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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/5/2016

File Folder USSR (1/27/84-1/31/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

365

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172010	MEMO	D. FORTIER TO J. POINDEXTER RE U.S.-SOVIET CONFLICT (W/ADDED NOTE) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-1-0	1	1/27/1984	B1
172011	REPORT	RE DANGER OF WAR R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-1-0	2	ND	B1
172012	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE MESSAGE	1	1/27/1984	B1
172013	MEMCON	RE 1/26/84 MEETING ABOUT HOROWITZ'S CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW (INCL. 2 COPIES OF PAGE 3) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-3-8	4	ND	B1
172014	MEMCON	DRAFT OF PAGE 3 OF DOC #170213 (RE 1/26/84 MEETING ABOUT HOROWITZ'S CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-3-8	1	ND	B1
172015	REPORT	RE SOVIET REACTON TO U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON PAR 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-4-7	2	1/30/1984	B1
172016	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE PEACE INITIATIVE	2	2/6/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/5/2016

File Folder USSR (1/27/84-1/31/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

365

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172484	REPORT	TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-9-6-5	7	1/1/1984	B1
172485	REPORT	TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS: BACKGROUND OF PRINCIPALS	1	1/1/1984	B6
172018	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE PEACE INITIATIVE	1	2/2/1984	B1
172017	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PEACE INITIATIVE	1	1/31/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/5/16 688

ID 8400824

RECEIVED 28 JAN 84 09-1

TO

POINDEXTER

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 27 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT INCREASED DANGER OF US - SOVIET CONFLICT

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE. 31 JAN 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

No further action required

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	X 1/30	Noted by Poindexter w/ comments		
Fortier	X 1/30	For Redo		
	C 2/13	No further action necessary		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE 1A 765

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb 13, 1984

TO NSC/S

FROM DON FORTIER

RE 0824

No further action necessary.

**National Security Council
The White House**

958

System #

I

Package #

824

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Forten	2		Redo

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/30

Bob,

Please have this paper
re-done. Ty Cobb has
some ideas. Also they
should review Bud's background.

R

958 6

**National Security Council
The White House**

84 JAN 27 P 6: 47

System # I
Package # 0824

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>✓</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>X</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>2</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

QMP 6

*Except is for 09
This argument is
defense of
fore gater
Same as
because correlation of
force is not
balanced, see
my grammar*

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch M = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

*Give copy to Bob
Show to Bud*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

824

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

January 27, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

DONALD FORTIER

SUBJECT:

Increased Danger of US-Soviet Conflict

NLRR 748-25-9-1-0

BY 601 NARA DATE 4/5/16

Attached is a quick paper on the subject of the increased danger of US-Soviet conflict. If there is time, I would like to develop one additional point upon which I need to secure additional information. That has to do with Soviet efforts to improve flight control procedures in the Far East, in the aftermath of our rhetorical censure of their behavior.

Attachment

TAB I Paper on Increased Danger of US-Soviet Conflict

Bud,

This is in response to Jim Baker's question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here.

John

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

(Z/ASD)

8

NLRR 748 25-9-1-0

INCREASED DANGER OF WAR

BY ~~COB~~ NARADA: 4/8/0 FACT OR FICTION?

170216

During the last few months, a feeling has emerged in both the United States and in West Europe that the danger of a war has increased. The shootdown of the Korean Air Lines passenger jet, the bombing attack on our peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, the terrorist bombing of the leaders of the Republic of Korea in Rangoon, and the suspension, which we hope is temporary, of the START and INF arms control discussions have all contributed to the feeling that the world has become a more dangerous place, and that the superpowers may be edging toward a conflict.

These events, of course, have had some effect, a negative effect, on the state of US-Soviet relations. It is curious, however, that the government of the United States is being held responsible by some people for the present state of affairs. It was not the United States that was the perpetrator of these acts, but the Soviet Union, its allies and proteges who have attacked civilians and walked out of negotiations.

Did the United States, by its actions, create an environment in which clashes between the superpowers became more likely? What, in fact, has the United States done over the last three years? We have made substantial progress toward rebuilding our armed forces to repair the damage that they suffered during the 1970s as a result of reduced budgets. While there is some debate about exactly how large the increases in our defense budget should be, no one that we know of, aside from George McGovern, has denied the need for those increases. It is interesting to notice that the chief defense analyst of the Carter administration Defense Department, Russell Murray, has now publicly stated that his office completed a study back in 1980 that showed that US defense spending increases of the size we have recommended were in fact necessary to restore the forces needed for our security (Washington Times, 19 January 1984; Armed Forces Journal International, June 1982, p. 57).

We have carried through on the policy chosen by NATO more than five years ago to deploy cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. We remain ready to return to a world in which no such missiles are deployed, or limited, equal numbers are deployed.

We defended our citizens in Grenada and defeated a coup d'etat led by pro-Soviet would-be dictators. And, unlike some other unfortunate recent episodes, we acted effectively and in time.

Part of what we are seeing, of course, is a self-conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Union to use rhetoric to fan the belief that the world is becoming more dangerous. They know that, to the extent they succeed in convincing world opinion this is so, the onus will increasingly be on us, rather than them, to make new concessions. Precedents for this kind of behavior can be found both in Khrushchev's effort in 1960 to abort the summit with President Eisenhower and also in subsequent Soviet provocations over Berlin, which were intended to try to prevent President Kennedy's defense buildup.

The real question, of course, is whether the chances of war have been increased by our programs to rebuild American military strength and support our commitments around the world. The Soviet Union, by means of its recent, angry statements, says that we have. History tells us something quite different. World War II became unavoidable when the democratic powers of West Europe surrendered first part, then all of Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler. This capitulation only reinforced Hitler's belief that it was safe to attack Poland, because the great democracies were too weak and timid ~~to fight~~. It reinforced the feeling of other nations that France and Britain were not reliable allies. The North Korean attack on South Korea became more likely when the Truman administration in 1950 mistakenly and inadvertently backed away from its public commitment to defend South Korea.

The record is clear. War is not made more likely when the military power of democracies is restored. It becomes more likely when the strength or will of those nations comes into question. No one has accused our Administration of allowing that to happen. We intend to keep it that way, and by doing so, and by remaining willing to engage in productive negotiations with the Soviet Union, we will keep the world as safe a place as a strong, prudent, United States can make it.

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

10
ID 8490108

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS(S)
1/3/16 CAG

RECEIVED 31 JAN 84 20

TO

McFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 27 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR

MOSCOW

ZAGLADIN

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM ZAGLADIN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

McFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(K / K)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane	X 1/31	For information		
Pres	P 2/1	For information		
	C 2/1	Pres Noted		No Copies

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

959 11

National Security Council The White House

147 P8: 09

System # II

Package # 90108

NO COPIES

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[initials]</i>	
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	RCM HAS SEEN	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

1/28
Last pg 6b
memo
revised

I don't know who is to prepare the answer Jack suggests -- or is he proposing raising it with State for now.

Jack will talk to Bud about this.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/5/2016

File Folder

USSR (1/27/84-1/31/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

25

365

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172012 MEMO

1 1/27/1984 B1

J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE MESSAGE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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
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NLRR

748-25-9-3-8

SYSTEM II
90108

BY

NARA DATE

1/5/16

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

170213

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Horowitz Conversations in Moscow

DATE & PLACE: January 26, 1984; Admiral Poindexter's Office

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, Administrative Assistant to
Senator Edward Kennedy
Admiral Poindexter
Jack Matlock

Horowitz said that he had come over to deliver a message from Zagladin, with whom he had a long conversation in Moscow on Thursday, January 19--that is, after the President's speech on U.S.-Soviet relations and the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Stockholm (although it was not certain that Zagladin had yet received a report of the meeting).

Horowitz said that his meeting with Zagladin began with Zagladin delivering a lengthy and vitriolic polemic against U.S. policy and the President personally. He even compared the present situation to the thirties and the President to Hitler, in the sense that he seemed to be preparing for war. He said the Soviets could not figure out what our aims were. He asked rhetorically if we were trying to frighten them, and observed that our policies had forced Soviet decisions on new weapons which had already been taken and the results of which would be apparent in two to three years. He observed that the Soviets will sacrifice whatever is necessary not to fall behind the U.S.

Zagladin then asked, again rhetorically, if the U.S. was trying to isolate them in the world, and answered that this would not work either. Then he observed that great powers have to allow each other to save face in a difficult situation, and noted, for example, that if oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were cut off, the Soviets would understand if the U.S. considered it necessary to take action to restore the flow. But then he complained about what he called a U.S. "propaganda campaign" directed at the Soviet people. He claimed that the Soviet people fear war, but that "Our greatest fear is what if--God forbid--Reagan is re-elected. Every door in every negotiation would be closed."

At this point, according to Horowitz, there was a total change in Zagladin's tone. He asked if it would be possible for Horowitz to deliver a message to the White House, and alluded to the fact that the request might appear strange, given the fact that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

Horowitz works for a Senator on the other side of the aisle. Horowitz assured him that, nevertheless, he was sure he could deliver a message if this was desired.

Zagladin then said that the situation between our two countries is serious, but that Soviet decision-makers have analyzed it and have found one area where progress might be possible. The only realistic first step seems to them to lie in the area of chemical weapons. If we could work jointly on a treaty in this area and bring it to a successful conclusion, then that would "start us on the right road."

Once this "message" was delivered, the rest of the discussion went back and forth on a variety of subjects, during which Zagladin told Horowitz that Andropov was on the mend and, indeed, that he had seen Andropov that very morning.

Other Conversations: Horowitz is a physician and had some contact with Soviet doctors. One told him that Andropov is suffering from instage renal disease, combined with hypertension. He had responded well to treatment, but had an unexpected downturn in December, from which he is recovering, is now working about three hours a day, and is likely to appear in public before the March 4 local elections. Horowitz was questioned at length, without direct reference to Andropov but clearly with the latter in mind, regarding how to deal with anesthesia during an operation on a patient who had recently undergone surgery. There was also discussion of possible new drugs which suppress the immune reaction, which suggested that consideration was being given to a kidney transplant.

During a conversation with Academician Velikhov, the latter expressed grave concern over U.S. BMD research. He said that the Soviets had researched the field and were convinced that BMD is in fact feasible, although enormously expensive, and commented that the Soviets considered it potentially supportive of first strike intentions. When questioned on the logic of this, Velikhov responded that no defensive system could be a hundred percent effective, but if a nation built one it could launch a first strike confident that the BMD would limit damage from a retaliatory strike to acceptable proportions.

Horowitz said that his principal contact in Moscow was Andrei Pavlov of the State Committee for Science and Technology, with whom he had worked during the 1978 visit of Senator Kennedy and that Pavlov's deputy, Valery Antonov, accompanied him at all times. (Pavlov had been instrumental in 1978 in arranging a meeting between Kennedy and Brezhnev after the meeting was initially refused.) He also noted that, before leaving, he received a call from a person named "Latva," who was identified as a personal assistant to Andropov, and who thanked him for coming. He took this as a signal that Andropov was aware of his visit and wished that fact to be known.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

3

At various times during the visit Pavlov, Velikhov and Antonov indicated they thought the President would be re-elected which would make arms control agreements nearly impossible to achieve in the second term.

Horowitz said that he had also discussed some "private matters" and expected to have further contacts if he could be of use to us. He said that Senator Kennedy considered the matter beyond politics and was ready to be of assistance if we desired, but would not be at all offended if we did not desire. He asked that his report not be disseminated widely and was assured that access to it would be confined to the West Wing.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

System II
90108 ~~025~~

18

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSWFM --CPUA
To: NSWFM --CPUA

01/27/84 14:01:22

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

Subject: Forwarding Note 01/27/84 12:31 Meeting with Horowitz
please follow up with jack.

*** F O R W A R D E D N O T E ***

To: Jack Matlock

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 608 NARA, Date 1/5/96

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Meeting with Horowitz

I debriefed Bud and he found it very interesting. He would like to have a
memcon of the meeting.

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

Action: JACK MATLOCK

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At various times during the visit Pavlov, Velikhov and Antonov ~~all~~ indicated they thought the President would be re-elected which would make arms control agreements nearly impossible to achieve in the second term.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-9-3-8

BY kol NARA DATE 4/9/0



Washington, D.C. 20505

74825-9-4-7
BY SCOR 1/5/86

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MORI/CDF
C05194219

30 January 1984

Soviet Reaction to the US Marine Presence in Lebanon

Summary

Several developments in addition to the MNF arrival in the fall of 1982 constrained the Soviets from playing a more active role in that country. These other factors pertain today and argue against a major effort by the USSR to increase its presence in Lebanon should the Marines be withdrawn. Principal among these is Syria's own military position in Lebanon -- rendering broader Soviet military involvement unnecessary -- and Damascus' demonstrated determination to play the lead in Lebanon and keep the Soviets in a supporting role. Withdrawal of the Marines would serve Soviet interests principally because it would be regarded as a setback in the region for the US at the hands of a Soviet client; it would also ease Soviet concerns about a US-USSR confrontation. [REDACTED]

25

1. A number of events coincided in the fall of 1982 to work against any Soviet effort to increase influence in Lebanon. Israel had just pushed Moscow's two allies in the country -- Syria and the PLO -- out of southern Lebanon. The MNF contingents arrived. The Lebanese Government of President Sarkis, with whom the Soviets were on good terms, was replaced by a staunchly pro-US and pro-Israeli Phalangist regime. [REDACTED]

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2. Two long-term factors, together with these events, thwarted any Soviet effort to take a more activist role. First, the Soviets do not consider Lebanon an area in which they have a vital interest. It is important to them because Syria -- their primary (and for now only) ally in the region -- considers it vital and because of a broader desire to counter US activity throughout the region. Most important, Moscow has deferred to Damascus, which is highly protective of its position in Lebanon. The USSR has links with various Lebanese factions, but is not a major benefactor for any save the Lebanese Communist Party, a relatively minor player. Moscow's willingness to defer to Syria was magnified in the fall of 1982 as the Soviets attempted to repair the damage to their relationship with Syria

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SECRET

stemming from its relative inaction during the June war. Moreover, the presence of over 50,000 Syrian soldiers in Lebanon rendered a broader Soviet military role unnecessary. []

25

3. The Intelligence Community has concluded in its most recent SNIE on Lebanon that the USSR's need to repair ties with Damascus in 1982 and the subsequent introduction of US forces prompted growing Soviet military and political support, including the deployment of Soviet-manned SA-5 surface-to-air missile complexes, for Syrian policies in Lebanon -- support which has emboldened President Assad.

What if We Leave?

4. The Intelligence Community has concluded that Moscow's primary objective in Lebanon today is having the US forces removed. The Kremlin appears to be concerned that the Marine presence is part of a trend of growing US military activity in the Middle East. Beyond the benefits from the elimination of what the Soviets see as a US forward base in an important region, Moscow would view the Marines' departure as a defeat for American policy and would spread that impression throughout the Middle East. In the wake of a US withdrawal, Syria would press Gemayel through support for his Muslim opponents, and would probably anticipate that the withdrawal of direct US backing would force Beirut to come to terms in short order. []

25

5. Moscow's relationship with Syria, however, makes it unlikely that the Soviets themselves would get more directly involved in Lebanon if the Marines leave. The issue of Lebanon has caused strains in Soviet-Syrian relations in the past, which neither side is likely to want to aggravate. The Syrians feel strongly about what they view as their predominance and would oppose any Soviet attempts to build an independent base of influence there. For its part, Moscow probably still holds some of the reservations about Syrian expansionism in Lebanon that it openly expressed in the 1970s. Soviet officials have complained privately about Assad's failure to consult them on Syrian strategy there. []

25

6. Soviet concern about a possible confrontation with US forces probably has encouraged Moscow to urge Syrian restraint in Lebanon even more emphatically since the Marine deployment than it had traditionally. Although the removal of the Marines would ease this concern, the Kremlin's respect for Israel's military capabilities would probably lead it to continue to urge caution upon the Syrians. The Soviets would be unable and unwilling, however, to bring significant pressure to bear to stop any effort by President Assad to capitalize on a US withdrawal. []

25

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIEDNOVAL
URE(S)

RECEIVED 01 FEB 84 15

DOCDATE 31 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR

GREEN, TOM

PEARCE, TERRY

SUBJECT: PEACE INITIATIVE IDEA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 06 FEB 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Mcfarlane	X 2/31	For decision		
Matlock	S 2/2	For further action		
Mcfarlane	X 2/1	Fwd to Pres for Sig		
Pers	f 2/6	For sig		
	C 2/7	Pers Sig		JM
DISPATCH	2/8 B	W/ATTCH FILE	PA	(10)

23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 7, 1984

Dear Tom and Terry:

Thank you for calling to my attention your proposal entitled "Taking the Essential Step Now to End War between Nations in Our Lifetime."

I think you are to be commended for the imagination and hard work which went into developing this proposal. I know that it required considerable personal sacrifice on your part and I admire your faith in the possibility of reaching out to the humane instincts which God has given every human being.

But in considering your proposal, I must give careful thought to how Chairman Andropov is likely to interpret it. The fact is that when I called for an expansion of our dialogue in an effort to solve problems between us, the Soviets charged me with political grandstanding and ill intentions. Now, I'm not going to give up on my effort to engage the Soviets in an intensive problem-solving dialogue. That effort is going forward, and I hope it will bring some concrete results soon. I fear that if I endorse your proposal at this time, the Soviets would interpret it as a ruse, to get off our problem-solving agenda. I know that this is not your intent, but feel that the Soviets are likely to view it that way.

Tom and Terry, your selfless efforts to promote peace provide another wonderful example of what I have always said makes America great: the dedication of our people to contribute their time and talents to making the world a better place. I

hope that the time will soon come when proposals such as yours can be accepted by our adversaries in the true spirit in which they are offered. It is my goal to bring us to that point.

Thank you again for sharing your idea with me.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mr. B. Tom Green
Mr. N. Terry Pearce
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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172016 MEMO		2	2/6/1984	B1
MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE PEACE INITIATIVE				

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NLRR 748-25-9-6-5
BY 706B NARA DATE 4/8/17

172484

DRAFT

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS IN OUR LIFETIME

JANUARY 1984

TO: President Yuri Andropov
Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping
President Ronald Reagan

This message is being privately presented to each of you by individuals you know and trust, who represent only themselves. The idea carried is merely a new form of one which is already yours. It is to take an essential step, now, which will make possible, in our lifetime, a shared goal: the end of war between nations. It is the power of history, and the contributions of millions before you, which have created the unique conditions which now allow you to play this significant role in human history. This week, the idea is being offered to all three of you through similar informal channels:

- To Deng Xiaoping -
- To Ronald Reagan - (names deleted for the Progress Report)
- To Yuri Andropov -

PROLOGUE

Throughout history and in virtually every country of the world, shifts have occurred in the attitude of the populace which appear to have been sudden, and which precipitated the taking of action to bring about a fundamental and monumental change in the direction of cultures. These sudden shifts were brought about by some dramatic, catalytic action which merely confirmed that which was already wanted could be. These dramatic actions changed what appeared to be a "dream" into an attainable, practical goal to be achieved. The many problems were then addressed and solved to bring about the previously only dreamed-about results. This is a plan to evoke such a shift in attitude on a global scale.

GOAL

To create a global political climate in early 1984 which, for the first time in history, actually supports and facilitates achieving the monumental challenge of ending war between nations in our lifetime.

This climate of possibility will be created through an effectively implemented dramatic, catalytic action which focuses the worlds' commitment on this goal. A measurement of the goal's achievement will be a working, non-violent process of conflict resolution.

SCOPE

The plan is to create the necessary climate of commitment to the goal. Implementation will not require you or any leader or any country to change a position, nor does this plan address solutions to the many complex problems which will need resolution before the end of war and the threat of war as an instrument of national policy can be accomplished. The plan will be effective in focusing all such efforts, for the first time, so the result will be accomplished - the establishment of a continuing process of practical peace - in our lifetime.

BASIS

For all things done, at least three elements are present in sequence:

- The result is wanted. (Will)
- The result is seen as really possible. (Commitment is made.)
- Actions are taken to produce it.

If will is assumed, then the achievement of a goal depends on it being seen as possible in a way that spurs action to accomplish the result. The difference between dreams that are merely dreamt and goals that are actually realized is the commitment, expressed strongly enough to evoke possibility, which brings reality to the result.

Much of the world population now wants to end war as an instrument of national policy, and much action is being taken to bring it about. The goal is not reached because the world does not see the whole, the result of the end of war between nations, as a real possibility. Accordingly, nations are working on the parts: disarmament, the Middle East, Central America, containment, detente trade, cultural and scientific exchanges, - as one would work on a jigsaw puzzle with one critical element missing: the boxtop. The boxtop for this puzzle is the whole: the goal of finding a way to end war and the threat of war as instruments of national policy. It is a goal shared by much of the world and one we can now commit to achieving by some time in the foreseeable future.

Possibility can be evoked by someone with the perceived power to produce the result declaring the possibility, stating the commitment, and thereby enrolling others totally in the result. In a family, such goals are often set by parents, in business by the chairman, and for nations by the body or individual with the power in the proper domain. Various bodies in each of your countries literally declare social change, and Heads of State literally declare war. In these examples, such declaration evokes possibility in a way that spurs action. Agreement by everyone isn't necessary, and in fact action opposing the result is often brought forth by such declaration. The result is seen as possible by all, whether they agree with the result or not.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

- The Reformation
- The end of slavery in the United States
- India's independence from Great Britain
- Egypt - Israeli "peace"
- America's Man-on-the-Moon
- American/Chinese normalization

29

In all of these cases, the declarer, the one who recognized and stated the real possibility, changed the "dream" to a goal, expressed a commitment to achieve it, and is recognized as the significant participant, even though all of the complex problems remained to be solved. Those credited with the cited events are clearly Luther, Lincoln, Ghandi, Sadat, Kennedy and Nixon/Mao. Others who followed did the work inside of the commitment and brought about the result.

We assert that the primary distinction between these examples and the end of war between nations is one of scale. There has not been a worldwide goal in the history of the planet, yet the basis for accomplishment, the principles, are the same. What catalytic action now could create a similar climate of real possibility for the ending of war as an instrument of national policy?

THE PLAN

A new global climate can be established by a joint televised declaration by the three of you: President Reagan, President Andropov and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping stating your commitment, and your countries' commitment, to the goal of ending war between nations by a definite time. This commitment will be to have in place, and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations, by a specific time in the foreseeable future, perhaps within ten years.

The commitment will be dramatically stated, simultaneously, to the people of your individual countries, and then directly by you to each other's countries and to the world, via international media. Such a joint declaration by you, who have the perceived power to make it so, will be the catalytic action which will create the necessary climate to allow the work going on to actually bring about the result.

The declaration will not require you or any leader to change his position on the method of bringing about the result and will create the atmosphere, overnight, for constructive discussion and re-evaluation of those positions in light of the fresh, time-specific commitment to the now-transcendent common interest: finding a way to end war between nations in our lifetime.

The declaration will include an invitation by you to the rest of the world to join in the commitment, and will be immediately followed that same day by announcements by each leader of a package of feasible unilateral actions, no matter how small. These actions will be initiated to demonstrate each nation's commitment to the goal, and to accelerate the process of bringing about the desired result. The actions will grow in number and significance until the result, a process of real peace, is achieved.

RISKS

If the time is not right, the shift in global attitude will not occur, and the world will continue on its present course. You will only receive credit for trying. If the time is right, and the shift occurs, your nations, and all nations, now supported by the world's commitment, will not just address but will solve the real and complicated challenges to achieving the goal. You and your three nations will have facilitated a magnificent step in human history. The risk of the present course is great. The risk of the declaration is minimal.

DISTINCTIONS

Other "agreements" regarding ending war have been made in the past, all have served and all have been insufficient, including the commitment in the U.N. Charter. There are differences in this idea:

1. THE-TIME-IN-HISTORY. The result is truly wanted by a critical mass of the world's people. This result is now deeply desired, and is greatly strengthened by the awareness of the real and growing threat of human extinction.
2. THOSE COMMITTING. You, the leaders of the three most powerful countries, collectively, have the perceived power to take the actions necessary to realize this first formal global goal.
3. THE FORMAT Making for the first time a joint, time-specific commitment directly to the others' countries, and to the world, is dramatic and evoking. The first-time use of this form of world-wide television makes attention of the world possible.
4. THE CONTENT Past declarations of commitment to end war have all had provisions of exception. This one commits only to achieving the goal, the end of war as an instrument of national policy by a definite date. The umbrella of common interest is broad, with the end being measurable: an effective, non-violent process of conflict resolution, in place and working by a specific time.

FORMAT-DETAILS

No summit meeting is required. Each of you will first address your nation, stating your commitment, and then directly address, via media, the other two countries, stating the same commitment. Each declaration contains common elements:

- The commitment of you and your country to the goal: to end war between nations by a specific time agreed to in advance, perhaps within ten years, and to have in place and working, a non-violent process of conflict resolution between nations by that specific time.
- An invitation to the rest of the world to join in the commitment.
- A statement that within the next 24 hours, at a specific time, actions will be announced by each of you to demonstrate your commitment to finding a way to achieve this historic goal. These will be unilateral, and as substantive as possible; however, the presence of action is more significant than the substance.

CONCLUSION

The declaration is simple, safe and serves your personal interest. No positions need be changed by this dramatic statement.

The statement of the goal by you, who have the perceived power to accomplish it will create the necessary climate by making the goal real and achievable to the world, and the specific date set for its achievement will allow for safe transition to the now-realizable condition of a world in which war between nations is unacceptable.

The emissaries bringing this thought support you in playing a pivotal role as one of three who can actually state this commitment for the world. History has brought you this opportunity. The world will commit to the goal sometime. If you wish, you can take this initiative now to create the historical turning point which will allow the goal's achievement in your family's lifetime.

The substance of The Declaration of Commitment will be your joint statement:

"I hereby commit (my country) to the goal of ending war between nations within ten years, and invite the world to join in this commitment. I will announce (within 24 hours) unilateral actions to demonstrate our intention."

NEXT STEPS

Within one week, your initial reactions, delivered to the individual presenting this will be exchanged with the private emissaries to the other leaders. You will each be informed of the others' responses. Your response to your emissary should include:

- Your willingness to pursue the plan another step if the others are.
- Your general concurrence with the procedures delineated below, unless modified by consensus.

General Procedures:

1. The substantive message of the declaration made by all of you will be identical. Any refinements necessary in the language of the declaration or in the date by which a means for a safe transition will be achieved, will be mutually agreed. The specific date stated as the goal in the declaration will be before the year 2000.
2. The date for making the declaration will be mutually agreed and will be before April 1984.
3. There will be no public acknowledgement of these discussions prior to the declaration. Any inquiries will be responded to in the same way; we suggest: "We are always looking for ways of opening discussions on subjects of mutual interest, and we continue to do so."
4. Any consultation with allies will be done in strict privacy at the highest levels.
5. Each leader will address his nation first. The sequence of speaking to other nations will be determined by lot. A copy of your and the other leaders' remarks to the other two nations will be exchanged three days before the declaration.
6. One week prior to the declaration, each party will deliver to the others concurrently, the list of minimum intended unilateral actions each plans for announcement within 24 hours of the declaration. Three days before the declaration, the list will again be exchanged, with any modifications.
7. The working language for these exchanges will be English. A possible text for a United States version of the declaration of commitment by President Reagan is included with this document only to provide a general sense of content, not to suggest specifics.

The initial response of the other two leaders and protocol for the next exchange will be communicated through these same private emissaries within two weeks of your initial response.

History has given you the unique privilege of being one of the first three spokesmen for the whole world. It is an honor to be part of bringing this history shaping opportunity to you.

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172485	REPORT TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS: BACKGROUND OF PRINCIPALS	1	1/1/1984	B6

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MEMORANDUM

0897
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

February 3, 1984

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

NARA, Date 1/5/16

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Green-Pearce Initiative

Attached at TAB I is a Memorandum to the President explaining the problems with giving support to the Green-Pearce suggestion, and at TAB A a letter from the President to them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Letter to Messrs. Green and Pearce
Tab B	Proposal by Tom Green and Terry Pearce

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

807 26
7 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: System Actions from Poindexter

897 - Green-Pearce Initiative --- Florence said the President has approved subject item to be signed as "Ronald Reagan" - and to send this through Darman.

Phyllis

cc: Brian ✓
Bill Martin

2/8
CJ to Sarah / Darman's etc

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172017 MEMO

1 1/31/1984 B1

MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PEACE INITIATIVE

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**National Security Council
The White House**

84 JAN 31 P 5: 47

System # I

Package # 0897

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>✓</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>X</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>Further action per Bud's note</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: () VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Poindexter

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

RECEIVED

National Security Council
The White House

84 FEB 3 P 3: 32

System #

I

Package #

0897 Add-on
AC

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	WFM	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	2		A
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	3		D
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

on Monday

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


January 30, 1984

TO: JACK MATLOCK

Jack:

Could you please look through these papers, particularly those clipped together at back. The two gentlemen involved have significant sponsorship with the President. Do you think that their going through with it would have any serious downside consequences? Please advise. I am afraid it is not going to go away.

Many thanks.


Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment

12:40 p.m.
January 30, 1984

Do you
have
original
paper?
(attached) →

RCM:

Tom Green and Terry Pearce called --

Progress continues. They want to bring you up-to-date and make two requests.

Where the plan is now is that the document has been delivered to Deng Xiaoping. Our emissary has requested a tentative response by February 10.

We have identified the appropriate emissary to take the document to the Soviets: Bill Verity. They believe that you are familiar with him in that he has carried a few documents for President Carter and one as well for President Reagan. He is with USA-USSR Trade Council and is the former Chairman of ARMCO. Their first request: they want to arrange an appointment for Mr. Verity to meet with you either Wednesday afternoon or Thursday of this week. He is coming to Washington and will be meeting with Amb. Dobrynin.

They have talked to George Kennan and a number of people who felt his counsel and his possible participation going with Mr. Verity might be useful. He is two weeks short of being 80 years old and feels very strongly about not doing many activities that require a lot of energy but is very ^{is} intrigued by the plan. He wants confirmation that it truly supported by the government before taking the next step; wants to be sure that this isn't just some private effort without the blessing of the government. Could you or someone from your office call George Kennan and indicate knowledge and support of the plan and request that he look at it seriously with regard to giving his counsel and participation.

How do you wish to handle?

1) Appt with Bill Verity:

_____ Squeeze him in

☒ Unable to do this week;
willing to do later

Other: _____

2) Call to George Kennan:

_____ Yes

☒ No

Do you wish to brief an NSC staff person and turn this project over to them for handling?

☒ Yes: Matlock

_____ No, I will handle

Wilma

I have
been
engaged
on other
issues!
This will
have to
wait for a
couple of weeks

Tom Green or Terry Pearce in San Francisco:

415/435-9663

415/435-0510

(If no answer, leave message on machine)

George Kennan:

After 4:30 pm today through Wed of this week
515/236-8855 (Univ of Iowa - ask for Rita)

Princeton Ofc: 609/734-8314

4X
January 27, 1984

RCM HAS SEEN

RCM:

Terry Pearce called --

He wanted to report to you that progress continues. He and Tom Green are currently focussing on quickly finalizing the American emissary. They will keep you informed as things move along.

Wilma

[You met with them on January 12 after referral from Cathy Osborne for the President.]

45
January 6, 1984

RCM:

Cathy Osborne called --

Albert Schwabacher, a very, old, old, old friend of the President's who is from the San Francisco Bay area -- corresponds regularly with the President and they talk on the telephone regularly called on December 26.

For background, Cathy offered that Mr. Schwabacher is with Dean Witter Reynolds; very wealthy; very smart. He and a couple of friends are very concerned and very involved about a "peace plan." Cathy doesn't know whether they are putting a report together or what, but they called the President and asked him who they should talk with in Washington. The President told them to come in and talk with "Bud."

Cathy advises that Mr. Schwabacher will call on Monday afternoon to try to arrange an appointment to get together with you for himself along with two reputable friends:

Tom Green 415/435-9663

^{Pierce}
Terry ~~Pierce~~ (sp?) 415/435-0510

They have talked with Vance, Carter and have Nixon's new book (private printing) "The Real Peace".

Cathy just wanted to alert you that they would be calling and allow you to decide whether you would meet with them personally or ask someone else to do.

Given fact that Mr. Schwabacher is a very, very good friend of President's, do you want me to schedule when he calls?

Yes

Refer to JMP

Other: _____

*Holmes
Suttle*
Wilma

Cathy Osborne

1/9 in U.C. at 292-2600 X 1017
not scheduled
11:30 AM January 11, 1984

N. Terry Pearce
400 San Rafael Ave.
Belvedere, California 94920

(415) 435-0510
(415) 435-0585

B. TOM GREEN
2349 SPANISH TRAIL
TIBURON, CALIFORNIA 94920
(415) 435-9664

48
1-12-84

But.

Your ability to see this idea for what it is comes from your humanness -
Thank God you are where you are.

The dramatization referred to in the draft is attached. It is no way an attempt to craft a speech, but rather is only an example to evoke the experience of the shift in climate resulting from whatever the three choose to say.

We are proceeding to refine and translate the document of delivery and to finalize arrangements with the emissaries. We will call early next week and know you will contact us with any thoughts that would serve to assist us in avoiding mistakes.

Warmest regards.

James Tom

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW

TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS WITHIN TEN YEARS

A Dramatization

"My fellow Americans, today it is my privilege to report to you on the most significant turning point in human history: the time when the world has chosen to move to end war between nations...to move beyond the use or threat of mass destruction as an acceptable means of resolving our conflicts as nations. I am speaking to you at this time of day and with these other representatives of our nation because right now, simultaneously, President Andropov and representatives of the Soviet government are addressing the people of the Soviet Union, and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China are addressing their people.

Our three nations, and in fact all nations, have vast differences. We do not embrace their forms of government; they do not embrace ours. Without being blind to the real differences between people, we know the people of all nations have common human interests. We all inhabit the planet, breathe the same air and cherish our children's future.

This growing interdependence, combined with the real and increasing threat of mutual extinction, and the contributions by millions today and throughout history toward this goal of peace, create the conditions in which the time is right, NOW, to bring forth peace between all nations. No nation, no leader alone, can produce world peace. Many have tried and it has not been achieved. For the first time in human history it is now time for the world to focus on and commit to ending war between nations.

Accordingly, in concert with President Andropov for the Soviet Union, and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping for the People's Republic of China, and using the power heretofore used by our Presidents to declare war, I hereby declare and commit the United States of America to achieving the end of war between nations within ten years, and we invite everyone in the world to join in this commitment.

Fellow Americans, peace between nations is possible now. There will be risks. We will maintain our freedom and security. It will not be easy, and with your support and that of the world's people, in the next 10 years we will develop an effective, non-violent means of resolving our conflicts as nations. We will realize conditions where war and the threat of war are obsolete as instruments of national policy.

In a few moments, President Andropov and Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping will be directly addressing you stating their countries' commitment to us and to the world, and I will be directly addressing their nations on your behalf. Then this evening I will be speaking to you and a joint session of Congress about specific actions already underway and being taken today to produce peace between nations within ten years, and about the role each of us can play in this shared journey.

As I said last Thanksgiving, "Let us work for peace, and as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, 'Oh God of love, Oh King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease.' Thank you, good day, and God bless you."

TAKING THE ESSENTIAL STEP NOW

TO END WAR BETWEEN NATIONS IN OUR LIFETIME

Note: This fictional dramatization is only an example, and the President of the United States might say something like this. He would say only what is true for him, and we are not writing his speech. This draft is only a form of support for him to express whatever is truly his vision of peace between nations.

The President of the United States of America's Speech, Early 1984

As announced earlier, our regularly scheduled program has been rescheduled to permit a special address by the President, the topic of which has not been announced. No one here knows what the President will be speaking about, or why he has chosen 10:00 in the morning to do so. We have just learned that with him in the Oval Office are his wife Nancy, their children and closest friends, Vice President Bush, former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon, all of the Democratic Presidential candidates, House Speaker O'Neill, and Senator Baker - obviously a remarkable and historic gathering. The President is about to speak.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the Oval Office in the White House, The President of the United States...

(over, please...)