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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171465	NOTE	FROM JOHN RE MEMO	1	3/28/1983	B1
		R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-5-1-5			
171466	MEMO	RE SOVIET FORCES AND RELATED ISSUES	5	3/25/1983	B1
171467	CABLE	290009Z MAR 83	4	3/29/1983	B1
		R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-5-3-3			
171468	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	3/29/1983	B1
171469	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	3/30/1983	B1
171470	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	ND	B1
171471	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	2	3/28/1983	B1
		R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-5-5-1			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171472	CABLE	MOSCOW 3726	2	3/30/1983	B1
		R 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-5-6-0			
171473	CABLE	MOSCOW 3722	15	3/29/1983	B1
		R 6/4/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-5-7-9			

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National Security Council
The White House

RCM HAS SEEN

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	
Bud McFarlane	2	RCM HAS SEEN	I
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark		has seen	
John Poindexter	3	✓	
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

Bud, 3/28

The judge took a copy of this draft to Pres today along with John Tuchowski's memo on the compliance issue. JL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/28

Bud,

In view of this memo I think we need to develop an INF game plan or next steps after we get Soviet reaction to our new ~~initiative~~ initiatives.

We need to constantly keep the ball in their court by sticking to our principles and at the same time making the public affairs point that they are intransigent and we are forthcoming. I don't think we are doing a good enough job of framing the arms control problem. In

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
171466	MEMO RE SOVIET FORCES AND RELATED ISSUES	5	3/25/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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[TEMPO 0831781 0880158Z FRP]

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DECLASSIFIED

/ / NLRR 148-24-5-3-3 CONFIDENTIAL FRP: ,2,3, . . . ,8

BY LCD NARA DATE 6/3/13 STATE

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ACTION: NONE INFO: CMASS-E ( ), DD/SOV, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OEA/CH/DEV-3, OEA/NA, OEA/NA/J-2, OGI/EC/CM, OGI/GD/SE, OGI/IIC/PI, OGI/IIC/T1, OGI/IIC/T2, OGI/IIC/TG-2, OOE/EI/EI, OSA/PA/S, OSWR/TTC/S, PLANFAC-E ( ), RF, SOV/CS, SOV/CS/CA, SOV/CS/E/E, SOV/CS/E/P, SOV/CS/S/I, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/EAD, SOV/PA/C, SOV/PA/D, SOV/PA/F, SOV/SE, SOV/SE/M, SOV/SE/R, SOV/SE/T, FILE, DDO-4, DDA, SE/ORP, SE/RR, SE/USSR, SE/XFR, ASG/MT, CI/FL, CI/OC, CR/U, D/FBIS-2, D/OMS, DSD/DEB, EPS/EG-2, IAD/CTG-4, IAD/IC, ICS/OHC/UR, INT/RR, NICAG/SOV, NICAG/USSR, NIO/PE, NIO/USSR, OTS, PPD, SAG/LIB, SAG/MEB, SAG/PPB, SAG/SEB-3, SECUR-2, STD/MTA, STD/MTH. (43/W)

171467

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4767
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1321
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 3784
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1156
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3521
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6255
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3492
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4647
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RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4891
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8665
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4767
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 9072
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 8162
RUFHMU/AMCONSUL MUNICH 7015
RUDKRP/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8829
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 8131
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0290
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I ~~D~~ E N T I A L MOSCOW 03659

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: RUMORS ON ANDROPOV HEALTH, PLENUM POSTPONEMENT SUGGEST POLITICAL DISARRAY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. ANDROPOV'S MEETING WITH ORTEGA ON MARCH 25 HAS DAMPENED SPECULATION ON ANDROPOV'S HEALTH. THESE RUMORS AND REPORTS HAVE PROBABLY ALREADY DONE POLITICAL DAMAGE TO ANDROPOV--WHICH, IN SOME CASES, MAY HAVE BEEN WHY THEY WERE "LEAKED." REPORTS OF A MARCH CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM ARE SUBSIDING. MOST BETS ARE NOW ON AN IDEOLOGICAL PLENUM IN JUNE, THOUGH SOME OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS STILL HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APRIL PLENUM IN ADDITION TO THE ONE IN JUNE. DISAGREEMENTS ON PERSONNEL CHANGES MAY HAVE FORCED POSTPONEMENT OF THE MARCH PLENUM. END SUMMARY.

ANDROPOV HEALTH SPECULATION

3. ANDROPOV'S MEETING WITH ORTEGA ON MARCH 25 HAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SPIKED MUCH OF THE SPECULATION HERE CONCERNING ANDROPOV'S HEALTH. WE NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE ABSENCE OF A PRAVDA (MARCH 26) PHOTOGRAPH OF THE MEETING WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANDROPOV'S HEALTH: THE MARCH 25 EVENING NEWS BROADCAST VREMYA CARRIED A STILL PHOTO. WHILE FOREIGN REPORTERS ARE BEING TOLD BY THEIR SOVIET CONTACTS THAT ANDROPOV WAS IN FACT ILL, ACCOUNTS VARY ABOUT WHEN THE ILLNESS TOOK PLACE AND ABOUT ITS SERIOUSNESS. MIKHAIL KAPITSA, FOR INSTANCE, TOLD A WESTERN JOURNALIST THAT ANDROPOV SIMPLY HAD THE FLU. MOST JOURNALISTS' CONTACTS ARE SAYING THAT ANDROPOV WAS HOSPITALIZED RECENTLY FOR A KIDNEY AND/OR HEART AILMENT.

4. MAVERICK HISTORIAN ROY MEDVEDEV TOLD EMBOFFS MARCH 24 THAT HE KNOWS FOR A FACT THAT ANDROPOV SPENT 21 DAYS IN THE HOSPITAL FOR KIDNEY TREATMENT, BUT THE MEDVEDEV

VERSION HAS ANDROPOV HOSPITALIZED IN FEBRUARY. MEDVEDEV SAYS ANDROPOV WAS ALREADY BACK ON THE JOB BY MARCH 15, WHEN HE RECEIVED EAST BLOC SECRETARIES FOR IDEOLOGY.

ANDROPOV "ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT"

5. THE RUMOR OF AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION ON ANDROPOV IS NOW WIDESPREAD AMONG SOVIETS. IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, SOVIETS RANGING FROM DOCTORS, BIOLOGISTS, AND PENSIONERS, TO WORKERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE TYPES HAVE QUERIED EMBOFFS ON THE SUBJECT AT INFORMAL GATHERINGS. NONE OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INCIDENT, WHICH IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS. THE RUMORS VARY FROM ANDROPOV BEING INJURED TO HIS CHAUFFEUR BEING KILLED.

6. EMBASSY COMMENT: WE ARE NOT YET SURE WHAT LIES BEHIND THE APPEARANCE OF BOTH THE HEALTH AND ASSASSINATION RUMORS. WE BELIEVE THAT OBJECTIVELY THEY DO POLITICAL DAMAGE TO ANDROPOV, WHO IS ONLY IN THE FIRST STAGES OF CONSOLIDATING POWER. MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE ARE LIKELY TO HESITATE IN FIRMLY ATTACHING THEIR BANNER TO ANDROPOV'S WAGON IF THEY THINK IT UNLIKELY FOR HIM TO BE MORE THAN A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. THE HEALTH RUMORS IN SOME CASES, HOWEVER, ARE BEING REPEATED BY PEOPLE WHO WERE AND APPEAR TO CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTERS OF ANDROPOV. PERHAPS ANDROPOV'S SUPPORTERS HAVE SIMPLY DECIDED NOT TO DENY WHAT HAS BECOME GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. END COMMENT.

MARCH PLENUM OFF?

7. THE RUMOR MILL NOW HAS A MARCH PLENUM POSTPONED OR CANCELLED. ONE OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES FOR A PLENUM BEING CONVENED IN MARCH, AN AP SOURCE AT NOVOSTI (PROTECT),

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: RUMORS ON ANDROPOV HEALTH, PLENUM POSTPONEMENT

IS NOW TELLING AP THAT THE PLENUM HAS BEEN POSTPONED, POSSIBLY UNTIL JUNE. MEDVEDEV ALSO NOW SAYS THAT A

MARCH PLENUM IS UNLIKELY, BUT THAT ONE IN APRIL IS STILL POSSIBLE, PERHAPS ON AGRICULTURE.

8. THE VAST BULK OF EMBASSY SOVIET CONTACTS FEEL THAT A PLENUM WILL NOT BE HELD UNTIL JUNE AND THAT THE SUBJECT WILL BE IDEOLOGY. THE CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, MIKHAIL OZEROV, AND THE DEPUTY EDITOR OF TRUD, RUDOLF KOLCHANOV, TOLD EMBOFF ON MARCH 16 THAT A PLENUM WILL BE HELD IN JUNE. MEDVEDEV SAYS THAT, HIS SOURCES ARE TELLING HIM THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS IN APRIL, THERE WILL BE A PLENUM ON IDEOLOGY IN JUNE, THAT THE TREATMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS WILL BE "CONSERVATIVE," AND THAT CHERNENKO WILL GIVE THE MAIN REPORT. ANDROPOV WILL DELIVER THE "CONCLUDING WORD," HOWEVER. YET ANOTHER SOURCE FROM THE STATE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SAYS HE IS "CERTAIN" THAT SOME SIGNIFICANT CADRE CHANGES WILL EMERGE FROM THE JUNE PLENUM. THE SAME SOURCE, INCIDENTALLY, CLAIMS THAT A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO ("PERHAPS" CHERNENKO) WILL GIVE A TELEVISED ADDRESS DEVOTED TO MARX ON MARCH 30.

9. EMBASSY COMMENT: THIS MEDLEY OF CONFUSING RUMORS OF WHEN A PLENUM IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE ONCE AGAIN LEAVES AN IMPRESSION OF DISARRAY. IN A MARCH CONVERSATION, MEDVEDEV INTIMATED TO EMBOFFS THAT POSTPONEMENT OF A MARCH PLENUM COULD BE A SIGN THAT ANDROPOV HAD NOT YET OBTAINED POLITBURO AGREEMENT TO DESIRED PERSONNEL CHANGES. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, THE CONFUSING SIGNALS ON THE PLENUM, WHEN COMBINED WITH THE ANDROPOV HEALTH RUMORS, COULD INDICATE INFIGHTING AT THE TOP. LOS ANGELES TIMES CORRESPONDENT BOB GILLETTE WAS TOLD BY A PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WORKING AS A JOURNALIST AT KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA (STRICTLY PROTECT) THAT PARTY INFIGHTING HAS BECOME RAMPANT AND THAT THE STRUGGLE IS BETWEEN ESSENTIALLY TWO FACTIONS. ON ONE SIDE ARE ARRAYED ANDROPOV, USTINOV, GROMYKO, GRISHIN, AND GORBACHEV. ON THE OTHER SIDE ARE TIKHONOV, CHERNENKO, ROMANOV, SHCHERBITSKIY, KUNAYEV, PELSHE (?), AND ALIYEV. GILLETTE DID NOT EXPLORE HOW SOURCE HAD ARRIVED AT THIS LINE-UP. END COMMENT.
HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
171468	PROFILE SHEET NSC/S	1	3/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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602

12

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90398

MAR 3 0 1983

1810P

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	1	M	A
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		R
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

Need not go forward
says Hadley has seen
memo.

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
171469	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	3/30/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restric-tions*
171470	MEMO CLARK TO REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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A

SYSTEM II
90398

17

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1/14/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz GPS

Subject: Meeting with Dobrynin

My meeting with Dobrynin today covered four subjects: Andropov's statements about your speech, our new INF proposal, the dialogue on the overall US-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet response to our proposal on the Threshold Test Ban.

I began by pointing out that your speech last week was not polemical but descriptive -- setting forth the facts as we see them. The evidence that deployment of the SS-20s was not frozen is overwhelming. I said that Andropov's claiming you had lied was troublesome and unnecessary, particularly when you had stayed away from invective. I reiterated that your statements on ballistic missile defense were consistent with the ABM Treaty and designed to enhance stability. I noted that the Soviet Union was doing work in this field and alone has a deployed ABM system.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets believe the facts you set forth were not correct, that they should know better whether or not they are adding SS-20s, and that based on the language of the interview Dobrynin believed Andropov was "angry." Dobrynin stressed that the word Andropov used was "untruth" not "lie," and that there is a difference in Russian. He said your speech contradicts the spirit if not the letter of the ABM Treaty.

After once more reiterating the stabilizing objective of your remarks on ballistic missile defense, I turned to INF. I informed Dobrynin that today Paul Nitze had given Kvitsinskiy the approach you had authorized him to make, and I gave Dobrynin the essence of the approach. I stressed that this is consistent with the principles you set forth in the American Legion speech. I noted that we deliberately had not set it in highly explicit form with specific numbers as we regarded this as a matter of negotiation, wanted to invite a Soviet response, but will be ready to put in numbers when the time comes. I underlined that we continue to believe that zero-zero is the best outcome. However, we are not making agreement in principle

to zero-zero a condition for agreement on our interim approach. I noted you would be mentioning your proposal in a speech later this week. And I suggested that it be useful for Dobrynin to get together with me and Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny to discuss INF and START respectively between rounds. I urged the Soviets to study our proposals carefully as they are made in the utmost seriousness.

Dobrynin responded in a "preliminary" and uninstructed way by stating that there is a difference in philosophy -- the Soviet Union wants reductions, but the United States wants to increase for itself, while asking the Soviet Union to go down. The Soviet Union insists on "equal security" and that French and British systems must be counted. And in perhaps his most important point, Dobrynin said: "It is difficult to see that we will sign an agreement introducing American nuclear missiles into Europe."

I reiterated the seriousness of our approach and said that it should be viewed in the context of our discussions on bilateral relations. I informed Dobrynin that I would be prepared later this week to resume our discussions on the broad agenda: arms control, including the Andropov message on MBFR; the Pentecostalists, Shcharanskiy and other such cases; regional issues; and bilateral issues.

Dobrynin then delivered an oral statement in response to our proposal for improvements in the verification provisions of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. We are sending you the full text separately. The Soviets reject our proposals, claiming that the treaties as written have adequate verification provisions. They urge us to go ahead with ratification of the treaties. They also urge that we resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) in April or May, 1983. This is obviously a propaganda ploy, as they know we will not renew the CTB talks at this point. We will have further analysis and suggestions for you on this issue.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

171472

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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OO RUEHC
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4823
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3535
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6838
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4902
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4658
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3029
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6270
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RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1351
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 03726
USINF/USSTART/USSCC
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL ON INF INTERIM SOLUTION

(C) AN MFA OFFICIAL TELLS US THE SOVIET UNION MUST "TELL THE TRUTH TO THE WORLD" ABOUT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EXPECTED PROPOSAL FOR AN INF INTERIM SOLUTION. ALEKSANDR KOKOREV, USA DEPARTMENT SECTOR CHIEF FOR ARMS CONTROL, TOLD EMBOFF AT A MARCH 29 SPASO RECEPTION FOR SFRC STAFFDEL THAT HE WAS "ABSOLUTELY PESSIMISTIC" ABOUT THE PROPOSAL HE EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE PUBLIC TODAY. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON FEBRUARY 24 CALLED ON THE U.S. TO OFFER NEW PROPOSALS, KOKOREV SAID "WE DID NOT MEAN THIS KIND OF PROPOSAL, WHICH WILL SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE." COMMENT: KOKOREV'S REMARKS ARE ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GO PUBLIC QUICKLY WITH A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT.
HARTMAN

20

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#3726
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

171473

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4813
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1344
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1158
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3528
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6263
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3494
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4651
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6831
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2086
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 03722
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP, PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFDEL: BESSMERTNYKH/LEBEDEV MEETING

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF, SOVIET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS PAINTED A BLEAK PICTURE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. LED BY MFA USA DEPARTMENT CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH, SOVIETS STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT U.S. PROPOSALS FOR INTERIM INF SETTLEMENT INVOLVING DEPLOYMENTS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AND DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A NITZE-KVITSINSKIY AGREEMENT. SOVIETS INSISTED THAT ONLY BASIS FOR INF AGREEMENT COULD BE BALANCE BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND NATO AS A WHOLE. THEY EXPRESSED LITTLE INTEREST IN RENEGOTIATION OF TTBT AND PNET OR IN DISCUSSION OF ICBM VULNERABILITY PROBLEM. THEY DENIED SOVIET UNION HAD TESTED SECOND "NEW TYPE" MISSILE IN VIOLATION OF SALT II. IN REITERATING SOVIET COMMITMENT TO ADHERE TO 1962 UNDERSTANDINGS ON CUBA, SOVIETS IMPLIED THAT PREVIOUS THREATS TO PUT U.S. IN POSITION OF "ANALOGOUS RISK" IN EVENT OF INF DEPLOYMENTS DID NOT ENVISAGE PLACEMENT OF

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NEW MISSILES IN CUBA. END SUMMARY.

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3. MEMBERS OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF DELEGATION BINNENDIJK, FORD, TIPSON AND SMITH MET FOR TWO HOURS MARCH 28 AT SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH SOVIET FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS LED BY USA DEPARTMENT CHIEF ALEKSANDR BESSMERTNYKH. MAJOR GENERAL YURIY LEBEDEV OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, BESSMERTNYKH'S DEPUTY SERGEI TARASENKO, USA DEPARTMENT SECTOR CHIEF VLADIMIR LOMOVTSEV, AND AN INTERPRETER WERE ALSO PRESENT.

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SOVIET VIEW OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: BLEAK

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4. BESSMERTNYKH LED OFF MEETING WITH PREPARED OVERVIEW OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING REACHED A "CRITICAL" STAGE. HE ATTRIBUTED THIS TO: AN ACROSS THE BOARD U.S. MILITARY BUILD-UP; U.S. PLANS TO "DEVELOP AND POSSIBLY DEPLOY NEW WEAPONS, EVEN IN AREAS (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE) CURRENTLY CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE"; ELABORATION BY THE U.S. OF NEW WAR-FIGHTING STRATEGIES; A HOSTILE U.S. RHETORICAL APPROACH, INCLUDING CALLS FOR A "CRUSADE" AGAINST THE USSR AND PLANS TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES; REDUCTION OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES; AND A LACK OF MOVEMENT IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. REFERRING TO ANDROPOV'S MARCH 27 PRAVDA INTERVIEW, BESSMERTNYKH QUOTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD ADOPTED A "HIGHLY DANGEROUS PATH" TOWARD THE USSR.

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5. BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT U.S. STATEMENTS OF INTEREST IN "POSITIVE CHANGES" IN THE RELATIONSHIP HAD NOT GONE UNNOTICED. BUT THE SOVIETS HAD FOUND NO CAUSE FOR ENCOURAGEMENT WHEN THEY HAD SOUGHT TO DETERMINE IF THERE WAS MORE TO SUCH STATEMENTS THAN RHETORIC. IT APPEARED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED THAT DETENTE HAD BEEN A MISTAKE OR AN "ACCIDENT OF HISTORY." THE USSR SAW DETENTE AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, AND CONTINUED TO WORK TOWARD THAT END. BESSMERTNYKH ADMITTED THAT, EVEN NOW, THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR. THERE WAS EVEN A DIALOGUE OF SORTS: AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL; AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL; AT THE WORKING LEVEL. THE CHALLENGE NOW WAS TO GIVE THAT DIALOGUE "PRACTICAL CONTENT." WHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO REDUCE THE RELATIONSHIP TO ONE ISSUE,

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ARMS CONTROL SEEMED TO REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT "TESTING FIELD."
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PROSPECTS FOR INF
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6. IN RESPONSE TO A STAFF QUERY ON SOVIET VIEWS OF PROSPECTS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT IN THE EVENT OF A NEW U.S.
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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE595
STU5541
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHMO #3722/02 0881616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4814
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1345
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1159
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3529
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6264
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3495
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4652
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6832
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2087
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 03722
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PROPOSAL, BESSMERTNYKH OBSERVED ON A GENERAL LEVEL THAT THE USSR WAS "DISTURBED" BY THE CURRENT U.S. APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL ON FOUR ACCOUNTS:

-- IT APPEARED TO HAVE AS ITS GOAL THE UPSETTING OF EXISTING BALANCES;

-- IT SOUGHT TO RESTRUCTURE SOVIET FORCES ON AMERICAN MODELS;

-- IT WAS "SELECTIVE" IN WAYS WHICH FAVORED THE U.S. (E.G. BY CONCENTRATING ON LAND-BASED ICBM'S IN START AND ON SS-20'S IN INF);

-- IT FAILED TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, AN ELEMENT ON WHICH THE USSR AND U.S. HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED, AND ON WHICH THE USSR WOULD NOT COMPROMISE.

7. RESPONDING TO STAFF'S SPECIFIC QUESTION, BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT THE USSR WOULD WELCOME A NEW

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

U.S. INITIATIVE ON INF IF RPT IF IT WOULD PRESERVE THE EXISTING BALANCE IN EUROPE AND IF IT WOULD RESULT IN A REDUCTION, NOT AN ADDITION OF NEW SYSTEMS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, A NEW U.S. PROPOSAL WERE DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE "IDEA" OF THE ZERO-OPTION BY SEEKING TO UNILATERALLY DISARM THE USSR OR TO ADD TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR POTENTIAL IN EUROPE, IT WOULD BE AS UNACCEPTABLE AS THE ORIGINAL U.S. PROPOSAL. U.S. DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE WOULD CREATE A QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION WHICH WOULD "ENDANGER" THE INF TALKS. THE USSR "WOULD NOT BE IDLE IN RESPONDING." LEBEDEV STRONGLY SECONDED BESSMERTNYKH'S REMARKS, ADDING "AS A MILITARY MAN" THAT THE U.S. WAS WRONG IN PERCEIVING THAT DEPLOYMENTS WOULD MAKE THE SOVIETS MORE FLEXIBLE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

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THE NITZE-KVITSINSKIY DEAL: "THERE WAS NONE."

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8. SEEKING TO DRAW THE SOVIETS OUT ON THE QUESTION OF AN INTERIM SOLUTION, STAFF ASKED FOR BESSMERTNYKH'S ASSESSMENT OF PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT REACHED BY NEGOTIATORS NITZE AND KVITSINSKIY IN GENEVA. BESSMERTNYKH DENIED THERE HAD BEEN SUCH A DEAL. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NITZE HAD MADE CERTAIN "PERSONAL" PROPOSALS. KVITSINSKIY HAD NOT EVEN REPORTED THEM. THUS, THERE WAS NOTHING FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED, AS HAD BEEN REPORTED BY THE PRESS. THE WHOLE INCIDENT HAD BEEN BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION. THE SOVIET POSITION ON AN INF AGREEMENT WAS THAT PRESENTED BY KVITSINSKIY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

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9. ON A MORE GENERAL BASIS, AND ELABORATING ON HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ON THE QUESTION OF AN INTERIM SOLUTION, BESSMERTNYKH REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD COME TO GENEVA TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE. IT HAD NO INTEREST IN HELPING THE U.S. DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS. EVEN THE ORIGINAL NATO DECISION ON INF HAD NOT ALLEGED THAT AN IMBALANCE IN SUCH SYSTEMS EXISTED IN EUROPE. IT HAD ONLY NOTED THE DANGER OF SUCH AN IMBALANCE DEVELOPING. AT THE TIME THE USSR HAD SS-4'S, SS-5'S, AND SS-20'S IN EUROPE. NOW THE U.S. WANTED TO ELIMINATE ALL THESE SYSTEMS, NOT ONLY FROM EUROPE, BUT FROM ASIA. MOREOVER, IT REFUSED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET CONCERNS OVER NATO THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS AND U.S. FBS. THE SOVIETS HAD NONETHELESS PROPOSED TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE BELOW THE 1979 LEVEL. THE U.S. REFUSAL TO

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL COULD ONLY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. OBJECTIVE WAS DEPLOYMENT AT ANY PRICE.

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10. LEBEDEV ADDED THAT U.S.-SOVIET EQUALITY IN LRINF COULD NOT BE THE BASIS OF AN INF AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD CONTRADICT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.
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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE596
STU5544
00 RUEHC
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291540Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4815
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1346
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1160
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3530
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6265
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3496
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4653
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6833
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2088
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C ~~O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 03722
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TAGS: OREP, PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: SFRC STAFFDEL: BESSMERTNYKH/LEBEDEV MEETING
THE ONLY BASIS COULD BE EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND SOVIET
FORCES. EVEN THEN THE U.S. WOULD HAVE THE EDGE, SINCE
NATO FORCES COULD STRIKE THE USSR, WHILE SOVIET LRINF
IN EUROPE COULD NOT REACH THE U.S.
.
DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS

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11. STAFF MEMBER NOTED THAT THE DISCUSSION SEEMED TO
REFLECT BASIC DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND USSR IN THREE KEY AREAS: THE STATE OF THE MILITARY
BALANCE; THE STABILITY OF CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURES; AND
MUTUAL STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL INTENTIONS. AFTER
OUTLINING U.S. VIEWS ON THESE POINTS, HE INVITED
BESSMERTNYKH TO RESPOND.
.
12. ON THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE
BESSMERTNYKH STRESSED THAT INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF
SOVIET MILITARY POWER COULD NOT BE SEEN IN ISOLATION
FROM SOVIET STRATEGIC CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH, HE
POINTED OUT, WERE LESS ADVANTAGEOUS THAN THOSE OF

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE U.S. THE USSR HAD TO CONTEND, INTER ALIA, WITH: TWO NATO NUCLEAR POWERS; "COUNTRIES IN THE EAST MORE DANGEROUS TO US THAN YOU"; AND "CERTAIN SITUATIONS ON OUR BORDERS." FOCUSING, AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAD RECENTLY, ON COMPARISONS OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN ARTILLERY PIECES IGNORED THE FACT THAT MUCH OF SUCH MATERIAL WAS NOT INTENDED FOR USE AGAINST THE U.S. AGAIN CITING THE ANDROPOV INTERVIEW, BESSMERTNYKH CLAIMED THAT IT COULD NOT BE "OBJECTIVELY PROVEN" THAT SOVIET MILITARY PREPARATIONS EXCEEDED THE USSR'S DEFENSE NEEDS OR THAT IT WAS SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

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13. ON THE QUESTION OF STABILITY, BESSMERTNYKH ASSERTED THAT THERE COULD BE ONLY ONE CRITERION -- PARITY. "ROUGH PARITY" EXISTED. AS FOR U.S. CONCERNS OVER THE "DESTABILIZING" QUALITIES OF CERTAIN SYSTEMS, THE TERM LACKED PRECISION. HOW WAS A PERSHING II LESS DESTABILIZING THAN A SOVIET ICBM?

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14. ON THE QUESTION OF INTENTIONS, BESSMERTNYKH ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT THE U.S. WANTED IN TERMS OF DEEDS FROM THE USSR. WHAT, HE ASKED, HAD THE USSR DONE IN THE LAST TWO YEARS TO AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS. (HE NOTED THAT HE COULD NOT DISCUSS POLAND IN THIS REGARD). IN RESPONSE TO STAFFF'S ASSERTION THAT ACTIONS LIKE ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN HAD PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED U.S. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND RELIABILITY, BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO LEAD PUBLIC OPINION AND ENSURE THAT REACTIONS WERE NOT "EXAGGERATED."

MBFR AND PRIORITY OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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15. PICKING UP ON BESSMERTNYKH'S REMARKS ON PARITY (PARA 13 ABOVE),STAFF ASKED IF THIS APPLIED TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. BESSMERTNYKH HEDGED, NOTING THAT IT APPLIED TO START AND INF; IN MBFR "NEITHER SIDE SHOULD DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER SIDE." FOLLOWING UP ON THE POINT, STAFF ASKED IF BESSMERTNYKH FELT THE PRESENT TRIAD OF NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC, INF, AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS WAS APPROPRIATE OR WHETHER A SINGLE NEGOTIATING FORUM WOULD BE BETTER. BESSMERTNYKH TOOK THE POINT THAT THERE WERE LINKAGES BETWEEN THE NEGOTIATIONS (HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET START PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

U.S. INF DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE). HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WAS ADEQUATE, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR URGENCY ON INF.

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ICBM VULNERABILITY AND MOBILE MISSILES

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4816
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1347
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1161
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3531
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6266
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3497
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4654
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6834
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2089
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16. RETURNING TO BESSMERTNYKH'S ALLEGATION THAT THE U.S. SOUGHT TO RESTRUCTURE THE USSR'S NUCLEAR FORCES, STAFF ASKED FOR BESSMERTNYKH'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF MOBILE MISSILES IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, NOTING THAT THEIR DEPLOYMENT COULD BE SEEN AS EITHER STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING. BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT, WHILE THE USSR, GIVEN ITS HEAVY RELIANCE ON FIXED ICBM'S, SHOULD BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF ICBM VULNERABILITY THAN THE U.S., IT DID NOT VIEW THE ISSUE AS A MAJOR PROBLEM. HE GRANTED THAT AT SOME POINT THIS ASSESSMENT MIGHT CHANGE. BUT THE PRIORITY TASK NOW WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS TO AGREED LEVELS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ONCE THIS WAS DONE, IT WOULD BE FAR EASIER TO EXAMINE ISSUES SUCH AS THAT RAISED BY STAFF.

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THE MIRV PROBLEM AND CRUISE MISSILES

17. NOTING THAT MANY IN THE U.S. NOW SAW ADVANTAGE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STABILITY IN FINDING MEANS TO REDUCE MISSILE WARHEAD LOADINGS, STAFF ASKED FOR BESSMERTNYKH'S VIEWS ON PROSPECTS IN THIS AREA.

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT THE USSR HAD INITIALLY WARNED THE U.S. AGAINST DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS ON GROUNDS THAT THEY WOULD BE DESTABILIZING. IT WAS IRONIC THAT THE U.S. NOW SAW THE GREATEST THREAT TO ITS SECURITY FROM SOVIET MIRVED HEAVY ICBM'S. THE SOVIETS SAW THE SITUATION NOW WITH RESPECT TO CRUISE 1ISSILES AS SIMILAR TO THAT REGARDING MIRVS IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES. CRUISE MISSILES WOULD POSE SERIOUS VERIFICATION AND NONPROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. THEY SHOULD BE STOPPED NOW.

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SALT INTERIM RESTRAINTS AND "NEW TYPE" MISSILE TEST

18. IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS BY STAFF, BESSMERTNYKH REAFFIRMED THE USSR'S INTENTION TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS OF SALT II SO LONG AS THE U.S. DID THE SAME, AND DENIED THAT THE USSR HAD TESTED A SECOND "NEW TYPE" MISSILE. THE USSR HAD TESTED THE ONE NEW MISSILE TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED UNDER SALT II. IT HAD VOLUNTARILY INFORMED THE U.S. OF THIS TEST. IT HAD ALSO TESTED A "MODERNIZED VERSION" OF THE SS-13, ALSO PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY. HE STATED THAT THE ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY DURING THAT TEST WAS NOT SUCH AS TO PREVENT THE U.S. FROM VERIFYING THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

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TTBT/PNET

19. STAFF ASKED FOR BESSMERTNYKH'S ASSESSMENT OF U.S. PROPOSALS TO RENEGOTIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET). THIS SEEMED AN AREA WHERE QUICK AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH POTENTIALLY POSITIVE IMPACT ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. BESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE FELT THAT THE TWO TREATIES HAD BEEN WELL PREPARED, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. HE WAS WILLING TO ADMIT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME UNCERTAINTIES IN THIS AREA, NOTING THAT BOTH SIDES HAD, SINCE THE TREATIES WERE INITIALED, SOUGHT CLARIFICATION FROM THE OTHER ON ASPECTS OF CERTAIN TESTS. BUT THE VERIFICATION

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PROVISIONS HAD NEVER BEEN TRIED, SINCE THE U.S. HAD NEVER RATIFIED THE TWO TREATIES. IT MADE NO SENSE TO REVISE THEM UNTIL THEY HAD BEEN PROVED FAULTY. BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT, WHEN SENATOR PERCY HAD FIRST RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF QUICK RATIFICATION OF TTBT AND

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PNET DURING HIS DECEMBER 1980 VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE HAD
NOT MENTIONED THE NEED FOR REVISIONS. BESSMERTNYKH
CLAIMED TO SEE A PATTERN IN U.S. HANDLING OF AGREEMENTS
SUCH AS TTBT, PNET, SALT II, AND LOS WHICH WAS
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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
HCE594
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RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6267
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3498
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4655
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6835
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2090
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"UNACCEPTABLE." RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET WAS
A U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEM; THE SOVIET UNION SAW NO REASON
TO CHANGE THE TREATIES TO MAKE THEM MORE PALATABLE TO
U.S. AUDIENCES.
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CUBA AND U.S. ANALOGOUS POSITION
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20. TURNING TO REGIONAL ISSUES, STAFF NOTED THAT CUBA'S
ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND SOVIET SUPPORT
OF THEM SEEMED AN UNNECESSARY IRRITANT IN U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS. BESSMERTNYKH RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. TENDED
TO APPLY A DOUBLE STANDARD IN SUCH CASES: 600 NEW U.S.
MISSILES ON THE USSR'S BORDERS WAS NECESSARY AND
ACCEPTABLE; CUBA'S ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA WAS A
PROBLEM. HE ASKED WHAT PROOF THE U.S. HAD THAT CUBA
WAS SEEKING TO DESTABILIZE ITS NEIGHBORS. HIS DEPUTY
TARASENKO ADDED THAT SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA
WAS LARGELY A FUNCTION OF U.S. VERBAL THREATS AND HINTS
OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THE "LEAST" THE SOVIET
UNION COULD DO UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WAS TO SEE THAT
ITS ALLY COULD DEFEND ITSELF.

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21. PICKING UP ON BESSMERTNYKH'S 600 MISSILE REMARK, STAFF ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT IT WOULD PLACE THE U.S. IN A SITUATION OF "ANALOGOUS RISK" SHOULD U.S. INF BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE. BESSMERTNYKH DEMURRED, QUOTING ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS SOMETIMES ADVANTAGEOUS TO KEEP ONE'S ADVERSARIES GUESSING ABOUT SUCH MATTERS. TARASENKO, HOWEVER, INTERJECTED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO CUBA, IT WAS TO BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET ADVANTAGE THAT BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO THE 1962 UNDERSTANDINGS. "THAT," HE SAID, "EFFECTIVELY ANSWERS ALL QUESTIONS." THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT, AND WOULD NOT, VIOLATE ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UNDERSTANDINGS. IT HOPED THE U.S. WOULD DO THE SAME.

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AREAS FOR COOPERATION
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22. RESPONDING TO STAFFDEL'S QUERY ON POSSIBLE AREAS OF WHERE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED, BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT THE CRITICAL FACTOR WAS THE WILL TO MAKE PROGRESS. THERE WERE NONETHELESS CERTAIN AREAS WHICH HELD PROMISE:

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-- IT MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE TO EXPAND ACTIVITIES UNDER
- SURVIVING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, OR TO EXTEND THOSE
- DUE TO EXPIRE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE USSR SAW LITTLE
- POSSIBILITY OF RESURRECTING THOSE AGREEMENTS WHICH
- HAD ALREADY LAPSED.

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-- THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES IN ARMS CONTROL. THE
- MBFR TALKS OFFERED SOME HOPE, PARTICULARLY IF
- THE U.S. WOULD AGREE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR
- "EXEMPLARY REDUCTIONS."

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-- FINALLY, THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN FURTHER EXPANDING
- AND DEEPENING BILATERAL CONTACTS AND DIALOGUE
- ALREADY UNDERWAY. IN RESPONSE TO STAFFDEL QUESTION,
- BESSMERTNYKH INDICATED HE DID NOT FEEL SUCH A
- DIALOGUE COULD INVOLVE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AT
- PRESENT. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EXPERIENCE HAD
- PROVEN THAT PROGRESS IN THAT AREA WAS MOST LIKELY
- WHEN RELATIONS WERE IMPROVING.

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