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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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26919	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE R 1/28/2008 F01-055	2	4/6/1982	B1
26920	CABLE	#152353Z APR 82; LETTER - REAGAN TO THATCHER R 1/28/2008 F01-055	2	4/15/1982	B1
26921	CABLE	#160512Z APR 82; MEMCON - REAGAN/PRESIDENT GALTIERI TELEPHONE CALL R 1/28/2008 F01-055	11	4/16/1982	B1
26922	CABLE	#161220Z APR 82; LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN D 10/19/2011 F2001-055/1	2	4/16/1982	B1
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
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THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA

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ARGENTINA and the UNITED STATES 1810-1960

by HAROLD F. PETERSON



STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

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V I I I

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: A DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT AND THE AFTERMATH, 1831-1960

The death of John M. Forbes in June, 1831, left the United States without diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires on the eve of discordant relations between the two countries. The diplomatic incident of 1832—the only serious blemish in the first century and a third of intercourse—grew out of a controversy over sovereignty in the Falkland Islands, bleak, barren sentinels of the South Atlantic. Although they lay strategically only two hundred miles east of the Strait of Magellan, these forbidding islands long had discouraged exploration; before 1750 only whalers, sealers, and intrepid navigators had touched their shores. After the middle of the eighteenth century, the need for protected trade routes lifted the islands from their obscurity. Once brought into the stream of world affairs, the Falklands have remained a point of controversy.

Argentina Inherits the Falklands

Resolute French settlers planted the first colony in the Falkland Islands in 1764.¹ Defying this action, the British took formal possession of

¹ The brief summary of early Falklands history which follows is based largely upon Julius Goebel, Jr., *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History*, pp. 1-433, *passim*. This superb treatise also contains an analysis of the Argentine-American controversy of 1831-1833 (pp. 438-455), upon which I have relied heavily for this chapter. The best study from the Argentine point of view is Adolfo Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina*, II, ch. XIX. A comprehensive popular description and history of the islands was published in the United States in 1842 (Robert Greenhow, "The Falkland Islands: A Memoir; Descriptive, and Political," in *The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*, VI [Feb., 1842], 105-151). This article was reprinted with the title "Memoria sobre las Islas Malvinas" in *La Revista de Buenos Aires*, XII, 142-154, 299-309, 448-454; XIII, 170-186, 352-360, 500-526.

the islands in January, 1765, and in the next year established a settlement at Port Egmont. When under authority of the Treaty of Utrecht Spain took over the French and English colonies in 1767 and 1770, it further complicated the question of sovereignty. After lengthy negotiations Great Britain formally abandoned its settlement on May 20, 1774. The withdrawal of the British left Spain free to exercise full control over the islands and their contiguous waters. The Spanish then ordered the absolute exclusion of all alien fishing and whaling vessels.

The much disputed islands were in Spanish hands, therefore, at the beginning of the revolutionary struggles in La Plata. On March 16, 1811, Xavier Elío, Viceroy of the Río de la Plata, notified the Spanish King that the rebel government had ordered the withdrawal of the colonists on the Falklands.² The vicissitudes of the United Provinces during the next decade, however, precluded attempts at recolonization, and, fortunately for Argentine national interests, no other nation sought to acquire them. In 1820, as the provincial government of Buenos Aires determined to unite all the territory in the old viceroyalty, it sent Colonel Daniel Jewett in the frigate *Heroína* to assume formal possession of the Falklands. The government maintained its control during the ensuing years, and in 1823 appointed Pablo Areguati as Governor. At about the same time, it granted the right of settlement and exclusive use of fisheries and cattle to several individuals, including Lewis Vernet, cosmopolitan adventurer of French origin but long a resident of Germany and the United States. Though his colony did not maintain itself continuously, in January, 1828, Vernet secured wide privileges to the island of Soledad, or East Falkland.³

During the subsequent months the colony grew vigorously. By June, 1829, the Governor of Buenos Aires, General Juan Lavalle, resolved to claim for Argentina all the possessions of Spain in its former Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. To insure permanent possession of the Falkland Islands and Tierra del Fuego, Lavalle placed them under a political and military governor. This officer would enforce all Argentine laws in the islands, especially those protecting the seal fisheries. To the scheming Vernet went this appointment. With official support he could now execute his ideas regarding the fisheries. Bluntly he warned masters of fishing vessels that he would tolerate no infringement of his monopoly.⁴

² Pedro Torres Lanzas, *Independencia de América: Fuentes para su estudio*, 1st series, II, p. 485, no. 2932.

³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XX (1832-1833), 420-421.

⁴ *Registro oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 238; Antonio Zinny, *La Gaceta Mercantil de Buenos Aires* (June 13, 1829), I, 213. On February 10, 1831, the Department of State directed Forbes to remonstrate against these measures, but his death prevented compliance (Secretary Van Buren to Forbes, William R. Manning [ed.], *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860*, I, 3-4).

Seizure of American Ships

If by such an order Vernet hoped to protect the seal fisheries from foreign depredations, he soon saw the futility of his desire. Alien ships, including several vessels of the United States, continued to transgress the rights of his concession. Vernet vainly appealed to Buenos Aires for a warship.⁵ Concluding that the situation demanded a more drastic course, in August, 1831, he seized three of these ships, the *Harriet*, the *Superior*, and the *Breakwater*.⁶ The *Breakwater*, promptly escaping, returned to the United States.⁷ After several weeks of negotiations, the captains of the other vessels accepted a contract with the Governor stipulating disposition of their ships.⁸ By this agreement the *Superior* was to continue fishing operations on the west coast of South America, while the *Harriet* sailed to Buenos Aires for trial. Vernet cunningly arranged, therefore, that one of the ships visit the sealing grounds while its trial was in progress, although he planned to institute condemnation proceedings against both vessels. Should they be condemned, the Governor would share in the proceeds of the voyage. This understanding concluded, the *Harriet*, with Vernet on board, proceeded to Buenos Aires.⁹

For both Argentina and the United States the *Harriet* reached La Plata at an acutely unpropitious moment. Throughout the Province of

⁵ Tomás Manuel de Anchorena, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Vernet, July 12, 1831, AGN, BA, Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 2. In the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, there is an extensive collection of Vernet manuscripts. Most of this material, however, relates not to the strictly diplomatic aspects of the incident but to colonization projects, contractual relations with the captains of captured ships, and claims for damages subsequently suffered at the hands of the American warship *Lexington* (see below, pp. 105-106).

⁶ In his "Memoirs on the Falkland Islands," Vernet says that the *Superior* had been warned in 1829 and 1830, the other two ships in 1830, but that all returned (AGN, BA, Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 10f).

⁷ *Ibid.*, núm. 3. Suit against insurance underwriters for recovery of losses was brought by the owners of the *Breakwater* and the *Harriet* in the United States Circuit Court, Boston.

⁸ The original contract is filed in AGN, BA, Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 5. For a copy, see Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 68-69.

⁹ George W. Slacum, U.S. Consul, to Anchorena, Nov. 21, 1831, *ibid.*, I, 65. This note, together with most of those dealing with the diplomatic controversy of 1831-1832, is printed in many places. The Argentine government issued the correspondence in 1832 in two publications, one Spanish and one English, with some slight differences in the documents included (*Colección de documentos oficiales con que el gobierno instruyó al cuerpo legislativo de la provincia del origen y estado de las cuestiones pendientes con la República de los E. U. de Norte América, sobre las Islas Malvinas; Papers Relative to the Origin and Present State of the Questions Pending with the United States of America, on the Subject of the Malvinas*). In 1836 they were printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XX (1832-1833), 311-441. They are also available in Manning, *op. cit.*, I. In cases where the documents have been printed, I have cited the most readily available source, usually Manning.

Buenos Aires and the back country turbulence prevailed. Assumption by the capital province of the management of national affairs had aroused political factionalism and widespread dissatisfaction. Moreover, its attempt to conscript aliens for military service involved the government in acrid disputes.¹⁰ Neither Argentina nor Brazil had yet completely acquiesced in the British settlement of the Uruguayan problem.¹¹

As to the United States, the death of Forbes in June left only a consul, George W. Slacum, as its official representative in Buenos Aires.¹² Forbes's ability and experience, together with his acceptability to the Argentine government, might have enabled the nations to pass through the crisis without tension. But Slacum, a tactless diplomatic novice, was particularly suited to inflame Argentine officials.¹³ His arbitrary and militant attitude, supported in Washington by a suspicious and impolitic administration, quickly sharpened a vexing issue.

Slacum swung into action immediately following the *Harriet's* arrival. His correspondence breathed indignation. In his first despatch to Tomás Manuel de Anchorena, Minister of Foreign Affairs, he wrote he could not understand the grounds for the capture. He inquired if the government intended to avow the seizure. He was dissatisfied when Anchorena explained that the Ministry of War and Marine was investigating and that the Governor would soon act.¹⁴ Although he held no rank but that of consul and had no specific instructions from Washington,¹⁵ Slacum promptly lodged a formal protest against the acts of Vernet. Denying that Argentine officials had the right of seizure or the right to restrain American citizens from use of the fisheries, he said he regarded Anchorena's note as an avowal of Vernet's captures. He protested against the decree of June 10, 1829. Anchorena, considering the Consul unauthorized to act, refused to regard Slacum's position as the official attitude of his government. He hoped for an amicable settlement. Nevertheless,

¹⁰ See above, pp. 95-96.

¹¹ See above, pp. 90-91.

¹² Slacum had served as consul since April, 1824 (Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 65, note 1).

¹³ As an illustration of his tactlessness, see correspondence on a feud which grew up among Slacum, Commander Silas Duncan, and Dr. Joshua Bond, American Consul in Montevideo. Plans were made for a duel to settle the dispute (Bond to Captain Edgar S. Hawkins, U.S. Army, Oct. 8, 1832, enclosure in Hawkins to Secretary of State Edward Livingston, Dec. 15, 1832; Slacum to Bond, Aug. 9, 1832, NA, DS, Con. Let., B. A., IV; Duncan to President Jackson, March 6, 1832, NA, DS, Misc. Let., Jan.-March, 1833). See also Vernet to Lewis Krumbhaar, correspondent of Vernet in Philadelphia, May 29, 1832, AGN, BA, Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 3.

¹⁴ Slacum to Anchorena, Nov. 21, 1831; to Livingston, Nov. 23; Anchorena to Slacum, Nov. 25, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 65-70.

¹⁵ Slacum may have taken authorization from Van Buren's instructions to Forbes on February 10, 1831 (cf. Slacum to Livingston, Nov. 23, 1831, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 70).

he took the opportunity to assert that the United States possessed no rights to the islands or to the fisheries.¹⁶

The "Lexington" Retaliates

This exchange of notes, revealing Slacum's open hostility and Anchorena's subtle intimations, made good tinder for a heated diplomatic controversy. At this critical moment the U.S.S. *Lexington* sailed into the harbor of Buenos Aires. It was commanded by a fiery, high-spirited young officer, Commander Silas Duncan. The arrival of the warship in the hands of the aggressive Duncan was hardly the restraining influence with which to temper a tense situation.¹⁷ Upon learning the facts of the seizures, the officer decided his duty lay in the protection of American citizens and commerce in the Falklands. When on December 6 Slacum reported Duncan's decision to Anchorena, he laid down a virtual ultimatum. Within three days, he said, unless the government of Buenos Aires promptly suspended the right of capture and promised immediate restoration of the *Harriet* and other captured property, the *Lexington* would proceed to the Falklands. To buttress this position Commander Duncan also communicated with the Foreign Minister. He accused Vernet of piracy and robbery and demanded his immediate trial in the courts of either the United States or Buenos Aires.¹⁸

The firmness of the British position at this time may have stimulated Slacum's "bold front and truculent behavior."¹⁹ At the very beginning of the controversy, Woodbine Parish had reminded the Argentines that Great Britain had not surrendered its claim to the Falklands by withdrawal in 1774 and that the United Provinces had no legitimate basis for their possession.²⁰ Whatever his inspiration, Slacum recommended to Livingston that "it is indeed time Sir that 'this Government should be made sensible of their obligations to respect our rights and to render justice to our Citizens.'" ²¹

When Anchorena failed to comply with Slacum's intemperate demands within the three-day limit, Commander Duncan and the *Lexington* sailed for the islands.²² The Foreign Minister's belated reply was far from an

¹⁶ Slacum to Anchorena, Nov. 26, 1831; Anchorena to Slacum, Dec. 3, 1831, *ibid.*, I, 71-73.

¹⁷ V. F. Boyson, *The Falkland Islands*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁸ Slacum to Livingston, Dec. 9, 1831, and enclosures; Slacum to Anchorena, Dec. 6, 1831, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 73-78 and notes; Duncan to Anchorena, Dec. 7, 1831, *British and Foreign State Papers*, XX (1832-1833), 319-320.

¹⁹ Goebel makes this suggestion (*The Struggle for the Falkland Islands*, pp. 442-443).

²⁰ Parish clearly stated the British position in a note to the Argentine Foreign Office on Nov. 19, 1829 (Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 109, note 2).

²¹ Slacum to Livingston, Dec. 9, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

²² Slacum to Livingston, Dec. 20, 1831, *ibid.*, p. 85.

acquiescence. His government viewed the whole controversy as a private litigious affair. Moreover,

if the Señor Commandant of the *Lexington* or any other person belonging to the said Government shall commit any act, or use any measure which may tend to a denial of the right which this Republic has to the *Malvinas* . . . and to impede the seal fishery which it may wish to exercise in them, and especially in the first, the Government of this Province will address a formal complaint to that of the United States, under the firm confidence that it will cause to make valid and respected its rights, by all the means it may esteem convenient. . . .²³

Finally, the Foreign Minister coldly informed Slacum that his government refused to treat with a consul who usurped diplomatic powers. The Consul retaliated with a blanket denial of virtually all of the Minister's contentions. He announced that he was referring the whole affair to Washington.²⁴

During this epistolary bout in Buenos Aires, Commander Duncan and the *Lexington* had reached the Falklands, where late in December the vessel entered Berkeley Sound allegedly flying the French flag.²⁵ Duncan proceeded to disarm the island, loot the settlements, and arrest some of the inhabitants. He declared the island government at an end and carried away as prisoners Matthew Brisbane, one of Vernet's aides, and six other persons.²⁶ When on February 3 the *Lexington* returned to Montevideo (rather than an Argentine port), Duncan advised Slacum that he would hold the prisoners until the government of Buenos Aires made arrangements for their disposition.²⁷

Reaction in Buenos Aires and in Washington

News of the *Lexington's* raid aroused sharp reactions in Buenos Aires. Popular resentment flared. *La Gaceta Mercantil* and *El Lucero* reprinted a letter of Vernet's exposing the details of Duncan's acts and defending his own former position in the Falklands.²⁸ Less denunciatory, *The*

²³ Anchorena to Slacum, Dec. 9, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

²⁴ Slacum to Anchorena, Dec. 15, 1831, *ibid.*, pp. 81-85.

²⁵ Boyson, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

²⁶ The entire incident was reviewed when Carlos María de Alvear, Argentine Minister to the United States, presented the Argentine case to Secretary of State John Forsyth, March 31, 1839, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 210-226 and notes.

²⁷ Duncan to Slacum, Feb. 2, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 93-98, note 5; Duncan to Levi Woodbury, Secretary of Navy, Feb. 3, 1832, NA, DN, Letters from Masters Commandant, Jan.-June, 1832; *La Gaceta Mercantil* (Feb. 8, 1832), II, 13. The Argentine government accepted responsibility for the prisoners (*Registro oficial de República Argentina*, II, 287).

²⁸ *La Gaceta Mercantil* (Feb. 9, 15, 20, 1832), II, 14, 15, 29; *El Lucero*, Feb. 10, 21, 1832. Both journals published editorials, articles, and documents on the

British Packet and *Argentine News* published a letter which assumed that the government of the United States would acquit itself honorably.²⁹ The Argentine government did nothing to quell the agitation. Rather, it issued a public proclamation denouncing the *Lexington's* violent attack. Popular indignation was fully justified, the government said, as it promised satisfaction of its rights.³⁰ Moreover, it notified Slacum that it would no longer recognize him as the official representative of the United States. Because of the prejudices aroused by his irregular ideas and by Duncan's unwarranted proceedings, the government felt obliged

to remove with the greatest care all that directly or indirectly might aggravate the feelings or change the moderation and temperance with which negotiations between civilized and friendly Governments should be conducted. . . .³¹

Slacum's immediate response was unyielding. He declined to appoint a successor, he said, because his government had not dismissed him nor authorized him to select a substitute.³²

In communicating these developments to Washington, Slacum reported that the government had resorted to every device to inflame the minds of the people. He was unable to determine the causes of the Argentine attitude toward him, but he was certain that "if this signal outrage is passed over without *immediate* and *ample* satisfaction, we may bid adieu to all security for our Citizens and commerce."³³

Meanwhile, the Jackson administration had determined upon an aggressive Falklands policy. Although he received no official report until long after,³⁴ the President had alluded to the *Harriet's* capture in his annual message of December 6, 1831. He announced that the right of fishing in the Falklands, never before denied to citizens of the United States, had been transgressed "by a band acting, as they pretend, under the authority of the Government of Buenos Ayres." He had already despatched an armed vessel, he said, to protect trade in the South At-

²⁹ See issue of February 11.

³⁰ *Papers Relative to . . . the Malvinas*, p. 23, no. XIV; *Registro oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 288.

³¹ Manuel J. García, Foreign Minister, to Slacum, Feb. 14, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 88-89.

³² Slacum to García, Feb. 16, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

³³ To Livingston, Feb. 20, 1832, *ibid.*, p. 91. Slacum had kept the Department advised of each new development in the crisis (Nov. 23, Dec. 9, 20, *ibid.*, pp. 66-70, 75-78, 85-88).

³⁴ Slacum's first report, dated November 23, did not reach Washington until long after December 6. It seems certain that the President's only source of information was the crew of the escaped *Breakwater*. News of its return was printed in the *Columbian Centinel* (Boston) and reprinted in *La Gaceta Mercantil* (Jan. 2, 1832), II 5.

lantic and would send a minister to examine Argentina's claim to the islands.³⁵

Secretary of the Navy Levi Woodbury officially approved Commander Duncan's decision to proceed with the *Lexington* to the Falklands.³⁶ But neither his position nor Jackson's was precisely consistent with that of Edward Livingston, Secretary of State, who ordered the United States Minister in Spain to inquire into the legal sovereignty of the Falklands.³⁷ Nor was Jackson's policy congruous with the attitude of Commodore George W. Rodgers, commanding American forces in the South Atlantic, who hoped no event in the Falklands would render necessary the presence there of a war vessel.³⁸ However, in the face of Slacum's boldness and the brusqueness of Jackson, the efforts of Livingston and Rodgers to meet the crisis judiciously were fruitless.

The militancy of the White House was reflected but dimly among the people of the nation. Newspapers of Washington and the larger cities noted the actions of Vernet and Duncan with interest but not with indignation. In Buenos Aires, too, popular resentment abated after its first fury, and by May Rosas resolved to await the arrival of a minister from the United States.³⁹

Jacksonian Diplomacy on Paper

The chargé d'affaires selected by President Jackson to undertake settlement of the controversy was Francis Baylies, Massachusetts lawyer, politician, journalist, and author.⁴⁰ A political henchman of the President without diplomatic experience, he impressed John Quincy Adams as "one of the most talented and worthless men in New England."⁴¹ Be-

³⁵ J. D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 553.

³⁶ Woodbury to Duncan, Feb. 15, 1832, NA, DN, Letters to Officers of Ships of War, XX (Aug. 5, 1831-May 7, 1834).

³⁷ To C. P. Van Ness, Jan. 11, 1832, NA, DS, Inst. Min., XIII, 269-270.

³⁸ Rodgers to Vicente López, Argentine Foreign Minister, April 24, 1832, enclosure Woodbury to Livingston, July 25, 1832, NA, DS, Misc. Let., July-Dec., 1832.

³⁹ Message to the Legislature, May 7, 1832, H. Mabrugaña, *Los mensajeros*, I, 260.

⁴⁰ Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 4; Paul Groussac, *Les Iles Malouines: nouvel exposé d'un vieux litige*, p. 27, note.

⁴¹ Adams confided to his *Memoirs* the following rancorous characterization of Baylies:

... Baylies, in 1825, had, as a member of Congress, voted for Jackson as President, libelled me in the newspapers, and lost his election in consequence. He thought Jackson undervalued him, by the offer of the Collectorship of New Bedford, and Jackson, to appease him, gave him as a second sop the office of Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Ayres. He went there; stayed there not three months—just long enough to embroil his country in a senseless and wicked quarrel with the Government; and, without waiting for orders from his Government, demanded his passports and came home. Nothing but the imbecility of that South American abortion of a state saved him from indelible disgrace and this country from humiliation in that concern. . . .

Adams, Francis Adams [ed.] *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, IX, 446-447.

cause of his inexperience and high-strung temperament, Baylies was clearly unqualified to fulfill the task to which Jackson assigned him.⁴²

Even before he learned of Duncan's acts, Livingston drafted instructions for Baylies. They were lengthy, detailed, often inaccurate, and typical of Jacksonian aggressiveness.⁴³ In depicting Vernet's "lawless and piratical" actions, the Secretary wrote that the President questioned the authenticity of the decree which authorized them. If by its decree of June 10 the government of Buenos Aires sought to delegate authority, it ought to have informed Forbes, either by special notification or by special interpretation. Seizure of a vessel without previous warning was a hostile act,⁴⁴ committed in this case while the United States was on friendly terms with the government of Buenos Aires. Citizens of the United States had enjoyed shelter and fishing in the Falklands for more than fifty years. Assuming, therefore, that Vernet had acted without authorization, the President had ordered all available warships to the area to protect American interests.

Baylies' primary duties, then, were to justify the protective measures taken by President Jackson and to insist upon the right of Americans to share in the fisheries of the islands. The Secretary upheld the traditional rights of all nations to the enjoyment of ocean fishery and the use of shores adjacent to the fishing grounds. For precedent he pointed to the Anglo-American treaty of 1782 and the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1790.

This approach brought him to the point of questioning the right of Buenos Aires to inherit Spanish sovereignty in the islands. He instructed Baylies, therefore, to negotiate for the settlement of the following points:

1. The perfect right of the United States to the free use of the fishery—on the ocean, in every part of it, and on the bays, arms of the sea, gulfs, and other inlets, which are incapable of being fortified.
2. To the same perfect right on the ocean within a marine league of the shore, when the approach cannot be injurious to the sovereign of the country, as it cannot be on the shores which are possessed by savage tribes, or are totally deserted, as they are to the south of the Rio Negro.
3. To the same use of the shores when in the situation above described.
4. That even where a settlement is made, and other circumstances would deprive us of the right, that a constant and uninterrupted use will give it to us.⁴⁵

⁴² See the comment by the Argentine historian, Enrique Vera y González, *Historia de la República Argentina*, I, 211-213.

⁴³ January 26, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 4-12.

⁴⁴ Warnings had been given on several occasions (see above, p. 103, note 6).

⁴⁵ Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 11.

Livingston authorized Baylies to sign a treaty which acknowledged these rights, and, if occasion arose, to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce. Finally, he should demand restitution of the vessels captured, indemnity for property destroyed, and disavowal of Vernet's acts. Livingston's blunt, unrelenting instructions were characteristic of Jackson's South American policy.⁴⁶

Jacksonian Diplomacy in Action

Baylies arrived in Buenos Aires in early June and received immediate recognition.⁴⁷ A few days later, in a lengthy narrative of his government's attitude, he initiated negotiations. He reviewed Vernet's offenses against American citizens and commerce: the capture of the fishing vessels; the extortion of a mercantile contract; the exposure of seven men on one of the islands; the seduction of North American seamen; and the seizure of property. He complained particularly because the United States had been singled out as the victim of these crimes. Furthermore, Baylies' accusations continued,

the Governor chose a time for the exercise of his power in acts of despotism, when no high diplomatic functionary [of the United States] was here to advocate and protect the interests and the rights of his countrymen—and remained unchecked and uncontrolled, until an American naval commander was found of sufficient energy and patriotism, to defend and protect those rights on his own responsibility.⁴⁸

Baylies' note complied fully with Livingston's instructions. But not content to rest his case there, he announced that he saw no justification for Slacum's suspension and suggested his reinstatement.⁴⁹

Such indecorum on the part of an agent whose mission Buenos Aires had thought to be that of conciliation must have been disconcerting. Nevertheless, Manuel Vicente de Maza, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, promptly replied with dignity (June 25). The serious nature of Baylies' declarations, he said, required that they be referred to Governor Rosas. The government would question Vernet and the others indicted at once and would reach a verdict without attempt to impair the rights of American citizens or to sacrifice those of the Argentine Republic. Baylies' response on the following day revealed much less reserve. He said that the questioning was unnecessary, since Vernet had admitted

⁴⁶ On the basis of an unofficial report of Duncan's departure for the Falklands, Livingston later instructed Baylies to justify the action to the Argentine government. When news of Duncan's acts at the Falklands arrived, the Secretary ordered that these, too, be justified (Feb. 14, April 3, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 12-13, 14-15).

⁴⁷ *Registro oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 291.

⁴⁸ Baylies to Manuel Vicente de Maza, Acting Foreign Minister, June 20, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 99-105.

his guilt; the pertinent problem was to determine the measure of guilt. The United States did not pretend to doubt Argentine rights but did wish to establish its own.⁵⁰

From De Maza's note of June 25 Baylies concluded that the Minister was trying to evade the main issue, to involve him as an accuser of Vernet, and to replace the question between the United States and Buenos Aires with one between the United States and Vernet.⁵¹ No further communication reached the Chargé until July 10, when De Maza wrote that the gravity of the controversy demanded the most thorough investigation.⁵² In the meantime, Baylies had prepared a comprehensive historical diagnosis of "the original rights of Spain and the derivative rights of the Argentine Republic" to the Falklands, in which he sought to show the weakness of the Argentine claim. He contended for American rights to free fishery.⁵³

When nearly a month passed without reply, the impatient Baylies determined to insist upon an answer to his demands of June 20. Because of the Chargé's alleged prejudice and his insistence upon Slacum's reinstatement, however, De Maza preferred to negotiate directly with the Department of State. His letter, written as a defense of Slacum's suspension, presented an adroit explanation of the Argentine position. His government had omitted no effort, he said, to keep the question within its lawful limits.⁵⁴

Within a week De Maza informed Baylies of the only basis upon which Governor Rosas would permit negotiations to continue. Viewing Duncan's conduct of the *Lexington's* raid as barbarous and palpably outrageous, the government had resolved to insist upon "prompt and complete satisfaction for said outrages, and reparation and indemnification, not only to the Argentine Republic, but to Comandante Vernet, and the Colonists . . . , for all the damages and injuries. . . ." ⁵⁵ Duncan's actions were made the core of the whole controversy. Until the United States satisfied Argentine demands for reparation, negotiations could not proceed.

Baylies' exaggerated sense of national loyalty apparently could not tolerate this decision. Four days later (August 18), he returned unread the copy of Vernet's detailed report which De Maza had transmitted and, at the same time, demanded his passports.⁵⁶ The Chargé returned

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-108.

⁵¹ Baylies to Livingston, June 30, July 24, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 108, 127-128.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

⁵³ July 10, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 111-126.

⁵⁴ Baylies to De Maza, Aug. 6, 1832; De Maza to Livingston, Aug. 8, 1832, *ibid.*, pp. 138-139, 141-145. For a brief description of the Argentine position, see J. B. Alberdi, *Escritos póstumos*, XVI, 376-377.

⁵⁵ De Maza to Baylies, Aug. 14, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 151.

⁵⁶ Baylies to De Maza, *ibid.*, p. 152.

the report because he felt that consideration of it might make the United States a litigant against Vernet in Argentine courts.⁵⁷ Although he thought Buenos Aires might be desirous of war, he betrayed no resolution to prevent it when he wrote to Livingston, "We have attempted to soothe, and conciliate and coax these wayward & petulant fools long enough."⁵⁸

Failure to reach an agreement by written communication induced De Maza to invite Baylies to a conference on August 27 for the consideration of certain controversial points. To the Minister's request for an explanation of the return of Vernet's report, the Chargé recited his desire to keep the United States from private litigation. The Minister had demanded satisfaction and reparation for Duncan's raid as a prerequisite to negotiation on other matters; therefore, since he was not authorized to deal with that topic, Baylies must insist upon his passports. But De Maza, believing the Chargé to have been given full authorization, could not comprehend this overt act. The Argentine suggested that Baylies might request new instructions or that they might invite the arbitration of a neutral. He saw no reason for severance of amicable relations. When the Minister insisted that they must settle the *cuestión de hecho* concerning Duncan's depredations before the *cuestión de derecho* regarding the fisheries, Baylies persisted in his uncompromising attitude.⁵⁹ Since he apparently felt that he had exhausted all possibilities of a settlement, further conferences were impossible. Receiving his passports on September 3, the impetuous Chargé soon departed for the United States.⁶⁰

In Buenos Aires the departure of Baylies occasioned widespread comment. *La Gaceta Mercantil* characterized the Chargé as lacking "in the possession of all those qualities which are indispensable in a political agent of his rank," and charged the aggravated situation to his "unskillfulness and imprudence" as well as to his lack of instructions.⁶¹ De Maza stooped to no such criticism but declared that Baylies had prevented an accommodation by his insistence upon justifying Captain Duncan.⁶²

⁵⁷ Extensive documentary evidence assembled by Vernet to substantiate his claim against the United States is preserved in AGN, BA, Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 10a and 10e. A brief of the claim is filed in *ibid.*, núm. 3.

⁵⁸ Aug. 19, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 153-154.

⁵⁹ This account is based upon three "minutes" of the conference by De Maza, J. D. Mendenhall, an American citizen, who served as interpreter, and Francis B. Stockton, purser from the United States Navy, who knew Spanish. De Maza's minute is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XX (1832-1833), 437-440; those of Mendenhall and Stockton are in NA, DS, Desp. Arg., IV, the former printed in Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 155-157.

⁶⁰ De Maza to Baylies, *ibid.*, p. 158.

⁶¹ (Sept. 22, 1832), II, 65.

⁶² De Maza to Livingston, Oct. 13, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 166.

Although the leaders of both countries exhibited an unmistakable coolness both before and after the withdrawal of Baylies, there seems little doubt that each was earnestly desirous of an early renewal of diplomatic intercourse. When on September 18 De Maza transmitted the correspondence to the Legislature, he expressed confidence that the United States would make adequate redress at an early date.⁶³ Within a month his government determined to send a minister to Washington, and within three months selected General Carlos María de Alvear, only previous Argentine Minister to the United States.⁶⁴ In Washington, where the House of Representatives requested pertinent correspondence on the Falklands affair, President Jackson refused on grounds that it might be inconsistent with the public interest. "Negotiations . . . are not considered broken off," said he, "but are suspended only until the arrival of a minister, . . ."⁶⁵

Great Britain Fills a Vacuum

Relations between Washington and Buenos Aires had reached this turn when British reoccupation of the Falklands startlingly transformed the situation. Reasserting rights which they had ostensibly relinquished in 1774, the British late in 1832 moved in before the Argentines could re-establish their colony. By this sudden coup the British settled in fact, if not in debate, the question of sovereignty.⁶⁶ Whether or not Captain Duncan's destruction of the Argentine colony inspired the British action is a matter of speculation.⁶⁷ Certainly, British agents in Washington and Buenos Aires knew that relations between the two countries were strained. They doubtless assumed that the United States would not prevent a British occupation or lend support to Argentina.⁶⁸

This *fait accompli* by Great Britain gave Argentina its second opportunity in less than a decade to invite an application of Monroe's principles. In this case, unlike that of the Brazilian War in 1826, it did not immediately make such a request. Nor did the government at Wash-

⁶³ These documents were published as mentioned above, p. 103, note 9.

⁶⁴ De Maza to Livingston, Oct. 13, Dec. 20, 1832, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 166, 167; *Registro oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 302.

⁶⁵ *Reg. of Deb.*, 22 Cong., 2 sess., IX, pt. 1, 900-901; Richardson, *op. cit.*, II, 608-609. Meanwhile, the government was maintaining in the South Atlantic an adequate protecting force for American commerce and fisheries (Woodbury to Livingston, Dec. 24, 1832, NA, DS, Misc. Let., July-Dec., 1832).

⁶⁶ The Falklands have remained a British possession in spite of Argentine "irredentism."

⁶⁷ See Baylies' view in his note to Livingston, April 23, 1833, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 179-180.

⁶⁸ Charles Bankhead, British Minister to the United States, to Viscount Palmerston, LC, MD, Photostats, F. O. 5, Vol. 273, Folio III; Goebel, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-455.

ington undertake to protest to Great Britain. The national interest in 1833 clearly did not dictate a decisive stand against the British move.⁶⁹ Moreover, once Great Britain had reaffirmed its claim by actual reoccupation, it was obvious that Jackson would be unwilling to deny British sovereignty as he had previously that of Argentina.

The Sequel—A Decade Later

The abrupt departure of Chargé Baylies in September, 1832, precipitated a *de facto* suspension of diplomatic relations, which endured for more than a decade. Although each government repeatedly made friendly overtures to the other, they did not renew formal diplomatic intercourse until 1844. Argentine intentions to send a minister to Washington soon after Baylies' withdrawal were suspended by the British *démarche* in the Falklands⁷⁰ and further delayed by a series of domestic and international complications.

The delay of 1832 grew into months, then years, and no Argentine minister reached Washington until 1838.⁷¹ Each year the Argentine Legislature was apprised of the failure to renew negotiations. Periodically the Congress of the United States was informed that a minister would soon arrive.⁷² When in July, 1834, Secretary of State John Forsyth appointed a new consul for Buenos Aires, he addressed the Minister of Foreign Relations in the friendliest of terms. The postponement of a minister's arrival, he said, was disappointing to the President, who was ready to entertain propositions which would lead to an accommodation.⁷³

Of the manifold factors which postponed Argentine action, the lack of continuity in the nation's administration was most disturbing. General Rosas resigned in December, 1832. Before his return to the governorship in April, 1835, three executives struggled to quell dissensions within the province. Rosas' campaign against the Indians in the southern wilderness (1833) added to his personal popularity and prompted a demand for his return to office. Civil war between the provinces of Salta and Tucumán (1834), opposition to Rosas after his return to power (1835), war against the Republic of Bolivia (1837), and a break in relations with

France (1837-1838)—all these developments, together with depletion of public funds, pushed relations with the United States into the background.⁷⁴

General Alvear, appointed Minister to the United States in December, 1832, did not depart for his post. Manuel Moreno, ordered in September, 1835, to transfer to Washington from London, could not comply because of illness, physical or diplomatic.⁷⁵ Three more years elapsed before General Alvear, then reappointed, reached Washington.⁷⁶ In the meantime, the United States maintained only a consulate in Buenos Aires and made no move to send a minister.

Alvear's instructions, prepared by Rosas' Foreign Minister, Felipe Arana, included a flat mandate to secure satisfaction from the United States for Duncan's depredations and Slacum's effrontery. They did not mention British reoccupation or the Monroe Doctrine. Alvear was ordered (1) to promote the most satisfactory reparation for the insults inflicted upon Argentine sovereignty by Duncan's destruction of Vernet's colony, by his capture of innocent persons and their removal to foreign lands, and by Slacum's lack of respect for Argentine authority; (2) to promote reparation to the Argentine Republic, Vernet, and the colonists for all damages caused by Duncan's aggression; and (3) to clarify and defend Argentine rights to the Falklands and to fisheries along their coasts. If Alvear failed to secure suitable satisfaction on the first point, he was not to take up the others and was to terminate his mission.⁷⁷

The Minister laid his case before the Department of State in a conference with Secretary Forsyth on January 14, 1839. Alvear learned for the first time that the American government had long since approved Commander Duncan's conduct. In support of the naval officer's actions, the Secretary sought to argue from allegory; in rebuttal, the Minister erected his proof upon established laws and upon human and neutral rights. If there were a choice between Great Britain and Argentina as possessors of the Falklands, said Forsyth, the United States would of course prefer the American state, but it could not set itself up as judge of rightful ownership. Nevertheless, Forsyth declared to Alvear, the

⁶⁹ Ricardo Levene, *A History of Argentina*, pp. 404-409; Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 196-202.

⁷⁰ Arana to Forsyth, Sept. 13, 1836, *ibid.*, pp. 193-195; Arana to Moreno, Sept. 19, 1835, AGN, BA, S1-A2-A4-núm. 9.

⁷¹ *Registro oficial de República Argentina*, II, 388; Alvear to Arana, July 4, 1837, May 25, 1838, AGN, BA, S1-A2-A4-núm. 13.

⁷² "Instrucciones que deberán regir al Ministro Plenipotenciario Extraordinario cerca del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de la América del Norte," May 22, 1833, AGN, BA, S1-A1-A1-núm. 5. Vernet also provided Alvear with "Breves observaciones sobre los daños y perjuicios ocasionados por la destrucción de la colonia en las Islas Malvinas por el Comandante de la Corveta de los Estados Unidos Lexington, en 31 de Diciembre de 1831" (*ibid.*).

⁶⁹ Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867*, pp. 8-9; S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, IV, 253-254.

⁷⁰ Eben R. Dorr, Consul at Buenos Aires, to Forsyth, Jan. 1, 1835, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 187-188.

⁷¹ For correspondence on this delay, see *ibid.*, pp. 184-185, 186-191, 193-195, 186-197.

⁷² Mabragna, *op. cit.*, I, 281, 290, 309; Richardson, *op. cit.*, III, 27, 151.

⁷³ July 29, 1834, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 15-16; Forsyth to Dorr, July 29, 1834, NA, DS, Inst. to Con., VI, 32-33. Until the arrival of Dorr, the United States had had no official representative in Buenos Aires since the departure of Baylies and Slacum in September, 1832.

United States "will never permit that any European nation take possession of one inch of land in any point of all America," a promise which Alvear found of "great use and mutual interest for all the American continent." The Secretary closed the conference by assuring the General that he would lay the whole matter before the President and by reminding him that the United States also had claims against Argentina.⁷⁸

Alvear's documentary presentation of the case two months later, couched in far gentler language than his own instructions, made little if any impression upon President Martin Van Buren or his Secretary of State.⁷⁹ At any rate, willfully or otherwise, they forced a distinguished hero of Argentine independence to set something of a record for cooling diplomatic heels. They permitted the two remaining years of their administration to run out without reply to the Argentine demands. Nine more months passed before Secretary of State Daniel Webster finally stated the American position. Webster asserted simply that the United States must suspend final judgment upon Alvear's request until Argentina and Great Britain adjusted their dispute. If the Argentine government was willing to acquiesce in this postponement, then the United States would agree to a reopening of diplomatic relations.⁸⁰ Lacking instructions to deal with such a proposal, Alvear avoided a direct reply. Since Rosas seemed unwilling—or unable—to make up his mind to accept Webster's proposal, the Minister received no guidance from Buenos Aires.⁸¹ The Tyler administration, therefore, proceeded on the basis of the Secretary's stated position.⁸² Diplomatic wheels have rarely ground so slowly.

The Sequel—A Half-Century Later

Although full diplomatic relations were restored in 1844, the Argentine claim lay dormant another forty years.⁸³ Except for the writings of an occasional journalist, politician, or political theorist, the controversy over

⁷⁸ This account is based upon Alvear's minute of the conference, AGN, BA, S1-A1-A1-núm. 5. Thomas B. Davis, Jr. has written extensively of Alvear's fruitless negotiations with the Department of State (*Carlos de Alvear: Man of Revolution*, pp. 112-121).

⁷⁹ Alvear to Forsyth, March 21, 1839, and enclosures, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 210-226.

⁸⁰ Webster to Alvear, Dec. 4, 1841, *ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

⁸¹ Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

⁸² J. C. Calhoun, Secretary of State, to William Brent, Jr., appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, July 15, 1844, Manning, *op. cit.*, I, 22-23. In every annual message to the Legislature from 1840 to 1844, Rosas or his ministers expressed hopes for a settlement (Mabragaña, *op. cit.*, I, 4, 23, 39-40, 55, 72).

⁸³ In 1866 Vernet solicited aid from Domingo F. Sarmiento, Argentine Minister to the United States. Sarmiento wrote the Foreign Minister from New York that he had been given no instructions on the subject (April 6, 1866, *Obras de D. F. Sarmiento*, Vol. III, pp. 200-215). Vernet died in 1871.

the Falklands remained a dead issue in Argentine-American relations.⁸⁴ Finally in 1884, near the close of Chester A. Arthur's administration, the claim was resurrected by Luis L. Domínguez, Argentine Minister to the United States. Twice, through formal notes to Secretary F. T. Frelinghuysen, he presented the Argentine claim for indemnity and damages.⁸⁵ He received no reply. Twice more, during the first four months of the first Cleveland administration, the Minister addressed formal statements to Secretary Thomas F. Bayard.⁸⁶ The last of these four communications finally brought the persistent Argentine a reply which reverted to the reasoning of Daniel Webster. The case must remain in abeyance until Argentina settled its differences with Great Britain.⁸⁷ To this argument Domínguez responded that Argentina was willing to arbitrate, even with the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court as arbiter. There was no rejoinder.⁸⁸

In his annual message of 1885 President Grover Cleveland handled this revival of the old claim with unfortunate bluntness:

The Argentine Government has revived the long dormant question of the Falkland Islands by claiming from the United States indemnity for their loss, attributed to the action of the commander of the sloop of war *Lexington* in breaking up a piratical colony on those islands in 1831, and their subsequent occupation by Great Britain. In view of the ample justification for the act of the *Lexington* and the derelict condition of the islands before and after their alleged occupation by Argentine colonials this Government considers the claim as wholly groundless.⁸⁹

Dr. Vicente G. Quesada, just beginning a seven-year mission to the United States, waited less than twenty-four hours to score Cleveland's errors in fact. He described as unjust the President's references to the "piratical colony" and the "derelict condition of the islands." The claim could not fairly be called "wholly groundless," he contended, until it had been adjudicated.⁹⁰ Bayard's reaction echoed Frelinghuysen and re-echoed Webster. Admission of the claim for reparation would be tacit recognition of Argentina's sovereignty over the islands; and sovereignty

⁸⁴ In the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires, there is an extensive file of newspaper clippings illustrating press revival of the issue. Few of these, however, antedate 1884 (Archivo de Vernet, S1-A4-A5-núm. 8).

⁸⁵ Sept. 24, 1884, Jan. 23, 1885, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., III. Much of the correspondence on the revival of the claim has been printed in *Memoria*, 1885, pp. 126-143; 1886, pp. 48-64; 1887, pp. 193-278.

⁸⁶ May 4, June 27, 1885, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., III.

⁸⁷ July 20, 1885, NA, DS, Notes to Arg. Leg., VI, 240-242.

⁸⁸ July 27, 1885, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., III.

⁸⁹ Richardson, *op. cit.*, VIII, 325.

⁹⁰ To Bayard, Dec. 9, 1885, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., III. Quesada has written of his activity on behalf of the Falklands claim in *Recuerdos de mi vida diplomática: misión en Estados Unidos (1885-1890)*.

was a question for Great Britain and Argentina to resolve. Even if Argentine sovereignty should be established, there was still justification for Captain Duncan's actions of 1832. Moreover, this was not a case in point for an application of the Monroe Doctrine, because that principle pretended no retroactive features.⁹¹ Quesada's reply was a cogent exposition of the Argentine position, but it failed to persuade Cleveland and Bayard.⁹²

This prolonged correspondence brought to an end active agitation for settlement of the Argentine-American debate over sovereignty in the Falkland Islands.⁹³ During the long controversy, the United States had adhered to four rules of action: (1) nonapplication of the Monroe principle where the dispute antedated 1823; (2) nonapplication of the doctrine in a retroactive sense; (3) the denial of the right of a foreign government to demand an enforcement of the principle of reparation for injuries resulting from its nonapplication; (4) the right of the United States "to abate a nuisance involving lawless aggressions upon the persons and property of its citizens, without regard to the question of territorial jurisdiction."⁹⁴ Argentina had based its case upon the legality of Spain's claim to sovereignty, the inheritance of that claim by Argentina in 1810, and continuous exercise of Argentine jurisdiction until 1832.

The Sequel—A Century Later

The disappearance of the Falklands question from direct Argentine-American negotiations did not signify Argentina's dropping of its claim to the islands nor end its agitation for return of the "unredeemed" territory. Persistently it maintained the legitimacy of its position and especially during and after World War II acted more aggressively to sustain its rights. Turning their resentment toward Great Britain during these later years, Argentine leaders, nevertheless, utilized the machinery of the Inter-American System to project and support their contention. As the issue reappeared on the agenda of successive conferences, American statesmen from Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles to John Foster

⁹¹ March 18, 1886, NA, DS, Notes to Arg. Leg., VI, 256-267, printed in *Memoria*, 1886, pp. 49-56.

⁹² May 4, 1887, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., III, printed in *Memoria*, 1887, pp. 201-273.

⁹³ In 1897, when the Bureau of the American Republics officially listed the Falkland Islands as a British possession, the Argentine Minister in Washington, Martín García Mérou, protested to the Department of State (García Mérou to William R. Day, Assistant Secretary of State, Nov. 23, 1897, NA, DS, Notes from Arg. Leg., IV; Day to García Mérou, Dec. 1, 1897, NA, DS, Notes to Arg. Leg., VII, 15). The Bureau, of course, was not an agency of the United States government.

⁹⁴ These principles are well stated by Charles E. Martin, *The Policy of the United States as Regards Intervention*, p. 126. See also Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907*, pp. 62-64.

Dulles found themselves caught between a Hemisphere neighbor and a European friend.

At the very outset of World War II British efforts to fortify the Falklands against possible German occupation, such as Admiral von Spee had attempted in 1914, placed a heavy strain on Anglo-Argentine friendship. Porteño leaders looked upon the recruitment of young Britons within Argentine territory for service in the islands as a violation of their neutrality and sovereignty.⁹⁵ When, at Panama in October, 1939, the First Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers resolved to create a broad security zone around the Hemisphere, the Argentines flatly reserved their legitimate rights to the possession they had lost in 1832.⁹⁶

Seven months later, after Nazi armies had occupied Holland and France, the Argentines took further steps to re-establish their claims to the islands. When the United States proposed that the American republics recognize no transfer of Hemisphere territory from one non-American power to another, the Argentines countered with the proposition that no European colony should exist within the Americas. They ratified the Convention of Havana, tailored by the Second Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers along the lines of the American proposal, but only with the reservation that it did not apply to the Falklands, "since they are a part of Argentine territory and are included within its dominion and sovereignty."⁹⁷

During the post-World War II decade the chauvinism engendered by Juan Perón created appropriate atmosphere for the reassertion of Argentina's claims. Its threats to lay the Falklands case before the United Nations inspired Prime Minister Clement Atlee's assurance to the House of Commons that Britain would not be "cheeked or chivvied" out of its territories anywhere in the world. Periodically, by issuing stamps showing the islands as the "Islas Malvinas" or as a British crown colony, the one or the other nation renewed the "battle of the postage stamps."⁹⁸ Even as late as 1958 the famed old wheel horse of the Socialist Party, Alfredo L. Palacios, could publish the third edition of his nationalist volume, *Las Islas Malvinas, archipiélago argentino*. The issue may have been one essentially of "honor" between two long-time friends, yet it sometimes provoked the strategic movement of warships.⁹⁹

At successive inter-American gatherings after the war—Rio (1947), Bogotá (1948), and Caracas (1954)—Perón's representatives renewed their familiar cry. While re-emphasizing Argentine rights to the Falklands

⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, Oct. 23, 1939.

⁹⁶ See below, p. 402, note 12.

⁹⁷ See below, pp. 404-405.

⁹⁸ *The New York Times*, June 4, Oct. 6, 1946, Feb. 24, 1948. For a summary of Argentine agitation against Great Britain, see C. A. Silva, *La política internacional de la Nación Argentina*, pp. 641-646.

⁹⁹ *The New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1948.

and other territories in the South Atlantic and Antarctica, they sought and won Latin American approval for their opposition to all colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. In loyalty to their European allies, American delegates to the regular Inter-American Conferences at Bogotá and Caracas felt compelled to withhold support from anticolonial resolutions.¹⁰⁰

For more than a century and a quarter the Argentines have mourned the loss of the strategic Falklands. During the first part of that time, by insisting upon reparations, they clearly held the United States responsible for violation of their sovereignty. Failing to win the indemnification they sought, more recently they have switched their animus, with equal lack of success, toward Great Britain. These repeated failures help to account for Argentina's current hostility toward colonialism within the Americas and its unaccustomed resort to multilateral diplomacy to achieve national aims.

¹⁰⁰ See below, pp. 467, 469, 488.

**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

**Defense: Use of Wideawake Airfield in Ascension Island
by United Kingdom Military Aircraft**

*Agreement effected by exchange of notes
Signed at Washington August 29, 1962;
Entered into force August 29, 1962.*

The British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to the Secretary of State

**BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

August 29, 1962

No. 326

SIR,

I have the honour to refer to the technical discussions which have recently taken place between representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning the use of the Airfield at Wideawake in Ascension Island by aircraft of the Royal Air Force. In these discussions agreement was reached in principle upon the following provisions:-

- (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV(2) of the Agreement of the 25th of June, 1956, [1] concerning the Extension of the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground by the Establishment of Additional Sites in Ascension Island:
- (i) the Government of the United Kingdom shall have the right to land United Kingdom military aircraft at Wideawake Airfield upon receipt by the United States Commanding Officer at the Airfield of at least 94 hours advance notification of the arrival of any single aircraft and at least 72 hours advance notification of the arrival of groups of two or more aircraft.
 - (ii) in the event that additional logistic, administrative or operating facilities at the Airfield are considered by the Government of the United Kingdom to be necessary in

connexion with its use by United Kingdom military aircraft, the Government of the United States shall permit the Government of the United Kingdom to establish, maintain and use such facilities in accordance with arrangements to be agreed between the United Kingdom and United States authorities.

- (b) Arrangements shall be made between the United Kingdom and United States authorities to ensure that the operation of the Long Range Proving Ground and the use of Wideawake Airfield by United Kingdom military aircraft are carried out in such a way as to avoid interference with one another.
- (c) The Government of the United Kingdom shall reimburse the Government of the United States for any readily identifiable additional cost to the latter arising out of the use of Wideawake Airfield by United Kingdom military aircraft, including costs related to claims arising out of or incident to such use, subject to the terms of the Exchange of Notes of the 23rd of October 1946/ 23rd of January 1947^[1] between the two Governments for Mutual Forbearance concerning Claims against Members and Civilian Employees of their respective Armed Forces.

I now have the honour to confirm that the above provisions are acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom and to propose that, if they are likewise acceptable to the Government of the United States, the present Note and your reply to that effect should be regarded as constituting an Agreement between the two Governments in this matter, which shall enter into force on this day's date and shall continue in force for the duration of the Agreement of the 25th of June, 1956, referred to above.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hooo

The Honourable

DEAN RUSK,

*Secretary of State of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.*

¹ TIAS 1622; 61 Stat. (pt. 8) 2876.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
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per McFarlane*

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Thatcher memo
to P asking
for economic
measures*

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

26919 6 April
Haig memo saying he will go

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1982: 39

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. *(signature)*

SUBJECT: FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

In keeping with the initiatives you have taken with both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri and your offer of our good offices to help settle this most unfortunate dispute, I have begun to explore what we might be able to do. Today, I have talked personally with the UK and Argentine Ambassadors, as well as with the new UK Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, by phone following receipt of a letter from him. Tonight I met with the visiting Argentine Foreign Minister. My objective in these discussions has been to listen to both sides and look for opportunities for diplomacy. I believe we have found a few.

We need now to move quickly, while there is still uncertainty on both sides and while each is having second thoughts. Furthermore, we should act before we are placed in an untenable position of having to compromise our impartiality if we are to be responsive to escalating British requests for assistance. In this connection you have just received a letter from Thatcher asking us to take a range of economic measures on their behalf.

Subject to your approval, and an indication from the British that they agree, I propose to go to London and Buenos Aires, leaving tomorrow or Thursday. The principal objective of this mission would be to test our understanding of each side's minimum requirements for a solution to the immediate problem of a prospective

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RDS 1,3, 4/6/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI 055 #26919

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 1/28/08

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

armed conflict in this hemisphere between two friends. If we are correct that the greatest concerns of the British are withdrawal of Argentine forces and respect for the rights of its subjects, and that the Argentines must have at least a change from UK administration of the Islands with the clear prospect of ultimate sovereignty, we will have a base on which we may be able to build at least a temporary settlement. Only a beginning, but an essential step to avert hostilities and lay the groundwork for a lasting solution.

Neither the British nor the Argentines want the OAS or the UN involved. Consequently, we are thinking of the formation of a neutral force to administer the Islands while the sovereignty issue is settled. This might include ourselves (the British will not accept less), the Canadians and two Latin countries. This will be a high risk mission but one I believe we must take if we are not to suffer a major setback to our policies in this hemisphere.

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26120
OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2011
SIT806

DTG: 152353Z APR 82 PSN: 041150
TOR: 105/2329Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP COMM SIT /004
WHSR COMMENT: BLAIR

FLASH

DE WTE #2011 1052329
Z 152353Z APR 82
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH02011

APRIL 15, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

AT HIS REQUEST, I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH GENERAL GALTIERI CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS ISLAND CRISIS. I WANTED TO RELAY TO YOU A SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR IN LONDON, I HAVE SENT YOU THIS MESSAGE, BUT WE CAN TALK ON THE TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY.

GENERAL GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO ME HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH YOUR COUNTRY, AND HIS FEARS THAT CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DETERIORATION IN RECENTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE ADVANCE OF YOUR FLEET AND THE BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS WERE MAKING HIS SITUATION DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM THAT I SHARED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT, AND URGED HIM TO BE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WHO HAD MY FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS TO ME, GENERAL GALTIERI PROMISED TO DEAL HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-055#26920

BY LOT NARA, DATE 1/28/08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 2011

DTG: 152353Z APR 82 PSN: 041150

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO AL DURING HIS TWO VISITS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTIVITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY, ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, AND ARGENTINA, WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN ADVANCING SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

0286

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

26721
OUTGOING

*Pres - Galtieri
MEMCON*

PAGE 01 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2019
SIT856

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041582
TOR: 106/0505Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP SIT FONT /005

FLASH

DE RUEADWW #2019 1060505
Z 160512Z APR 82 ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

~~SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02019 SECTION 1 OF 3

FOR AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN:

PLEASE DELIVER TO SECRETARY HAIG IMMEDIATELY.

BEGIN TEXT

APRIL 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXANDER HAIG

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR SECRETARY HAIG ON PRESIDENT'S PHONE CALL
TO PRESIDENT GALTIERI

FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI, ATTACHED
IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT GALTIERI TONIGHT. AS YOU CAN SEE, IT RAN ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

GALTIERI DID NOT RAISE MUCH THAT WAS NEW NOR DID HE BRING UP SPECIFIC
NEGOTIATING POINTS. HE DID UNDERLINE HIS OBVIOUS CONCERN ABOUT THE

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NLS FOI-055 #26921

~~SECRET~~

BY NOT NARA, DATE 1/28/08

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2019

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041582

APPROACHING BRITISH FLEET. GALTIERI ALSO SUGGESTED UNNAMED NATIONS MIGHT BE EXCERBATING THE CONFLICT, AN THAT U.S. MEDIA DISCLOSURES WERE UNHELPFUL. THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT EDNEO WITH A ROUSINGLY ARGENTINE VERSION OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE HISTORY AND IMPLIED THAT THE ARGENTINES AND NORTH AMERICANS SHARE A COMMON HERITAGE OF STRUGGLE AGAINST (BRITISH) COLONIALISM.

PRESIDENT REAGAN REITERATED OUR SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE AND CALLED ON THE PARTIES TO BE FLEXIBLE AND RESTRAINED IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. THE PRESIDENT ALSO EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR YOUR MISSION.

I MIGHT ADD WE READ GALTIERI AS A WORRIED MAN, BUT ONE NOT YET READY TO RETREAT FROM PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED POSITIONS.

WORD OF THE CALL LEAKED AND AS A CONSEQUENCE WE PREPARED A SHORT PRESS RELEASE WHICH DEALS ONLY GENERALITIES. THEN, SO AS TO RELIEVE ANY CONCERNS ON MAGGIE'S PART WE NOTIFIED PRIME MINISTER THATCHER OF THE CALL THROUGH A CABINET LINE MESSAGE.

ATTACHMENTS

TAB A TEXT OF CONVERSATION
TAB B TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE
TAB C TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

TAB A

PRESIDENT: THIS IS RONALD REAGAN.

GALTIERI: GOOD AFTERNOON, MR. PRESIDENT. THIS IS PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA SPEAKING TO YOU. IT'S A PLEASURE TO GREET YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. I WONDER IF YOU HEAR ME WELL. I CAN HEAR YOU VERY WELL.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 03 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2019

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041582

PRESIDENT: YES, I CAN HEAR JUST FINE, AND I KNOW THAT YOU WISH TO CONTINUE OUR CONVERSATIONS. I'M PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU. I'M AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, I'M VERY GLAD TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO YOU ONCE AGAIN AS A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR FIRST CONVERSATION THAT WE HAD WHICH, PERHAPS, WAS NOT VERY FRUITFUL ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL 1 AT A TIME FROM OUR STANDPOINT THE ESSENCE OF THE ISSUE WAS RESOLVED AND WE WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACCEDE IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR REQUEST. CAN YOU HEAR ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, JUST FINE.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, I THINK IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR ARGENTINA, FOR US TO HAVE ASSISTANCE, THE ASSISTANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, IN THIS VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, THAT WE ARE EXPERIENCING IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREAT BRITAIN WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IS AFFECTING THE SOLIDITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD. CAN YOU HEAR, ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: I CAN HEAR YOU, YES, VERY WELL.

GALTIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS THE PROFOUND WISH, MY PERSONAL WISH AND THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA, TO SEE TO IT THAT THIS SITUATION DOES NOT CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. AND IT IS FURTHERMORE OUR WISH THAT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT BOTH COUNTRIES SEEK AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UN RESOLUTION 502 TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WHOLE BACKGROUND OF THIS PROBLEM THAT GOES BACK 150 YEARS BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS WELL AS ALL THAT HAS BEEN DEBATED, ALL THAT HAS BEEN,

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2019 DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041582

THE WAY THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN DEALT WITH, THE WHOLE
RECORD OF THE UN IN ITS DEBATES OF THE PROBLEM OF THE
PAST 16 YEARS WITH REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF DECOLONIZA-
TION AROUND THE WORLD. DID YOU READ ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, I HAVE ALL OF THAT.

PRESIDENT: WAS THAT ALL THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO SAY BEFORE, OR DO
YOU WANT A RESPONSE FROM ME NOW OR DOES HE HAVE MORE>

GAITIERI: MR. PRESIDENT, GOING ON FOR ONE MORE PARAGRAPH, IF
YOU WOULD ALLOW ME, I ALSO WISH TO HAVE YOU REALIZE
THAT WITH THE ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FLEET TOWARD THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION WE FEEL THAT THERE IS AN IN-
CREASINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION, NOT ONLY BETWEEN OUR
TWO COUNTRIES, BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN
THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT IT ALSO OUR CONCERN THAT THIS
ISSUE NOT DETERIORATE TO A POINT WHERE OTHER NATIONS
MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED AND THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BECOME
TANGLED UP AND EXACERBATED BY OUTSIDE INTERESTS. WE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2020
SIT857

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041583
TOR: 106/0505Z

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DE RUEADWW #2020 1060505
Z 160512Z APR 82 ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

~~S E C R E T~~ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02019 SECTION 2 OF 3

WISH TO CONTINUE THE GOOD RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, YOUR ADMINISTRATION, OVER RECENT TIMES, RELATIONSHIPS WHICH HAVE BECOME SO CLOSE, MR. PRESIDENT, AND FOR THIS REASON WE WISH TO CONTINUE THIS RELATIONSHIP WITH REFERENCE TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND WITHIN THIS CONTEXT IT IS MY FEAR THAT IF THE BRITISH CONTINUE THEIR HOSTILITIES IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION THE SITUATION MAY SLIP OUT OF OUR GRASP, MAY SLIP OUT OF OUR CONTROL AND BECOME AN EXTREMELY DELICATE ISSUE FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. DID YOU UNDERSTAND ME, MR. PRESIDENT>

PRESIDENT: YES, LET ME JUST SAY I'M COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO US BECAUSE AS I'VE SAID BOTH COUNTRIES INVOLVED, YOURS AND GREAT BRITAIN, ARE FRIENDS OF OURS SO OUR GOOD OFFICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTENDED TO YOU BOTH. NOW, SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS, AND HE IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND I HAVE FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN HIM. NOW, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM COMMITTED WHOLEHEARTEDLY TO A

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2020

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041583

PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISPUTE. I AGREE THAT A WAR IN THIS HEMISPHERE BETWEEN TWO WESTERN NATIONS, BOTH FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES IS UNTHINKABLE. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY AND DISASTER FOR THE WESTERN WORLD, AND A BITTER LEGACY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS OF ARGENTINES, BRITONS, AND AMERICANS. THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD PROFIT FROM SUCH A WAR WOULD BE THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SLAVE STATE ALLIES, AND IT WOULD BE A COMMON MISFORTUNE FOR ALL THE REST OF US. SO I HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THIS. OVER

GALTIERI: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, I SHARE YOUR VIEWS. BUT WITH THE PASSING OF EVERY HOUR AND WITH THE CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE BY GREAT BRITAIN ALONG OUR COASTS AND AS THE BRITISH FLEET CONTINUES TO ADVANCE TOWARD THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, I FEAR THAT WHETHER WE WISH TO SEE THIS OR NOT, THIS MAY BRING ABOUT SOME SERIOUS MISFORTUNE THAT WE WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO PINPOINT OR TO KEEP UNDER CONTROL IMMEDIATELY AND WILL HAVE THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGGRAVATING THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THIS IS WHY I THINK THAT WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL IN REGARD TO THIS BECAUSE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE ATTEMPTS ALSO ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PRESS AND THE WORLD PRESS AS WE NOTICED IN SOME OF THE COVERAGE YESTERDAY, IN PARTICULAR TO BRING ABOUT SOME SPLIT IN THE VERY GOOD RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN RECENT TIMES, BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND OUR TWO NATIONS, AND BETWEEN OUR TWO ADMINISTRATIONS. FOR THIS REASON I FEAR THAT AS TIME PASSES WE MAY BE FACED WITH CERTAIN EVENTS THAT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO BRING UNDER CONTROL. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT I AM THANKFUL TO YOU FOR DISPATCHING SECRETARY HAIG ONCE AGAIN TO BUENOS AIRES AND, OF COURSE, I WILL AGAIN BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM TOMORROW AND WE WILL HAVE LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS TOMORROW TO FOCUS ON THIS PROBLEM WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN TO US. OVER.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 03 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2020

DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041583

PRESIDENT: MR. PRESIDENT, AS I SAID, I SINCERELY HOPE THAT WE ALL CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT SOON. AND I SHARE YOUR FEARS ABOUT SOME INADVERTENT ACT CREATING THE TROUBLE THAT YOU'D BE UNABLE TO RETREAT FROM. I KNOW THAT YOU AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER ARE LEADERS OF COURAGE, PRINCIPLE AND DETERMINATION AND WE'RE GOING TO NEED ALL OF THAT IN THESE DAYS AHEAD. WE'RE ALSO GOING TO NEED, THOUGH, FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT FROM BOTH YOU AND THE BRITISH. AND, IF WE HAVE THAT WE CAN GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. I KNOW WE HAVE A WAYS TO GO BUT THERE MUST BE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND ONE THAT AS I SAID THE OTHER NIGHT WHEN I SPOKE TO YOU, THAT TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF THOSE PEOPLE LIVING ON THE ISLANDS.

AND SECRETARY HAIG WILL BE WITH YOU SOON AND I WILL BE RELAYING WHAT WE HAVE JUST SAID TO MY OWN STAFF HERE, AND AGAIN YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE ABOUT HIM AND THAT HE IS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. IT'S A MOST SENSITIVE SITUATION AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT I KNOW OTHERS HAVE USED PROPAGANDA TO TRY AND INDICATE THAT THERE IS SOME DIVISION BETWEEN US. WE ARE DOING NOTHING TO UNDERMINE OUR ROLE AS AN HONEST BROKER IN THESE TALKS. PEACE, MR. PRESIDENT, IS OUR COMMON CAUSE. TO PRESERVE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO GOOD FRIENDS, YOU AND BRITAIN. THAT IS MY PERSONAL GOAL. AND THAT IS OUR SINGLE OBJECTIVE.

WE'VE BEEN CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH YOU AND THE BRITISH, BECAUSE IF WE DIDN'T WE COULDN'T CONTINUE TO OFFER OUR HELP ON THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, GOING BEYOND THEM, WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO PLAY AN HONEST ROLE. THE ROLE BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WANT. SO, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE ARE MAINTAINING THIS NEUTRAL ATTITUDE. I HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO, IF FIGHTING BREAKS OUT THIS WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. I HAVE UNDERGONE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 04 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 2020 DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041583

SOME CRITICISM MYSELF SIMPLY BECAUSE WE'RE TRYING TO REMAIN NEUTRAL. BUT I INTEND TO DO THAT AS WE CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THIS AND I JUST HOPE AND PRAY THAT THERE WILL BE NO HOSTILE ACT FROM EITHER SIDE WHILE WE CONTINUE TO WORK THIS OUT.

GALTIERI: I THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR. PRESIDENT, I'M SURE THAT YOU ARE AWARE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THIS CALL WAS TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE THAT WE HAD INITIATED ON THE FIRST OF APRIL FOR A DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS AND TO CONTINUE THE CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES IN OUR SEARCH ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN WORLD FOR SOLUTIONS TO OUR PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DIVISIONS OR SPLITS BETWEEN US. I ONLY WISH TO ADD, MR. PRESIDENT, THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1976 (SIC) AND THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE BEGAN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISM AND ACHIEVED THEIR INDEPENDENCE. WE, IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE, BEGAN THIS STRUGGLE IN THE LAST CENTURY, PERHAPS SOMEWHAT LATER THAN YOU DID, AND WE ACHIEVED INDEPENDENCE FOR OUR PEOPLE AND NOW

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 2021
SIT858

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TOR: 106/0505Z

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DE RUEADWW #2021 1060505
Z 160512Z APR 82 ZFF-1 ZFF-4
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

~~S E C R E T~~ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02019 FINAL SECTION OF 3

ON THE 2D OF APRIL 1982, WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE THIS
INDEPENDENCE COMPLETE. PERHAPS ACHIEVING COMPLETE
INDEPENDENCE, AS I SAID, LATER THAN YOU DID, MR.
PRESIDENT. I HOPE THAT YOU CAN APPRECIATE OUR
SENTIMENTS IN THIS REGARD, MR. PRESIDENT. OVER.

PRESIDENT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN AND ASSURE YOU AGAIN THAT
WE ARE GOING TO STAY IN THIS WITH THE SINCERE HOPE
THAT WE CAN HELP BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND
MAINTAIN THE FRIENDSHIP THAT WE HAVE WITH THE NATIONS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND I APPRECIATE YOUR CALLING ME
AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM SECRETARY HAIG AFTER
YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH HIM AND
SO I WILL SAY THANK YOU AGAIN AND GOOD NIGHT.

GALTIERI: TALK TO YOU AGAIN, MR. PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

GALTIERI: GOOD NIGHT TO YOU MR. PRESIDENT, WE'LL TALK AGAIN, SOME
TIME.

PRESIDENT: GOOD NIGHT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 2021 DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041584

TAB B

LATE THIS AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT GALTIERI OF ARGENTINA CALLED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

DURING THE CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID THAT HE WAS WHOLEHEARTEDLY COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE. HE SAID THAT A CONFLICT IN THE HEMISPHERE BETWEEN TWO WESTERN NATIONS WOULD BE A TRAGEDY AND WOULD LEAVE A BITTER LEGACY. PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO ASKED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND RESTRAINT BY ALL PARTIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. WITH THAT, HE SAID, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET THROUGH THIS TOGETHER. WE STILL HAVE A WAYS TO GO, HE ADDED, BUT HE IS HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN FIND A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THIS VERY SERIOUS MATTER. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID THAT SECRETARY HAIG, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, WOULD BE ARRIVING IN BUENOS AIRES IN A FEW HOURS TO CONTINUE THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

AS HE HAD IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, PRESIDENT GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN HIS PERSONAL DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE.

TAB C

APRIL 15, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

AT HIS REQUEST, I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH GENERAL GALTIERI CONCERNING THE FALKLANDS ISLAND CRISIS. I WANTED TO RELAY TO YOU A SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION. IN VIEW OF THE LATE HOUR IN LONDON, I HAVE SENT

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 2021 DTG: 160512Z APR 82 PSN: 041584

YOU THIS MESSAGE, BUT WE CAN TALK ON THE TELEPHONE TOMORROW MORNING IF YOU THINK IT NECESSARY.

GENERAL GALTIERI REAFFIRMED TO ME HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH YOUR COUNTRY, AND HIS FEARS THAT CONFLICT WOULD CAUSE DETERIORATION IN RECENTLY IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT THE ADVANCE OF YOUR FLEET AND THE BLOCKADE OF THE ISLANDS WERE MAKING HIS SITUATION DIFFICULT. I TOLD HIM THAT I SHARED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID CONFLICT, AND URGED HIM TO BE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WHO HAD MY FULL FAITH AND CONFIDENCE WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STEPS TO ME, GENERAL GALTIERI PROMISED TO DEAL HONESTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO AL DURING HIS TWO VISITS. WE ARE ALSO GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTIVITY YOU HAVE SHOWN TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY, ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES, AND ARGENTINA, WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO COOPERATE IN ADVANCING SPECIFIC INTERESTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

WARM REGARDS,

RON

BT

~~SECRET~~

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26922 CABLE

2 4/16/1982 B1

#161220Z APR 82; LETTER - THATCHER TO
REAGAN

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Falklands 26923

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 USMISSION USUN NEW 3236 DTG: 041906Z NOV 82 PSN: 048502
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4421
WHITEHOUSE FLASH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03236

EXDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY, EAGLEBURGER, - AND NEWELL; NSC FOR JUDGE
CLARK; FROM AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK
E. O. 12356: 11-4-88
TAGS: PROG, UNGA, UK
SUBJECT: REVISED TEXT OF EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON FALKLANDS
REF: USUN 3233

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.
BELOW IS REVISED TEXT OF DRAFT EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON
THE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION FOR USE AFTER THE VOTE IN
THE UNGA PLENARY NOVEMBER 4.
MR. PRESIDENT,
THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA
IN THEIR TRAGIC CONFLICT OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
(ISLAS MALVINAS). AT THE OUTSET OF THE CONFLICT,
MY GOVERNMENT MADE SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO BRING THE
TWO PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. WE SAID AT THAT
TIME THE UNITED STATES STANDS BEHIND THE PRINCIPLE
THAT THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS HEMIS
PHERE WHERE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES REMAIN TO BE SOLVED DIPLOMATICALLY. FOR
THE UNITED STATES, THE FALKLAND CRISIS HAS BEEN AND
STILL IS A PARTICULARLY AGONIZING, TRAGIC EVENT.
AS THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS, WE HAVE A LONG-STANDING
ALLIANCE AND, BEYOND THAT, THE CLOSEST RELATIONS
OF FRIENDSHIP WITH GREAT BRITAIN, THE COUNTRY FROM
WHICH OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND LANGUAGE
DERIVE. BUT WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN FOR A MOMENT OUR
CLOSE GEOGRAPHICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS
WITH OUR LATIN NEIGHBORS. WE DO NOT ONLY CARE ABOUT
THIS HEMISPHERE, WE ARE PART OF THIS HEMISPHERE, AND
WE SHARE MANY OF THE ASPIRATIONS, GOALS AND DREAMS OF
ALL NATIONS OF THE AMERICAS...
THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES TRIED SO HARD TO AVOID THE
CONFLICT ON THE FALKLANDS, WHY WE HOPED SO INTENSELY
TO REDUCE AND ISOLATE IT, AND WHY WE WERE EAGER AND READY
TO BACK ANY REALISTIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD
PUT A JUST END TO IT. THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT TO THIS CONFLICT LED THE UNITED STATES TO
SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505 OF MAY 26 WHICH
CALLED FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES,
WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, AND NEGOTIATIONS. THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF THAT RESOLUTION REMAIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE SAME VITAL NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION THAT WOULD PUT THIS CONFLICT ONCE AND FOR ALL

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BY *ADT* NARA DATE *1/25/88*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02 USMISSION USUN NEW 3236 DTG: 041906Z NOV 82 PSN: 048502

BEHIND US UNDERLIES OUR VOTE TODAY.
THIS RESOLUTION, IN ITS REVISED AND FINAL FORM, EXPRESSLY
REAFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER CONCERNING
NONUSE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE WELCOME
ITS REFERENCES TO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND TO THE
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES NOT TO RENEW THEM. THE COST,
IN BLOOD AND TREASURE, TO BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM DICTATES THAT FORCE MUST NEVER AGAIN BE USED TO
ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THIS DISPUTE. WE ASSUME, THEREFORE, IN
SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PREVENTING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE FUTURE.
THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT HAVE VOTED FOR ANY
RESOLUTION WHICH PREJUDGED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY
OR THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEVER TAKEN
A POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND WE DO
NOT NOW DO SO. WE CONCLUDE, HOWEVER, THAT THE
RESOLUTION BEFORE US DOES NOT LEGALLY PREJUDICE THE
POSITION OF EITHER ARGENTINA OR THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND, IN FACT, OPENS THE WAY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS
IN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT ANY PREORDAINED RESULT.
FINALLY, IN CALLING ON THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE, LET
US NOT FORGET, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THESE ISLANDS ARE
AND HAVE BEEN FOR GENERATIONS THE HOME OF A SMALL, BUT
RESOLUTE, POPULATION OF ISLAND PEOPLE. THE UNITED
STATES ASSUMES THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA WILL NECESSARILY TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT BOTH THE INTERESTS AND THE VIEWS OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDERS.
IN SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION, THE U. S. AFFIRMS THAT
THIS DISPUTE LIKE ALL OTHERS SHOULD BE SETTLED BY
DISCUSSION AND NEVER BY FORCE AND THAT THE FATE OF
PEOPLES SHOULD NEVER BE SETTLED WITHOUT DUE ACCOUNT
BEING TAKEN OF THEIR VIEWS, VALUES AND INTERESTS.
BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03236

LET THESE PRINCIPLES AND THOSE OF THE UN CHARTER
ITSELF GOVERNING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION TO CLOSE THIS
UNHAPPY CHAPTER AND MOVE FORWARD AGAIN TOWARD PEACE,
UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THIS HEMISPHERE.
END TEXT.
KIRKPATRICK
BT

26 924

P10: 35

~~SECRET~~

WIDE
SITUATION ROOM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

Subject: Falklands Crisis

Our latest exchanges with the British confirm that they are currently not of a mind to work toward a negotiated settlement which gives anything at all to the Argentines before they retake the Islands. After my conversation with you on Monday, I put to them the idea of a US-Brazilian peacekeeping force as a way of enabling them to contemplate withdrawal of British forces as part of an interim agreement. The reply I just received from my British counterpart, Pym, states that the ideas of mutual withdrawal and interim administration are "no longer realistic," given the major change in British mood resulting from their successful landing.

In the meantime, the UN Secretary General has asked the two parties for their positions on a ceasefire within 24 hours. The Argentines have replied that they could accept a ceasefire first, followed by discussions of mutual withdrawal. The British position, which has not yet been given officially to the Secretary General, is that a ceasefire is acceptable only if there is a simultaneous Argentine withdrawal. The two sides could not be further apart. The Secretary General has asked us to put pressure on the British to accept mutual withdrawal, warning that he will announce Thursday evening that a ceasefire is not possible if the British have not moderated their position.

It would be a major error for us to pressure the British at all at this point. Given the mood in London, American pressure would be in vain; we should conserve our leverage with Mrs. Thatcher until it can be used to produce results, i.e., when the islands are effectively in British hands.

At my suggestion, the British will try to delay responding to the Secretary General on the ceasefire question. At a

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minimum, we would hope to have the OAS meeting -- which begins Thursday and could last for several days -- behind us before the Secretary General declares that the British position makes a further effort on his part impossible. As it is, we will not find it easy to get through the OAS meeting without a bad resolution. If the latest UN effort aborts -- and the British are blamed -- our support from moderates in the OAS will disintegrate.

There is virtually no hope of productive negotiations before the British complete their re-occupation of the Islands. Even then, the British will be reluctant to offer anything to the Argentines. They will want a ceasefire, and they are sensitive to our concerns about further damage in the Hemisphere and new opportunities for the Soviets and Cubans. But they will not be flexible, at least in the short term, in the flush of victory.

At the right time, we should go back to the British with suggestions regarding the sort of offer they should make once they have retaken the Islands. A British victory on the Islands, unless followed by an effort to reach a negotiated solution, would lead only to further conflict and an unhealable wound in our relations with our Latin neighbors. We are now working on ideas for such an offer.

~~SECRET~~