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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**FOIA**

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743

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
92134	NOTE	NSC ROUTING SHEET <b>R 10/18/202 LIBRARY RE-REVIEW</b>	1	10/17/1984	B1 B3
92135	NOTE	DC (DAVID CHEW) TO DON REGAN, RE: NSC ITEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT	1	3/4/1985	B1
92136	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO AMINE GEMAYEL	2	3/2/1985	B1
92137	LETTER	REAGAN TO AMINE GEMAYEL	3	ND	B1
92138	LETTER	AMINE GEMAYEL TO REAGAN	3	1/19/1985	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 2606

RECEIVED  
NOV 16 1984  
SCHEDULING OFFICE  
260676  
C 0086

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 16, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH

SUBJECT REQUESTS MEETING FOR THE ARMENIAN POPE  
CATHOLICOS KAREKIN II TO DISCUSS PEACE IN  
LEBANON

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
MARY RAWLINS	ORG	84/11/16	FR 84/11/20	
REFERRAL NOTE:				
RONALD ALVARADO	RSI	84/11/16	C 84/11/16	
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				
REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

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ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 2300

IA MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C)

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING                *
*                       *                       * CORRESPONDENCE:       *
*A-A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED                *TYPE RESP=INITIALS    *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM        *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *           OF SIGNER  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE       *C-COMPLETED             *           CODE = A    *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED              *COMPLETED = DATE OF  *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                       *           OUTGOING  *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                       *                       *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE        *                       *                       *
*X-INTERIM REPLY        *                       *                       *
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

November 20, 1984

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your letter conveying the thoughts of the Armenian Pope, His Holiness, Catholicos Karekin II. I have passed on your message to the President and he is appreciative to have this information.

In regard to your suggestion that the President meet with The Holy Father, we do not foresee a time at the present when that could be arranged. However, we will certainly keep your recommendation in mind for the future.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.  
Director, Presidential  
Appointments and Scheduling

The Honorable Michael D. Antonovich, Supervisor  
County of Los Angeles  
Hall of Administration  
500 West Temple Street  
Los Angeles, California 90012

FJR:JAJ



260675



# Board of Supervisors County of Los Angeles

*Scheduling  
cc: Ron Alvarado*

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH  
SUPERVISOR FIFTH DISTRICT

*From  
please to a  
nice letter  
"Dear Mike"  
saying I have  
passed on to all  
and he is  
opponent of this info.*

November 13, 1984

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Friday evening, November 9th, I had a private audience with the Armenian Pope, His Holiness, Catholicos Karekin II, who resides in Lebannon.

He wanted to me to convey to you the following:

1. The need to strengthen the Lebannese Central government.
2. The need for the Israeli-Syrian pullout.
3. The need to pass a congressional resolution recognizing the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide. (This passed the House this year but was blocked in the Senate.)

The Holy Father was pleased with your re-election and is available to assist the United States in bringing peace to Lebannon. I feel it would be advantageous to your administration if you could meet with him personally.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH  
Supervisor, Fifth District

MDA:lk

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JV

December 22, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER  
DICK DARMAN

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, *MB*

Congressional

The attached letters are forwarded for your information. -  
As you can see, Lebanon will be at the top of the Democratic  
agenda for discussion during the second session.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

DEC 16 1983

December 14, 1983

A TIME FOR REAPPRAISAL


Dear Colleague:


We invite you to join us in writing Speaker Thomas O'Neill to urge that the issue of U.S. military involvement in Lebanon be placed at the top of the agenda of issues to be discussed during the second session.


The most recent use of U.S. military force in the Lebanese conflict -- including the bombing a week ago of Syrian positions along the Beirut-Damascus Highway -- marks a fundamental departure from the mission of U.S. forces authorized by Congress last September. American casualties during the last 14 months of the "peace-keeping" mission now stand at two hundred and fifty-seven killed in action. With no end to the bloodshed in sight, we feel it is essential that the mission of our Marines be spelled out in no uncertain terms, or that they be extracted altogether from what is quickly becoming an ever-expanding military involvement.

Congress must, of course, play a role in that decision. And it is with such considerations in mind that we have drafted the attached letter to the Speaker urging an immediate review of our deepening military involvement in the Lebanese conflict. If you would like to join us in signing this letter, please contact Scott Wilsdon (x52861) or John Corse (x52501) by the close of business on Wednesday, December 21.

Sincerely,

  
THOMAS J. DOWNEY  
Member of Congress

  
CHARLES E. BENNETT  
Member of Congress

  
LEON E. PANETTA  
Member of Congress



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

December 21, 1983

Dear Mr. Speaker:


We are deeply disturbed by our deepening military involvement in the Lebanese conflict. Two hundred and fifty-seven brave Americans have died in the 14 months of the "peace-keeping" mission, and the challenge of the nation is to ensure that those lives were not lost in vain.


Congress acknowledged the possibility of American casualties when it approved legislation (Senate Joint Resolution 159) authorizing for 18 months continued U.S. participation in the Multinational Force deployed in Beirut. Yet that authorization provided for the limited commitment of U.S. Marines solely for the purposes of ensuring the continued operation of Beirut International Airport and security of nearby neighborhoods.


With the American bombing earlier this month of Syrian positions many miles from the Lebanese capital, we have reached a new threshold in what has become an ever-expanding U.S. military presence in Lebanon. The inevitable result of our shifting policy has been to transform the perception of our soldiers over the last three months from neutral peace-keepers to active participants in a civil conflict. This is not the mission approved by Congress, nor is there an indication that the American people have approved such a policy.

Our purpose for writing is to urge that the issue of U.S. military involvement in the Lebanese conflict be placed at the top of the agenda of issues to be discussed during the second session of the 98th Congress. It is essential that Congress have an opportunity to review our commitment before additional lives are lost, and we look to your leadership to ensure continued Congressional participation in the development of U.S. policy toward Lebanon.

Sincerely,

  
THOMAS J. DOWNEY  
Member of Congress

  
CHARLES E. BENNETT  
Member of Congress

  
LEON E. PANETTA  
Member of Congress

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7/10/83

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D.C. 20515**

December 13, 1983

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan  
President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write as Democratic Members of the House of Representatives who supported you in recent votes on the Marine presence in Lebanon. Our votes meant that we shared your belief that it was both right and necessary to make an effort on behalf of peace in that country. We accepted your view that a short-term cut off date would have greatly reduced chances for success.

We want to make clear our view that our commitment in Lebanon should not be open-ended. The American people have little tolerance for further sacrifice of their young men to the hatred and ambitions of others. Not only are the people unlikely to support a continued Marine presence in the absence of progress toward peace, but the peace process itself may suffer if it appears our policy includes no practical limit to our participation.

We have concentrated on getting the Marines into Lebanon and keeping them there. We should also keep in mind that getting the Marines out of Lebanon is a policy option, and one which needs to be considered. Just as we cannot allow ourselves to be pushed out of Lebanon by terrorists, neither should we overreact to terrorism by staying there even if hopes for peace evaporate. We will err if we continue to act as though hanging on is the only way to protect our interests.

It seems to us that there are two actions we are taking which need more emphasis and three policy issues with which we have some disagreement.

The first action to be emphasized has to do with the safety of the Marines. Initially, at least, the Marines were sent to Lebanon on a "presence" mission. Before the October 23rd bombing, "presence" was interpreted to mean "visibility," and "visibility" was interpreted to mean there could be no substantial barricades around the Marine positions. The lack of adequate security endangered their mission; it did not enhance it. The increased emphasis now being put on security must continue.

Honorable Ronald W. Reagan

December 14, 1983

Page Two

The second action to be emphasized is the effort to include other nations in the peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The Marines in Lebanon are surrogate targets for the United States itself in the minds of those who oppose us. To attack these men is to attack this country symbolically. In this sense, there is a contradiction between our purposes as a peacekeeper, and our interests as a great power. We would be better off, both as a peacekeeper and as a great power, were other countries to join the peacekeeping force, and were our presence to be diluted by the involvement of others.

There are three policy issues on which we must express disagreement. First, we believe you have overstated our stake in Lebanon. We would all like to see a peaceful, stable, united Lebanon, free of foreign troops. However, outcomes short of that ideal are more likely and, in any event, even the collapse of the peace effort ought not to be presented as a calamity for America. Lebanon is neither the key to the supply of Persian Gulf oil, nor essential to the continued existence of Israel. While the Soviets are always ready to exploit other people's troubles, the origin of Lebanon's problems cannot be traced primarily to Moscow.

Second, we believe that you have not pushed hard enough to achieve a political solution to the crisis. The real source of Lebanon's tragedy is the struggle among local factions. To say that Lebanon's crisis is fundamentally indigenous is not to ignore the role of Syria, Iran, and the Soviet Union in making things worse. However, the national reconciliation process in Lebanon will do more to determine the prospects for that country than the rate at which foreign troops leave the country. In the national reconciliation process, Lebanese leaders have a chance, purchased at great and tragic expense to us, to give their country peace, and thereby to create conditions that would promote the withdrawal of foreign forces. For this to happen, painful compromises will have to be made. Those who have held a disproportionate share of power in the Lebanese government must realize that we are not in Lebanon to permit them to cling to their advantages. Those presenting claims for a share of power must understand that if they are unreasonable, we will depart and open the way for the dissolution of their nation.


Third, we must resist the temptation to resort to military solutions in Lebanon, despite Syrian behavior and the strong support that the Soviet Union is providing Syria and other groups in Lebanon. Specific military actions may be necessary to protect our forces in Lebanon when they are attacked, but we should have no illusions that military options will help resolve the political problems we confront in Lebanon. To seek a military solution in Lebanon would be unwise and against our national interest.

Honorable Ronald W. Reagan  
December 14, 1983  
Page Three


Mr. President, we support the American presence in Lebanon because its objectives are worthy. However, we believe the additional steps proposed in this letter would make the achievement of our objectives more likely.

We appreciate your consideration.

Sincerely yours,



Les Aspin, M.C.



Lee H. Hamilton, M.C.



## Committee on Foreign Affairs

### CONGRESS TO REVIEW MARINE PRESENCE IN LEBANON WITHIN CONTEXT OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Representative Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), Acting Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:

"In authorizing the continued presence of the U. S. Marines in Lebanon, the Congress clearly intended that both the letter and spirit of that authorizing legislation be strictly observed. The President's War Powers report is a key factor in the decision-making process.

"Congress will soon undertake a review of that commitment in the context of recent events. As we assert Congressional authority in this area, my personal goal will be to act within the cooperative decision-making structure provided by the War Powers Resolution. I do not seek confrontation or Constitutional impasse; instead, my only objective will be to promote the best national security interests of the United States.

"In one sense, therefore, the report is helpful in that it reflects the President's willingness to comply with the War Powers Resolution and to cooperate with Congress. Unfortunately, however, it still leaves unanswered too many vital questions regarding the future role of U. S. armed forces in Lebanon. For example:

- What is being done to improve the security of the Marines in Lebanon?
- Are we doing everything possible to avoid widening the conflict in Lebanon? In this connection, I remain convinced that the best way to achieve Syrian withdrawal is through diplomatic rather than military initiatives.
- How much longer will the Marines remain in Lebanon?

"Congress will be directly - and properly - involved in deciding whether a continued U. S. peacekeeping role in Lebanon is necessary or justified. That decision is central to the broader American policy of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. More immediately, it is also crucial to the development of a truly balanced and representative government in Lebanon.

"All of these issues are difficult and complex. They will require careful scrutiny and honest judgment. I believe Congress is ready and willing to meet that challenge. As Acting Chairman of this



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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November 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER  
ED MEESE  
BUD MC FARLANE  
DICK DARMAN  
DAVE GERGEN  
LARRY SPEAKES

FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN *Ken D.*

Attached is the radio address delivered by Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) last Saturday on Lebanon. Lee is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. His speech has received very favorable reaction on the Hill.

The Speaker's Rooms  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  
October 28, 1983

For Further Information:  
Nick Cullather  
225-5315

LEE HAMILTON TO DELIVER DEMOCRATIC RADIO ADDRESS

Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, will deliver the Democratic radio address on Saturday, October 29th.

Hamilton serves on the House Intelligence Committee and is a member of the 15-member panel group named by Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. to monitor Administration policies in Lebanon.

His address will be broadcast live at 1:06 PM from NBC radio studios in the National Press Building.

# # #

TEXT EMBARGOED UNTIL 1:06 p.m. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 29

THIS IS CONGRESSMAN LEE HAMILTON. I REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF THE NINTH DISTRICT OF INDIANA.

IN THE WAKE OF THE GHASTLY TERRORIST ATTACK WHICH CLAIMED THE LIVES OF OVER 225 MARINES IN BEIRUT, MANY PEOPLE ARE CONFUSED ABOUT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON, WHAT THE MARINES ARE DEFENDING THERE, AND WHY THEY NEED TO STAY.

IN LOOKING AT THESE QUESTIONS WE MUST FIRST PUT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON INTO PROPER PERSPECTIVE. WE SHOULD AVOID OVERSTATING WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO. OUR GOALS IN LEBANON ARE WORTHY AND ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT ACCOMPLISHING A UNITED, SOVEREIGN LEBANON IS NOT VITAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THIS GOAL SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED PRIMARILY IN STRATEGIC TERMS OR AS PART OF THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF POWER.

HOW LONG MUST THE MARINES STAY? IF WE SAY WE WILL STAY UNTIL LEBANON IS A STABLE COUNTRY AND SYRIA NO LONGER A THREAT, WE MAKE A MORE OPEN COMMITMENT THAN WE CAN AFFORD. IF WE SAY THE MARINES WILL STAY A FIXED NUMBER OF DAYS OR WEEKS, OUR COMMITMENT IS TOO FEEBLE, AND WE HAND OUR ADVERSARIES THE ABILITY TO OUTMANEUVER US. PERHAPS IT IS BEST FOR US TO SAY THAT WHEN WE JUDGE THAT THE LEBANESE ARE ON THE ROAD TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND A BETTER SECURITY SYSTEM IS AVAILABLE IN THE COUNTRY, OUR MARINES WILL BE ON THEIR WAY HOME.

THE UNITED STATES NEEDS A DIVERSIFIED STRATEGY IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO WITHDRAW THE MARINES BEFORE THE 18-MONTH DEADLINE WORKED OUT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS. THE UNITED STATES MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THAT WITHDRAWAL IN MIND, AND IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

SIX GOALS SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF AMERICAN POLICY:

THE FIRST IS AN AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. WE MUST PRESS HARD FOR AGREEMENTS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME 50,000 SYRIAN TROOPS, 15,000 ISRAELI TROOPS, CLOSE TO 10,000

PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS AND OVER 1,000 IRANIANS, LIBYANS, AND OTHER NATIONALS.

SECOND, WE MUST WORK TO RESTART THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. THAT PROCESS CANNOT WAIT FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN THESE BROADER MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS MAY BE ONE WAY TO MOVE THE PEACE AGENDA IN LEBANON.

THIRD, THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION MUST GET UNDERWAY IN A CONFERENCE OF ALL LEBANESE FACTIONS. A CONFERENCE WILL LIKELY BEGIN MONDAY IN GENEVA. OUT OF THIS CONFERENCE MUST COME THE CRITICAL COMPROMISES LEBANON NEEDS IF IT IS TO SURVIVE. SUCH COMPROMISES MUST LEAD TO A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, BACKED BY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. AMERICAN DIPLOMATS CAN HELP THIS PROCESS ALONG, BUT ONLY LEBANESE LEADERS CAN MAKE IT SUCCEED. IF LEBANESE LEADERS DO NOT SEE IT THAT WAY AND FAIL TO PLAY THEIR BEST HAND, THE MARINES WILL BE USEFUL NO LONGER AND SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. STRONG PRESSURE TO COMPROMISE MUST BE PUT ON ALL FACTIONS IN LEBANON. THEY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR CHOICE IS UNITY OR ANARCHY, AND THAT THE HOUR IS LATE. IT IS THEIR NATION, NOT OURS, WHOSE FUTURE IS ON THE LINE.

FOURTH, AN ACCEPTABLE SECURITY STRUCTURE COULD BE BUILT UP AROUND A BETTER TRAINED AND EQUIPPED LEBANESE ARMY, APPROPRIATELY DEPOLITICIZED AND ORGANIZED TO REFLECT THE RELIGIOUS MOSAIC OF THE NATION. MILITARY AID FROM A NUMBER OF NATIONS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEBANESE ARMY IN A FORM AGREED TO BY ALL FACTIONS. SOLDIERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BE ROTATED THROUGH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, KEEPING IT IN PLACE AS LONG AS IT WAS NEEDED BUT ALLOWING THE MARINES TO DEPART MORE QUICKLY THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE OTHERWISE.

FIFTH, IN THE DAYS JUST AHEAD, WE MUST ALSO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY AREAS IN BEIRUT WHERE THE MARINES OPERATE. WE CAN NOT ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO PROTECT THE MARINES FROM



KAMIKAZE TACTICS. THERE IS NO HIGHER PRIORITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAN THE PROTECTION OF THEIR LIVES.

FINALLY, WE SHOULD MAKE A QUICK BUT EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE TERRORIST ATTACK, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED BY A SMALL GROUP OF UNCONTROLLABLE FANATICS SEEKING TO CREATE ANARCHY FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH SUMMARILY BEFORE THEIR TWISTED VISION FOR LEBANON OVERWHELMS THE SENSIBLE VISION OF THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE PEOPLE.

THE MISSION OF THE 1,600 MARINES NOW ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON SHOULD BE PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE. THE MARINES WERE DISPATCHED TO LEBANON ONE YEAR AGO TO PARTICIPATE IN A MULTINATIONAL FORCE REQUESTED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE MARINES ARE NOT IN LEBANON TO TIP THE BALANCE OF POWER. THEY ARE THERE AS ONE ELEMENT AMONG SEVERAL TO HELP ACHIEVE STABILITY. THEIR MISSION REMAINS ONE OF KEEPING THE PEACE, NOT FIGHTING A WAR.

THEY ARE SYMBOLS OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND TO A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT LEBANON. WITHDRAWING THEM IMMEDIATELY WOULD MAKE HOLLOW OUR INSISTENCE THAT DIPLOMACY BE GIVEN A CHANCE. WHAT WE HAVE WORKED FOR, AND WHAT THOSE MEN HAVE DIED FOR, WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED, IF NOT LOST. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GIVEN MORE LEEWAY AS IT TRIES TO DOMINATE LEBANON, AND THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BECOME A MORE INVITING TARGET OF SOVIET OPPORTUNITY. SYRIA WOULD NEVER HONOR ITS PLEDGE TO PULL ITS TROOPS OUT, NOR WOULD IT END ITS SUPPORT OF REBEL FACTIONS OR ITS COLLABORATION WITH IRAN. ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER WOULD BE EVEN MORE VULNERABLE. MODERATE ARAB STATES WOULD BE ALIENATED FROM US, AND OUR GENERAL INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD SINK WHILE THE INFLUENCE OF RADICALS ROSE. WE WOULD ALSO HAVE MORE DIFFICULTIES IN RESTARTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE TALKS AND IN GETTING THE PARTIES IN THE AREA TO TAKE RISKS FOR PEACE.

FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES CONFRONT THE UNITED STATES IN LEBANON, BUT

THE ROAD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS ALWAYS BEEN STREWN WITH OBSTACLES.

AS A GREAT POWER, THE UNITED STATES MUST SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT ACCOMPANIES POWER. WE CANNOT WALK AWAY FROM LEBANON AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO BE THE SAME AGAIN.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1984

Dear Win,

I sincerely appreciated the Thomas Friedman piece you recently distributed to the Council. I agree that it is as thoughtful and compelling as it is timely. I have passed it along to the President. Many thanks.

re Lebanon

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

+

Mr. Winston Lord  
President  
Council on Foreign Relations  
58 East 68th Street  
New York, NY 10021

775 @ 840 7811

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *Phil*

SUBJECT: Letter from Winston Lord Forwarding Thomas Friedman's Article "The Lessons of Lebanon"

*It's only disappointing that he doesn't treat Israel's contribution to the center as a*  
**SIGNED**  
*Sharon*

As you requested, I have highlighted the article at Tab II. I read the reprint in The New York Times Magazine, and believe it is an exceptionally thoughtful and thought-provoking piece which I recommend you read in its entirety. I also think the President would find it interesting.

Of the five reasons Friedman cites for the growing spectre of extremism, the first may be the most important for our future planning. Put another way, coercion and violence are a relevant currency in contemporary Middle East diplomacy. If we are going to conduct diplomacy, and certainly if we are going to lead the search for peace in this region, we have to gird ourselves for the inevitable trumps from the bloody-minded antagonists of genuine peace. I have attached a letter you might want to send in reply to Winston Lord.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane letter to Lord
- Tab II - Article: Lessons of Lebanon

National Security Council  
The White House

JF

92134

System # I

Package # 7811

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Tom Shull	<u>5</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Wilma Hall	<u>6</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>7</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Concurrence</u>

OCT 29 1984

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Do you want to put Tab-II in POB?  
No, Bud already gave the President  
the article.



OCT 15 1984

# Council on Foreign Relations Inc.

*Phil Day  
Pls highlight  
Khawr  
Bud*

October 5, 1984

Dear Council Member,

From time to time we send all of you texts of particularly interesting remarks made here at the Council. This is part of our effort to engage our increasingly far-flung membership, most of which naturally cannot attend any particular session.

On September 17, 1984 Thomas Friedman, Pulitzer Prize winning reporter of The New York Times, spoke at a box lunch on "The Lessons of Lebanon: A Personal Retrospective." He cited "five reasons extremists are winning in the Middle East." His presentation was disturbing, eloquent, provocative. The audience found it compelling to hear. We believe you will find it compelling to read.

Sincerely,

*Winston Lord*

Winston Lord  
President

WL/lt  
Enclosure

THE LESSONS OF LEBANON: A PERSONAL RETROSPECTIVE  
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
September 17, 1984

I have often been asked, what was the most frightening moment I lived through in Beirut -- when was I really terrified? I saw a lot of awful scenes and I was shot at by anonymous madmen more times than I care to remember. But in the end it wasn't an act of physical violence that scared me most. My most frightening moment in Beirut came at the Commodore Bar on February 8, 1984. The Commodore was the hotel where most of the journalists stayed. February 8, you may recall, was the day after the Shiite Muslim Amul Militia seized control of Beirut from the Lebanese army. And after the fighting had died down, small groups of Shiite militiamen belonging to the pro-Iranian, very extreme Party of God, went on a rampage through the city -- ransacking heathen bars and whorehouses. Well, I was sitting in the restaurant of the Commodore Hotel that afternoon eating lunch when I heard a ruckus coming from the lobby. I turned around to see what was happening and I saw a tall, heavy-set Shiite militiaman with a big black beard, marching through the lobby with this wild look in his eyes and an M-16 in his hands. I knew he wasn't going for a drink. The Commodore bartender had been preparing for such a showdown and had replaced the liquor display in the bar with cans of Pepsi and Perrier. The Shiite militiaman wasn't fooled. He stalked behind the bar, shoved the bartender aside and began smashing every liquor bottle and glass in the bar with the butt of his M-16. When he was done, he stalked out of the lobby, leaving a wake of liquor on the floor.

In thinking back on that incident, I think two things about it really disturbed me. First was coming face to face with something that I had never confronted so close up before in my life. It was the face of violent religious extremism. It easily could have been human beings as much as liquor bottles that militiaman was smashing. I don't think it would have made a dime's difference to him. He was from The Party of God, literally, from The Party of God. He had truth with a capital "T", he had his M-16 and he was not about to let anything stand in his way. He seemed so strong and we seemed so weak. And that is what was really scary.

I think the second reason I was so disturbed by the incident was because I wasn't some objective reporter that day, chronicling someone else's misery. It was me. It was my house that had been invaded. It was my liberty that was at stake. And suddenly I had an inkling of what it was like to be the target of all the extremist violence I had covered. It wasn't like being caught out in the middle of the street when some crazy man starts shelling your neighborhood from five miles away. No, this was aimed at me. I saw that militiaman's face. I saw the wild look in his eyes and I saw how easily he imposed his values on me.

I spoke to friends about that scene at the Commodore Bar often in subsequent months. It came to symbolize for me the power that is created when political and religious extremism is wedded to violence. The way that one militiaman broke up that bar -- while we the majority stood by and watched, unwilling and unable to defend our way of life -- that was violent extremism in action.

I felt as though I had seen moderation and tolerance on the run that afternoon. I felt as though I felt it get up off the barstool of the Commodore Hotel and slink away. And that is what I'd like to talk about this afternoon. Let me put it bluntly: more and more it seems to me that the political center in both the Arab world and in Israel are being hijacked and taken to the fringe of society by extremists determined to go to any length to pursue their causes and to set the agenda for us all. Although political centrists and moderates in the Middle East remain a majority, they are finding it increasingly difficult to defend their way of life and their values. And here I'm not just talking about the right to have a drink. My overwhelming impression, after five years in the Middle East, is that moderates everywhere are increasingly on the defensive and often on the run. What I would like to do is outline to you what I think are the five reasons extremists are winning in the Middle East. Why those who hold the most hard line, the most uncompromising positions are setting the agenda for us all. I don't think these five reasons are the only reasons and I don't think they apply only to the Middle East.

I think the first reason extremists are winning is very simple. They are ready to go all the way and use whatever amount of force is necessary to preserve their interests or to further their own causes. Let us be frank. In the Middle East crime pays. Don't have any doubt about it. And absolute crime pays absolutely. Judging from what I witnessed in the Middle East, if you are ready to use violence to its ultimate extreme, if you are ready to go all the way, you will not go to jail, you will pass go, you will collect two hundred dollars and you may be elected President.

I first learned that lesson in the Syrian city of Hama, formerly a town of some 180,000 inhabitants. Back in February 1982, the regime of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad had a little problem in Hammah. It turned out that roughly 150 of its residents, belonging to an underground organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood, were trying to organize a little rebellion there against the regime. To make sure that the revolt was quashed, the Assad regime pounded Hama for almost three weeks with tank and artillery fire, killing an estimated 20,000 of its inhabitants. That is my definition of going all the way.

I went to Hama six weeks after the massacre when the Syrian government finally opened the city to foreigners. Now, I've seen a lot of scenes of destruction in my time in the Middle East — but I have never seen anything like Hama. Whole neighborhoods of the city had literally been flattened. I mean flat like this floor. The buildings had been plowed up like cornfields and bulldozed as flat as parking lots, with all of their contents rolled underneath, including bodies. The only clue as to what lay below came when you kicked the ground and unearthed a tennis shoe or an old tattered photo or a piece of clothing.

The Assad regime wanted to send a message to its residents and the rest of Syria on what would happen to those who challenged its leadership, and the message got through loud and clear. There has been no anti-government activity of any note in Syria since. I remember being struck by the fact that during the whole day I spent in Hammah, I saw only one Syrian soldier. After what the Syrian army had done to the city, that was probably all the



government needed to keep the peace -- one soldier. The Assad brothers, Hafiz and Rifaat, who understand how to use extremist violence as an instrument of state, and I think they understand it better than anyone in the Middle East, proved in Hama that they would use force to absolutely any length to preserve their domination. And, quite honestly, it worked.

Assad also applied the principle of going all the way in his conflict with the United States and Israel over Lebanon. After being defeated by the Israeli army in the summer of 1982, Mr. Assad knew exactly what he wanted to do in Lebanon to restore Syria's domination -- and although he was outnumbered and outgunned by the Israelis and Americans, he went after his objectives with utterly ruthless single-mindedness. He is believed to have supported everything from the blowing up of the American Embassy, to the destruction of the Marine compound, to the daily shelling and sniping on the Marines. While Assad systematically went about his business, knowing exactly what he wanted, we Americans preoccupied ourselves with sending chocolate chip cookies to the Marines and worrying ourselves sick whenever an American serviceman got a hangnail. Unlike Assad, we never had any idea of what we really wanted out of Lebanon or how far to go to get it.

The first reason, then, that some extremists in the Middle East are winning is because they are ready to play by their own rules -- and their own rules are Hama rules -- and Hama rules are everything goes. The moderate's dilemma is that he cannot defend himself against such violence without becoming just as ugly as his opponent. Or as one Marine Commander said to me about Lebanon: "If you want to operate in this environment, fellah, you had better throw out the New Testament." The end result is that while extremists are going all the way, the moderates tend to just go away. What I saw while living in Beirut was that the best people, the most sensitive, honest, and politically tolerant people, tend not to stand and fight for their way of life. They just don't know how. Rather, they do just what moderates everywhere do best, and that is yield to the militants and activists.

West Beirut was the perfect example. It had been a unique island of tolerance and cosmopolitanism, where Christians, Druse and Muslims lived side by side. But as pressure from religious extremists grew, the silent peaceful majority that could afford to just pick up and leave. And they left behind a Lebanon where, to paraphrase Yeats: the center truly could not hold -- the best indeed lacked all conviction, and the worst were indeed full of passionate intensity. That same process has occurred in Iran where the Khomeini regime has allegedly killed more than 10,000 of its own people, and prompted countless others to take flight. And it may be under way in other countries in the Middle East.

But you don't have to smash up a bar or wipe out a city to be a successful extremist. Some of the most successful extremists have never wielded a gun. But they do know how to wield words. Which brings me to my second point: extremists and all those in the Middle East who reject compromise solutions are gaining strength today because they understand, much better than the forces of moderation, the importance of language and agendas. They recognize much more clearly than their opponents that determining how people describe their world, how they see their alternatives, is where the real power lies. Once you have set the agenda and language of a public



debate, the rest is easy. Take a look at language, for instance. After the 1967 war, elements from the extreme Gush Emunim movement in Israel were able to generate enough pressure on a succession of hesitant and divided Israeli cabinets to get the biblical name of the West Bank -- Judeah and Sumaria -- imposed as the official name of this territory in all Israeli radio and television broadcasts in government communications. This naturally carried over into the daily language of politics, to such an extent, in fact, that even Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, in the last election campaign, referred to these territories as Judeah and Sumaria, which he never did a few years ago. The Gush Emunim people know that to name something is to own it. They know that any Israeli who calls the area Judeah and Sumaria can never really deny the argument that this area is the biblical cradle of Judaism. Hence it's Jewish land and hence to return it to Arab sovereignty would involve a kind of sacrilege. To call it the West Bank has a much more neutral connotation, and these open the possibility of compromises.

One can actually see the battle over language now being played out in the Israeli media over how to describe the 24 Jewish men from the West Bank who have been arrested for alleged involvement in violent acts against Arabs. Some Israeli papers describe them as Jewish terrorists, implying obvious condemnation for the crimes that they were allegedly involved in. But the West Bank supporters of these 24 men refer to them constantly as "The Jewish Underground," a term that is at worst neutral, and at best evokes the images of The Free State Underground that fought for Israel's independence. The state-run Israel radio has also come to call them The Underground, and the term now seems to be gaining wide currency. The ultra-nationalist forces in Israel which reject any form of territorial compromise with the Arabs have also predominated in the debate about the future of the West Bank. They have succeeded in persuading most Israelis that their choices on the West Bank are very simple. Either a pro-Soviet PLO state or the present security we now enjoy.

But imagine for a minute how different the debate might be if the agenda were shaped differently. If, for instance, the debate over the West Bank were framed as a debate over the ultimate character of Israel. Instead of the public being told that its choices vis-a-vis the West Bank were between the present security Israel enjoys and a PLO neighbor state, its choices may be presented as whether Israel absorbs one million Palestinian Arabs and loses its Jewish character or finds a way to safely divest itself of the West Bank and retains its Jewish character. As a Peace Now activist once noted to me, "That is a much better field to hold a debate on, the character of Israel." But that is not the field they are fighting on. Which is precisely why they are on the run.

Extremists in the Arab world have shaped the debate the same way. Arab extremists have imposed an agenda which says that any short-term Arab accommodation with Israel that contradicts the long-term aims of establishing a Palestinian state in all of Palestine is treasonous. But imagine how different the position of Palestinian moderates might be if they had been able to shape the Palestinian agenda differently. If they had been able to convince the Palestinians that the question before them was not "How do we get back everything?" but "How do we relieve the homelessness of our people and satisfy our minimal demands for national self-determination?" Approaching their future with that agenda in mind might have led the Palestinian leadership to make some very different choices and compromises at critical stages in their history.

Now, you might say "Who cares about language and agendas, what is this guy talking about? I mean it's only words. What does it matter what Peres says in public? It's his private feelings that count." Well, in the end it just doesn't work that way and I saw that covering the Hussein-Arafat negotiations over the Reagan Plan in the spring of 1983. In the end, there was no question that Yasir Arafat wanted to go along with King Hussein and enter into negotiations with the United States on the Reagan Plan. At the height of those talks, Arafat and his colleagues on the PLO Executive Committee retreated to Kuwait for a climactic debate on the issue. And the PLO Executive Committee overwhelmingly rejected Arafat's position. In my opinion the fault lay squarely with Arafat. After all those years of talking out of both sides of his mouth, after all those years of using the language of extreme in public and moderation in private, Arafat had in a sense abdicated the public debate to his hard-line rivals. Hence, when he really needed a constituency for compromise, it wasn't there. He had never shaped it. He had always treated his public statements as mere words that he could manipulate whenever he wanted. But in the end he became a prisoner of those words.

When the Palestinian leadership retreated to Kuwait that day and Arafat presented his case for going with King Hussein, in a sense his hard-line rivals didn't even understand the language he was using. You can almost imagine what the debate must have been like. They must have said to him: "Why, how can you say that? Here in Algiers you said this, here in Cairo you said that, here in Damascus you said that." He was truly, if anyone ever was, hoist on his own petard. Arafat had not prepared the ground for compromise within his own movement. Instead he had saved his moderation for visiting European dignitaries and correspondents from Time magazine. That is a lesson which Shimon Peres may also wish to ponder.

Extremists and religious zealots not only understand the importance of language and agendas, but also the importance of simplicity, which brings me to the third reason extremists are winning. Because they are willing and able to simplify their positions into short cliches that divert attention from the complexities of the real world, extremists have always been much better at exploiting the media. Precisely because they understand that the media responds to simplicity, to black and white. The short, simple and outrageous statement is what radio and television live for.

I remember talking recently to a friend of mine in Jerusalem who happens to be one of the founders of Peace Now. He was explaining the difficulty he has in defending his position on the West Bank in a public debate with people from Gush Emunim, who advocate the absorption of the West Bank into Israel. When he asked the Gush Emunim people why Israel should keep the West Bank, they have a very simple answer. My friend said it's actually only two words: "It's ours." Historically who can argue with that? It was on the West Bank that the heart of the ancient Jewish kingdom was located. But as my Peace Now friend explained, when you ask him what his stand is, he gives you a five-page position paper about long-term demographics and the decline of humanistic values and so on and so on and so on. He simply doesn't stand a chance against a two-word answer.

Palestinian moderates, incidentally, have the same problem. Palestinian hard-liners have a clear and simple answer when they're asked why they will not settle for half a loaf of Palestine instead of always demanding



the whole loaf. Their answer is three words: "It's all ours." Historically, what Palestinian can argue with that? If you ask dovish Palestinians like the late Isham Sartawi why they thought the Palestinians should agree to accept half a loaf, they would give you a long, very guarded explanation about how half a loaf is better than no loaf at all. But all the time they'll be looking over their shoulder for the assassin's bullet. In the case of Mr. Sartawi, it finally caught up with him.

Obviously, in simplifying their positions into two-word answers, neither Palestinian nor Jewish extremists do justice to the complex reality involved in these issues. I'm sure deep down some of them know that. But they are not out to do justice, they are out to advance their beliefs and interests. And by shamelessly simplifying things, by wiping out all distinctions between people, they have been quite effective. One example that still burns in my mind is during the recent Israeli election campaign, extreme right wing opponents of the Labor Party printed some posters, trying to depict Labor Party leader Shimon Peres as the whitest of doves. Now, these posters were quite large and they had four pictures on them. One was the Mayor of Bethlehem, another was Bruno Kreisky, the former Austrian Chancellor, another was Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, and the third was Ahmed Jibril, head of the extreme Palestinian, pro-Syrian group the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. The poster said it all: they're all the same. On top was a headline: "What do all these men have in common?" and the answer below was: "They all want Shimon Peres to be elected Prime Minister of Israel."

Not surprisingly, one found Yasir Arafat engaging in the same form of no-distinction, they're all the same, what is the difference between an Elias Freij and an Ahmed Jibril? Nothing but a whole world. After the Israeli election, Yasir Arafat was asked for his comments on the results. He said it was very simple. He told a Kuwaiti newspaper that the Israeli election was just a snake changing its skin. Arafat said this knowing full well that under a Labor government, Israel would probably be much more willing to negotiate over the West Bank. Instead of welcoming that possibility and maybe saying something that might help make the negotiation process easier, Arafat simply labeled all Israelis as ugly, Zionist expansionists.

Now it would be nice to just dismiss these election posters and statements by Arafat as so much political propaganda that we should just ignore. But I believe these statements do matter. They matter very much. Precisely because, when people don't make distinctions, killing and extremist violence become so much easier to carry out and to rationalize. In fact, these kind of statements and oversimplifications pave the way for extremist violence. Such statements are what enables a Palestinian to leave a bomb on a Zionist bus in Israel. They will kill Zionist soldiers and Zionist civilians and Zionist peace activists and Zionist war mongers alike. Who cares, they're all just Zionists. Such statements are what enabled the Druse to lob shells into Christian East Beirut day after day, never caring whether they hit a militiaman or a civilian. What the hell, they were all just Christians. And that was enough to condemn them. Such statements, of course, were what laid the groundwork for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila. The Phalangist militia and, to a certain extent, some Israelis had dehumanized the Palestinians in their own mind by labeling absolutely everything they touched as terrorist: terrorist hospitals, terrorist nurses, terrorist doctors, and terrorist tanks.

They could no longer distinguish between women and children, guerrillas and true terrorists. They didn't even realize, for instance, that the part of Shatila camp where the massacre began was primarily populated by poor Lebanese Shiites who had bought the homes of Palestinians who were able to get up enough money to move out of the camp.

There was a picture in the paper the day after the Sabra and Shatila massacre which to me said it all. It was of a Lebanese Shiite woman they found in the camp. She was sprawled on the ground, a row of bullets running across her breasts. Locked in her left hand, frozen in death, was her Lebanese identity card. She was obviously trying to explain to someone, to one of the Phalangist militiamen, that she was Lebanese, not a Palestinian, but he riddled her full of bullets. She went to her grave holding up her ID card. It is a little known fact that roughly one-sixth of the people killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre were Lebanese.

The fourth reason I think extremist violence is on the rise is because it has in many cases a much wider popular base than we want to believe. I learned that lesson in Beirut, on the morning of October 23, watching some people playing tennis. October 23, you might recall, was the day the bombings of the Marines and French took place. But what I remember most about that morning was that the tennis players at the clay courts next to our apartment never missed a set. Even though the explosion must have shaken the very dirt under their feet. The largest sub-nuclear explosion in the world and these people just went on playing tennis.

That was one of the first signals I had about the true attitude of many Lebanese toward the Marine bombing. While most Lebanese condemned it publicly, there was privately a widespread feeling that "it serves you right." The Lebanese seemed to be saying, "You Americans have finally gotten a taste of what it's like to be bombed and shelled as we Lebanese were during the Israeli invasion," which, the Lebanese argued, the United States implicitly supported. You Americans, Beirutis seemed to say, came here and promised to rearrange everything for the better, and you only muck things up. So now you see what it's been like.

I thought a lot about those tennis players and people like them whom I had met elsewhere in the Middle East. I think they teach us a very important lesson. That lesson is that most extremists are not so crazy. Anyone who thinks extremists are crazy is probably crazy. People who resort to extremist violence are often acting on wider feelings in their society. Sometimes the only difference between the extremist and the average citizen is that the extremist takes the frustration and anger of the people around him and plays them out to their limits and beyond. The difference is that he is ready to act and to act violently on the basis of feelings he senses inside of himself and inside his next-door neighbor. I think the news media and government often do a great injustice by trying to depict the men who blew up the American Embassy and the Marine Compound as wild-eyed fanatics from the lunatic fringes of their society. I would never justify what they did. I believe their actions were grotesque. But I don't think they were done by people all that much different than you and me. I think that those people were acting very much in tune with the widespread anti-American sentiment that had been growing in their societies and in the Middle East in general in the last three years.



I believe this ever since I went to Egypt to cover the aftermath of the assassination of Anwar Sadat. I think Anwar Sadat was a truly great figure. But let me tell you, the men who killed Anwar Sadat were very, very much in tune with their environment. Sadat was much more in Manhattan and in Washington than in Cairo's gigantic slum City of the Dead. His economic policies and his family's ostentatious lifestyle had alienated him from many of his people. I went to the City of the Dead a few days after the assassination and I remember being shocked to find so many people there expressing quiet satisfaction that the Pharaoh, as they called him, was dead. I remember talking to a hotel desk clerk in Cairo who told me about a wedding party that had been scheduled at her hotel only a few hours after Sadat was gunned down, and how the celebration went ahead as though nothing unpleasant happened. A friend of mine who just returned from Egypt told me that it's impossible to find a picture of Anwar Sadat in any public place in Egypt today. I would not be surprised if, in a few years, they build a monument in Cairo to the men who killed Anwar Sadat.

I think anyone who says that Jewish terrorists in Israel are fringe elements is also fooling himself. And there are polls that make this very clear. One poll taken by the Ha'aretz newspaper shortly after the 24 men were arrested in alleged involvement in the murder and maiming of West Bank Arabs, found that one third of the Israeli public felt that their actions were fully or somewhat justified. There is nothing fringe about that. It was revealed in the court papers that when the ringleaders of the Jewish terrorists were out recruiting, they went around to the houses of certain people to see if they would join. They would knock on the door and say "Is Moshe here?" and Moshe wasn't home. But they'd say no, his brother Jossi is here. And they would say "Fine, Jossi, would you like to join us." And that's how two people in the 24 were actually recruited. They just happened to be home. The image of some underground meeting in caves by candlelight simply does not apply. I think that the thing one must worry about in the Middle East today is not the rise of the extremist fringe, as it's been called, but the rise of the extremist center. As extremist violence engulfs more and more people's lives, it also gains more and more recruits. Behind every extremist's back, I believe, one can usually find an amorphous body of feelings and attitudes which support it to a substantial degree.

Which leads me to the fifth and final reason why I think that extremism is gaining strength. That is because extremism feeds on itself, and it feeds on frustration and it feeds on insensitivity. And right now in the Middle East there's a glut of all three. The Arab world in particular is going through a very frustrating era right now. There is an ideological vacuum in the Arab world -- a gnawing feeling that all of the political solutions have been tried and none of them have worked. The old ideologies from Nasserism to Arab Socialism have proven to be bankrupt and completely incapable of solving the fundamental political, social and economic problems of Arab societies -- let alone redress their basic weakness compared to Israel. This has produced a cynicism and a sense of impotence which is impossible for any visitor to the area to ignore. This trend has been compounded by the fact that the power brought to the Arab states by the oil boom of the 1970's has been largely squandered. Enormous amounts of resources have been wasted on white elephant industrial projects to such an extent that several of the leading Arab oil exporters now find themselves in debt. The expectations of the early 1970's, that oil would enable the Arab states to fundamentally transform their

societies, has been dashed. I would say that there is not a single Arab regime that is stronger today than it was in 1973. It was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which exposed the weakness and division of the current Arab regimes and just how far their power has eroded in the last decade. All of this has created a wide opening for frustration in the area, which in many cases has been filled by extreme religious fundamental ideologies that offer a political messiah which secular politics has failed to deliver. But as I said, not only does extremism feed on these and other frustrations, it also feeds on itself. Once it gets going in one place, it sets off a chain reaction that is felt around the region.

I think the best example of how extremism breeds extremism is the phenomenon of Rabbi Meir Kahane. During the recent Israeli election campaign, Rabbi Kahane ads were very simple. He would stand in front of a television camera, a backdrop of Jerusalem behind him, and he would say very simply, "Give me your vote, and I will take care of them once and for all." Them, of course, were Israel's Arabs. In Israel, Kahane's winning of the Knesset seat was the most talked about result of the election. "How could this happen?" people asked, "Who could have elected such a xenophobic extremist?" I will tell you who I think elected Meir Kahane. The Arabs, that is who. The votes may have been Jewish, but the conditions for his success were created largely by the Arab states and it is only the Arabs, I believe, who can bring him down. By refusing to recognize Israel and negotiate with it directly, the Arabs have only strengthened Israeli fringe elements like Rabbi Kahane, who can then play on the legitimate fears and security concerns of the Israeli public.

For the last thirty years, the Arabs in general and the PLO in particular have continued to delude themselves that they are somehow going to get what they want out of Israel, somehow going to secure a homeland for the Palestinians by organizing extreme pressure from the outside. This pressure has taken many forms: warfare, terrorism, guerrilla raids, and diplomatic pressure. Arafat was constantly entertaining delegations in Beirut of the Non-Aligned Conference, the EEC Commission on the Middle East, even the American Indian Movement, you name it. The Arabs have got to recognize, though, that the road to Palestine does not run through the Non-Aligned Conference. It does not run through the American Indian Movement, and it doesn't even run through the UN Security Council. It runs through the Israeli public in democracy. The Arabs have an enormous ally in Israeli democracy and sensitivities, if only they would exploit them and use them to their advantage as Anwar Sadat did. There is still a majority for compromise in Israel, but it has to be activated, and that can only begin with dialogue and recognition. The longer the Arabs wait, the more votes Kahane will get.

As I said, extremism not only feeds on frustration and on itself, but also on insensitivity. And the best example of that is Israeli actions in South Lebanon. The Israelis are cultivating a garden of extremism in South Lebanon. South Lebanon is an area whose population is roughly 80% Shiite and 20% Christian. Most Shiites of the area dislike the Palestinians because of the capricious manner in which they rule the region and because of the attacks and air raids they attracted from Israel. When the Israelis invaded South Lebanon, many of the Shiites there threw rice and flowers at the advancing Israeli tanks. Today those same Shiites are still throwing things at the Israelis, only they aren't flowers and rice. From almost the day the Israelis arrived, their policy in South Lebanon has been a chronicle of insensitivity and errors that has created an extremist Shiite opposition that was virtually non-existent in the years before the invasion.



Instead of seeking to work quietly through the legitimate Shiite leadership in the south, which was represented by the Amal militia, the Israelis imposed Major Saad Haddad, a Greek Orthodox Christian as their effective governor-general in the area. This was an affront to both the Shiites in general and the Amal militia in particular, which could have served as just as effective an anti-PLO force as Saad Haddad. At the same time, Israelis placed more than a few Shiites in the Ansar prison camp on suspicion of having cooperated with the PLO. Some of them were guilty, others were not. The not guilty ones were released sooner or later, but not without a good deal of bitterness toward the Israeli army. When the Israelis finally did get around to trying to work through the local Shiite leadership, they tended to favor the traditional, land-owning families who had completely lost their power bases. This tended to antagonize the popular Shiite groups even more.

Finally, in October 1983, the Israeli army made its most serious blunder. October 16 was the Shiite Muslim holy day of Ashura. It is probably the most sacred day of their calendar. On that day a group of some 50,000 Shiites were gathered in Nabatiya, a village in South Lebanon, commemorating the holiday when an Israeli army patrol in jeeps and armed personnel carriers tried to drive through the crowd, totally ignoring Shiite religious sensibilities. This precipitated a riot in which the local Shiites stoned the Israeli vehicles and set fire to several jeeps. The Israeli soldiers then opened fire on the crowd, killing one civilian and wounding fifteen others. The Israeli soldiers responsible for the incident were later disciplined, but not before the damage had been done. The overall result has been that the Shiites of South Lebanon have now become the sworn enemies of Israel as much as they were those of the PLO. Their opposition to Israel is being organized in the mosques and being led primarily by Shiite clerics. Not surprisingly, it has taken on deep and extreme fundamental and religious overtones of Islam against Judaism. Instead of having as an enemy in South Lebanon the PLO, an organization which was not rooted in the land, and whose opposition to Israel was essentially political and nationalistic, Israel now faces an enemy that is rooted in the land and whose opposition is increasingly religious. In other words, today the Israelis have an uncompromising enemy among the people who only two years ago were potential friends.

These then are the five reasons I believe that extremism in the Middle East is on the rise. Let me just say, in conclusion, that I have a nightmare. I have a nightmare that Lebanon is not just some freak place where a bunch of unruly religious fanatics are running around killing one another, but that it is a microcosm and a harbinger of things to come in the Middle East. Certainly it is a reminder to us all about what happens when extremist violence gets out of control. When everyone decides to go all the way. Seven years of civil war, greed, selfishness and fear have literally driven every Lebanese religious community to its most extreme position. There is no political center there anymore. The values of tolerance and compromise disappeared long ago from the local vocabulary. Politics in Lebanon is simply the politics of competing extremes. And in my darker moments I wonder if that trend isn't spreading to the region as a whole.

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM LORD, WINSTON

DOCDATE 05 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM COUN FORN RELATIONS INC RE LEBANON

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 23 OCT 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

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( LB )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X 19/17</i>	<i>For Signature</i>	<i>10/18</i>	
	<i>C OCT 29 1984</i>	<i>Mcfarlane</i>		<i>PL</i>
DISPATCH	<i>[Signature]</i>			W/ATTCH FILE <i>wh</i> (C)





# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
92135	NOTE  DC (DAVID CHEW) TO DON REGAN, RE: NSC ITEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT	1	3/4/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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92136 MEMO

2 3/2/1985 B1

ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE:  
PRESIDENTIAL REPLY TO AMINE GEMAYEL

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
92137	LETTER  REAGAN TO AMINE GEMAYEL	3	ND	B1

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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120

743

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
92138	LETTER  AMINE GEMAYEL TO REAGAN	3	1/19/1985	B1

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

0086

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 1 11 26

Name of Correspondent: Mr. Mrs. Miss Gertrude Ashley

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Asks for help in getting Benjamin Weir released from captivity in Lebanon.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
CoKell	ORIGINATOR	84 11 28 <sup>LDL</sup>		84 12 17
<del>dos</del>	Referral Note: R	84 11 20 <sup>LDL</sup>	A	84 12 12
	Referral Note:	1 1		1 1
	Referral Note:	1 1		1 1
	Referral Note:	1 1		1 1

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.



## RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

### CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 4000 \_\_\_\_\_

Prime Subject Code: CO 086 Secondary Subject Codes: JR 003 \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

### PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

**SIGNATURE CODES:**

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

**MEDIA CODES:**

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

UNCLASSIFIED  
(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S # 8432953

DATE December 14, 1984

84 DEC 15 A 4: 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Mrs. Gertrude S. Ashley  
DATE: November 21, 1984 SUBJECT: The release of Benjamin  
Weir being held in Lebanon.

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: November 30, 1984 NSC # 278233

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY  
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached  
 A draft reply will be forwarded  
 A translation is attached  
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached  
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below  
 Other

REMARKS:

for *J. L. Berry*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(CLASSIFICATION)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 12, 1984

Mrs. Gertrude S. Ashley  
3021 Lomita Road  
Santa Barbara, California 93105

Dear Mrs. Ashley:

I am replying to your letter to President Reagan concerning the status of the Reverend Benjamin Weir, who was kidnapped in Beirut on May 8, 1984.

We are very concerned about the continuing terrorist attacks on Americans in Beirut, of which Mr. Weir's kidnapping is another tragic example. Although an organization calling itself "Islamic Jihad" has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, virtually nothing is known about the group.

The Department of State and our Embassy in Beirut are following every possible avenue to effect Mr. Weir's safe release. For example, we have enlisted the assistance of several governments that may be in a position to help. We also remain in close consultation with the Weir family and the New York headquarters of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

Let me assure you we will continue our efforts on Mr. Weir's behalf.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Alan D. Romberg".

Alan D. Romberg  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
for Public Affairs and  
Acting Spokesman

8432953

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 30, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:  
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 278233

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 21, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MRS. GERTRUDE S. ASHLEY  
3021 LOMITA ROAD  
SANTA BARBARA CA 93105

SUBJECT: ASKS FOR HELP IN GETTING BENJAMIN WEIR  
RELEASED FROM CAPTIVITY IN LEBANON

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE



MRS. GERTRUDE S. ASHLEY  
3021 Lomita Road  
Santa Barbara, California 93105

8432953

278233

STENOGRAPHIC SERVICES  
HOURLY OR BY CONTRACT  
TELEPHONE: 687-2238

November 21, 1984

President Ronald Reagan  
Washington  
D. C.


Dear President Reagan,

I don't expect you to remember me, but I met you several years ago as you rode with the Rancheros to the Mission in Solvang when you were Governor. I am a dedicated Republican, and I want to congratulate you on your sweeping victory this month.

Now I am asking your assistance in the effort to have our missionary, Rev. Benjamin Weir released from captivity in Lebanon. As stated in the enclosed letter copies, he was kidnapped on May 8, 1984 and there has been no word of or from him since then.

My sincere and heartfelt thanks for your efforts. And best wishes to you for your next four years.

Respectfully,

  
Gertrude S. Ashley

GSA:A

cc: Robert Pryor, Pastor, First Presbyterian Church

October 29, 1984

Senator Pete Wilson  
880 Front Street. 6-S-9  
San Diego CA 92188

Dear Senator Wilson,

May I ask that you do everything in your power to assist in a program foremost in the minds of all Presbyterians and many other Christians, namely the kidnapping of the Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American citizen and Presbyterian missionary. He was taken by unknown parties on May 8, 1984 in Beirut, Lebanon.

There has been no word from him or his captors since then.

May I ask that you do everything in your power to encourage our government to do all they can to seek his release from captivity.

My sincere and heartfelt thanks.

Sincerely,

Gertrude S. Ashley

GSA:A

cc: President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz  
Robert Prypr, Pastor, First Presbyterian Church

October 29, 1984

Senator Alan Cranston  
5757 V. Century Blvd. #515  
Los Angeles, CA 90045

Dear Senator Cranston,

May I ask that you do everything in your power to assist in a problem foremost in the minds of all Presbyterians and many other Christians, namely the kidnapping of the Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American citizen and Presbyterian missionary. He was taken by unknown parties on May 8, 1984 in Beirut, Lebanon.

There has been no word from him or his captors since then.

May I ask that you do everything in your power to encourage our government to do all they can to seek his release from captivity.

My sincere and heartfelt thanks.

Sincerely,

GERTRUDE S. ASHLEY

GSA:A

cc: President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz  
Robert Pryor, Pastor, First Presbyterian Church

October 29, 1984

Congressman Robert J. Lagomarsino  
814 State St.  
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

Dear Congressman Lagomarsino,

May I ask that you do everything in your power to assist in a problem foremost in the minds of all Presbyterians and many other Christians, namely the kidnapping of the Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American citizen and Presbyterian missionary. He was taken by unknown parties on May 8, 1984 in Beirut, Lebanon.

There has been no word from him or his captors since then.

May I ask that you do everything in your power to encourage our government to do all they can to seek his release from captivity.

My sincere and heartfelt thanks.

Sincerely,

Gertrude S. Ashley

GSA:A

cc: President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz  
Robert Pryor, Pastor, First Presbyterian Church

Identical letter to:  
Senator Alan Cranston  
Senator Pete Wilson



October 29, 1984

Congressman Robert J. Lagomarsino  
614 State St.  
Santa Barbara, CA 93101

Dear Congressman Lagomarsino,

May I ask that you do everything in your power to assist in a problem foremost in the minds of all Presbyterians and many other Christians, namely the kidnapping of the Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American citizen and Presbyterian missionary. He was taken by unknown parties on May 8, 1984 in Beirut, Lebanon.

There has been no word from him or his captors since then.

May I ask that you do everything in your power to encourage our government to do all they can to seek his release from captivity.

My sincere and heartfelt thanks.

Sincerely,

Gertrude S. Rabley

cc: President Reagan and Secretary of State Schultz  
Robert Pryor, Pastor, First Presbyterian Church

Identical letter to:  
Senator Alan Cranston  
Senator Pete Wilson

EP

278383

7272



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WS

0000  
FOOO  
JLCC  
PRCIB  
F006-00

September 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Press Guidance regarding September 20, 1984  
Bombing of U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut

Attached at Tab I is coordinated press guidance regarding the terrorist attack on our embassy annex in Beirut. An advanced copy has been provided to Bob Sims and Karna Small.

State Department participated in the preparation of this press guidance and concurs in its use.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the press guidance at Tab I.

Approve           

Disapprove           

cc: Chris Lehman  
Philip Dur  
Karna Small

Attachment  
Tab I - Press Guidance

NSC #8407272

Statement on Ambassador Oakley's meeting with the President of  
September 27, 1984

Ambassador Robert Oakley, Director of the State Department Office for Combatting Terrorism and Emergency Planning, briefed the President this morning on his recent survey trip to Beirut regarding the terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy annex. He reported that, despite the bombing, the morale of U.S. personnel remains very high; that Ambassador Bartholomew and his staff greatly appreciated President Reagan's telephone call and that they all strongly believe that the U.S. must not allow itself to be forced out of Lebanon by terrorist attacks and threats.

He noted that the embassy is now back in business; operating primarily out of the Ambassador's residence in Varze.

Ambassador Oakley reported on the additional protection measures provided by the Lebanese Armed Forces, precautions being taken by post security and the Marine security guards, and plans for the future. In this connection, the President noted that his request to the Congress for \$366 million to improve the security of U.S. missions around the world would be forwarded today.

Question: Was there discussion of weaknesses in the protection of the embassy annex in Beirut?

Answer: Ambassador Oakley observed that preliminary investigation showed that the principal weakness to security derived from the fact that the terrorists struck before work had been completed on all security measures for the facility. He also noted, however, that the judgement had been made that the move to the annex in East Beirut was on balance, safer than retaining the entire staff in West Beirut. The President does not intend to second guess that judgement.

PRESS GUIDANCE

September 26, 1984

Subject: Under Secretary Ronald Spiers' Criticism of Security  
in Beirut

Under Secretary Spiers has stated in response to the AP story that "he himself would have done the same thing if he had been there". He was referring to Ambassador Bartholomew's handling of the security situation at East Beirut.

Drafted:M/DGP/PA:FMatthews

Cleared:M:DMason



Subject: OMB Cut Department Request for Security Funds Early  
This Year

There were discussions between the State Department and OMB of dollar figures that would have approached the sum of \$150 million for security measures in future years.

However, we did not request nor did OMB deny a specific supplement for \$150 million in 1985.

Drafted:M/DGP/PA:FMatthews

Cleared:M/COMP:LJurvis

Subject: Bad Security at West Beirut U.S. Embassy

We are moving rapidly to eliminate any security deficiencies in our West Beirut Embassy.

However, I would like to correct a number of inaccuracies in the press accounts of the security at this facility. The press account of the alley does not take note of a 14" diameter tree in the middle of the alley. There are two embassy cars blocking the entrance to the alley. There is also a 50-caliber machine gun covering this area. Additionally, there is under construction 20,000 lbs. concrete blocks in the alley.

The rocket propelled grenade screens are 95% completed on Building A. On Building B pillars are going up and screen wire will be hung within one week.

Currently there are no employees working in the West Beirut buildings.

Drafted:M/DGP/PA:FMatthews/NEA/P:RHall

Cleared:A/SY:RRobinson

PRESS GUIDANCE

September 26, 1984

Subject: Fascell Committee Report on Security Improvements and  
the "Bureaucratic Mess" at the State Department

The Department received the report this morning, September  
26, 1984.

It is a classified document and after the report has been  
read and studied the Department will respond to the  
Chairman.

Drafted:M/DGP/PA:FMatthews

Cleared:M:DMason

Subject: State Department's Supplemental Appropriations Request for Increased Security at Missions Abroad

Q: Will you provide us with a copy of the request letter to OMB?

A: OMB received the letter September 24th. OMB is working with State and the White House to review this request. It would be ~~be~~ appropriate to distribute copies of this letter prior to OMB and Presidential review and appeal.

Q: At who's initiative was the supplemental appropriations request made?

A: The White House requested the State Department to identify its priority needs and that is what State has submitted.

Q: When did the White House take this initiative to help the State Department?

---

A: Several days after the Marine headquarters attack in October 1983, the President directed a detailed assessment of security requirements worldwide. A review of *the* ~~this~~ proposal was ongoing when the most recent tragedy in Beirut occurred. *resulting* The full evaluation of this multi-year plan has not yet been completed, however, the requirements for next year's security enhancements were sufficiently resolved to allow this urgent supplemental proposal. In light of last week's terrorist attack, the President decided to expedite the forwarding of this request.

*good*

Subject: The Involvement of the Secretary's new Security Panel  
in Investigating the Incident in East Beirut

Q: What is the involvement of the Secretary's new Security Panel in investigating the incident in East Beirut?

A: The Secretary directed Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Richard Murphy to lead our investigating team to Beirut. He was accompanied by our senior security official, Deputy Assistant Secretary David Fields, and the Director of our Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning Ambassador Robert Oakley. The investigation is already underway.

The Secretary's Panel on Overseas Security will be given all information concerning the incident in East Beirut and all other incidents. The Panel is studying the whole spectrum of how we protect our people and facilities abroad.

Q: Will you tell us in general what the letter requested?

A: Yes, the request is for approximately \$366 million (\$366,278,000.00) for increased security at our missions worldwide. (This represents a refinement of the figures John Hughes presented Monday night in his briefing.)

Heavy emphasis will be placed on security protection at Middle Eastern posts. A relatively small amount, approximately one-tenth of one percent, is targeted for Beirut facilities.

Q: What steps are needed to obtain this budget supplemental and how soon will work begin once the funds have been allocated?

*may have some up*  
A: The budget package is now with OMB and we hope will be brought before the Congress before the end of the current session. If Congress approves our request we are prepared to begin work immediately on increased security arrangements at posts worldwide.

Q: Did you consult with Congress in advance before requesting this new budget package?



A: We consider this request<sup>11</sup> urgent and top priority. We are in constant contact with various committees of the Congress. However, because of the urgency of this request, we were not in as close contact as we would have liked. Our request is being thoroughly discussed with them at this time. The Congress has always been very supportive of our efforts to protect our personnel and facilities. As Secretary Shultz stated on September 24th, "Congress has repeatedly told us they will give us what we need to combat terrorism, if we tell them what it is that we need."

Q: Why did you not ask for supplemental appropriations before the bombing of East Beirut?

A: We have asked for and obtained a supplemental appropriations specifically for Beirut after the first bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Beirut was of such urgency that it was handled separately by the State Department and the Congress.

Obviously the bombing in East Beirut has increased the urgency to provide even greater protection at our embassies abroad and this present request made yesterday will fund increased security improvements at our embassies worldwide. The recent Beirut incident is indicative of the incremental increase of threats to all of our missions in the last five years. The acceleration of our increased security program is directly related to the increased threat level targeted at our missions worldwide.



National Security Council  
The White House

System #                     

Package # 7272

2 P12 18

NSA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>                    </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>                    </u>
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>                    </u>
Tom Shull	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
Wilma Hall	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>                    </u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>	<u>                    </u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other                     

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:                       
(Date/Time)

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8407272

RECEIVED 27 SEP 84 15

TO POINDEXTER

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 27 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

LEBANON

MEDIA

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE RE 20 SEP BOMBING OF EMBASSY ANNEX

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 27 SEP 84 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( DW DW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 9/27	Poindexter Approved Recon		ON

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

WH (6)

UNCLASSIFIED  
RECEIVED 27 SEP 84  
DOCTRIN 27 SEP 84

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM  
MEDIA

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE RE IS THE FORMING OF EMBASSY PRESS

ACTION: FOR DECISION  
OCT 27 SEP 84 STATUS C YLIS 84

FOR INFO  
FOR ACTION  
FOR INFORMATION

COMMENTS

REF: 1 DW DW

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED: C  
ACTION REQUIRED: [Signature]  
DATE COMPLETED: ON

DIVISION: WATCH THE [Signature]