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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**FOIA**

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SKINNER

360

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171942	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING SCENARIO FOR PRESIDENT'S SPEECH	2	1/14/1984	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>4/8/2013</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-25-4-1-5</b>		

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8490055

RECEIVED 14 JAN 84 16

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 14 OCT 84

HILL, C

14 OCT 84

DOLAN, A

11 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT. PRES SOVIET SPEECH 16 JAN

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

KIMMITT

SHULL

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POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

C JAN 17 1984 MCFarlane noted

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

RED  
TAG

P 4: 42

System #

II

Package #

90055

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	
NSC Secretariat	6		R
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Bud: Any staff distribution?

No

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1984

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE  
DAVID GERGEN  
RICHARD DARMAN  
BEN ELLIOTT  
ALLEN MEYER

FROM: ANTHONY R. DOLAN *AD*  
SUBJECT: Soviet-American Relations Speech

The upcoming Soviet-American relations speech is a good opportunity to stress the President's moderation in international matters and his record on peace initiatives. The speech, however, will lose its impact if it is seen as a divergence from the President's unequivocal candor about the Soviet Union and its international activities.

If there is even a hint in the press guidance that the President is trying to backtrack on his former position -- something I am certain the President would never want said -- it will set off a long debate and the President will ultimately be forced to step in. I don't think there is any doubt about where he will come down on the question. But this will only lead to stories about the President's reaffirmation of his view of the Soviet Union as an evil empire and it seems to me that for tactical purposes this is exactly the point he does not want to have to emphasize at the moment.

Second, It should also be borne in mind that the President's defense and national security policies have been successful because they have developed behind them a wide political consensus. This consensus, which was voiced in the 1980 elections and has gathered momentum in the subsequent years, is due in large part to the President's realism about the Soviet Union -- something the American people felt was desperately lacking in the national leadership for a couple of decades. The President's policy has been entirely coherent: he has stressed that Western statesmen have a moral obligation to speak candidly about the Soviet Union and its intentions -- for our own sake, for the sake of those who suffer under Soviet rule, for the sake of realistic negotiations with the Soviets. If the President is perceived as

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suddenly back tracking, it will damage the perception of policy coherence the public finds so reassuring.

I make these recommendations:

a) That the press guidance be very clear in this matter. The President adheres to his long-held view of the Soviet Union, indeed that he feels America's foreign policy must have a moral center i.e. speaking out about the nature of Soviet rule and the human suffering it causes. (The President has reaffirmed as recently as the People Magazine interview his belief in the "evil empire." In Time Magazine as well, he seems to be saying it is not necessary to emphasize a point already made and implicitly understood.)

b) I would suggest the following insert in the speech:

"Candor about the Soviet Union and its international activities, far from hindering the peace process, actually enhances it. History has shown that when the Soviets realize that their counterparts in negotiations have no illusions about the true nature of their system and its ultimate intentions that they settle down to the hard business of serious negotiations. As I have said before, while the democracies have their own serious injustices to deal with this should not prevent us from making the crucial moral distinctions between a system which attempts to deal with its problems forthrightly and a system that justifies wrongdoing done in the name of the state. Our willingness to speak out about injustice is at the heart of our foreign policy, indeed forms its moral center. To fail to enunciate the differences between totalitarian and democratic systems of government would be to forsake this moral high ground. Equally as important, it would persuade the Soviets we are once again in the grip of self-delusion. This would only tempt them to exploit negotiations rather than work towards results beneficial to both sides.

**National Security Council  
The White House**

04 1/17 P 9:37

System # II  
Package # 90055

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>JAN 17 1984</u>	<u>R</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*File in final Soviet speech System II file*

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

IMMEDIATE

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03

RELEASER

PRIORITY

DEX

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DTG

140327Z JAN 84

ROUTINE

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TTY

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FROM/LOCATION/

1. DAVID ELSCHER / CAMP DAVID

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM / DICK DARMAN / NANCY ROBERTS  
140345Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.  
2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Deliver One Copy Each to Dick Darman and Nancy Roberts.

JMP: This is final version. According to Al Myer, Dave Fisher said that the President was happy with it

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

Cap's changes in red.



1  
(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)  
January 13, 1984  
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS  
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have come a long way since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. [During the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States, ~~They~~ deployed six times as many ICBM's,

three times as many tanks, and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

~~As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from Ethiopia to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies tried to force their will on others.~~  
~~HISTORY TEACHES THAT WARS BEGIN WHEN GOVTS.~~  
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.]

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

[Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control.

<sup>HOWEVER</sup> Unfortunately, there has been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been <sup>VIOLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION</sup> breached and that ~~the Soviet Union~~ <sup>HAS BEEN TAKEN OF</sup> takes advantage ~~of any~~ <sup>OUR</sup> ambiguities in ~~an~~ agreements.

In response to a congressional request, a report <sup>ON THIS</sup> ~~to the~~ Congress ~~on these Soviet activities~~ will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.]

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[~~Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union~~  
~~has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous~~  
~~for all concerned by introducing sophisticated weapons and~~  
~~thousands of its military personnel into Syria.~~ Everyone's  
interests would be served by stability in the region. ~~AND~~ Our  
efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets ~~should use~~ <sup>COULD</sup>  
~~their influence to~~ <sup>HELP</sup> reduce tensions ~~in the Middle East.~~ <sup>THERE INSTEAD OF INTRODUCING SOPHISTICATED</sup>  
~~WEAPONS INTO THE AREA. THIS~~  
~~confidence created by such progress~~ would certainly help us to  
deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.]

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp //

STAFF	C/O
McFarlane	
Poindexter	C
Kimmitt	O
Shull	
Martin	
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

*Delivered as  
"EYES ONLY"*

C : Copy

O : Original



DECLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

NLE 748-25415

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY OADR NARA DATE 4/8/83 171942~~SECRET/SENSITIVE//EYES ONLY~~

January 14, 1984 37

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Briefing Scenario for the President's  
Speech on US-Soviet Relations

In order to ensure the maximum diplomatic and public impact for the President's speech on US-Soviet relations, we propose the following approach to briefing the Allies, Congressional leaders, and the press. We will also inform the Soviets before the speech is delivered.

Soviets: With the Soviets, we will want to emphasize the importance of this speech as a signal of the President's seriousness in moving our relationship forward and improving the public atmosphere to promote private dialogue. Acting Secretary Dam will call in Dobrynin the morning before delivery to hand over a copy, review its highlights, and underline the importance we attach to it. In Moscow, our charge will deliver a copy to Acting Foreign Minister Korniyenko the same morning (eight hours earlier Moscow time). We will also pass a copy to Gromyko's party in Stockholm in order to encourage a more positive approach by Gromyko in Stockholm.

Allies: We recommend the President send messages and the speech before delivery to Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Craxi, Nakasone, and Trudeau highlighting the positive tone of the speech and his desire to signal the Soviets we want an improved dialogue and atmosphere. The Secretary will send messages (without copies) to the Foreign Ministers of our other European and Asian allies, China, possibly Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania, and other selected countries. In all of the briefings, we will want to use talking points and Q's & A's designed to encourage a strongly positive international reaction.

Congress and the Press: We will want to brief key Congressional leaders beforehand on the speech. Our preference would be to inform the leadership and key members of the Senate and House foreign affairs committees the afternoon of the speech. We should elicit public statements of support from friendly members of Congress immediately following the speech and over the

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

days to follow. To ensure complete press coverage, we recommend a background briefing at the White House an hour or so before the speech. We will also brief selected columnists.

Other Countries: We will work with USIA to ensure they have materials, including the speech to translate, ahead of time to maximize international publicity. The speech and Q's & A's will be telegraphed immediately to all diplomatic posts at the time it is delivered for provision to governments around the world.

*Charles Hill*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

**National Security Council  
The White House**

84 17 P 8: 51

System # II  
Package # 90055

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>KL</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>KS</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

- ① LDX copies to Hill, Stanford, and Cormack (Date/Time)
- ② Staff info copies to Matlock, Kimmitt, Shull, McFarlane, ~~Kimmitt~~ Poindexter.



(MYER)

MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984  
10:00 A.M. - EAST ROOM

15

PRESIDENT'S BACKUP COPY:

ADDRESS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

DURING THESE FIRST DAYS OF 1984, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU -- AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD -- MY THOUGHTS ON A SUBJECT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE -- RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

TOMORROW, THE UNITED STATES WILL JOIN THE SOVIET UNION AND 33 OTHER NATIONS AT A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. THE CONFERENCE WILL SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL AND MEANINGFUL WAYS TO INCREASE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PRESERVE PEACE. WE WILL BE IN STOCKHOLM WITH THE HEARTFELT WISHES OF OUR PEOPLE FOR GENUINE PROGRESS.

WE LIVE IN A TIME OF CHALLENGES TO PEACE, BUT ALSO OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE. THROUGH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY AND FRUSTRATION, AMERICA'S HIGHEST ASPIRATION HAS NEVER WAVED: WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE FOR A LASTING PEACE THAT ENHANCES DIGNITY FOR MEN AND WOMEN EVERYWHERE. I BELIEVE 1984 FINDS THE UNITED STATES IN ITS STRONGEST POSITION IN YEARS TO ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES -- YEARS WHEN THE UNITED STATES SEEMED FILLED WITH SELF-DOUBT AND NEGLECTED ITS DEFENSES, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION INCREASED ITS MILITARY MIGHT AND SOUGHT TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE BY ARMED FORCE AND THREATS.

OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS, THE SOVIETS DEVOTED TWICE AS MUCH OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS THE UNITED STATES, PRODUCED SIX TIMES AS MANY I.C.B.M.'s, FOUR TIMES AS MANY TANKS, AND TWICE AS MANY COMBAT AIRCRAFT. AND THEY BEGAN DEPLOYING THE SS-20 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD NO COMPARABLE WEAPON.

HISTORY TEACHES THAT WARS BEGIN WHEN GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THE PRICE OF AGGRESSION IS CHEAP. TO KEEP THE PEACE, WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONVINCE ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT WAR COULD BRING NO BENEFIT, ONLY DISASTER. SO WHEN WE NEGLECTED OUR DEFENSES, THE RISKS OF SERIOUS CONFRONTATION GREW.

THREE YEARS AGO WE EMBRACED A MANDATE FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO CHANGE COURSE, AND WE HAVE. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE CONGRESS, WE HALTED AMERICA'S DECLINE. OUR ECONOMY IS NOW IN THE MIDST OF THE BEST RECOVERY SINCE THE SIXTIES. OUR DEFENSES ARE BEING REBUILT. OUR ALLIANCES ARE SOLID AND OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR VALUES HAS NEVER BEEN MORE CLEAR.

AMERICA'S RECOVERY MAY HAVE TAKEN SOVIET LEADERS BY SURPRISE. THEY MAY HAVE COUNTED ON US TO KEEP WEAKENING OURSELVES. THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR YEARS THAT OUR DEMISE WAS INEVITABLE. THEY SAID IT SO OFTEN THEY PROBABLY STARTED BELIEVING IT. IF SO, I THINK THEY CAN SEE NOW THEY WERE WRONG.

THIS MAY BE THE REASON WE'VE BEEN HEARING SUCH STRIDENT RHETORIC FROM THE KREMLIN RECENTLY. THESE HARSH WORDS HAVE LED SOME TO SPEAK OF HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY AND AN INCREASED DANGER OF CONFLICT. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN. LOOK BEYOND THE WORDS, AND ONE FACT STANDS OUT: AMERICA'S DETERRENCE IS MORE CREDIBLE AND IT IS MAKING THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE; SAFER BECAUSE NOW THERE IS LESS DANGER THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL UNDERESTIMATE OUR STRENGTH OR QUESTION OUR RESOLVE.

YES, WE ARE SAFER NOW. BUT TO SAY THAT OUR RESTORED DETERRENCE HAS MADE THE WORLD SAFER IS NOT TO SAY THAT IT IS SAFE ENOUGH. WE ARE WITNESSING TRAGIC CONFLICTS IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. NUCLEAR ARSENALS ARE FAR TOO HIGH. AND OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WHAT IT MUST BE. THESE ARE CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED AND IMPROVED.

DETERRENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE PEACE AND PROTECT OUR WAY OF LIFE, BUT DETERRENCE IS NOT THE BEGINNING AND END OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE MUST AND WILL ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DIALOGUE AS SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE, A DIALOGUE THAT WILL SERVE TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE TROUBLED REGIONS OF THE WORLD, REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, AND BUILD A CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN WISH AWAY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES AND OUR PHILOSOPHIES. BUT WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. AND THE FOREMOST AMONG THEM IS TO AVOID WAR AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS.

THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STEER A COURSE WHICH I WOULD CALL CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION; AND IF WE DO SO, WE MIGHT FIND AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

OUR STRENGTH AND VISION OF PROGRESS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR DEMONSTRATING, WITH EQUAL CONVICTION, OUR COMMITMENT TO STAY SECURE AND TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS WHY 1984 IS A YEAR OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE.

BUT IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO RISE TO THE CHALLENGES FACING US AND SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE, WE MUST DO MORE TO FIND AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THEN BUILD ON THEM. I PROPOSE THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO SEE IF WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD PROBLEM AREAS.

FIRST, WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE -- AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE -- THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED MORE THAN 100 MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II ALONE. TODAY, THERE ARE ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND AFRICA. IN OTHER REGIONS, INDEPENDENT NATIONS ARE CONFRONTED BY HEAVILY ARMED NEIGHBORS SEEKING TO DOMINATE BY THREATENING ATTACK OR SUBVERSION.

MOST OF THESE CONFLICTS HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN LOCAL PROBLEMS, BUT MANY HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES -- AND, OF COURSE, AFGHANISTAN HAS SUFFERED AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET INVASION.

FUELING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND EXPORTING VIOLENCE ONLY EXACERBATE LOCAL TENSIONS, INCREASE SUFFERING, AND MAKE SOLUTIONS TO REAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT. FURTHER, SUCH ACTIVITY CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF LARGER CONFRONTATIONS.

WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER AND SAFER IF WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO ASSIST PEOPLE IN AREAS OF CONFLICT IN FINDING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS? THAT SHOULD BE OUR MUTUAL GOAL. BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE GAP IN AMERICAN AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY IS SO GREAT THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE MUST BE MORE MODEST. AS A FIRST STEP, OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD JOINTLY EXAMINE CONCRETE ACTIONS WE BOTH CAN TAKE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THESE AREAS. AND IF WE SUCCEED, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE.

OUR SECOND TASK SHOULD BE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE VAST STOCKPILES OF ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD.

IT IS TRAGIC TO SEE THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS SPENDING MORE THAN \$150 BILLION A YEAR ON ARMED FORCES -- SOME 20 PERCENT OF THEIR NATIONAL BUDGETS. WE MUST FIND WAYS TO REVERSE THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF THREAT AND RESPONSE WHICH DRIVES ARMS RACES EVERYWHERE IT OCCURS.

WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SIMPLE TRUTH IS, AMERICA'S TOTAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE HAS DECLINED. TODAY, WE HAVE FAR FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN WE HAD 20 YEARS AGO. AND IN TERMS OF ITS TOTAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER, OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IS AT THE LOWEST LEVEL IN 25 YEARS.

JUST 3 MONTHS AGO, WE AND OUR ALLIES AGREED TO WITHDRAW 1,400 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM WESTERN EUROPE. THIS COMES AFTER THE REMOVAL OF A THOUSAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE 3 YEARS AGO. EVEN IF ALL OUR PLANNED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS -- AND WE HOPE THIS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY -- WE WILL HAVE ELIMINATED FIVE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR EACH NEW WEAPON DEPLOYED.

BUT THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT WILL GREATLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, PROVIDE GREATER STABILITY, AND BUILD CONFIDENCE.

OUR THIRD TASK IS TO ESTABLISH A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER, ONE MARKED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE BUILT ON DEEDS, NOT WORDS. COMPLYING WITH AGREEMENTS HELPS; VIOLATING THEM HURTS. RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS BOLSTERS THE RELATIONSHIP; DENYING THESE RIGHTS HARMS IT. EXPANDING CONTACTS ACROSS BORDERS AND PERMITTING A FREE INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS INCREASE CONFIDENCE; SEALING OFF ONE'S PEOPLE FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD REDUCES IT. PEACEFUL TRADE HELPS, WHILE ORGANIZED THEFT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS CERTAINLY HURTS.

COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO ARMS CONTROL. IN RECENT YEARS, WE HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES. COMPLIANCE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE SEEK TRULY EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AND THAT ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN TAKEN OF AMBIGUITIES IN OUR AGREEMENTS.

IN RESPONSE TO A CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST, A REPORT ON THIS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED WILL BE FULFILLED. WE MUST TAKE THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD INTO ACCOUNT, BOTH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND IN OUR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE WILL WORK TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES WHICH THREATEN TO UNDERMINE EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND THE BROADER ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

THE EXAMPLES I HAVE CITED ILLUSTRATE WHY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO TRY AND TRY AGAIN. WE MAY HAVE TO START IN SMALL WAYS, BUT START WE MUST.

IN WORKING ON THESE TASKS, OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: REALISM, STRENGTH, AND DIALOGUE.

REALISM MEANS WE MUST START WITH A CLEAR-EYED UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD WE LIVE IN. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG-TERM COMPETITION WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT SHARE OUR NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AT HOME AND PEACEFUL CHANGE ABROAD. WE MUST BE FRANK IN ACKNOWLEDGING OUR DIFFERENCES AND UNAFRAID TO PROMOTE OUR VALUES.

STRENGTH IS ESSENTIAL TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. IF WE ARE WEAK, WE CAN DO NEITHER. STRENGTH IS MORE THAN MILITARY POWER. ECONOMIC STRENGTH IS CRUCIAL AND AMERICA'S ECONOMY IS LEADING THE WORLD INTO RECOVERY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS OUR STRENGTH OF SPIRIT, AND UNITY AMONG OUR PEOPLE AT HOME AND WITH OUR ALLIES ABROAD. WE ARE STRONGER IN ALL THESE AREAS THAN WE WERE 3 YEARS AGO.

OUR STRENGTH IS NECESSARY TO DETER WAR AND TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS. SOVIET LEADERS KNOW IT MAKES SENSE TO COMPROMISE ONLY IF THEY CAN GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. AMERICA CAN NOW OFFER SOMETHING IN RETURN.

STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE GO HAND-IN-HAND. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US, AND TO WORK FOR PRACTICAL, FAIR SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL COMPROMISE. WE WILL NEVER RETREAT FROM NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE OPENLY EXPRESSED MY VIEW OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I DON'T KNOW WHY THIS SHOULD COME AS A SURPRISE TO SOVIET LEADERS, WHO HAVE NEVER SHIED FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEW OF OUR SYSTEM. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE CAN'T DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. WE DON'T REFUSE TO TALK WHEN THE SOVIETS CALL US "IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS" AND WORSE, OR BECAUSE THEY CLING TO THE FANTASY OF A COMMUNIST TRIUMPH OVER DEMOCRACY. THE FACT THAT NEITHER OF US LIKES THE OTHER'S SYSTEM IS NO REASON TO REFUSE TO TALK. LIVING IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO TALK.

OUR COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE IS FIRM AND UNSHAKABLE. BUT WE INSIST THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH REAL PROBLEMS, NOT ATMOSPHERICS.

IN OUR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR -- AND ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR -- IS PRIORITY NUMBER ONE. A NUCLEAR CONFLICT COULD WELL BE MANKIND'S LAST. THAT IS WHY I PROPOSED, OVER 2 YEARS AGO, THE "ZERO OPTION" FOR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. OUR AIM WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR ARMS.



INDEED, I SUPPORT A ZERO OPTION FOR ALL NUCLEAR ARMS. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, MY DREAM IS TO SEE THE DAY WHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE BANISHED FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.

LAST MONTH, THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER STATED THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO AVERT THE THREAT OF WAR. THESE ARE ENCOURAGING WORDS. BUT NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE FROM WORDS TO DEEDS.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL EXISTS; THE SOVIET LEADERS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. WE HAVE PROPOSED A SET OF INITIATIVES THAT WOULD REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

THE WORLD REGRETS -- CERTAINLY WE DO -- THAT THE SOVIET UNION BROKE OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, AND HAS NOT SET A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE READY TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENTS IN I.N.F., START, AND M.B.F.R. WE WILL NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. WHENEVER THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO DO LIKEWISE, WE WILL MEET THEM HALFWAY.

WE SEEK TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND TO REDUCE THE CHANCES FOR DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION. SO WE HAVE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR WHAT WE CALL "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES." THEY COVER A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES. IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO EXCHANGE ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS OF MISSILE TESTS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES. FOLLOWING UP ON CONGRESSIONAL SUGGESTIONS, WE ALSO PROPOSED A NUMBER OF WAYS TO IMPROVE DIRECT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. LAST WEEK, WE HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HERE IN WASHINGTON ON IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING THE "HOTLINE."

THESE BILATERAL PROPOSALS WILL BE BROADENED AT THE CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL, MEANINGFUL WAYS TO REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTY AND POTENTIAL FOR MISINTERPRETATION SURROUNDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND TO DIMINISH THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

ARMS CONTROL HAS LONG BEEN THE MOST VISIBLE AREA OF U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE. BUT A DURABLE PEACE ALSO REQUIRES BOTH OF US TO DEFUSE TENSIONS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

TAKE THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE. EVERYONE'S INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY STABILITY IN THE REGION, AND OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THAT GOAL. THE SOVIETS COULD HELP REDUCE TENSIONS THERE INSTEAD OF INTRODUCING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO THE AREA. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY HELP US TO DEAL MORE POSITIVELY WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS HUMAN RIGHTS. SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER ISSUE, HAVE CREATED THE MISTRUST AND ILL WILL THAT HANGS OVER OUR RELATIONSHIP.

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS ALONE COMPEL US TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OVER THE VIRTUAL HALT IN THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS, ARMENIANS, AND OTHERS WHO WISH TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD.

OUR REQUEST IS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD: THAT THE SOVIET UNION LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS IT HAS FREELY ASSUMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS -- IN PARTICULAR, ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE REAL. BUT WE CAN AND MUST KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS AND MAKE IT A BETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL MANKIND.

OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, A POLICY OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION, WILL SERVE OUR TWO NATIONS AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. IT IS A POLICY NOT JUST FOR THIS YEAR, BUT FOR THE LONG TERM. IT IS A CHALLENGE FOR AMERICANS. IT IS ALSO A CHALLENGE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF THEY CANNOT MEET US HALFWAY, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS, AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. BUT WE WANT MORE THAN DETERRENCE; WE SEEK GENUINE COOPERATION; WE SEEK PROGRESS FOR PEACE.

COOPERATION BEGINS WITH COMMUNICATION. WE SEEK SUCH COMMUNICATION. AS I HAVE SAID, WE WILL STAY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLES IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE MEETING THIS WEEK WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM. THIS MEETING SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS, SO THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BECOME A REGULAR AND NORMAL COMPONENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

OUR CHALLENGE IS PEACEFUL. IT WILL BRING OUT THE BEST IN US. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE BEST FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

WE DO NOT THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION. FREEDOM POSES NO THREAT, IT IS THE LANGUAGE OF PROGRESS. WE PROVED THIS 35 YEARS AGO WHEN WE HAD A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND COULD HAVE TRIED TO DOMINATE THE WORLD. BUT WE DIDN'T. INSTEAD WE USED OUR POWER TO WRITE A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.

WE HELPED REBUILD WAR-RAVAGED ECONOMIES IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, INCLUDING THOSE OF NATIONS WHO HAD BEEN OUR ENEMIES. INDEED, THOSE FORMER ENEMIES ARE NOW NUMBERED AMONG OUR STAUNCHEST FRIENDS.

WE CAN'T PREDICT HOW THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL RESPOND TO OUR CHALLENGE. BUT THE PEOPLE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE WITH ALL MANKIND THE DREAM OF ELIMINATING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM, BECAUSE ELIMINATING THESE RISKS IS SO CLEARLY A VITAL INTEREST FOR ALL OF US. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER FOUGHT EACH OTHER; THERE IS NO REASON WE EVER SHOULD. INDEED, WE FOUGHT COMMON ENEMIES IN WORLD WAR II. TODAY OUR COMMON ENEMIES ARE POVERTY, DISEASE AND, ABOVE ALL, WAR.

MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO, PRESIDENT KENNEDY DEFINED AN APPROACH THAT IS AS VALID TODAY AS WHEN HE ANNOUNCED IT: "SO, LET US NOT BE BLIND TO OUR DIFFERENCES," HE SAID, "BUT LET US ALSO DIRECT ATTENTION TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THOSE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED."

WELL, THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE COMMON INTERESTS HAVE TO DO WITH THE THINGS OF EVERYDAY LIFE FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE.

SUPPOSE, FOR A MOMENT, IVAN AND ANYA FOUND THEMSELVES IN A WAITING ROOM, OR SHARING A SHELTER FROM THE RAIN WITH JIM AND SALLY, AND THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE BARRIER TO KEEP THEM FROM GETTING ACQUAINTED. WOULD THEY DEBATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS? OR, WOULD THEY FIND THEMSELVES COMPARING NOTES ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN, AND WHAT EACH OTHER DID FOR A LIVING?

BEFORE THEY PARTED COMPANY THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TOUCHED ON AMBITIONS, HOBBIES, WHAT THEY WANTED FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND THE PROBLEMS OF MAKING ENDS MEET. AND AS THEY WENT THEIR SEPARATE WAYS, ANYA WOULD BE SAYING TO IVAN, "WASN'T SHE NICE, SHE ALSO TEACHES MUSIC." JIM WOULD BE TELLING SALLY WHAT IVAN DID OR DIDN'T LIKE ABOUT HIS BOSS. THEY MIGHT EVEN HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY WERE ALL GOING TO GET TOGETHER FOR DINNER SOME EVENING SOON.

ABOVE ALL, THEY WOULD HAVE PROVEN THAT PEOPLE DON'T MAKE WARS. PEOPLE WANT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN IN A WORLD WITHOUT FEAR, AND WITHOUT WAR. THEY WANT TO HAVE SOME OF THE GOOD THINGS OVER AND ABOVE BARE SUBSISTENCE THAT MAKE LIFE WORTH LIVING. THEY WANT TO WORK AT SOME CRAFT, TRADE, OR PROFESSION THAT GIVES THEM SATISFACTION AND A SENSE OF WORTH. THEIR COMMON INTERESTS CROSS ALL BORDERS.

IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE, THEN THERE WILL BE PEACE. TOGETHER WE CAN STRENGTHEN PEACE, REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, AND KNOW IN DOING SO WE HAVE HELPED FULFILL THE HOPES AND DREAMS OF THOSE WE REPRESENT AND INDEED OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. LET US BEGIN NOW.

# # #

**National Security Council  
The White House**

84 JAN 20 P 4: 49

System # II  
Package # 90055

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	2	✓	_____
Wilma Hall	<del>3</del>		_____
Bud McFarlane	<del>4</del>		_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<del>3</del>		<del>A</del>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

~~What action should we take on this State draft?~~ (Date/Time)

Staff Sup II to Matlock for action. Memo to  
RCN due 1/12/84

## Soviet speech

SYSTEM II  
90055

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine purposes.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

January, 1984 offers good opportunities for peace, and these opportunities extend most importantly to the US-Soviet relationship. On the eve of the Stockholm conference I would like to issue a challenge to the leaders of the Soviet Union. I challenge them to join us in a new, historic attempt to move away from sterile confrontation to constructive engagement, from bellicose rhetoric to reasoned dialogue, from threats and use of force to peaceful competition.

My challenge would demand the best in us and benefit all the peoples of the world. It would take the example of postwar Europe and apply it across the globe. It would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and do much to eliminate the risks of major war. My challenge would bring us together in the search of a better life for all of us.



The American people can take up this challenge with confidence, because it reflects their highest aspirations for peace. Just a few year ago, perhaps, this would not have been so. During the 1970's, many Americans--and many others--questioned our purposes and our role in the world. This questioning eroded our self-confidence and raised doubts about our commitment to a strong defense. During these same years the Soviet Union continued inexorably to build up its forces and increasingly to use its military power and that of its surrogates beyond its own borders. During the past three years much has changed. We Americans have reaffirmed our commitment to a strong military, and moved to restore a military balance. Our economy is enjoying a strong recovery. We have regained confidence in ourselves, our values and our purposes.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union cannot ignore the very real differences that exist between us. I have spoken frankly of these differences in the belief that we must recognize them before we can resolve them. Yet speaking of these differences does not negate the fact that we share with the Soviet Union certain common interests, the first of which is, as John Kennedy said so many years ago, that we live on the same planet.

The United States has long been dedicated to the cause of peace; the stability of Europe today--and the peace that

continent has known for almost four decades--is in large part a result of this dedication. In spite of the harsh rhetoric that emanates from the Kremlin I sincerely believe that the Soviet leadership also realizes that there is absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose from reckless and dangerous confrontation. Let us work, then, to identify areas in which we can take initial steps to make the world safer.

One such area is arms control. We, the United States, have negotiated sincerely with the Soviet Union over the size of our conventional forces in Europe, our intermediate nuclear forces, and our strategic nuclear forces. While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what was needed to establish a stable nuclear balance and to maintain effective deterrence. In fact, America's nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago, and our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just two months ago we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This follows the removal of one thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate nuclear range missiles have to be deployed in Europe--and we hope this will not be necessary--we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new one deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It is with this goal in mind that I first proposed in November 1981 the "zero option" for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets must back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world. The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviets must take advantage of it. I challenge the Soviet leadership to move from words to deeds. If they do so, they will find the United States ready to work hard, and fast, to move as far down the road toward a non-nuclear world as the realities of our over-armed and excessively suspicious times will permit.

[ We have noted the Soviet proposal last week to eliminate chemical weapons from Europe. We and our allies will want to discuss this proposal among ourselves before responding formally, but on the face of it we believe any proposal should be studied carefully. There are some obvious problems: For example, chemical weapons can be easily transported, and a

regional ban would not, in our view, be sufficient. Our goal is to ban all chemical weapons everywhere, and we and our allies have been negotiating at the Conference on Disarmament toward this end. Vice President Bush presented a major proposal to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last February. The most essential component of any such agreement -- the only sure means of providing adequate assurances -- is effective procedures for verification, and our efforts in Geneva have been aimed at reaching agreement on verification. As a further stimulus to the work of the Geneva negotiations, I will be instructing our negotiators to present a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis, in the upcoming round of the Conference on Disarmament.

We could extend our efforts to reduce the superpower arsenals to an effort to rein in the arms race in the Third World. It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion per year on arms--a sum equal to almost 20 percent of their national budgets. The Soviet Union and its East bloc allies have played an important and very unhealthy role in escalating the arms race in the Third World.

Armed conflicts are currently raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems; but many

are fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. These local conflicts in turn threaten superpower confrontation which we do not seek and from which neither of us has anything to gain and potentially much to lose.

I challenge the Soviet leadership to join us in ending the Third World arms race. Let us begin by breaking the vicious cycle of threat and response that has driven the arms race in the developing world.

Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbate local disputes, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict to negotiate peaceful solutions? I challenge the Soviet leaders to join us in cooperative efforts to seek such solutions.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that region. I challenge the Soviets to use their influence to limit tensions and to contribute to

security in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

In Southeast Asia, Moscow's ally, Vietnam, continues to occupy neighboring Kampuchea despite the repeated calls from the U.N. and Kampuchea's neighbors for a complete withdrawal and arrangements that would permit the people of that conflict-torn country to choose their own leaders. As the dry season in that area begins, Vietnamese forces are poised for new attacks near the Thai border, and tensions remain high. I challenge the Soviet leaders and their Vietnamese allies to reduce their forces in Kampuchea, to begin a serious dialogue with Thailand and the other ASEAN countries, and to move away from this interminable conflict.

In August 1982, South Africa informed the UN Secretary General that it was prepared to proceed to a Namibia settlement if an agreement on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola could be reached. What needs to be done is clear. I challenge the Soviet Union to contribute constructively to the achievement of peace in the region and Namibian independence.

Most importantly, I challenge the Soviet leadership to step back from their ideology and rhetoric and coolly assess the present opportunity to improve our bilateral relations. They could demonstrate their sincerity by lowering the temperature of the overheated rhetoric which has come lately from the

Kremlin. Their harsh words have frightened much of the world with their suggestions of heightened international uncertainty and their scarcely veiled warnings of the increased danger of conflict. Such rhetoric should not obscure the fact that the restoration of a political-military balance has opened the way for true progress to be made in improving our bilateral relations, as well as providing the opportunity for us to further the cause of global peace.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Proof of our commitment to peace is evident in our historic behavior. Thirty-five years ago we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. We could have used them to dominate the world, but we did not. Instead, we dedicated ourselves to the restoration of the war-ravaged economies of Europe. We have built a strong system of alliances and we value these ties above all others. But these are solely defensive relationships and we have no intention of attacking others. Likewise our relations with friendly non-allies like China are aimed at improving global stability and prosperity; they do not threaten the USSR or any other country. With the Soviets, our approach was articulated more than 20 years ago by President Kennedy when he said, "So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved." We look to engage the

Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and as cooperative as they are prepared to make it.

Let us review the several areas of our bilateral dialogue. We have proposed a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and, we hope, reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation. In the most recent round of talks, we proposed--with strong Congressional support--a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence safer by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

In addition to reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we hope to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. We have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures," which would cover a wide range of activities. We have proposed, for example, that the United



States and the Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we have suggested a number of ways to improve direct lines of communications with the Soviets.

We will follow up with other initiatives during the Stockholm conference. We are currently working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

It is unfortunately true that the Soviet Union has at times abused our confidence. Cooperation and understanding are especially important in the field of arms control. Yet in recent years we have seen a growing number of instances in which the Soviet Union has breached elements of important arms control agreements, or stretched ambiguous aspects of agreements to the limit. We take these actions very seriously, not only because of what they permit the Soviets to accomplish, militarily, but also because of the grave doubts they raise about the Soviet Union's adherence to signed agreements. They thus jeopardize the arms control process which has been an integral part of our national security equation for over two decades. I am soon going to send the Congress a report on these activities. We are continuing our discussions with the Soviets on these actions and I challenge them to take concrete steps to remedy the problems.

Cooperation and understanding are also important in improving our perceptions of each other. We are more than willing to compete peacefully with the Soviet Union in the marketplace of ideas. We are willing to test our views by permitting the widest possible range of contacts between our peoples. I challenge the Soviet leadership to join me in inaugurating a broad expansion of official and unofficial exchanges in order to encourage such contacts.

I also challenge the Soviet leaders to demonstrate their respect for the rights of their own people. No other aspect of Soviet official behavior so clouds our ability to work together, because it demonstrates so vividly the profound differences in our values. Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

My challenge is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it freely assumed under international covenants--in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Nothing requires that our relationship be a hostile one. Our two countries have never fought each other. There is no reason that we ever should. The United States does not seek conflict; it does not seek unilateral advantages; it does not seek the humiliation of our adversaries. Americans would welcome the peaceful challenge that I have outlined today--the challenges to reduce the arms race, to resolve regional conflicts, and, not last, to encourage the broadest possible contacts between the peoples of our two great nations.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally and there were no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, finding out what each did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, and what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate way Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war.

They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that makes life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction.

If the Soviet Government wants peace there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so that we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. That is the ultimate challenge, to us and to our Soviet counterparts--that we begin now.

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