Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/13/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: _____

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

(1/13 - 2:00 p.m. draft)

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	JENKINS	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☑	McFARLANE	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☑	McMANUS	☐	☑
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☐S	ROGERS	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	VERSTANDIG	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	KIMMITT	☐	☑
HICKEY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

The attached has gone forward to the President.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 13, 1984
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have come a long way since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's,

three times as many tanks, and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from Ethiopia to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's

deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through

negotiations. That is why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace, we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 100 major conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Today, there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet

perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on armed forces -- some 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. Today, we have far fewer nuclear weapons than we had 20 years ago. And in terms of its total destructive power, our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years.

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe 3 years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability, and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. Unfortunately, there has been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been breached and that the Soviet Union takes advantage of any ambiguity in an agreement.

In response to a congressional request, a report to the Congress on these Soviet activities will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.

The examples I have cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit, and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America can now offer something in return.

Strength and dialogue go hand-in-hand. We are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiations. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders, who have never shied from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed, over 2 years ago, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country would do everything to avert the threat of war. These are encouraging words. But now is the time to move from words to deeds.

The opportunity for progress in arms control exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. We have proposed a

set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed to exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication. Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risk of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing sophisticated weapons and thousands of its military personnel into Syria. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in the region. Our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets should use their influence to reduce tensions in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation, will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us halfway, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it: "So, let us not be blind to our differences," he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose, for a moment, Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan

did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

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Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

URGENT

DATE: 1/6/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: _____

SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH (1/6/84 - 2:00 p.m. draft)

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	JENKINS	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☑	McFARLANE	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☑	McMANUS	☐	☑
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☑SS	ROGERS	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	VERSTANDIG	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	KIMMITT	☐	☑
HICKEY	☐	☐	ELLIOTT	☐	☑

REMARKS:

This revision has gone forward to the President.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

RECEIVED
8 JAN 10 P6:43

National Security Council
The White House

System # II

Package # 90014

RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	2 of 2	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	3	JAN 11 1984	N
Situation Room			

Return in folder

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

28

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 10

TO BILL MARTIN / BOB KIMMITT

FROM SALLY SHERMAN

RE Soviet Speech Comments

In Don Fortier's absence, I'm sending on Dick Childress' note after reviewing the 1/10, 1:00 p.m. edit of the speech.

29

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1/10/84
1715

TO: RC (Dick Childress)

Sally Sherman gave this to me to give to you advising that she has just received and asking if you have any ideas on it.

j.

Given the level this has been to already - I have no minor edits.

30

SYSTEM II PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED ID 8490014

RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM DARMAN, R DOCDATE 05 JAN 84

DARMAN, R 10 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR SPEECHES

SUBJECT: PRES SOVIET SPEECH

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 06 JAN 84 STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	FORTIER	LEHMAN, R
		POINDEXTER
		KIMMITT

COMMENTS ** URGENT MEMO DUE TO MCFARLANE BY 0900 AM 11 JAN

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

SYSTEM II
90014 add-on

Document No. _____

RECEIVED
84 JAN 10 P3:42

URGENT

Forster

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/10/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 1/11

SUBJECT: U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS SPEECH (1/10 - 1:00 p.m. draft)

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	JENKINS	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☑	McFARLANE →	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☑	McMANUS	☐	☑
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☑SS	ROGERS	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	VERSTANDIG	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	KIMMITT	☐	☐
HICKEY	☐	☐	ELLIOTT	☐	☐

REMARKS:

This reflects the President's edits and senior staff comment. Any additional minor edits should be forwarded to Ben Elliott by c.o.b. tomorrow, January 11th.

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 10, 1984
1:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It

was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist

aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union

exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in two world wars. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?

Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

When we begin a new year, we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Now, as ~~We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my~~ we enter into 1984, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy ~~mankind~~ civilization itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

45

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending ~~by three-to-four-percent~~ every year. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when ~~one side~~ a government feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not military superiority.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong. Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized system is proving less able than the Western democracies to adapt to the challenges of a new era.

A Safer World

Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the

danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward

the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

Preventing War, ~~for me~~, is ~~public enemy number one.~~ my solemn responsibility. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes

solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

(Does this invite them into the M.E peace process? [NO]

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives [redacted] arms races everywhere it occurs.

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a

Check to make sure these figures are accurate

little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to greatly ~~radically~~ reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."

The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the

other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish greater mutual confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings

were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would

increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first

session of the conference in recognition of the importance we attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact will also attend.

Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions; our respective interests, and how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the

Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to ~~collaborate~~ cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. ~~[We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviet~~ Government, ~~and here too our approach is a flexible one.]~~ We are not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in

results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,

productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz ~~will be~~ is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm ~~in January.~~ two weeks from now, when the Conference on European Security convenes. [If invited, he will ~~We would like to establish a regular pattern of~~ also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. [And ~~I hope that this can be followed~~ This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

as I have said

~~I would hope that, if these and other talks create the basis for real progress and concrete results in our relationship, I will be ready to meet with Soviet President Andropov.~~

Conclusion

Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too. No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help

make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we ~~look toward Christmas, we should reflect on~~ embark upon the New Year; we must ~~the lessons of the past, and~~ rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

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