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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 1/5/2016

**File Folder** USSR (2/13/84-2/14/84)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 25

SKINNER

367

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172044	REPORT	RE USSR <b>D 1/26/2012 CREST NLR-748-25-11-8-0</b>	2	2/13/1984	B1
172045	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE ANDROPOV CONDOLENCE BOOK <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-11-1-7</b>	1	2/13/1984	B1
172046	MEMO	R. ROBINSON TO R. MCFARLANE RE TREASURY ISSUE SUMMARY <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-11-2-6</b>	1	2/14/1984	B1
172047	REPORT	RE SOVIET FORCED LABOR (INCL. ATTACHMENT) <b>R 1/26/2012 CREST NLR-748-25-11-3-5</b>	6	2/10/1984	B1
172048	REPORT	ANDROPOV'S LEADERSHIP STYLE AND STRATEGY (INCL. COVER MEMO FROM J. MCMAHON TO R. MCFARLANE) <b>PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-25-11-4-4</b>	3	2/14/1984	B1
172049	REPORT	RE SOVIET REACTIONARIES <b>PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-25-11-5-3</b>	17	3/18/1971	B1
172050	MEMO	SITUATION ROOM TO MCFARLANE RE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHERNENKO <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-11-6-2</b>	1	2/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172051	TALKING POINTS	RE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHERNENKO (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #172052) <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-11-7-1</b>	2	2/14/1984	B1
172052	MEMO	T. COBB TO MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-11-7-1</b>	2	2/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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## Ronald Reagan Library

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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USSR (2/13/84-2/14/84)

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367

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172044	REPORT  RE USSR	2	2/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C DOCDATE 13 FEB 84 14  
DOBRIANSKY 13 FEB 84  
LENCZOWSKI 13 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANDROPOV, YURI

SUBJECT PRES SIGNING OF ANDROPOV CONDOLENCE BOOK

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ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 14 FEB 84 STATUS C FILES PA  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8404443

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( CB HW )

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RECEIVED  
84 FEB 19 4 51 47

National Security Council  
The White House

System # I  
Package # 1254

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>please record</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Paula should also communicate this message to STATE.*

February 13, 1984

Please Note:

The following message drafted by Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski (and cleared with State) was put on a 3x5" card for the President's use and hand-carried to the West Wing. The President left at 4:30 p.m. today to sign the Andropov condolence book at the Soviet Embassy. No memoranda were needed.

fl

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE  
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV AND CONVEY MY  
SYMPATHIES TO HIS FAMILY. THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET  
PEOPLE TO DEVELOP A BETTER AND MORE  
PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL OF US.

NOTED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 8404443  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74825-11-1-7

BY Kon DATE 4/5/16

February 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Andropov Condolence Book

The Department recommends that the President pay a call on the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for Yuri Andropov. We believe such a gesture is important both because the President signed the Brezhnev condolence book fifteen months ago, and because it would reinforce our efforts to convey the President's readiness to establish a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Secretary Shultz signed the condolence book on Friday.

The Soviet Embassy is receiving visitors to sign the condolence book today and tomorrow from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

*Tometzinsky*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR



2/13/84 6

PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE  
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV AND CONVEY MY  
SYMPATHIES TO HIS FAMILY. THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET  
PEOPLE TO DEVELOP A BETTER AND MORE  
PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL OF US.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2/13/1

Admiral Poundexter

*[Red signature]*

Mr. McFarlane

*[Blue signature]*

Attached is a brief but  
thorough summary of  
the evolution of Soviet party  
chiefs (prepared by Ty Cobb).

Tom

NOTES:

- (1) Lenin took control of the Communist Party in 1903 when the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party, founded in 1898, split into the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions.
- (2) Sverdlov was the first Party Secretary, which meant that he, literally, kept the Party records.
- (3) Following Sverdlov's incapacitation and Lenin's failing health, there ensued a scramble for key positions. Most sought high-visibility offices (Trotsky--War/Foreign Ministries; Zinoviev--Communist International). Stalin, considered a drudge by his compatriots, took the low-level "General Secretary" position, along with other seemingly unimportant jobs (Rabkrin -- a super inspector general). However, Stalin used the position to pack the Party cadre positions and when the crunch came against Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev and others, he had the Party in his control.
- (4) Malenkov assumed two key positions on Stalin's death: General Secretary (Head of Party) and Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (Head of Government, or Prime Minister). The Head of State position was unimportant. However, in the collective that ruled then Malenkov was forced to choose between these two positions. Mistakenly he assumed the government job to be more important and he retained only the PM position after only ten days. Khrushchev quickly assumed power as the renamed "First Secretary", then in 1958 ousted Malenkov and others and took the PM position as well.
- (5) Brezhnev took over as First Secretary in 1964, a post he re-titled "General Secretary" in 1966, to disassociate himself from Khrushchev much as Khrushchev changed the title to rid it of the Stalinist implications. Interestingly, Brezhnev never did get the PM position -- Kosygin held it from 1964 until his death in 1981, at which time Brezhnev crony Tikhonov took over (he still has it at this time). However, Brezhnev did take the title in 1977 of "Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet" after he bounced his rival Podgornyy from that office. For the first time the "Head of State" position meant something.
- (6) Andropov immediately became General Secretary after Brezhnev's death and took the vacant Head of State (President) position in 1983..
- (7) Key positions to watch now:
  - Who will be the General Secretary?
  - Who will take the Head of State job? (May be a consolation prize).
  - Who will get the Chairmanship of the Defense Council? The position of "Commander-in-Chief" of the armed forces?
  - Will 71-year old Tikhonov remain as Head of Government or will the ineffective Brezhnev crony be replaced?

EVOLUTION OF SOVIET PARTY CHIEFS

1917-1922 Party Secretary Sverdlov	1922-1953 General Secretary Stalin	1953 General Secretary Malenkov (& P.M.)	1953-1964 First Secretary Khrushchev	1964-1966 First Secretary Brezhnev	1966-1982 General Secretary Brezhnev	1982-1984 General Secretary Andropov	1984 Key Positions to Watch
1903) <del>_____</del> (1924) Acknowledged Party Leader Lenin	<u>STALIN</u>  1941-Chairman of Presidium of Council of Ministers (Prime Minister)  1941-Generallismo (Highest Military Rank) -Chairman, GKO (Defense Council)				1977-Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet (Head of State)  1976-Chairman, (or Defense Council sooner)  1978-Marshall of the Soviet Union (Highest Rank)  ? -(Supreme??) Commander-in-Chief Chief of the Armed Forces	1983-Chairman, Presidium of Supreme Soviet (Head of State)	-- General Secretary  -- Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet  -- Chairman, Presidium of Council of Ministers (now held by 71-year old Brezhnev crony Tikhonov)  -- Chairman, Defense Council and CINC Armed Forces (Andropov probably held)

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RECEIVED 14 FEB 84 15

1/11/86 EOB

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM ROBINSON

DOC DATE 14 FEB 84

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT. TREASURY ISSUE SUMMARY RE SOVIET FORCED - LABOR IMPORTS

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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MCFarlane noted

20

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE 2A (c)

**National Security Council  
The White House**

System #

Package #

I

1278

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	WTR	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	M	I
Bob Kimmitt	6	K	
NSC Secretariat	7		
Situation Room			
We will present this May			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

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1278

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 748-25-11-2-6

February 14, 1984

INFORMATION

BY KOH NARA DATE 4/2/83

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Treasury Issue Summary on Soviet Forced-Labor Imports

We received, today, the Treasury issue paper on Soviet forced-labor imports (Tab A). As a summary of the background and chronology of events, we do not believe it adds measurably to the package we submitted to you last Friday but it does provide additional background on the process by which Treasury arrived at its position, and it is a useful measure of the atmosphere behind the issue. It summarizes:

- o The legislative rationale for instituting a partial ban on Soviet experts.
- o The chronology of events leading up to the present "imminent" decision to go forward.
- o The "pressure" on Treasury from various external factions to implement the Custom's findings.
- o Various views of Treasury, other agencies and Treasury rebuttals.

Attachment

TAB A Treasury issue paper on Soviet forced-labor imports

cc: Don Fortier  
Ken DeGraffenreid  
Walt Raymond  
Jack Matlock  
Doug McMinn  
Richard Levine

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-25-113-5

BY 601 NARA DATE 1/26/12

~~SECRET~~

170747  
FEB 10 1984

SOVIET FORCED-LABOR IMPORTS

ISSUE SUMMARY

The Statute

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC 1307) prohibits the importation of any foreign-made goods produced in whole or in part by convict, forced and/or indentured labor. The Commissioner of Customs has the delegated authority to make findings on whether such goods reasonably appear to be imported into the U.S. The Secretary of the Treasury has the statutory duty to prohibit their importation if he agrees with the Customs finding. (U)

If a forced-labor product is to be prohibited from entry, it will be detained by Customs at ports of entry; the importer will be given an opportunity to prove that it is not a forced-labor product; and, if he fails, the product will be either exported out of the U.S. by the importer or destroyed by U.S. Customs. (U)

This statute is basically a nonpunitive trade protectionist law designed to keep presumably cheaply-made foreign products out of the United States. It is not intended to be a discretionary foreign policy tool. If available information reasonably indicates that forced-labor products are being imported or are likely to be imported into the United States, the Secretary is compelled to act to prohibit their entry. (U)

Chronology

Sept. 28 -- Commissioner of Customs, based upon public reports from the CIA and the State Department, found preliminarily that Soviet forced-labor products were in 50 different types of articles imported into the United States. He requested the Secretary of the Treasury's approval to prohibit their importation. (U)

October 5 -- Assistant Treasury Secretary John Walker held an interagency meeting to discuss the recommendation, the evidence involved, and the legal, foreign policy and trade aspects. State and STR expressed strong concern over the effects of an import prohibition against Soviet-made products. (U)

October 13 -- Secretary Regan informed the SIG/IEP of the Customs finding and proposed action. SIG/IEP members were told that Treasury was developing uniform standards for enforcing the statute and that CIA was being requested to provide any additional or updated information on Soviet forced-labor products. Views of the SIG/IEP members were solicited. (U)



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- 2 -

Nov. 7 -- New, detailed CIA report on forced-labor products is provided to Customs and other involved agencies. (U)

Dec. 3 -- Final legal guidelines are adopted by Treasury and Customs. After studying the new, detailed CIA report, Customs recommends that five (5) Soviet articles be prohibited from importation because they are reasonably believed to be forced-labor products. (C)

Mid-Dec. -- Secretary Regan and Secretary Shultz discuss the matter, and Secretary Regan agrees to defer his decision until after the mid-January CDE meeting in Stockholm. (S)

#### Congressional and Interest Group Views

Congressional and ethnic/interest group pressures to bar the importation of Soviet forced-labor products began before the Commissioner of Customs made his recommendation and have continued throughout the pendency of the issue. Letters signed by about 80 Senators and Representatives, all urging enforcement, have come to Treasury. Press commentary has been uniformly for enforcement. Please see attachment A for more details. (U)

#### Other Agency Views

Three other agencies -- State, USTR and Agriculture -- have commented upon Treasury's proposed import prohibition. Their views, which are CON, are summarized below. (U)

1. Their principal shared concerns are: (a) that the Soviet Union might decide to retaliate against the U.S. by cancelling the new 5-year long-term-agreement (LTA) on grain trade with the Soviet Union or by other actions against U.S. exporters and (b) that action against the Soviets could be a precedent for similar actions against other countries, particularly the Peoples' Republic of China and South Africa. (S)
2. USTR was also concerned about the sweep of Customs' initial proposal involving 50 articles as being too broad for the evidence and as causing severe hardship on U.S. importers. (S)
3. State has also objected on the grounds that (a) the U.S. has disavowed unilateral economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and that this would upset our allies and trading partners and (b) that it would be viewed by the Soviets as an economic warfare measure, thus, significantly affecting US-Soviet relations. (S)
4. State has also argued that the evidence is inadequate and that court challenges would occur if the proposed ban is enforced.
5. State and USTR think NSC review is necessary before Treasury makes a final decision; Agriculture wants SIG/IEP discussion. (S)

15

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- 3 -

### Treasury Views

In summary, Treasury believes that we are dealing with a trade protectionism statute under which enforcement is mandatory when there is reasonable evidence that the U.S. is importing, or is likely to import, foreign forced-labor products. This is not a law under which the government has discretionary authority to take sanctions in order to further some foreign policy interest.

Treasury has carefully reviewed the statute, its legislative history and the implementing regulations and has produced a set of uniform guidelines for the application of the statute. Those guidelines have been applied to the most up-to-date and comprehensive information which the CIA could provide. This has resulted in a determination that five (5) categories of articles, out of the fifty (50) originally proposed, are reasonably believed to be Soviet forced-labor products that should be prohibited from importation into the U.S.

While Secretary Regan is prepared to listen once again to the arguments against enforcement which have been described on the preceding page, he has previously considered all of them. In the absence of some overriding national security problem which has not yet been described, Treasury cannot continue now reasonably delay the enforcement of an import prohibition against those articles from the Soviet Union.

### Treasury Response to Other Agencies' Views

1(a) - While U.S. exports to the Soviet Union (\$2.4 Billion) far outbalance the value of Soviet-made imports which would be covered by the prohibition (\$230 Million), the Soviet Union has not in the past retaliated against other U.S. enforcement actions which restrict Soviet imports to the United States. They have not, for example, taken any action as a result of the ban on Soviet-made steel imports which may contain Cuban nickel. In addition, it seems likely that the pragmatic reality of the Soviet Union's desire for U.S. products, particularly U.S. grain, would outweigh any strong desire for significant retribution. (S)

1(b) - The legal procedures which have been crafted to guide the use of the anti-forced-labor statute, have within them sufficient requirements and tests to be met when considering the information and circumstances involving a possible forced-labor import situation to prevent the utilization of this statute except in the most limited of cases. While there is no guarantee that sufficient evidence and the requisite conditions will not be found with respect to another country, the possibility is as limited and controlled as possible within the terms of the statute. (S)

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- 4 -

2 -- Whatever merit USTR's original concern over 50 articles may have had, it has been overcome by the Customs determination that only five (5) types of articles imported from the Soviet Union are products of forced-labor. (C)

3a -- The proposed import ban is not an economic sanction for foreign policy purposes as State's expressed concern implies; this is instead an enforcement action required under United States law which would be imposed against a carefully limited group of imports. While it may be interpretable as a punishment for Soviet forced-labor abuses, the statute is essentially a nonpunitive trade protection law. Its net impact on Soviet trade and behavior toward the West will probably be negligible, and its enforcement is not a foreign policy initiative and does not require concerted action with our allies who should be unaffected by the proposed U.S. ban on Soviet forced-labor imports. (S)

3b -- When State originally raised the bete noire of worsened US-Soviet relations as a result of the proposed import ban, they focussed on the then-recent KAL-007 tragedy and argued that to take the enforcement action at that time would be seen as U.S. economic warfare retaliation against the Soviets for shooting down the jetliner. Without considering the dubious merits of a very limited import ban as "retaliation" for the Soviet destruction of a fully-loaded civilian airliner, it is clear that that issue has been overcome by the passage of time. In addition, as stated above, the proposed ban is clearly segregable as a statutorily mandated enforcement/protectionist measure. (S)

State's conceptual substitute for the now stale KAL-007 incident might be the death of Soviet leader Andropov and the concern that our import ban would be read as the first U.S. signal of the future course of US-Soviet relations. However, if the U. S. Government treats the import prohibition in the limited, legalistic manner we have suggested, quietly informing the Soviets of the action which our domestic law requires, neither the Soviet Union nor others should interpret it as some form of broad signal about US-Soviet relations be they post-Andropov or otherwise. (S)

4 -- The evidence concerning the five articles is reasonably supported by the available information. Under our new standards, patterned in part on other U.S. laws restricting importation of unfairly priced foreign goods, Customs has clearly met the key required standards in this case. Please see attachments B and C. The possibility of litigation in this case is no more significant and presents no greater problems of proof than in other cases involving the imposition of U.S. import restrictions. We certainly are not presented with a litigative prospect that is unusual for Customs. Each attempted import contrary to the ban will be tried on its own merits, with the importer having the burden of proving that the import is not a forced-labor product. (S)

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- 5 -

5 -- Secretary Regan has considered the views expressed by the other agencies. All are on notice of our intention to proceed with enforcement of the statute. This is a statutorily imposed enforcement action for which the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible. While he has offered to discuss this again with the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser to the President, this is not an action which can be further delayed. In the absence of an NSC meeting or SIG/IRP meeting, both of which seem unnecessary, Treasury would, of course, advise all the concerned parties of its impending action.

attachments:

- A - Summary of Congressional and Interest Group Views
- B - Standards for Application of 19 U.S.C. 1307
- C - Factors Considered and Applied in Proposed Import Ban

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## CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS

October 25 - In a joint letter, 45 Senators urged enforcement against forced-labor imports.

November 9 - Hearing on Soviet forced-labor before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

November 22 - In a joint letter, thirteen Members of the House Republican Study Committee urged prohibition of Soviet forced-labor imports.

Grain-producing States: At least twenty Senators from grain-producing states have urged strong enforcement measures against Soviet forced-labor imports. House Minority Leader Bob Michel and several other Congressmen from grain-producing states have also urged enforcement. The Illinois State Senate has passed a resolution calling for strict enforcement of the prohibition.

House Resolution: On November 18, House Congressional Resolution 100 was passed condemning Soviet forced-labor and expressing the sense of Congress that the President should "in the strongest terms" express U.S. opposition to the practice.

Senate Resolution: Senate Joint Resolution 194 was passed by the Senate near the end of the last session. It expressed the sense of the Senate that the forced-labor import prohibition should be enforced.

## ETHNIC/INTEREST GROUPS

All of these groups have urged enforcement of the forced-labor products ban:

- ° National Captive Nations Committee
- ° Joint Baltic American National Committee
- ° Estonian American National Council
- ° American Latvian Associates
- ° Lithuanian American Council
- ° Baltic American Freedom League
- ° National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups

Since the Commissioner of Customs originally proposed, on September 28, 1983, to ban Soviet forced-labor products, Treasury has not received a single letter or other communication from any Member of Congress or from any ethnic or other interest group indicating that the ban should not be enforced. Indeed, the single consistent theme, also repeated by the print media, is to ban the import of Soviet forced-labor products.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REQUEST  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 15 FEB 84 16

1/5/16 KOB

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MCMAHON, J

DOCDATE 14 FEB 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

SUBJECT. ANDROPOV'S LEADERSHIP STYLE &amp; STRATEGY

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ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

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COMMENTS

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

14 FEB 1984


PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF NSC EQUITY IS REQUIRED

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

Thank you for the note on our recent paper entitled Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United States. I also appreciated Jack Matlock's commentary that you forwarded and agree with him that an elaboration of Andropov's style and strategy would have helped. I have attached some additional comments on Jack's remarks from one of my senior Soviet analysts.

Sincerely,

  
John N. McMahon  
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

*Bud - this is obviously OBE  
but it does have historical  
value*

Attachments:

Tab A - Comments

Tab B - Intelligence Memorandum 

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3 February 1984

### Andropov's Leadership Style and Strategy

1. We would agree that the coercive measures employed by Stalin to improve the economy probably have some appeal to Andropov. Undoubtedly aware of the tensions that declining economic growth and inefficiency are generating in Soviet society, he seems to have set a course that combines regime firmness toward the population with greater rewards for hard work. It is an overall carrot and stick approach, albeit with the emphasis on the stick during Andropov's first year in office because of Brezhnev's inability to wrench productivity from the workplace. There is no doubt, moreover, that "conservative" elements in the party approve of Andropov's administrative measures (the discipline and anticorruption campaigns), but many Soviets would argue that these are needed prescriptions. That approval is likely to become more widespread since the measures appear to have contributed to an upturn in industrial productivity in 1983.

2. The stereotypical Russian image of Jews as profiteers may, in the present circumstances, cause anti-semitism to rise as part of the campaign for discipline in the economy. A similar campaign was conducted in the 1950s. There is, in fact, a notable increase in government-approved anti-semitic propaganda, which has taken the form of newspaper articles, broadcasts, and the widely-publicized (by Soviet standards) activities of the "Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet

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Citizens." Although the Anti-Zionist Committee has not figured prominently in the Soviet media over the past several months, the Committee, staffed by people of Jewish ancestry, will probably serve as a mouthpiece for regime policy toward Soviet Jews in the future. We are also struck by the harshly anti-semitic article in Pravda on 17 January. This is the first time in recent memory that an article like this has appeared in such an authoritative forum. (See Tab B, our publication on the subject written some years ago, for more background.)

3. We agree that Russian nationalism is more pronounced, but this is not new with Andropov. Emerging demographic trends, which threaten to alter the ethnic balance of the population, the party and the military in favor of non-Russians, have engendered the growth of Russian nationalism since the late 1970s. In the face of foreign and domestic problems, Russian nationalism is also likely to increase. It is the traditional refuge of Soviet leaders in difficult circumstances. So far, however, recent Soviet leaders, including Andropov, have not moved away from the calculated blurring of Russian chauvinism and Soviet patriotism, stressing, as Stalin did, the former at the expense of the latter.

4. Clearly Andropov has a stake in the "appearance" of bilateral tension as long as it appears that the United States is the offending party. This would not be the first time that Soviet leaders have used international tensions to mobilize their population. Nevertheless, there is no necessary connection between what is essentially a propaganda strategy (e.g. US military threat, danger of war) and actual Soviet foreign policy behavior. There is no indication, for example, that the propaganda strategy is having an impact on operational foreign policy and, in fact, there are indications that the Soviets want to curb any further escalation in the spiral of tension. Moreover, we have seen other signs that the Soviets are telling their own people that the international environment is not that sour.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

SOVIET REACTIONARIES: HATING JEWS AND LOVING STALIN

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18 March 1971

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
18 March 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Soviet Reactionaries: Hating Jews and Loving Stalin

Introduction

The "liberal" end of the Soviet political spectrum, whatever real weight it carries, has been relatively visible to the West for several years. Soviet liberals have turned to the West for inspiration and aid, and their cause has attracted attention, often born of hope, from many in the West. This paper portrays some aspects of the opposite end of the spectrum. Soviet reactionaries have little interest in publicizing their views before Western audiences, but recently they have said and written enough to provide a rather complete model of political thought of an extremist type against which more commonly held opinion in the USSR can be measured. The reported political ties and activities of the ultra-conservatives, moreover, shed light on some of the motives in the decision-making process within the Politburo. The policies that emerge from this process help to identify the limits imposed on the Soviet leaders by the need for consensus in the Kremlin.

Anti-Semitism, before and after the Revolution, has been a conservative force at three levels of national life: the popular, the political, and the philosophical. It was endemic to the Russian masses before the Revolution and has hardly been shed by their descendants, the new proletariat class and ruling elite of the Soviet Union. The Tsars pandered to anti-Semitism as a convenient outlet for

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

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popular frustrations; Stalin turned to it with more frequency after he had completed his transformations of society and was intent on freezing the mold. Anti-Semitism has also been part of the recurring question of the country's politicians and intellectuals: "Whither Russia?" Three historical influences easily converge here: the Slavophile insistence on the unique character of the Russian people that must be preserved if Moscow is to fulfill its destiny as a third Rome, Stalin's revival of Great Russian nationalism and his intolerance of foreign variations to Soviet Communist doctrine, and the view of Jews not only as foreigners but also as bearers of an essentially Western Weltanschauung that threatens the foundations of Russian society. In today's world these attitudes are sharpened by the position of China and Israel vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. China complements the West by offering a more Eastern alternative to post-Stalin Communism in the USSR, while Israel gives world Jewry a state focus and stands as a military threat to Soviet interests in the Middle East.

Study of four recent developments in Soviet politics helps to reveal the dynamic nature of these issues. To be examined are a set of decisions on literary themes and political appointments taken by the Politburo in July 1970, the activities of Soviet Stalinists in Czechoslovakia, the views of Soviet officials involved in Mideast affairs, and another set of Politburo decisions taken in December concerning the trial of alleged Jewish hijackers in Leningrad. In all these cases, our information is fragmentary and disconnected. Taken together, however, the data form a pattern that presents a composite picture of reactionary opinion in the USSR and the current extent and limits of its influence.

#### July Leadership Decisions

1. Several months of tension in the Kremlin came to a climax in July 1970 as Soviet leaders actively jockeyed for position and finally were forced to make some difficult decisions on the future course of party and state affairs. The issues

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revolved around the scheduling of the overdue party congress and the shape of the new five-year plan. Events of the period indicated that Premier Kosygin's position was being eroded, and rumors predicted his retirement at the July session of the new Supreme Soviet. At the same time, one of Kosygin's first deputy premiers, Polyansky, was engaged in abetting an anti-Semitic and Stalinist push in cultural affairs, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Personnel matters at lower levels were up for decision before the congress, and one of the most startling appointments was the assignment of Leningrad Oblast party first secretary, V. S. Tolstikov, as ambassador to Peking.

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2. During a Central Committee plenum on 2-3 July General Secretary Brezhnev announced a five-year agricultural program that represented a victory for Polyansky's agricultural interests. The decision to postpone the Party Congress was apparently made by the Politburo between this plenum and the one on 12 July which announced that the Congress would be held in 1971 and that Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin would be reporters at the Congress.

3. It was also at this time [REDACTED] that the Politburo stepped into a controversy over two reactionary novels by Ivan Shevtsov published in early 1970. The novels enthusiastically endorsed Stalin's leadership, justified the bloodshed of collectivization and the purges, glorified the working class while vilifying liberal intellectuals as dupes of the West--all to the drumbeat of blatant anti-Semitism. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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A resolution was passed censuring the writings of Shevtsov, the works of several other authors, and an interview by Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev that extolled Stalin too directly and

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On 12 July Pravda ran a scathing review of Shevtsov's novels damning them as "ideologically corrupt and artistically worthless." This has been the only direct result of the resolution, however, and neither the reactionary writers nor Polyansky has visibly suffered from its adoption. Sensitivity to the question of anti-Semitism was nevertheless betrayed in the elevation of a Jew with meager party credentials to become first secretary of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast party committee in Birobidzhan on 24 July.

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4. This appointment, related changes among provincial party leaders, and the choice of envoys to China may also have been agreed upon by the leadership in mid-July. News services reported on 14 July that according to "authoritative sources" Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev would replace his colleague Kuznetsov as chief negotiator at the border talks in Peking. A Soviet journalist reported on 28 July that Tolstikov was under consideration for the ambassadorship, and on 5 August news services quoting "Communist sources" reported that China had agreed to his appointment.

5. Various explanations have been advanced for Tolstikov's banishment to Peking in spite of the fact that it has long been evident that he was no favorite with the majority of the collective leadership. [REDACTED] implied [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] that Tolstikov's assignment was connected with Moscow's unhappiness over the Leningrad trials of Jews and the attendant publicity. [REDACTED] claimed that the case had been stirred up by Tolstikov in an attempt to make a name for himself. The affair did receive unusual and prompt publicity when Leningradskaya Pravda, the local Leningrad newspaper, reported

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the attempted hijacking and the arrests on 16 June, the day after the events. Not only were most of those arrested at the airport Jews, but the incident was used as a pretext for rounding up members of Jewish circles in Leningrad, Riga, Kaliningrad, Kishinev, and Odessa. Clearly, some authorities--and not only those in Leningrad--were preparing a wide crackdown on Jewish activists.

6. Tolstikov has displayed neo-Stalinist tendencies at least in the spheres of culture and law and order. It is possible that he had been, in addition, exhibiting another quality of a neo-Stalinist--a critical attitude toward past handling of relations with China. His assignment may have had the double purpose of sparing his government from his criticism and educating him to the realities of affairs with China. Criticism of policy toward China would have been a particular irritant to Suslov, who had carried the main burden of articulating the Soviet case against China. It was Suslov who presided over the installation in Leningrad of Tolstikov's successor, second secretary G.V. Romanov, on 16 September.

7. In retrospect, it seems likely that the Politburo's decision to send Tolstikov abroad was made concurrently with its censure of excessively Stalinist themes in literature that had received encouragement from Polyansky. The anti-Semitism of much of the literature censured and the arrests of Jews in Tolstikov's bailiwick the preceding month provide a suggestive common thread.

8. It is also noteworthy that these events coincided with the solidification of Kosygin's position in the leadership. Kosygin--a moderate in cultural affairs, the one leader publicly identified with the launching of the Peking border talks, and the one Soviet leader who has addressed a Soviet audience on the impermissibility of anti-Semitism--had suffered a number of setbacks in the spring of 1970. These included the triumph of the agricultural lobby, the decision to rework the new five-year plan, Brezhnev's intrusion in the affairs of

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the Council of Ministers, and a rash of rumors in Moscow and abroad that Kosygin would retire with the convening of the newly elected Supreme Soviet. Polyansky, as one of his two First Deputies, was (and is) a natural contender for Kosygin's position. In announcing the Congress and Kosygin as one of the reporters, the Central Committee plenum on 13 July established his tenure at least until March 1971. Kosygin and his entire government were re-elected at the Supreme Soviet on 14-15 July.

9. In sum, the evidence suggests that the Politburo in mid-July, along with other business, gave attention to the growing manifestations of a Stalinist and anti-Semitic strain in public life. The moderates led by Suslov were able to deal a tactical reversal to this development and its apparent sponsors, including Polyansky and Tolstikov. Kosygin, who appeared to be tottering a bit, was able to right himself.

#### Soviet Reactionaries Abroad

10. Soviet reactionaries abroad, particularly those in Czechoslovakia and the Middle East, have been more accessible to Western observers than their counterparts in the Soviet Union. They have kept in contact with Stalinist elements in Slovakia, espousing a thoroughly dogmatic line and trying to encourage anti-Semitism in order to reinforce the contention that the "counterrevolution" of 1968 was the work of "imperialism and international Zionism."

11. A main figure in this activity has been Nikolay Starikov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Prague. On 18 November, Starikov reportedly presented awards to seven factory workers who had drafted a letter published in Pravda in July 1968 protesting the policy of Dubcek. Speaking later that day to a group of about 40 ultraconservative Czechoslovak Communists, Starikov charged that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in 1956 was ultimately responsible for the difficulties of Communism in

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Eastern Europe during the last 14 years. Events since 1956 have vindicated Stalin's policy he said; therefore, if the strength of Communism is to be restored, the "poison of Khrushchevism" must be destroyed at the 24th Party Congress in March and the offending aspects of the 20th Congress repudiated. Once this is accomplished, according to Starikov, it will be possible to restore unity with China and within the international Communist movement.

12. The Soviet hand in propagating anti-Semitic themes in Czechoslovakia is also revealed in the December publication by the Slovak Pravda publishing house in Bratislava of Beware: Zionism. The book--written by two Soviets, Yuri Ivanov and Ye. Yevseyev, who has been described as a "paranoic anti-Semite"--is a vicious attack on Zionism for anti-Soviet activity and for instigation of the Czechoslovak reforms.

13. The "new" book is actually a revised version of Ivanov's book bearing the same title that was first published in the USSR in March 1969 and then reissued in May 1970 by Politizdat in a press run of 200,000--significantly larger than the 1969 edition. The May edition, like the recent Slovak one, was updated and included a more direct implication of Zionism in the Czechoslovak reforms as well as in events in Hungary in 1956 and the Polish "spring" of 1968. The publication of the book in Czechoslovakia coincides with increasing exhortation in the Soviet Union on the need for vigilance and anti-Zionist propaganda. The Czechoslovaks themselves seem to be conducting a similar, albeit less virulent, campaign, probably under the influence of the Soviets. Although no direct links between both Ivanov and Yevseyev and any major political figure in the Soviet Union are apparent, the highly laudatory review which Ivanov's book received from Sovetskaya Rossiya, which is reportedly responsive to Politburo member Polyansky, suggests the possibility that Ivanov, like Shevtsov, may have his support.

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The Middle East Experts: Specialists in Anti-Semitism

14. Anti-Semitic sentiments also seem to be prevalent among Soviet officials involved in Middle East affairs. Preoccupation with Israel apparently leads them to magnify what they see as related dangers, including the challenge of "international Zionism," the supranational loyalties of Soviet Jews, and the less than total commitment of the Russian people to fighting Israel and foreign influences. Stalinism flourished under a siege mentality, and the evident insecurity felt by some officials dealing with the Middle East makes them also susceptible to a Stalinist analysis of Soviet problems.

15. It is not surprising, therefore, that such officials have taken to the ideas of the author Ivanov. Ivanov himself is assigned to the Israeli desk in the Middle East Section of the Central Committee's International Department. Yevseyev, who now works for Problems of Peace and Socialism, an international Communist journal published in Prague, was formerly a Soviet diplomat in Cairo (1961-64). Prior to assuming his present position he was on the Lebanese desk in the Middle East Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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In January 1971, the Western press

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reported the existence of the Za Rodinu (For the Fatherland) Society, allegedly composed of xenophobic, anti-Semitic Stalinists [redacted]

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[redacted] In March, the press reported that a new samizdat (underground) journal, Veche, described as nationalistic, anti-Semitic and Slavophile (anti-Western) was being published. The journal's stated purpose is to root out Trotskyism and cosmopolitanism in Soviet life. Both terms have strong anti-Semitic overtones reminiscent of the Stalin era. Although the relationship between these anti-Semitic elements is unclear, a striking coincidence of views is evident. Veche, for example, contained an article by an unnamed author who, [redacted] deplores the "architectural rape" of Moscow by Jews [redacted]

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December Leadership Decisions

21. In late December, the "Jewish question" came back to haunt the Politburo. On this occasion, however, it was not the novels of an obscure writer that resurrected the issue, but Western reaction to the Leningrad trial of Soviet Jews, who allegedly attempted to hijack a Soviet aircraft in June. The Soviet response to vehement Western denunciations, some of which came from important Communist parties, was a retreat from the tough position taken by the authorities earlier.

22. Whatever the relationship of the arrests to Tolstikov's change in assignment, the new ambassador's departure from Leningrad had not stopped plans for prosecution either of the alleged hijackers or of those Jews accused more ominously of "anti-Soviet activity." The prosecution's course did not run smoothly. The trials reportedly were scheduled to begin in October but were delayed until mid-December. The secrecy of the trial, the severity of the verdict--including two death sentences--and underground rumors that the whole affair was staged combined to produce a wave of adverse publicity in the West. The imminence of the second-level trials of Jews arrested at the same time on charges of "anti-Soviet activity" lent added impetus to the Western protests against what were branded as manifestations of anti-Semitism. The severity of the Western denunciations and the criticism of the Communist parties

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in Great Britain, France and Italy were apparently unexpected in Moscow and resulted in a rapid about face on the Leningrad affair.

23. On 28 December, only four days after the court handed down its verdict, it was already rumored that an appeal would be heard on 30 December. The rumor initially seemed somewhat improbable, because the normal appeal process in the Soviet Union takes several weeks. But on 30 December the Supreme Court did in fact hear the appeal and the following day commuted the death sentences and reduced several prison sentences. The sensitivity of the issue, the speed with which the appeal was heard, and the reversal of the lower court's decision suggest that the new Soviet attitude was the result of a Politburo decision reached sometime between 25 and 30 December.

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25. The decision to reverse the death sentences and the subsequent delays in prosecution of the other Leningrad Jews arrested last June were probably related to the coming Party Congress and, perhaps in some degree, to the policy adopted on the Jarring mission. The agitation among foreign Communists over the trials threatened to create unnecessary inter-party friction while plans for the Moscow conclave were being made. Moreover, the emotional storm the trials raised in Israel and among her sympathizers would probably have compounded the problems facing the Jarring mission and would have detracted from the "reasonable" public image the Soviets had decided they and the Egyptians should present in

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the Middle East. These factors are in addition to what must have been a basic desire to counteract the domestic impact of the affair which, with its numerous arrests in several cities, almost certainly aroused fears in some quarters that another witch hunt, reminiscent of the Doctors' Plot and the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, was in the wings. Similar considerations may have been a factor in the regime's decision to allow several groups of the most outspoken Jewish activists to emigrate to Israel in the early months of 1971.

The Weight of the Stalinists

26. The issues of Stalinism and Khrushchevism, orthodoxy and revisionism, and accommodation with China and/or the West define basic cleavages in Soviet political life. Shevtsov, Starikov, [ ] probably represent the far left of the spectrum of Soviet political opinion. Their views are distinguished even from most conservative political expression by both their extremism and their logical consistency. Unity of the socialist community is to be re-established not by China's disavowing Maoism, but by the Soviet Union's repudiating Khrushchevism and returning to the orthodox path trod by Stalin. Such a course would demand intense vigilance toward the West, liquidation of Zionist elements in the Soviet Union as the bearers of Western influences and revisionism, and elimination of the Israeli threat to Arab and Soviet interests in the Middle East.

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27. This program is less important for the number of people who embrace it as a whole than for its definition of an ultimate position on one side of political debate in the Soviet Union. Against this model Soviet political opinion in general can be measured and divided according to the degree of correspondence or divergence. In this sense, Shevtsov, Starikov, [ ] represent zealous advocates for what is probably a large conservative constituency in the Soviet Union whose members themselves, either individually or corporately, rarely reach such extreme or consistent views on all questions. [ ] certainly thinks he has allies in the Central Committee apparatus, and Starikov's activities

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must receive sanction from fairly high levels in the party apparatus. Given the strength of conservative impulses in the Soviet Union, a Politburo member like Polyansky undoubtedly finds it politic to patronize Shevtsov's efforts, and there are other indications that on some issues his sympathies lie in this direction. This does not mean, however, that Polyansky buys Shevtsov's program wholesale or would be eager to enact it in all respects.

28. The program, in fact, is a logical extension of the general policies of the regime since 1964. The current leadership has presided over a steady but controlled rehabilitation of Stalin and his heritage, a repudiation of Khrushchev's innovations, ruthless measures to preserve uniformity and unity in the Communist movement, and a growing commitment to the Arabs in the Middle East. It has thus fostered a climate that is not only congenial to conservatives but also stimulates the zealots among them to try to push these policies to their ultimate conclusion. The fact that these extremes have been deliberately avoided by the collective leadership leaves it open to the charge, even from the ambitious among its own numbers, that it is not pursuing its policies with enough vigor and to their logical end. It may not be unreasonable to ascribe such views to Tolstikov, whose position had long given him claim to a seat at the summit in Moscow, and to Polyansky, who assuredly covets the title of his boss, Kosygin.

29. Polyansky got no more than the tip of a finger singed in the Shevtsov affair last summer. Since then the dogmatists have tightened their grip on cultural policy, and reactionaries in art are riding high. Polyansky and his agricultural interests remain the biggest winners in the allocations sweepstakes under the new five-year plan.

30. In addition, the impending Party Congress, with its possibilities for readjustment of the party line and realignment of the political hierarchy, has undoubtedly been a stimulant to the activity of the ultra-conservatives, as well as to other political elements. The statements by Starikov

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on the role of the 24th Congress, however, appear to be not much more than expressions of their own fervent hopes for its outcome. In reality, the conservative and moderate forces at the top seem so evenly balanced as to make any predictions that the Congress will veer one way or another highly suspect.

#### Moderates Have Final Say

31. Most telling are the decisions taken by the Politburo in July and December when it was faced with the escalating consequences of conservative initiatives. On both occasions the collective sought to rein in the extremists, and in December the leaders, moved by a variety of personal rivalries, domestic policy concerns, and foreign policy considerations, in unaccustomed fashion reversed public decisions.

32. That Suslov should be a key figure on the side of moderation is readily explained by his responsibility for ideology and the international movement, areas where extremism threatens to wreak havoc. It was Suslov who enunciated, at a Comintern anniversary on 25 March 1969, the rationale for working with Social Democracy--that is, a stance Westward instead of Eastward--and criticized Stalin in this regard. On such a rationale is built Moscow's treating with Bonn that has been such a prominent part of Soviet foreign policy during the past year. This attitude has long been shared by Kosygin.

33. In the past year Brezhnev's public stature has grown, and if the trend continues, he is likely to dominate at least the platform at the Congress. He has appeared very comfortable with the conservative drift of policy under his regime. Nevertheless, in policy matters he is still playing the moderator and seems careful to apportion his support to all factions. Two of his aides, G. E. Tsukanov and A. Ye. Bovin, reportedly worked hard to bring Shevtsov under censure. Having agreed to that, however, Brezhnev is reported to have turned aside the petitions for redress of a liberal playwright, Mikhail Shatrov, who had suffered at the hands of conservatives in the spring of 1970. In foreign policy,

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Brezhnev has identified himself with the Soviet - West German treaty and portrayed it as a major accomplishment of the regime.

34. In short, the bust now erected above Stalin's grave is no sure sign that the Party Congress is about to re-install his remains in the Mausoleum. Agitation from reactionary quarters reveals the present conservative cast of political argument in the Soviet Union and the strength and expectations of one political faction as it looks forward to the Congress. Its triumph, however, would require a convulsion among the ruling collective. Decisions taken by the Politburo and the policies it is pursuing indicate the limits placed on the Soviet leaders' scope for policy initiatives. The consensus in the Kremlin continues to be tested, but there are no good signs that it is about to yield to reactionary extremes.

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February 14, 1984 170250

BY KDB NARA DATE 4/8/0

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Chernenko

An informal summary of the Vice President's meeting with Chernenko today was dictated to State by the DCM and passed to the Situation Room by phone. Jack Matlock asked that it be passed to you immediately.

The meeting lasted 1/2 hour. The atmosphere was positive and quite upbeat. Chernenko did not depart from standard Soviet positions, but his emphasis was on the positive throughout. His main themes were continuity in the positions of the Soviet leadership -- they were in favor of peaceful coexistence but would protect their security interests. They have no desire for military advantage.

On bilateral relations Chernenko said the state of relations was cause for concern. He pledged that the Soviet Union would do all it could in favor of good relations between the two countries. He took note of the President's expression of interest and cooperation and said it was up to the U.S. to take practical steps toward cooperation, citing in this regard the importance they attach to non-first-use of nuclear weapons. He also said the two countries should not transfer the arms race to other areas that do not now have significant armaments. Both sides need to work to keep regional conflicts from getting out of control. The Soviet Union does not believe confrontation between the two countries is inevitable. This ended Chernenko's opening statement.

The Vice President then handed over the President's letter (in longer version) and went through his talking points. He mentioned the President's speech of 16 January and the possibility of a summit if conditions are right. He discussed regional issues, emphasizing the Middle East, START and human rights, and naming Shcharanskiy, Orlov and Sakharov in particular. After the meeting, the Vice President told the press that the session was constructive and useful. Our ambassador felt that the Soviet side, especially Chernenko and long time Brezhnev aide Alexandrov were particularly cordial. They thanked the Vice President profusely for coming. Chernenko's health appeared to the ambassador to be quite frail. He was short of breath and needed some help getting down stairs.

State comment: The Soviets have been making a real effort to downplay rhetoric. The embassy has the same impression. TASS has been restrained.

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 14 FEB 84

MCFARLANE

14 FEB 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI  
VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES MTG W/ SPERLING GROUP

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( CL MR )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 2/15 Noted by Pres

CO ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

2/15

- NSUs -

- Als close out - Pres noted

- Als ds pull folder -

Tks

KMS

990

National Security Council  
The White House

84 FEB 14 P 7:49

System # I  
Package # 1291

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>		<u>26</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP  
(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_  
Received SS

AD

1291

1984 FEB 14 PM 8:40

DE  
White House Cl  
By 273  
FED  
August 23, 1997  
Date 1/3/16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

February 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*  
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Breakfast Meeting  
with the Sperling Group

Attached at Tab A are suggested talking points for your use in your discussions with the Sperling Group scheduled for 9:00-10:00 a.m., Wednesday, February 15.

RECOMMENDATION

OK      No

✓ 1      That you read the attached talking points at Tab A.

Attachment  
Tab A - Talking Points

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

1291

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRN 748-25-11-71

BY KOB NARA JATE 4/8/13

February 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Presidential Meeting with  
Sperling Group

The memorandum at Tab I from you to President forwards suggested talking points on the Vice President's meetings in Moscow with Chernenko for the President's use in his meeting with the Sperling group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the talking points.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I - Memo to the President

Tab A - Talking Points

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~



TALKING POINTSOn Vice President Bush's Meeting with Chernenko

170251

Let me share with you the Vice President's impressions of the new Soviet leadership that he passed to me following his useful half-hour discussion with new Soviet General Secretary Chernenko.

- The atmosphere was positive and quite upbeat. Although Chernenko did not depart from standard Soviet positions, he stressed the positive aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations over time. He pledged that the Soviet Union would do its part to improve relations.
- Chernenko does not believe confrontation is inevitable. He felt that both sides needed to devote particular attention to keeping regional conflicts from getting out of control, on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on developing practical measures to reduce the risk of the employment of nuclear weapons.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748 25-11-7-1  
BY ~~LOL~~ NARA DATE 4/8/3

SECRET

16

SECRET

2

- The Vice President reiterated my expressed desire to expand the dialogue and develop more fruitful ties. However, he was quite direct in identifying key impediments to the improvement of relations: Soviet human rights behavior; Moscow's proclivity to exacerbate third world disputes; and the Kremlin's demonstrated recalcitrance in the various arms negotiations.
  
- Vice President Bush and I have the impression that the new Soviet leadership is making a real effort to downplay rhetoric and to explore avenues that would promote a more constructive dialogue.

SECRET

SECRET