

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR-(01/19/1983-01/21/1983)

Box: RAC Box 23

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder USSR (1/19/83-1/21/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171289	MEMO	W. CLARK TO D. REGAN RE BUTTER BARTER ARRANGEMENTS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-1-7	1	1/15/1983	B1
171290	MEMO	H. NAU TO W. CLARK RE BUTTER BARTER ARRANGEMENTS	1	1/15/1983	B1
171291	MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-3-5	1	2/1/1983	B1
171293	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR	1	1/26/1983	B1
171294	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-5-3	2	1/19/1983	B1
171292	MEMO	DRAFT OF DOC #171291 (M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-3-5	1	ND	B1
171295	CABLE	STATE 15921 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-6-2	4	1/19/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder USSR (1/19/83-1/21/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171296	MEMO	W. CLARK TO G. SHULTZ RE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-7-1	2	1/28/1983	B1
171297	NOTE	BUD TO JUDGE CLARK RE MEMO (WRITTEN ON NSC ROUTING SLIP) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-8-0	2	ND	B1
171298	NOTE	COPY OF PAGE 2 OF DOC #171297 (BUD TO JUDGE CLARK RE MEMO - BACK OF NSC ROUTING SLIP) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-8-0	1	ND	B1
171300	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 (W/ADDED NOTES) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-9-9	3	1/28/1983	B1
171301	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-10-7	4	1/19/1983	B1
171302	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983	1	1/22/1983	B1
171303	SCHEDULING MEMO	RE 1/24/83 MEETING WITH DON KENDALL (INCL. ATTACHED TALKING POINTS) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-40-12-5	2	1/21/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]


C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0368
add-on

January 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM CLARK
ED MEESE

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER 
SUBJECT: Barter Arrangement with the USSR on Butter

Secretary Block has indicated to me that he discussed the attached paper on barter arrangements with the USSR on butter with Don Regan. Don wants to discuss this matter the SIG/IEP tomorrow and Jack agreed. However, Jack will want to take the matter to the President if it is not resolved in the SIG/IEP to his satisfaction.

This is simply an alert. I would suggest that we arrange either an ad hoc meeting with the appropriate players and the President, hold a Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture meeting with the President on the matter or schedule an NSC meeting with the President on the matter. What Jack would like to avoid is having the matter settled with the President without an opportunity to present his case.

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The USSR will import up to 225,000 MT of butter in CY1983. Barter of CCC-owned butter for USSR-owned strategic material could be linked to a Soviet agreement to import as much as an additional 6 million tons of U.S. grain (over current estimated imports of 8 million tons of U.S. grain). Two options to implement this butter for strategic materials arrangement are available: (1) a Government-to-government barter arrangement, or (2) use of U.S. barter contractors. Details and implications of this proposal are spelled out in the attached paper.

BARTER ARRANGEMENT WITH THE USSR

BACKGROUND

- It is estimated that during CY 1983, the USSR will import up to 225,000 MT of butter. The major suppliers of butter to the USSR have been the EC, Finland, Sweden and New Zealand. The USSR is currently interested in acquiring up to 100,000 MT, and it is expected that the EC will make a strong effort to conclude an arrangement for this amount within the next few weeks. A barter arrangement involving the exchange of CCC-owned butter and USSR strategic materials for the national strategic stockpile would probably place the U.S. in competition with the EC.

PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR LEVERAGING GRAIN TRADE

The barter of CCC-owned butter to the USSR for strategic materials would be of special importance to them and could be linked with a Soviet agreement to purchase a larger quantity of U.S. grain. Such a commitment would probably not be entered into in writing, but would need to be discussed and clearly understood. In the current October/September year, the Soviets are currently projected to import a total of 38 million tons of grain from all origins, including 8 million from the U.S. In agreeing to barter U.S. butter to them, we could ask that this be increased to perhaps as much as 14 MMT.

AUTHORITY

CCC has broad legal authority to barter CCC-owned butter for strategic materials and to hold title to the strategic material until transferred to the stockpile (See attached OGC memo for detailed opinion).

NATIONAL STRATEGIC STOCKPILE

The USSR produces the following strategic materials which are deficit to the stockpile (See attach table for USSR production, exports and imports).

<u>STRATEGIC MATERIAL</u>	<u>STOCKPILE GOAL</u>	<u>STOCKPILE SHORTFALL</u>
COBALT	85,400,000 Lbs.	41,607,769 Lbs.
NICKEL	200,000 ST	167,790 ST
TITANIUM SPONGE	195,000 SDT	195,000 SDT
PALLADIUM	3,000,000 Tr Oz	1,747,212 Tr Oz
PLATINUM	1,310,000 Tr Oz	870,402 Tr Oz
IRIDIUM	98,000 Tr Oz	81,010 Tr Oz

The materials must meet GSA specifications. GSA would provide a stockpile site and manage the inventory.

From a transportation cost standpoint, it is to CCC's advantage to negotiate for cobalt, palladium and platinum. (See Cargo Preference section).

METHOD OF OPERATION

OPTION 1. GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT BARTER ARRANGEMENT.

- CCC, in cooperation with GSA, would enter into an agreement with the USSR covering the kind(s) quantity, specification and delivery of the strategic materials.
- CCC would negotiate the agreement with the USSR covering the quantity, quality and delivery of the butter.
- CCC would delivery the butter to the USSR FAS U.S. port. Ocean transport to be furnished by USSR. (Cargo preference not applicable)
- The USSR would deliver the strategic material to CCC C&F U.S. port. Agreement would provide that 50 percent of the material would be shipped on U.S. flag vessels to comply with Cargo Preference Act.
- CCC would accept title to the materials at U.S. ports and would pay domestic transporation costs of the strategic material from U.S. port to the GSA storage site.
- GSA would pay the cost of placing the material in the storage site and all subsequent costs of maintaining the inventory.

OPTION 2. USE OF U.S. BARTER CONTRACTORS

- CCC would issue invitations for U.S. bidder to enter into a barter arrangement with the USSR under which the contractor would deliver CCC-owned butter (from CCC-stocks and newly purchased unsalted butter of 82 percent milkfat) to the USSR and receive for the account of CCC, strategic materials from the USSR.
- CCC would accept offers on the basis of the most viable proposed arrangement and proposed barter exchange.
- CCC and GSA would establish a range for the value of the material (delivered USSR port) and CCC would establish a range for the value of the butter delivered FAS U.S. ports. The successful barter contractor would negotiate within these ranges and could only deviate with the approval of CCC and GSA.
- The barter contractor would furnish a performance bond in favor of CCC for an agreed upon amount. CCC would draw against the performance bond in the event the barter contractor failed to carry out its responsibilities under the agreement with CCC.
- CCC would deliver the butter to the barter contractor FAS U.S. port. Ocean transportation to be furnished by the USSR (Cargo preference not applicable).

- 6
- The barter contractor would deliver the strategic material to CCC basis C&F U.S. ports. The agreement between CCC and the barter contractor would provide that the barter contractor pay the cost of ocean transportation and related charges, and that 50 percent of the material be shipped on U.S. flag vessels to comply with the Cargo Preference Act.
 - CCC would accept title to the materials at U.S. ports and would pay domestic transportation costs of the materials from U.S. ports to the GSA storage site.
 - GSA would pay the cost of placing the material in the storage site and all subsequent costs of maintaining the inventory.
 - The barter contractor would receive a quantity of the material at U.S. ports as payment for the barter exchange fee, ocean transportation costs and other related costs approved by CCC. The quantity of the material would be based on the barter exchange fee.

Comments

A barter arrangement would have the following advantages:

- Reduce the inventory of CCC-owned butter and the amount which would otherwise be purchased by CCC under its price support program, thereby reducing program costs.
- The displacement of EC exports of butter to the USSR.
- CCC would swap a perishable commodity for a strategic material needed for the national stockpile which would have a longer storage life. This would probably be looked upon as a favorable arrangement by the majority of the U.S. public.
- Positive reaction from most dairy farmers and some from U.S. public.
- Would benefit the U.S. in general by the acquisition of materials needed for the national stockpile.
- CCC could later receive reimbursement from GSA for some of its program outlay.

- 6
- Purchase unsalted, 82 percent milkfat butter. Projections are that CCC will purchase about 390 million pounds (172,365 MT) of butter in FY33. One hundred thousand metric tons would represent 56 percent of CCC's projected purchases. CCC buys 80 percent of its butter during the period January-June.

Other Considerations

See the attached statement prepared by ASCS of its concern regarding the delivery of unsalted, 82 percent milkfat butter.

RECOMMENDATION ON QUALITY OF BUTTER.

Use a combination of all options to provide the quantity of butter needed. CCC should purchase unsalted 82 percent milkfat butter for delivery January thru June and during the last part of the year should swap CCC-owned butter for unsalted 82 percent milkfat butter. This would prevent heavy purchases by CCC during the off-flush period. The CCC-owned butter would be diverted into the domestic market and would prevent inflated prices during peak use of high milkfat products such as ice cream.

It is believed that by using a combination of the options, CCC could deliver up to 100,000 MT. If only a direct purchase is used, consideration should be given to a maximum of 50,000 MT per year.

Reimbursement to CCC

Currently, GSA does not have funds which could be used to reimburse CCC for the market price of the strategic materials. However, CCC has authority to hold title to the materials. Options available to CCC include:

- Provide support to GSA to obtain an budget sufficient to reimburse CCC for the materials.
- Support legislation which would authorize CCC on a one-time arrangement to transfer title of the materials acquired under this arrangement to GSA without reimbursement.
- Support legislation which would authorize the GSA to sell the materials for the account of CCC.

CARGO PREFERENCE

The Cargo Preference Act would apply to the shipment of the strategic material since the material is being acquired under a government contract.

The Cargo Preference Act would not apply to the shipment of the butter since the value of the butter would be negotiated at world market prices and delivered FAS U.S. ports and the arrangement would not involve any credit arrangements.

PRIOR PROPOSALS

Attached are letters from Philbro-Salomon Inc. and Cometals, Inc. regarding a barter arrangement with the USSR.

PRICESButter

World butter price (fresh, unsalted,
82 percent butterfat), f.o.b. Europe.....\$2,025/MT (\$.92/lb.)

Estimated ocean freight, U.S. east
coast to Black Sea port.....\$150/MT
(\$1.07/lb.)^{1/}

F.o.b. U.S. east coast port.....\$1,875/MT (\$.85/lb.)

Stowage Charges.....\$33.29/MT
(\$1.51/cwt)

F.a.s. U.S. east coast port.....\$1,840/MT (\$.84/lb.)

Strategic Materials

GSA material on prices is attached.

QUALITY OF BUTTER

The inventory of CCC-owned butter is salted with 80 percent milkfat. The USSR is interested in butter that is unsalted and 82 percent milkfat. (See attached detailed study by ASCS).

Options available

- Negotiate with the USSR to accept butter directly from CCC inventory. USSR preference and usual imports of butter are of unsalted, 82 percent milkfat. The U.S. may be able to negotiate for small quantities of CCC-owned butter.
- Swap CCC-owned butter with manufacturers for unsalted, 82 percent milkfat butter. This could prevent major price swings in low production months since the CCC-owned butter would go into the domestic market.

^{1/} Ocean freight rates are estimated. - A published conference rate for refrigerated butter is not available according to the Ocean Transportation Division, GSM.

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



PROTECTED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

12/14/88

368

UNITED STATES

1983 JAN 15 PM 1 48

27

MESSAGE NO. 149 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 1

FROM William P. Clark (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION BUTTE BATTLE AIRCRAFTS

(AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>STATE</u>	<u>SECURITY SERVICE</u>		<u>1</u>
<u>TRAVEL</u>	<u>SECURITY SERVICE</u>		

REMARKS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIA LDX

a

THE WHITE HOUSE

0368

WASHINGTON

171289

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

January 15, 1983

NLRR 748-23-40-1-7

BY 11013 NARA DATE 4/8/13

Don

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD P. REGAN
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Butter Barter Arrangements (U)

I have consulted with Secretary Shultz. We need to clarify the coordinating procedures for handling discussions within the Administration on a possible barter arrangement with the Soviets (i.e. US butter for Soviet nickel). This issue has important political as well as economic ramifications and should be handled in the SIG-IEP process for decision by the President. (C)

I recommend a three stage process:

1. You initiate a secure call with Secretaries Shultz, Block, Brock and any other relevant cabinet officers to discuss informally whether the issue should go any further. Since the formal consideration of this issue in the interagency process will entail certain vulnerabilities, we should decide deliberately whether we wish to go this route.
2. If there is a difference of view on this first step, the matter should be referred informally to the National Security Advisor for decision by the President.
3. If it is decided to prepare the issue formally for interagency discussion, the issue should be handled in the SIG-IEP process and forwarded to the President through the NSC for decision. (C)

The decision on whether or not to prepare the issue formally for consideration in the SIG-IEP process should be communicated to me no later than C.O.B., Tuesday, January 18, 1983. (C)

Bier

William P. Clark

cc Secy Shultz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/19/83-1/21/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

303

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171290	MEMO H. NAU TO W. CLARK RE BUTTER BARTER ARRANGEMENTS	1	1/15/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-403-5

500

S/S 8301379

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

BY GDB NARA DATE 3/4/8
4/8/13

171291

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Congressional Delegation to USSR Led
by House Majority Whip: Implications for
Afghan Sanctions Policy (C)

We have reviewed and concur with the suggestions set forth in your memorandum of January 19. In addition to the responses suggested in that memorandum, we recommend that the press guidance make it explicitly clear that Administration policy is unchanged, but Congress has its own prerogatives. (C)

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

**National Security Council
The White House**

504

11

Package # 0368

1300P
JAN 1 5 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			<u>NYC</u>

861 5
JAN 1 5 1983

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

send via LDX.
R

RECEIVED 15 JAN 83 13

TO CLARK FROM NAU

DOCDATE 15 JAN 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/15 (CO)

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

USSR

SUBJECT: BUTTER BARTER ARRANGEMENTS

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 1/15	clark Sgd Memo		HW, Index

DISPATCH CLARK W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MS

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	2 1/19	Rec'd Fuller memo/Response		
Nau	S 1/19	Any action Required	1/21	same
	C 1/19	NFA per Nau		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MS

PRESERVATION COPY

RECEIVED 20 JAN 83 09

TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 19 JAN 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/15 (CDB)

KEYWORDS: USSR

CONGRESSIONAL

FOLEY, TOM

AFGHANISTAN

EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR - IMPLICATIONS FOR AFGHAN
SANCTIONS POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 22 JAN 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

SOMMER

MYER

KEMP

BLAIR

KIMMITT

DUR

COMMENTS

REF# 8301379

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>FEB 0 1 1983</i>	<i>Clark approved</i>		
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>for signature</i>	<i>2/2</i>	
	<i>FEB 0 1 1983</i>	<i>Wheeler Sgd (Memo to Bremer)</i>		<i>Do, [initials]</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>2/1</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/19/83-1/21/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

303

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171293	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO USSR	1	1/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8301379

0500

16

171294

83 JAN 19 10:09

January 19, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

NLRR 748 23-40 J-3

BY CSB NARA DATE 4/8/83

SUBJECT: Proposed Congressional Delegation to USSR Led by House
Majority Whip: Implications for Afghan Sanctions Policy

House Majority Whip Tom Foley met with Under Secretary Eagleburger December 21 to inform the Department of Foley's intention to lead a large bipartisan delegation to Moscow during the 1983 Easter recess, and to ask the Department's views of such an undertaking.

Eagleburger noted that parliamentary exchanges had been suspended as part of the USG package of Afghan sanctions in January of 1980. Eagleburger pointed out that while the USG was not prepared to return to business as usual with the Soviets, absent significant improvement on the ground in Afghanistan, continuing adherence to the sanction on parliamentary exchanges was in large part up to the Congress. To date, Congressional groups traveling to the USSR had been considerably smaller than the pre-Afghan invasion delegations. Nonetheless, the Department would not stand in Foley's way, should he decide to proceed, and would of course provide the usual assistance.

We understand that Foley's staff subsequently met with Soviet Embassy Political Counselor Chetverikov to discuss Foley's planned USSR trip, and Foley followed up with a letter to Ambassador Dobrynin. While the Soviets have not yet given Foley a definitive reaction, they likely will view this delegation as a departure from our Afghan-related suspension of parliamentary exchanges. It would be the first of such stature to visit the Soviet Union strictly for parliamentary discussions (Sen. Dole's recent visit occurred in conjunction with the US/Soviet Trade and Economic Council Meeting and Congressman Lantos had no parliamentary meetings) since the previous House Majority Whip, John Brademas, led a large group in April, 1979. Moreover, we can expect the Soviets to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


DECL: OADR

17
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

press Foley for an invitation to a Soviet parliamentary group, a step that, if taken, could be seen as reviving the pre-Afghanistan parliamentary exchange program. When word of Foley's plans gets to the press, we thus should be prepared for some questioning as to whether we have decided to remove another Afghan sanction.

In response to such questions, we would propose to say that while we do not intend to return to "business as usual" with the USSR until there is a significant improvement in Soviet behavior in Afghanistan or elsewhere, we have not stood in the way of other Congressional groups that have traveled to the Soviet Union in the past three years. Should the press ask if Foley's trip means that a similar invitation will be extended to a Soviet parliamentary group, our guidance will be that we would not speak for the Congress regarding a possible return invitation. If asked how the Department will assist Foley with his trip, we will say that of course we stand ready to provide the usual support to Cong. Foley and his delegation in arranging their visit to the Soviet Union.


L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**National Security Council
The White House**

518

18

820 pm
1/26/83

Package # 500

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary		<u>[initials]</u>	
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-23-40-3-5

BY KIS NARA DATE 4/8/13

500

S/S 8301379

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

171292

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Congressional Delegation to USSR Led
by House Majority Whip: Implications for
Afghan Sanctions Policy

We have reviewed and concur with the suggestions set forth in your memorandum of January 19. In addition to the responses suggested in that memorandum, we recommend that press guidance be explicitly clear that our policy is unchanged but we are unable to curtail Congressional actions in this regard.

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

20

171245

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026
SIT776 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 019/0358Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST REPORTEPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5921 0190210
O 190157Z JAN 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-40-8-2

BY ODD NARA DATE 4/8/83

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
AMCDNSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 015921

NODIS

JERUSALEM FOR AMB. HA01B

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US, IS, SY

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT TO SYRIA

REF: (A) STATE 04007; (B) MOSCOW 0267; (C) STATE 05919

1. ~~BT~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SOVIET DCM BESSMERTNYKH CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DESIGNATE BURT JANUARY 17 TO CONVEY THE CONSIDERED SOVIET
RESPONSE TO OUR APPROACHES IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW
JANUARY 7 (REFTELS) ON DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5 ANTI-AIRCRAFT
MISSILES TO SYRIA.

3. AFTER SUMMARIZING DEMARCHE ORALLY, BESSMERTNYKH LEFT
THE FOLLOWING ENGLISH TEXT OF THE COMPLETE STATEMENT:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. BEGIN TEXT: WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENTATION MADE BY
THE U.S. SIDE ON THE QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT IN SYRIA OF
THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES, WHICH ARE CALLED IN THE WEST
SAM-5 MISSILES, WE WOULD LIKE FIRST OF ALL TO POINT OUT
THAT THE CONCERN THAT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN THIS RESPECT
IS TOTALLY UNFOUNDED AND EVEN UNJUSTIFIED. TO POSE THAT
ISSUE THE WAY THE U.S. SIDE DOES, MEANS TO PREJUDICE THE
INALIENABLE RIGHT OF EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE TO SELF-DEFENSE
RECOGNIZED BY THE UN CHARTER. IT BECOMES EVEN MORE
OBVIOUS IN THIS CASE SINCE THE MATTER CONCERNS
ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
DEFENDING STATE ITSELF.

5. WE HAVE MADE AND CONTINUE TO MAKE NO SECRET OF THE
FACT THAT WE ARE SUPPLYING THE VICTIMS OF THE ISRAELI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026

AGGRESSION WITH CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS TO ENSURE THEIR LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS.

6. IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN LEBANON AND UNENDING THREATS BEING MADE BY ISRAEL AGAINST SYRIA, IT IS ONLY NATURAL AND RIGHTFUL FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF SYRIA TO TAKE MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF THAT COUNTRY.

7. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION SERVE NO OTHER PURPOSE THAN TO DEFEND SYRIA FROM AIR ATTACKS. THEREFORE, THOSE SYSTEMS MAY CAUSE CONCERN ONLY WITH THOSE WHO WOULD CONTEMPLATE SUCH ATTACKS, THAT IS A NEW AGGRESSION. IN OTHER WORDS, IF SUCH A THREAT ON THE PART OF ISRAEL TO THE SECURITY OF SYRIA IS RULED OUT--AND IT IS THE U. S. THAT CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THAT RESPECT--THERE WILL BE NO NEED WHATSOEVER TO USE THE SAID ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS SUPPLIED TO SYRIA FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

8. WE CATEGORICALLY DECLINE THE ATTEMPT BY THE U. S. SIDE TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION RESPONSIBLE FOR A FURTHER POSSIBLE AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS TO PUT IN DOUBT THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTED AT THE LESSENING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND RESOLVING OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS POLICY HAS REPRESENTED AND CONTINUES TO REPRESENT A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF THE USSR AND ITS FRIENDS. IT WAS AGAIN REAFFIRMED WITH ALL DUE EMPHASIS IN THE PRAGUE DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES.

9. THE SOVIET UNION INVARIABLY STANDS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. IT HAS OFFERED A CONCRETE WAY OF ACHIEVING A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST--ITS PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD PRACTICALLY COINCIDE FULLY WITH THE POSITION OF THE ARAB STATES, AS IT WAS FORMULATED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE FEZ MEETING.

10. THE TENSIONS AND THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE CREATED AND ARE BEING FUELED BY THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY ISRAEL. THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS, TOO, THAT NONE OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIES ISRAEL WITH EVER MORE DESTRUCTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED MEANS OF WARFARE, THUS ENCOURAGING ISRAEL TO COMMIT NEW ACTS OF BRIGANDAGE AGAINST NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES.

11. IF THE UNITED STATES IS GENUINELY INTERESTED, AS IT SAYS, IN EASING TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN REACHING A POLITICAL SOLUTION THERE, IT POSSESSES AMPLE POSSIBILITIES TO MAKE ISRAEL CEASE THE PERPETRATION OF ARBITRARY AND LAWLESS ACTS. INSTEAD, THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TAKES UPON ITSELF THE UNSEEMLY ROLE OF AN ADVOCATE OF THE AGGRESSOR AND ATTEMPTS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR ISRAEL TO ATTAIN ITS AGGRESSIVE AND EXPANSIONIST AIMS WITH REGARD TO THE SOVEREIGN ARAB STATES

12. ACCORDINGLY, ALSO, THE FULL BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A FURTHER POSSIBLE AGGRAVATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WILL REST, ALONG WITH ISRAEL, ON THOSE WHO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026

SUPPORT ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND ENABLE ISRAEL TO CARRY OUT ITS ACTS OF AGGRESSION. END TEXT.

13. IN HIS REPLY, BURT SAID THAT WE WERE DISAPPOINTED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE DID NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE CONCERNS SET-OUT IN THE APPROACHES MADE EARLIER BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND AMBASSADOR HARTMAN. HE REITERATED THAT WE VIEW DEPLOYMENT OF A MISSILE IN SYRIA WITH AN INHERENT CAPABILITY FOR USE BEYOND SYRIAN BORDERS AS DESTABILIZING AND A POSSIBLE INHIBITION TO PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON AND A BROADER MIDEAST PEACE. HE ADDED THAT THIS SOVIET ANSWER WOULD NOT SERVE TO REDUCE THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ANY OF THE PARTIES IN THE REGION; INDEED, IT WOULD INCREASE THEM.

14. BESSMERTNYKH REJOINED THAT THE SA-5 SYSTEM WAS NO THREAT TO ISRAEL AT ALL, THAT AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPON IS NOT AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON, AND THAT THE MISSILE POSED A THREAT ONLY TO WEAPONS USED AGAINST IT, NOT TO ANY COUNTRY. HE ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SECURITY PROBLEM AT ALL IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT ATTACK SYRIA.

15. BURT SAID THAT HE WANTED TO CLOSE BY REPEATING A VERY IMPORTANT POINT MADE TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER IN OUR PREVIOUS APPROACH. HE THEN REPEATED THE LAST TWO TALKING POINTS IN REF A CALLING FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN THIS MATTER AS A SIGNIFICANT SIGN OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THAT THEY HAVE SAID THEY SEEK.

16. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

17. COMMENT: WE NOTE THAT THIS SOVIET RESPONSE IS MORE CONCRETE THAN SIMILAR ASSURANCES WE RECEIVED TO OUR EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT OF SA-6 MISSILES IN LEBANON IN 1981. AT THAT TIME, THE SOVIETS WOULD SAY ONLY THAT THE SA-6 WAS "PURELY DEFENSIVE," WITHOUT FURTHER ELABORATION. IN THE LATEST EXCHANGE ON THE SA-5, IN CONTRAST, THEY HAVE BROADENED THEIR ASSURANCES TO INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE TERRITORY TO BE DEFENDED (SYRIA) AND THE SPECIFIC SITUATION WHICH WOULD CALL THE MISSILES INTO USE (ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS).

SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

18. ALTHOUGH MORE FORTHCOMING, THE SOVIET RESPONSE DOES NOT ALLAY THE CONCERNS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED, AS BURT NOTED IN HIS REMARKS TO BESSMERTNYKH. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED TO HANDLE THIS ISSUE IN A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER AND TO OFFER A DECLARATIVE STATEMENT PLACING SOME LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF THEIR MISSILES. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE CLEARLY CONVEYED THEIR INTENTION TO FULLY DEPLOY THE SA-5 IN SYRIA AND HAVE DENIED ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. END COMMENT.
SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026

SECSTATE WASHDC 59211 DTG: 190157Z JAN 83 PSN: 006026

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 21 JAN 83 11

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G DOCDATE 19 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: US - USSR RELATIONS IN 1983

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 1/24</i>	<i>Pres for signature info</i>		
<i>per</i>	<i>IP JAN 2 6 1983</i>	<i>for info via PDB</i>		
	<i>JAN 2 8 1983</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		
	<i>C JAN 2 8 1983</i>	<i>Clark sgd memo</i>		<i>LB, UP</i>
				<i>DO</i>

DISPATCH *ed cox* JAN 2 8 1983 W/ATTCH FILE (C)

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

SYSTEM II
90065

STATE

123 JAN 28 AM 9 24

CEIV-1

3 JAN 28 49:13

MESSAGE NO. 254 CLASSIFICATION SECRET SENSITIVE PAGES 2

FROM ADM. PRINTER 456-2255
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>STATE</u>	<u>TERRY BREMER</u>		

REMARKS: JUDGE CLARK WILL PROVIDE ORIGINAL TO SEC. SMUTZ
THIS MORNING

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Log Number 90065

Date JAN 28 1983

Subject: US-USSR RELATIONS in 1983

CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Posa	_____ Mr. Tambs
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Guhin	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Reed	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. McGaffigan	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Cmdr. Blair	_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Col. Russell	_____ Col. Wheeler
_____ Mr. Boverie	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Ltc. Myer	_____ Col. Rye	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Nau	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Admin. Office
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Pipes	_____ Capt. Sims	
_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	1/28/83	12	Proby pr. w. k.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241				
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10th/Const. NW, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. #1051, Arlington, VA				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), 8th & SO Courthouse Rd, Arlington, VA				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

171296

January 28, 1983

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

NLRR 748 23-40-71
BY ODD NARA DATE 4/8/0

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

The President has asked me to respond to your thoughtful and suggestive memorandum of January 19 on the means of improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the coming year. (S)

I believe you are correct in assuming that the recent changes in Soviet leadership portend a more intense and more sophisticated Soviet challenge to U.S. interests. I have no problem at all with your excellent suggestions concerning such topics as our stand in arms reduction talks, regional issues, and human rights issues. Some questions, however, arise in connection with your proposal for significantly increased U.S.-Soviet dialogues. (S)

The Soviet leadership has always favored continuing multi-level dialogues with the United States because they offer Moscow opportunities for identifying and exploiting differences of opinion that exist in every democratic society and government. (Such differences probably also exist on the Soviet side but, given the closed nature of Communist society and government, we are unable to exploit them.) It is with this in mind that during the past two years we have sought to confine U.S.-Soviet political contacts largely to the ministerial and ambassadorial levels. We have staunchly rejected all Soviet efforts to establish an independent link to the White House which would enable it, as in the past, to play NSC against State, and State against NSC. Our assumption has been that if and when Moscow is prepared to make meaningful concessions on outstanding differences between us, these will be communicated to you through Gromyko or Dobrynin. It is then and then only that a dialogue on lower levels (departmental desks and "experts") should get underway. If and when a variety of outstanding issues can be brought near a point of resolution through such meetings then a summit between heads of state may be profitably arranged. (S)

In the light of these considerations your proposal for a possible summit and for more intense dialogues between specialists of the State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs strikes me as somewhat premature. The record of meetings which Al Haig and you have had with Gromyko

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

2

28

indicates no readiness on the Soviet part whatever to contemplate concessions on outstanding political and regional differences between us. The same holds true of such "expert" level meetings as were held on Afghanistan and Namibia last year. Would it, therefore, not make more sense for you to schedule another meeting with Gromyko (and Andropov, if possible) to determine whether Moscow's position on any outstanding issue has altered to the point where meaningful expert level talks could be usefully contemplated? (S)

If it appears that there is genuine possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the Soviet positions will continue to offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our effort to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations through intensified dialogues might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course. (S)

151

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-23-40-80

BY 6000 NARA DATE 4/8/17

National Security Council
The White House

Package #

90065

'83 JAN 24 A11:18

*Requiring me
Copy of package*

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

US-Soviet Relations

Judge--The staff's memo would have you take a position almost 180 degrees against that of the Secretary of State. If you are going to do that, it is not unreasonable that you have a program of your own. The paper doesn't really give you that. I think we have to bear in mind that Shultz is saying--like the President--now we have built the leverage, now let's see if we can use it. It's just that our staff (with good cause) believes that State will mess it up. (lift)

The only parts of the State paper that I --
would cut out are the proposal for the
resurrection of the Joint Commercial
Commission, the Afghanistan talks and the
business of having everyone from the desk
officer to the Ambassador talking to the
Russians--that's a recipe for disaster.

On the whole, I would think this is the kind
of paper which is better discussed in
person than acted upon after reading.
Recommend that you send both memos to
the president with yours unsigned but
with a note on the top to the effect
"Could we discuss this with George
before long?"

Bud


Brian,

1/28th

This type ~~memo~~
closes this package.
Judge gave orig to
Shultzy and copy sent
to Pres. with PDB.
J

Brin, ~~one~~ 1/28 32

JAN 27 1983

Also send a
copy of top memo
and Shultz memo
at Tab A to VP
Eyes Only. I?

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 718-23-40-80

BY 1603 NARA DATE 4/8/13

171298

The only parts of the State paper that I -- would cut out are the proposal for the resurrection of the Joint Commercial Commission, the Afghanistan talks and the business of having everyone from the desk officer to the Ambassador talking to the Russians--that's a recipe for disaster.

On the whole, I would think this is the kind of paper which is better discussed in person than acted upon after reading. Recommend that you send both memos to the president with yours unsigned but with a note on the top to the effect "Could we discuss this with George before long?"

Bud

Bud

MEMORANDUM

PRESIDENT

PV

SYSTEM II
90065

34

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~

January 28, 1983

*These 30 merit in much of what he proposes. RR*INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

Could we discuss this with George before he leaves for India? WPC

George Shultz forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) outlining how to handle U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. His memorandum sets forth a strategy for "countering new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is possible." George posits that a "process of dialogue" (Depts./Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would help us gauge the seriousness of Andropov's proclaimed intentions to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, and could permit us to seize the high ground domestically and internationally, and foster Allied unity.

Specifically, he argues that the Administration should continue its present arms control policy, resume a dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues (Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East), and continue to seek improved Soviet human rights behavior. On economic and bilateral issues, the Administration should pursue careful and controlled forward steps -- no dramatic expansion, only carefully paced positive change. Lastly, he suggests that the whole dialogue process would lead to a summit if relations warrant.

While there may be some initial public relations benefit to explore the possibility of "across the board" improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, I believe that we should have no illusions about the nature of the Andropov regime. Thus, I have serious reservations about the proposed timing and method of implementation in State's memo. I am specifically concerned that the U.S. would soon be forced to dissipate its leverage by making piecemeal concessions in bilateral negotiations which would not result in any meaningful Soviet response, but which would further intensify rather than mollify domestic and Allied pressures to do more. In sum, this course of action would be sure to arouse even more public expectations and would make it difficult for us to maintain a firm policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; moreover, Soviet activism is largely in the field of public propaganda. This is difficult to counter through dialogues which normally remain private.

Instead, I suggest that we use existing channels to smoke out real Soviet intentions and their willingness to be flexible on critical issues before embarking on a campaign to improve our bilateral relations. The private Shultz-Gromyko exchanges,

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-2340-9-9

3Y 6013 NARA DATE 12/14/15

should continue to concentrate on eliciting concrete Soviet views on how military, political and economic aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations can be specifically improved. Right now, I do not see any important areas for give in our basic positions: in arms control, any signal of readiness for compromise on INF would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness -- a sign that we fear we will be unable to deploy our missiles in Europe; on regional issues, we might be willing to reach some small compromises on individual issues, but we would not make major changes in our positions on Afghanistan, Central America or the Middle East. Since there is no basis for major reciprocal deals, I, therefore, do not see the justification for undertaking a major effort to intensify the dialogue.

If it appears that there is real possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the Soviet positions still offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our efforts to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course.

I have grave reservations not only about the overall thrust of the proposed strategy for "improving U.S.-Soviet relations", but I also disagree with some of the specific policy initiatives set forth.

1. On regional issues, State sees the possibility of new Soviet flexibility on Afghanistan and proposes tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement. There actually seems to be little willingness to compromise in the Soviet position and a proposed settlement by us could lead to negotiations which would take the heat off the Soviets and erode U.S. credibility with Pakistan.

2. Bringing Moscow into renewed bilateral discussions on Namibia/Angola as State proposes has pitfalls which we should avoid. I suggest that we continue to deal with the problems of Cuban presence in Angola through the frontline African states.

3. State recommends the restoration of government to government economic contacts through the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This proposal would send a dramatic signal of changed trade policies and procedures to the business community and would seriously hinder our efforts to forge Allied consensus on East-West economic relations. Any unilateral actions at this time would be counterproductive as the East-West Economic Study is not completed. Instead, trade should continue to be conducted through private channels. Restoration of the JCC can only be seriously contemplated if meaningful improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations appear imminent.

~~SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~

3

4. In accordance with the terms set forth in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the USSR), a U.S. dialogue with the Soviets should address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations and not just arms control. However, in addition to what State mentions, arms control -- without becoming the centerpiece -- should be addressed in these discussions with the expressed purpose of gauging Soviet seriousness of purpose on reductions, equality, verification and compliance. That is, Soviet behavior in INF and their willingness to fundamentally alter their present negotiating stance offers an excellent litmus test of true Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the U.S. If the Soviets are not prepared to relinquish the current clearcut nuclear superiority they enjoy in the European theater, no modicum of dialogue or even of piecemeal agreements in the political/economic sphere would decrease the Soviet threat to Western security.

5. A "process of dialogue" at all levels (Departments/Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would not be fruitful but counterproductive, as it would serve primarily Soviet interests. We should seek a better balance between contacts through Dobrynin and our Ambassador in Moscow.

6. Finally, a summit meeting is envisioned by State as the ultimate objective of the dialogue proposal. I see little point in summitry until the Soviets have made a major move which clearly demonstrates a willingness to reduce threats to us and the rest of the free world.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from the Secretary of State, January 19

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

~~SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~



83 JAN 19 7:32

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONVH
SITUATION ROOM

171301

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 19, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

To: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *gpb*
Subject: US-Soviet Relations in 1983

NLRR 148-23-40-10-7

BY 601

ATE 4/8/83

The recent NSPG discussion of US-Soviet relations underscored the fact that increased Soviet activism since Andropov's rise to power confronts us with a situation requiring strength, imagination and energy. This memo sets forth a strategy for countering this new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship is possible. Even if no improvement ultimately takes place, the dialogue itself would strengthen our ability to manage the relationship and keep the diplomatic initiative in our hands.

As we proceed, we must keep in mind that our challenge is not to launch a bold, new initiative, but to build on the good beginning we have made in the patient, steady, yet creative management of a long-term adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to an early opportunity to discuss this topic with you in greater detail.

Enduring Features of US-Soviet Competition: The US-Soviet competition has deep roots in the fundamentally different nature of the two societies and in Moscow's readiness to use its growing military power in ways that threaten our security. Thus there is no realistic scenario for a breakthrough to amicable relations with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the Soviet system is beset by serious weaknesses. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet capacity for competition with us will diminish at any time during your Presidency. While recognizing the adversarial nature of our relationship with Moscow, we must not rule out the possibility that firm U.S. policies could help induce the kind of changes in Soviet behavior that would make an improvement in relations possible.

We have made considerable progress toward a more effective Soviet policy through our long-term rearmament program, actions to revitalize our Alliances, a new ideological offensive on behalf of our fundamental values, and arms control proposals that have made clear our seriousness in the search for peace.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

31

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

The Challenge of US-Soviet Relations in 1983: There is already evidence of greater foreign policy energy and sophistication under Andropov, and the Soviets will clearly be on the offensive in 1983. In Europe, we can expect that the Soviets will make the fullest possible use of Western hopes raised by the succession to redouble their appeals to Western publics on issues such as INF. In Asia, Moscow will use renewed talks with the Chinese to press its diplomatic offensive, while hinting at new flexibility on Afghanistan. I believe that we can best preempt this increased Soviet maneuvering with increased diplomatic and public activism of our own, including through an intensified dialogue with Moscow. If this dialogue does not result in improved US-Soviet relations, the onus will rest clearly on Moscow; if it leads to actual improvement, all the better.

Preconditions for Effective Dialogue: To proceed with an intensified dialogue while protecting our security interests, we need to fulfill the following preconditions: (1) continued rebuilding of American economic and military strength; (2) continued revitalization of our Alliances; (3) stabilization of relations with China; (4) continued regional peacekeeping efforts (Middle East and CBI); and (5) continued competition in ideas.

The Purposes of Intensified US-Soviet Dialogue: Such a dialogue could serve our interests by: (1) probing for new Soviet flexibility (get Andropov to put his money where his mouth is); (2) controlling events (reaffirming our determination to play a central role on all issues while preventing opening of gaps between us and our Allies); (3) maintaining Allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive".

Substance of the Dialogue: As we intensify dialogue, it is neither necessary nor advisable to abandon the policy framework we have established. We must continue to insist that US-Soviet dialogue address the full range of our concerns about Soviet behavior: the military buildup, international expansionism, and human rights violations. We must be prepared for evolution of our substantive positions in the give and take of negotiations, but we must not lower our basic requirements for improved US-Soviet relations.

A. Arms Control: We must not abandon the high standards we have set for potential agreements -- real reductions, equality in the important measures of military capability, verifiability, and enhanced stability. We must at the same time win the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that is impeding progress toward agreements.

Our most formidable arms control challenge will be in INF: at stake is whether or not we can sustain the integrity and vitality of the Western Alliance. In START, we should hold firm on the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

40

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

conceptual framework of our approach, including substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We must negotiate seriously, taking as the point of departure the apparent Soviet willingness to accept the principle of reductions.

B. Regional Issues: The fact that we have engaged Moscow on regional issues -- Afghanistan and southern Africa -- positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process this year. Given the many signals we have heard on Afghanistan, we should test Soviet intentions by another round of our bilateral talks, and possibly by tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement.

We must also deal effectively with the Soviet "Asian offensive" by adding substance to the US-PRC dialogue and holding firm on our requirements for a Kampuchean settlement. This will be one of the objectives of my China trip.

On other issues, we may wish to renew bilateral discussions with Moscow on Namibia/Angola to press for Cuban troop withdrawal. In some cases, we may need to reinforce warnings about possible unacceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua. In the Middle East, we want to continue to avoid dialogue that could help Moscow regain a role in the peace process.

C. Human Rights and Western Values: We must continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: relief of prisoners of conscience, resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation, and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We must also press our democracy offensive and ensure that human rights remains a major component of our policy toward Poland and in the CSCE context.

D. Economic Relations: Any steps we take must not contribute to Soviet military power, subsidize the Soviet economy, or undercut our efforts to develop a new framework for East-West economic relations. We must also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take is geared to our overall US-Soviet strategy. A possible mechanism for managing these pressures would be to restore government-to-government economic contacts through a session of the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC).

E. Bilateral Relations: Small steps have a modest but real role to play in the relationship, and we should seek opportunities to use them. We should be careful to ensure that benefit is mutual and reciprocal and that our actions advance our objective of broadening access to Soviet society. We could implement Charlie Wick's suggestion to negotiate a new umbrella cultural agreement; this would

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

41

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

prevent Soviet cultural groups from making their own arrangements with U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the USSR.

The Process of Dialogue: We should begin to put in place the building blocks for a productive summit, but without committing ourselves prematurely. Four levels of dialogue should be considered:

--Summitry: The dialogue process should be constructed to lead to a summit if relations warrant, but without initially defining a summit as the only possible outcome. Should we later decide on a US-Soviet summit, you should probably meet with the Chinese first.

--Ministerial-Level Contacts: We could consider another meeting between Gromyko and me, possibly in Moscow if a meeting with Andropov could be guaranteed. Another option would be a neutral site. We might also consider a possible Weinberger-Ustinov meeting.

--Dialogue through Ambassadors: We should make maximum use of both Dobrynin and Art Hartman, and possibly try to regularize their access to Gromyko and me. We might also recall Art for consultations this spring and send him back with a message from you to Andropov.

--Dialogue between "Departments and Desks": We could accept Dobrynin's proposal of intensified dialogue between specialists on US-Soviet relations from the State Department and the Soviet MFA.

Conclusion: In sum, 1983 will be a year of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for an intensified dialogue with Moscow along the lines I have described. Such a dialogue would protect our security interests while giving the Soviets incentives to address our concerns -- as long as we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach we have established over the past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to satisfy our criteria for an improvement in the relationship. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part, and the responsibility for continued tensions will rest squarely with Moscow.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/14/2015

File Folder

USSR (1/19/83-1/21/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

23

303

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171302 MEMO

1 1/22/1983 B1

DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS IN 1983

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/15 EAD

January 21, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Don Kendall, Chairman
of Pepsico

Attached for your use is a briefing memorandum for your meeting with Don Kendall, Chairman of Pepsico, scheduled for Monday, January 24.

Attachment:

Tab A Briefing Memorandum

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

097

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 21, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING WITH DON KENDALL

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: Monday, January 24, 1983
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:45 - 10:00 a.m.

NLRR 74-23-10-12-5

BY CDJ NARA DATE 4/8/0

I. PURPOSE: A brief courtesy meeting.

II. BACKGROUND: Don Kendall, Chairman of Pepsico, has requested a meeting with you to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Recently, he travelled to Moscow as part of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council and probably would like to convey his impressions of the "new" Soviet leadership and "opportunities" for the West. Since Kendall is an "accommodationist" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, he would use such a meeting to discuss present opportunities for the United States to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, to make important concessions in the arms negotiations, and to increase all kinds of U.S.-Soviet exchanges. In particular, it is likely that he would highly recommend a U.S.-Soviet summit and would encourage this Administration to be more forthcoming on its trade with the USSR and to establish less restrictive COCOM guidelines.

III. TALKING POINTS:

- Emphasize the U.S. remains ready and willing to pursue improved relations with the Soviet Union should positive and meaningful Soviet deeds not mere words warrant.
- Indicate that already you have stated clearly your willingness to consider a summit at an appropriate time
-- following adequate preparations and when there are reasonable prospects for a successful outcome.
- Mention that this Administration is pursuing actively a variety of arms control negotiations with the Soviets including MBFR, INF and START in which all of our proposals are equitable, verifiable, fair and would result in genuine deep reductions while strengthening deterrence and restoring strategic stability. Although, firmly committed to our position, we are prepared to explore any Soviet proposals which contain positive elements.
- State that we are committed to maintain tight controls over the transfer of equipment and technology to the USSR. Previous liberal trade policies have failed to encourage moderate Soviet international behavior, while contributing to the Soviet military buildup.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45
MEETING WITH DON KENDALL/January 24, 1983

-- U.S. READY & WILLING IMPROVE RELATIONS
WITH USSR, NEED MEANINGFUL DEEDS NOT WORDS.

-- I HAVE STATED MY WILLINGNESS FOR SUMMIT
WHEN PROSPECTS REASONABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL
OUTCOME.

-- ADMINISTRATION PURSUING VARIETY OF
NEGOTIATIONS (MBFR, INF, START)--SEEKING DEEP
REDUCTIONS, STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

-- WE COMMITTED TO TIGHT CONTROLS OVER
TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT/TECHNOLOGY TO USSR.
PREVIOUS LIBERAL POLICIES FAILED.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

January 21, 1983

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
 12/14/15 KDB

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON ^{CPT}

SIGNED

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^(P)

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Don Kendall

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding a briefing memorandum (Tab A) for his meeting with Don Kendall, Chairman of Pepsico, on Monday, January 24, 1983. At Tab II is a copy of Sadleir's requesting memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 Tab A Briefing Memorandum
 Tab II Sadleir's memorandum of January 20, 1983.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

007
47
REVISED

MEMORANDUM

'83 JAN 20 P5:35

1/20/83

TO: WILLIAM CLARK
FROM: WILLIAM K ^{fu}SADLEIR
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

PLEASE IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING AND NOTIFY AND CLEAR ALL PARTICIPANTS.
THE BRIEFING PAPER AND REMARKS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO RICHARD DARMAN
BY 3:00 P.M. OF THE PRECEDING DAY.

NOTE: AS PROJECT OFFICER FOR THIS ACTIVITY, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY
TO SUBMIT A COMPLETE, CONFIRMED LIST OF STAFF AND ATTENDEES,
IDENTIFIED BY TITLE, TO THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
AND SCHEDULING WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER THE EVENT.

MEETING: with Donald Kendall

DATE: January 24, 1983

TIME: 9:45 am

DURATION:]5 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Background to be provided in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY

PARTICIPATION: No

cc: A. Bakshian M. McManus C. Tyson
M. Brandon J. Rosebush M/ Wheeler
R. Darman B. Shaddix
R. DeProspero W. Sittmann
D. Fischer L. Speakes
C. Fuller WHCA Audio/Visual
W. Henkel WHCA Operations
E. Hickey A. Wrobleski

**National Security Council
The White House**

512
48

1445 P

Package # 0097

JAN 2 1 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	X	X
Bud McFarlane	2	M	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
We were overruled on this by
Mike Deaver. He indicates President
agreed to meet with him. Recommend
you also attend. We need a "witness".
cy in w. folder J

Brian - this

49

is ready --

May all
have copies
pls.

50

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8300548

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/14/15 EOB

RECEIVED 21 JAN 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 21 JAN 83

TYSON

21 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

KENDALL, DON

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPERS FOR PRES 24 JAN MTG W/ KENDALL RE US - SOVIET
RELATIONS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 24 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

ROBINSON

WHEELER

MYER

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8300097

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>1P 1/21</i>	<i>for info</i>		
<i>C</i>	<i>2/2</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>Do, cr</i>

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE *Pa* (C) *MB*