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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES		Wit	hdrawer
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File Folder	FALKLANDS WAR (UN/KIRKPATRICK/HAIG) 11/04/1982		A)-147	
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1289 CABLE	061311Z JUN 82	5	6/6/1982	B1
1209 CADLL	0013112 3010 02	5	0/0/1/02	DI
1290 CABLE	041322Z NOV 82	2	11/4/1982	B1
1292 CABLE	SAME TEXT AS 1290	2	11/4/1982	B1
1293 CABLE	041711Z NOV 82	4	11/4/1982	B1
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	R 6/23/2006			
1296 CABLE	SAME TEXT AS 1294	3	11/4/1982	B1
	R 6/23/2006			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. RF-1 (6/6/82)

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

U.S. TELEVISION NEWS REACTION TO PRESIDENTIAL TRIP

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE SATURDAY SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS, THE FLAP OVER THE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION VOTE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN EUROPEAN CITIES UPCOMING ON THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE WERE AMONG THE SUBJECTS RECEIVING MOST ATTENTION ON THE JUNE 5 NEWSCASTS ON NATIONAL TELEVISION. FOLLOWING IS A SAMPLING OF THE REPORTS AND COMMENTS:

CBS' BOB SCHIEFFER: "IN THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN VERSAILLES, FRANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG SAID THE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ARE A VERY SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT. HE SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION ALL DAY. PHILIP HABIB, THE AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO HELPED ARRANGE LAST YEAR'S CEASEFIRE, WILL CONFER IN PARIS TOMORROW WITH MR. HAIG AND MR. REAGAN. HABIB WILL THEN FLY ON TO ISRAEL.

"THE UNITED STATES APPEARS TO BE CATCHING THE WORST OF IT ON ALL FRONTS IN THE FOULUP THAT OCCURRED YESTERDAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JEANE KIRKPATRICK CAST A U.S. VETO ON A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE FALKLANDS, THEN LATER SAID THERE HAD BEEN A MIXUP IN INSTRUCTIONS IN THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ONLY INTENDED TO ABSTAIN THE VOTE. TODAY, SOURCES SAID BOTH THE BRITISH AND THE ARGENTINES WERE FURIOUS ABOUT IT. TO COMPOUND THE PROBLEM PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO IS ATTENDING THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT AT VERSAILLES, WAS LEFT IN THE EMBARRASSING POSITION OF SAYING HE HADN'T HEARD ABOUT IT."

CBS' DON KLADSTRUP: "BETWEEN 200 AND 300 THOUSAND MARCHERS COURSED THROUGH THE STREETS OF ROME TODAY IN ONE OF THE LARGEST PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS EVER HELD HERE. TRAFFIC WAS BLOCKED THROUGHOUT THE CITY AS DEMONSTRATORS CHANTED "NO TO NUCLEAR ARMS," AND "YANKEE GO HOME." ORGANIZERS SAID THE PROTEST WAS TIMED TO PRECEDE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO ITALY MONDAY. BANNERS CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT (FILM SHOWING BANNERS) WERE EVERYWHERE. CHANTS OF "ITALY OUT OF NATO", COULD BE HEARD TOO, A REFERENCE TO THE 120 NUCLEAR MISSILES FLANNED FOR INSTALLATION IN THAT COUNTRY. IN PARIS, A SMALLER, THOUGH JUST AS VUCAL ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION WAS TAKING PLACE. AS IN ROME THE MARCH WAS MOSTLY PEACEFUL, MOSTLY. NOT UNTIL PROTESTERS REACHED THE END OF THEIR ROUTE DID SOME BRIEF VIOLENCE BREAK OUT. LEFTIST DEMONSTRATORS PELTED RIOT POLICE WITH ROCKS AND BOTTLES. POLICE RESPONDED WITH TEAR GAS (FILM SHOWS POLICE THROWING TEAR GAS AT DEMONSTRATORS) THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF SERIOUS IMJURIES.

BUT THE INCIDENT DID RAISE FEARS OF MORE TROUBLE IN OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR THE DAYS AHEAD."

Haig Altered U.N. Stance While President Slept

By Lou Cannon Washington Pert Malf Writer

VERSAILLES, France, June 5-While President Reagan alept, the U.S. government switched positions on a controversial United Nations resolution without telling him, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said today.

Haig acknowledged that he decided to have Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, abstain on a Panamanian-Spanish resolution, opposed by Britain, that aimed at producing a diplomatic solution to the Falklands conflict.

Kirkpatrick, however, voted with Britain against the resolution because the instructions telling her to abstain did not arrive in New York in time,

Asked why he hadn't called Kirkpatrick directly, Haig said of . the U.N. ambassador, who has Cabinet rank but is held in low

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See REAGAN, A22, Col. 1

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regard hy Haig: "You don't talk to a company commander when you have a corps in between."

The remark revealed an open secret of the Reagan administration, which is that Haig and Kirkpatrick are barchy on opeaking terms. Some officials here were critical both of the secretary of state and of the U.N. ambassador—of Haig for not calling the instructions directly to Now York and of Kirkpatrick for drawing attention to the change in instructions after she had cast her vote.

The incident proved an embarrassment to Reagan, who had hoped to demonstrate qualities of competence and leadership during this weekend's economic summit meeting and the remainder of his 10-day European trip.

"President" neegan came to surope to thy to prove that he could ride, and he instead fell off his horse at the first fence," said a British television commentator, reflecting the mystification of his country's delegation at the U.S. action. British sources said that Foreign Secretary Francis Pym "expressed dismay" when Haig informed him of the U.S. intention to abstain minutes before the vote was taken."

. The incident recalled an occasion in 1980 when a U.S. representative in the United Nations voted for an anti-Israeli resolution and subsequently changed positions after a wave of public criticism. One of the most vocal critics was then-candidate Reagan, who refused to accept President Carter's explanation of a breakdown in communications, and instead interpreted the incident as demonstrating a failure of the Carter leadership.

Haig, taking full responsibility for the decision on the U.N. resolution, made light of suggestions that he should have awakened Reagan.

"It was just a nuance vote," he said, adding that if he awoke Reagan for matters like this, "My God, the president would be up 24 hours a day, and I'd be up too."

Reagan did not learn of the incident until his morning staff meeting and still did not seem very conversant with what had happened when a television reporter caught up with him at lunchtime.

The president, seated between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, was æsked at the lunch whether the United States had meant to oppose or abstain on the resolution at the United Nations.

"Uh, you've caught me a long ways from there," be replied. "Let me catch up with things of that kind."

When the reporters said that British sources were "furious" about what had happened, Reagan said: "I have no information with which to answer." Instener would not comment at all, beyond saying that she did not give interviews at lunchtime.

[United Proce International sold a senior British official who asked not to be identified described the U.S. mixup as "duplicitous." His choice of the word was an apparent tit-for-tat reference to Haig's characterization of former British foreign minister Lord Carrington, whom Haig once called "a duplicitous bastard."]

The day before, during a 1½-hour private meeting with Thatcher, Reagan had expressed full support for British efforts to regain control of the disputed Falklands territory by military force.

This in itself was a different view than administration officials, both inside and outside the White House, had conveyed during the week leading up to the meeting. The message that the administration had sent in advance of the Reagan-Thatcher talks was that the president intended to persuade the prime minister to be magnanimous and try to avoid a bloody battle for the Falklands espital of Stanley:

When this view changed to one of all-out backing for the British, it apparently failed to carry along Kirkpatrick. She remained concerned that too close an identification of U.S. and British interests would damage U.S. standing among Third World countries, particularly in South America. Because of these views, White House officials said that Kirkpatrick consistently favored abstention rather than opposition to the Panamanian-Spanish resolution.

with a secretary of state and an administration that give a relatively low priority to the United Nations and were preoccupied this week with the many thorny issues of the summit.

Haig had discussed the resolution with Pym earlier in the day without focusing on details. The British believed from what Haig said that the United States intended to join them in opposition to the resolution as a sign of Anglo-American sulidarity on the Falklands issue.

Shortly after 11 p.m. [5 p.m. EDT] yesterday, Haig discussed the resolution by telephone with Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel and Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders in Washington. Both of them supported Kirkpatrick's view and recommended an abstention rather than a veto, officials here said today.

Haig then called Pvm. who was out. He also called National Security Adviser William P. Clark, who also was away. Then he called back the State Department in Washington and gave the instructions that Kirkpatrick should abstain.

By the time Haig reached Pym and Clark in subsequent phone calls, he believed that the instructions had been carried out. He learned a few moments later, however, that the message had failed to reach Kirkpatrick in time.

A minor mystery remained over whether Kirkpatrick had been instructed to announce the intended abstention—as she said yesterday—or decided, as Haig today suggested, to do this on her own. White House officials said they didn't know which version was accurate.

The incident revived some of the long-festering animositisc between the White House staff and Haig, which had notably diminished during the past five months after Clark became national se curity adviser The inclination in the White House, at least today, was to dismiss the most recent incident as an aberration rather than an episode that presaged a new period of conflict between the White House and riag.

"It's unfortunate as hell," said one high-placed White House aide, "but I do think Al had the authurity to make the decision."

Another high-ranking official, while saying that he wished Haig had mentioned to the president what he was going to do, excused the secretary on the grounds that he was preoccupied with many other issues.

"There was so much going on here that the resolution really wasn't given that much significance, though perhaps it should have been," this official said. "Al didn't focus on it."

Haig, asked whether the administration was trying to have it both ways, had the last word. "If we are," he replied with a smile, "it's proved that's not the way to do it, not at all."

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EXD-S	1. 2. HERE IS THE STATEMENT WE PROPOSE FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM SHERMAN AFTER THE VOTE ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS RESOLUTION. THAT VOTE IS EXPECTED LATE THIS AFTERNOON. PLEASE LET US HEAR FROM YOU SOONEST. BEGIN TEXT: DRAFT EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION FOR USE IN PLENARY NOVEMBER 4 MR. PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINDOM AND ARGENTINA IN THEIR TRAGIC CONFLICT OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS). AT THE OUTSET OF THE CONFLICT, MY GOVERNMENT
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MADE SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO BRING THE TWO PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. WE SAID AT THAT TIME THE UNITED STATES STANDS BEHIND THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS HEMISPHERE WHERE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF TERROTORIAL DISPUTES REMAIN TO BE SOLVED DIPLOMATICALLY. FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE FALKLAND CRISIS AHS BEEN AND STILL IS A PARTICULARLY AGONIZING. TRAGIC EVENT. AS THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS. WE HAVE A LONG STANDING ALLIANCE AND, BEYOND THAT, THE CLOSEST RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP WITH GREAT BRITIAN. THE COUNTRY FROM WHICH OUR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. LAW AND LANGUAGE DERIVE. BUT WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN FOR A MOMENT OUR CLOSE GEO GRAPHICAL. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OUR LATIN NEIGHBORS. WE DO NOT ONLY CARE ABOUT THIS HEMIS PHERE. WE ARE PART OF THIS HEMISPHERE. AND WE SHARE MANY OF THE ASPIRATIONS. GOALS AND DREAMS OF ALL NATIONS OF THE AMERICAS...

THAT IS WHY THE UNITED STATES TRIED SO HARD TO AVOID THE CONFLICT ON THE FALKLANDS. WHY WE ARE HOPING SO INTENSELY TO REDUCE AND ISOLATE IT. AND WHY WE ARE EAGER AND READY TO BACK ANY REALISTIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE WHICH WILL PUT A JUST END TO IT. THE NECESSITY FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THIS CONFLICT LED THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505 OF MAY 26, AS WELL AS OTHER POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE COURSE OF THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT.

THE DISPUTE THAT APPEARED TO MANY TO BE SIMPLE HAS NONETHELESS PROVED EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE. BUT WE MUST ABANDON THE EFFORT, BECAUSE IT LINKED THE SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, AND NEGOTIATIONS. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENNS OF THAT RESOLUTION REMAIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE SAME VITAL NEED FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION THAT WOULD PUT THIS CONFLICT ONCE AND FOR ALL BEHIND US UNDERLIES OUR VOTE TODAY.



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THIS RESOLUTION, IN ITS REVISED AND FINAL FORM, EXPRESSLY REAFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER CONCERNING NONUSE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE WELCOME ITS REFERENCES TO CESSATION OF HOSITILITIES AND TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO RENEW THEM. THE COST, IN BLOOD AND TREASURE, TO BOTH ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DICTATES THAT FORCE MUST NEVER AGAIN BE USED TO SOLVE THIS DISPUTE. WE ASSUME, THEREFORE. IN SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION A RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRE VENTING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE FUTURE. THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT HAVE VOTED FOR ANY RESOLUTION WHICH PREJUDGED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR THE OUT COME OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE NEVER TAKEN A POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND WE DO NOT NOW DO SO. WE CONCLUDE. HOWEVER. THAT THE RESOLUTION BEFORE US DOES NOT LEGALLY PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF EITHER ARGENTINA OR THE UNITED KINGDOM AND. IN FACT, OPENS THE WAY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONSIN GOOD FAITH WITHOUT ANY PRE ORDAINED RESULT.

FINALLY, IN CALLING ON THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE. LET US NOT FORGET. MR. PRESIDENT. THAT THESE ISLANDS ARE AND HAVE BEEN FOR GENERATIONS THE HOME OF A SMALL. BUT RESOLUTE. POPULATION OF ISLAND PEOPLE. THE UNITED STATES ASSUMES THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA WILL NECESSARILY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE INTERESTS AND THE VIEWS OF THE FALKLAND IS LANDERS.

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IN SUPPORTING THIS RESOLUTION. THE U.S. AFFIRMS THAT THIS DISPUTE LIKE ALL LTHERS SHOULD BE SETTLED BY DISCUSSION AND NEVER BY FORCE AND THAT THE FATE OF PEOPLES SHOULD NEVER BE SETTLED WITHOUT DUE ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF THEIR VIEWS, VALUES AND INTERESTS. LET THESE PRINCIPLES AND THOSE OF THE UN CHARTER ITSELF GOVERNING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES SERVE AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION TO CLOSE THIS UNHAPPY CHAPTER AND MOVE FORWARD AGAIN TOWARD PEACE. UNDERSTANDING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THIS HEMISPHERE. END TEXT. KIRKPATRICK BT 1

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) E. O. 12356: N/A TAGS: SOPN, FA, UK, US, AR SUBJ: BRITISH PRESS ON US SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION

1. THE FALKLANDS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD COVERAGE IN THE BRITISH PRESS. REPORTS THAT THE U.S. WAS SUPPORTING THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND BUENOS AIRES ELICITED A MIXTURE OF RESPONSE FROM THE LEAD AND EDITORIAL COLUMNS OF FLEET STREET.

2. FPSE TIMEZ LEAD THOUGHT THE MOVE COULD BE REGARDED AS A SERIOUS SET-BACK FOR THE BRITISH ON THE GROUNDS THAT "IT IS ILL-CONCEIVED AND ILL-TIMED" WHILE THE TELEGRAPH MENTIONED SOURCES SAYING THAT "THEY DID NOT FEEL THAT LONDON SHOULD SEE THE DECISION AS BEING IN ANY WAY AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE U.S." THE TELEGRAPH FOLLOWED THIS UP NEXT DAY IN ITS EDITORIAL COMMENTING THAT THE SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN "TOO TRAGICALLY". IT POINTED OUT THAT ON THE VITAL ISSUE (ARGENTINA'S INVASION) PRESIDENT REAGAN DELIVERED. REFERRING TO REAGAN'S FORTHCOMING LATIN AMERICAN VISIT, THEY CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT "MR REAGAN IS ENTITLED TO HIS LITTLE QUID PRO QUO"

3. THE TELEGRAPH'S COMMENTS ARE IN SOME WAYS AN ANSWER TO THE GUARDIAN EDITORIAL WHICH WAS HEADED "AMERICA IS BACK ON THE FENCE". THE GUARDIAN ALSO CONCEDED THAT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT'S "ANGER AND DISMAY" OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS "MAY BE A LITTLE OVERDONE". THEY WERE NOT SURPRISED AT MR. REAGAN'S CHOICE, BUT SAID THAT "THERE IS... A RATHER BRISKER DISTANCING FROM THE BRITISH POSITION THAN MIGHT HAVE REASONABLY HAVE BEEN EXPECTED". THE GUARDIAN ALSO HAS BEEN CARRYING DAILY "FACTUAL" REPORTING ON THE FRONT PAGES IN WHICH THEIR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT HAS REFERRED TO SEVERAL BACKGROUND INTERVIEWS WITH AMERICAN DIPLOMATS WHICH HIGHLIGHT THE U.S. ROLE IN BROKERING THE RESOLUTION.

4. THE TIMES LEAD FOR 4 NOVEMBER MENTIONED THE MEETING BETWEEN AMBASSADOR LOUIS AND FRANCIS PYM, AND QUOTED PYM AS CALLING THE UN MOTION "HYPOCRITICAL AND OFFENSIVE."

5. THE FINANCIAL TIMES LEAD SAID THAT "THE U.S. ANNOUNCE-MENT IRONICALLY CAME AT A MOMENT WHEN IT SEEMED THAT ANY SUPPORT ARGENTINA COULD COUNT ON FROM UN MEMBERS WAS FALTERING FAST." THE TELEGRAPH SAID THAT THE CAUSE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 4077 DTG: 041827Z NOV 82 PSN: 048751 OF BRITISH ANGER "CONCENTRATED PRIMARILY ON THE PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE U.S. OF IT'S VOTING INTENTIONS."

6. THE TABLOIDS HAVE NOT PICKED UP ON THE ISSUE AS YET.

7. ACTION: WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ASAP UNCLASSIFIED POINTS TO USE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES AFTER THE VOTE. LOUIS BT

Dear Margaret:

Reading your message of November 4, I realize that our understanding of these events is indeed quite different. I can assure you, Margaret, that the United States did not make a decision to support Argentina against Britain, or to support dictatorship against democracy. Neither did we abandon the principle of self-determination. We reaffirmed our support for a negotiated settlement to a long-standing conflict. We have supported the principle of negotiation throughout this long, difficult dispute. It is the principle to which Britain herself has adhered for so many years with regard to this and other disputes. Certainly, we will never alter our view that a people must ultimately determine their own future and catanity we Finally, you and I have supported each other in the

past because of our shared faith in the Anglo-American relationship and our shared commitment to the same fundamental principles and values. I feel sure neither you nor I will abandon those principles and values nor the effort to help our peoples understand their application in this complex, difficult world.

I assure you we stand as firmly with you on the principles of non-use of force, of negotiation and self-determination as ever.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø3 THE WHITE HOUSE/CAB 7725
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MESSAGE:

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TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

SECRET VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WHØ7725

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

NOVEMBER 4, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

READING YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 4, I REALIZE THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS 1S INDEED QUITE DIFFERENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU, MARGARET, THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT MAKE A DECISION TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA AGAINST BRITAIN, OR TO SUPPORT DICTATORSHIP AGAINST DEMOCRACY. NEITHER DID WE ABANDON

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THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WE REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO A LONG-STANDING CONFLICT. WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION THROUGHOUT THIS LONG, DIFFICULT DISPUTE. IT IS THE PRINCIPLE TO WHICH BRITAIN HERSELF HAS ADHERED FOR SO MANY YEARS WITH REGARD TO THIS AND OTHER DISPUTES. CERTAINLY, WE WILL NEVER ALTER OUR VIEW THAT A PEOPLE MUST ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE AND CERTAINLY WE MEAN THIS WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE ON THE FALKLANDS.

FINALLY. YOU AND I HAVE SUPPORTED EACH OTHER IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF OUR SHARED FAITH IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SHARED COMMITMENT TO THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND VALUES. I FEEL SURE NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL ABANDON THOSE PRINCIPLES AND VALUES NOR THE EFFORT TO HELP OUR PEOPLES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDERSTAND THEIR APPLICATION IN THIS COMPLEX. DIFFICULT WORLD.

I ASSURE YOU WE STAND AS FIRMLY WITH YOU ON THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE. OF NEGOTIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS EVER.

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THE WHITE HOUSE/CAB 7725 DTG: 042159Z NOV 82 PSN: 048896

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