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Collection Name BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 7/14/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM - 1982 (03/01/1982-04/30/1982)

FOIA

F01-055

Box Number ~~90233~~ RAC Box 6

CHARTRAND

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26863	NOTE	REAGAN TO THATCHER R 1/28/2008 F01-055	1	ND	B1
26864	CABLE	#312025Z MAR 82; LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN D 10/19/2011 F2001-055/1	2	3/31/1982	B1
26865	TELEGRAM	RE: SECRETARY'S WORKING DINNER WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER - PAGE 1 ONLY R 1/28/2008 F01-055	1	4/8/1982	B1
26866	PAPER	TALKING POINTS - THATCHER R 1/28/2008 F01-055	7	ND	B1
26867	PAPER	TALKING POINTS - GALTIERI R 1/28/2008 F01-055	7	4/9/1982	B1
26868	PAPER	POINTS FOR COSTA MENDEZ R 1/28/2008 F01-055	2	ND	B1
26869	TELEGRAM	USDEL IN BUENOS AIRES TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: VISITS OF LEW ALLEN AND BILL BROCK R 1/28/2008 F01-055	2	4/10/1982	B1
26870	NOTE	JIM RENTSCHLER TO JUDGE CLARK, BUD MCFARLANE, RE: FALKLANDS, ETC. R 1/28/2008 F01-055 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	4/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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CHARTRAND

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26871	MEMO	JIM RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: THE GUNS OF APRIL? - WHERE WE NOW STAND WITH ARGENTINA, THE UK AND OURSELVES R 1/28/2008 F01-055 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	4	4/20/1982	B1
26872	MEMO	TOM ENDERS TO THE SECRETARY, RE: YOUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, APRIL 20 R 1/28/2008 F01-055	2	ND	B1

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26863

~~SECRET~~

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

Dear Margaret:

The decisions I made last Friday were aimed at putting you in the strongest possible position to achieve a peaceful settlement in line with the basic principles and values to which we are both committed. I believe there is now a chance to realize that aim, and that we must seize it before more lives are lost.

Al Haig has sent to Francis Pym new formulations which might provide a basis for a peaceful settlement if recent military developments have instilled a greater sense of realism in Buenos Aires. I am sure that the ideas sent to Al by your Foreign Secretary would not provide such a basis. Equally important, you will see that our suggestions are faithful to the basic principles we must protect.

I urge you to agree to have these ideas proposed by us and Peru as soon as possible, recognizing that it will be difficult to get Peruvian agreement to join us in this initiative and more difficult still to gain Argentine acceptance. This, I am convinced, is now our best hope.

Sincerely,

Ron

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F01-055 #26863
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 1/28/08

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S&Ls have a
largely ineffec-
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ad Dies Wrote inhead'

P—Novelist Ayn
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Saturday at her
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tainhead," and for

novels were: "An-
d in 1938; "For the
ual," 1961; "The
ness," 1965; "Capi-
known Ideal," 1966;
Objectivist Episte-
"The Romantic Ma-
see RAND, Page 19

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been won-directed. Of the 13 pieces
of legislation the bankers pushed
last year, the bankers' association
boasts that all but one passed.

"The bankers are really heavy-
weights around here," says John
Meade, press officer for the com-
mission. "When they slug it out
with someone, it usually is a real
blood bath and money bath. They
usually overpower anyone in their
way."

Records show that the California
Bankers Assn., the state industry's
lobby, and Bankers Responsible
Government, its political action
committee, spent more than \$742,-
000 on lobbying and contributions
during the two-year period. When
this is added to the funds doled out

Please see BANKS, Page 20

Presidential First

Parliament to Hear Reagan

By GEORGE SKELTON,
Times Staff Writer

SANTA BARBARA—President
Reagan in June will become the
first U.S. President in history to ad-
dress a joint session of the British
Parliament, it was learned Satur-
day.

Reagan has been invited to speak
to the houses of Lords and Com-
mons on June 8 in historic West-
minster Hall, the 883-year-old
Gothic structure reserved by the
British for momentous occasions.

He is also believed to be only the
second non-British head of state to
address Parliament, the other being
the late President Charles de Gaulle
of France, according to White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Mi-
chael Deaver.

De Gaulle addressed Parliament
on April 7, 1960, calling for the de-

Please see REAGAN, Page 11

THE WEATHER

National Weather Service fore-
cast: Mostly cloudy through tonight
with a slight chance of rain tonight.
Variable clouds and cooler Monday.
Highs today near 72 and Monday,
68; overnight lows 44 to 54. High
Saturday, 78; low, 52. High March 6
last year, 64; low, 53. Record high
March 6, 90 in 1899; record low, 39
in 1882.

Complete weather details and
smog forecast in T. III, Page 17.

tion. Two others, a blind
preacher and a teacher w
quitted.

The bearded defendants,
them wearing long white
and carrying the Koran, app
enjoy the proceedings, whi
at the end of their 3½-mor
They climbed the bars of
foot-high cage in which th
held for security reasons
laughed, waved white han-
iefs and crude hangman's
fashioned from old robes, ar
banners that displayed a t
Star of David and the word
Muslims Are Coming."

Killing Never Denied

"We are not Sadat's killer
Salamouni, 33-year-old t
said before the verdict w
nounced by the three-offic
bunal. "Sadat killed him
making what he did of our c
Dear friends, for all human
it is Islam, Islam, Islam!"

The court-appointed chi
fense counsel, Abdel Halim
dan, never denied that the
dants killed Sadat. But he
that the 24 men were innoce
cause the murder was justifi
means of protecting Muslim
in this tradition-bound societ

No date for the execution
announced. Under Egyptia

Please see EGYPT, I

Haig Briefs Mexican Sa

By OSWALD JOHNSTON

NEW YORK—Secretary of
Alexander M. Haig Jr. hear
tailed explanation Saturday
ico's peace initiative, for
America, and Foreign M
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico sa
agreed to consider some M
ideas for "trade-offs and
concessions" that could lead
duced foreign intervention
Salvador.

Haig and Castaneda agree
their 2½-hour meeting he
"constructive" and led to
"convergence of views." Bu
the United States and
seemed to remain at odds o
extent to which Nicaragua
tively supporting leftist gu
in El Salvador.

The peace initiative, ann
Feb. 21 in Managua by M
President Jose Lopez Portil
in the U.S. view, the defect o
to "grapple with the problem
caraguan involvement in El

REAGAN: He Will Address Parliament

Continued from First Page

struction of all nuclear weapons in order to rid the world of the "fear of sudden annihilation." He received a four-minute ovation after his 30-minute address.

Deaver said of Reagan's reaction to the invitation: "He was very flattered, obviously."

Deaver told The Times in an in-

terview that Reagan also will become the first U.S. President since Woodrow Wilson to stay at Windsor Castle, currently the weekend residence of Queen Elizabeth II, 22 miles west of London.

Reagan will be the guest of the queen at the castle on June 7-8, and on the second night will be feted at a white tie dinner for 160—all seat-

ed at one table.

Deaver is coordinating Reagan's trip to Europe, the President's first outside the North America continent since taking office.

The presidential adviser, who recently spent six days in Europe organizing the trip, outlined this crowded itinerary.

Reagan will leave Washington on

June 3 and stay at Versailles near Paris until June 6 while he attends an economic summit of seven industrialized nations.

On June 7, he will fly to Rome for visits during a five-hour period with Pope John Paul II, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini and President Sandro Pertini.

Reagan considers Italy to be one of his Administration's staunchest allies, Deaver said, adding "Not the least of the reasons for going there

is this country's gratitude for the rescue of Gen. (James L.) Dozier." Dozier was kidnaped by Red Brigades terrorists on Dec. 17 and rescued six weeks later by Italian police commandos.

Also on June 7, Reagan will fly to London for his two-night stay at Windsor Castle. "Among other reasons, the President is looking forward to going to Windsor because he will have an opportunity to do some horseback riding," Deaver

said.

The next morning, Reagan will meet with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at 10 Downing St., then be driven to Westminster Palace, the largest gothic edifice in England.

Reagan will then fly to Bonn on June 9 for a meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. And the next day the President will attend a 15-nation summit of the North Atlantic Treaty organization.

EGYPT: 5 Sentenced to Death for Sadat's Murder

Continued from First Page

President Hosni Mubarak must ratify all military death sentences. The defense can ask Mubarak for mercy but has no higher court to which it can appeal.

Sentenced to death were Lt. Khaled Islambouli, 24, who substituted three men from his assassination squad for three soldiers in charge of a 120-millimeter gun at the parade where Sadat was killed, and the assassins: Abdel-Hamid Abdel-Salam, 29; Atta Tayel Hem-

sassins with hand grenades and ammunition.

Though the trial began Nov. 21, by last Wednesday the 34-man defense counsel team said it had completed the defense of only 10 of the accused. The court, however, abruptly cut short arguments and said a verdict would be announced Saturday. The government had asked for the death penalty for all 24.

When journalists entered the courtroom Saturday, the defendants began performing for the television

recess until the power returned.

During the 2-hour recess, the verdict was announced in a closed courtroom with neither defense attorney's nor journalists present. Later, the prisoners were whisked out a side door while the journalists waited in a back room.

Earlier Saturday, Cairo newspapers had linked all 24 defendants with a plot by Islamic radicals to overthrow the Mubarak government. The semiofficial daily, Al Ahram, said indictments against about



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
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD, UK
SUBJECT: PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM IN UK

1. FULL DETAILS OF LONDON MEDIA PLAY THIS MORNING ON
PRESIDENT'S VISIT, BASED ON U.S. BRIEFINGS, HAVE BEEN
SENT SEPARATELY VIA USINFO. AS DEPARTMENT WILL
NOTE, TONE OF REPORTING HERE HAS BEEN ACERBIC AND
UNHELPFUL, REFLECTING BRITISH PRESS VIEW THAT UNILATERAL
U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT BREACHES USUAL COURTESY AND PROTOCOL.

2. QUEEN'S PRESS SECRETARY, MICHAEL SHEA, CALLED EARLY
MARCH 8 TO SAY THAT IN ANSWER TO ALL INQUIRIES, THE PALACE
PRESS OFFICE WILL NOT SAY ANYTHING BEYOND THAT QUOTE IT
CONFIRMS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE THE QUEEN'S GUEST AT
WINDSOR. UNQUOTE

3. PALACE PRESS OFFICE PLANS TO RELEASE FURTHER DETAILS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

By *dlb* Date *7/13/06*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 5100

DTG: 081304Z MAR 82 PSN: 045019

ONLY FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION OF DETAILED PROGRAA BY BOTH SIDES, COORDINATION WITH APPROPRIATE LOCAL OFFICIALS (I.E., THOSE WITH AUTHORITY FORMALLY TO INVITE THE PRESIDENT TO WESTMINSTER AND OTHER EVENTS) AND AGREEMENT WITH WASHINGTON ON TEXT AND TIMING OF JOINT PUBLIC RELEASE.

4. SHEA WAS COOLLY POLITE THROUGHOUT.

5. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT ABOVE PROCEDURE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE.

LOUIS

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01
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EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 3/30/02 (STREATOR, E. J.) OR-M
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), UK
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES
- OF PARLIAMENT
REF: STATE 78632

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE HAVE CHECKED ON PRESIDENTIAL VISITS AS FAR BACK AS WOODROW WILSON AND HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT NO PRESIDENT SINCE THEN HAS ADDRESSED PARLIAMENT.
3. BASED ON SOURCES AVAILABLE HERE WE ARE REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT PRESIDENT WILSON NEVER MADE SUCH AN ADDRESS EITHER BUT WE ARE MAKING FINAL CHECK WITH WILSON ARCHIVES VIA ICA IN WASHINGTON. WE WILL ADVISE ON THIS FINAL POINT AS SOON AS WE HAVE RESPONSE.
4. FYI: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SIMILAR INQUIRY TO OUR EMBASSY REFERENCE LIBRARY. STREATOR
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7/13/06
dlb

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TELEGRAM

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2686

12065 E.O. XXXX TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION:	FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES	CLASSIFICATION SECRET /NODIS
	RDS-1 4/8/82 (REX RENTSCHLER, JAMES M.) (Haig, Alexander M. J.)	
	SECRETARY'S WORKING DINNER WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, A	
	SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6666 , 6667, 6668	
	SECTO 5038	
	NODIS	
	<p>1. SUMMARY. During an extended working dinner discussion April 8 in Number Ten, the Secretary and senior members of his party explored with Prime Minister Thatcher the possibilities of a peaceful settlement between the UK and Argentina of the South Atlantic crisis. The PM, strongly seconded by Defense Minister Nott and less so by Foreign Secretary Pym, asserted UK determination to achieve the status quo ante. The Secretary suggested a possible promising course which might ensure essential of British position (withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands, restoration of British administration) while leaving Argentina a face-saving way out via interim arrangement involving internationally recognized presence. PM indicated little willingness of give in UK position but</p>	

DRAFTED BY: NSC:JMRentschler:fp	DRAFTING DATE 4/8/82	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED THE SECRETARY
------------------------------------	-------------------------	-----------	---

CLEARANCES:

P:DCGompert

S:AAdams

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NLS F01-055 #26865 ~~SECRET~~/NODIS

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL
(Form J)

50153-101

BY LOT NARA DATE 1/28/08

TALKING POINTS -- THATCHERArgentine Mood

- As we agreed, I was brutally frank with Galtieri about your resolve and the solidarity of the British people. I told him you were ready for war--militarily and psychologically--and that this would be the result unless he altered his course.
- Galtieri is being swept along by forces over which he has at best limited control. He has whipped up the public into a state of frenzy. He is not committed to fight--though the navy is itching for battle.
- He will have no choice but to see this through unless he can show his people that the original decision was not a mistake. And if his forces are attacked, he will have no choice at all.
- My sense is that your strategy of pressure is working--so far. But there is no doubt in my mind that it will not produce a withdrawal from the Falklands. Thus, if there is no settlement, and assuming hostilities do not occur, what it comes down to is whether the Argentine presence on the Island will become untenable over time.
- It will not. The Argentines are a fatalistic people. Your fleet will be in the South Atlantic indefinitely, even if we are lucky enough to avoid hostilities.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-055 #26866BY LDS, NARA, DATE 1/28/08

State of Play

- After twelve hours of back and forth--and ups and downs--we came up with a package which the Argentines may be able to accept. I say "may" because as I left they reintroduced unacceptable demands involving Argentine interim rule and assumed sovereignty. We have no choice but to ignore this posturing.
- The package I have brought here is not a US proposal. But I must tell you in candor, I would have to say it's reasonable.
- If the choice is between this package and war, the view of the United States is clear.

Thatcher's Starting Point

- I understand and support your basic position:
 - withdrawal
 - restoration of British administration
 - preservation of the right of self-determination for the Falklanders.
- My whole effort in Argentina was aimed at bringing them as far as possible on these fundamental points.
- They began by demanding, as the price for withdrawal, Argentine rule in the interim and a commitment to Argentine sovereignty in a fixed, short period.
- We brought them along way. If they were to confirm their acceptance of the package we developed there, your three basic needs would be met.

The Package

- The basic concept is to trigger withdrawal by giving the Argentines some sort of interim official presence on the Islands and a commitment on negotiations, without saying how the negotiations turn out.
- We would accomplish this by an agreement containing the following elements.
- First, the sides would agree to withdraw from the island and an agreed surrounding area. Knowing you do not relish the thought of keeping your fleet at the bottom of the world, we got the Argentines to agree to two weeks.
- Second, the vacated zone would become demilitarized until a final settlement. The Argentines would like a commitment from you to keep your fleet out of the South Atlantic altogether, but in the end will be satisfied if you simply announce unilaterally your plans to return the fleet as the crisis is defused.
- Third, compliance with these provisions would be entrusted to a commission made up of American, British, and Argentine representatives. Such a mechanism is needed anyway, and there is a logic to the composition. The alternative is the OAS or an ad hoc group of friendly countries.

- 4-
- Fourth, the sanctions will be lifted. This would not have to include restoring of diplomatic ties.
 - Fifth, traditional local administration would be restored, including the Executive and Legislative Councils. In keeping with the idea that the Commission is to ensure compliance with the agreement, your administration would submit its decisions and regulations to ensure that British actions on the Island were consistent with the agreement. I believe you told me last time that you could accept a mechanism to ensure your compliance. The fig leaf for Galtieri is his representative on the Commission.
 - Sixth, the commission will recommend ways of facilitating communication, trade, and transportation between Argentina and the Islands. You would have a veto, though frankly I'm not sure that greater communication isn't wise.
 - Seventh, negotiations on a final settlement will be pursued consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. This covers the right of self-determination.
 - Rightly or wrongly, the Argentines claim that the negotiations would drag on forever. They therefore insisted that the parties undertake to complete them by December 31, 1982.

-- I took to heart what you said when I was last here about your position, and I believe what I've outlined is responsive.

Principles and Politics

-- I recall that you also stressed that we could not reward aggression. This is as important to us as it is to you.

-- Let's face it, if there is to be a peaceful outcome, Galtieri will, by definition, try to sell it as a victory. If we try to deny that, I'm convinced we'll have war.

-- But consider the larger equation. Argentina seizes the Falklands by force. Then, confronted with the British fleet and British resolve, he is compelled to withdraw, without much to show for it.

-- This will be a success for British will, British principles, British might, and American diplomacy. We want such a success as much as you.

The Consequences of Failure

-- I am sure you have considered the consequences of failure to arrive at a peaceful outcome.

-- Argentina has isolated itself by using force. If Britain does so now, the fact that you feel it's justified won't stop world opinion from turning against you. I'm sure you're ready for that, but it won't help you in proving your point that aggression doesn't pay.

-- The Soviets were cautious

at first, but no longer. The Cuban Ambassador to Argentina returned while I was there, after over a year's absence. He offered Galtieri full support and implied strongly that the Soviets were also ready to help.

-- The Soviets see a chance to replace the French and others as Argentina's arms supplier and thus establish a beachhead in the Southern Cone. The junta will not decline, if there is no settlement. Anti-communist feelings will be subordinated to the imperative of survival.

-- Soviet access to Argentina could have profound strategic consequences.

-- A conflict would tear the OAS apart, virtually eliminating it as a bul^Awork against communist subversion.

-- It could trigger trouble in Belize, the Beagle Channel, and between Guyana and Ve^yezuela.

-- And of course, the Argentines will not leave the Falklands alone.

-- The problem will not simply be the destruction of American policy in the Western Hemisphere. Western interests are at stake in the broadest sense.

-- Finally, having brought the Argentines this far, how will we be able to explain to our own people why war was chosen over peace.

How to Proceed

--

If you believe what I have outlined provides a basis for discussion, I suggest that I follow up with Francis and John and then get back to you.

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 1/28/08TALKING POINTS: GALTIERI

26867

OPENING

- IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO MEET YOU. I HAVE BEEN
LOOKING FORWARD TO THIS.
- I HAVE HEARD SO MUCH ABOUT YOU. AMBASSADOR WALTERS
AND JEAN KIRKPATRICK HAVE TOLD ME HOW IMPRESSED
THEY ARE WITH YOUR LEADERSHIP. I HAVE ALREADY
SEEN THE RESULTS OF YOUR INTERNATIONAL ROLE, IN
PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO CENTRAL AMERICA.
- I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER. I AM
COMMITTED TO HELP HOWEVER I CAN.

RESULTS IN LONDON

- IN THIS SPIRIT, LET ME BE TOTALLY CANDID ABOUT WHAT
I ENCOUNTERED IN LONDON.
- THE BRITISH SHOWED NOTHING BUT DETERMINATION TO GET
YOUR FORCES OFF THE ISLANDS.
- THATCHER'S DEMANDS WERE CLEAR: YOU MUST WITHDRAW
BEFORE THEY WILL CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS.
- I TOLD HER I WAS SURE YOU COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS --
AND FRANKLY I DON'T BELIEVE YOU SHOULD. THE BRITISH
POSITION IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ULTIMATUM. BEYOND
THAT, PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAS TAKEN THIS POSITION
PUBLICLY AND IN HER PARLIAMENT, SO ITS ABANDONMENT
WILL NOT BE EASY.
- YOU HAVE UNIFIED YOUR COUNTRY, BUT SO HAS SHE. FROM
THE FAR LEFT TO THE FAR RIGHT, THE ENGLISH ARE READY
FOR WAR, AS I KNOW IS ARGENTINA.

GALTIERI'S CHOICES

-- I BELIEVE I KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO ACHIEVE.

-- LET ME OFFER YOU MY THOUGHTS ON YOUR BASIC CHOICES,
IN THE BROADEST HISTORICAL SENSE.

-- HISTORY'S ASSESSMENT OF WHO PREVAILED IN THIS AFFAIR
DEPENDS ON WHAT OCCURS IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

-- I BELIEVE YOU CAN EMERGE THE VICTOR. YOU CAN
IMPROVE ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL STANDING AND
ENSURE PROSPERITY BASED ON THE ABUNDANCE GOD HAS
PROVIDED THIS LAND.

-- YOU CAN ENTER INTO A NEW AND FAR MORE PRODUCTIVE
RELATIONSHIP WITH US. WE CAN DEVELOP COMMON POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AS WELL AS AN ARMS SUPPLY
RELATIONSHIP. YOU WOULD BE WELCOMED IN WASHINGTON
AS A FRIEND AND RECOGNIZED AS A WORLD LEADER.

-- THE ALTERNATIVE, I BELIEVE, WILL BE HARSH, IN
HISTORICAL TERMS.

-- LET ME SPEAK WITH A FRANKNESS THAT ONLY FRIENDSHIP
PERMITS, BECAUSE I KNOW YOU RESPECT THAT.

-- I KNOW AND ADMIRE THE WILL AND ABILITIES OF YOUR
FORCES. BUT YOU COULD SUFFER SIGNIFICANT LOSSES
AND FACE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING YOUR
MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND FOR A PROLONGED
PERIOD OF BRITISH ENCIRCLEMENT. A HOSTILE FLEET

MAY REMAIN OFF YOUR SHORES FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

-- THE BRITISH WILL FIND IT HARD TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES
AND FIGHT AT SUCH A DISTANCE--BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE.
MY SENSE IS THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT
A LONG WAR, AS WOULD YOURS.

-- OTHERS IN THE AREA -- PERHAPS IN LEAGUE WITH THE
BRITISH -- MIGHT TRY TO EXPLOIT NEW OPPORTUNITIES
AT YOUR EXPENSE.

-- YOU STAND TO REVERSE RECENT ADVANCES AND TRIGGER
ONCE AGAIN ISOLATION. YOU COULD FACE ECONOMIC
RUIN, RESULTING FROM WAR REQUIREMENTS, LOSS OF
EXPORTS, FROZEN ASSETS, LOSS OF CREDITS AND EVEN
DEFAULT. THOUGH YOUR ECONOMY IS RESILIENT AND
YOUR PEOPLE STRONG, THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT COULD
BE DEVASTATING.

-- YOU WOULD LOSE YOUR SOURCES OF DEPENDABLE ARMS
SUPPLIES FROM FRANCE, ITALY, AND OTHERS. SOME
HAVE MENTIONED MOSCOW AS AN ALTERNATIVE. BUT
HAVE THEY CONSIDERED THE PRICE? DO THEY WANT
THE SOVIETS TO BECOME ARGENTINA'S ONLY SOLUTION?
DO THEY REALIZE HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD TRY TO
EXPLOIT SUCH DEPENDENCE, AS THEY HAVE ELSEWHERE?
DO THEY WANT ARGENTINA TO BE SEEN AS A NEW FOOT-
HOLD FOR SOVIET INFLUENCE, IF NOT PRESENCE, IN SOUTH
AMERICA?

-- ARGENTINA MIGHT COME TO BE SEEN AS HAVING TORN THE OAS APART, ELIMINATING IT AS AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO COMMUNIST SUBVERSION. BORDER DISPUTES COULD TURN VIOLENT THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA-- GUAYANA, BELIZE, PERU-ECUADOR.

-- I NOW SEE THE PROMISE OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH US, BUT THIS PROMISE COULD BE SWEEPED AWAY. LET ME BE FRANK, IF HOSTILITIES OCCUR WE WILL COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO FAVOR THE BRITISH. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY BEEN SEVERELY CRITICIZED FOR OUR EVEN-HANDEDNESS.

-- WE VERY MUCH WANT THE SORT OF RELATIONSHIP I HAVE DESCRIBED. AND WE WANT YOU TO EMERGE STRONGER THAN EVER. WE DO NOT WANT TO LOSE THATCHER, WHO IS A BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM. BUT WE ARE ALSO DETERMINED THAT YOU SUCCEED.

THE SOLUTION

-- FOR THIS REASON, WE WANT NEITHER HOSTILITIES NOR CAPITULATION TO THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM THAT YOU WITHDRAW BEFORE THEY WILL CONSIDER ANY OTHER QUESTIONS.

-- ON MY LONG FLIGHT HERE FROM LONDON, I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO BREAK THE BRITISH DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL AS A PRECONDITION.

-- I BELIEVE THE SOLUTION IS TO COME UP WITH AN
INTEGRATED PACKAGE, THUS BOXING IN THE BRITISH BY
ESTABLISHING THAT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL CANNOT BE
AGREED WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS AGREEMENT ON OTHER
KEY, RELATED ELEMENTS.

-- I HAVE IN MIND THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE, WHICH WOULD
BE ANNOUNCED IN ITS TOTALITY.

-- FIRST, BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR
FORCES IN A FIXED PERIOD. THUS, THE BRITISH WOULD
HAVE TO KEEP THEIR FLEET AWAY IN RESPONSE TO YOUR
AGREEMENT TO MOVE YOUR FORCES BACK TO THE MAINLAND.

-- SECOND, A DEMILITARIZED ZONE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED.
THIS WOULD KEEP THE BRITISH FROM MOVING FORCES TO THE
ISLANDS, AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO ANTE
FROM YOUR STANDPOINT.

-- THIRD, AN INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM WOULD BE INSTALLED
ON THE ISLANDS. IT COULD INCLUDE THE US, CANADA,
AND TWO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SPANISH-SPEAKING LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THIS UMBRELLA WOULD PERMIT A
CLEAR CHANGE IN THE GOVERNING ARRANGEMENT ON THE
ISLANDS IN THE DIRECTION OF AUTONOMY, AND WOULD
PROVIDE FOR AN ARGENTINE ROLE.

- FOURTH, THERE WOULD BE A JOINT COMMITMENT TO EXPEDITE NEGOTIATIONS TO DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE ISLANDS. THE CONSORTIUM WOULD MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE PROGRESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
- AS YOU CAN SEE, EACH ELEMENT IS RELATED TO THE OTHERS, THUS EXPOSING THE BRITISH INSISTENCE THAT WITHDRAWAL IS A PRECONDITION AS UNREASONABLE AND UNWORKABLE.
- IN ITS TOTALITY, THE PACKAGE PROVIDES FOR SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FROM THE STATUS QUO ANTE. IT WOULD BE A CLEAR SUCCESS FOR YOU.
- YOU WILL HAVE BROUGHT WORLD ATTENTION TO YOUR CASE AND INTERNATIONALIZED THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT.
- YOU WILL HAVE STOPPED THE BRITISH FLEET.
- AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, YOU WILL HAVE AVOIDED A WAR.
- I AM NOT TERRIBLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE BRITISH WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS. BUT WE MUST MAKE THE EFFORT.
- LET ME PROPOSE THAT WHILE I AM HERE WE TRY TO CRAFT A PIECE OF PAPER ALONG THE LINES I'VE DESCRIBED. I WOULD THEN TAKE IT TO LONDON AND PUT HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT.

-- IF I CAN PRESENT THEM WITH A PROPOSAL FOR PEACE
THAT YOU HAVE ACCEPTED, IT WILL BE CLEAR THAT THEY
WILL BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF
REJECTION.

-- I BELIEVE I HAVE OFFERED AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY
TO SHOW YOUR COURAGE AND TO DELIVER YOUR COUNTRY
INTO A NEW ERA. I CAN OFFER NO ASSURANCE OF
SUCCESS, BUT I WILL SPARE NO EFFORT.

BY

NOT

NARA, DATE 1/28/08

POINTS FOR COSTA MENDEZSITUATION IN BRITAIN

- AT LEAST AS TOUGH (AND UNIFIED) AS I HAD THOUGHT.
- SOME BACKLASH OF COURSE. WORRIES ARE SURFACING ABOUT COST OF WAR, POSSIBILITY OF LONG INVOLVEMENT, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY LIFE. WE HAVE SOME NEGOTIATION TALK AND WILL GET MORE.
- BUT THATCHER WAS ROCK-HARD. SHE IS, OF COURSE, FIGHTING FOR HER POLITICAL LIFE. BUT SHE IS ALSO CONVINCED SHE IS RIGHT. SHE WANTS RETRIBUTION. AND I THINK SHE CAN RALLY THE COUNTRY ON IT.

MILITARY SITUATION

- NOBODY KNOWS BUT HOW WELL THE BRITISH TASK FORCE WILL PERFORM, OR FOR HOW LONG.
- BUT THE BRITISH NAVY IS OBVIOUSLY COUNTING ON THE SUBMARINE AS ITS TRUMP CARD, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF A LONG CRISIS. YOU ARE GOOD AT ASW -- BUT MAYBE NOT GOOD ENOUGH.
- ECONOMIC WEAPON COULD BE MORE POWERFUL. EC PROBABLY CAN BE MOBILIZED. WE ARE TELLING LONDON IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PEACE EFFORT FOR US TO JOIN THE EMBARGO -- BUT IF THERE IS WAR OUR PUBLIC WILL FORCE US TO. BANK OF ENGLAND SAYS IT WANTS TO AWAIT ARGENTINE DEFAULT, BUT IT MAY HAPPEN ANYWAY.

DIPLOMATIC

- I PROBED FOR GIVE. FRANKLY FOUND NONE SO FAR. I HAVE SOME IDEAS YOU AND I CAN DISCUSS AFTER WE SEE GALTIERI. THEY ARE BASED ON THE NOTION THAT IT WILL BE INTOLERABLE

FOR YOU TO HAVE TAKEN THE ACTION YOU DID IN
VAIN. BUT UNLESS I CAN GO AWAY FROM HERE WITH
A WRITTEN PROPOSITION (NOT YOURS, MINE, BUT ONE YOU
CAN LIVE WITH) THERE WILL BE WAR. ARGENTINA HAS
MADE ITS POINT. I AM HOPEFUL WE CAN FIND A WAY TO
PROTECT THAT -- WITHOUT A CONFLICT.

26869

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

12065	FROM USDEL SECRETARY IN BUENOS	CLASSIFICATION AIRES SECRET
E.O. XXXX	RDS-1 4/10/18	
TAGS:	OVIP (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)	
SUBJECT:	VISITS OF LEW ALLEN AND BILL BROCK	
ACTION:	SECSTATE WASHDC <i>NIAC Immediate</i>	
	SECRET SECTO <u>3048</u>	
	FOR BUD MC FARLANE, PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT, INFO JUDGE CLARK	
	<p>1. You will recall that we had decided to review the advisability of proceeding with the visits of high-level U.S. officials to Argentina in light of progress toward a peaceful resolution of the Falklands crisis. General Lew Allen is due here April 13 for a meeting of hemispheric air force Chiefs of Staff and Bill Brock is scheduled to be head of our delegation to the U.S.-Argentina Mixed Economic Commission April 14-16.</p> <p>2. While the problems we face in promoting a peaceful outcome to this crisis are by no means surmounted, I have nonetheless believe that the Argentines have been sufficiently forthcoming to justify keeping those two visits on schedule.</p>	

DRAFTED BY: NSC:JREntschler:fp	DRAFTING DATE 4/10/82	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: <i>S/S: APAdams</i>
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CLEARANCES:

ARA:Tenders *[Signature]* ARA:RService *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F01-055#26869

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 1/28/08 ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
 (Formerly FS-413)
 January 1975
 Dept. of State

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 2 of

MRN

Cancellation of them at this delicate point could well have a highly damaging effect on the Argentine mind-set and jeopardize whatever program^{est} we may now have achieved.

3. For that reason I strongly recommend that both Lew and Bill proceed with their travel plans as previously scheduled.

HAIG

~~SECRET~~

Classification

CK
26870

TO: JUDGE CLARK
BUD McFARLANE

SUBJ: Falklands, etc.

In addition to my airborne thoughts on where we now stand with the Falklands crisis (attached), you might want to review the talking points (Tab 1) which Tom Enders prepared for the Secretary's use when the latter briefs the President (perhaps today). Tom, in his usual magisterial fashion, did not see fit to share these with his fellow delegates before they were done up in final. As they stand, I fear they suggest a far too leisurely, even laid-back U.S. posture given the impasse we face at this point in the intermediary process (I am not at all certain, for example, that Pym will want to fly over here, particularly at this delicate juncture in the evolution of events). Whether or not the Secretary follows these points (his instincts are pretty good, and he may take his own tack), I think a number of key questions must now be asked:

--- What are the criteria we are using to determine each party's bottom-line and how will we know when we have reached it?

--- Don't we need to put some clear (and preferably early) time limit on how long we are willing to continue this process, particularly if both sides maintain the rigidity they have so far displayed?

--- Is this exercise really doable now? Can we, in other words, meet each party's minimum requirements (withdrawal of forces and restoration of UK administration for the Brits, some understanding of eventual sovereignty over the islands for the Argies) and at the same time enable Thatcher to persuade her Parliament (and our own public) that we have not rewarded Argentine use of force?

Incidentally, Tom seems to be in some doubt concerning the location of both the Brit and Argie bottom lines; I am in no such uncertainty myself...

Jim Reuschla

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOL-055426870
BY LAT NARA, DATE 1/28/08

April 20, 1982

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

THRU: Bud MacFarlane

FROM: Jim Rentschler

SUBJECT: The Guns of April? - Where we now stand with
Argentina, the UK, and Ourselves

The suspension of our peace shuttle and the likely imminence of armed conflict between the UK and Argentina require a very hard look at our next course. En route home from the dispiriting frustrations of Buenos Aires, I offer the following personal thoughts:

-- We promised both parties our best shot at assisting them to find a peaceful settlement; we gave them that shot -- for the time being, at least, there is nothing more to give.

-- Implicit and explicit in our promise was the determination to practice even-handedness so long as the process continued; that stage has now ended.

Tilting toward either of the parties at this moment will undoubtedly damage our relations with the non-tiltee; yet tilting toward neither -- i.e., attempting to prolong an appearance of "even-handedness" or even worse, passivity -- could put larger US strategic interests at risk.

-- The greatest of all such risks may lie in the psychology of leadership: at what point does the US no longer appear "constructively concerned" but instead is perceived by the British and our own public as irresolute, ungrateful, and evasive?

-- The bilateral question for us thus boils down, in both policy terms and public perceptions, to pro-UK or pro-Argentina; the larger strategic question boils down to Pan-America vs. NATO.

There will be arguments that the choices set out above are, in reality, neither so stark nor simplistic, and that a US policy course which is both prudent and proper will aim to preserve the best of both worlds.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F01-055 #26871BY LJI, NARA, DATE 1/28/08~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

I believe such a course will prove illusory. It is a circle that cannot be squared; both sides of the conflict have too much invested in emotional, geopolitical, and historical capital to allow us a safe passage between them. More important, the moves we make -- or fail to make -- with respect to one or the other disputant will have a long-term ripple effect throughout our national security environment.

We need, therefore, to decide -- on an extremely urgent basis -- in which set of relationships (Hemispheric or Atlantic) we are prepared to sustain the most immediate (but perhaps less costly) casualties, recognizing that we cannot escape some significant damage in either case, and could well incur far worse.

This is properly the subject of an early NSC which would carefully weigh a detailed set of options and the consequences likely to flow from each. Meanwhile, in a spirit of total prejudice and partiality, I advance these views:

-- It is essential to back Britain, and for reasons which transcend the already compelling ties of history, language, and formal alliance.

-- Our strategic imperatives in the East-West context and the stakes we have in asserting the primacy of our Western leadership require it.

-- Enforcement and credibility of the UN system -- particularly our strong backing for UNSC Resolution 502 -- justify it.

-- Moreover, our support for the UK must be seen as convincingly generous and resolute (this means something far beyond rhetoric in both the military supply and economic sanctions areas).

-- Failure to back our most important and forthcoming ally at this critical juncture -- to reenact, in effect, a 1980s version of Suez or Skybolt -- will have a profoundly adverse effect on an already shaky alliance and at a time when we can least afford such turbulence (we must understand that an Anglo-Argentine war will be bad for NATO and our own East-West interests, but that this unhappy state of affairs will be infinitely worse should we alienate Britain into the bargain).

To the positive factors which dictate a pro-British tilt, I would add a number of negative observations based on our direct and highly unpleasant experience with the Argentines over the past few days (in connection with which I invite the views of Roger Fontaine, who is a far better informed student of the gaucho psyche than I):

-- The talks in Buenos Aires demonstrated, more than anything else, the emptiness of our bilateral "Relationship" with the Argies. (Ambassador Shlaudeman voiced this same view, heartily seconded by everyone of us who had to deal with them);

-- Even if we achieved a responsible agreement with the Argentines on a politically workable text, there is no assurance that the present junta -- quite possibly an ephemeral expression of leadership -- could or would deliver;

-- None of us ever had the certainty that the Argentine side was negotiating in good faith; indeed, the evidence indicated that we were being strung along (a risk we recognized and were willing to take in the larger interests of averting bloodshed);

-- We were deliberately treated to a series of petty but cumulatively significant, not to say contemptuous, derogatives from simple courtesy (manipulated crowd boos, squalid "holding" conditions for delegation members in the Presidential Palace, excessive rudeness on the part of Security and administrative personnel) which called into further question the seriousness and good faith of Argentine negotiating tactics:

-- On the larger question of what the South Atlantic crisis will do to the inner-American "system" I favor a fatalistic stance, believing as I do that those who are minded to back us would likely do so in any event, while traditional anti-gringo sentiment would line up a number of states against us no matter what role we played in the peace process (again, however, I would defer to Roger Fontaine).

The Argentines with whom we dealt were not, in sum, nice people; in this sense Mrs. Thatcher and her colleagues may from the start ^{have} read Argentine intentions and operating style more accurately than we. That fact simply reinforces my view that the time of even-handedness, indispensable during a period when we were actively engaged in a peace-shuttling effort, may now be past. We must not lose sight of the assertions with which the President addressed his very first message to Mrs. Thatcher in this crisis: "I told Galtieri that initiating military action against the Falkland Islands would seriously compromise relations between the United States and Argentina" and "while we have a policy of neutrality on the sovereignty issue, we would not be neutral on the issue of Argentine use of force."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Just so. Secretary Haig has undertaken a gallant and gruelling marathon effort to make the Argentines see reason, an effort which I for one strongly supported. But the Argentines have not yet seen reason, and frankly I don't think they ever will -- they may, indeed, be incapable of reasonable compromise in the sense that we understand that concept.

Assuming that a miracle rabbit or two will not pop out of our hat (Pym visit to the U.S., etc.), all of this argues for the earliest possible expression of support for the Brits in ways that are politically unambiguous for them. Unless such practical expression is soon forthcoming -- and absent the kind of Argentine give which now seems unlikely -- I can't imagine that the President would have a comfortable stay in Windsor Castle come early June.

cc: Roger Fontaine
Dennis Blair

26872



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: ARA - Tom Enders

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the President, April 20

CHECKLIST

- o Argentine position both very tough and very hard to establish. Some 50 military, including corps commanders, involved in decision making. Military kept jerking diplomats back. Believe I have got as close to Argentine bottom line as is possible this week.
- o What we got:
 - arrangements or language tilting towards Argentina on the two main questions (future negotiations and local administration), but
 - a British veto on both so that London could control the pace of future change.
- o As expected, London can't and won't go that far, and we shouldn't in any way push them at this point. As you saw, my message to Pym was neutral.
- o Now comes the delicate part of the problem.
 - military pressures are rising (Britain may debark on South Georgia tomorrow);
 - British will step up pressure on us to back them openly;
 - Argentina will start Rio Treaty gambit and try (probably successfully) to get wide Latin support for its position (we doubt that Argentina will try for sanctions under the Rio Treaty now -- or that it could get them).

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-055 #26872

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS 1,3 4/20/12

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 1/28/08

- o We need to identify the British bottom line, just as we are close to Argentina's. That is the reason for asking Pym to come over this week.
- o Meanwhile, suggest we keep to a neutral press line: we've been identifying respective positions but not characterizing.
- o This game is excruciatingly difficult and may well be impossible to win. But every time I recalculate the cost to us of war in the South Atlantic, I cannot avoid concluding that we would be a major loser, on both continents.