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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 2/24/2000

File Folder IRAN-IRAQ WAR 07/1983-4/31/84 (1)

FOIA

F96-127/2

Box Number 36

BATTLE

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
265124	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #147	1	4/30/1984	B1
265125	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #148	4	4/30/1984	B1
265126	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO HODEL R 8/23/2011 F96-127/2#149	1	4/19/1984	B1
265127	MEMO	MARTIN TO MCFARLANE RE UPDATE ON IRAN-IRAQ ENERGY WORKING GROUPS R 8/23/2011 F96-127/2#150	2	4/17/1984	B1
265128	MEMO	FORTIER/DUR TO MCFARLANE RE SWM BREAKFAST ITEM PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2#151	2	4/10/1984	B1
265129	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #152	1	4/9/1984	B1
265130	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #153	2	4/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FOIA

F96-127/2

Box Number 36

BATTLE

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
265131	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE IEA DISCUSSIONS R 7/9/2001 F96-127/2 #154	1	4/16/1984	B1
265132	MEMO	MARTIN TO MCFARLANE RE MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT ON IEA DISCUSSIONS R 7/9/2001 F96-127/2 #155	1	4/4/1984	B1
265133	CABLE	281147Z R 4/17/2026 M134#32654 (NEAR COPY)	5	3/28/1984	B1
265134	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #157	1	4/2/1984	B1
265135	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #158	3	4/2/1984	B1
265136	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE MORNING REPORT FOR IRAN-IRAQ PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #159	3	3/30/1984	B1
265137	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE MORNING REPORT FOR IRAN-IRAQ PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #160	1	4/2/1984	B1

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F96-127/2

BATTLE

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1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
265138	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #161	1	3/30/1984	B1
265139	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #162	4	3/30/1984	B1
265140	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #163	1	3/29/1984	B1
265141	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #164	3	3/29/1984	B1
265142	MEMO	BEAL TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMARY R 11/23/2011 F96-127/2 #165	1	3/20/1984	B1
265143	SUMMARY	IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION PAR 4/17/2026 F96-127/2 #166	3	3/20/1984	B1

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC Office
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File Folder: Iran-Iraq I 1983-4/31/84 (1) Box 91354

Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F96-127 (Battle)
Date: 02/24/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #147	4/30/84	~~P1/F1~~
2. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 4p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #148	4/30/84	P1/F1
~~3. memo~~	~~McFarlane to Hodel 1p R 8/23/11 F96-127/2 #149~~	~~4/19/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
~~4. memo~~	~~Martin to McFarlane re Update on Iran-Iraq Energy Working Groups 2p " " " #150~~	~~4/17/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
5. memo	Fortier/Dur to McFarlane re SWM Breakfast Item 2p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #151	4/10/84	P1/F1
6. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #152	4/9/84	~~P1/F1~~
7. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 2p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #153	4/9/84	P1/F1
~~8. memo~~	~~McFarlane to the President re IEA Discussions 1p R 7/9/01 NLSF96-127/2 #154~~	~~4/16/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
~~9. memo~~	~~Martin to McFarlane re Memo to the President on IEA Discussions 1p R 7/9/01 " #155~~	~~4/4/84~~	~~P1/F1~~
10. cable	281147Z 5p R 4/17/26 M134 #32654 (NEAR COPY)	3/28/84	P1/F1
11. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #157	4/2/84	~~P1/F1~~
12. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 3p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #158	4/2/84	P1/F1
13. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Morning Report for Iran-Iraq 3p PAR " " #159	3/30/84	P1/F1
14. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Morning Report for Iran-Iraq 1p PAR " " #160	4/2/84	P1/F1
15. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #161	3/30/84	~~P1/F1~~
16. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 4p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #162	3/30/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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File Folder: Iran-Iraq I 1983-4/31/84 (1) Box 91354

Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F96-127 (Battle)
Date: 02/24/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #163	3/29/84	~~P1/F1~~
18. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 3p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #164	3/29/84	P1/F1
19. memo	Beal to McFarlane re Summary 1p R 11/23/11 F96-127/2 #165	3/20/84	~~P1/F1~~
20. summary	Iran-Iraq Situation 3p PAR 4/17/26 F96-127/2 #166	3/20/84	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

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FILE TRANSFER
BY THE REAGAN LIBRARY STAFF

Energy Briefing Book re Iran Iraq War

Previously filed: Iran - Iraq War I 1983-4/31/84

New file location: Energy Briefing Book re Iran Iraq War

Date of transfer: 2/24/00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

April 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT: Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
30 April 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 596-127/2 # 147
BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~TOP~~
~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ORCON

THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AS OF 1400 30 APRIL 1984

I. NATURE OF THE THREAT

A major new concern is the affect of the Soviets' latest Middle East initiatives on long-term U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Visits by MFA Mideast Department Chief Polyakov and Middle East expert Brutents indicate that the Soviets are interested in pursuing new opportunities with traditionally Western-aligned states.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

The Soviets are said to have recently agreed to provide to Iraq large quantities of arms, and possibly credits for some arms purchases. A communique in the Communist Party newspaper Pravda said Iraqi Deputy Premier Ramadan and Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhipov had signed a long-term agreement on expanded economic and technical cooperation. According to Saturday's Washington Post, the joint statement also condemned U.S. policies in the Middle East and gave full backing to Soviet claims that the United States exploits the Gulf War as a pretext to interfere militarily in the region. While there are reports that the Iraqis did not agree to the criticism of the U.S. in the communique, Ramadan is reported to be pleased with the results of his "very tough" talks with the Soviets, claiming that the USSR has now abandoned its neutrality in the conflict (Ref: INR Morning Summary, 28 April).

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

Finally, the government of Egypt is said to

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ORCON
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Authority F96-127/2#148
BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

see itself as at last having begun an "orchestrated, evolutionary process" of normalizing relations with the USSR (Ref: AMEMBASSY Cairo 281131Z).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Finally, the Israelis have categorically denied Saudi statements that they have been making overflights over Saudi territory. They also denied any intention of attacking Iraqi chemical facilities (Ref: SECSTATE 280146Z).

III. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

A discussion paper prepared for an Interagency Group (IG) meeting outlined a number U.S. policies and objectives. The following is extracted from that discussion paper.

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. moved to rebuild a security relation with Pakistan. Our objective was to reinforce Pakistan's ability to withstand Soviet intimidation, and if necessary to resist Soviet aggression. U.S. strategy is to develop closer military cooperation, in line with the direction provided by the President in NSDD-99. Keeping in mind Pakistan's strategic location and its close ties to a number of Persian Gulf states, our goal is to enlist Pakistani participation in our regional collective security arrangements.

[REDACTED]

IV. STATUS OF PLANNING

In accordance with a request by NSC, Politico-Military and Near East Affairs will co-chair an Interdepartmental Group (IG) meeting on implementation of NSDD-99 with respect to Pakistan and India. The IG has been tasked to address pending politico-military issues prior to the Vice President's trip. It will meet at 13:30 on Tuesday May 1, in the NEA conference room at State.

V. REFERENCES

[REDACTED]

TO

MCFARLANE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM MARTIN *sup*
2/24/00

RECEIVED 18 APR 84 14

DOCDATE 17 APR 84

KEYWORDS. ENERGY

IRAN

IRAQ

SUBJECT. UPDATE RE IRAN - IRAQ ENERGY WORKING GRPS

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE: 20 APR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8402745

NSCIFID NSDD0134 (MR

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	APR 19 1984	<i>Mcfarlane approved</i>		
	APR 19 1984	<i>Mcfarlane spd</i>		<i>index</i> <i>Wm</i>
DISPATCH	<i>✓</i> <i>204/19</i>		W/ATTCH	FILE <i>PA</i> (C) <i>19</i>

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3121

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD P. HODEL
Secretary of Energy

SUBJECT: Energy Contingency Planning (S)

I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for a job well done. In my opinion, the work on international energy contingency planning has gone extremely well, thanks in large part to the efforts of the Department of Energy and especially Don Pearlman. (S)

As you are probably aware, we will be continuing consultations with our allies over the next several weeks on the current stock situation and the question of stock coordination during a crisis. The success of these efforts will, in part, depend on the credibility of our domestic contingency planning. I am somewhat concerned that work on domestic energy and economic policy issues has not moved as swiftly as the work on our international energy policy. As a result, we have not been able to compile the common briefing book promised to the Cabinet at the 20 March NSC meeting on Iran-Iraq energy issues. I urge you and your staff to move forward to conclude work on these issues with all due speed so our policy options can be clearly defined and the briefing book can be completed and submitted to the President by early May. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

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~~SECRET~~

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NLRR F96-127/2 #149

BY RW

NARA DATE 8/23/11

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3121

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Update on Iran-Iraq Energy Working Groups

Summary. Implementation of international energy policy, per the guidelines established in NSDD-134, is proceeding on schedule. Special emphasis is being placed on the consultative process and developing an adequate public information strategy.

International Energy Policy. As I reported earlier, initial consultations have already been held within the IEA. There was widespread enthusiasm for our suggestions and, as a result, follow-up work is underway to establish an IEA mechanism for consultations on the stock situation among major countries with a view toward developing a common approach to stock coordination during a crisis. I have also had quiet discussions with Ulf Lantzke and Acting Director Hopkins about proceeding on a fast track in order to ensure adequate preparation which will parallel preparations for the Summit. Both have assured me that they will meet this schedule. *good* ✓

The first formal round of bilateral consultations is scheduled to begin next week. Undersecretary Wallis will be leading a delegation to London, Bonn, Paris and Rome. As I will be on leave, I strongly recommend that Roger Robinson accompany Wallis. During the first week in May, Ambassador Fairbanks will be returning to the Far East to follow-up on earlier discussions in Japan. A strategy paper for use in these discussions is being prepared.

In addition to the above consultations, the IEA is scheduling a low profile May meeting outside Paris to discuss the stock situation and coordination among the major consuming countries. This will be a vital step in obtaining consensus among the allies.

Public Information. State and DOE are currently drafting, per NSDD-134, a comprehensive public information strategy covering what we can do to educate key opinion leaders prior to a crisis and how to best respond after a disruption in order to disseminate accurate information to calm the market. Once this plan of action is completed it will be forwarded to the NSC for approval. Should the war in the Persian Gulf heat up again, we may want to offer a background briefing to the Democratic Presidential candidates to reduce sniping (hopefully) in this sensitive area.

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NLR 96-1272 #150

BY *RW*
NARA DATE 8/23/11

Other Areas. Very slow progress is being in the other areas under review within the interagency process. Until work is finished on domestic energy and economic policy options, it will not be possible to complete the planned common briefing book for the Cabinet. DOE and Treasury are still working on analysis and position papers on issues in these areas. It would be useful to give this work a little prodding by sending the attached memo to Secretary Hodel in his role as chairman of the Energy Response Working Group.

DR
Roger Robinson, Rich Beal *RB* and Don Fortier concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve sending Roger Robinson with the Wallis delegation to Europe next week. *Does he have*

Approve *RCM*

Disapprove _____

2. That you sign the memo to Secretary Hodel at Tab I urging speedy completion of work underway in the Energy Response Working Group.

Approve *✓*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Secretary Hodel

cc: Don Fortier
Roger Robinson
Rich Beal
Ben Bonk

TO MCFARLANE FROM DUR
FORTIER

DOCDATE 10 APR 84
10 APR 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN
TERRORISM

IRAQ

SHULTZ, G
WEINBERGER, C

SUBJECT: BREAKFAST ITEM FOR MCFARLANE W/ SEC SHULTZ & SEC WEINBERGER ON IRAN -
IRAQ / RESPONDING TO IRANIAN TERRORISM

ACTION. NOTED BY MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
DUR
FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID NSDD0139 (HW HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

April 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

PHILIP A. DUR *pl 12*
DONALD R. FORTIER *df*

SUBJECT:

S W M Breakfast Item: Iran-Iraq War / Responding
to Iranian Terrorism

State has proposed this particular item. With the issuance of NSDD-139, it would appear that a better subject for discussion would be how to proceed in implementing decisions the President has already made (Tab A). In that vein, you could raise the following:

- What additional force deployments would enhance our deterrent posture and our ability to move onto the Peninsula or warning of serious escalation. (FYI, TACAIR starting from CONUS would mean that, on warning, we would have to arrange overflight, tanking, etc. with the Europeans, North Africans, etc. before we could begin moving. The advantage of starting from Egypt, Sudan, or Diego Garcia is that we would not need third country approval before moving onto the Peninsula. In short, we would be ready to move on warning.)
- What measures does DOD contemplate to enhance anti-terrorist defenses for U.S. forces and facilities in the Gulf? From the standpoint both of national self-interest and probability of occurrence, this must be a top priority. We also need to recognize that measures taken to enhance our security can have a positive spillover effect in places like Bahrain.
- What are the constraints on counter-terrorist training and assistance to the Gulf States? (DOD claims they cannot provide this training under the law. While this is true regarding training for police or gendarmeries, it is not true about foreign military organizations. This came up during Rumsfeld's meetings in Qatar. The Ambassador said DOD had asserted they could not train the Qatari military in counterterrorism. This is simply not true.)
- What are we doing about the plan of action to avert an Iraqi collapse? (State needs to get a CIA/DIA assessment of Iraqi

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Declassify OADR

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Authority F96-127/2 #151BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

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military needs before we decide on how we can help.)

(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

52

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

April 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT: Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
9 April 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRREF96-127/2 #152

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON
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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ORCON

THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AS OF 1400 9 APRIL 1984

I. NATURE OF THE THREAT

Prior to the launching of the long-awaited Iranian offensive, the most serious threat will remain Iranian-sponsored terrorism both within the Persian Gulf region as well as other areas.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

(b)(1) The current "equilibrium" on the battlefield is unlikely to be broken unless political directions change. Such change could take many forms: a Khomeini-directed beginning of an offensive, leadership or other changes in the government in either Baghdad or Tehran, or breaks in diplomatic mediation efforts. Until then, we are likely to see Iranian military moves (reinforcing, probing, harassing fire) and Iraqi countermoves (flooding Iranian occupied areas, air strikes on logistics, chemical warfare, reinforcing weak points, keep SCUD and FROG weapons ready for contingencies along with the option of more strikes on Gulf shipping). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Based on imagery of 5 April, Iraq is likely to receive additional armored vehicles and SCUD missiles from the USSR in the near future (Ref: NAVOPINTCEN 062151Z). Finally, a Japanese company has offered to sell four Bell helicopters to Iran possibly for medivac operations (Ref: SSO DETRICK 062001Z).

"The Islamic Association of Students of the World's Islamic Countries" has threatened to target various places in Kuwait--including foreign embassies--unless certain persons were released from Kuwaiti prisons. The aftermath of the recent trials in Kuwait is just one of many factors which could generate terrorism in the region (Ref: AMEMB KUWAIT 041636Z).

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Authority F96-127/2#153

BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ORCON
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

While admirable, Indira Gandhi's efforts to obtain movement toward a peaceful resolution of the Iran-Iraq war will meet almost insurmountable obstacles. Nevertheless, her discussions with Arab leaders 7-10 April could help in moving the process along (Ref: SECSTATE 042316Z, AMEMB NEW DELHI 061349Z). Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's visit to Japan on 10 April could elicit whether Iran is interested in some new form of relationship with the U.S. (Ref: AMEMB TOKYO 050842Z, SECSTATE 070507Z).

III. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

The President has approved NSDD 139, "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War." This NSDD calls for actions to (1) proceed with consultations and advance planning with Saudi Arabia; (2) dispatch a political-military mission to key Gulf states to further refine contingency planning; (3) continue to improve intelligence collection; (4) determine ways to reduce vulnerability of U.S. assets in the region; (5) consult closely with Allies, (6) prepare a plan to avert Iraqi collapse; and (7) ensure consistency in U.S. policy regarding use of chemical weapons and other inhumane methods of war. The purpose of these actions is to improve our immediate ability to deter an expansion of the Persian Gulf conflict and to defend, if necessary, U.S. interests.

IV. STATUS OF PLANNING

Consultations with allies on the Persian Gulf situation are continuing with a 10 April meeting in Paris (Ref: SECSTATE 070229Z, 060228Z, 060329Z).

A letter to King Fahd from President Reagan has been transmitted detailing our common concerns and the need for contingency planning (Ref: SECSTATE 060228Z).

Discussions on solidifying the U.S.-Omani relationship continue and should receive a boost from The Vice President's upcoming visit (Ref: SECSTATE 062125Z, AMEMB MUSCAT 091025Z).

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 APR 84 14

TO MCFARLANE FROM MARTIN

DOC DATE 04 APR 84

KEYWORDS. ENERGY

OIL

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

IRAN

IRAQ

NSDD

SUBJECT: MEMO TO PRES ON IEA DISCUSSIONS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS IP FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID NSDD0134 (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP</i> APR 16 1984	<i>Information</i>		<i>VP, G4, JB, WM</i>
	<i>C</i> APR 16 1984	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>WM</i>
DISPATCH		W/ATTCH	FILE	<i>PA MEN</i> (C)

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen
Received 2745

1984 APR 16 AM 9:51

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1984

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: IEA Discussions on Emergency Preparedness

Issue

Background on follow-up consultations concerning international energy policy within the International Energy Agency (IEA).

Facts

The U.S. delegation to last week's IEA Governing Board made a very successful presentation on U.S. international energy policy based on the guidelines you established during the NSC meeting on energy implications of the Iran-Iraq war, as embodied in NSDD-134.

Discussion

Our representative highlighted the need for appropriate international policies, including:

- o Coordinated stock policies.
- o The need for increased strategic stocks.
- o An effective public information strategy to calm the market.
- o Other means to reduce demand on the world oil market in a disruption.

We noted the importance of fairly sharing the burden of a disruption among the allies with each country responding through measures appropriate to its own situation. The other members of the IEA were very receptive of our views and were particularly appreciative of our clarification of U.S. international energy policy. As a result, the IEA agreed to activate extensive work on stock coordination in a crisis.

In sum, I believe we are off to an excellent start in the international arena thanks to sound policy formation and good execution by our representatives abroad.

cc: Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Michael Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F96-127/2 #154
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 8/6/01

Prepared by:
William F. Martin
Ben Bonk

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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2745

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

April 4, 1984

~~INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT:

Memo to the President on IEA Discussions
on Emergency Preparedness

As I pointed out in my cable from Paris (Tab II), we have made an excellent start on consultations concerning international oil emergency preparedness within the International Energy Agency. These consultations were carried out based on the guidelines established at the NSC meeting on the energy implications of the Iran-Iraq war and NSDD-134. It is important that we inform the President of the success of the initial follow-up to his decisions on U.S. international energy policy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I describing our initial consultations on international energy policy within the IEA.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
II Cable

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96-127/2 #155

BY WJ NARA, DATE 8/6/01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 PARIS 2334
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DISTRIBUTION: COMM /001 *MARTIN (Kathy)*

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O 281147Z MAR 84
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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 12334

USOECB
FOR NSC - MCFARLANE ONLY FROM WILLIAM MARTIN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OECD, IEA, ENRG
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA): DISCUSSIONS
- ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
-

1. (C) IEA DISCUSSIONS ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS HAVE GONE WELL. OUR DELEGATION MADE PRESENTATION BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS IN THE NSDD HIGHLIGHTING IMPORTANCE OF APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL POLICIES INCLUDING (1) COORDINATED STOCK POLICIES AND IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING STRATEGIC STOCKS, (2) AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY TO CALM MARKET, AND (3) OTHER MEANS TO REDUCE DEMAND ON THE WORLD OIL MARKET DURING A DISRUPTION. WE ALSO NOTED THAT OUR DOMESTIC RESPONSE WOULD BE BASED ON RELIANCE ON MARKET FORCES COUPLED WITH USE OF THE SPR. WE ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF FAIRLY SHARING THE BURDEN OF A DISRUPTION AMONG THE ALLIES WITH EACH COUNTRY RESPONDING THROUGH MEASURES APPROPRIATE TO ITS OWN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND ENERGY SITUATION.

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BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 PARIS 2334

DTG: 281147Z MAR 84 PSN: 008772

2. (C) OTHER NATIONS WARMLY WELCOMED U.S. VIEWS, NOTING IN PARTICULAR THEIR APPRECIATION OF CLARIFICATION OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, INCLUDING EARLY USE OF THE SPR.

3. (C) BASED ON OUR APPROACH, DR. LANTZKE HAS MADE A VERY HELPFUL PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM TO CONSULT ON THE STOCK SITUATION AMONG MAJOR COUNTRIES (NORTH AMERICA, EC AND JAPAN) WITH A VIEW TOWARD DEVELOPING A COMMON APPROACH TO STOCK COORDINATION DURING A CRISIS. MEMBER GOVERNMENTS AS A WHOLE RESPONDED ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO LANTZKE/U.S. INITIATIVE. SEVERAL NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO DEMAND RESTRAINT AS WELL AS STOCKDRAW, ALTHOUGH LANTZKE RESPONDED THAT THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE ON STOCKS. (THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH.) THE SECRETARIAT WILL BEGIN INTENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE WITH A VIEW TO HAVING PRELIMINARY VIEWS BY EARLY JUNE. THIS WOULD ALLOW INPUT INTO THE SUMMIT IF THE SITUATION IN THE GULF DETERIORATES. I THINK THAT IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY IS RIDING HIGH IN THIS FORUM DUE TO THOUGHTFUL POLICY FORMATION IN WASHINGTON AND GOOD EXECUTION BY OUR REPRESENTATIVES.

4. (LOU) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT WHICH WE MADE AT THE MEETING.
BEGIN QUOTE.

AGENDA ITEM 3.A. REVIEW OF MEMBER COUNTRIES EMERGENCY
RESPONSE PROGRAMS

TALKING POINTS
ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PRINCIPLES:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 PARIS 2334

DTG: 281147Z MAR 84 PSN: 008772

-- THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF AN OIL SUPPLY DISRUPTION OF UNCERTAIN, BUT POTENTIALLY VERY SERIOUS MAGNITUDE HAS SHARPENED OUR THINKING AND CAUSED US TO REEVALUATE OUR POLICIES FOR DEALING WITH ENERGY EMERGENCIES. I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SHARE WITH YOU A FEW KEY ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY.

-- U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY FOR DEALING WITH MAJOR OIL SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS IS BASED ON FOUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES:

- . PRIMARY RELIANCE ON FREE MARKET FORCES.
- . ENHANCEMENT OF ENERGY SUPPLIES IN AN EMERGENCY.
- . PROVISION OF ENERGY SUPPLIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES.
- . INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE IEA AND OTHER MECHANISMS TO REDUCE PANIC, MINIMIZE ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS AND ASSURE THAT THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES DO NOT SUFFER UNACCEPTABLE HARM AS A RESULT OF AN OIL SUPPLY SHORTFALL.

-- I THINK THAT WE HAVE ALL LEARNED IN THE PAST THAT SOME FLEXIBILITY IS NEEDED IN DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO AN ENERGY DISRUPTION. DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS, AS WELL AS DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONDING TO ENERGY
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PAGE 01 OF 03 PARIS 2334
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USOECDC
FOR NSC - MCFARLANE ONLY FROM WILLIAM MARTIN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OECD, IEA, ENRG
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA): DISCUSSIONS
SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS.

-- BECAUSE OF THIS, WE NEED TO COLLECTIVELY ADOPT
POLICIES THAT WILL FAIRLY SHARE THE BURDEN AND REDUCE THE
ADVERSE IMPACTS OF A MAJOR OIL SUPPLY DISRUPTION BY MEANS
WHICH ACCOMMODATE AND RESPECT THE PARTICULAR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY.
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY:

-- FOR THE UNITED STATES, IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR
EMERGENCY POLICY ENTAILS PRIMARY RELIANCE ON FREE MARKET
FORCES COUPLED WITH USE OF THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM
RESERVE AS OUTLINED IN SECRETARY HODEL'S STATEMENT OF
FEBRUARY-21, 1984.

- WHILE WE MUST MAINTAIN A CERTAIN DEGREE OF
FLEXIBILITY IN ORDER TO ADAPT QUICKLY TO CHANGING
CIRCUMSTANCES, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 PARIS 2334

DTG: 281147Z MAR 84 PSN: 008774

RESERVE IS A VALUABLE U.S. TOOL FOR OFFSETTING WORLD SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS.

- WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, AN EARLY DRAW OF SPR OIL IN LARGE VOLUMES WILL BE OUR BEST POLICY TO OFFSET THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A MAJOR DISRUPTION.

-- WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH OUR ALLIES TOWARD APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL POLICIES WHICH INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO:

- COORDINATED STOCK POLICIES, BEARING IN MIND THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY OF DECISION-MAKING AT THE TIME OF A DISRUPTION. HERE IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP A DATA BASE ON THE PRESENT STOCK SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT HIGH STOCK LEVELS OFFER US THE BEST MEANS OF DEALING WITH A SUPPLY DISRUPTION. BECAUSE THE THREAT OF SUCH A DISRUPTION IS REAL, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR WORK IN THE IEA ON STOCK ISSUES SHOULD BE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY;

- AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY TO CALM THE MARKET; AND

- OTHER MEANS TO REDUCE DEMAND ON THE WORLD OIL MARKET DURING A DISRUPTION.

-- I THINK WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT THE IEA EMERGENCY SHARING SCHEME IS LIKELY TO BE CUMBERSOME AND DISRUPTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE ALTERNATIVE MEASURES AT OUR DISPOSAL SHOULD BE TRIED FIRST AS LONG AS PRACTICABLE.

-- NEEDLESS TO SAY, HOWEVER, IF ACTIVATION OF THE IEA ALLOCATION PROGRAM IS REQUIRED, THE U.S. STANDS FIRMLY BEHIND OUR COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM. ON THIS SCORE, I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT SECTION 252 OF OUR ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT HAS BEEN EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1985.

END TEXT.

KATZ

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

157

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

April 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT:

Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
2 April 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E96-127/2 #157

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON
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THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AS OF 1400 2 APRIL 1984



I. NATURE OF THE THREAT


Despite the apparent calm in the war, the possibility of a sudden and dramatic escalation is still high. Frustration or miscalculation on either side could promote an escalation.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

Despite Iraq's claims of hundreds of fighter sorties, no major hostilities were discernible this weekend, and the front lines remain essentially unchanged (Refs: SSO DIA 310740, 010630, 020700). The Iranians continue preparations for the next offensive; all major Iranian units in the Al Basrah Sector were to be inspected for combat readiness beginning last Friday. The Iraqi Air Force has apparently had the mission of disrupting the Iranian buildup in and to the rear of the Majnoon Island, and, despite its apparent ineffectiveness in destroying Iranian ground targets, Iraq's air superiority over the southern battle area is undisputed (Ref: SSO DIA 010225).

(b)(1)





A select committee whose role is coordination of a diplomatic effort to curtail Iranian oil exports to major Iranian trading partners was reportedly established at the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting in Baghdad on March 13 to 14. Although the United Arab Emirates is not a member of the committee, a number of representatives of the UAE have raised the issue of possible curtailment of Iranian oil exports with U.S. officials (Ref: AMEMBASSY Abu Dhabi 011146).

III. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

In a meeting on the proposed Aqaba pipeline chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Placke and attended by Eugene Moriarty, Vice President of Bechtel Great Britain, a number of interesting policy questions were raised. A brief synopsis of the meeting follows:

Moriarty: With respect to issues involving U.S. policy, Bechtel finds troublesome Iraq's vague but persistent statements regarding the need for a U.S. guarantee of the pipeline's security. Bechtel was uncertain as to what assurances the U.S. was prepared to offer, and it seemed to feel increasingly caught between Iraq and USG on this question.


Placke: The security question was one with which the U.S. Government should deal, and we have talked to Iraq in terms of symbolic U.S. involvement, such as project management. This, coupled with public statements favoring the project, would be sufficient motivations for Iraq to proceed. Ultimately, we cannot be the guarantors of the behavior of another government.

Moriarty: Suggested that a long-term purchase contract with a major U.S. oil firm might be another element in U.S. participation in the project, and raised the possibility of a contract to supply the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

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3

Placke: Due to the one year limitation on SPR contracts resulting from our appropriations process, there might be difficulties involved in making politically motivated SPR purchases. It was agreed, however, that the U.S. would look at possible options involving the SPR (SECSTATE 310112).



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 30, 1984


RCM 1013

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT: Morning Report for Iran-Iraq, 30 March 1984

- o The Iraqis appear intent on continuing their attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf in order to pressure Iran and other interested parties to end the war.
 - Iraqi aircraft struck a Bandar e Khomeini convoy on 29 March destroying at least one of four ships. The Iraqis may have destroyed two helicopters attempting to rescue crew members from the abandoned ships.
 - The success of the relatively indiscriminate attacks on 24, 27, and 29 March will be measured by the Iraqi political and military leaders in ordering future missions.
 - From a military standpoint, the success of the missions probably will embolden Iraqi pilots while pressuring the Iranians to seek immediate countermeasures and retaliation.
 - From a political standpoint, the Iraqis likely will believe they are achieving some success as the oil markets show uncertainty and as they receive diplomatic notes and entreaties to stop escalating the war.
- o Iranian preparations for offensive operations continue.
 - 
 - Iraqi air strikes against the Iranian buildup continue at high rates, but they are only delaying the eventual Iranian offensive.

(b)(1)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Authority F96-127/2 #159

BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

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o

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

- o The Soviet Ambassador in Kuwait commented to Ambassador Griffin on 27 March that representatives of the two countries in the region should have a regular exchange of views, especially in regard to ending the Iran-Iraq War.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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
April 2, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT: Morning Report for Iran-Iraq, 2 April 1984

- o It continues to be unclear if and when the Iranians will launch their long-expected major offensive.
 - Iraqi air sorties against Iranian targets are over 100 every day, but damage from the attacks has only slowed preparations for the Iranian offensive.
 - A more important factor on delays in the offensive may be difficulties in the political and military leadership of Iran.
 - Rumors continue that Khomeini has health problems.  (b)(1)
 - Ayatollah Montazeri reportedly has been seen prominently on television in roles previously reserved for Khomeini.
 - The Iranians evidently have attempted to mobilize one million Basij volunteers, but may be having trouble.
- o Shipping markets and the oil spot markets appear to have been minimally affected by last week's Iraqi attacks on shipping in the Gulf.
 - War risk insurance rates rose from 0.4 percent to 0.75 percent for cargo on 30 March.
 - Iraq may have to take another escalatory step to achieve further political gains.

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Authority F96-127/2#160

BY LM NARA DATE 4/17/26

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Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

161

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

March 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL *RB*

SUBJECT: Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
30 March 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F96-127/2 #161
BY KNL NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON
Declassify on: OADR

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THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AS OF 1400 30 MARCH 1984

I. NATURE OF THE THREAT

The Persian Gulf war is no longer a localized conflict but is gradually becoming another piece on the super-power chess board. It is not a dramatic development, but this additional component adds an extra burden to a difficult decision process.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

Exchanges of artillery fire continue, particularly in the Al Basra area. Iraqi military sources claim that 122 air sorties were flown against Iranian positions and assembly points during a recent 24 hour period. Although Iranian fighters have been in the air during some of Iraq's air operations, they have thus far made no effort to challenge Iraqi actions (Ref DIA 300750Z).


(b)(1)




Baghdad also is directing its efforts toward a major contest in the Majnoon and Al Basrah area. Both sides are dedicating considerable resources to this area (see attached map). Tehran may consider the occupation of the Majnoon Islands as the most successful part of its current offensive (the Khaybar offensive). Indeed, the logistic buildup on and near Majnoon reflects Iran's determination to maintain control of the Islands. In addition, the nearby Baghdad-Al Basrah highway is a tempting target for those Iranian leaders who want to continue the war and isolate Basrah province (Ref DIA 300406Z).

Prices on the international oil spot market fluctuated considerably during 28 and early 29 March as uncertainty continued over the actual situation in the Persian Gulf. Prices at the opening of business on 29 March in New York averaged \$.20 over closing prices of 27 March. These changes reflect the market's reactions to the Iraqi attacks on Iranian positions and international shipping around Khark Island. Iraqi strikes against shipping in the Gulf have increased in frequency and scope. Attacks during 1982 and 1983 averaged two to three per month, mainly against merchant convoys bound to or from the port of Bandar-e Khomeyni (see attached map). Since late February,

however, the Iraqis claimed to have attacked tankers or Khark Island on three different occasions. It is also certain that Iraq conducted operations against some targets farther south in the Gulf. While Baghdad's 27 March success in damaging a tanker was achieved beyond visual range of the aircraft and may have been accidental, it tends to indicate a command decision to up the ante from threats to at least occasional attacks against oil exports. The increase in the number of Iraqi attacks will probably result in a heightened level of Iranian planning for retaliatory action (Ref JCS 300236Z).



And finally, the Persian Gulf conflict and the chemical warfare issue apparently are becoming an issue in super-power politics. The Soviets reportedly consider the recent Arab League meeting in Baghdad as very significant insofar as it reinforced political support for Saddam Hussein and might set the stage, if other efforts fail to end the war, for direct Arab military assistance. A decided tilt toward Iraq has been detected in the Soviet statements (Ref AMEMBASSY Kuwait 290739).



it is important to note that the chairmanship of the Security Council will pass in April to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and in May to the Soviet Union. The apparent "tilt" of the USSR toward Iraq may evidence itself in efforts by the Ukrainians and the Soviets to blunt or deflect criticisms of Iraq. If the Ukrainians or Soviets

are successful in this effort, and if the U.S. continues to encounter difficulty dealing with the Iraqis on the chemical warfare issue, the Soviets may make use of this opportunity to undermine not only U.S. efforts to resolve the conflict, but also U.S. prestige in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area.

III. STATUS OF PLANNING

The NSPG on the Iran-Iraq war was held today. The outcome of this meeting will determine future planning efforts.

Military Update



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701973 3-84

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163

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

March 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

RICHARD S. BEAL *RSB*

SUBJECT:

Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
29 March 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F96-127/2 #163

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON
Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION AS OF 1400 29 MARCH 1984

I. NATURE OF THE THREAT

Today's main concern, particularly on the eve of the NSPG, is Iraq's demonstrated ability to attack shipping in the upper Persian Gulf. The attacks on tankers represent a potentially serious escalation of the war and has the potential of embroiling other Gulf states.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

There was no significant ground activity on any of the war fronts. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) [REDACTED] Continued Iraqi deployment to the southern front suggests Baghdad is confident that the main attack will come in that sector [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. NATIONAL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

The following is from a State cable informing Iraq of U.S. actions on the chemical warfare issue (Ref SECSTAE 290729Z):

The U.S. feels strongly about the chemical warfare (CW) issue but does not wish to see differences over this issue dominate our relations with Iraq. The U.S. may issue new regulations as early as Friday, March 30, requiring validated licenses for export to Iraq and Iran of chemical substances that could be used in the production of chemical weapons. We have no desire to control a long list of substances and equipment for export to Iraq. We also wish to avoid having to consider and to deny export license applications for chemicals apparently intended for use in CW production. We therefore ask the cooperation of the government of Iraq in instructing its purchasing agents not to seek to acquire from the U.S., or from U.S. subsidiaries abroad, any chemicals, equipment, or technology related to CW.

IV. STATUS OF PLANNING

Tomorrow's NSPG meeting is designed to integrate those economic/energy and military/political components of the planning process which were designed to cope with the potentially severe difficulties that may confront us if the war in the Persian Gulf continues. It is the culmination of many weeks of work and several recent CPPG meetings.

[REDACTED]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA ORCON

INFORMATION

March 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD S. BEAL ^{RSB}

SUBJECT: Threat Situation Summary for Iran-Iraq
20 March 1984

The attached threat situation summary describes the status of our current crisis planning activities for Iran-Iraq.

Attachment

Tab I - Threat Situation Summary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F96-127/2 # 165

BY KML NARA DATE 11/23/11

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Declassify on: OADR

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THREAT SITUATION SUMMARY

Iran-Iraq Situation as of 1400 20 March 1984

I. NATURE OF THE THREAT

An ongoing concern is that both Iran and Iraq may demonstrate their capabilities to disrupt oil flows from the Persian Gulf: Iraq by attacking tankers near Kharg Island (the island itself is well defended); Iran by attacking oil exports of other Gulf nations, perhaps through terrorism. Another current threat is the next Iranian offensive. If the Iranians have some success in this offensive, the Iraqis almost certainly will escalate.

II. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION AND ESTIMATES

(b)(1) Fighting continues at a relatively low level as Iran continues to probe Iraqi lines. Iran continues to prepare for the long anticipated offensive in the Al Basrah area [REDACTED] Iranian prisoners of war reported recent Iraqi attacks have caused heavy losses and probably delayed the Iranian offensive. They also said there would be simultaneous Iranian attacks in the Majnoon area and northeast of Al Basrah. Tehran radio reported that Iranian troops pledged to forego new year celebrations which begin on March 20. If preparations are completed in time, Iran might begin an offensive in the Majnoon/Al Basrah sector on the new year holiday (Ref INR Morning Summary of 20 March).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. STATUS OF PLANNING

The National Security Council (NSC) meeting on the domestic and international energy-economic aspects of the Iran-Iraq war was held at 1400 this afternoon. The NSC meeting included a review of the conflict between Iran-Iraq, previous experience with the disruption to oil flows, and the current policy challenge facing the U.S. This portion of the discussion was read by National Security Adviser

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Robert McFarlane and was followed by Don Pearlman, speaking on behalf of Secretary of Energy Don Hodel, on the domestic aspects of the oil disruption. A final presentation was given by Ambassador Fairbanks who basically reviewed the International Energy Security Group's recommendations regarding three interrelated policy decisions: (1) how should the U.S. approach triggering the IEA sharing system in the event of a severe disruption; (2) to what degree should the U.S. seek consultation or coordination with our allies on stock drawdown; and (3) should the U.S. support coordinated international action to influence the spot market in the event of an oil disruption.

As a result of this NSC meeting, the NSC staff is currently preparing a NSDD for the President, which will cover the following points: (1) postpone triggering the IEA sharing to the extent possible; (2) seek to maintain flexibility in U.S. policy while conducting consultations with our West European allies and the Japanese; (3) announce the policy to have an early stock drawdown of the SPR but without announcing any of the particulars of that drawdown in order to keep speculators uncertain as to the specific rate or rates of the SPR drawdown; (4) encourage the allies to increase their own reserves; and (5) develop a public information strategy to assure allies, Congress, and the public that we are capable of coping with an oil disruption in the Persian Gulf.

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NSC/S PROFILE

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM MARTIN

RECEIVED 09 MAR 84 17

DOCDATE 08 MAR 84

TO MCFARLANE

KEYWORDS ENERGY

IRAN

IRAQ

SUBJECT. FUTURE IRAN IRAQ ENERGY BRIEFINGS

ACTION. FOR SIGNATURE

DUE. 14 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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