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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171994	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE ET AL. RE PRESS THEMES (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	2	1/23/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-7-1-2			
171995	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	3	2/18/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-7-2-1			
171997	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	2/6/1984	B1
171998	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO J. MATLOCK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	1/28/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-7-4-9			
171996	MEMO	COPY OF PAGE 3 OF DOC #171995 (R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS)	1	ND	B1
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NSC/S PROFILE CONFIDENTIAL ID 8400677

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TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C DOCDATE 23 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR MEDIA SHULTZ, G

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: PRESS THEMES ON SHULTZ - GROMYKO MTG / US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR KIMMITT DUE: 25 JAN 84 STATUS S FILES

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84 JAN 24 P6:32

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The White House

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Press Talkers on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

State has supplied the talking points at Tab I for use with the press in briefing on the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm. They seem appropriate.

Lenczowski and Brazil concur.

OK
1/24/84

Attachment:

Tab I Memo from State with talking points for the press

cc. Bob Sims
Mark Brazil

CONFIDENTIAL
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8402036 thru 8402043

A

United States Department of State

(677)

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 23, 1984

171994

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, The White House ------- 8402036
Mr. William B. Staples, ACDA ------------------- 8402037
Mr. Raymond Lett, Department of Agriculture ---- 8402038
Mrs. Helen Robbins, Department of Commerce ----- 8402039
Col. John Stanford, Department of Defense ------ 8402040
Cdr. Timothy R. Hartung, Joint Chiefs of Staff - 8402041
Mr. Christopher Hicks, Treasury Department ----- 8402042
Ms. Teresa Collins, U.S. Information Agency ---- 8402043

SUBJECT: Press Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a set of press themes for use by Administration officials in commenting on Secretary Shultz's January 18 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the current state of US-Soviet relations.

Administration officials should adhere closely to these themes. Casual public speculation at this time about US-Soviet relations could seriously undercut our foreign policy goals.

Attachment: As Stated

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

-- Secretary Shultz's five-hour meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko provided the opportunity for a full review of the current US-Soviet bilateral relationship. There were no breakthroughs on substantive issues, but the tone was business-like and non-polemical.

-- The Secretary reiterated the President's commitment to a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at finding solutions to the many real problems in the US-Soviet relationship. He made clear our objections to the misrepresentation of American policy contained in Gromyko's CDE speech, and expressed the view that, despite our differences, we should get down to the business of building a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- The Secretary reviewed U.S. arms control positions. He reiterated the President's commitment to arms control and our desire to resume negotiations. Gromyko said that INF deployments made it impossible to move ahead on those talks. He indicated, however, that the MBFR talks could resume.

-- Discussion of bilateral issues as well as regional issues was substantive and extensive. The two ministers discussed such issues as the recent talks on upgrading the Hotline and upcoming talks on nuclear non-proliferation.

-- There was a serious exchange of views on the Middle East, southern Africa, Afghanistan and the Caribbean.

-- There was also a discussion of human rights, in which the Secretary gave U.S. views on specific problems as well as the overall Soviet human rights performance.

-- Both sides agreed the meeting was useful and that there should be more such serious exchanges. No new dates or levels of discussions were specified.

-- At this time any further public discussion of the meeting or speculation about future developments in US-Soviet relations would be counterproductive.

-- As President Reagan stressed in his January 16 speech, the United States seeks a more productive working relationship with the Soviet Union. Respecting the confidentiality of our diplomatic exchanges is vital if we are to move forward on arms control and resolution of outstanding international and bilateral problems.

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RECEIVED 28 JAN 84 13

TO MATLOCK FROM MCFARLANE DOCDATE 28 JAN 84

MATLOCK 06 FEB 84

GREGG, D 23 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR BILLINGTON, JAMES H

SUBJECT: US / USSR RELATIONS RE DEFINING A STRATEGY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

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FOR INFO: POINDEXTER, KIMMITT, MARTIN, FORTIER, GREGG, D

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DOCDATE 28 JAN 84

MATLOCK 06 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR BILLINGTON, JAMES H

SUBJECT. US / USSR RELATIONS RE DEFINING A STRATEGY

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Phyllis

9

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7 P4:26

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Return copy to me of all items.

Jane

10

SYSTEM II
90109

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1984

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of March 29, 1984. It was my pleasure to be afforded the opportunity to attend the event at the Center on March 27. It was a very enjoyable occasion.

Thanks for your further words of endorsement of Theodore Friend. I will definitely keep him in mind when considering applicants for a position requiring his expertise.

Sincerely,

Bud

Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. James H. Billington
Director, The Wilson Center
Smithsonian Institution Building
Washington, D. C. 20560

THE WILSON CENTER

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

MAR 30 1984

March 29, 1984

Short ack "I will keep Friend in mind" thanks to RMK FYI

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 23rd, and also for coming to the Center the other evening. It was excellent to have a chance to see you, however briefly; and I hope that we can continue to be in touch.

I am heading off to Europe to help set up our new European program which will involve both East and West Europe. Since I will be away for awhile, I wanted to write one last word about Theodore Friend. I gather that he now has a two to three weeks' grace period in which to make up his mind whether or not to accept the other very attractive offer, which is, I am sure, only the first of a number that will be forthcoming. Since this might give you more time to consider the possibility of his working with you, I thought I should tell you that the deadline is not quite as urgent as I feared. It is rare, I think, that expertise in Southeast Asia and the West Pacific are combined with such administrative experience and realism as his, and I hope that if you wish to reach out for such talent that you do it soon.

I would just repeat again that I almost never presume to recommend one of our Fellows--except where I feel a patriotic obligation to alert responsible officials to a really extraordinary potential opportunity. I consider this remarkable scholar/administrator to present such an opportunity; and I was frankly excited at his own seeming enthusiasm for considering the kind of hard work that I know would be involved with your team. If you, or someone you would designate, wants to get in touch with him in the next several days, I suggest you call him directly at 357-2422 or 357-2429.

With all good wishes for all your important work and the hope that our paths will cross soon again.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Billington

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20560 202 357-2429 CABLE: WILCEN

Dr. James H. Billington, Director
THE WILSON CENTER
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C. 20560

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Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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1 ENVELOPE

13

National Security Council
The White House

MAR 19 P8:13

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Package # 90109

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD McFARLANE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: Don Gregg DG

SUBJECT: Washington Post Article on Russia by James H. Billington

Attached per your request is Jim Billington's article on resuming dialogue with the Soviets.

In my discussion with Billington on Friday, his main points were as follows:

- Major foundations in the U.S. (Carnegie, MacArthur, etc.) are gearing up to encourage the resumption of dialogue with the Soviets. Lacking guidance and/or communication from the Administration, their thrust would be that we should start talking to the Russians with the major objective of lowering tensions even though this might mean giving up some of the hard-won gains we have recently acquired. Their inclination would be to blame the high state of current tension on U.S. toughness.

- The dialogue would be with the same handful of Soviet manipulators, Bromyko, Dobrynin, Arbatov, and a few others, whose main objective is to use such dialogue for the benefit of current Soviet leadership, and the weakening of U.S. influence in Europe.

- Congress is also going to push for a recommendation of dialogue. Some will seek it on a responsible and tough minded basis. Others will pursue it with a willingness to debase our own positions.

- The great need is to establish dialogue with a new generation of Russians -- people young enough to be able to look into the future where it may be possible to shape a new Soviet-U.S. relationship based less on current confrontation and more on a dialogue about new and different issues.

I asked Billington what he would recommend. He suggested that representatives of the leading foundations and think tanks should be convened and/or contacted to discuss holding a series of exchange meetings with the Soviet citizens to discuss such issues as "the state of the world in the year 2000." Such topics would enable us to reach a broader range of Soviets than we currently contact. He would be glad to help the Administration in "coordinating the need and means to communicate with the Soviets." His objective would be to break through to a new generation in the Soviet Union.

We agreed that working toward such a dialogue could have considerable political benefit in this country in the short run, and that it would also be very reassuring to our allies in Europe.

Attachment

cc: Roger Robinson, NSC

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The President has seen

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16

CONFIDENTIAL

February 18, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention. Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

-- Economic: Here we have already won.

-- Imperial: A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.

-- Ideological: An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.

-- Psychological: The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are "the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves."

-- Thermonuclear: The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Vice President
E Meese; J Baker
M Deaver

We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

-- With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

-- With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

-- With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

--Dealing with the Soviet Leaders: We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: The Vice President

With Russia: After 50 Years

The 50th anniversary of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was observed this past week in conditions of severe tension and sourness and, because of the illness of Yuri Andropov, unusual political uncertainty on the Soviet side. We asked a leading American student of Soviet affairs to size up the larger Soviet scene and to suggest some ways in which the American relationship with Moscow might be steadied.

James H. Billington

A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue



The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlike any confrontation of major powers in recent history—perhaps in all history. It has been remarkably stable, not having led to any direct fighting between the principal rivals in 35 years of Cold War. Yet it is a relationship that is inherently dangerous because of the unprecedented weapons available.

The main destabilizing force in the relationship in recent years has been the great increase in Soviet military might and international involvements without any comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. The cold, unpleasant fact is that the U.S.S.R. is currently in a very dangerous stage in which old psychological insecurity still exists alongside awesome new power.

Part of Soviet insecurity results from the legitimate desire for respect of the Russian people, who have often been attacked militarily and disparaged culturally. But far more of the current insecurity comes from the leaders' own progressive retreat from previous halting attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s to exorcise Stalin's ghost and to build some new basis for self-respect within Soviet society.

The aging Stalinist oligarchy and its swollen, corrupt bureaucracy effectively stopped de-Stalinization under Brezhnev, chose a chief of police as his successor, and now seem to be falling back increasingly on the high Stalinist technique of using targeted acts of violence to coerce the respect that they have given up trying to earn. In the combination of brutality and deception that accompanied the Korean airline tragedy and the treatment of imprisoned symbols of social conscience such as Yuri Orlov and Sergei Khodorovich, there seem to be new hints of inertial drift into the old Stalinist formula of terror without bounds or shame. It is born less of a traditional desire for dominance than of a totalitarian compulsion to disorient, divide and in some sense destroy everything that cannot be controlled.

All of this is so profoundly unpleasant that one set of Americans, largely on the left, prefers to say that this isn't really happening or doesn't really matter. Another set, largely on the right, prefers to say that nothing else really happens or matters. Sincere people on both sides increasingly call for heroic, one-sided solutions—unilateral disarmament, unilateral crusades—often mixing disguised sermons to America into supposed analyses of Russia.

"The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home."

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The beginnings of a more rational understanding may lie in acknowledging complexity and in differentiating several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry: economic, imperial, ideological, psychological and thermonuclear.

Economically, there is no longer any serious competition. Capitalism has simply proven itself more dynamic and adjustable, and far more capable of effective production for human use. Communism as a functioning economic system is unlikely to have sustained appeal to anyone in the modern world who is free to make a first-hand comparison—unless of course the capitalist economy allows itself to self-destruct in some massive new economic crisis.

The imperial aspect of the superpower rivalry involves our confronting a new form of a traditional Russian policy of extending the nation's borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller powers and states. Traditional national interest lies at the base of Soviet pressure on Europe and the push into Afghanistan. Here the Soviets made a classical imperial gambit in the "great game"—a timely move on a target of opportunity that must have seemed irresistible at a time of American weakness and preoccupation elsewhere.

But the Soviets' justification for their involvement in Afghanistan—and the probable reason for their refusal to withdraw—is the purely ideological argument that the revolutionary process once begun cannot be reversed.

This argument points to the new tendency to propel Soviet foreign policy beyond the realm of traditional Russian national interest into the more dangerous field of ideological politics.

The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home. It has worked with cocky new revolutionary cadres from Vietnam and Cuba, even as it played on American self-doubt after Vietnam to expand in various ways into Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen. It gradually came to accept the long-resisted Cuban contention that the road to revolution in Latin America must be essentially violent rather than peaceful.

Once China after Mao adopted a more pragmatic and inward-looking attitude, the U.S.S.R. became the main source of ideas as well as arms for what was perceived to be a rising revolutionary tide. The Soviets put venture capital of various kinds into distant, destabilizing forces, and increasingly risked becoming involved in crises that they might not be able to control.

All of this is further complicated psychologically by Russia's tradition of a love-hate relationship with its principal Western adversary. To Russians, America is now the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves. Their love-hate feelings toward us suggest the persistence of feelings of psychological inferiority even in the presence of strategic parity.

The massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and rocketry possessed by both superpowers gives a historically unprecedented dimension to the rivalry. The danger is probably not so much that either side will deliberately set out to use them, but that some developing crisis in a fuzzy area may escalate to a point where it will be difficult for one party not to use them in order to avoid a humiliating defeat.

The new weapons also pose new possibilities for blackmail—the key element in the current campaign to prevent new missile deployments in Germany. The long-range objective is to divide, neutralize and eventually establish political dominance over Europe.

The immediate campaign is to convert the West's moral anguish over nuclear weapons into a political separation of Western Europe from the United States. Though so far unsuccessful in its short-run objective of preventing missile deployment in Germany, this campaign has helped change the basic international orientation of opposition parties in England and, increasingly, in Germany.

With the increasing pro-Soviet drift of the German Social Democratic Party, the U.S.S.R. is gaining a major new asset for resolving both its physical security and its psychological inferiority by establishing greater political dominance over Germany: the only "West" that really matters to them in Europe.

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Is there any rational hope that an open America may in time be less threatened by the closed colossus in the U.S.S.R.?

There is plenty of irrational hope on the market. On the left, there is the vague idea—one that only increases the likelihood of blackmail—that reaching agreement with the Soviets is an end in itself. This attitude is supported by gossip and disinformation accepted as evidence, or by wishful thinking about the putative plight of alleged "doves" and "liberals" within the Soviet leadership—for whose very existence there may be no real evidence.

On the right there is the hope that the Soviet system may be on the verge of convulsive economic collapse and/or national disintegration. Although there is hard evidence of deep problems in both areas, there is no indication of any such drastic imminent outcome and there are many reasons for rejecting the hidden assumption that "the worse for them the better for us."

"There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any times since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921."

Any basis for rational hope must be found within their system rather than our preconceptions. There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any time since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921.

There is a scholarly consensus that the Soviet economy is too stagnant, the society too corrupt and degenerating, and the administrative and productive system too saddled with deferred maintenance for anything short of massive reforms to be effective.

Simply to keep up as a great power, Soviet leaders will have to mobilize new energies from the broader society. This can be done realistically only by drastically extending the authority over Soviet life as a whole of one of the only two areas that are still productively efficient in the U.S.S.R.: either the command economy based on centralized military power or the market economy based on local entrepreneurial incentive (the growing "second" economy). While Russian tradition may favor the former, the imminence of an unnaturally delayed generational change in leadership may favor building more on the incentive principle.

There could hardly be a more dramatic contrast than between the basic experiences that shaped Yuri Andropov and the last Stalinist generation (the unending bloody convulsions of coerced industrialization and collectivization, artificial famines, incessant internecine purges, and heroic wartime sufferings) and the influences on those under 50. The latter are the better educated, psychologically less complicated products of a post-war period of small deeds, uninterrupted peace and relative prosperity.

The coercive stand-pat policies of recent years with their emphasis on repression at home and aggression abroad will be very difficult to sustain in the absence of signs that they are succeeding. A new generation of leaders will lack the legitimizing authority that accrued to the older survivors from a period of great if bloody deeds. It will surely be tempted to reshape the system in terms of its own experiences and perhaps even to buy into the new ideal that appeared among its generation in the freer atmosphere of the '60s and early '70s.

The dissident movement was only the tip of an iceberg, most of which still lies submerged within the system. This movement of ideas represented an unofficial effort to continue the process of de-Stalinization that Khrushchev began and Brezhnev definitively stopped. There was—and continues to be in the new generation—an attempt to recover links with those elements of old Russian tradition that Stalin had systematically sought to destroy: Christianity, rural Russia, literature with an authentic moral meaning. This generation felt its way toward social criticism in the early '70s—codifying alternate versions of history through the oral counter-culture, staging satirical plays and forming a human rights movement and even a tiny free labor movement.

One cannot be sure that the new generation of leaders will identify with the higher moral aspirations of its own generation once in power, rather than with the quasi-Stalinist system through which they will have to rise to power. But so great is the social and economic need to mobilize fresh energy and enthusiasm, and so strong the psychological desire to find a worthy, non-Stalinist identity to make some sense of its sufferings, that one has to allow for the possibility of profound rather than merely cosmetic changes with the coming of this generation.

Americans cannot directly determine in any important way how the Soviet Union will evolve. Nor should we look for a maturing society with its own traditions to replicate or even approximate our own. But as the Soviets' principal adversary and object of fascination, we are more involved in their evolution than we may realize.

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To me this suggests a need to begin, in the second half-century of our relations, a far more comprehensive Soviet-American dialogue than we have tried in the first 50 years.

The first need at this time of dangerously diminished dialogue is for increased but more clearly defined contacts between the two superpowers. All dialogue, especially at the higher levels, should be polite and respectful in tone—particularly since the Russians crave respect and may invisibly mimic our model. The dialogue should be of three quite different types, each with a different objective.

1. With the vestigial Stalinist oligarchy that is still in charge, we need a dialogue that is tough and specific. One should never be soft and general with Stalinists. The meaningless "general principles" of the 1972 Soviet-American summit facilitated rather than forestalled subsequent Soviet advances. Ingratiating approaches taken for domestic political reasons are invariably received as a sign of weakness and an invitation to further manipulation.

It is also important that there be only a sin-

gle, substantive dialogue on the high strategic questions, because unity, like firmness, is essential for closing a deal. One should feel neither intimidated by threats of a walkout nor compelled to make gratuitous demonstrations of flexibility to win vague good will. The older leaders know about war and almost certainly want an agreement in this area.

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3. A new category of dialogue would involve Russians and Americans with other countries in discussing and developing a new global agenda—perhaps looking to the year 2000. Such a format would provide the model for the next generation of Russians, who must look to us for new approaches to world order. Many of the problems are themselves multinational, and new ideas may be easier to accept if there are new forums that are multinational rather than binational.

Each of these dialogues would help overcome a weakness that has plagued American relations with the Soviet Union. The first helps to avoid the illusion of some liberals in assuming that Soviet society will naturally evolve into something better if only we are nice to the surviving Stalinists. The second, broader level moves beyond the dead-end reliance of some conservatives solely on material toughness. The third dispels the seductive belief, common to both liberal and conservative politicians (and to many Russians), that our many bothersome involvements in the world will drastically diminish once we cut a deal with the Russians and cut out everyone else.

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Almost certainly the traditional imperial aspect of Soviet policy will increasingly become a greater concern of Russia's Eurasian neighbors rather than of the United States. Since the problem of Russia's borders involves deep psychological sensitivity on the Russian side and the very existence of many neighboring peoples, it should not be left to the play of chance but discussed in the third type of multilateral dialogue over a long period of time.

We clearly need to increase support for Russian studies throughout America, and we probably need one high-level place in government to provide comprehensive analysis and policy coordination for all our dealings with the U.S.S.R.

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No longer can there be any room for illusions about a governing group that, in the Stalin era, produced one of the two greatest, sustained state-sponsored set of atrocities against its own subjects in the 20th century. There can be no excuse for weakness in dealing with those who have ceased in the last 20 years to permit talk about, let alone restitution for, the horror on which their power rests.

But we do not have to lower our guard to raise our sights. We can invent new forms of dialogue, reach limited agreements, and perhaps even devise new forms of joint activity that can substitute cooperation for confrontation. The coming Soviet generation would welcome fresh initiatives. In trying to find a non-Stalinist path into the future, they will want better links both with their own deep past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Those who will continue the troubled Soviet-American dialogue in the years ahead may someday conclude that, for such vast countries and such expansive, complicated peoples, it might just be harder to take small steps than big ones.

The writer, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, has written histories of Russian culture and the revolutionary tradition.

National Security Council
The White House

System # II

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January 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

I would appreciate your preparing a summary of the attached article by Jim Billington as well as an assessment of it in the form of a memo to the President. It seems to me that there is much in common between Jim's prescriptions and your own. I would like to infuse the President with an historical appreciation of where we stand in the relationship and what we can expect in the way of Soviet leadership (goals and strategy). Finally, given what I believe we share (a basic pessimism toward any near-term movement away from the deeply Stalinistic values held by the current senior generation of leaders), we ought to propose how we should proceed so as to avoid catastrophe in our strategic relationship while seeking to at least keep alive the hope of an alternative future among the successor generation. I would like to get this to the President as soon as possible.

Many thanks.

cc: Adm Poindexter
Robert Kimmitt
Bill Martin
Don Fortier
Don Gregg

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With Russia: After 50 Years

The 50th anniversary of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was observed this past week in conditions of severe tension and sourness and, because of the illness of Yuri Andropov, unusual political uncertainty on the Soviet side. We asked a leading American student of Soviet affairs to size up the larger Soviet scene and to suggest some ways in which the American relationship with Moscow might be steadied.

James H. Billington

A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue



"The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home."

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlike any confrontation of major powers in recent history—perhaps in all history. It has been remarkably stable, not having led to any direct fighting between the principal rivals in 35 years of Cold War. Yet it is a relationship that is inherently dangerous because of the unprecedented weapons available.

The main destabilizing force in the relationship in recent years has been the great increase in Soviet military might and international involvements without any comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. The cold, unpleasant fact is that the U.S.S.R. is currently in a very dangerous stage in which old psychological insecurity still exists alongside awesome new power.

Part of Soviet insecurity results from the legitimate desire for respect of the Russian people, who have often been attacked militarily and disparaged culturally. But far more of the current insecurity comes from the leaders' own progressive retreat from previous halting attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s to exorcise Stalin's ghost and to build some new basis for self-respect within Soviet society.

The aging Stalinist oligarchy and its swollen, corrupt bureaucracy effectively stopped de-Stalinization under Brezhnev, chose a chief of police as his successor, and now seem to be falling back increasingly on the high Stalinist technique of using targeted acts of violence to coerce the respect thet they have given up trying to earn. In the combination of brutality and deception that accompanied the Korean airline tragedy and the treatment of imprisoned symbols of social conscience such as Yuri Orlov and Sergei Khodorovich, there seem to be new hints of inertial drift into the old Stalinist formula of terror without bounds or shame. It is born less of a traditional desire for dominance than of a totalitarian compulsion to disorient, divide and in some sense destroy everything that cannot be controlled.

All of this is so profoundly unpleasant that one set of Americans, largely on the left, prefers to say that this isn't really happening or doesn't really matter. Another set, largely on the right, prefers to say that nothing else really happens or matters. Sincere people on both sides increasingly call for heroic, one-sided solutions—unilateral disarmament, unilateral crusades—often mixing disguised sermons to America into supposed analyses of Russia.

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The beginnings of a more rational understanding may lie in acknowledging complexity and in differentiating several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry: economic, imperial, ideological, psychological and thermonuclear.

Economically, there is no longer any serious competition. Capitalism has simply proven itself more dynamic and adjustable, and far more capable of effective production for human use. Communism as a functioning economic system is unlikely to have sustained appeal to anyone in the modern world who is free to make a first-hand comparison—unless of course the capitalist economy allows itself to self-destruct in some massive new economic crisis.

The imperial aspect of the superpower rivalry involves our confronting a new form of a traditional Russian policy of extending the nation's borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller powers and states. Traditional national interest lies at the base of Soviet pressure on Europe and the push into Afghanistan. Here the Soviets made a classical imperial gambit in the "great game"—a timely move on a target of opportunity that must have seemed irresistible at a time of American weakness and preoccupation elsewhere.

But the Soviets' justification for their involvement in Afghanistan—and the probable reason for their refusal to withdraw—is the purely ideological argument that the revolutionary process once begun cannot be reversed.

This argument points to the new tendency to propel Soviet foreign policy beyond the realm of traditional Russian national interest into the more dangerous field of ideological politics.

The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home. It has worked with cocky new revolutionary cadres from Vietnam and Cuba, even as it played on American self-doubt after Vietnam to expand in various ways into Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen. It gradually came to accept the long-resisted Cuban contention that the road to revolution in Latin America must be essentially violent rather than peaceful.

Once China after Mao adopted a more pragmatic and inward-looking attitude, the U.S.S.R. became the main source of ideas as well as arms for what was perceived to be a rising revolutionary tide. The Soviets put venture capital of various kinds into distant, destabilizing forces, and increasingly risked becoming involved in crises that they might not be able to control.

All of this is further complicated psychologically by Russia's tradition of a love-hate relationship with its principal Western adversary. To Russians, America is now the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves. Their love-hate feelings toward us suggest the persistence of feelings of psychological inferiority even in the presence of strategic parity.

The massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and rocketry possessed by both superpowers gives a historically unprecedented dimension to the rivalry. The danger is probably not so much that either side will deliberately set out to use them, but that some developing crisis in a fuzzy area may escalate to a point where it will be difficult for one party not to use them in order to avoid a humiliating defeat.

The new weapons also pose new possibilities for blackmail—the key element in the current campaign to prevent new missile deployments in Germany. The long-range objective is to divide, neutralize and eventually establish political dominance over Europe.

The immediate campaign is to convert the West's moral anguish over nuclear weapons into a political separation of Western Europe from the United States. Though so far unsuccessful in its short-run objective of preventing missile deployment in Germany, this campaign has helped change the basic international orientation of opposition parties in England and, increasingly, in Germany.

With the increasing pro-Soviet drift of the German Social Democratic Party, the U.S.S.R. is gaining a major new asset for resolving both its physical security and its psychological inferiority by establishing greater political dominance over Germany: the only "West" that really matters to them in Europe.

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Is there any rational hope that an open America may in time be less threatened by the closed colossus in the U.S.S.R.?

There is plenty of irrational hope on the market. On the left, there is the vague idea—one that only increases the likelihood of blackmail—that reaching agreement with the Soviets is an end in itself. This attitude is supported by gossip and disinformation accepted as evidence, or by wishful thinking about the putative plight of alleged "doves" and "liberals" within the Soviet leadership—for whose very existence there may be no real evidence.

On the right there is the hope that the Soviet system may be on the verge of convulsive economic collapse and/or national disintegration. Although there is hard evidence of deep problems in both areas, there is no indication of any such drastic imminent outcome and there are many reasons for rejecting the hidden assumption that "the worse for them the better for us."

"There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any times since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921."

Any basis for rational hope must be found within their system rather than our preconceptions. There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any time since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921.

There is a scholarly consensus that the Soviet economy is too stagnant, the society too corrupt and degenerating, and the administrative and productive system too saddled with deferred maintenance for anything short of massive reforms to be effective.

Simply to keep up as a great power, Soviet leaders will have to mobilize new energies from the broader society. This can be done realistically only by drastically extending the authority over Soviet life as a whole of one of the only two areas that are still productively efficient in the U.S.S.R.: either the command economy based on centralized military power or the market economy based on local entrepreneurial incentive (the growing "second" economy). While Russian tradition may favor the former, the imminence of an unnaturally delayed generational change in leadership may favor building more on the incentive principle.

There could hardly be a more dramatic contrast than between the basic experiences that shaped Yuri Andropov and the last Stalinist generation (the unending bloody convulsions of coerced industrialization and collectivization, artificial famines, incessant internecine purges, and heroic wartime sufferings) and the influences on those under 50. The latter are the better educated, psychologically less complicated products of a post-war period of small deeds, uninterrupted peace and relative prosperity.

The coercive stand-pat policies of recent years with their emphasis on repression at home and aggression abroad will be very difficult to sustain in the absence of signs that they are succeeding. A new generation of leaders will lack the legitimizing authority that accrued to the older survivors from a period of great if bloody deeds. It will surely be tempted to reshape the system in terms of its own experiences and perhaps even to buy into the new ideal that appeared among its generation in the freer atmosphere of the '60s and early '70s.

The dissident movement was only the tip of an iceberg, most of which still lies submerged within the system. This movement of ideas represented an unofficial effort to continue the process of de-Stalinization that Khrushchev began and Brezhnev definitively stopped. There was—and continues to be in the new generation—an attempt to recover links with those elements of old Russian tradition that Stalin had systematically sought to destroy: Christianity, rural Russia, literature with an authentic moral meaning. This generation felt its way toward social criticism in the early '70s—codifying alternate versions of history through the oral counter-culture, staging satirical plays and forming a human rights movement and even a tiny free labor movement.

One cannot be sure that the new generation of leaders will identify with the higher moral aspirations of its own generation once in power, rather than with the quasi-Stalinist system through which they will have to rise to power. But so great is the social and economic need to mobilize fresh energy and enthusiasm, and so strong the psychological desire to find a worthy, non-Stalinist identity to make some sense of its sufferings, that one has to allow for the possibility of profound rather than merely cosmetic changes with the coming of this generation.

Americans cannot directly determine in any important way how the Soviet Union will evolve. Nor should we look for a maturing society with its own traditions to replicate or even approximate our own. But as the Soviets' principal adversary and object of fascination, we are more involved in their evolution than we may realize.

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To me this suggests a need to begin, in the second half-century of our relations, a far more comprehensive Soviet-American dialogue than we have tried in the first 50 years.

The first need at this time of dangerously diminished dialogue is for increased but more clearly defined contacts between the two superpowers. All dialogue, especially at the higher levels, should be polite and respectful in tone—particularly since the Russians crave respect and may invisibly mimic our model. The dialogue should be of three quite different types, each with a different objective.

1. With the vestigial Stalinist oligarchy that is still in charge, we need a dialogue that is tough and specific. One should never be soft and general with Stalinists. The meaningless "general principles" of the 1972 Soviet-American summit facilitated rather than forestalled subsequent Soviet advances. Ingratiating approaches taken for domestic political reasons are invariably received as a sign of weakness and an invitation to further manipulation.

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The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges with Soviet society as a whole—on a professional, regional, educational, cultural and purely random basis—will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility. Economic contacts could suggest new models for management and encourage the kind of self-respect that might make Russians less psychologically dependent on gaining respect through the military.

3. A new category of dialogue would involve Russians and Americans with other countries in discussing and developing a new global agenda—perhaps looking to the year 2000. Such a format would provide the model for the next generation of Russians, who must look to us for new approaches to world order. Many of the problems are themselves multinational, and new ideas may be easier to accept if there are new forums that are multinational rather than binational.

Each of these dialogues would help overcome a weakness that has plagued American relations with the Soviet Union. The first helps to avoid the illusion of some liberals in assuming that Soviet society will naturally evolve into something better if only we are nice to the surviving Stalinists. The second, broader level moves beyond the dead-end reliance of some conservatives solely on material toughness. The third dispels the seductive belief, common to both liberal and conservative politicians (and to many Russians), that our many bothersome involvements in the world will drastically diminish once we cut a deal with the Russians and cut out everyone else.

Our continuing confrontation at the thermonuclear level clearly requires the first type of contact: tough and specific and at the highest level. We and the Soviets both have by now, it seems to me, an overriding responsibility not to leave the nuclear negotiating table until we have begun to limit and reduce the global menace we have co-authored, and not to make this overriding issue hostage to other issues.

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The writer, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, has written histories of Russian culture and the revolutionary tradition.

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It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

--<u>The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation</u>: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov is moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greatly expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.

Attachment: Tab A - Billington article

Prepared by: Jack Matlock
cc. The Vice President