: 25x1

25x1

15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO

SIT: PUBS FLD

FOR:

WHSR COMMENTS:

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NLR Crest NR 748-23-32-70

BY CN NARA DATE 4/8/13

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*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****

16. (U) ENCLS: N/A
17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A
SANITIZED VERSION WILL BE RELEASED BY USDAO MOSCOW TO:
UK, CA, FR, GE, IT
DECL: OADR
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PAGE 01 AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2807 DTG: 110937Z NOV 82 PSN: 001430
SIT673 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 315/0945Z

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MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9263

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9309
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LENINGRAD 02807
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINT, UR
SUBJ: BREZHNEV'S DEATH--REQUEST FROR INSTRUCTIONS AND
- INITIAL IMPRESSIONS

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. I REQUEST PERMISSION: 1) TO CALL THE HEAD OF THE DIP AGENCY AND OFFER ON BEHALF OF THE USG OUR CONDOLENCES OVER BREZHNEV'S DEATH AND 2) TO SIGN THEBOOK OF CONDOLENCES WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE PLACED AT SMOLNY.
3. SO FAR WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING UNUSUAL HERE. MEMBERS OF THE STAFF HAVE BEEN OUT AND ABOUT SINCE THE FIRST INDICATORS EARLY THIS MORNING. PHONE LINES WERE JAMMED FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES AFTER THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS. HOWEVER, AS OF AN HOUR LATER EVERYTHING SEEMED THE SAME AS ANY OTHER THURSDAY MORNING. ONE ELDERLY WOMAN WAS SEEN SOBBING IN THE METRO. OTHER SOVIETS NOTED THE FACT OF BREZHNEV'S DEATH BUT HAD NO REACTION TO IT. SHINN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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NLRR 78-23-32-8-9
BY CDN NARA DATE 12/19/15

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 0008 DTG: Z PSN: 006115
SIT527 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 318/1217Z

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MESSAGE:

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O-141230Z NOV 82
FM DON GREGG ABOARD AIR FORCE TWO
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

REF: STATE 9788

SUBJ: BILATERALS IN MOSCOW.

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE PLEASED TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI. THE MEETING WITH THE JAPANESE NEED NOT BE LONG.

2. IF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OLD FRIEND, HUANG HUA, HEADS THE PRC DELEGATION, A SHORT MEETING SHOULD BE ARRANGED FOR AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, WITH THE SECRETARY HANDLING THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETING. IF SOMEONE ELSE COMES, AT THE VICE PREMIER LEVEL, THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET MORE SUBSTANTIVELY, IF THAT WERE MUTUALLY CONVENIENT.

DON GREGG

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BY 60713 NARA DATE 12/10/15

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUEADWW #8213 3181004
Z 140945Z NOV 82
FM DON GREGG ABOARD AIR FORCE TWO

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW (FOR SEC SHULTZ AND AMB HARTMAN) FLASH

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
WHITE HOUSE SITROOM
BT

~~SECRET~~ WH08213

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV FUNERAL -- VIEWING THE BODY

REF: (A) MOSCOW SECTO 15005

1. VICE PRESIDENT ALL FOR SUGGESTED VIEWING OF BODY IMMEDIATELY
UPON ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW.

2. WILL LEAVE ALL LOGISTICS TO THOSE ALREADY ON THE GROUND IN MOSCOW.
PLEASE SHARE ALL ARRANGEMENTS WITH DAN SULLIVAN AND RALPH BASHAM.

DON GREGG

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-32-10-6

BY GDB NARA DATE 12/10/15

~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2808 DTG: 111222Z NOV 82 PSN: 001580
SIT668 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 315/1235Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

HAS SIMPLY NOT CAUSED ANY SURPRISE. UNDOUBTEDLY,
OF COURSE, ATTITUDES ARE QUITE DIFFERENT WITHIN THE
PARTY APPARAT. SHINN

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHLG #2808 315122Z
O 111222Z NOV 82
FM AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9264

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9310

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LENINGRAD 02808
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINT, UR
SUBJ: BREZHNEV'S DEATH: INITIAL REACTION - BUSINESS
AS USUAL
REF: LENINGRAD 2807

1. ~~TO~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AS MEMBERS OF THE CONSULATE HAVE BEEN REPORTING
IN, THE OVERALL PICTURE WE GET FROM VARIOUS LOCATIONS
IS OF BUSINESS AS USUAL. THE LENINGRAD MAN-IN-THE-
STREET SEEMS REMARKABLY APATHETIC OVER BREZHNEV'S DEATH.

3. STANDING IN FOOD LINES WE HAVE HEARD PEOPLE
SIMPLY PASSING THE WORD TO EACH OTHER. THERE HAS BEEN
VIRTUALLY NO EMOTION EXPRESSED AT ALL. THE EX-
PRESSION OF GRIEF CITED IN REFTEL REMAINS THE ONLY
ONE WE HAVE SEEN. TYPICAL OF OUR OBSERVATIONS WAS
THAT OF TWO YOUNG COUPLES IN A SMALL BEER PARLOR WHO
WERE WATCHING TV, LAUGHING AND CONVERSING ABOUT THEIR
PERSONAL AFFAIRS. ONE STAFF MEMBER WHO WENT FOR A RUN
ENCOUNTERED THREE SOLDIERS IN A JEEP WHO, IN A
JOCULAR WAY, CHALLENGED HIM TO A RACE. HE REPORTED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT THE HERMITAGE WAS OPEN AS USUAL. ANOTHER
CONSULATE MEMBER ESTIMATED THAT SMILES PREVAILED OVER
SAD FACES BY A MARGIN OF TEN TO ONE. THIS WAS NOT
TO SAY THAT PEOPLE WERE HAPPY ABOUT BREZHNEV'S DEATH,
BUT RATHER THAT THEY WERE UNCONCERNED. TWO CONSULATE
OFFICERS, WHO OBSERVED THE SITUATION AT PARTY
HEADQUARTERS (SMOLNY) REPORT THAT ALL IS QUIET THERE.
ALL THEY OVERHEARD WERE PEOPLE IN SMALL GROUPS
SHARING STORIES OF WHERE THEY HAD BEEN WHEN THEY FIRST
HEARD THE NEWS.

4. WE HAVE SEEN NO RPT NO PRESENCE OR EVIDENCE OF ANY
UNUSUAL MOVEMENT OF MILITARY OR MILITIA.

5. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT BREZHNEV'S DEATH HAS BEEN
SO LONG IN THE ANTICIPATION THAT ITS OCCURRENCE

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NLRR 748-23-32-11-5
BY CSDB NARA DATE 12/10/15

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8234817

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November 11, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

82 NOV 12 A 7: 03

NLRR 748-23-32-2-4


BY 1008 NARA DATE 12/10/15

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Statement on Death of President
Brezhnev

Per your request, we attach a draft statement for
the President to use at tonight's press conference on
President Brezhnev's death and some proposed questions
and answers.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Press Statement and
Q's and A's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLAS: OADR

52
Drafted: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.

Clearances: EUR: MPalmer
EUR: RBlackwill

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-2332-12-4
BY CDD NARA DATE 12/10/15

53
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SUGGESTED BREZHNEV PORTION OF PRESIDENT'S OPENING
STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 11, 1982

Our veterans show us what the American qualities of
steadfastness and sacrifice mean in a world of change.
These qualities are more important now than ever.

President Brezhnev's death yesterday morning is
another reminder of change.

I spoke earlier today of my intention to continue
to work to improve our relationship with the Soviet Union
in the wake of President Brezhnev's death. Our two nations
bear a tremendous responsibility for peace in a dangerous
time. Each of us must recognize the consequences of
failure. The American Government has put forth serious
and far-reaching proposals to reduce the levels of nuclear
and conventional forces. I pledge to the new Soviet
leadership that we will continue to pursue every avenue
and opportunity for progress in this effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

PROPOSED Qs & As FOR PRESIDENT'S
NEWS CONFERENCE

Q: Can you tell us anything about the current situation in Moscow? Has there been any unusual movement of Soviet military forces?

A: Our information is that arrangements for Brezhnev's funeral are proceeding. Otherwise we are aware of no unusual events in Moscow or any unusual Soviet military movements.

Q: Has there been any change in the status of U.S. forces?

A: No. There are no plans for any such change.

Q: Can you tell us about the U.S. delegation to the Brezhnev funeral?

A: I have asked Vice President Bush to lead a distinguished bi-partisan delegation of Americans to represent me at President Brezhnev's funeral. The delegation will include Secretary of State Shultz, members of Congress from both parties, and several former Secretaries of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Q: Why did you decide not to attend the funeral yourself?

A: I believe the distinguished delegation we have announced, headed by the Vice President as my personal representative, will appropriately represent the United States.

Q: Can you give us your views on who might succeed Brezhnev?

A: It would be entirely inappropriate for me to speculate on this question which is entirely an internal Soviet matter.

Q: With Brezhnev's death, isn't this the time for a new effort by the United States to improve U.S.-Soviet relations?

A: The U.S. is prepared for an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union is prepared to act with restraint. Unfortunately, Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Poland, and elsewhere have made progress in our bilateral relationship extremely difficult. Our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations will be consistent, firm and steady in the coming period. We will make every effort to determine Soviet willingness to join us in an improved relationship. If there are positive changes in Soviet policies there will be a positive response from us.

Q: What impact do you think Brezhnev's death will have on the prospects for agreements on START and INF?

A: We have been negotiating seriously with the Soviets in Geneva toward balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels in both the START and INF talks. The U.S. will continue this effort and I would certainly expect that the Soviet side will also wish to continue. We will be alert to any opportunities for progress.

Q: What about a summit. Doesn't it make sense for you to have an early meeting with the new leadership?

A: I have made clear in the past that we are prepared to meet with Soviet leaders wherever such meetings can be mutually beneficial. This remains our position.

Drafted:EUR/SOV:LCNapper
11/11/82, ext. 20821

Cleared:EUR/SOV:TWSimons
EUR:MPalmer
EUR:RBlackwill

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 12 NOV 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 11 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: MEDIA
USSR

Q+A

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: PRES STATEMENT ON DEATH OF BREZHNEV

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

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COMMENTS OBE UPON RECEIPT TO NSC/S

REF# 8234817

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

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RECEIVED 12 NOV 82 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 11 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

NATO

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

CHINA P R

JAPAN

AUSTRALIA

NEW ZEALAND

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO ALLIES ON BREZHNEV DEATH

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 12 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

BLAIR

KRAEMER

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MCGAFFIGAN

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WHEELER

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COMMENTS

REF# 8234826

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

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OBE per RP

12 Nov see note - 2

DISPATCH

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OBE
An edited text has
been worked in &
agreed upon yesterday
11/12/82 per RP



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8234826

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DECLASSIFIED

November 11, 1982 11 P 6:49

NLRR 74823 32-13-3
BY CLB NARA DATE 12/20/15WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMMEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Allies on Brezhnev's Death

Attached is the text of a message we recommend the President send today to Allied leaders on Western policy in the aftermath of Brezhnev's death. We suggest the message be sent to all fifteen NATO leaders, plus those of Japan, Australia and New Zealand. We would also propose to provide the text of the President's message to NATO Secretary General Luns for his information.

In addition, we have prepared the attached modified version of this letter for the Chinese leadership. We believe this second letter would be a constructive step in resuming our exchanges with China on matters of strategic concern.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

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DECL: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748 23-32-13-3

BY CLB NARA DATE 12/10/17

171174

Dear

The death of President Leonid Brezhnev brings to a close an eventful eighteen-year period in world affairs, upon which that leader has left his mark. Whether his passing will open a period qualitatively different in important respects remains to be seen. Certainly, in the near term we expect little change in Soviet behavior, either as regards the Soviet Union's relations with others, or the internal ordering of its own society. For the present, our Embassy reports Moscow calm, and there are no signs of unusual Soviet military activity.

Over the longer term, however, there may be changes in the Soviet Union of a sort which could present the West with new opportunities and new challenges. The direction of such change can be influenced, for better or worse, by the manner in which we Western leaders conduct our relations with the Soviet Union in the coming months. At this important juncture, therefore, I want to share with you my thoughts upon the path ahead.

Our approach to the Soviet Union has been based upon the principle that one must hold that government responsible for its actions, and conduct our relationship with it based upon the realities of Soviet behavior. This means we must

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stand ready to improve these relations, and add new content to them, when Soviet actions so merit, just as we have sought to express, through a cooling of our relationship, our disapproval of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Poland and Indochina in recent years. As the current Soviet leadership surveys the future, and as a new generation of leaders gradually emerges, it is particularly important that they recognize that the nature of their relationship with the West will depend upon the way they conduct Soviet policy.

Under current circumstances I believe Western leaders should, in our public and private statements directed to the Soviet leadership, affirm the possibility for enhanced East-West cooperation and for improved relations between our countries, while stressing at the same time that such changes will require concrete evidence of Soviet willingness to exercise restraint. I am sending a message of condolence to First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov in this constructive spirit. Secretary Shultz has written similarly to Foreign Minister Gromyko. Vice President Bush, who will lead our delegation to President Brezhnev's funeral, will communicate the same message regarding our intentions to the Soviet leadership. In our public statements over the coming days, I and other

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intensive exchange as regards developments in the USSR, analyses of their consequence, and intentions regarding our respective policy statements and communications.

FOR
NATO
LEADERS

/_ The meeting of NATO foreign ministers next month offers an early opportunity for an authoritative exchange of Western views on the future course of developments in the USSR, and their consequence for Western policies. It will also provide an opportunity to send the sort of positive, firm, and concerted message to the Soviet leadership which I trust will mark all our actions throughout this important period. _7

We will be following events in Moscow and elsewhere closely in the coming days. We will very much appreciate receiving your government's evaluation of the situation, and thoughts regarding future Western policy. I know that we will work closely together to ensure that the approach of a united West during the period will have the effect we all desire upon the new Soviet leadership.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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His Excellency
Zhao Ziyang,
Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China,
Beijing.

171175
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 78-23-32-13-3

Dear Mr. Premier:

BY 600 NARA DATE 12/1/88

The death of President Leonid Brezhnev brings to a close an eventful eighteen-year period in world affairs, upon which that leader has left his mark. Whether his passing will open a period qualitatively different in important respects remains to be seen. Certainly, in the near term we expect little change in Soviet behavior, either as regards the Soviet Union's relations with others, or the internal ordering of its own society. For the present, our Embassy reports Moscow calm, and there are no signs of unusual Soviet military activity.

Over the longer term, however, there may be changes in the Soviet Union of a sort which could present new opportunities and new challenges. The direction of such change can be influenced, for better or worse, by the manner in which other leaders conduct their relations with the Soviet Union in the coming months. At this important juncture, therefore, I want to share with you my thoughts on our course in the months ahead.

Our approach to the Soviet Union has been based upon the principle that one must hold that government responsible for its actions, and conduct our relationship with it based upon the realities of Soviet behavior. This means we must stand ready to improve these relations, and add new content to them,

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- 2 -

when Soviet actions so merit, just as we have sought to express, through a cooling of our relationship, our disapproval of Soviet behavior in recent years, in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, in Poland, and elsewhere. As the current Soviet leadership surveys the future, and as a new generation of leaders gradually emerges, it is particularly important that they recognize that the nature of their relationship with other nations will depend upon the way they conduct Soviet policy.

Under current circumstances we, in our public and private statements directed to the Soviet leadership, will seek to affirm the possibility for enhanced East-West cooperation and for improved relations between our countries, while stressing at the same time that such changes will require concrete evidence of Soviet willingness to exercise restraint. I am sending a message of condolence to First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov in this constructive spirit. Secretary Shultz has written similarly to Foreign Minister Gromyko. Vice President Bush, who will lead our delegation to President Brezhnev's funeral, will communicate the same message regarding our intentions to the Soviet leadership. In our public statements over the coming days, I and other U.S. officials will similarly affirm our desire to build a better relationship with the USSR upon the basis of mutual respect and responsibility.

Continuity will mark the nature of our contacts with the Soviet Union in the weeks ahead. We will continue all the

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- 3 -

discussions and negotiations we have under way, including the arms control negotiations in Geneva and Vienna, and our dialogue on critical regional issues. We will be alert to any possibility of forward progress. In Moscow and Washington we will maintain our regular contacts. Secretary Shultz will be ready to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko for another in-depth exchange when mutually convenient.

We will be following events in Moscow and elsewhere closely in the coming days. I hope that in coming days our governments can maintain an intensive exchange as regards developments in the USSR. We will very much appreciate receiving your government's evaluation of the situation, and thoughts regarding future policy.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~