

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National
Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

USSR (08/10/1983-08/30/1983)

Box: RAC Box 24

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

File Folder USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

Box Number 24

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

343

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171749	LETTER	ANDY BEREZHKOVA TO REAGAN	1	ND	B6
171737	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANDREI BEREZHKOVA CASE	2	8/13/1983	B1
171738	MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE ANDREI BEREZHKOVA CASE	1	8/18/1983	B1
171739	MEMO	D. FORTIER AND A. KEYES TO W. CLARK RE STATE DRAFT OF SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	8/23/1983	B1
171740	MEMO	C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL	1	8/26/1983	B1
171742	STATEMENT	SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	2	ND	B1
171741	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #171740 (C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL)	1	8/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 24

SKINNER

343

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171743	STATEMT	COPY OF DOC #171742 (SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL - ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	2	ND	B1
171744	CABLE	RE US-USSR ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT	2	8/26/1983	B1
171745	CABLE	RE US-USSR ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT (ORIGINAL OF DOC #171744)	2	8/26/1983	B1
171746	MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE 8/18/83 MEETING WITH SOKOLOV	2	8/19/1983	B1
171747	NON-PAPER	RE ARMS CONTROL (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	3	ND	B1
171748	NON-PAPER	RE ARMS CONTROL (ORIGINAL, IN RUSSIAN)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

0278R 11452BYLZSARYR

AM-HOTLINE

HOT-LINE TO BE SUBJECT OF FURTHER U.S.-SOVIET TALKS

MOSCOW, AUG 10, REUTER - A U.S. ADMINISTRATION TEAM LEFT MOSCOW TODAY AFTER TALKS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON IMPROVING THE SO-CALLED "HOT-LINE" BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE KREMLIN AND A U.S. SPOKESMAN SAID FURTHER DISCUSSION WAS ANTICIPATED.

THE DISCUSSIONS ON UPGRADING THE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE SUPERPOWERS FOLLOWED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CALL LAST YEAR FOR A BETTER SYSTEM.

THE "HOT-LINE" IS AN OPEN TELEX LINE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN REPRESENTED AT THE TALKS BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND EMBASSY CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WARREN ZINNERNAN.

THE CONTENT OF THE TALKS WAS STILL SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE TO PRECLUDE RELEASE OF ANY DETAILS, HE SAID.

THE U.S. DELEGATION ARRIVED ON SUNDAY.

AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES SAID A SECOND ROUND OF TALKS WAS LIKELY TO BE HELD IN WASHINGTON.

REUTER 1930 PD

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171749 LETTER

1


ND

B6

ANDY BEREZHKOVA TO REAGAN

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]****B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]****B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]****B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]****B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]****B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]****B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]****B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]****C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

Ralph Bunche



Washington D.C. 20036
Mr. President.
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Av. NW

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ II

ID 8390988

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/28/15 CCB

RECEIVED 12 AUG 83 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 12 AUG 83

LENCZOWSKI

12 AUG 83

SHULTZ, G

13 AUG 83

KEYWORDS. USSR

CM

BEREZHKOV, ANDREI

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET EMBASSY DEFECTOR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

SIMS

COBB

KIMMITT

THOMPSON

MATLOCK

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

Reopen

REF# 8324720

LOG

NSCIFID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

STAFF	C/O
Clark	C
McFarlane	
<u>Poindexter</u>	C
Kimmitt	
Merchant	O
NSC S/S	

COPY SENT
TO EL PASO
LAW
B.

C : Copy

O : Original

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171737 MEMO

2 8/13/1983 B1

G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANDREI BEREZHKOVA CASE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Soviet-Cuban strategy a threat

ON JULY 28, the House of Representatives voted to halt covert U.S. aid to the forces fighting the Marxist Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

The Sandinistas had come to power in 1979 with more than the tacit support of the Carter administration as the successor to the 40-year authoritarian, oligarchical rule of the Somoza family. Since 1979, the Sandinista junta has reneged on its pledge to form a representative, pluralistic political system. Instead, it has far surpassed the Somoza regime in the repression of human rights and turned Nicaragua into a Soviet-Cuban base for the export of Marxism to neighboring states.

Although the complicity of the Carter administration in the political demise of the rightist, but not anti-American, Somoza government evoked no discernible public opposition in the United States and abroad, the policies of the Reagan administration against a politically repressive leftist regime aligned with Cuba and the Soviet Union as a base of operations against vital U.S. interests have produced a barrage of criticism that threatens to cripple an effective American response.

In Central America, the threat that the United States faces is the direct result of a Soviet-Cuban strategy into which immense resources have been poured. For nearly a quarter century, the Soviet Union has heavily subsidized the faltering Cuban economy and built Castro's military machine as an integral part

by **ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF**

of Moscow's power projection capabilities in the Third World.

With an army of 225,000, an air defense force of 16,000, and a navy of 11,000, Cuba ranks ahead of every Warsaw Pact country in military manpower except for Poland and the Soviet Union itself. In overall capabilities, thanks to Soviet support, Cuba has the largest military establishment in Latin America.

The cost of the Soviet subsidization of Cuba, said to total \$11 million a day, is not excessive for Moscow, if considered in the context of the global strategy of the Soviet Union. Cuban mercenary forces have been deployed effectively on behalf of Soviet interests in such distant African states as Angola and Ethiopia. In Nicaragua there are reported to be 7000 Cuban troops and advisors, together with several thousand Soviet and other East European personnel. The flow of Soviet weapons to Nicaragua, stepped up in recent months as part of the Soviet-Cuban backed offensive in neighboring El Salvador, includes armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank rocket launchers, semi-automatic small arms, tanks and mortars.

Such capabilities support a Soviet-Cuban "strategy of unification" based upon, as Castro has stated, "revolutionary armed struggle." Its tactics, refined since Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in 1959, provide for the systematic employment

of sabotage and armed attacks against a country's economy as well as the fomenting of disorder by the sporadic use of violence designed to produce a crackdown by the incumbent government which can then be accused of political repression and human rights violations.

The purpose of such tactics is to undermine the political legitimacy of the existing government. As in El Salvador — the current focus of Soviet-Cuban strategy — bridges, water supply facilities, power plants are attacked.

Guerrilla cadres from the targeted state are trained in Cuba and returned to their own country to conduct military operations. The strategy provides for covert or overt Cuban alignments with opposition groups and local leadership elements most closely identified with Soviet-Cuban Marxist goals, together with sustained assistance, including a steady flow of weapons.

Among the elements of this strategy is the use of deception in order to allow forces such as the Sandinistas to consolidate power before the true orientation of the regime is fully revealed to the outside world, or even to some of its original supporters, as in the case of certain of the groups presently fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Last but not least, this Soviet-Cuban strategy depends upon the possession of a secure base of operations in a neighboring country from which insurgent forces can be resup-

plied and to which they can return for sanctuary.

Nicaragua presently provides such a staging area for the flow of weapons into El Salvador.

The ultimate goal of this Soviet-Cuban strategy is the creation of a new political-military front for the United States that will eventually absorb vast amounts of U.S. resources without comparable expenditures by Moscow.

The Cuban-Nicaraguan base, after having been expanded to include El Salvador, is to be followed by stepped-up operations in Guatemala and Honduras, with the remaining states of Central America and, to the north, Mexico, as likely subsequent targets.

Central America constitutes a strategic-geographic bridge between the continents of the Americas — between the oil fields of Mexico to the north and the petroleum reserves of Venezuela to the south. Faced for the first time in its history with a combination of hostile states in such close proximity to the United States, the diversion of American resources would preclude the preservation of existing extended security commitments in support of other vital interests in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asian-Pacific area.

Thus the Soviet strategic interest in the region is apparent. In the last decade there has been a huge increase in Soviet naval deployments in the Caribbean, across which shipping that would be indispensable to any American resupply of NATO

Europe would have to pass.

During World War II, Hitler concentrated "wolf packs" of submarines in waters of the mid-Atlantic and the Caribbean whose effect was nearly to sever the sea lanes across the Atlantic. The Soviet Union undoubtedly views this maritime region as having a similar function in any future NATO-Warsaw Pact military contingency.

The purpose of the U.S. military exercises and diplomatic initiatives announced by the Reagan administration, of course, is to warn the Soviet Union and Cuba that the United States is determined to take appropriate action to prevent the further enlargement of Moscow's bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere.

The halt of the Soviet-Cuban arms flow, the isolation of regimes supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the strengthening of alternative political groups in Central America represent the indispensable elements of U.S. policy if we are to avert far graver future threats to the United States and other peoples whose security is dependent upon American strength.

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. is president of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and a professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REVIEW
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 19 AUG 83 08

12/28/15 EAB

TO

PRES

FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 18 AUG 83

URGENT

KEYWORDS USSR

MEDIA

BEREZHKOV, ANDREI

CM

SUBJECT MEMO TO PRES RE ANDREI BEREZHKOV THE LAST DAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 19 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SIMS

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(S /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

NSC/S

C

19 Aug

(per Sit Room)

Copy sent to CALIFORNIA to Tyson & Clark NFAR per JL

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171738 MEMO

1 8/18/1983 B1

K. DAM TO REAGAN RE ANDREI BEREZHKOVA
CASE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8391008

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 20 AUG 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM DAM, K 12/23/15 CDB

DOCDATE 19 AUG 83

KEYWORDS USSR
CM

ARMS CONTROL

SOKOLOV, OLEG

SUBJECT SUMMARY OF DAM AUG 18 MTG W/ SOVIET CHARGE SOKOLOV RE ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO CLARK TO PRES DUE: 23 AUG 83 STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LEHMAN, R

KRAEMER

LENCZOWSKI

DE GRAFFENREID

COMMENTS

REF# 8325335

LOG 8391009

NSCIFID

(C / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C JAN 1 7 See 91009 for final action

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

12

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8305897

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 24 AUG 83 11

12/28/15 208

TO

CLARK, W

FROM FORTIER, D

DOC DATE 23 AUG 83

KEYES, A

KEYWORDS USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT STATE DRAFT SPEECH ON US SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(A /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

AUG 25 1983

Clark noted

JL, DF

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 AUG 23 P 5: 29

System #

Package#

784/3
I

5897

RM

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary

1

mmk

John Poindexter

3

✓

I

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

4

✓

I

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

5

5

2

✓

N

✓

DACOM

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

cc John Lenczowski

8/24-WC noted.

RECEIVED

83 AUG 23 P 6: 25

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171739	MEMO D. FORTIER AND A. KEYES TO W. CLARK RE STATE DRAFT OF SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	8/23/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

16
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

12/28/15 GDB

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

3

IMMEDIATE

DACOM #

124

RELEASER

DY

PRIORITY

DEX #

#

DTG

21 AUG 83 08:10

ROUTINE

TJY #

#

FAX #

#

24 0010Z AUG 83

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM POINDEXTER FOR JUDGE CLARK/LOS ANGELES

TOR: 240023Z AUG 83

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Attached: Log # 5897

83 AUG 23 P10:14

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

ANDROPOV-MISSILES

URGENT

MOSCOW (AP) -- PRESIDENT YURI U. ANDROPOV HAS OFFERED TO
"LIQUIDATE" ANY MISSILES THE SOVIET UNION REMOVES FROM ITS EUROPEAN
TERRITORY IF NATO RENOUNCES PLANS TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES IN WESTERN
EUROPE, THE OFFICIAL TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID TODAY.

IT SAID THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE PART OF AN AGREEMENT TO CUT
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

IT WAS THE FIRST TIME ANDROPOV HAD PUBLICLY MADE AN OFFER TO DESTROY
THE MISSILES REDUCED UNDER AN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE ARMS AGREEMENT. THE
QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD BE DONE WITH SOVIET MISSILES REMOVED FROM EUROPE
HAS BEEN ONE OF THE CHIEF STUMBLING BLOCKS AT THE GENEVA ARMS REDUCTION
TALKS, WHICH ARE IN RECESS UNTIL SEPTEMBER.

BUT ANDROPOV, IN AN INTERVIEW TO BE PUBLISHED SATURDAY BY THE
COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER PRAVDA, SAID ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO
INCLUDE "RENUNCIATION" OF NATO PLANS TO DEPLOY 572 NEW MISSILES IN
WESTERN EUROPE STARTING THIS WINTER.

HE ALSO REPEATED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT IT WON'T CUT ITS
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE FORCES, INCLUDING THE SS-20 MISSILE, BELOW 162 --
THE NUMBER CURRENTLY DEPLOYED BY THE FRENCH AND BRITISH. THE UNITED
STATES, AS WELL AS BRITAIN AND FRANCE, HAVE REJECTED THE IDEA OF
CONSIDERING THE FRENCH AND BRITISH WEAPONS IN THE TALKS.

"SHOULD A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BE ACHIEVED, INCLUDING
RENUNCIATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW
MISSILES, THE SOVIET UNION, IN REDUCING ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES TO
THE LEVEL EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF MISSILES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE, WOULD
LIQUIDATE ALL THE MISSILES TO BE REDUCED.

"IN THIS EVENT, A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THE MOST MODERN MISSILES,
KNOWN IN THE WEST AS THE SS-20S, WOULD BE LIQUIDATED AS WELL."

ANDROPOV SAID HIS OFFER RENDERS "TOTALLY GROUNDLESS" WESTERN FEARS
THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SIMPLY TAKE THE HIGHLY MOBILE SS-20S OUT OF THE
EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MOVE THEM EASTWARD.

BY MOVING THEM EAST THEY COULD BE USED AGAINST CHINA OR JAPAN OR
ROLLED BACK INTO POSITION EASILY TO TARGET WESTERN EUROPE.

AP-WX-88-26-83 1414EDT

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8306015

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 27 AUG 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

12/28/15 COB

DOCDATE 26 AUG 83

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 31 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~MATLOCK~~

LENCZOWSKI

KRAEMER

ROBINSON

Kraemer

LEHMAN, R

FORTIER

LEHMAN, C

RYE

SOMMER

Not out

COMMENTS

REF# 8325957

LOG

NSCIFID

(S /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Kraemer 29 Aug Transferred from JM & JL

C 11/18 Incorporated into other action.

11/18 - SLC

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(14)

(C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171740 MEMO

1 8/26/1983 B1

C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET ORAL
STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171742 STATEMT

2

ND

B1

SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE
ARMS CONTROL (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

22

MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE MUST BE
PREVENTED: NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE

Moscow. August 21. TASS. Following is the full text of a letter from Andrei Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar:

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

The Soviet Union suggests that the question "On Concluding a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space with Regard to Earth" be included in the agenda of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

In making this proposal, the USSR guides itself by the desire to prevent the militarization of outer space. A particular danger in this respect is posed by the plans to develop and deploy different systems of space weapons capable of hitting targets both in outer space and on Earth.

The Soviet Union believes it imperative to raise a dependable barrier to these plans to turn outer space into a source of mortal danger to humanity as a whole by quickly taking effective measures to prevent the projection of the arms race to where there has so far been none, namely, to outer space.

Guided by this objective, the USSR put forward at the United Nations in 1981 a proposal on the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment of weapons of any type in outer space, a proposal that was approved by the General Assembly. However, work to draw up that treaty has not yet begun for well-known reasons.

Time is not waiting, however, and the USSR is now suggesting that a further step be taken right away and agreement be reached to ban altogether the use of force both in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth. It is submitting to the session a draft for an appropriate treaty.

An important characteristic of this draft treaty is the combination of the political and legal obligations of states to refrain from the use of force against one another in outer space and from outer space and substantive measures intended to prevent the militarization of outer space.

Specifically, the Soviet Union stands for banning altogether the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

It also stands for the radical solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons, namely, for the complete renunciation by states of

(more)

the development of new antisatellite systems and for the elimination of such systems already in their possession.

The treaty participants would also undertake not to destroy or damage the space objects of other states nor disrupt their normal functioning or change their flight trajectories in any other way.

In addition, a ban is suggested on the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military purposes, including antisatellite aims; their use should serve entirely the solution of diverse scientific, technical and economic problems.

The implementation of these far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would mean a major, tangible contribution toward the achievement of a goal approved by the United Nations earlier, the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I ask you, Mr. Secretary General, to regard this letter as a memorandum provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly and to release it jointly with the appended text of the draft treaty as an official document of the UN General Assembly.

Andrei Gromyko,
First Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

NEW SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVE

Moscow. August 21. TASS. The Soviet Union has proposed for the consideration of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly a draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth.

The draft treaty is meant to prevent the arms race in outer space and in this way to lessen the threat of nuclear war looming over humankind, and also to make a contribution toward the objective in accordance with which the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The articles of the proposed treaty prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space, in the atmosphere and on Earth by employing space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner as a means of destruction.

It is also prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force with regard to space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner.

The states participating in the treaty undertake:

1. Not to test and not to deploy by putting into orbit around the Earth, stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
2. Not to use space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner as a means of hitting targets on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
3. Not to destroy or damage space objects of other states, nor disrupt their normal functioning or change their flight trajectories.
4. Not to test and not to develop new antisatellite systems and to eliminate such systems already in their possession.
5. Not to test or use for military purposes, including against satellites, any manned spacecraft,

To ensure confidence of the clauses of the treaty being respected, the draft continues, every participating state shall use the national technical verification facilities available to it in a way meeting the commonly recognized principles of international law.

(more)

25

The states participating in the treaty shall undertake to consult and cooperate with one another in tackling any question which may arise in connection with reaching the objectives of the treaty or with observing its provisions.

Every state participating in the treaty shall undertake to carry out any internal measure it deems necessary in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent any activity contravening the clauses of the treaty that falls within its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it might be.

Nothing in the treaty affects the rights and duties of states under the UN Charter.

All the disputes which may arise in connection with the enforcement of the treaty shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means with the use of the procedures provided for by the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

The treaty, the draft says, shall be concluded in perpetuity.

The draft includes procedural clauses which are common for such international treaties.

###

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8306015

26

RECEIVED 27 AUG 83 10

12/28/15 (CDS)
ALL COPIES UPON REMOVAL
OF ORIGINAL ENCLOSED

DOC DATE 26 AUG 83

~~SECRET~~

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT. SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 31 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

KRAEMER

ROBINSON

LEHMAN, R

FORTIER

LEHMAN, C

RYE

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# 8325957

LOG

NSC/FID

(S /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 4/8 OBE per Matlock

— 4/8 ORIG NOT Returned to NSC/S

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

1A

(C)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171741 MEMO

1 8/26/1983 B1

COPY OF DOC #171740 (C. HILL TO W. CLARK RE
SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE
ARMS CONTROL)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171743	STATEMENT COPY OF DOC #171742 (SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL - ENGLISH TRANSLATION)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

70

MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE MUST BE
PREVENTED: NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE

Moscow. August 21. TASS. Following is the full text of a letter from Andrei Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar:

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

The Soviet Union suggests that the question "On Concluding a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space with Regard to Earth" be included in the agenda of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly.

In making this proposal, the USSR guides itself by the desire to prevent the militarization of outer space. A particular danger in this respect is posed by the plans to develop and deploy different systems of space weapons capable of hitting targets both in outer space and on Earth.

The Soviet Union believes it imperative to raise a dependable barrier to these plans to turn outer space into a source of mortal danger to humanity as a whole by quickly taking effective measures to prevent the projection of the arms race to where there has so far been none, namely, to outer space.

Guided by this objective, the USSR put forward at the United Nations in 1981 a proposal on the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment of weapons of any type in outer space, a proposal that was approved by the General Assembly. However, work to draw up that treaty has not yet begun for well-known reasons.

Time is not waiting, however, and the USSR is now suggesting that a further step be taken right away and agreement be reached to ban altogether the use of force both in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth. It is submitting to the session a draft for an appropriate treaty.

An important characteristic of this draft treaty is the combination of the political and legal obligations of states to refrain from the use of force against one another in outer space and from outer space and substantive measures intended to prevent the militarization of outer space.

Specifically, the Soviet Union stands for banning altogether the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space.

It also stands for the radical solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons, namely, for the complete renunciation by states of

(more)

the development of new antisatellite systems and for the elimination of such systems already in their possession.

The treaty participants would also undertake not to destroy or damage the space objects of other states nor disrupt their normal functioning or change their flight trajectories in any other way.

In addition, a ban is suggested on the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military purposes, including antisatellite aims; their use should serve entirely the solution of diverse scientific, technical and economic problems.

The implementation of these far-reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union would mean a major, tangible contribution toward the achievement of a goal approved by the United Nations earlier, the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I ask you, Mr. Secretary General, to regard this letter as a memorandum provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly and to release it jointly with the appended text of the draft treaty as an official document of the UN General Assembly.

Andrei Gromyko,
First Deputy Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

31

NEW SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVE

Moscow. August 21. TASS. The Soviet Union has proposed for the consideration of the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly a draft treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth.

The draft treaty is meant to prevent the arms race in outer space and in this way to lessen the threat of nuclear war looming over humankind, and also to make a contribution toward the objective in accordance with which the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The articles of the proposed treaty prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space, in the atmosphere and on Earth by employing space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner as a means of destruction.

It is also prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force with regard to space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner.

The states participating in the treaty undertake:

1. Not to test and not to deploy by putting into orbit around the Earth, stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
2. Not to use space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies or deployed in outer space in any other manner as a means of hitting targets on Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.
3. Not to destroy or damage space objects of other states, nor disrupt their normal functioning or change their flight trajectories.
4. Not to test and not to develop new antisatellite systems and to eliminate such systems already in their possession.
5. Not to test or use for military purposes, including against satellites, any manned spacecraft.

To ensure confidence of the clauses of the treaty being respected, the draft continues, every participating state shall use the national technical verification facilities available to it in a way meeting the commonly recognized principles of international law.

(more)

mb

The states participating in the treaty shall undertake to consult and cooperate with one another in tackling any question which may arise in connection with reaching the objectives of the treaty or with observing its provisions.

Every state participating in the treaty shall undertake to carry out any internal measure it deems necessary in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent any activity contravening the clauses of the treaty that falls within its jurisdiction or under its control, wherever it might be.

Nothing in the treaty affects the rights and duties of states under the UN Charter.

All the disputes which may arise in connection with the enforcement of the treaty shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means with the use of the procedures provided for by the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

The treaty, the draft says, shall be concluded in perpetuity.

The draft includes procedural clauses which are common for such international treaties.

###

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8306029

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~
12/28/15 CDB

RECEIVED 29 AUG 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM GREEN, F

DOCDATE 26 AUG 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ENVIRONMENT

SUBJECT: US CO-CHAIRMAN OF US-USSR JOINT COM ON COOPERATION IN FIELD OF
ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 31 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

BAILEY

ROBINSON

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Kinnutt	S 9/21	For Signature		
Ponderfetter	X 9/26	For decision		
Kinnutt	S SEP 26 1983	further action		
	C 10/3	Kinnutt sgd memo		RLC, JL

DISPATCH

VL 10/3

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

**National Security Council
The White House**

RECEIVED

83 OCT 3 P 3:20

System #

Package#

I
6029
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>4</u>		<u>E</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action B-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 SEP 21 P 4: 24

System #

Package#

I

6029

CT

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary

1

K

John Poindexter

2

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

3

K

A

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

Lenczowski

4

A

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP

Meese

Baker

Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

JP: Yam memo?

Bob K,

John: Has State cleared on this?

Bub

If this is consistent with approved actions from KAC IG then go ahead and sign out. If this is a new action, coordinate with State.



LD

RECEIVED

61 P 6: 18

83 SEP 26 12: 53


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FITZHUGH GREEN
Associate Administrator
United States Environmental Protection
Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Co-Chairman of U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental
Protection

Just to clear the record, not only have recent events compelled us to withdraw from consideration the proposal to designate a U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Environmental Joint Committee, but State Department opposes taking such an action, which would be contrary to our policy of Afghanistan invasion sanctions. Any future revival of this effort should be undertaken through ICCUSA -- the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

6029

AUG 26 1983

OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

MEMORANDUM

TO: William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Fitzhugh Green *Fitzhugh Green*
Associate Administrator

SUBJECT: US Co-Chairman of US-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection

On the basis of conversations with John Marcum of OSTP and John Lenczowski of your staff, we are given to understand that NSC would not oppose in principle the designation of a US Co-chairman to head the US-USSR Environmental Joint Committee. As you know, our environmental bilateral with the Soviets was renewed in May 1982 for a third five-year term after a complete inter-agency review the previous fall.

Administrator Ruckelshaus and I believe that if this program is worth continuing, as seems to be the case, it is worth doing properly. For 3 1/2 years, the US-USSR Environmental Agreement has suffered from a leadership vacuum, a partly outdated agenda, and severe financial neglect on the US side. The absence of high-level involvement on the Soviet side has reduced the ability of our counterparts in the Soviet bureaucracy to coordinate effectively within their own system. In both cases, the effect is frequently slipshod planning, misunderstanding, and significant inconvenience to the participating scientists.

At the same time, the Environmental Agreement has remained strong in terms of substantive benefit and humanitarian content. No significant reciprocity issues have arisen in the past several years. Geographical access inside the USSR has been excellent; Ambassador Hartman has noted this aspect as one of the major advantages of the Agreement. In short, this program stands as a clear example of a successful cooperative relationship between the two countries.

12/22/83

39

-2-

In recognition of this fact and to remedy the difficulties outlined above, we request NSC approval of the attached cable instructing our Science Counsellor at Embassy Moscow to approach the Soviet Executive Secretary informally on the question of my designation as US Co-chairman of the Environmental Joint Committee and on the possibility of a Joint Committee meeting in Moscow. In view of the interagency coordination role attendant upon the Co-chairmanship, we believe a memo from your office formalizing my designation would be most helpful.

Attachment

cc: John Marcum - OSTP
 Martin Smith - White House
 John Lenczowski - NSC
 Byron Merton - State Dept. (EUR/SOV)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171744 CABLE

2 8/26/1983 B1

RE US-USSR ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

September 21, 1983

ACTION

OF CLASSIFIED BY
12-28/15 CDB

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: U.S. Co-Chairman of U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in Field of Environmental Protection

The attached memorandum (Tab II) succeeded in reaching the bottom of my priority list on September 1. But to clear the record officially, could you please sign the memorandum at Tab I, which informs EPA that we are not going to revive activities under the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Agreement at this time?

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve K Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed memorandum to EPA
Tab II Incoming memorandum from Fitzhugh Green of EPA,
August 26, 1983

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171745 CABLE

2 8/26/1983 B1

RE US-USSR ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT
(ORIGINAL OF DOC #171744)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FITZHUGH GREEN
Associate Administrator
United States Environmental Protection
Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Co-Chairman of U.S.-USSR Joint Committee on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental
Protection

not only have
Just to clear the record, recent events ~~have~~ compelled us to
withdraw from consideration the proposal to designate a U.S.
Co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Environmental Joint Committee,
but State Department opposes taking such ^{on} actions, which would be contrary to our
policy of ~~the~~ Afghanistan invasion sanctions. Any future removal of this effort
should be undertaken through ICCUSA -- the Interagency Coordinating Committee
on U.S.-Soviet Affairs.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Page of I

(467)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System #

Package#

47
II
91008

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>ADVANCE</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>DACOM</u>
<u>TYSON</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Judge,
Staff is working on
a cover memo.* [Signature]

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171746 MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE 8/18/83 MEETING WITH SOKOLOV	2	8/19/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

171747 NON-PAPER

3

ND

B1

RE ARMS CONTROL (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/28/2015

File Folder

USSR (8/10/83-8/30/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

24

343

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
171748	NON-PAPER RE ARMS CONTROL (ORIGINAL, IN RUSSIAN)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.