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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
171595	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	5/31/1983	B1	
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-19-1-0				
171596	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE THE ATTACHED	1	5/27/1983	B1	
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-24-19-1-0				
171597	NOTE	RE ATTACHED REPORT	1	5/16/1983	B1	B3
		PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-24-19-1-0				
171598	REPORT	RE SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS	14	5/9/1983	B1	B3
		PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-24-19-1-0				
171608	LETTER	REAGAN TO POPE JOHN PAUL II	2	7/2/1983	B1	
171609	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE STOESSEL MISSION: MEETING AT THE VATICAN	1	7/1/1983	B1	
171599	LETTER	REAGAN TO JOSEPH LUNS	2	7/2/1983	B1	

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171600	LETTER	REAGAN TO FELIPE GONZALEZ	2	7/2/1983	B1
171601	LETTER	REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171602	LETTER	REAGAN TO FRANCOIS MITTERAND (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171603	LETTER	REAGAN TO MARGARET THATCHER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171604	LETTER	REAGAN TO HELMUT (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171605	LETTER	REAGAN TO AMINTORE FANFANI (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171606	LETTER	REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171607	LETTER	REAGAN TO CHANCELLOR (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1
171610	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE STOESSEL MISSION: GONZALEZ LETTER	1	6/23/1983	B1
171611	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE IN AMERICA ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE	2	6/7/1983	B1
171612	NOTE	NOTE WRITTEN ON NSC ROUTING SLIP	1	ND	B1
171613	NOTE	D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE (INCL. ATTACHMENTS)	6	6/9/1983	B1
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171614	REPORT	RE USSR (EXCERPT, W/ADDED NOTES)	1	ND	B1
171620	CABLE	030440Z JUN 83	4	6/30/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
171615	MEMO	FROM W. CLARK RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	2	6/26/1983	B1	
171616	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	1	6/24/1983	B1	
171617	MEMO	TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED MEMO	1	6/10/1983	B1	
171618	MEMO	RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	2	6/8/1983	B1	B3
171619	CABLE	LENINGRAD 0802	7	3/31/1983	B1	

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/25

Judge,

To protect Bob's source recommend you just tell Shultz about this.

OK

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Box Number 74

Description of Material:

Memo Bob Sims to Judge Clark, 5/20/83, 1p. (w/note)

TO:
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File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # USSR (5/25/83-6/8/83)
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 20, 1983

RR Shortcut Sent to Ass Chief 22.

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM BOB SIMS

Subject: Dobrynin lunch with Time magazine

You will be interested to know that at a lunch today with Time's managing editor and other staff members of the magazine, Dobrynin was asked about his access to people in this Administration.

He said nothing had changed from previous Administrations, he has regular access to George, knows Clark but not well. You do it like the boss wants, he explained, and this President wants him to talk to the State Department. Are the communications more frequent? About the same. Are they acceptable at that level? Yes, he said, quite acceptable--but it is the character of the communications that is important, the kind of discussions you have. He seemed to be suggesting that he was seeing people here often enough, but that the discussions were more formal--more of a question and answer basis. He also said Shultz was busy with other things like the Middle East, so they didn't have much time to talk about arms control.

My contact at Time, who gave me this feedback in confidence, said Dobrynin was the "ultimate dissembler."

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TO CLARK FROM BAILEY DOCDATE 27 MAY 83

171595

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BY CI NARA DATE 4/8/13

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS USSR

SUBJECT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CIA RPT ON SOVIET USE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION: CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE:

FOR INFO: ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C JUN 07 1983	Clark noted		NB-

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National Security Council
The White House

6893

Package # 3693

1812
MAY 27 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	2		
Bud McFarlane	1	M	I
Jacque Hill	3	✓	
Judge Clark	4	✓	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	5		
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Please share w/ staff

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171596	MEMO N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE THE ATTACHED	1	5/27/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 27, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT: CIA Report on Soviet Use of Economic Relations

I draw your attention to the attached Executive Summary of a CIA report on the above subject. In this area, as in others, the unilateral disarmers are at work.

Attachment
As stated

cc: Roger Robinson

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
171597	NOTE RE ATTACHED REPORT	1	5/16/1983	B1 B3

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171597

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

The attached typescript describing Soviet use of economic relations for political gain was prepared in anticipation of the Williamsburg Summit. Because this topic is related to the broader issue of Soviet intentions in the international arena we believe it might be of interest to you.

25X1

Director
Soviet Analysis

Attachment:
SOVM83-10084

Date 16 May 1983

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 5-71

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
171598	REPORT RE SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS	14	5/9/1983	B1 B3

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Central Intelligence Agency

171598

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

9 May 1983

Soviet Use of Economic Relations for Political Purposes

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR Crest 7/8/13
BY CN NARA DATE

Key Judgments

The Soviets never lose sight of possible political gains that may be realized through economic relations.

In trade with Western countries they seek direct political concessions from governments when they think they have leverage and judge that the effort will not backfire. On a few known occasions such pressure has been successful. However, they also seek political profit indirectly through trade by:

-- Strengthening the Soviet domestic economic foundation for meeting both military production and consumption needs, thereby buttressing the USSR's international power position.

-- Reinforcing those international economic and military trends and interdependencies which, in their own right, have favorable long-term political consequences for the USSR.

-- Encouraging the emergence in foreign countries of lobbies pushing governments for political as well as economic actions consonant with Soviet interests.

Because the USSR presently does not enjoy great market power vis-a-vis the West, it generally concentrates on these indirect paths to advance Soviet political interests and avoids jeopardizing its political-strategic interests by provocative attempts to exert leverage directly for political purposes.

25X1

25X1 25X1 25X1

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Soviet Economy [redacted]

WARNING NOTICE
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The Soviets in the past have applied heavy economic pressures for political ends against Communist regimes whose leaders have not been subject to direct Soviet control--but only with mixed success. They have also bluntly used economic leverage against Communist regimes within their sphere of direct control even though they have other means of influence and must take into account the possible destabilizing effects of such actions.

The main Soviet instrument of pressure against Third World countries has been the military supply relationship, and Moscow has frequently tried to use it against recipients of its military assistance in order to gain political or military-security objectives. [redacted] 25

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Table 1

Importance of Soviet-Western Trade to Selected Western Countries, 1980

Soviet Trading Partner	Exports to USSR as a Share of Total Exports	Imports From USSR as a Share of Total Imports	Share of Trading Partner's GNP
			Exports to the USSR
Argentina *	15.0	0.2	0.8
Australia	5.1	0.1	0.8
Austria	2.7	4.2	0.6
Brazil *	2.1	0.2	0.2
Canada	2.1	0.1	0.5
France	2.2	2.7	0.4
Italy	1.6	3.0	0.4
Japan	2.1	1.3	0.3
Netherlands	0.7	1.6	0.3
United Kingdom	0.9	1.5	0.2
United States	0.7	0.2	0.1
West Germany	2.3	2.2	0.5

* Estimated.

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Discussion

Introduction

The Soviets take a broad view of possible political (including military-security) gains from foreign economic relations. From a Leninist standpoint, "politics" and "economics" are two sides of the same coin. Economic relations necessarily have political consequences, just as political actions have economic consequences. Not to perceive that trade has political implications is thus, from the Soviet standpoint, naive. How to exploit trade relationships for political payoffs, and how publicly to talk about economic/political linkages, is for Moscow simply a matter of tactical expediency dictated by current strategic objectives and the local situation. 25

Policy Toward Developed Countries

Soviet exercise of economic leverage for political purposes in the West has been cautious. Overall, the Soviet Union does not enjoy great market power vis-a-vis the West, although certain Western industries are disproportionately dependent upon sales to it. As a share of total trade turnover, Western trade with the USSR is quite low (see Table 1). The USSR is currently more dependent on the West economically than the West is on it. 25

Moscow assigns a high priority to imports from the West of advanced technology, machinery, and foodstuffs--and to credits that facilitate these imports and make possible such critical hard currency-earning projects as the gas export pipeline. The Soviets also have key political/security equities at stake in relations with the West that could be endangered by too open and belligerent an attempt to exploit for political purposes those Western interests in trade that do exist. Thus, Moscow's strategy has generally been to avoid provocative attempts to exercise political leverage, promote Soviet imports and technology acquisition, and--to the extent possible--work to weaken West European and Japanese economic ties with the United States and to develop stronger West European energy dependence on the USSR. 25

Where the Soviets have tried to apply economic leverage for political purposes, they have often sought to do so indirectly by working through industrial, business, and banking groups. Thus, for example, they:

-- Sharply increased trade with and aid to Iceland in the mid-1950s when the issue of a US base was being hotly debated. 25

-- Have for years dangled the lure of trade before Japanese businessmen in order to weaken US-Japanese ties, sidetrack Japanese demands for the return of the disputed

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25X1

Northern Territories, and undercut strategic cooperation between Tokyo and Washington. [redacted] 25

[redacted]

-- Threatened an Italian business delegation in late 1982 that Italian commercial interests would suffer if the Italian government did not take politically-significant economic "normalization" steps. [redacted] 25

It is difficult to assess how successful these efforts have been, since the influence process is diffuse and hard to trace.

On other occasions the Soviets have resorted to more direct use of leverage. For example:

-- In 1958 Moscow cut purchases from Finland in a successful bid to force the exclusion of Conservatives from the Finnish Cabinet. [redacted] 25

25X1 [redacted] 25X1

-- In [redacted] 1982 the Soviets strongly hinted at harsh trade reprisals against Finland if the Finns did not agree to improve the trade balance [redacted]

-- In March 1983 Moscow offered large-scale economic assistance to the Turkish government [redacted]

25X1 25X1

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Policy Toward Communist Countries

Historically, the Soviet leadership has exerted heavy economic pressure upon some communist regimes in order to achieve political gains. In most of the known cases in which this has occurred, the countries involved were--for a variety of reasons--less susceptible to direct Soviet military/police control. Soviet success has been mixed. For example:

-- In an attempt to topple Tito and draw Yugoslavia back into the Soviet camp, Moscow imposed a total economic embargo against Yugoslavia between 1949 and 1954. [redacted] 25

-- In responding to the Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological and political leadership of the international communist movement, Moscow abruptly canceled Soviet technical assistance in August 1960 and withdrew some 2,000 experts, together with their blueprints--threatening the very core of China's industrialization program. [redacted] 25

-- In dealing with what they regarded as Fidel Castro's harmful revolutionary adventurism abroad and gross mismanagement at home, the Soviets began to apply a sophisticated fuel (but not military supply) squeeze against Cuba in 1967. By early summer 1968 Castro was ready to mend his fences with Moscow and bring his foreign policy into line with that of the USSR. [redacted] 25

More recently, Moscow has used a lighter touch in dealing with communist states outside its physical control. Thus, for example:

-- Moscow has potentially strong leverage over Hanoi because it is the source of all military aid received by Vietnam, and also provides about 95 percent of Vietnam's foreign economic aid (see Table 2). Vietnamese leaders have felt keenly their dependence on Soviet aid since the cutoff of Chinese assistance in 1978 ended Hanoi's strategy of playing Moscow off against Beijing. Nevertheless, the Soviets have apparently not extracted great political mileage from this dependency. They have gained military base visitation privileges (less than they probably wanted) and Vietnamese support of general Soviet foreign policy, but seem to have been refused a greater presence in Vietnamese planning organs and line ministries. [redacted] 2

-- The USSR's rejection of mounting Romanian requests for preferential economic treatment may be intended to force the Romanians back into line. The Romanians appear to believe this is the case, and have tried the last few years to win Soviet economic concessions by restraining

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FOREIGN NATIONALS

Table 2

Million US $

USSR: Economic and Military Assistance to Indochina

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Total	**386**	**637**	**428**	**789**	**313**	**352**	**344**	**449**	**1,644**	**1,106**
Economic aid [a]	196	157	218	271	229	305	291	335	572	417
Trade surplus [b]	131	87	143	196	154	225	196	225	457	297
Economic grants [c]	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Technical services [d]	15	20	25	25	25	30	45	60	65	70
Military equipment deliveries	190	480	210	518	84	47	53	114	1,072	689
Vietnam	190	480	210	120	73	32	12	91	1,058	606
Laos and Kampuchea	0	0	0	398	11	15	41	23	14	83

[a] Including economic aid to Vietnam only. No trade subsidies have been calculated.
[b] From the Soviet foreign trade handbook; used as a rough estimate of economic aid, excluding grants and services.
[c] Based on proportion of grants in reported commitments.
[d] Minimum estimated value of Soviet technicians in Vietnam and training of Vietnamese in the USSR.

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their behavior. They have refused, however, to give way on issues key to their hard-won--if limited--political independence. 25

-- Since the early 1970s, the USSR's economic ties to Yugoslavia have steadily increased, despite political differences on major issues such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Yet the Soviets have apparently refrained from serious attempts to apply economic leverage against Belgrade. They probably seek to increase long-term Yugoslav dependence on trade with the USSR and to stave off increased Western influence that might arise from Yugoslavia's current economic plight. 25

The record of Moscow's readiness to apply economic pressure for political purposes against communist countries whose leaders are subject to direct Soviet control is more ambiguous. Two key factors, however, clearly affect Soviet calculations about leverage. On the one hand, there is the massive economic reliance of these regimes on the USSR--and thus the potential for leverage. The cost of Moscow's direct and indirect assistance to all communist countries increased dramatically in the 1980s (see Tables 3 and 4), reaching an astounding $23 billion in 1980. The economic burden can now be considered sizable--equivalent to more than 1.5 percent of Soviet GNP in 1980. Moreover, a substantial portion of the costs represents foregone earnings of hard currency that the USSR increasingly needs to sustain its modernization and consumer programs. Support for Eastern Europe is the heaviest burden and is largely responsible for the phenomenal growth in costs. It accounted for 20 percent of total costs in 1971 but nearly 80 percent in 1980. Eastern Europe's heavy dependence on the USSR for subsidized fuel deliveries accounts for most of the increase. 25

On the other hand, the East European governments are potentially unstable since these regimes are perceived by their citizens as imposed by the Russians and not authentically national. What popular legitimacy they do enjoy depends largely upon their continued ability to meet at least minimal consumer expectations. To a degree, then, Moscow is subject to reverse economic leverage by its clients, who can argue that failure to meet local economic demands may have untoward political consequences. 25

The Polish case demonstrates nevertheless that when pressed, the Soviets may be prepared vigorously to employ economic pressure for political purposes in Eastern Europe. In the fall of 1981 Moscow threatened to cut off supplies of oil and raw materials unless what the Soviet Union saw as a Solidarity-led anti-Soviet campaign was halted. 2

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Table 3

Million US $

USSR: Economic Costs of Supporting Communist Countries

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Total	1,737	976	1,705	7,349	6,593	7,806	8,955	8,490	13,562	23,043
By area										
Eastern Europe	358	−746	174	5,384	4,678	5,124	5,723	3,874	7,490	18,050
Cuba	607	701	652	754	1,122	1,725	2,051	3,252	3,335	3,228
Vietnam [a]	386	637	428	789	313	352	344	449	1,644	1,106
North Korea	254	190	156	101	92	64	84	22	133	NA
Mongolia	105	165	223	244	348	468	613	714	672	493
Afghanistan [b]	27	29	72	77	40	73	140	179	288	166
By type of cost										
Trade subsidies	443	−61	918	5,711	5,128	5,780	6,314	6,367	9,268	18,906
Export surpluses [c]	−29	−685	−594	101	472	714	1,190	146	899	1,569
Economic aid	897	1,027	925	832	746	955	1,140	1,429	1,763	1,602
Military aid	426	695	456	705	247	357	311	548	1,632	966

[a] Includes military equipment deliveries to Laos and Kampuchea.
[b] Afghanistan is included because it is clearly a client state at the moment.
[c] Eastern Europe only.

25

Table 4

Million US $

USSR: Economic Assistance to Eastern Europe

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 [a]	1980 [a]
Total	358	−746	174	5,384	4,678	5,124	5,723	3,874	7,490	18,050
Implicit subsidies	387	−61	768	5,283	4,206	4,410	4,533	3,728	6,591	16,481
Trade surpluses	−29	−685	−594	101	472	714	1,190	146	899	1,569

[a] Estimated from preliminary data.

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Whether the Kremlin more routinely applies economic armtwisting for political/security purposes in Eastern Europe is unclear. Because of Moscow's direct political influence over East European regimes and their leaders, the multitude of economic, political, and military contacts constantly underway between East Europeans and the USSR, and anticipation in East European capitals of political winds blowing from the Kremlin, it is difficult to distinguish economic from other types of pressure. [ ] 25

Policy Toward the Less-Developed Countries

The Soviets have not enjoyed much economic leverage with a majority of LDCs:

-- Economic dealings with LDCs account for a relatively small share of Soviet foreign trade (about 14 percent in 1981).

-- In less than a dozen cases did trade with the USSR amount to over 5 percent of an LDCs total foreign trade in 1979-81. [ ] 25

After first trying to compete with the West in providing development aid during the 1960s, Moscow has increasingly turned to military assistance for its entree to the Third World:

-- By 1981 Soviet military deliveries far outdistanced other economic aid extended to LDCs (see Table 5).

-- The largest share of military assistance (95 percent since 1954) has gone to nations on the Soviet border and to North African and Middle Eastern states such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and South Yemen, although Ethiopia and Peru have also been major recipients.

-- Many of these countries have equipped their forces largely with Soviet arms and remain dependent upon Moscow for parts, supplies and servicing. [ ] 25

The Kremlin has relied primarily on the military program in establishing influence because it:

-- Can create dependence more quickly than economic aid.

-- Provides direct access to politically powerful elites.

-- Is more readily implemented than economic agreements.

-- Is financially much more advantageous to the USSR, generating an estimated $5 billion in hard currency annually. [ ] 25

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Table 5 *Million US $*

USSR: Military Agreements With LDCs

1977	9,335
1978	2,520
1979	8,360
1980	13,915
1981	6,060

Million US $

USSR and Eastern Europe: Military Deliveries to LDCs

	USSR	Eastern Europe
1977	4,740	355
1978	5,705	550
1979	7,615	635
1980	6,290	525
1981	6,445	775

Million US $

USSR: Economic Aid Extended to LDCs

Total	22,355
1954-76	13,060
1977	430
1978	3,000
1979	3,345
1980	2,070
1981	450

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Nevertheless, Moscow still considers economic aid a useful tool for expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. It has been pressing for broad, long-term cooperation agreements with all of its major LDC clients in order to synchronize their planning cycles with Moscow's, encourage formation of a state economic bureaucracy less attuned than private entrepreneurs to relations with the West, and assure a stable flow of raw materials to the USSR. [redacted] 25

Over the past decade, as their overseas naval operations have expanded, the Soviets have consistently probed for new or improved access to port facilities and airfields for naval reconaissance purposes:

-- As inducements, they have offered naval equipment, training, services, and--in some instances--economic development assistance.

-- The main targets have been Indian Ocean and Mediterranean littoral states and West African countries.

-- But they have not pushed so hard for access as to endanger broader political objectives and have generally backed off if their requests for access appeared to threaten their relationship with the host government. [redacted] 25

In pressing for internal changes in LDCs, the Soviets have sought both to influence the short-term balance of power within regimes and to bring about long-term political and economic structural changes designed to weaken pro-Western forces and strengthen those more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Thus, for example, the Soviets have used their military supply relationship and (to a much lesser extent) the prospect of economic assistance to:

-- Push for the inclusion of communists or pro-Soviet elements in the leadership of non-aligned regimes (or for toleration of their activities) or to defend the same groups against active regime repression--as in Egypt in the late 1960s, Iraq in the 1970s, North Yemen in the 1979-80 period, and Syria in recent years. [redacted] 25

-- Pressure regimes of a "socialist orientation" to purge Western-trained and politically-moderate officials from office and to institute changes in the party, armed forces, and government designed to guarantee Soviet access over the long-haul and prevent new "Sadats" from turning regimes toward the West. This type of pressure has been exerted in recent years, for example, against Ethiopia and possibly Angola. [redacted] 25

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-- Encourage other regimes to nationalize private property and introduce other changes in property ownership intended to weaken pro-Western classes--recently, for example, in Syria. [redacted] 25

In the foreign policy arena, the Soviets have pursued several types of objectives by offering, or implicitly or explicitly threatening to withhold, military assistance. Thus, they have:

-- Sought to prevent development of closer military (and thus political) ties between individual LDCs and the West by moving aggressively to preempt sales by other suppliers. Cases here include India, Syria, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. [redacted] 25

-- Extracted diplomatic support in the UN, Non-Aligned Movement, and other international forums for Soviet-backed positions--for example, from Mali and (probably) Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique on the issue of Afghanistan. [redacted] 25

-- Tried to affect the outcome of regional issues by influencing, for example, Syria on its military intervention in Lebanon in 1976, Guinea-Bissau's participation in the West African Non-Aggression and Mutual Defense Agreement, and probably Angola's position on settlement of the Namibian issue. [redacted] 25

As a general rule, most Soviet attempts to apply leverage against LDCs have been restrained by a realistic assessment of the limits of such leverage and a desire not to put at risk assets already in hand:

-- In pro-Soviet countries such as Angola or Ethiopia, the USSR has been afraid of destabilizing friendly regimes, weakening these regimes' struggle against foreign enemies, or opening the door to renewed Western influence.

-- In pro-Western countries such as the moderate Arab states, Soviet policy has been influenced by lack of market power, a reluctance to jeopardize supplies of raw materials, fragility of relationships with leaders, and pursuit of a long-term strategy keyed to separating "politics" and "economics."

-- In neutralist countries such as India, Moscow has sometimes held back for lack of market power, fear of endangering geostrategic interests, and a wish not to be tarred with the same brush as the "imperialists."

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In all three sets of countries Moscow has been concerned not to up the ante of Soviet economic development assistance in the process of exerting leverage, and regularly has advised LDC leaders not to jeopardize possible development aid from the West by precipitate radicalism in domestic economic policy. Cases here include Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. [redacted] 25

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NSC/S PROFILE CONFIDENTIAL ID 8303716

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TO CLARK FROM HILL, C DOCDATE 27 MAY 83

DOBRIANSKY 07 JUN 83

KIMMITT 18 JUN 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 12/20/15 cms

KEYWORDS: USSR HUMAN RIGHTS STOESSEL, WALTER J

EUROPE WEST HS

GERMANY F R GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: AMB STOESSEL MISSION TO EUROPE FOR CONSULTATIONS ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 27 JUN 83 STATUS X/P FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
DOBRIANSKY	LENCZOWSKI	RAYMOND	MYER
	ROBINSON	FORTIER	STEARMAN
			KRAEMER
			KIMMITT

COMMENTS dispatch TCS

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Pres	P 6/28	For signature		
	JUN 29 1983	Pres sgd ltr to Luns		

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171608	LETTER REAGAN TO POPE JOHN PAUL II	2	7/2/1983	B1

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171609	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE STOESSEL MISSION: MEETING AT THE VATICAN	1	7/1/1983	B1

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171599	LETTER REAGAN TO JOSEPH LUNS	2	7/2/1983	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 8303716

REFERRAL DATE: 29 JUN 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: LUNS, JOSEPH

SOURCE: PRES

DATE: 02 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: USSR HUMAN RIGHTS STOESSEL, WALTER J

EUROPE WEST HS

SUBJ: LTR TO LUNS FOR STOESSEL MISSION TO EUROPE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE:

COMMENTS:

C. Millison

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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171600	LETTER REAGAN TO FELIPE GONZALEZ	2	7/2/1983	B1

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171601	LETTER REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171602	LETTER REAGAN TO FRANCOIS MITTERAND (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171603	LETTER REAGAN TO MARGARET THATCHER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171604	LETTER REAGAN TO HELMUT (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171605	LETTER REAGAN TO AMINTORE FANFANI (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171606	LETTER REAGAN TO PRIME MINISTER (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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171607	LETTER REAGAN TO CHANCELLOR (PAGE 1 ONLY)	1	7/2/1983	B1

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REFERRAL DATE: 27 JUN 83

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: HEAD OF STATES

SOURCE: PRES

DATE: 02 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: USSR HUMAN RIGHTS STOESSEL, WALTER J

EUROPE WEST HS

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

** SEE COMMENTS

DUEDATE: 02 JUL 83

COMMENTS: ** THESE ARE THE REVISED LTRS. FIRST PAGE WAS REDONE.

FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Received S S
1983 JUN 28 AM 10: 02

MEMORANDUM

3716 add-on

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1982
By ICOB Date 12/21/15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 28, 1983

SYSTEM

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK wpc

SUBJECT: Stoessel Mission on Soviet Human Rights Performance: Letter to NATO Secretary General

Ambassador Walter Stoessel's itinerary has been changed to include an appointment with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. State has recommended, and I concur, that a Presidential letter similar to those prepared for Western leaders with whom he will meet is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

OK	No	
—	—	That you sign the letter to Secretary General Luns at Tab A.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed letter to Secretary General Luns

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By ____ NARA, Date 12/2/13

3716 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

June 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Stoessel Mission on Soviet Human Rights Performance: Meeting with NATO Secretary General

The Department of State has informed me that Ambassador Stoessel has been granted an appointment with Secretary General Luns and recommends that a Presidential letter be provided similar to those prepared for other leaders with whom he will be meeting. A proposed letter to NATO Secretary General Luns is attached at Tab A, with a memorandum to the President (Tab I).

Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed letter to NATO SG Luns

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
171610	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE STOESSEL MISSION: GONZALEZ LETTER	1	6/23/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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1983 JUN 27 PM 12:39

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/27

Dick Darman,

Request you process attached letter. A previous letter was signed but it was noted there was no mention of the recent Gonzalez visit. The last paragraph has been modified.

Ron

Imp — ✓ 6/27/41

The ltrs were originally signed + they are at State. They have made changes in the Spain (two) both pages — need to be ~~copy~~ resigned. The other only have changes on 1st pg.

National Security Council
The White House

718

ED

Package # 3916 A2

83 JUN 24 P6:13

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	X	A
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		D
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

Flo,

Where are the page 2 under Tab II?

P

4m

DSC/S:

Original given to Paula Dobriansky to be picked up by State.

Carol

Carolyn 4k

Stoessell is leaving on Sunday

PRESERVATION COPY

National Security Council
The White House

720
AS

RECEIVED

Package # 3716

83 JUN 27 P5:51

URGENT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1P	JL ✓	A
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		D
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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AP

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12/20/15 0003

RECEIVED 02 JUN 83 18

TO KIMMITT FROM EARLE, R DOCDATE 01 JUN 83

LENCZOWSKI 07 JUN 83

KIMMITT 09 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR MEDIA

USIA

SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO SOVIET PEOPLE IN AMERICA ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 13 JUN 83 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
LENCZOWSKI	ROBINSON	DOBRIANSKY	MYER
	SIMS	LORD	STEARMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (N / M)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 6/10	Draft Appropriate Recom		
	6/10	Kimmitt Sgd Memo		JC, RK

~~DISPATCH~~ hold 6/10 W/ATTCH FILE SG (C) WH

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By ICOR NARA, Date 2/24/15

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 20, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT L. EARLE
Executive Assistant to the Director
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Soviet People in America Illustrated Magazine

Attached is a slightly revised version of the message from the President to the peoples of the USSR for inclusion in America Illustrated. It includes the special message that the President would like to convey -- namely that we have no aggressive intentions toward them.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment

cc: Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By NSB NARA, Date 12/21/15

TO THE READERS OF AMERICA ILLUSTRATED

Fifty years ago, in November 1933, the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics established formal diplomatic relations. The establishment of our respective diplomatic missions in Washington and Moscow, and the appointments of William C. Bullit as U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and Aleksandr Troyanovsky as the USSR's Ambassador to the United States, marked an important change in the relations between our two countries. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said at the time, the difficulties between our two nations were "serious" but not "insoluble" and could be ameliorated by frank discussions and negotiations. Our goal then, as now, was the preservation of peace in the world.

In less than a decade, however, we found ourselves fighting together as Allies in World War II in the struggle against National Socialism. The enormous sacrifices that we all made in that war convinced both our countries that we would need to cooperate to preserve the peace, yet the differences between our governments remained serious. We both realize that, in this age of enormously destructive nuclear weapons, the world of 1983 poses new kinds of dangers compared to those of the world of 1933.

To cope with these dangers, I have suggested to our government and scientific community that we work toward developing a new form of defensive system to protect ourselves against the dangers of deliberate or accidental nuclear attack. It is because the American people have no quarrel with the peoples of the Soviet Union, and do not want to threaten you in any way, that we seek to abandon a defense strategy that relies exclusively on a retaliatory attack against you, your families and your homes. We in America hope that your government will find that mutual defense is a better way of maintaining peace and strategic stability than the existing strategy of retaliatory destruction or any strategy of an offensive first-strike nature.

Of course, defensive systems of this type are a hope for the future. But in the meantime, I want to stress my continuing commitment to achieving deep, balanced, and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons by both the Soviet government and mine.

The American people, like you, want peace, and our government is directly and immediately responsible to the people, by whom we were elected. Any attribution of hostile intentions to the U.S. is a misrepresentation of our policy. There is no possible electoral constituency in the U.S. in favor of a war of aggression, and the Soviet government knows this. Even when the U.S. had an absolute monopoly in nuclear weapons, this was the case. Then, as now, we did our best to convey our peaceful intentions.

Let us hope that our efforts to maintain nuclear peace can be matched by greater efforts to ensure that this peace be accompanied by freedom, justice, democracy and unconditional individual human rights for all people, so that the absence of war can mean not only international peace but peace at home as well. The U.S. was founded upon the concept of liberty as the divine birthright of all men. We stand today, as we did during World War II in the defense of liberty. Our hand is extended in friendship to the peoples of the USSR, for whom we wish only the blessings of peace, prosperity and freedom.

696

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 3829

SECRETARY

13 JUN 9 P3:07

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	
Bud McFarlane		✓	
Jacque Hill	2	✓	
Judge Clark	3	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	5	Send Tab I to Kimmitt. Return rest of package to me.	
Sit Room			
JUDGE	4	✓	

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

John. Bill Casey wld like to see this. Don

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171611	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE IN AMERICA ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE	2	6/7/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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53

[redacted] CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 12/20/15 KDB RECEIVED 11 JUN 83 13

TO MCFARLANE FROM DUR DOCDATE 07 JUN 83

FORTIER 09 JUN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR MEDITERRANEAN

CPPG LEBANON

SUBJECT: US MILITARY POSTURE IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION: MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE:

FOR INFO: FORTIER, KEMP, TEICHER, NORTH

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390649 NSCIFID (B / CM)

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	C 6/15	Noted by McFarlane		PD, DF

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171612	NOTE NOTE WRITTEN ON NSC ROUTING SLIP	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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171613	NOTE D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE (INCL. ATTACHMENTS)	6	6/9/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NLRR 748-24-19-8-3
BY LCDB NARA DATE 11/15/13

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 9, 1983

NOTE TO ROBERT MCFARLANE:

Bud:

Phil's paper raises some timely and valid points about the kind of signals a more credible U.S. posture in the Med would convey. I think the paper, like all of Phil's work, is well worth your reading.

Incidentally, the point about Turkish overland warning and the defense of the 6th Fleet is one we used to great effect in getting the Turkish arms embargo lifted in 1979. It is no less true today as we struggle with new modernization and funding issues. A mention of this point by you in the context of high-level briefings you may provide to members on the current crisis would be worth a hundred phone calls when votes are finally in the offing.

From a strategic standpoint, of course, we now face a similar (potential) problem in the south, with the prospect of the Soviet's staging (or recovering) backfires in Libya.

Don Fortier

Attachment:
Phil Dur's paper

NSC Review Completed as Redacted.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NAVY, JCS, DOS, reviews completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/11/15 : NLR-748-24-19-8-3

TOP SECRET

System II
90724

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

June 7, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR

SUBJECT: US Military Posture in the Eastern Mediterranean (U)

In the aftermath of the most recent Syria-Israel CPPG, I think it is important to convey to you some misgivings about current US military posture in the Eastern Med. This concern, which has not been expressed to anyone save a very few colleagues here on the NSC staff, stems from several factors:

-- The consensus view in the Intelligence community that the USSR will respond to an Israeli strike in Syria which destroys Soviet systems and kills Soviet military personnel.

-- The marginal posture of the Sixth Fleet (with tensions running high in the Levant, a single carrier posture may not be prudent).

-- The current Soviet naval posture (six mid/long-range surface-surface missile units) and a spate of recent SOVMEDRON-Black Sea Fleet Air Force exercises.

-- The occasional lack of good current intelligence on Soviet submarine movements in the Med. (For example, last week there were at least two undetected nuclear-powered submarines operating in the Med.)

-- The lack of base access in the Eastern Mediterranean which we have traditionally used to sustain crisis presence and which we would certainly need to ensure readiness in the event of a serious Syrian-Israeli clash.

The recent CPPG revealed there is no consensus about what the Soviets are likely to do across a spectrum of plausible Syrian-Israeli conflict scenarios. Unfortunately, the estimates you have heard of what they can do have more to do with assumed intentions and less with putative capabilities. In this regard a shortcoming of the CPPG is that those who believe the Soviets will assume high risks to protect their position in the Middle East (CIA) may not be fully conversant with the tactical and operational considerations with important bearing on what

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exactly the Soviets can do. Those who are very conversant with Soviet doctrine, capabilities and tactics (and who therefore recognize the vulnerability of our position in the Eastern Med.) are convinced that the Soviets will not run the risk of a major confrontation with the US to protect their positions in Syria. This latter group (DOD and some parts of State) are also very anxious to protect their Arab connections by not undertaking measures that align us with Israel in the name of better readiness for a confrontation with the Soviets.

I do not believe, and this memo should not suggest, that there is a high probability of Soviet military action against Israel in the near future. I do agree [redacted] that a significant 25X1
Israeli defeat of Syria and further damage to the credibility of Soviet power in the Middle East could trigger Soviet reprisals against Israel--even military reprisals. Following that logic, I think it is imprudent for State to issue stern warnings to the Soviets ("bearing full consequences, etc.") without at least thinking very hard about Israeli vulnerabilities to Soviet reprisals, and what we would do to confront the Soviets before they undertook to punish Israel for attacks on what the entire world knows are Soviet systems and Soviet personnel. 25X1

You may have received mixed signals about one possible (if unlikely) Soviet option in the face of an Israeli strike into Syria, namely, the use of BACKFIREs. [redacted]

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/11/15 : NLR-748-24-19-8-3

[redacted]

While IAF F-15s and F-16s could certainly take a toll of BACKFIREs, they would have to be cued and controlled. In short, the Soviets are not "ten feet tall," but we should give them some credit for imaginative planning which also takes the systemic vulnerabilities of their opponents into account.

The important point in all of this is that we have assumed that the real deterrent to Soviet reprisals against Israel is the high likelihood of a confrontation with the US. Fair enough, but unless our forces are organized and disposed in a manner which the Soviets recognize as a credible impediment to reprisals, they may ultimately decide that the risks are

25X1

[redacted]

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/11/15 : NLR-748-24-19-8-3

bearable and present us with a fait accompli. Accordingly, if the warning indicators of a Syrian-Israeli clash are high, we should consider mustering the forces necessary to block Soviet reprisals against Israel. In my estimation, this should at a minimum include reinforcing the SIXTHFLT to a level of at least 3 CVBGs. (The SIXTHFLT Commander was not very comfortable with even this CV level during the Yom Kippur war in 1973.) It should also include establishing a continuous AWACS orbit over the Aegean/Turkey perhaps in the guise of a NATO exercise. If we could negotiate it with the UK, we should also have a contingency plan to rapidly deploy USAF F-15s/F-16s from EUCOM to the Cyprus SBA because it is unlikely we will be allowed to bed-down TACAIR in either Turkey or Greece in any situation short of a declared NATO emergency.

---

cc: Don Fortier, Geoff Kemp, Howard Teicher, Ollie North

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/11/15 : NLR-748-24-19-8-3

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U.S. NAVY CARRIERS - WORLDWIDE



AS OF 0800EDT 11 JUN 83

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/11/15 : NLR-748-24-19-8-3

Mexico 61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/8

Judge,

Here is the data on Mexican - Soviet oil equipment deal.

JK

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171614	REPORT RE USSR (EXCERPT, W/ADDED NOTES)	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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171620	CABLE 030440Z JUN 83	4	6/30/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
171615	MEMO FROM W. CLARK RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	2	6/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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171616	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	1	6/24/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	*Document Type* *Document Description*	*No of pages*	*Doc Date*	*Restrictions*
171617	MEMO TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED MEMO	1	6/10/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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171618	MEMO RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE	2	6/8/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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171619	CABLE LENINGRAD 0802	7	3/31/1983	B1

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National Security Council
The White House

719

Package # 4048 79

730 pm
6/24/83

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	
Bud McFarlane	2	✓	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	~~5~~		D
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

COMMENTS

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WHSR
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Time Stamp 8⁰

STAFF	C/O
Clark	C
McFarlane	
Poindexter	C
→ LENCZOWSKI	
Merchant	O
NSC S/S	

C : Copy O : Original

John,
Should we modify your earlier package to take some of this into account?

Steve 160237 June 9.

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