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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, National  
Security Council: Country File

**Folder Title:**

USSR (02/04/1984-02/11/1984)

**Box:** RAC Box 25

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 1/5/2016

**File Folder** USSR (2/4/84-2/11/84)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 25

SKINNER

366

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172019	MEMO	R. LEVINE TO J. POINDEXTER RE STATE MEMO ON U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY  <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-1-8</b>	1	2/23/1984	B1
172020	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE U.S.- SOVIET BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS  <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-2-7</b>	1	2/4/1984	B1
172021	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE WHAT IF ANDROPOV DIES  <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-3-6</b>	1	2/6/1984	B1
172022	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO G. SHULTZ RE FISHERIES AGREEMENT  <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-4-5</b>	1	ND	B1
172023	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE FISHERIES AGREEMENT	1	2/18/1984	B1
172024	MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE FISHERIES AGREEMENT  <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-6-3</b>	2	2/8/1984	B1
172025	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE FISHERIES AGREEMENT	1	2/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172026	REPORT	DOBRYNIN AND THE POLITBURO <b>PAR 10/12/2010 CREST NLR-748-25-10-8-1</b>	5	2/2/1984	B1
172027	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S. REPRESENTATION AT ANDROPOV FUNERAL (W/ADDED NOTE)	2	2/10/1984	B1
172028	REPORT	RE USSR <b>D 1/26/2012 CREST NLR-748-25-10-13-5</b>	2	2/10/1984	B1
172029	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE IMPACT OF ANDROPOV'S DEATH ON SOVIET POLICY <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-10-10-8</b>	2	2/10/1981	B1
172030	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL AND U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS (W/ADDED NOTE)	5	2/10/1984	B1
172032	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CHERNENKO: INITIAL THOUGHTS (INCL. ATTACHED REPORT)	6	2/10/1984	B1

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8401052

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

RECEIVED 06 FEB 84 08

DOCDATE 04 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

MARITIME

SUBJECT: US - SOVIET BOUNDARY NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 06 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

LEVINE

ROBINSON

FORTIER

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF# 8403604

LOG

NSCIFID

( CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Poincaré	X	2/23 for info		
Levine	S	2/29 for further action		
		Action Completed		
	C	3/17 No Further Action Per Levine		Lrv

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MR

ml 1006 2

RECEIVED

National Security Council  
The White House

84 FEB 23 P 3: 24

System # 1

Package # 1052

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4		X
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
LEVINE	4		

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Do not agree with sales  
without checking back with  
Budor J. J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1052

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

NLRT 748-28-10-1-8

February 23, 1984

INFORMATION

BY LCR NARA DATE 4/8/17

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM:

RICHARD LEVINE *R*

SUBJECT:

State Memo on U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary

The attached State memo (TAB A) notes that our delegation was unable to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation at the recent Washington meeting on the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary. A follow-up meeting is planned for Moscow. The action-forcing event here is Interior off-shore lease sales in the contested area.

At the end of this week, February 23-24, I will enter into interagency discussions with Interior (Dick Morris) and State (Liz Verville) on our position vis-a-vis the lease sales, given the lack of quick progress on the boundary question. Currently, some of us think going ahead with the lease sales would strengthen our hand in our negotiations with the Soviets (I understand this is Judge Clark's view). Others think that such sale offerings would needlessly complicate the negotiations. In any case, no company is expected to bid on the contested area and close consultations between the concerned agencies will take place before this matter is decided. I will continue to keep you informed.

Attachment

TAB A State memo

cc: Matlock, Robinson, Thompson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

United States Department of State



NLRR 74825-102-7

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY 1055 NARA DATE 4/8/13

February 4, 1984 172020

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE 84 - 4 P 3 54

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Boundary Negotiations

U.S. and Soviet delegations met January 30 - February 3 to consider a U.S. proposal to split equally the area between our differing depictions of the 1867 Convention Line. The U.S. considers that Line as the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary. Although the Soviets specifically agreed to use the Line to divide our fisheries jurisdictions in 1977, we had no similar agreement for continental shelf purposes.

The Soviets were prepared to agree to our proposal along certain segments in the Bering Sea and North Pacific Ocean and to use the Convention Line to divide our respective maritime jurisdictions north of the Bering Strait. However, the Soviet side raised a serious new element. They indicated that they are not prepared to use the Convention Line as the maritime boundary in two areas of the Bering Sea: first, in an area within 200 miles of the Soviet coast but beyond 200 miles of the U.S. coast; and second, in an area which is beyond 200 miles of both coasts. We learned for the first time that they claim 200 mile fisheries or EEZ jurisdiction in the former area and believe that the latter area should be divided roughly in half by a line which would lie to our side of the Convention Line. We rejected both Soviet proposals and said we could agree only to a total resolution.

The Soviet response was disappointing in that we had hoped for an early resolution. At the same time, this initial response is not surprising since any depiction of the 1867 Convention Line in the Bering Sea would be highly advantageous to the U.S.

Difficult questions remain regarding the scheduled March 1984 Outer Continental Shelf Lease sale, part of which lies in the area the Soviets claim. They dropped a strong marker that neither side should engage in activity which would jeopardize a mutually acceptable resolution of the issue and stated that they reserved the right to take appropriate measures to defend their lawful interests. We responded that our proposal had been put forward to avoid precisely such a complication, urged them to give it careful consideration and admonished them against claiming fisheries jurisdiction or an EEZ in an area which we regard as our continental shelf.

Another round in Moscow is anticipated in the near future.

*Charles Hill*Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490142

UPIC SPEED UPON REMOVAL  
OFC FILED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 06 FEB 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK 1/5/86

DOCDATE 06 FEB 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY

SUBJECT: WHAT IF ANDROPOV DIES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( B / K )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

FEB 2 7 1984

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)



974 uml 6

**RECEIVED**  
**National Security Council**  
**The White House**

84 FEB 6 P 4: 51

System # II

Package # 90142

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>h</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Phyllis*

Please copy for John Poindexter —  
Send original through to Bud via Wilma. WM

*2/8 Done*  
*Phyllis*

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II  
90142

172021

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

February 6, 1984

INFORMATION

NLRR 74825-103-6

BY KON NARA DATE 1/5/16

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jew*  
SUBJECT: What If Andropov Dies?

IS SEEN

NOTED

The sudden cancellation of Ustinov's visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene, and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov's condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov's demise.

I believe that Andropov's passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov's successor.

Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the "pro" side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the "cons" are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.

My initial view is that the "pros" would slightly outweigh the "cons" if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President's going if a successor has not been named.

You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday. I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don't believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED  
OF CLASSIFIED EVIDENCE

1/5/16 KOB

RECEIVED 09 FEB 84 14 8

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 08 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

POLAND

CM

URGENT

SUBJECT FISHERIES AGREEMENTS W/ SOVIET UNION &amp; POLAND

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 10 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF# 8403815

LOG

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( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane	X 2/10	For Signature		
Pres	P FEB 18 1984	Pres for decision		VP
	C FEB 20 1984	Pres approved		JM, DO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1178  
(S/S 8403815)

10

NLRR 74825-104-5  
BY EDB NARA DATE 4/8/17

172022


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Fisheries Agreements with the Soviet Union and  
Poland

The President has reviewed and approves your recommendation that the Governing International Fisheries Agreements (GIFA) with the Soviet Union and Poland be renewed for 18 months, reserving the right to terminate their benefits if warranted.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
Robert C. McFarlane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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172023 MEMO

1 2/18/1984 B1

MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE FISHERIES  
AGREEMENT

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM:

Collection Exec. Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Series \_\_\_\_\_

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # USSR (2/4/84-2/11/84)

Box Number 25

Description of Material:

Memo, Kenneth Dam to Reagan, 2/8/84, 2p.  
(w/ signature)

TO:

Collection: Historic Preservation File

Series: \_\_\_\_\_

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # USSR (2/4/84-2/11/84)

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Transferred by: K. B. Aron

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1178

172024

04 FEB 9 A6: 15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTONWHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**CONFIDENTIAL**

February 8, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

HLRR 748-2576-63

BY 160 NARA DATE 1/5/16

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *ftd*

SUBJECT: Fisheries Agreements with the Soviet Union and Poland

The Governing International Fisheries Agreements (GIFAs) with the U.S.S.R. and Poland expire on July 1 this year. Unless the GIFAs are renewed, fisheries joint ventures under these agreements off the U.S. West Coast would terminate.

Under the joint fisheries ventures which have been operating for several years, about 50 U.S. trawlers and 200 fishermen catch fish in our waters and turn them over to Soviet and Polish factory ships for processing. Last year U.S. fishermen reportedly earned about \$30 million. Without the GIFAs, they would face severe economic hardship in a depressed industry. No Polish operations took place in 1983, but they are expected to resume this year, since we have lifted the Polish fish allocation sanction.

The Commerce Department, West Coast senators and several Congressmen support the joint ventures and the extensions of the GIFAs, necessary for the operations to continue.


You have approved two one-year extensions of the Soviet and Polish GIFAs. This year, we recommend a further 18-month extension to December 31, 1985 to remove the fear of U.S. fishermen that the agreement will lapse in mid-season (July), the peak of the fishing season. We reserve the right to terminate its benefits by withdrawing vessel permits on short notice should conditions require. An 18-month extension would also enable the U.S. fishermen to make firm plans to participate in the joint venture and would acknowledge their specific economic position. These extensions would not preclude renegotiation of these GIFAs at a later date.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



These extensions are consistent with our policy of conducting non-military mutually-beneficial trade on commercial terms with the U.S.S.R. and Poland. We terminated the rights of the Soviets and the Poles to engage in direct commercial fishing in response to the Afghan invasion, and the imposition of martial law, respectively. The Poles may now receive allocations, however, the GIFA extension for the U.S.S.R. would not in itself permit resumption of direct fishing by the Soviets.

Approve



Disapprove

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

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172024 MEMO

2 2/8/1984 B1

K. DAM TO REAGAN RE FISHERIES AGREEMENT

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172025 MEMO

1 2/10/1984 B1

P. DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE FISHERIES  
AGREEMENT

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15

CLASSIFICATION

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MODE

PAGES

6

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

34 FEB 84 P11 06

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RELEASER

DEX #

DTG

090335Z FEB 84

TTY #

FFAX # 13

FROM/LOCATION/

1. RADM POUNDSTER - SANTA BARBARA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Bud McFARLANE - WASHINGTON DC

2.

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

NOTIFY IN THE MORNING

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

CLASSIFICATION

# National Security Council The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package# \_\_\_\_\_

FROM HAS SE

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>MATLOCK</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>I</u>

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

## DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Bud,*  
*I had the Agency pull this together.*  
*J*

172026

2 February 1984

Dobrynin and the Politburo

## SUMMARY

Anatoliy Dobrynin probably does not get the hearing in Moscow's highest circles that he did in the halcyon days of US-Soviet relations in the early 1970s. Because of his now circumscribed access in Washington, he has less of interest to report. His boss, Foreign Minister Gromyko, has become more powerful--and reportedly more difficult to get along with--and Dobrynin may have run afoul of him in some way. Nevertheless, his skill in handling Americans is appreciated in Moscow, and he still makes an input into policy discussions on the US-Soviet relationship. As an experienced political animal, he probably avoids getting trapped in internal policy debates where there are winners and losers. If Dobrynin were to succeed in reestablishing the exclusive intermediary role he once had, both he and the Politburo would probably be pleased. Thus there are factors operating on several levels that will keep him in Washington for the foreseeable future, regardless of any bureaucratic ambitions he might have.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR

Crest

BY CN NARA DATE 4/8/13

In the 1970s Dobrynin was a highly influential member of the Brezhnev national security team. His unique access in Washington's highest circles and his critical role in the back channel arms control negotiations made him uniquely valuable to Soviet policymakers. In particular, Dobrynin apparently enjoyed good access to Brezhnev.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Today his circumstances are different. As US-Soviet relations have deteriorated and Dobrynin's access to US officials has become circumscribed, he has had less opportunity to exercise his skills on matters that thrust him into the immediate concerns of the Politburo. In effect, he no longer has anything special to communicate. His boss, Gromyko, who has had a major role in the conduct of foreign affairs since the days of Stalin, has acquired increasing political power and personal responsibility. He was a member of the powerful inner Politburo circle that aided Andropov's accession to the leadership in 1982, and became a First Deputy Premier in 1983. This has widened the political distance between Gromyko and Dobrynin, along with everybody else in the bureaucracy that Gromyko directs. And it is unlikely that Dobrynin's relationship with Andropov could be as close as it was with Brezhnev, simply because Dobrynin has not yet shared with Andropov a challenge comparable to that of the early SALT period, nor as close as the one Gromyko has with Andropov.

A case could be made that Dobrynin is in political difficulties. He did not accompany Gromyko to the foreign minister summits at Madrid and Stockholm, whereas our Ambassador to Moscow attended both. Dobrynin also did not attend the plenum of the Central Committee in December. Early in Andropov's tenure, we heard that rumors were circulating that Dobrynin was slated to return to Moscow as the Foreign Minister, although the scenario under which such a promotion could take place was never made clear. The rumors alone, however, would be enough to anger Gromyko if he got wind of them, especially if he thought that the rumormongers were acting on Dobrynin's behalf.

There have been some reports in the past, moreover, that relations between Gromyko and Dobrynin have not always been good. The reports are believable for a number of reasons. Gromyko's explosive outbursts of abuse at his subordinates are well known. Dobrynin's unique high-level access in the past, and the urbane and positive image he is able to project, in contrast to his dour and irascible boss, are enough to cause friction on the face of it. Gromyko has never been easy to work for.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

We are more ready to believe that Dobrynin may have fallen victim to Gromyko's ire--perhaps more than once--than we are to believe that Dobrynin's political fortunes have fundamentally deteriorated with the political apparatus in Moscow. Gromyko may have taken more personal responsibility for the conduct of the US-Soviet relationship than was the case before, and may have wanted to make that clear both to Dobrynin and others by not taking Dobrynin along to Madrid and Stockholm. As for the December plenum, it did not deal with foreign affairs, and Dobrynin has skipped plenums before. He may have been told to return to Washington to perform specific missions. Most importantly, as discussed later in this paper, Dobrynin has always been careful not to become a position-taker in a way that could make him a political loser. Simply being the Ambassador to the United States, and attempting to do his job in difficult times, is not enough to put him in jeopardy unless he has gone out on a limb beyond his instructions, and we have no evidence that he has ever done that.

25X'

Moreover, upon his return to Washington, Dobrynin was quick off the mark in providing a US journalist with the new policy line--i.e., that the Soviets are prepared to resume substantive exchanges in the field of arms control despite their public inflexibility on returning to the INF talks. His remarks have been consistent with those of high-level party officials such as Vadim Zagladin back in Moscow, indicating that he is still very much in the main channel in carrying out policy directives.

25X



While presenting the official party line in Washington, Dobrynin probably would attempt to secure an exclusive intermediary role for himself similar to the one he enjoyed in earlier days. From his point of view, the ideal situation would be an unpublicized channel to the top levels of the US Administration. Failing that, Dobrynin would seek, simply as a matter of tactical advantage for the Soviet side, to meet one-on-one with his talking partner, speaking English with no interpreter present. We know that Gromyko himself during the 1970s encouraged Dobrynin to employ the latter tactic, and the former was considered so desirable by the Soviets in the past that Gromyko would probably concede its usefulness today regardless of his attitude toward Dobrynin. Obviously such a role would be highly desirable from Dobrynin's personal point of view as well.


25X

25X

Dobrynin's caution would be likely to keep him from becoming involved in internal debates--at the Central Committee staff level--where there might be winner and losers. He is probably content to let others issue nuanced statements skirting around the question of whether detente is irreversible or whether the US ruling class is too fundamentally untrustworthy for the Soviet Union to deal with. As an ambassador, he would not engage in such discussions overtly anyway, but we suspect he does not do it in his cables to Moscow either.

25X1

The people who know Dobrynin's skills and services best are probably Gromyko most of all, but also Andropov and Ustinov, as both men held positions during Brezhnev's regime that gave them access to his reporting. Dobrynin is undoubtedly very careful in his dealings with Gromyko.



25X

Soviet leaders probably see Dobrynin as uniquely useful where he is, regardless of the US-Soviet climate, and they seem to have no intention of returning him to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow in the foreseeable future. He has been in Washington for almost 22 years, is dean of the diplomatic corps, and knows how to cultivate Americans. Whatever his desire to return to a higher position in Moscow, he seems destined to remain in Washington as long as Gromyko remains Foreign Minister. Gromyko is 74, however, and Dobrynin is a decade younger. He is probably content to stay where he is, move with great care, and wait to see what the future holds for him.

25X1

SYSTEM II PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8490160

UNCLASSIFIED FROM REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 10 FEB 84 15

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY

SUBJECT: US REPRESENTATION AT ANDROPOV FUNERAL

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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ACTION REQUIRED

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C FEB 11 1984

Mcfarlane approved

JM

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

✓ *see 13*  
*CR*  
National Security Council  
The White House

84 FEB 10 P 3: 10

System # II

Package # 90160

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>Wm</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>W</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

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172027 MEMO

2 2/10/1984 B1

MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.  
REPRESENTATION AT ANDROPOV FUNERAL  
(W/ADDED NOTE)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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172028 REPORT

2 2/10/1984 B1

RE USSR

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8401224

OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
1/5/16 CBR

RECEIVED 10 FEB 84 19

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY

SUBJECT: IMPACT OF ANDROPOV DEATH ON SOVIET POLICY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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National Security Council  
The White House

CF E-2  
FEB 10 P 6:47

System # I

Package # 1224

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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84 FEB 10 P 7: 29

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

February 10, 1984

~~INFORMATION~~

NLRR 748-25-10-10-8

BY CTD NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Impact of Andropov's Death on Soviet Policy

I see only minor modifications of Soviet foreign and domestic policy this year as a result of Andropov's death.

The current chill in U.S.-Soviet relations will probably continue, but the new leadership may want to reassure the Soviet people by somewhat dampening fears of a U.S.-Soviet clash which have been systematically generated for the past few years. Stopping, or at least slowing U.S. INF deployments in Western Europe will remain a high, if not the highest, priority of Soviet foreign policy. Tactics in pursuit of this objective may change, but not because of a change in leadership. ✓

The relatively modest domestic reforms initiated under Andropov will probably continue, but perhaps implemented with less draconic measures. For example, we may, for the time being, not see any more Soviet officials executed for taking bribes. ✓

The continuity we will probably see in Soviet foreign and domestic policy would be explained by a general satisfaction of the majority of the Politburo with current policies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a Soviet leadership in transition is not necessarily inhibited from making substantial policy changes. For example, soon after Stalin's death in 1953, the new leadership initiated dramatic (by Soviet standards) changes in both foreign and domestic policy which continued through the transition period until Khrushchev completely took over in 1957. For example, the Austrian State Treaty was agreed to in 1955 -- early in Khrushchev's ascent to power. These post-Stalin changes were dictated by a deep concern about Stalin's foreign and domestic policies. I do not see a similar concern in today's Politburo. ✓

I hesitate to speculate about the make-up of the new Soviet leadership, but I would guess that Gromyko and Ustinov will continue to wield considerable influence -- insuring a continuity in foreign and defense policies. The selection of Chernenko as Chairman of the Funeral Commission is, of course, interesting. As you recall, Andropov was selected for this honor after Brezhnev's death; however, I see a more collective leadership,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

for the time being, with Andropov's successor probably moving more slowly to positions of real power than did Andropov, but who knows?

At this point, I see little realistic opportunity for us to influence the new leadership one way or the other. Strictly in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations (and disregarding other possible considerations), I would recommend that, for the time being, our attitude towards the new leadership be one of watchful reserve while keeping open lines of communication with the Kremlin.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 FEB 84 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LENCZOWSKI

DOCDATE 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT ANDROPOV FUNERAL &amp; US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 10 FEB 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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( CL )

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The White House

84 FEB 10 P 1: 58

System # I

Package # 1205

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Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
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172030 MEMO

5 2/10/1984 B1

J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE  
ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL AND U.S.-SOVIET  
RELATIONS (W/ADDED NOTE)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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OF CLASSIFIED

RECEIVED 10 FEB 84 16

1/5/16 KDD

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 10 FEB 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

SUBJECT: INITIAL THOUGHTS ON CHERNENKO

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ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490160

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983 cm 18

**National Security Council  
The White House**

8 FEB 10 4:09

System # II

Package # 90161

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Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>WH</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

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cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

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Phyllis: Please make copies for Kimmitt and Poindexter, but pass original to Bud ASAP.

Done  
2/10/10  
Phyllis



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172032 MEMO

6 2/10/1984 B1

MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CHERNENKO:  
INITIAL THOUGHTS (INCL. ATTACHED REPORT)

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### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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