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KDB 12/17/2015

File Folder USSR (4/1/83) (3)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171480	MEMO	C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE GROMYKO'S APR. 2 PRESS CONFERENCE AND U.S. RESPONSE	3	4/1/1983	B1
171481	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SEC. SHULTZ MEMO	2	4/5/1983	B1
171482	MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH USSR	2	4/1/1983	B1
171483	NOTE	TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ MEMO	1	4/1/1983	B1
171484	MEMO	N. BAILEY, J. LENCZOWSKI, AND D. FORTIER TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ MEMO	3	4/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Points for Inclusion in
State Department Statement on
Gromyko's Remarks at his Press Conference

Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks suggest that the Soviet Union is not yet prepared to respond to the positive proposals to reduce armaments and to resolve US-Soviet disagreements in other areas that President Reagan has put forward. We regret this Soviet attitude, but we will persist in seeking to put the US-Soviet relationship on a more stable and secure footing, based on respect for each other's interests and restraint in international conduct.

In pursuit of these objectives, the United States has launched the most comprehensive program of arms control initiatives ever undertaken. We have put forward proposals in the talks on strategic, intermediate-range, and conventional forces that seek substantial reductions in the level of East-West military confrontation. We have also proposed a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and a wide range of measures to reduce the risk of war from accident or miscalculation. We hope that Moscow will give serious consideration to our proposals. At the same time, we have made clear that we will ensure a stable military balance through appropriate defense efforts.

In addition to our arms control initiatives, we have sought to engage the Soviet Union in an intensive dialogue on the many other problems in US-Soviet relations: human rights, Soviet expansionism beyond its frontiers, economic relations and other bilateral issues. We have made clear -- not only in words, but in deeds -- that we will leave no stone unturned in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

We are disappointed that the Soviet Foreign Minister has spoken so critically of the President's proposal for an interim agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear missiles on an equal basis. Mr. Gromyko seems to be saying that no equal level

of intermediate-range missiles could form the basis for a satisfactory agreement. The President's offer could produce tangible progress in the Geneva negotiations toward the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons entirely. Our Allies in Europe and Asia strongly support it.

The Soviet Union owes the world a more positive response; we hope that during the recess between rounds of the INF talks, taking into account the concerns of other nations, the Soviet Union will take a more flexible view. As the President's proposal makes clear, we intend to return to Geneva in a constructive search for a solution which provides for equality at reduced levels. As he said, "it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many."

[Following rebuttal paragraphs as appropriate]

[If explicit rejection on INF: It is unfortunate that the Soviet Union has chosen to reject our new proposal even before exploring it with us in Geneva. We hope that this initial, hasty and negative response will not stop the Soviet Union from considering our proposal carefully, and returning to the bargaining table in Geneva next month prepared for serious negotiations.]

[If door left open on INF: We are hopeful that Gromyko's comments on the President's proposal mean we can look forward to serious negotiations when the Delegations reconvene in Geneva next month.]

[If threat of INF counterdeployments: We note that Mr. Gromyko has repeated previous Soviet threats of countermeasures in the event NATO's INF deployments proceed on schedule. Such threats do not contribute to the task of negotiating a fair and equitable INF agreement, and obscure the fact that the USSR has an overwhelming advantage in missiles that threaten U.S. friends and Allies in both Europe and Asia.]

[START: We cannot agree with Mr. Gromyko's characterization of the status of the START negotiations. The United States has proposed equal, substantially reduced limits on the various categories of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, with particular focus on reducing those systems most destabilizing for the strategic balance. Moreover, the U.S. Delegation has made a conscientious effort to move the negotiations forward, including the tabling in the latest round of a draft of the basic elements of a Treaty on the comprehensive reductions of strategic arms. We call upon the USSR to take a similarly constructive approach to the negotiations.]

[TTBT/PNET: We are disappointed that Mr. Gromyko has reaffirmed the Soviets' negative response to the U.S. proposal to negotiate verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Based on exhaustive analysis, the U.S. has concluded that we cannot adequately verify compliance with the 150-kiloton limit, and that the verification measures of these treaties, even if implemented, would do no more than marginally improve the situation. If the Soviets refuse to engage in discussions on improved verification measures for these treaties, we would be forced to question the sincerity of their commitment to effective limitations on nuclear testing.]

[CTB: A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal, but we believe that, under present circumstances, conclusion of such a treaty does not appear realistic. There are continuing, serious difficulties with respect to verification. Further, we believe that a comprehensive test ban should be considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions and expanded confidence-building measures.]

[BMD: We regret that Mr. Gromyko has once again repeated previous distortions of the substance and intent of the President's proposal to initiate a major review of technologies and other areas related to ballistic missile defense systems. The President made clear

that his aim is to explore the possibilities for reducing reliance on destabilizing offensive ballistic missile systems, and not to "disarm" or gain unilateral advantage over the USSR. We seek a more stable military balance, which will enhance the security of the United States, the USSR, and all other nations.

The President has stated explicitly that the effort called for in his speech will be conducted consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, which does not prohibit research into ballistic missile defense concepts. Indeed there is only one nation which has a deployed ABM system, which is carrying out an intensive research program in this area, and which has a demonstrated capability to attack unarmed satellites -- the Soviet Union.

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Drafted:EUR/SOV:AVershbow
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PM:JTHowe
OSD:RPerle

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PM PRESS GUIDANCE

April 1, 1983

INF

- Q: Is the U.S. going to propose a specific number in the INF negotiations?
- A: The President has put forward a proposal for equal levels of warheads on land-based, longer-range INF missile launchers which demonstrates maximum U.S. flexibility. If the Soviets are seriously interested in reaching agreement, the ball is now in their court. For 18 months, the Soviets have insisted they will not accept zero-zero. Now we are asking what equal level they will accept.

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April 2, 1983

INF: Gromyko's Press Conference

Contingency 1 -- Gromyko rejects the President's new INF initiative in highly categorical terms which indicate that the Soviet Union sees no positive elements in it:

Q: In his press conference today, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made it clear the President's new INF proposal is completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Any comment?

A: We regret this unconstructive initial Soviet reaction, made less than five days after our proposal was introduced. There has not even been time for a full discussion of the proposal at the negotiating table in Geneva. While making clear that we continue to regard the elimination of the entire class of land-based longer range INF missiles as the best solution, the President has offered to negotiate an interim agreement calling for reduced and equal levels of warheads on both sides. This is an eminently fair proposal which demonstrates very great flexibility and takes full account of the security needs of both sides. It has been strongly and unanimously endorsed by the NATO Allies. The US position is based on the principle of equality. As the President said, with regard to these missiles, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. By contrast, as is clear from Mr. Gromyko's statement, the Soviets remain attached to their goal of preserving their unacceptable and destabilizing monopoly on longer-range land-based INF missiles. Mr. Gromyko seems to be

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saying that no equal level of LRINF missiles could form the basis for a satisfactory agreement. By turning their backs on our open-ended proposal, the Soviets contradict their own claims to be negotiating seriously.

Ambassador Nitze presented the new US initiative in Geneva March 29. He will be pursuing it when the talks reconvene May 17. We hope the Soviet Union, despite this initial reaction, will consider our proposal carefully during this period and will return to the bargaining table prepared to negotiate seriously to achieve an agreement in the interests of the security of all nations.

Contingency 2 -- Gromyko sharply criticizes the President's initiative, but appears to stop short of a final and unconditional rejection:

Q: Do you see any positive elements in Gromyko's statement on the President's INF initiative?

A: We are not surprised at Mr. Gromyko's allegations, which are both familiar and ill-founded. At the same time, we hope the Soviets are giving the President's new initiative the most serious consideration. The President has put a significant new offer on the table, demonstrating great flexibility. He has reaffirmed that we continue to see the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles as the best solution for both sides in Geneva. At the same time, he has offered to negotiate an interim agreement providing for reduced and equal levels of warheads on both sides. As the President said, when it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. Our offer is an equitable one which takes account of the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is a demonstration of our flexibility, and has been strongly and unanimously endorsed by the NATO Allies. We hope the Soviet Union will take this into account, and return to the bargaining table ready to negotiate seriously when the talks resume May 17.

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Q. Why is the United States not prepared to accept the Soviet demand that they be compensated for British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations?

A. The Soviet Union has raised this demand not as a serious negotiating objective but as an obstacle to reaching agreement.

-- The Soviets, of course, know that British and French systems are different in type and function from the U.S. and Soviet systems under negotiation.

-- They know that British and French systems are nationally based strategic deterrents, designed to defend France and Britain, not to deter attacks upon the other countries of NATO.

-- They know that only new American INF missiles can offset Soviet SS-20's, and ensure retention of the necessary link between American strategic power and the security of Europe.

-- They know that the British and French forces consist almost exclusively of sea-based, submarine-launched strategic missiles, not land based INF missiles like the SS-20, Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile.

-- They know that their own nuclear forces are a hundred times more powerful and their nuclear weapons are eighty times more numerous than those of the UK and France combined.

-- They know that, in addition to their strategic forces targeted upon the United States, they have a very substantial superiority in nuclear forces targeted upon Europe, a superiority which more than offsets the British and French forces.

-- They know that the United States has rejected these same Soviet demands for compensation for British and French systems

in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. Like the SALT talks, the INF negotiations are bilateral, and neither France nor Britain would permit its forces to be included.

-- Finally, the Soviets must realize that their demand to be allowed nuclear forces as large as every other country of the world combined is tantamount to a demand for effective military superiority, and thus global hegemony:

We hope that the Soviet Union, in responding to President Reagan's latest initiative, will drop this artificial barrier to progress in the negotiations and bargain seriously on the basis of U.S.-Soviet equality, which is the only reasonable foundation for arms control agreements between our two countries.

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Apr 1, 1983

Q. How is your new proposal better than the Andropov proposal for reductions to 162 missiles?

A. We are proposing equal limits for the US and USSR, covering all land-based, longer-range INF missile systems on a global basis.

Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain over 800 warheads on SS-20 launchers and there would be more for the US. Of these Soviet warheads, there would be 486 in Europe and the 324 currently in Asia. In addition, Soviet SS-20s in the Far East would be completely unconstrained, and the excess in Europe (currently 243 warheads) could simply be transferred to Asia. Their proposal would actually leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began in 1981.

As NATO Defense Ministers said in their communique of March 23:

"The Soviet proposals have not substantially changed since the beginning of the negotiations. In fact, their most recent proposal would leave the Soviet Union with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiations began, deny NATO the right to modernize its means of deterring this threat, allow them to have an unlimited number of mobile SS-20s east of the Urals which would still pose a

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threat to NATO Europe and almost totally eliminate from the European continent United States aircraft which are indispensable to NATO's conventional defences. The result would be to preserve the Soviet monopoly in the field of land-based LRINF missiles, to erode seriously the linkage between the United States' strategic deterrent and the defence of NATO Europe and to further the Soviet long-term aim of dividing the Alliance."

INF: Press guidance

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AFGHANISTAN

Q: Have you detected any Soviet willingness to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict there?

A: We have detected no real change in the Soviet position in Afghanistan. The Soviets continue to press military operations within the country and have given no clear sign, in any channel, that they are ready to discuss a settlement.

The U.S. goal remains constant and is shared by many other countries: to achieve a political solution that will get Soviet troops completely out of Afghanistan, provide for self-determination for the Afghan people, create an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, and lead to the return of refugees in safety and honor.

We have expressed our support for the UN process undertaken by Under Secretary Cordovez as a way of realizing these objectives and implementing UNGA resolutions on Afghanistan.

If the Soviets are serious about a settlement, they certainly have been given an opportunity to show it. The world community awaits some tangible sign of movement toward a settlement from Moscow.

START NEGOTIATIONS

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Q. The Soviets claim that no progress is being made in START. Is that a correct assessment?

A. Details of the Geneva negotiations are kept confidential. It is certainly correct to say that there are many serious differences between our position and that of the Soviets. However, given the complexity of the issues, the exchanges have been useful and we continue to believe that a sound equitable agreement is possible. Unfortunately, achieving such an agreement does not depend on us alone.

Q. Does the U.S. proposal limit bombers?

A. We have made clear to the Soviets that we are willing to accept limits on heavy bombers.

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START NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Does the U.S. proposal limit cruise missiles?

A. Our proposal places highest priority on ballistic missiles -- the most destabilizing systems. Nevertheless, the President has stated that "everything is on the table."

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Q. Is it true that U.S. proposals would have a one-sided impact on Soviet forces?

A. Because the Soviets have forged ahead in certain areas, particularly ICBMs, some of their reductions must be greater than ours in order to achieve an equal outcome. However, it is important to understand that our proposal would require substantial reductions in U.S. forces as well. For example, we would be required to cut our deployed ballistic missiles by about one-half and the warheads on those missiles by about one-third.

Salt II

23
March 29, 1983

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT II

Q. Has the Soviet Union violated SALT II Treaty Ban on no more than one new type of ICBM?

A. -- The Soviets tested a missile on February 8, which is different from a new type ICBM tested earlier. The February 8 missile may also be different from ICBM's currently deployed. We are evaluating the preliminary data on this test -- the U.S. monitors compliance with existing arms control agreements on a continuing basis and evaluates all relevant information. As the President said, however, we "don't have the full answers on that one yet."

-- Based on the information we now have, we do have concerns about the consistency of this new missile with SALT II Treaty provisions, but final conclusions must wait until analysis is complete.

Q. Why don't we ratify the SALT II Treaty?

A. The SALT II Treaty contained serious flaws which would not be in our interest as a legal obligation. These are graphically illustrated by the uncertainties surrounding the recent Soviet missile tests and continuing concerns about encryption of missile telemetry data.

Therefore, I have chosen to place our emphasis and our energies toward achieving real, significant reductions in START.

C BMS

Q. You mentioned new Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in your speech. What did you have in mind?

A. We have spent a good deal of time consulting with members of Congress in putting together a package of CBMs which are designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. We have solicited inputs from all areas of government in putting together this comprehensive package. The details of our proposal will be unfolding in the next few weeks. I will say this, the proposals are broad in scope concerning a number of potential agreements.

Q. Did you propose a Crisis Control Center as part of your CBM package?

A. We have reviewed a large number of initiatives from State, Defense and Congressional sources that were designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war. A proposal on a Crisis Control Center was part of that review.

Q. Have you been working with Congress in the development of your CBM package?

A. Yes, we have been working key members of Congress for several months on this comprehensive package of proposals of all possible initiatives for improving the containment and control of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during time of crisis. In particular, we have been working with Senators Nunn and Jackson.

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Q. What does the Administration think of the Congressional CBM proposal?

A. We have closely examined all ~~the popular~~ Congressional proposals and many have special merit. We have incorporated several of their proposals and, as a result, I feel the Administration's package is stronger and broader based and will have a great impact on lowering, still further, the risk of accidental nuclear war.

Q. How does the Congressional CBM package differ from yours?

A. The Administration and Congressional proposals share a common goal--to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. We have taken parts of the Congressional proposal which had special merit and folded them into our own.

Q. Have you submitted your CBM report to Congress?

A. No, we haven't submitted our report to the Congress as yet. It is currently at the White House for review after which it will be sent to the Congress by Secretary Weinberger. The report will be submitted in response to Section 1123(a) of Public Law 97-252 of the DoD Authorization Act, 1983, which directed SecDef to conduct a complete study.

COHEN-NUNN PROPOSAL

Q. Do you have any comment on the proposal by Senator Cohen for a "mutual, guaranteed nuclear arms build-down" under which the US and USSR would eliminate two old warheads for any new warheads deployed?

A. Senator Cohen's proposal has a number of interesting features. We share the spirit and the intent of his proposal -- to achieve substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals while allowing for necessary modernization and maintenance of deterrent forces. In this sense, it is consistent with the objectives of our arms control proposals at the START and INF negotiations in Geneva. The proposal will have to be considered with respect to its effect in enhancing stability and equality of forces.

29
Q. Earlier, in Berlin, you talked about negotiating confidence building measures with the Soviets. What is the status of that initiative?

A. We have proposed to the Soviets, in Geneva, a number of measures -- expanded exchanges of forces data, advance notification of major military exercises and advance notification of strategic and LRINF ballistic missile launches. These are part of our discussions in START and INF and I am hopeful we will be able to reach agreement on these.

NUNN-JACKSON PROPOSALS

Q: What do you think of the various proposals for confidence-building measures (including proposals for crisis control centers) which have been advanced by prominent legislators such as Senators Nunn and Jackson?

A: We share the concern Senators Nunn, Jackson and others have expressed over the need to reduce as much as possible the risks of accidental nuclear war. In our study of this issue we have intensively examined the Senators' proposals, and have incorporated many of their ideas into specific concepts which will be reported to the Congress in the near future.

Q. Are you planning to propose any changes to the Hotline link between Washington and Moscow?

A. The President noted in his address of November 22 that "the existing hotline is dependable and rapid with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing hotline system." We are looking at improvements very carefully and will announce the results of that study in the near future.

SOVIET CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Q. Have the Soviets proposed any confidence-building measures in START?

A. Yes, the Soviets have proposed several measures in the START talks. These measures, along with the proposals set forth in November, are presently under discussion in Geneva. [If pressed as to US response to Soviet proposals: We do not comment on the substance of ongoing negotiations.]

ADMINISTRATION REACTION

Q: What is the Administration's interpretation of the Soviet response not to join in negotiations to improve TTBT and PNET verification?

A: We are very disappointed in the Soviet response. We will be discussing this with them more in the future.

If they continue to refuse to discuss our concerns, we would be forced to question how genuine their commitment is to effective limitations on nuclear testing.

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^ TREATY PROVISIONS

Q. What are the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty? Of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty?

A. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, signed in July 1974, established a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (the equivalent of one hundred fifty thousand tons of TNT). Underground nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes were specifically exempted however.

The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed in May 1976, governs all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapons tests sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The PNET obligated the US and USSR not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosions (consisting of a number of individual explosions) having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosions unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures.

32
Q. Is it true that the Soviets have violated their undertaking to observe the 150-kt limit?

A. Because of uncertainties in monitoring techniques, we cannot conclude with certainty whether Soviet tests have exceeded the 150-kt limit. However, certain Soviet tests have been of sufficient magnitude to raise serious questions. When questioned, the Soviet Union asserted that it has not tested above 150 kt. These ambiguities in the test measurements clearly demonstrate the need for improved verification procedures for those treaties.

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U.S. TESTS ABOVE 150 kt

Q. Does the U.S. intend to continue to abide by the 150-kiloton limit of the TTB and PNE Treaties?

A. We have no current plans to test above this level.

Q. Why are the verification provisions of the TTBT and PNET inadequate?

A. Since 1976, our estimates of the yields of a number of Soviet tests have led to serious concerns regarding whether the Soviets are observing the threshold.

We have determined that if we were to implement the provisions of the Treaties, the improvements in our ability to monitor the yield of Soviet nuclear tests over the existing situation would be marginal.

Thus, we believe that the verification measures of these treaties need to be improved.

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Q. Why have you decided not to resume the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations?

A. While we continue to view a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal, under present circumstances conclusion of such a treaty does not appear realistic.

There are continuing, serious difficulties with respect to verification -- thus we support further discussion of ways to improve verification related to CTB in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

We believe that a comprehensive test ban should be considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities.

Nuclear testing plays a very important role in ensuring the continued credibility of our deterrent and in maintaining our expertise in nuclear weapons technology. In addition to the development and certification of new nuclear weapons, the U.S. employs nuclear testing to ensure the continued reliability of existing weapons and to incorporate modern safety and security features.

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Non-Proliferation Talks with the Allies

Q. How and when will the President discuss non-proliferation with our Allies?

A. The President is scheduled to meet with the leaders of other Western nations at the Williamsburg economic summit in May. Non-proliferation is likely to be one of the many issues addressed at that meeting.

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Non-Proliferation Policy

Q. The President's speech raises non-proliferation as an issue of great concern to the U.S. Can you summarize the Administration's policy in this area?

A. -- President Reagan has committed the US to a strong and active non-proliferation policy, concentrating on realistic means to pursue more effectively our goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

-- By helping friendly nations to meet their legitimate security needs, we are seeking to reduce motivations that can lead countries to seek nuclear weapons.

-- In close consultation with other nuclear suppliers, we are working to improve international export controls on nuclear equipment, materials, and technology and to strengthen the system of IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities.

-- We are working to restore our reputation as a reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation in order to secure more effective cooperation with our allies in coping with proliferation problems.

-- We are continuing efforts to encourage more countries to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under which 116 countries have already renounced acquisition of nuclear weapons, or to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco creating a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America.

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Non-Proliferation Policy and the Allies

- Q. What does the President mean when he speaks of the special responsibilities our Allies bear in the non-proliferation area?
- A. Our Allies include most of the technically advanced countries which are the principal suppliers of nuclear technology. The supplier nations have a special responsibility to take steps to ensure that the facilities, materials, and equipment they provide are used only for peaceful purposes and are adequately safeguarded against misuse. We are working closely and cooperatively with other nuclear suppliers to improve nuclear export controls and to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. We are also urging other suppliers to require safeguards on all of a country's nuclear activities as a condition of significant new nuclear supply.

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March 29, 1983

U.S. INITIATIVE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL

Q: The United States has tabled in Geneva what it calls its detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. What are these?

A: -- The document we tabled at the Committee on Disarmament on February 10 is a new U.S. chemical weapons arms control initiative. It outlines in detail our views on all aspects of a complete, effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban. These proposals include a framework for systematic international verification, including on-site inspections, so that all nations could have confidence that the ban would be faithfully observed.

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March 29, 1983

CBW Arms Control and Soviet CW Use

Q: Isn't it inconsistent for the US to be sitting down to negotiations on a chemical weapons ban at the very time the Soviets and others are using chemical and toxin weapons in violation of existing arms control agreements covering these weapons?

A: -- No. Evidence that existing arms control arrangements are inadequate makes it all the more important to conclude agreements which contain effective provision for verification and compliance. We seek to conclude a verifiable and effective international agreement which would totally eliminate chemical weapons from the arsenals of all states. We also supported the UNGA resolution calling for a meeting of the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to strengthen its verification and compliance provisions.

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March 29, 1983

Multilateral versus Bilateral CW Arms Control

Q: Why is the U.S. supporting multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) on chemical weapons, rather than its traditional course of bilateral arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? Isn't this really just proof that the U.S. is not seriously interested in concluding a chemical weapons ban?

A: -- No. Chemical weapons arms control directly affects the interests of a large number of countries - not just the U.S. and USSR. Any state with a chemical industry, in fact, has the means to develop a chemical weapons capability.

-- To be truly effective, a chemical weapons ban must have the widest possible international adherence. To secure this, negotiations must ensure that the diverse concerns of the various potential parties to the future agreement have been fully taken into account - not just those of the U.S. and USSR.

-- The 40-nation Committee on Disarmament provides the best forum today for carrying out this task. The U.S. and USSR are members of this body and, therefore, will both be participants in the CD negotiations on chemical weapons.

-- The possibility of resuming bilateral US/Soviet negotiations on a chemical weapons convention also remains open. However, the Soviet Union must demonstrate genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to abide by their obligations under existing agreements. Without this, there can be little hope that such bilateral talks would be productive.

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March 29, 1983

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

Q: How do you see the course of the MBFR negotiations in the months ahead?

A. Last year, the US and its Allies undertook a major initiative in MBFR by tabling a draft treaty designed to take legitimate Eastern security concerns into account. We hope the East will give that initiative the constructive response it deserves. Our goal in MBFR is to enhance security and stability in Europe through:

- significant manpower reductions to equal levels
- a verifiable agreement to ensure that the reduced levels are maintained.

Q. What is your response to the new Eastern initiative proposing an informal agreement on US and Soviet withdrawals by mutual example?

A. We are studying the new proposal which has not been fully spelled out. However, it does not seem to include adequate verification measures and guarantee significant reductions to equal levels.

CDE

Q. What are the prospects that a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) will take place?

A. -- That is one of the questions which was being discussed at Madrid in the latest round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

-- We are seeking a balanced outcome in Madrid.

-- We are looking for real progress on human rights not just security issues, but if we do get progress in both areas, then the prospects for a CDE are good.

CDE

- Q. The neutrals have proposed a compromise on all areas, including human rights. Can we accept?
- A. The most important factor in our evaluation of this compromise will be the need for balanced progress including progress in human rights.

46

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q. Why does the Administration oppose a freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons?

A. We share the concern about the risk of nuclear war and we are doing everything possible to reduce that risk.

-- A freeze at current levels would seriously handicap our efforts to negotiate arms reductions because it would lock in existing Soviet military advantages, and prevent us from carrying out necessary modernization of our nuclear forces..

-- It would thus reduce Soviet incentives to discuss seriously proposals for cuts in nuclear arsenals.

-- Although a freeze appears simple, because of its broad coverage, it would require extensive and lengthy negotiations to agree on the terms. This would divert us from the task of seeking reductions. Moreover, a comprehensive freeze cannot be effectively verified.

Q. The House of Representatives will soon be voting on a nuclear freeze resolution and it is expected that it will be approved. What is wrong with the resolution and why does the Administration oppose it?

A. The House of Representatives voted against a nuclear freeze proposal last year by a narrow margin and voted instead for a resolution that called for deep reductions in the levels of nuclear forces. The matter is again before the House of Representatives although this year's resolution is more ambiguous with respect to a nuclear freeze and what a freeze would cover.

The Reagan Administration has made clear its reasons for opposing a nuclear freeze. A freeze would preserve today's high and unstable levels of nuclear forces and would undercut our negotiations which seek deep reductions in nuclear weapons levels. A freeze would not be verifiable and a freeze would preserve the Soviets in a position of military advantage while preventing the United States from replacing obsolete and deteriorating military equipment.

The House of Representatives should consider these serious drawbacks to what has been and is a superficially attractive, simple and wrong solution to our arms control problems.

Q. What would be the effect of passage of a freeze resolution in Congress on our START and INF negotiations?

A. That would depend on the kind of resolution passed. There are over a dozen resolutions on nuclear arms control and the freeze before the House now: all of these resolutions are non-binding. The effects of the two major freeze proposals on our ongoing negotiations would be very different. A freeze at current levels could undermine the START and INF negotiations and hamper our efforts to achieve a sound agreement by reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate for reductions. It could undo the progress we have already made in convincing the Soviet Union to negotiate for substantial reductions.

The proposal for a freeze after reductions to equal and verifiable levels supports the goals we are seeking in the negotiations, and would contribute to their achievement.

Q: Why shouldn't we freeze first and then negotiate reductions?

A: Because a freeze would allow the Soviets to preserve their current nuclear advantages. They would have little incentive to discuss reductions. Moreover, although a freeze sounds simple, reaching agreement on the elements to be frozen, verification measures, etc. would be lengthy and difficult, thus delaying negotiations for actual reductions. We can do much better by continuing to negotiate vigorously for reductions.

KF

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TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 01 APR 83

BAILEY

04 APR 83

LENCZOWSKI

04 APR 83

KEYWORDS: GRAINS

USSR

SUBJECT: NEW LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT W/ USSR

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# 8309613

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(B / B

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

1) Pres	C	7/01	OBEX original not returned		
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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. RADM JOHN POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA

TOR: 011610Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

SUBJ: STATE RECOMMENDATION FOR AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE A NEW
LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT (LTA)

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171481 MEMO

2 4/5/1983 B1

W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SEC. SHULTZ MEMO

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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171482 MEMO	SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH USSR	2	4/1/1983	B1

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171483 NOTE

1 4/1/1983 B1

TO ADM. POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ MEMO

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**National Security Council
The White House**

1550 Package # 90419

'83 APR -4 P1:28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>4/c</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>Tab I sent to Pres.</u>	<u>N</u>
Sit Room	<u>at 0930.</u>		
		<u>X</u>	

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
You may want to fold this
into the other papers that we
should get tonight on all of the
issues. John This is essential

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171484	MEMO N. BAILEY, J. LENCZOWSKI, AND D. FORTIER TO W. CLARK RE SHULTZ MEMO	3	4/4/1983	B1

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