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USSR (1/24/84-1/25/84)

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RE 1/18/84 SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK W

SUBJECT:

NOTED ROM HAS SEEN Shultz-Gromyko Meeting, January 18, 1984

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation (Tab I) of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm, as prepared by State. Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat.

As soon as Secretary Shultz has reviewed and cleared the memorandum, it will be sent officially for submission to the President.

Attachment:

Tab I Advance text of Shultz-Gromyko memcon

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

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RE 1/18/84 SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING

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
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



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INFORMATION

January 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND, JR. 10

SUBJECT:

International Labor Organization Strategy

I ordered up an interagency examination of our strategy for the upcoming International Labor Organization (ILO) session in Geneva. The attached paper represents an agreed strategy by the concerned agencies and departments.

There are several points of particular interest. After discussion between George Shultz and Lane Kirkland they have agreed to the appointment of a special envoy to visit certain key countries in advance of the ILO conference in June to secure support for US positions, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The ILO, as you know, is an international structure where the battlefield gets drawn quite sharply. We have formidible assets that can be marshalled but the Soviets also have been active and reasonably effective in their political operations in this forum. 1983 was a good year at the ILO for us; a strong delegation supplemented by work by a special envoy should help generate continued support for programs which we favor at the ILO.

As a result of a direct request from Secretary Donovan, the Department of State has concurred in providing Bob Searby with the personal rank of Ambassador during his tenure as delegation chairman.

Pages 10 and 11 of the attached document provides specifics on courses of action to be followed. This paper was developed in the context of an IPC working group on international labor.

Attachment

Tab I

Department of State Strategy paper

UNCLASSIFIED WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT







Washington, D.C. 20520

January 25, 1984

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W/CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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MEMORANDUM FOR WALTER RAYMOND, SENIOR DIRECTOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: International Labor Organization

Further to the request in your memorandum of December 1, 1983, I convened a second meeting of the IPC working group to discuss the strategy paper for dealing with the Soviet initiative to degrade the ILO's human rights supervisory machinery. The paper also defined the role of a Special U.S. Envoy to deal with this issue.

The working group met on January 17, 1984, and included representatives from the Department of Labor, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the National Security Council. The group agreed on final revisions to the DOL draft and the approved strategy paper attached. I am sending copies to all concerned.

Gerald B. Helman

Deputy to the Under Secretary

for Political Affairs

Attachment: As stated.

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COPING WITH THE SOVIET ASSAULT ON THE ILO'S HUMAN RIGHTS SUPERVISORY MACHINERY: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to outline a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the continued Soviet assault on the ILO's human rights supervisory machinery in 1984. This strategy includes a concept for using a special envoy to reinforce U.S. Government efforts.

BACKGROUND

The Soviet assault against the ILO's supervisory machinery stretches back nearly three decades -- to 1954 when the USSR and other Eastern European countries returned to the ILO. Repeated, protracted, angry, and inconclusive debates over communist violations of trade union rights and forced labor in the later 1950's led, throughout the 1960s, to a de facto moratorium on ILO criticism of Soviet bloc countries -- in effect, a "double standard."

Although the United States resisted the double standard, it was only after we withdrew from the ILO in 1977 that other members finally faced up to their responsibilities. Since then the ILO has cautiously but effectively pursued serious cases of violations involving the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and now Cuba.

The Soviets have consistently responsed to such ILO criticism by attacking the ILO's system of supervision. In 1979 the Soviets tried to revise and weaken the supervisory machinery through a special working party of the ILO Conference -- a move that was successfully blocked in 1980 when the United States returned to the ILO, joined the working party, and pushed through reforms which strengthened rather than weakened the machinery.

During the 1983 ILO Conference, the GDR introduced a "memorandum" again calling for a conference working party to consider radical changes in the supervisory system. This

CONFIDENTIAL (Based on Geneva 10884, November 23, 1983)



memorandum received little support outside the Soviet bloc, and went absolutely nowhere. Not only that, but, for the first time ever, the Soviets failed in 1983 to defeat the report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR), which included special paragraphs criticizing Czechoslovakia and other "socialist" countries.

Soviet voting strength on the issue of supervision has slipped badly since 1974, when the Soviets first challenged and defeated the CACR report -- from 56% in 1974 to 59% in 1977, then down to 43% in 1982, and 39% in 1983. These numbers demonstrate growing Western solidarity and determination and widespread (but still fragile) Third World support for ILO supervision.

More than that, the numbers illustrate the current Soviet predicament: any formal motion to create a Conference working party in 1984 will require a 55-60% Soviet majority for adoption, i.e. using the quorum rule, we can stop the Soviets with only 40-45% of the votes.

The Soviets now have their backs to the wall in the ILO. The Commission of Inquiry on Poland is proceeding with its work, and a new freedom of association case involving Cuba has recently been added to the list. Their only hope is to destroy the supervisory machinery itself. Despite the difficulties they face, we expect that they will be back in 1984 more determined than ever. This must be considered the most serious Soviet challenge to the supervisory machinery since 1979-80, and will require special efforts by the United States to continue it in 1984.

POSITIONS OF THE MAJOR GROUPS

Governments

IMEC: The United States and other Industrial Market Economy Countries (IMEC) are already strongly and solidly determined to stop the Soviet assault in 1984. A special staff-level IMEC Working Party on Standards (WPS) has already begun formulating a detailed and coordinated approach to this issue. We must not take IMEC for granted, however. The Italian member recently warned the group that it must not humiliate the USSR; IMEC's November meeting focussed on a related subject -- the alleged need for a more cautious approach to standard setting.



CONFÍDENTIAL -3-

Third World: They remain the key, especially Africa. In 1983 the majority of Third World delegates voted with IMEC. They have their own problems with the supervisory machinery, however, such as CACR criticism of their failure to submit reports on unratified Conventions under Article 19 of the ILO Constitution. They also could decide to "punish" IMEC for opposing other political issues they consider important.

Soviet bloc: Although persistent, they are also usually heavy handed -- and this costs them Third World support. Unlike 1983, they will almost certainly introduce a formal resolution or some other motion in 1984 requiring a Conference decision if they hope to move their assault on the supervisory machinery beyond the rhetoric stage. They will also court the Third World, trade votes, and attempt to form alliances wherever possible.

Workers

They will be very strong in their support of the supervisory machinery. The workers' group, however, is more diverse than the employers' group (ICFTU, WCL, WFTU), making group solidarity more problematical. The WCL worker vice chairman of the CACR may again try to soft-pedal Soviet bloc cases in the CACR in a misquided effort to mollify Soviet criticism of the supervisory machinery.

Employers

They are stronger and more united than ever on this issue. When the workers' group hesitated this year, the employers initiated the special paragraph on Czechoslovakia and called for the secret ballot on the CACR report. They will, however, push for a more conservative approach to standard setting in 1984 as part of an overall discussion of standards --a move which will win strong IMEC and Third World support.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER KEY CONFERENCE ISSUES

1984 Report of the Director General

This year's subject is standards. It will provide a vehicle for a concerted Soviet bloc chorus of speeches attacking ILO standards and the supervisory machinery. The USSR has already formally submitted what it believes the 1984 Report should cover (essentially a repeat of the 1983 GDR memorandum). The

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Soviets could introduce a resolution from the plenary floor (bypassing the Resolutions Committee) calling for another special working party to review the supervisory machinery.

Arab/Israel

The Soviets will play on Arab frustration over the defeat of their resolutions on Israel in 1982 and 1983 to try to build support for "punishing" IMEC through a coordinated attack on the supervisory machinery. They may again adopt tactics designed indirectly to prevent adoption of a resolution on Israel (as they did in 1982) to keep the Arab pot boiling.

South Africa

This issue also has the potential of drawing critical African support away from us on the supervisory machinery. As in 1982 and 1983, however, this issue can be handled in such a way that damage is minimized while preserving the integrity and consistency of U.S. policies towards South Africa.

Structure

Our main disagreement with Latin America involves proposals to change the structure of the ILO Governing Body. We are still far from agreement on the distribution of seats for the Americas region, and negotiations have been suspended as a result of the events in Grenada. This issue is likely to get worse before it gets better, and could affect Latin support for the supervisory machinery.


ELEMENTS OF A U.S. STRATEGY

An effective U.S. strategy for coping with the Soviet assault should represent an extension of the successful policies which led to the strong support for ILO supervision demonstrated during the 1983 Conference. Such a strategy should include the following:

1. Maintain and strengthen IMEC coordination and cohesion

A. Support the IMEC Working Party on Standards:

Long-term U.S. efforts to build an effective IMEC mechanism for coordinating CACR positions have finally (thanks to a new Swiss chairman) led to a special IMEC staff-level working party on standards. This group



has already identified stopping the Soviet assault on the supervisory machinery as its top priority for 1984. We must continue to work with this group to define a detailed and coordinated approach for responding to the Soviet challenge.

B. Consult informally with key IMEC reprsentatives:

Recognizing the problems inherent in any group as large and diverse as IMEC, we must also continue to consult quietly and informally on strategy before the Conference and on day-to-day tactics during the Conference with a smaller group of representatives from the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Switzerland and the FRG. The mechanism for this has been developed over the last several years through discussions of Governing Body representatives and delegation advisers responsible for the CACR.

2. Build special bridges of understanding with the Third World

- A. Accent the Positive: We need to demonstrate that we understand the legitimate Third World concerns about ILO standards and supervision (which are quite different than the Soviet complaints), and will work with them to overcome these problems. We plan to make this a key factor in the IMEC strategy through the Working Party on Standards. In addition, we have already received strong ILO support for a modest program of bilateral assistance aimed at helping certain Third Workd countries (mainly African) overcome problems in fulfilling their procedural obligations relating to ILO standards.
- B. Minimize the Negative: The opposite side of the coin is to minimize the negative impact on Third World support for ILO supervision of our policy differences in other areas -- particularly the Middle East, South Africa and structure. In 1982 the Soviets successfully pinned blame for the anarchy in the resolutions committee (which they, in fact, inspired) on the West. This led a number of Third World Delegations to "punish" us by voting against the CACR report. Our strategy for handling the expected Arab resolution on Israel in 1984 must, therefore, take into account the political climate it will create for preserving the supervisory machinery.

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Our position on apartheid has been less of a problem vis-a-vis support for the ILO's supervisory machinery in recent years because we have made the Conference committee the main arena rather than the plenary. We should continue this policy. In addition, we should give serious consideration to providing some financial support for legitimate ILO programs in southern Africa before next June as a means of generating even closer ties with the Africans. The funding might be in part available from funds earmarked by Congress for the encouragement of human rights in South Africa.

Structure may continue to be a problem for our relations with Latin America. We must take a special effort over the next six months to fully explain our position in capitals and to search for a realistic compromise.

3. Strengthen U.S. credibility through ratification of ILO standards

The poor U.S. ratification record makes it tactically difficult for us to forcefully take the lead on preserving the ILO's supervisory machinery. We have only ratified seven of the ILO's 159 Conventions, the last one thirty years ago. Not only the Soviet bloc, but also more and more Western governments are criticizing our failure to ratify ILO standards since we thereby remain relatively immune from ILO supervision. We can forestall this criticism by submitting one or two ILO Conventions to the Senate for advice and consent before the 1984 Conference. The President's Committee on the ILO has decided to recommend ratification of at lease one convention (no. 147) and has asked for a draft executive branch letter. No final decision has yet been made on Convention 144, which will be further reviewed once we have drafted the executive branch letter.

4. Use the Director General's Report to reinforce ILO standards and supervision

A. Coordinate IMEC, Third World, and worker and employer speeches to balance the Soviet chorus: Through the IMEC Working Party on Standards, bilateral contacts with Third World governments, as well as through U.S. worker and employer contacts with the ICFTU and IOE, we need to coordinate speeches on the DG's Report on standards to highlight the many positive aspects of

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standard setting and supervision. This will allow the DG, in his reply to the debate, to resist Soviet demands for changes in the system.

В. Encourage celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Declaration of Philadelphia: To promote an even more positive plenary discussion during the 1984 Conference, we should encourage the ILO to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Declaration of Philadelphia which, as an appendix to the ILO Constitution, establishes the ILO's basic democratic and pluralistic goals. This could be done through a special sitting of the Conference during the debate on the DG's Report and include the participation of several IMEC and Third World ILO delegates who attended the 1944 Conference. We have informally discussed this idea with several government and employer Governing Body representatives, and they share our view that it would be useful in providing a positive diversion in the midst of the Soviet assault.

5. Support close coordination with the ICFTU and IOE

Since the ILO is half non-governmental, no comprehensive strategy for building support would be complete if it ignored the need for close coordination with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Organization of Employers. The U.S. Government should facilitate close contacts between U.S. workers and employers and their counterparts. International visitor grants, the National Endowment for Democracy, and possibly other programs provide mechanisms for such contact, and should be carefully reviewed with the objective of strengthening support for the ILO's supervisory machinery.

6. Appoint a Special Envoy

Special envoys have been used in the past on many issues, including the ILO. Although special envoys can take on a variety of roles, the following precepts traditionally establish the nature of the envoy's role:

 Appointment of a special envoy can be used to demonstrate high-level U.S. Government concern about a given issue.

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- 2. A special envoy has access to the very highest levels in foreign capitals. He can, therefore, be especially effective in mobilizing support among governments which otherwise might adopt a neutral or opposing position on the issue in question. He can also help explain U.S. policies which are not completly understood by other governments.
- 3. Special envoys deal with macro issues. Because their discussions are usually with foreign ministers, issues are covered in broad outline, not at the detailed level of tactics.

The appointment of a special envoy for ILO in 1976 met each of these precepts. In November 1975, the United States had submitted a letter of intent to withdraw from the ILO in two years time unless certain trends were reversed. Most other IMEC governments objected to our position and disagreed with our views of the state of the ILO. We therefore needed to demonstrate a high-level concern about these trends and our determination to work effectively and actively to remedy them. The envoy visited most IMEC capitals and, in discussions with foreign ministers, explained why we have submitted a letter of intent to withdraw and sought their understanding and support. He reviewed with the foreign ministers the four basic issues raised in our letter of withdrawal, and indicated our desire for further detailed discussions between delegations to coordinate strategies and tactics.

In countering the Soviet initiative, the special envoy would coordinate closely with the U.S. representative to the governing body. He would:

- A. Visit IMEC capitals to express general U.S. concern over the Soviet assault. He would seek a commitment at the political level to defend it.
- B. Focus on those aspects of the issue where our position is weak or not fully understood, and thereby supplement ongoing U.S. efforts to build support and coordinate tactics. In addition to IMEC capitals this would require the special envoy to travel to key African and Latin American countries.

In pursuing his responsibilities, the special envoy would be guided by the following considerations:

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- We can assume that IMEC governments will support stopping the Soviet assault on the ILO's supervisory machinery. This should be confirmed by senior level political decisions by each of these governments. There will be tactical differences, but these micro level issues can best be worked out in the IMEC Working Party on Standards or in other staff-level discussions with key IMEC delegations.
- 2. Also unlike 1976, we are going into the 1984
 Conference from a position of relative strength.
 Remember, in 1974 the Soviets had obtained a 56%
 majority in their successful defeat of the CACR
 report, and, despite the efforts of a special envoy,
 they actually increased their majority to 59% in
 1977. The situation is quite different now -- they
 received only 43% of the vote in 1982, and dropped to
 39% in 1983. While we may want to express high-level
 U.S. Government concern over the continued Soviet
 assault on the ILO's supervisory machinery, it would
 be a mistake at this point to be "alarmist" or to
 present the issue as simply a East/West confrontation.
- 3. We do need to take special steps to establish our credibility as a advocate for effective ILO supervision of standards. As noted above, a number of IMEC governments (France, FRG, Australia) have expressed concern over our failure to ratify Conventions. Should the President decide, on the recommendation of the President's Committee on the ILO, to submit one or more Conventions to the Senate for advice and consent, a special envoy could play a positive role in explaining to IMEC and other governments that such action represents a continuing U.S. commitment to ILO standards and the supervisory machinery.
- 4. A special envoy could play a major role in ensuring that policy differences involving other issues (Israel, South Africa, structure) do not obscure or negatively affect support for the supervisory machinery. These are all issues where our positions have not received full support and understanding in either IMEC or Third World Capitals. This effort could involve visits by a special envoy to selected capitals to explain our positions on these issues in broad terms at the foreign minister level.

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
5. Finally, any mission undertaken by a special envoy must mesh with ongoing efforts by the U.S. Representative to the ILO and other U.S. delegation members. Such efforts should also coincide with special efforts by U.S. employers and workers to reach out to their counterparts in a coordinated tripartite strategy for building support for 1984. This requires careful preparation and thorough briefings in Washington. It would be vital for the special envoy to be accompanied on his visits to foreign capitals by senior Foreign Service officers (e.g. Roger Schrader, Robert Hare, and John Stephens) selected as regional advisors for the 1984 Conference delegation, and, as necessary, by a DOL representative. This would ensure the presence during the special envoy's discussions of individuals with extensive experience and detailed knowledge of the ILO, and, more importantly, would provide for effective follow-up with other delegations during the Conference itself.

Future Courses of Action

In light of the foregoing, the following actions should be undertaken:

- 1. Develop a strong, high-level U.S. delegation to the 1984 ILO Conference (State and DOL). The following steps should be considered:
 - A. Give the Chairman of the delegation the personal rank of ambassador.
 - B. Assure that the delegation is at full strength and include specific regional liaison responsibilities.
- 2. Develop intelligence on Soviet plans, intentions, and tactics (State, CIA).
- 3. Draft a paper on Soviet options for pursuing its assault on the supervisory machinery, e.g.
 - (a) In the discussion of the Director General's report on standards;
 - (b) As a resolution in (1) the resolutions committee; or (2) the plenary;





- (c) As a paragrah in the CACR report;
- (d) As an attempt to modify the composition of the Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association;
- (e) As a recommendation to Blanchard to hold an ILO seminar on the role of trade unions in the East Bloc;
- (f) As a recommendation to hold a European colloquium on ILO standard-setting.
- 4. Determine what policy options there may be, if any, that can be developed regarding the Arab/Israel question, apartheid, and the structure issue, as well as the proposal to "go easy" on standard-setting (State, DOL).
- 5. Embassies Bonn and Paris should consult host governments regarding the significance of the Malintoppi paper and what degree of support this has in IMEC.
- 6. Discuss with the AFL-CIO ways of strengthening worker support within worker delegations.
- 7. DOL to provide list of key Governing Body and Conference delegates to be invited to U.S. for consultations before June. Department to consult USIA regarding leader grants.
- 8. Study whether there are African and other countries in which U.S. bilateral assistance to help them meet procedureal obligations relating to ILO standards would incline them to support U.S. more in the ILO; Department/DOL to consult with AID if additional technical assistance funds are necessary.
- 9. Department/AID to review the proposal for financial support of legitimate ILO assistance to Southern Africa.
- 10. DOL and Department/AID to review the Egyptian vocational training project.