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Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder USSR (8/5/83-8/9/83)

FOIA

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342

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171727 MEMO	D. DORNAN TO W. CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK	5	8/11/1983	B1
171728 MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO W. CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK	3	8/8/1983	B1
171729 STRATEGY PAPER	RE CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK (INCL. COVER MEMO)	7	8/5/1983	B1
PAR 12/31/2012 CREST NLR-748-24-34-3-1				
171730 ATTACHMT	TERMS OF REFERENCE (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #171729)	2	ND	B1
171731 MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #171729)	2	8/8/1983	B1
PAR 12/27/2011 CREST NLR-748-24-34-5-9				
171732 MEMO	F. WETTERING TO W. CLARK RE SOUTHERN AFRICA/USSR	1	8/11/1983	B1

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171733	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE RE SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS: NEXT STEPS	2	8/8/1983	B1
171734	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE PROPOSED SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS (W/ADDED NOTES)	1	8/23/1983	B1
171735	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE PROPOSED SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	ND	B1
171736	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO W. CLARK RE SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	8/10/1983	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8390965

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RECEIVED 05 AUG 83 19

12/28/15 KOB

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 05 AUG 83

MATLOCK

08 AUG 83

DORNAN

11 AUG 83

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KEYWORDS, USSR

EXCHANGES

SUBJECT STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS RE CONSULATES IN KIEV & NEW YORK

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

FORTIER

ROBINSON

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# 8323879

LOG 8390641

8390802

NSCIFID NSDD0075

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

X

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8/12

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4/24

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171727 MEMO

5 8/11/1983 B1

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U.S. Officials See Less Strain in Soviet Ties

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — On the strength of some favorable developments in several fields of negotiation with Moscow, senior Administration officials say the decline in Soviet-American relations has stopped. But they are uncertain whether a genuinely positive trend has taken hold.

President Reagan set the mood after the announcement of a new Soviet-American grain agreement late in July when he was asked whether the accord signaled "a thaw" in the two countries' relations. "I wouldn't use that word yet," he replied, taking a position between caution and hopefulness.

But senior Administration officials have drawn some modest encouragement from several developments: the new grain agreement increasing the minimum level of Soviet purchases, a long-sought compromise at the East-West talks in Madrid, some easing of differences in the strategic nuclear arms negotiations and the talks on conventional forces in Europe, and a go-ahead for working-level talks on a new Soviet-American cultural agreement and an exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York.

"There's a willingness to do business," said a senior State Department official. "That's a change. Several of these developments are favorable signs. But whether they are coincidental or represent a change in attitude, we'll have to wait and see over time. I don't think anybody is prepared to say these things represent a major turnaround in Soviet attitudes. In these recent agreements, there's been benefit for them. They're not making big concessions."

White House officials share that assessment but are very careful not to seem overly eager to make positive pronouncements. "There is a little sense of movement on the peripheral issues," said one. A national security specialist observed that "both sides are trying to handle things to show that the doors are not completely shut, to show that we can reach agreements when it is in our interest."

Against the favorable signs, Government analysts of Soviet affairs cite troublesome developments in the increased flow of Soviet cargo ships mov-

ing military supplies into Nicaragua this year and the Kremlin's move last spring to place a highly sophisticated air defense system of SAM-5 missiles manned by Soviet troops in Syria.

The Administration is also carefully assessing the situation in Poland to see whether the lifting of martial law there will lead to some political relaxation or whether the measures that have been substituted for it will be more stringent.

The present naval maneuvers off Central America are intended in part to warn Moscow to pull back from that region and to persuade Nicaragua and the Salvadoran leftists to seek political settlements with Washington and the Government of El Salvador. Some officials believe that Moscow, through Cuba, may have advised caution.

The tracking of a Soviet freighter by an American destroyer 10 days ago off the Nicaragua coast raised the risks of a new Soviet-American confrontation. But Administration officials contend that this is "not super-unusual" for naval exercises, say that no naval blockade is in force and assert that the lack of diplomatic protest from Moscow indicates the Russians may be less alarmed than some members of Congress.

Despite uncertainties, some officials speculate privately that the climate may be changing slowly because of the political needs in both capitals — President Reagan's apparent preparation for a re-election campaign and the Kremlin's reassessment of Soviet economic troubles and the Soviet needs for Western commerce and technology.

Within the Government, more officials are saying they believe the Soviet leadership under Yuri V. Andropov has concluded that with American economic recovery well under way, President Reagan stands a good chance of re-election in 1984. This means that Moscow faces the prospect of dealing with him for five more years.

Several months ago, in the wake of the Republicans' 1982 election defeats, high Soviet officials were telling official American visitors that it was impossible to do business with the Reagan Administration. The view developing within the Administration is that Moscow now shows a willingness to reach agreements here and there rather than take a hard line across the board.

Major tests of Soviet intentions and attitudes toward the Reagan Administration will come in the fall when Secretary of State George P. Shultz is scheduled to meet Foreign Minister

Andrei A. Gromyko at the East-West conference in Madrid and again at the United Nations, and when the talks on European-based nuclear missile systems resume in Geneva.

Officials differ on how vigorously the Administration should seek new agreements with Moscow. In several sessions this spring with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Mr. Shultz won agreement to proceed with working-level talks on cultural exchanges and the opening of a new Soviet consulate in New York and a new American consulate in Kiev.

After Moscow agreed in a new five-year grain agreement to increase its minimum purchases of American grain from six million to nine million tons a year, Mr. Shultz joined with Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige to recommend relaxation of the Administration's controls on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, reportedly backed by William P. Clark, Mr. Reagan's national security adviser, has so far resisted such a move.

The grain deal was seen here as a plus for President Reagan, who has been seeking to hold political support in the farm belt states despite large farm surpluses.

Summit Meeting Mooted

More broadly, Mr. Shultz and some of President Reagan's political strategists, including James A. Baker 3d, the White House chief of staff, and Michael K. Deaver, the deputy chief of staff, have reportedly favored testing the possibilities of working toward a summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov next year, to deal with various economic, cultural, consular, and regional issues.

Mr. Clark and Mr. Weinberger are said to have taken the position that any top-level meeting would have to deal mainly with arms control issues and would have to be structured in advance to assure agreement.

The talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces are cited by many officials as affording the key test of Soviet intentions and constituting the one arena where Moscow has been unyielding.

Some State Department and arms control officials believe that in a final effort to block or disrupt the scheduled deployment of American missiles in Europe later this year, especially Pershing 2 missiles in West Germany, the Kremlin may modify its line this fall.

USA TODAY 9 AUGUST 1983 Pg. 9

Japan: Pacifists protest ship's weaponry

TOKYO — On the eve of the 38th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Nagasaki, some 800 people marched into the port of Sasebo claiming the aircraft

carrier USS Midway carried nuclear weapons in violation of Japan's ban on all nuclear arms. In Nagasaki, meanwhile, thousands of pacifists opened a two-day conference on nuclear weapons.

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171728 MEMO

3

8/8/1983

B1

J. MATLOCK TO W. CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER
FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK

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United States Department of State

NLRR 24-34-3-1

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90965

BY CDD NARA DATE 12/24/12

August 5, 1983

83 AUG 5 P 5: 28

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

171729

Subject: Strategy Paper for Negotiations with the Soviet Union on
the Establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York

In response to your July 5 request, the State Department convened interagency meetings to draft Terms of Reference and a strategy paper for negotiating with the Soviets on the establishment of Consulates in Kiev and New York. There are still some differences of view among agencies, and these are set forth in the paper transmitted herewith, which has been cleared by the FBI, NSA, CIA and USIA. We recommend concurrence in the State/NSA positions.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

FBI, DOS, Review
Completed

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Strategy Paper
Kiev and New York Consulates

Summary:

1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office site will be available to us in Kiev.

2. Issues for Decision:

A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available, State and NSA believe we should accept it, and send an inspection team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on both apartments and office site.

25X1

B. Staffing. State and NSA believe we should set staffing patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements.

25X

C. Purchase vs. Lease. State and NSA believe we should seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged delays if we adopted this course.)

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Recommendation:

NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous site; and NSC concurrence with the State/ NSA positions on office site, staffing and purchase vs. lease.

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DECL: OADR

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-2-

BACKGROUND

Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that the President had approved in principle the establishment of new Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department, representatives of CIA, FBI, and NSA accepted the attached terms of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group, augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate in Kiev

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[redacted] will give us a unique vantage point for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.

MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS

On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination with interested agencies.

The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.

SPECIFIC GOALS

1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two

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-3-

consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as well as support from the home front on logistics and funding. 25X1

2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities: Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still holding for our use the previously designated office building and Consul General residence. NSA has indicated that the previously designated building remains valuable for its purposes, although recent additions to the height of nearby buildings have decreased its utility somewhat. If the Soviets resist returning the building, NSA would prefer that, rather than pursuing the issue, we use the Soviets' failure to keep it for us as leverage to attempt to gain a better site. State concurs in this approach.

State and NSA agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept the building available, we should accept it. We have already invested \$1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the current site remains available, State and NSA believe that we should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put it into suitable condition. 25X1

Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space requirements. 25X1

Since, to the best of our knowledge, the

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Soviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical. The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so could involve legal proceedings.

We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible -- long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they previously purchased in New York for their Consulate. Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for necessary renovations.

3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a goal.

State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The Department and NSA believe that we should negotiate on the basis of our requirements - consular, political, and intelligence -- in Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing patterns.

4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems: Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our negotiations we shall also address these general issues and attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;

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an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad, and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff.

5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing, personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that we will obtain the previously designated office building.

1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.

A. Funding:

State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget submission, which does not include a request for funds or positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated \$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing budget.

State anticipates an additional outlay of \$2.5 million annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the Consulate (total estimated cost of \$5.2 million). Not included in this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an extremely isolated post (roughly another \$1.0 million).

Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in order to obtain the requisite funds.

B. Personnel:

In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use

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personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular Officer with reporting responsibilities.

In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of 1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the Consulates.

We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent positions for Kiev:

Principal Officer
Deputy Principal Officer
Consular Officer
Administrative Officer
Agricultural Officer
Press and Culture Officer
Communications Program Officers (2)
Secretaries (2)
Marine Security Guards (6)

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

State Dept. review completed

August 8, 1983

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 748-24-34-5-9

BY 6013 NARA DATE 12/27/11

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Negotiations with the Soviet
Union on the Establishment of Consulates in Kiev
and New York

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

We have reviewed the strategy paper transmitted by your memorandum of August 5, 1983, and approve it with the following stipulations:

1. If the old building site is available, it should be accepted. If it is not available, we should insist on a site equally or more advantageous, and at no greater cost, than the one previously selected.

2. The staffing level should be set according to our needs and the Soviets granted a quota in New York of an identical number. On the latter point, there seems no need to negotiate a reciprocal agreement. A clear statement of U.S. policy in regard to issuance of visas (such as was used in establishing a quota for the Soviet consulate general in San Francisco) should suffice.

3. Inasmuch as the Soviets own the building in New York that they will use for their consulate general, we should insist upon long-term lease arrangements at a reasonable rent for our building in Kiev. Legal wording has been developed and accepted for some properties in Moscow and Leningrad which provides adequate long-term protection while conforming to Soviet law. Such arrangements would be acceptable, so long as the long-term commitment is clearly established, and there is adequate protection against arbitrary or excessive rent increases.

4. Before deciding on the final staffing pattern in Kiev, a careful study of the feasibility of operating the consulate without local employees should be made. Since it is highly desirable to reduce our dependence on local employees in the USSR, we should look for innovative ways that this can be done, and perhaps use Kiev as a pilot project. A study of this question should be done and forwarded to the NSC for review by September 30.

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5. [REDACTED]

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- 2 -

The Department is requested to proceed with the negotiation of this question on the basis of the negotiating plan submitted, incorporating points 1-3 above. The clarification of points 4 and 5 can proceed while negotiations are in progress since determination of the final staffing level can be deferred.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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100

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TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOC DATE 08 AUG 83

URGENT

KEYWORDS USSR

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AFRICA

SUBJECT. SOVIET FACTOR IN SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS / NEXT STEPS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 10 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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LENCZOWSKI

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August 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Soviet Factor in the Southern Africa Negotiations (S)

The President asked me to thank you for your memo on the "Soviet Factor in Southern Africa Negotiations." Before commenting on it specifically, could we review with the President, the full agenda of issues you are considering discussing with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid. (S)



William P. Clark

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171732 MEMO

1 8/11/1983 B1

F. WETTERING TO W. CLARK RE SOUTHERN
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171733	MEMO G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE RE SOUTHERN AFRICA NEGOTIATIONS: NEXT STEPS	2	8/8/1983	B1

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John Poindexter

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Soviet Factor in the Southern Africa Negotiations

The President asked me to thank you for your memo on the "Soviet Factor in Southern Africa Negotiations." Before ~~we~~ ^{my} comment on it specifically, ~~we would appreciate you sending us the full agenda of issues you are considering discussing with Foreign Minister Groyenko in Madrid. Thank you. (S)~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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Could we review the
President the full
agenda - - -

William P. Clark

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KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

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CM

SUBJECT: SPEECH ON US / SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 09 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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LENCZOWSKI

LINHARD

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Judge discussed this
with President and
Shultz. Final decision
is no speech for now.

R

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Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u><i>[checkmark]</i></u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>8/25</u>
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John Poindexter			
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John: Please get concurrence from
Fortier, Sims, Raymond, and Kraemer.
Peter Sommer also should see. I recommend
you have WPC tell the (P), and Shultz,
that he has asked our staff (i.e., you) to begin
working with State on a revised version of
the Shultz submission, the "little work" your current
memo suggests. This would operationalize the issue
and get it on a track. Pub

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171734 MEMO

1 8/23/1983 B1

W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE PROPOSED SPEECH
ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS (W/ADDED NOTES)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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171735 MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE PROPOSED SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of US-Soviet diplomatic relations. In announcing this step, President Roosevelt expressed his "trust" that US-Soviet relations would grow "closer and more intimate with each passing year." Unfortunately that trust has not been vindicated. Nor have our nations been able, as he hoped, "to cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of peace."

Experience has long since taught us not to premise our relations with Moscow on trust. We know we are in a long-term competition with a rival whose respect for our interests depends on our political realism, civic courage, and economic and military strength. At the same time, however, we continue to share President Roosevelt's belief that it is essential to maintain an active dialogue with Moscow and to do everything possible to direct US-Soviet relations toward "the peaceful purposes of the civilized world." In an age of nuclear weapons, our responsibility to keep the peace means that we cannot afford to stop talking.

For a brief but vital interlude during World War II, US-Soviet relations were overwhelmingly cooperative. Caught up in the spirit of this cooperation, optimists found it easy to think that it might last. They thought that the post-war Soviet regime might decisively curtail the domestic and international practices that had delayed recognition for sixteen years. Trusting that their own good will would prove contagious, these optimists hoped that there would be no repetition of the systematic mass murders and repressions of the 1920's and '30's; that Moscow's efforts to subvert foreign governments and foment Communist insurrections were a thing of the past; that the unprovoked invasions of Finland and Poland, and the Baltic states by the Red Army were wartime aberrations.

In the event, the war brought no change in Moscow's predatory conduct. The Soviets rejected the opportunity to maintain their alliance with us. They showed no interest in trying to translate our common victory into an enduring system of collective welfare and security. Instead, they presented us with an almost uninterrupted series of provocations and challenges.

As a result, the process of building a safer and more humane world became an uphill struggle -- a struggle in which our attempts to control the atom, to put an end to colonialism, to erect safeguards against aggression, and to foster international contacts and communication were countered by Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan, by the satellitization of the countries of Eastern Europe, by the invasion of South Korea, and by the lowering of an almost impenetrable Iron Curtain behind which tens of millions of people were deprived of their most elementary human rights. Moreover, the underlying Soviet drive to dominate and control has persisted to the present day. It has in many respects become even more threatening.

If we are to deal realistically with the continuing Soviet challenge to our values and interests, we must face the unpalatable facts. We are confronted by a regime that continues to oppress its own people and to stifle their aspirations for individual freedom and collective self-expression. The infamous Gulag still holds innocent prisoners whose only crimes are their religious convictions, their political principles, or their ethnic affiliations and commitments. Courageous spokesmen for civil rights continue to be confined in psychiatric prisons or, like

Academician Sakharov, to be kept under virtual house arrest in remote provincial cities. Would-be emigrants continue to be denied exit visas, while would-be reformers are stripped of their citizenship and driven into foreign exile. Political censorship is still ubiquitous; foreign broadcasts continue to be jammed; history continues to be rewritten; and privilege and power remain the monopoly of a self-perpetuating ruling elite that continues to sacrifice popular well-being to its appetite for military might and foreign adventure.

The high priority that the Soviet leadership gives to increasing its military power is indicated by the uninterrupted growth in Soviet defense spending during the past fifteen years. In this period the military has consistently consumed between 13 and 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product. What makes this relentless military buildup so ominous is not only the resultant accumulation of highly destabilizing weapons but also, and above all, the fact that it has continued in international and domestic circumstances that would have led any other government to reconsider its course. Internationally, the buildup persisted throughout the period of "detente." It continues despite cutbacks in Western defense spending, agreement on arms limitations, or improvements in East-West political, economic, and cultural relations.

Domestically, the Soviet military buildup has persisted despite declining rates of economic growth, rising consumer dissatisfaction, and increasingly severe shortages of capital.

Even allowing a large margin for Soviet tendencies toward "overinsurance," this buildup clearly exceeds any reasonable defensive requirements. This is even clearer when one examines the actual mix of Soviet forces and weapons with their heavily offensive bias. The evidence virtually forces one to conclude that the sustained buildup of the past fifteen years was undertaken to provide the wherewithal for precisely the sort of intimidation and aggression in which the Soviet Union has in fact engaged.

Unfortunately the Soviet Union does not appear satisfied merely to accumulate military power. It uses it. Thirty years ago, Soviet tanks were employed against stone-throwing protesters in East Berlin -- just as they were subsequently employed to imprison the entire population of that city behind the unspeakable Berlin wall. In 1956, Soviet forces invaded Hungary to suppress the reform efforts of a local Communist regime -- an operation that was repeated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, where the Communist government had the temerity to come out in favor of "socialism with a human face." Then, in 1979, came the Christmas-Eve invasion of Afghanistan,

followed over the next two years by the heavy-handed political and military intimidation of Poland, which culminated in the Soviet-sponsored installation of General Jaruzelski's martial law regime. Not to speak of the Soviet proxy war against the peoples of Cambodia and the Soviet-supported deployment of Cuban forces to Ethiopia, Angola, and, most recently, Nicaragua. For Soviet leaders, military power is clearly something to be used without compunction wherever this can be done with impunity.

When Chairman Andropov took office the hope was widely voiced that he would take steps to reduce the scope and severity of the US-Soviet competition. Mindful of earlier disappointments, we have not been willing to lower our guard in anticipation of a radical change in Soviet behavior. However, we have not been insensitive to the possibilities of change. We have intensified our continuing dialogue with Moscow in order to make certain that our concerns and our desires for an improved relationship are clearly understood. And we have taken note of a few small steps that we would like to interpret as possible harbingers of greater Soviet responsiveness and flexibility.

We are heartened by Soviet willingness to end the long ordeal of the Pentecostalist families who took refuge in the US Embassy in Moscow five years ago. We are also pleased that

the Soviets have stopped withholding certain data that are essential for a serious evaluation of their START position. And we find it hopeful that they have acknowledged that warheads should be the unit of account at the INF talks in Geneva. We do not and must not overestimate the significance of any or all of these steps. But we do view them as constructive and hope that they will be followed by other steps of real substance.

In our view, any positive movement that may be in the offing will owe a great deal to our success in rebuilding our strength and that of our friends and allies. Both militarily and politically, we believe that our fresh resolve and new capabilities have convinced Moscow that a continuation of its established policies will involve higher costs and risks. We harbor no illusions that our accomplishments thus far are sufficient to preclude continued Soviet pursuit of unilateral advantage. We have, however, shaken Moscow's former confidence that what it calls "the correlation of forces" has permanently shifted in its favor. Our credibility as a tough and resolute competitor has undoubtedly been enhanced, and the Soviet leadership knows that it must bear the full consequences of continued disregard for our concerns.

We have always believed that our strategy of building strength should complement and reenforce a parallel strategy of comprehensive negotiation. Our most important negotiations can only be productive, however, if the Soviets are far more forthcoming than they have been to date. They will have to join us in a process of true give and take, of seeking truly equitable solutions for common problems. For our part, we recognize that no true negotiating outcome is likely to incorporate all of the preferences of just one of the parties. We do not fear compromises that are consistent with our fundamental objectives and protect our basic interests.

Given these absolutely indispensable preconditions, it is obvious that there will be many issues on which we cannot and will not compromise. But, given reciprocity, there will be other issues on which we can. This is the spirit in which we approached the just concluded US-Soviet negotiations on a Long-Term Grain Agreement. It is the spirit that governed our conduct at the just concluded CSCE negotiations in Madrid. And it is the spirit that has led us to modify elements of our original START proposal and to propose an "interim solution" in the INF negotiations in Geneva.

Our goal in all of our negotiations with Moscow -- as well as in the broader bilateral dialogue that is now underway -- is to foster better and more stable relations on the basis of real

changes in Soviet conduct. If we can achieve this, we can reduce the costs of competition, the risks of confrontation, and the possibilities of conflict. We believe this is a goal that is entirely consistent with the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is a goal that we believe prudent and responsible Soviet leaders ought to share.

It is too early in this bargaining process to know what we can reasonably expect to accomplish. We are prepared for modest advances as well as major breakthroughs. We have made ambitious proposals that, if accepted, could put the Soviet-American relationship on a fundamentally new and much safer footing. We have also made more limited proposals designed to stabilize the competition at the margins.

Our arms control strategy is the best illustration of how we have set our sights both high and low. We have offered a plan for the deepest cuts in strategic weapons ever proposed in Soviet-American talks on this subject. We have also proposed the full abolition of an entire class of nuclear weapons -- intermediate-range missiles -- on our side as well as theirs. At the same time, I have instructed our negotiators to explore any indication of Soviet flexibility. In INF, while retaining zero as our goal, we have offered the Soviets an interim

agreement that would require less drastic reductions. We have asked whether fifty, or a hundred, or even four hundred and fifty missiles on each side would be acceptable.

In other arms talks as well, we have looked for small ways to strengthen stability. We are hopeful, for example, that agreement will be possible on such steps as improving the "hot line". Other so-called "confidence-building measures" are under discussion directly with the Soviets, and similar proposals will be discussed at a Europe-wide conference scheduled to open early next year. Working again with our allies, we are also actively exploring ways to make long-overdue progress at the Vienna talks on a mutual balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

In dealing with Soviet policies in the Third World, we have followed the same two-fold approach -- doing what we can to keep the competition in bounds while exploring the possibility of more fundamental improvement. Naturally, our first priority has had to be to prevent new instances of Soviet expansionism and interference in the Third World. This goal has guided us in trying to create a shield for the independence of Central American nations.

But, perhaps more ambitiously, we have also tried to point the Soviet Union toward a more constructive role. We have given our full support to UN mediation to secure a Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan. Because withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola would contribute so much to final achievement of independence for Namibia, we have kept this set of issues high on the Soviet-American agenda. And, because the development needs of the Third World are so great, we have called on the Soviet Union to assume an appropriate share of the effort in this area, and to pursue policies that complement those of other industrialized nations.

Finally, in all our dialogue with the Soviet Union we have paid constant attention to human rights. And here too we have expressed our interest in two kinds of changes. We have pressed for concrete, specific, immediate improvements, both in the treatment of particular individuals and in the way in which these issues are discussed between East and West. We have, for example, in concluding the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, been able to agree on two human rights follow-on meetings in the next two years, to address such specific issues as family reunification. Similarly, the Soviets know that US law explicitly links most-favored nation trading status to freedom of emigration.

But, even as we focus on these matters, we have tried to reiterate the larger significance of human rights for the future of the Soviet-American competition. The ever-broader

enjoyment of human rights by Soviet citizens would be a real and enduring contribution to peace. It was with this in mind that the Western nations put so much effort into widening the obligations that European governments assume toward their own people when they participate in CSCE. Nothing would so strengthen European security as Soviet respect for those obligations....

Our approach on every one of these issues is flexible but also demanding. Above all, we know the difference between major results and minor ones. We will never dismiss small gains as valueless, but neither will we settle for a little and pretend that it is a lot. The American people have had more than enough of a cycle of exaggerated expectations and extreme disappointments. Nor will we mistake progress in a single area for a more comprehensive breakthrough. A true restructuring of such a deeply competitive relationship requires real commitment and follow-through. We hope the Soviet leadership understands this point clearly: if they desire a major improvement in relations, then minor adjustments in their policies, let alone cosmetic changes, will not suffice.

If we were to see more significant changes in Soviet behavior, we would be prepared to respond appropriately. If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a

relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed. We hope that the Soviet leadership is ready to rethink its behavior sufficiently thoroughly to bring such a relationship about.

This is the outlook that guides this Administration at the bargaining table. Its practical meaning should be clear enough. In particular, it indicates the very pointed questions that the Soviet leaders should ask themselves as they review their policies.

If, for example, the Soviet Union will not accept equitable arms agreements and refuses to yield any of the one-sided advantages they have built up, then the United States and its allies will have to continue their modernization programs to neutralize these advantages. Is there any Soviet gain in this result? We believe not. We believe that Soviet interests were not well served in the past by rejecting American proposals -- such as the arms control offers put forward by President Carter in March 1977, at the beginning of his term. At that time he offered a choice between radical cuts and more limited but stabilizing measures. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what if anything it gained -- in the long run -- by flatly rejecting both.

Similarly, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing policies in the Third World, and not least in our own hemisphere, that threaten us and our friends, then we will have to respond

equally strongly, thereby escalating the East-West competition. Isn't the level of competition too high already? We believe so, and believe the Soviet view should be the same. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what it gained --in the long run-- from its confrontation with the United States in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Finally, if improvement in Soviet human rights performance means nothing more than occasional, cynically manipulated releases of individuals, then the Soviets cannot expect that international -- and internal -- pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn't the Soviet Union pay a price at home and abroad for this censure, and for the isolation that goes with it? We believe the price is large and steadily increasing. Let the Soviets review the record themselves. Looking back, surely the leadership must have had second thoughts about what was really gained --in the long run-- by rejecting the cooperative possibilities of the Marshall Plan and denying its own citizens and the citizens of Eastern Europe the benefits of membership in a broader European community.

We hope the Soviets are reflecting on some of the opportunities that have been lost as a result of their failure to make major changes in their conduct. If so, they may draw

appropriate lessons for the future. Isn't it clear that the West would respond differently to Soviet initiatives -- such as proposed pledges of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- once the Soviet conventional threat to Europe had been eliminated? Wouldn't the Soviet Union be able to claim a legitimate role in international peacemaking if it did not consistently stimulate or prolong conflicts that obstruct the peacemaking efforts of others? And would not other countries view cooperation with the Soviet leadership differently if it were at last prepared to cooperate with its own people?

Nothing in our experience entitles us to expect that the Soviet leaders will answer these questions as we hope. Yet we should not assume that they have learned less from their history than we. We believe that in weighing their choices the Soviet leadership must eventually conclude, if only to themselves, that the policy of rejection has not served their country well. The Soviet Union has missed many opportunities, and in the nuclear age the consequences of missed opportunities can be awful indeed. If Moscow's preference is for unremitting competition, we are prepared for it. But we invite the Soviet leadership to consider the opportunity at hand. We are ready to seize it.

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