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Collection: Clark, William: Files
Folder: Haig Resignation-Classified Documents
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: CLARK, WILLIAM P.: Files
 OA/Box: ~~91643~~
 File Folder: Haig's Resignation-Classified Documents

Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F97-107/2, Wills
 Date: 02/02/2001

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	To the President, re Department of State, partial of 2p	6/25/82	B6
2. cable	261032Z Jun 82, 3p <i>PART. 4/11/06 F97-107/2# 203</i>	6/26/82	B1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Source - Close hold

EYES ONLY

TO: The President

FROM: ~~ED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~
WD ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~

DATE: June 25, 1982

The Department of State traditionally considers itself autonomous, aloof of other departments and agencies. The Secretaries of State usually reflect this attitude, particularly when it comes to staffing. This is why it is imperative that ground rules are established with the new Secretary early in order to avoid a repeat of our past experiences with State in the future.

The White House Personnel Office under your administration has never and will never act heavy-handed. However, we do have the responsibility to make sure that all your appointees have integrity, the ability to do the job, a philosophical commitment to your programs as well as loyalty to this administration. Since all of us agree on the importance and the need for both the White House and the Secretaries to share a mutual confidence in, for instance, the Deputy or Assistant Secretaries, we have worked out a system which assures that our recommendations to you reflect a joint effort and agreement on the candidates we propose to you for vacancies. There are occasional differences but overall the system has worked very well with most departments with the exception of State where, as you know, we repeatedly have had personnel conflicts. White House recommendations for key positions were generally ignored; personnel State recommendations sent over to the White House then were usually considered as a fait accompli.

To make sure that we do not fall into the same trap, certain understandings and agreements must be reached before our new Secretary of State takes office. The following are key points to be discussed:

1. That recommendations to you for Presidential appointments as well as other non-career positions reflect the joint effort of the Department of State and Presidential Personnel.
2. That the changes the new Secretary will undoubtedly want to make are made in consultation with Presidential Personnel as they can give him insight of our past problems and concerns.
3. That the Undersecretary for Management responsibilities be reduced in order that he can pay more attention to the personnel matters. The incumbent (Mr. Kennedy) presently wears two hats IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and management.

4. That he move quickly to fill the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs position that has been vacant since Myer Rashish officially resigned on January 20, 1982. That he seriously reconsider Allen Wallis for that position.

5. That he carefully review all regional bureaus and senior non-career positions with an eye toward ensuring that they are filled by the most-competent people and that they reflect your philosophy.

6. That he work to establish better rapport with our U.N. Mission in New York.

7. That he needs to impose a management structure that will ensure a correlation between day to day policy decisions of the Department and your objectives in the area of foreign policy.

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**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	WPC HAS SEEN	<u>RCM HAS SEEN</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>WPC HAS SEEN</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6-26

TO: Clark, Poindexter, McFarlane

FROM: ~~DAVID R. GERGEN~~ Mort Allin

FYI: ~~X~~

LET'S DISCUSS:

COMMENT:

Bob Sims agrees
with this. Confirmation
hearings will be tough
because of Bechtel connection.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1982

Dear Al:

It is with the most profound regret that I accept your letter of resignation. Almost forty years ago you committed yourself to the service of your country. Since that time your career has been marked by a succession of assignments demanding the highest level of personal sacrifice, courage and leadership. As a soldier and statesman facing challenges of enormous complexity and danger, you have established a standard of excellence and achievement seldom equalled in our history. On each occasion you have reflected a quality of wisdom which has been critical to the resolution of the most anguishing problems we have faced during the past generation -- the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the transfer of executive authority at a time of national trauma and most recently, advancing the cause of peace among nations.

The nation is deeply in your debt. As you leave I want you to know of my deep personal appreciation, and in behalf of the American people I express my gratitude and respect. You have been kind enough to offer your continued counsel and you may be confident that I will call upon you in the years ahead. Nancy joins me in extending our warmest personal wishes to you and Pat.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TALKING POINTS--HAIG

--AL, AFTER CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT ABOUT THE MATTER, I HAVE DECIDED TO ACCEPT YOUR RESIGNATION.

--IN REFLECTING ON THE POINTS YOU MADE WHEN WE LAST MET, THEY SEEM TO ME TO INCLUDE SOME POINTS WHICH PERHAPS COULD BE RECTIFIED, BT THERE WAS A LARGER SENTIMENT OF DISSATISFACTION ON YOUR PART WHICH TRANSCENDED ANY PARTICULAR DISAGREEMENT OR PERSONALITY.

--AS A CONSEQUENCE, I RESPECT YOUR JUDGMENT TO LEAVE.

--I HAVE ASKED GEORGE SHULTZ TO SUCCEED YOU AND HE HAS ACCEPTED.

--AL, I DO THIS WITH DEEP PERSONAL SADNESS. I HONESTLY BELIEVE WE SEE THE WORLD THE SAME WAY. I AM SEEKING THE SAME GOALS YOU HAVE PURSUED FOR A LIFETIME IN THE ARMY AND AS A STATESMAN.

--AND SO, I WOULD CHARACTERIZE THIS DECISION AS NOT FOR REASONS OF POLICY DIFFERENCE, BUT RATHER FOR PERSONAL MATTERS. DO YOU AGREE?

--THERE ARE TWO ADDITIONAL FAVORS I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU. THE FIRST IS THAT YOU STAY HELP GEORGE GET UP TO SPEED ON THE SEVERAL DIFFICULT ISSUES ON OUR AGENDA. THE SECOND IS THAT I BE ABLE TO CALL UPON YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD FOR COUNSEL.

--(Effective Date) I PROPOSE TO ANNOUNCE THIS AT TWO O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON. UNLESS YOU PREFER A PARTICULAR DATE FOR THIS TO BE EFFECTIVE, I WOULD PROPOSE NEXT WEDNESDAY (JUNE 30).

PUBLIC STRATEGY:

A VISIBLE GEORGE SCHULTZ--CONFERRING WITH THE PRESIDENT, ETC.,
BUT A SILENT ONE UNTIL THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS.

ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN SHOULD KNOCK DOWN THE STORY THAT
THE CHANGE REPRESENTS A SHIFT IN A PRO-ARAB DIRECTION.
FOREIGN POLICY IS CONSISTENT, WE ARE STILL SUPPORTIVE
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS RIGHT TO EXISTENCE.

PRESIDENT SHOULD GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT HIS DISCUSSIONS
WITH SCHULTZ AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WEDNESDAY,
DEMONSTRATING PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE TURNOVER.
(DO NOT YIELD TO TEMPTATION TO MOVE THE PRESS
CONFERENCE FORWARD FROM WEDNESDAY)

STRESS CONSISTENCY OF FOREIGN POLICY, INFLUENCE HAIG
HAS HAD IN FORMULATING THAT POLICY, AND PROSPECTS FOR
HARMONIOUS CONTINUATION OF POLICY PROCESS.

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY:

EARLY HEARING FOR SCHULTZ.

PREPARED BY:
BOB SIMS

Some Questions By Your Observer

- How long can Haig stay -- or be expected to -- given dissecting of his policy difference -- alleged or real -- and the psychoanalyzing of his relationship with WH? A rapid confirmation seems in order (will Bechtel connections slow that?) or move to Stoessel as Acting sooner rather than later.
- Direct RR assurances to American Jewish Community may be in order.
- Congressional and foreign policy types and columnists should be briefed as soon as possible on situation to speak out strongly for Shultz and say it bodes well for Admin. policy-making (Percy on Brinkley show Sunday.) Clearly, things have never gone as well as they should have with Haig. Everyone has policy differences from time-to-time, but who was it speaking glowingly of our policies through-out Europe? And where's the so-called drift? Policy-wise, didn't things go well in Europe? And we're riding virtual world-wide acclaim, particularly in Europe, over RR's arms reduction moves. Fact is this departure has been inevitable, if unfortunate. And didn't happen because of policies. Recognizing Haig's many strengths, RR tried to make it work, but it just couldn't. Virtually entire WH has been involved at one time or another in struggles with Haig ranging from petty and mundane to the critical. Similarly, many efforts to resuscitate him after fallouts. There's been no Meese, Baker or Allen in the way for 6 months; Haig has been the spokesman.

RR's Announcement

- He is variously described as appearing shaken, surprised, pale, white, startled, shocked, grim, close to tears, seemed to have trouble reading it. (Haig also seen in several reports as emotional, close to tears)
- Puzzling in that he gave no explanation (nor did WH later. Inquirer edit says the nation must know why and neither RR nor the Secretary offered the slightest clarification. Mathias says hearings may be in order; Moynihan also calling for explanation.)

Why Did he Resign?

(Split between policy and personality)

- Was he pushed or did he jump?
- Policy difference over pipeline and Mideast. (Fear that NATO shattered by pipeline decision. RR/Admin. implied one thing on pipeline pre-and during Versailles; then acted differently on return.) Knight-Ridder's Boyd says Haig's reasons apparently due to new hard-line anti-communist crusade ordered by RR. Couldn't be number 1; felt increasingly cornered by Bush, Baker and Clark. Not treated with proper deference on European trip. Slights to Mrs. Haig.
- Long simmering feelings on both sides; clashes with all his peers; prickly, abrasive personality; problems since the beginning (his January 20 memo, crisis management, post. assassination attempt, etc.), emotional instability
- "Haig leaves because he never achieved his primary goal, to be number 1 in Foreign policy. RR ultimately wanted the job." (Dunsmore-ABC) Letter was an impertinence; he thought he should be equal to RR. (Will)
- "If anyone can take responsibility for pushing him over the side, it's Bill Clark." (Woodruff-NBC) CBS said feuding even began with Clark, Haig's last friend in White House. Shouting match in Europe with Clark; argument Thursday over pipeline; Saudi Amb. meeting with Clark; Speakes statement on Israeli assurances over Beirut, Bush assuring Saudis - Haig felt undercut.
- Chemical mixture not right -- Kissinger.
- Defeated by pettier minds and an ambivalent RR. (NY Times edit)

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- Views split between no significant change expected and others who expect harder line on Soviets and Israel.
- Admin. loses only moderate voice, the "single man closest to reality" (Kalb); the only top official with significant experience abroad (NY Times edit); NATO, understands Europeans; made sense of foreign policy babble in Washington; close to the only one with foreign policy experience (Stahl); in "ultra-conservative" Admin, he was a liberal by comparison (Dunsmore); though hardline rhetoric, he was the moderate on Soviets and pipeline. Praised by Cranston and Pell for moderation and voice of solidity.
- Handling raises questions which RR used against Carter -- is Admin. competent dealing with foreign policy? (Donaldson who cited Tony Lewis on most inept Admin. this century in foreign policy).
- "Odd man out in sympathy for Israel" (Kalb)
- Major problem now regarding China (Holbrooke)

SHULTZ

- High praise and high regard. Everytime top job in a GOP Admin. becomes available, Shultz's considered. Gets along with adversaries; avoids publicity and limelight; "pontifical calm"
- A team player; will accept RR as number 1 in foreign policy; good manager and organizer; solid.
- Well-known and respected in Europe. Some see him as pro-European and moderate similar to Haig.
- Israel and Jewish groups reported very concerned. Cranston, Kalb, ABC and American Jewish Congress among many who cite Bechtel's close ties to Saudis. Weinberger/Shultz alliance could be tougher on Israel. Bernstein in TelAviv and American Jewish Congress rep both emphasize RR's strong support for Israel. Shultz Dec '80 quote that he differs from RR only on Mideast. (Opposition to economic sanctions in past also noted.)
- Conservatives upset over Shultz; opposed him strongly when suggested for Secretary of State during transition.

SCHEDULING SHULTZ

The initial play seems excellent. One reason is that Shultz's outstanding intellectual quality, character, balance, reassuring poise, grace, and record of team play all contrast so dramatically -- and so evidently -- with Haig.

The story we want tells itself simply by having Shultz out front -- in his own quiet, intelligent, and decorous way. For the next few days, we should continue to try to have Shultz visible -- so that the press will focus more on him. He, Shultz, is neither naturally charismatic nor likely to be talkative at this point. But a photo and an event a day will, of course, get play in this context -- and the play on Shultz can only help.

There will inevitably be negative stories emanating from the Haig contingent, and from a press that is looking for trouble. But we will do best to try to point forward -- promptly -- not back. If we handle the forward-looking (Shultz) actions well, the Haig retrospectives will make Haig appear to be what he is.

I do not think we have a problem with establishing an image of "continuity". Some people don't want it! Many others who do are well satisfied with Shultz. I'd just leave this worry alone, and get on with the business of showing Shultz in the process of stepping right in:

-- Working with the President

- Today, at Camp David -- and again, early next week.

-- Working with senior White House staff

- Today and again right away with Clark and others (visibly) early next week.

NOTE: The imagery of working well with the White House -- not just NSC, but the whole "White House" -- is one we should consciously establish early -- for a host of obvious reasons.

-- Working with the intelligence community

- Getting briefed (visibly) by Casey et al. (at CIA?) (Sunday?)

-- Working with his friend and colleague Cap Weinberger (again, the point makes itself) -- as soon as possible.

NOTE: Shultz might consider a prompt visit to Maine.

-- And, only somewhere down this list, working with Haig/State/et al.

NOTE: It's important not to alienate the State bureaucracy. But it's equally important not to seem to focus the business of transition on State alone. For a little while, that will be Haig territory. And for a host of obvious reasons, it will be to everyone's advantage to emphasize the broader range of Shultz's capacities and good relationships.

Dear Al:

It is with the most profound regret that I accept your letter of resignation. Almost forty years ago you committed yourself to the service of your country. Since that time your career has been marked by a succession of assignments demanding the highest level of personal sacrifice, courage and leadership. As a soldier and statesman facing challenges of enormous complexity and danger, you have established a standard of excellence and achievement seldom equalled in our history. On each occasion you have reflected a quality of wisdom which has been critical to the resolution of the most anguishing problems we have faced during the past generation -- the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the transfer of executive authority at a time of national trauma and most recently, advancing the cause of peace among nations.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


June 25, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

Your accession to office on January 20, 1981 brought an opportunity for a new and forward looking foreign policy resting on the cornerstones of strength and compassion. I believe that we shared a view of America's role in the world as the leader of free men and an inspiration for all. We agreed that consistency, clarity and steadiness of purpose were essential to success. It was in this spirit that I undertook to serve you as Secretary of State.

In recent months, it has become clear to me that the foreign policy on which we embarked together was shifting from that careful course which we had laid out. Under these circumstances, I feel it necessary to request that you accept my resignation. I shall always treasure the confidence which you reposed in me. It has been a great honor to serve in your Administration, and I wish you every success in the future.

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The President,
The White House.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SITUATION ROOM LOG
SIT344 DATE 06/26/82


DTG: 261032Z
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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:



SITUATION ROOM LOG FOR 25/26 JUNE 1982

DAY: 25 TIME: 0958

JUDGE CLARK RECEIVED SECURE PHONE CALL FROM MR. SCHULTZ.
PER JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS, UPON CONCLUSION CALL IS BE
TRANSFERRED TO PRESIDENT.

DAY: 25 TIME: 1010

SCHULTZ CALL TRANSFERRED TO PRESIDENT.

DAY: 25 TIME: 1029

JUDGE CLARK REQUESTED SECURE CALL BE PLACED TO GEORGE
SCHULTZ. SO DONE.

FOIA(b) (1.)

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DAY: 25 TIME: 1145

SEC WEINBERGER CALLED FOR JUDGE CLARK FROM WAR COLLEGE,
BUT BEFORE JUDGE'S OFFICE COULD PICK UP THE CALL, THE
CALLER HUNG UP. SDO SPOKE WITH PENTAGON CONNECTION HY-2
WHO SAID WAR COLLEGE HUNG UP BECAUSE LINE WAS NO GOOD.
ACCORDING TO PENTAGON, WAR COLLEGE SAID WEINBERGER WILL
TRY TO CONTACT JUDGE IN ANOTHER WAY. SDO NOTIFIED KAY.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SITUATION ROOM LOG

DTG: 261032Z

PSN: J000025

FOIA(D) (1) FOIA(b) (3)

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DAY: 26 TIME: 0630
END LOG.

MESSAGE:

NONELECTRICALLY RECEIVED MESSAGE

SITUATION ROOM LOG

DTG: 261032Z

PSN: J000025

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1982

CHECKLIST

1. Conversation with new choice.
2. Conversation with Haig.
 - o Exchange of letters
 - o Request that it be effective June 30
3. CONGRESSIONAL notifications
 - o By personal representative (one-on-one)
 - o Leadership
 - o Chairman and ranking minority of SFRC and HFAC
 - Request for prompt confirmation hearings
4. Message to all diplomatic posts tailored to key allies and crisis posts (M.E.)?
This is not really essential.
 - o Special message to Begin insisting on no attack into Beirut.
5. Press Announcement
 - o By the President in the press room accepting the resignation and expressing intention to nominate _____.
 - o Q's and A's (Handled by Jim Baker)

THE MISMANAGEMENT OF A CRISIS

1. THE U.S. VOTE ON UNSC RESOLUTION 509: (June 6, Versailles)

On Sunday, June 6, the U.N. Security Council prepares to vote on Resolution 509. Unlike Resolution 508, passed the day before, the new text specifies "forthwith and unconditional" Israeli withdrawal, with no mention of attacks against Israel along the Lebanese border. The State Department is working on a version of an evolving text and a gist of the Resolution plus the changes sought by the U.S. is hand-copied for the Secretary. At that point, before the Secretary had commented, a different text of the Resolution had already been datafaxed to the White House communications center at Trianon Palace Hotel; Judge Clark had secured the President's decision to vote in favor of it. The Secretary did not see the final text nor did he have the opportunity to comment on the Resolution before the President's decision.

2. VETO OF UN RESOLUTION: (June 8, Windsor Castle)

The Secretary learns after dinner of the impending vote on a UN Resolution that condemns Israel and contains an implied threat of sanctions. Clark tells Haig that the President has decided that the U.S. should vote for it, on the basis of a unanimous recommendation. Haig protests that the President is clearly unaware that Haig, had he seen it, would have recommended a veto; Clark promises to tell the President. Upon further checking, it develops that Ambassador Kirkpatrick has also not been consulted. The basis of the President's decision is the Vice-President's recommendation through McFarlane and Clark.

Clark professes confusion over instructions, whether to veto if Israel is mentioned by name in the Resolution or not. He also claims not to have realized that a U.S. vote in favor will result in the first major U.S. break with Israel. On Haig's recommendation, decision is reversed in favor of a veto. On crucial U.N. vote with major consequences for the U.S. position in the Middle East, Secretary was not consulted nor did President know that he opposed the recommendation.

3. PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AFTER ISRAEL REJECTS CALL FOR CEASE-FIRE: (June 10, Bonn, Schloss Gymnich)

The draft text of a letter from the President to Prime Minister Begin, after Israel's rejection of his cease-fire request is passed by Judge Clark to the President for signature before the Secretary sees it. Subsequently, the letter is not sent on Haig's recommendation. Clark's assertion that Eagleburger and McFarlane had cleared the letter is denied by both men. Crucial communication to foreign head of state was not shown to the Secretary before President was asked for approval.

4. PROPOSED HAIG TRIP TO ISRAEL: (June 10, Bonn, Schloss Gymnich)

After the Secretary's meeting with the President and the establishment of three conditions for the trip, Clark subsequently tells Haig that the President has not yet decided to let Haig go; once Israelis reply, the President will decide. At 4 p.m. Meese tells press that Haig is not going to Israel. Presidential staff reinterprets President's decision and preempts Secretary's announcement of plans.

5. DECISION ON HABIB'S BASIC POLICY GUIDANCE: (June 12, Washington)

On Saturday, June 12, Haig wants Presidential decision on basic policy guidance needed for Habib's discussions with Begin, scheduled for Sunday morning, and for his subsequent trips to Lebanon and Syria. Haig stresses to President and Clark the need for swift action. At 6:30 p.m. Clark promises to send the datafaxed copy of Haig's memo outlining guidance for Habib to the President at Camp David immediately upon receipt. Subsequently, Haig is informed by Operations Center that the President wants an NSC meeting to consider the matter on Monday. Haig calls Clark but he has retired for the night. Haig then calls the President, saying that, if NSC needed, it should be convened immediately. (The President had not read the Secretary's memo). The President says that Clark will call the Secretary. When that occurs, Haig tells Clark that the urgency of the matter requires immediate action, approved by the NSC or not. Unexplained delay in NSC procedures threatens urgent and essential U.S. initiative.

6. SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BEGIN: (June 16, Washington)

In response to speculation over the President's "tentative" meeting with Begin (based on White House back-grounding) President, en route from Houston, is queried by Clark at Haig's urging: Can the President's meeting with Begin be announced as definite? (Begin has announced already a previously scheduled meeting with Haig on Friday and with the President on Monday.) At 10 a.m. Clark relays to Haig that the President's meeting with the Prime Minister is definite, but that the Haig-Begin meeting is cancelled. Haig asks the origin of the latter decision. Clark specifies "war council" rather than the President. Haig then calls the President on the secure phone; after discussion, he authorizes Haig's meeting with Begin. As for announcing the Begin-Reagan meeting, Meese later opines that the decision to announce is still "tentative." An announcement of a definite meeting is eventually issued. President's staff cancels critical meeting between Secretary of State and foreign leader.

On June 25, 1982, Habib calls to relate the latest round of his talks with the Lebanese. They tell him that the Saudis are stiffening the Palestinian resistance to a deal. The latest message from Riyadh to the PLO is that the Israelis have agreed to the 5 kilometer pullback--information given to the Saudi Ambassador in Washington by Judge Clark. Habib protests that this must be a misunderstanding--the Israelis have not agreed. As he talks, a call comes to the Lebanese from Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister. Saud repeats the message about Israeli willingness to pull back the 5 kilometers, basing his statement on the report from Judge Clark. Habib concludes that these messages have reinforced Palestinian stubbornness in negotiating with the Lebanese. Conflicting Signals Damage the Habib Mission at critical Moments in US efforts to halt the fighting.