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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 6/20/2005

File Folder PRESIDENT-GROMYKO-WORKING PAPERS (8)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15951	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER/MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE DEBRIEF TO KEY ALLIES [19 - 19]	1	9/29/1984	B1
15956	REPORT	USSR [20 - 20]	1	9/29/1984	B1
15952	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER/MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE DEBRIEF TO KEY ALLIES (SAME TEXT AS DOC #15951) [21 - 21]	1	9/29/1984	B1
15953	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO SEPTEMBER 29 [23 - 27]	5	9/29/1984	B1
15954	CABLE	300049Z SEP 84 [29 - 30]	2	9/30/1984	B1
15955	CABLE	011507Z OCT 84 [43 - 43]	1	10/1/1984	B1

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FROM: BRUNSON MCKINLEY S/S 632-3126 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION FOR TV APPEARANCES 30/9, PER OUR DISCUSSION

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>BOB KIMMITT</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	
	<u>KARNA SMALL</u>		
			
	<u>matlock</u>	<u>Steinica</u>	
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POINTS TO MAKE: US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Meetings with Gromyko

-- We are very interested in developing a fruitful dialogue with the Soviets and moving relations forward. It was in that spirit that President invited Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington.

-- President's talks with Gromyko and my two sessions with him constituted a rigorous give-and-take on the full range of US-Soviet issues.

-- President's three-and-a-half hour session was a strong and useful encounter between two very powerful persons. Mr. Gromyko got the full flavor of our thinking, and we in turn received a complete account of Soviet views.

-- I had two good conversations with Mr. Gromyko. Discussions were calm and thoughtful. We now have, I hope, a better understanding of each other's concerns.

-- In all of the discussions, President and I made clear our intention to maintain our strength, but stressed that it is in both sides' interest to resume serious dialogue on arms control.

State of Relations

-- Overall relations remain difficult. We are disappointed at lack of progress on major issues, but talks in recent months on range of bilateral issues have yielded some welcome results.

-- We signed agreement on Hotline upgrade on July 17 and have reached agreements on long-term economic matters, fisheries, consular relations. Negotiations have begun on new exchanges agreement, and we have proposed reinvigorating various cooperative agreements.

-- Soviet grain purchases proceeding at healthy pace. We have offered an additional 10 million metric tons in the coming year beyond agreed limits.

-- We know our two countries can cooperate to mutual benefit on a variety of issues. But we now need to move beyond these modest bilateral steps.

-- We were disappointed by Gromyko's UNGA speech: sad that he should have given yet another misrepresentation of history and distortion of peaceful and constructive US role in world affairs.

-- We are well aware of our differences with the Soviets, but it serves no purpose to dwell indefinitely on them. We need to work actively and creatively to resolve our problems through serious dialogue.

- 2 -

-- Soviets in general, however, have tried to dismiss President's expressed desire for better relations as election-year ploy.

-- Real problem is that Soviet leaders are either unwilling or unable to make hard decisions needed on big issues.

Arms Control

-- Regret that meeting last month in Vienna on space weapons did not take place. Soviets simply refused to take "yes" for an answer to their own proposal. We have set no preconditions, are ready to meet at any time, any place.

-- Soviets remain unwilling to resume talks on reducing nuclear arms as well. President committed to negotiating substantial reductions.

-- Soviets have not yet responded to President's proposals in UNGA speech. Creative and serious initiatives merit attention.

Regional Issues

-- Also waiting to see Soviet reaction to our offers for detailed exchanges of views on volatile regional problems.

-- We strongly desire progress on regional questions. We are particularly disturbed by increasingly brutal Soviet tactics in Afghanistan, and continued supply of arms into Central America.

Human Rights

-- Soviets continue to violate human rights obligations under Helsinki Final Act, refuse to respond to Western concerns.

-- Handling of Sakharovs is case in point: Soviet treatment of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner is an outrage, as is refusal to allow independent verification of their well-being.

-- President and I underscored to Gromyko the importance of human rights to our overall relationship.

Prospects

-- We have no illusions about likelihood of early breakthrough in US-Soviet relations. But we will be patient, and hope Soviet leadership will soon recognize need to join in more productive dialogue over next four years.

-- The meetings last week are concrete examples of our commitment to dialogue as a means of solving the problems in US-Soviet relations.

4

USA Today Op Ed Piece

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have never rested on a more stable or a more realistic basis. For the last three and one-half years, the world has witnessed no superpower confrontation, no dangerous thrust toward the brink of a nuclear crisis, and no conventional confrontation between the most two most powerful nations on earth. In fact, despite an intensive Soviet propaganda barrage designed to suggest a heightened danger of war, neither side has undertaken an kind of alert activities that suggested the imminence of direct hostilities. The fundamental explanation for the stability in super-power relations today lies in the fact that the Kremlin leadership understands fully that it is dealing with a vibrant and strengthened America.

Contrast this with the situation we faced four years ago. Our military strength had steadily declined while that of the Soviet Union were modernized and expanded at relentless pace. Moscow probably calculated that it was dealing with an America that lacked confidence in its leadership, its military forces, and its economic vitality. As a result, the world witnessed more pressure on our allies and friends around the world, adventures in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and especially Afghanistan, and a deteriorating US-Soviet relationship. A prime goal of my administration has been to remedy the weaknesses the Soviets perceived on our side during the 1970's, and therefore to put us on a course toward a more stable and constructive relationship with the USSR.

To borrow a favorite Soviet phrase, the "global correlation of forces" has shifted in favor of the Western democracies, reversing the trend toward the Soviet bloc that Moscow so loudly trumpeted in the 1970's. This Administration has taken a realistic view of Soviet policy. We have tried to get relations back on track by correcting the basic problems rather than just the symptoms. We've made real progress in rebuilding American military and economic strength and restoring our alliances and friendships. If the Soviets thought they could count on American weakness, they no longer think so now. It is clear to me -- and I think it is becoming clearer to the rest of the world, including the Soviets -- that we are a strong, dynamic force in world affairs, determined to preserve and promote freedom, prosperity and peace both at home and abroad. We stand tall again as a nation and we and the world are safer as a result of our policies.

We know we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union, but we also have a common interest in reducing the threat of war and lessening the reliance on the use of force. From the beginning we have tried to engage them in negotiations to resolve these differences peacefully. Naturally, we have concentrated on the critical problem of how to reduce nuclear arms, but we have been in intense dialogue with them on a broad agenda of issues: nuclear and conventional arms control, regional trouble spots,

human rights, and bilateral questions. To date, the Soviet response has not been as forthcoming as we desire, but we've not only persisted, we've stepped up our efforts.

Last January 16 I set out three objectives in our search for a better basis for cooperative US-Soviet relations: to find ways to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat and use of force in resolving international disputes; to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world; and to establish a working relationship marked by greater cooperation and understanding between our two countries. We have been talking frequently through diplomatic channels with the Soviets to make progress toward these aims.

The meetings Secretary Shultz and I just had with Foreign Minister Gromyko have made a critical contribution to this process. I emphasized to the Foreign Minister the importance we attach to greater mutual understanding between our countries, our desire to open a new, more constructive chapter in our relations, and the need to resolve the many problems that divide us through dialogue and negotiation.

The meetings were quite useful in forming the basis for further movement toward these goals. We cannot predict how soon the Soviets will respond. I expect it will take some time. But I am certain our overall approach is the correct one and has been bearing fruit. The meetings last week ensure that we are on the right path. The United States can further develop productive relations with the Soviet Union, based on a realistic understanding of Soviet intentions and capabilities and carried out by a strong and proud America.

Q: What really was achieved by the meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko this week?

A: I think that the President's meeting on Friday provided an opportunity for a thorough, intense, and personal exchange of views on US-Soviet relations. His discussions with Mr. Gromyko, as well as my own two meetings, were good conversations. I think the President succeeded in conveying to Mr. Gromyko his strong desire to reduce tensions and establish a more constructive relationship.

The meetings produced agreement on the need for a process of follow-up exchanges between the two sides. I don't want to get into the details or the mechanisms of how those follow-up exchanges will take place, but I think we can assume that future exchanges will take place at a variety of levels. The next step will be for us to reflect on the dialogue which took place and determine how best to proceed.

[I plan to speak about this with Ambassador Dobrynin in a few weeks time, at which point I hope the Soviet leaders will have had the opportunity to examine the record of these conversations as well, and convey their ideas to Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.]

9

Q: Where there any agreements reached on specific issues?

A: As I have suggested, our key objective was not to arrive at any specific agreements. We wanted Mr. Gromyko to hear directly from the President how we approach the question of relations between the two superpowers. We certainly succeeded in that. If that exchange leads to a more fruitful dialogue, that in itself will be a real achievement. I believe that these were the most thorough and useful exchanges that we have had to date with Mr. Gromyko, and we have every reason to believe that our future conversations will be as calm, extensive, and useful.

9

Q: Was agreement reached on any of the proposals made in President Reagan's UN speech?

A: In a broad sense, yes. In his speech, the President called for an expanded and more fruitful dialogue with the USSR, and the meetings this week produced agreement on a process of followup discussions and exchanges between our two countries.

It is premature to look for agreement on the very specific proposals which the President mentioned, such as exchange of observers at nuclear test sites, and so on, but we hope that the Soviets will give serious scrutiny to these initiatives and respond positively.

Q: You have mentioned the "continuous contact" with the Soviets that you look forward to. How does this differ from what you have been doing?

A: Our discussions with the Soviets have often been devoted to presentations of each side's positions on the full range of issues. What we saw this week, and what we hope for in the future, are occasions to explore the issues in greater depth, and to get to the heart of one another's concerns. We believe that rigorous give-and-take along these lines leads to fuller understanding, and can help in moving us closer to solutions.

Q: What specifically do you have in mind for upcoming US-Soviet meetings?

A: I would only say that we expect more thoroughgoing discussions to take place. It's too soon, though, to get into specifics about future exchanges. We first need to reflect on the very useful and extensive talk which the President had on Friday with Mr. Gromyko, as well as my two sessions.

7 11

Q: Is another Shultz-Gromyko meeting in the offing soon?

A: President Reagan and I made clear that we are very interested in keeping this expanded dialogue going, and thus we're open to future contacts with the Soviets at all levels. I would hope to continue my discussions with Mr. Gromyko, but it is too soon to talk about the timing of a next meeting. We will want to take a good look at the results of the unusually comprehensive dialogue which took place this week, and then decide on future steps which would be useful.

12

Q: Did this week's meetings bring us any closer to a summit meeting between President Reagan and Chairman Chernenko?

A: Both we and the Soviets have taken the position that we would be in favor of a summit at the proper time and with the necessary preparation. This week's meetings with Mr. Gromyko were useful in clarifying each other's views on a wide range of issues, and in laying the basis for more thorough-going exchanges in the weeks and months ahead. But it is far too early to tell whether the meetings brought us any closer to a summit.

12

Q: Where any new subjects discussed in your Saturday meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A: Saturday's meeting provided an opportunity to tie up some loose ends that remained from the President's meeting on Friday. I don't want to get into any details of the specifics, but it's fair to say that the discussion continued the valuable exchanges we had earlier on our respective positions.

(If appropriate) We continued our discussion of how to proceed on the vital question of arms reductions, exchanged views on a number of regional issues, as well as discussed exchanges and other areas of bilateral cooperation.

Q: Did the Soviets signal any change in their position on arms control or any other major issue?

A: I can't comment on the positions taken by Mr. Gromyko during the meetings. In any case, the President's purpose was not to engage in negotiations on specific questions, but to set forth our overall approach to the US-Soviet relationship, and to convey to the Soviet leadership that the U.S. is prepared to take concrete steps to move things forward, whenever the Soviets are prepared to do the same.

T W

Q: Did these meetings bring us any closer to resumption of the major arms control negotiations?

A: We certainly hope so. The President emphasized his view that substantially reducing, and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons was the number-one task before our two countries. He also made clear that the United States is prepared to talk about weapons in space, where the Soviets have laid such stress of late, although we expressed our view that the questions of space and offensive arms reductions are interrelated. In all three meetings, we emphasized that we are prepared to be flexible regarding on ways to begin negotiations, and urged the Soviets to consider seriously the President's suggestion that we try to develop a new framework that could provide a larger umbrella over our efforts in individual areas.

I would not want to predict how the Soviets will respond. But we hope they will take our message to heart, and that the meetings will prove to have helped bring us closer to renewed negotiations.

Q: Did the President or you present any specific new arms control proposals to the Soviets?

A: I can't comment on the specifics of the discussions.

Our purpose for the meetings, however, was not to engage in negotiations on specifics, but to set forth our overall approach to the US-Soviet relationship, and to emphasize our readiness to be flexible whenever the Soviets are prepared to engage in real give-in-take in pursuit meaningful and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

7 73

Q: Will the President appoint a new senior arms control negotiator to head the "umbrella" talks he has proposed?

A: If the Soviets prove responsive to the President's proposal for a broad-based "umbrella" negotiation, it is possible that he would consider appointing a new, senior negotiator to head the U.S. team. No decisions have been taken, however, and it would be premature to speculate further about this possibility.

11

Q: What impact will these meetings have here at home? Will they help the President in his re-election effort?

A: The President undertook these meetings out of his deep-seated convictions about the necessity of preventing nuclear war, reducing the arsenals of both sides, and fostering a realistic and constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union. I am sure that those are views shared by most Americans, but domestic politics really did not play a role in his decision to hold this meeting. As far as the election is concerned, my predecessors have generally refrained from getting involved in partisan politics and I have tried hard to hold to their good example.

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TO .PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 29 SEP 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997

By CW NARA, Date 10/22/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ GROMYKO ON 29 SEPT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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ПИСЬМО

первого заместителя
Председателя Совета Министров СССР,
министра иностранных дел СССР А. А. Громыко
генеральному секретарю ООН
Х. Пересу де Куэльяру

Уважаемый господин генеральный секретарь,
Советский Союз предлагает включить в повестку дня 39-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН в качестве важного и срочного вопроса «О недопустимости политики государственного терроризма и любых действий государств, направленных на подрыв общественно-политического строя в других суверенных государствах».

Постановка этого вопроса продиктована тем, что некоторые государства, взяв курс на достижение военного превосходства и проведение политики терроризма в международных делах, все чаще предпринимают действия, направленные на подрыв общественно-политического строя других государств, не останавливаясь перед применением оружия.

Такая политика и действия, являющиеся нарушением элементарных международных норм поведения и морали, особенно опасны в условиях ядерного века, когда они могут иметь пагубные последствия не только для свободы народов, но и для самого их существования.

Очевидно, что любые действия в отношениях между государствами, направленные на подрыв общественно-политического строя, ведут к разрушению самой возможности обеспечения мирного характера таких отношений и взаимного доверия, резко обостряют напряженность и возрастанию военной опасности.

По убеждению Советского Союза, интересы сохранения мира требуют, чтобы в межгосударственные отношения не привносились идеологические разногласия и чтобы они строились на основе строгого соблюдения Устава ООН, а также общепризнанных принципов и норм международных отношений, что подтверждено в Заключительном акте Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, в решениях конференции стран Азии и Африки в Бандунге и форумов движения неприсоединения, уста-

ве Организации африканского единства и в других соответствующих международных документах. Концепции «политики с позиции силы», «крестового похода», «психологической войны» и любые иные, призванные оправдать действия государств, направленные на подрыв общественно-политического строя других государств, должны быть категорически отвергнуты.

Исходя из этого, Советский Союз предлагает, чтобы Генеральная Ассамблея, выражая волю Объединенных Наций, решительно осудила политику и практику государственного терроризма как метод ведения дел с другими государствами и народами. Ассамблея вправе потребовать от всех государств не предпринимать какие-либо действия, направленные на насильственное изменение или подрыв общественно-политического строя суверенных государств, дестабилизацию и свержение их законных правительств, и, в частности, не начинать под каким бы то ни было предлогом военные действия с этой целью и незамедлительно прекратить уже ведущиеся такие действия.

Одновременно Генеральная Ассамблея могла бы призвать все государства уважать и строго соблюдать право народов свободно, без вмешательства извне избирать свой общественно-политический строй, осуществлять самостоятельно политическое, экономическое, социальное и культурное развитие.

Тем самым ООН внесла бы весомый вклад в создание политических гарантий мира, укрепление безопасности отдельных государств и упрочение международной безопасности в целом.

Прошу Вас, господин генеральный секретарь, рассматривать настоящее письмо как объяснительную записку, предусмотренную правилами процедуры Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, и распространить его вместе с прилагаемым проектом резолюции в качестве официального документа Генеральной Ассамблеи.

А. ГРОМЫКО

Первый заместитель Председателя Совета Министров СССР, министр иностранных дел СССР

Проект резолюции
Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН

О недопустимости политики государственного терроризма и любых действий государств, направленных

Встреча А. А. Громыко с Р. Рейганом

ВАШИНГТОН, 29. (ТАСС). Член Политбюро ЦК КПСС, первый заместитель Председателя Совета Министров СССР, министр иностранных дел СССР А. А. Громыко встретился 28 сентября в Белом доме с президентом США Р. Рейганом по его приглашению.

В ходе двухчасовой беседы, которая затем продолжилась за завтраком, устроенным президентом в честь А. А. Громыко, были в крупном плане обсуждены ключевые вопросы отношений между Советским Союзом и Соединенными Штатами Америки и в этой связи положение дел в мире в целом.

А. А. Громыко изложил президенту принципиальную советскую оценку нынешнего курса политики США, который в недавнем заявлении К. У. Черненко был охарактеризован как явно сориентированный на дальнейшее опасное нагнетание международной напряженности.

Было подчеркнуто, что на деле политика США направлена на достижение военного превосходства над СССР и на продолжение военной подготовки, на дальнейшее накопление ядерного оружия. Вместе с тем было вновь подтверждено, что Советский Союз готов к нормализации и всестороннему развитию отношений между СССР и США на основе равенства, взаимного уважения и невмешательства в дела друг друга. Такое их развитие позволило бы приступить к серьезным переговорам по ограничению и сокращению вооружений, что имело бы решающее значение для обеспечения поворота к лучшему и во всей международной обстановке.

✓ После встречи с президентом А. А. Громыко сделал следующее заявление для печати:

«Состоявшаяся беседа с президентом Р. Рейганом, в ходе которой с обеих сторон были изложены основы политики Советского Союза и США, не позволяет, к сожалению, сделать вывод о практических положительных изменениях во внешнеполитическом курсе администрации США. Не видно, чтобы она была готова занять реалистические позиции по существу острых проблем войны и мира, без взаимоприемлемого решения которых невозможно поворот к лучшему ни в советско-американских отношениях, ни в международной обстановке.

Президент высказался за более частые встречи представителей сторон: и на высоком, и на среднем, и на других уровнях. Само по себе это, если сочетать с нужным содержанием переговоров и ставить при этом конструктивные цели, а именно: прекращение гонки вооружений, сокращение ядерного оружия, с тем чтобы в конечном счете оно было полностью уничтожено, устранение опасной международной напряженности — все это, конечно, содействовало бы выправлению положения дел как в целом в мире, так и в области двусторонних отношений между двумя державами.

Но этого же нет. Советский Союз будет и впредь судить о действительных намерениях американской стороны по ее практическим делам. Будущее покажет, собирается ли Вашингтон скорректировать свой курс политики».

СОЛИДАРНОСТЬ КРЕПНЕТ В БОРЬБЕ

ТБИЛИСИ, 29. (ТАСС). Опасный курс империализма, и прежде всего США, его попытки с помощью ядерного шантажа навязать миру свое господство наталкиваются на решительное противодействие стран социалистического содружества, на растущий отпор всех миролюбивых сил планеты. Это еще раз подтвердили участники завершившейся сегодня в столице Грузии V Советской конференции солидарности с народами Азии и Африки.

ветский Союз выступает в авангарде борьбы с происками империализма, расизма и реакции, подчеркивали гости конференции — генеральный секретарь постоянного секретариата общепарабского народного конгресса Омар Халифа аль-Хамди, член Политбюро ЦК Народной организации Юго-Западной Африки (СВАПО) Кавеке Катамила, заместитель председателя организации мира, солидарности и дружбы Афганистана Эмтияз Хасан, заместитель председателя сирийского комитета афро-азиатской солидарности Ахмед аль-Асаад, представитель ООП в СССР Яхья Хабах и другие. Они высоко оценили усилия СССР

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 1, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RON LEHMAN
SVEN KRAEMER
JACK MATLOCK
TY COBB
WALT RAYMOND
KARNA SMALL
BILL MARTIN
STEVE ROSEN
BOB LINHARD
HOWARD TEICHER
GEOFF KEMP

FROM: STEVE STEINER *Steve*
SUBJECT: Guidance on UNGA Speech

Attached is the interagency-cleared guidance on the President's UNGA speech which we developed last week.

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52

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7369 DTG: 270405Z SEP 84 PSN: 041240
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TAGS: MNUC, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S UNGA SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IN NUMBER 4 IS PRELIMINARY GUIDANCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 24 UNGA SPEECH. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THIS TO RESPOND TO HOST GOVERNMENT PUBLIC OR MEDIA INQUIRIES.
 2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON SEPTEMBER 26, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH GROMYKO ON SEPTEMBER 28 FOLLOWING WHICH THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AVAILABLE.
 3. SOME POSTS MAY HAVE RECEIVED EARLY GARBLED VERSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN WHICH THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR TALKS IN VIENNA: DURING THE TALKS, WE WOULD CONSIDER WHAT MEASURES OF RESTRAINT BOTH SIDES MIGHT TAKE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. THAT SENTENCE PROCEEDS "HOWEVER, ANY AGREEMENT MUST LOGICALLY DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO GET THE COMPETITION IN OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER CONTROL . . ."
- Q. THE PRESIDENT TONED DOWN HIS CRITICISM OF THE USSR IN THE SPEECH. WAS THIS A GESTURE TO GROMYKO, TO AVOID SPOILING PROSPECTS OF THE MEETING?
- A. -- THE PRESIDENT HAS CONSISTENTLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SERIOUS DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIS ADDRESS LAST JANUARY, THE PRESIDENT LAID OUT IN COMPREHENSIVE TERMS HIS DESIRE TO IMPROVE ALL AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. HIS UNGA SPEECH REPRESENTS A RENEWED ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A MORE PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. OUR INVITATION TO THE USSR IS CLEAR: WE ASK THEM TO JOIN US IN CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES.
- Q. HOW DO YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REACT TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS?
- A. -- WE CAN'T PREDICT HOW THEY WILL REACT, BUT WE CERTAINLY HOPE THEY WILL TAKE US UP ON OUR OFFER FOR A BROADER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE.
- Q. WHAT IS NEW ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS?
- A. -- THE PRESIDENT OFFERED SEVERAL PROPOSALS SUCH AS

REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL OR CABINET LEVEL TO DISCUSS THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP, EXPANDED MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS, AND REGULAR EXPERTS' DISCUSSIONS ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS. HE MADE SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT WOULD INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND ENHANCE CAPABILITY FOR ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: INCLUDING EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS TO MONITOR NUCLEAR TESTS AND EXPANDED EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION. HE ALSO OFFERED TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS THE IDEA OF DEVELOPING A "ROAD MAP" ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES TO ENSURE LONG-TERM DIALOGUE IN THIS AREA.

Q. WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPOKE ABOUT A "BIGGER UMBRELLA" UNDER WHICH THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CAN OPERATE?

A. -- WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A WAY IN WHICH WE AND THE SOVIETS CAN TAKE A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AND AT THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATIONS -- TO SEE WHERE IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ADVANCE THE INDIVIDUAL NEGOTIATIONS. I CANNOT GO INTO MORE DETAIL SINCE THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT HAS TO BE WORKED

OUT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

Q. DOES THIS MEAN YOU ARE DROPPING THE IDEA OF RETURNING TO THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS?

A. -- NO. WE REMAIN PREPARED TO RESUME THESE TALKS IMMEDIATELY, AND WE DEEPLY REGRET THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO AVOID NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE CRITICAL ARMS REDUCTIONS ISSUES.

Q. DOES THIS MEAN YOU WILL ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS OR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS AND LEAVE THE ALLIES OUT OF THE PICTURE?

A. -- ABSOLUTELY NOT. WE HAVE DEVELOPED OUR POLICY TOWARD THE USSR IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE THIS PROCESS IN THE FUTURE. THE STRENGTH OF OUR ALLIANCES, INCLUDING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ALLIES, ARE ONE OF THE WEST'S MAJOR ASSETS IN SHAPING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR.

OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

Q. WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE IN MIND WHEN HE SPOKE ABOUT OPENING TALKS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE FORCES?

A. -- THERE IS A CLEAR AND INTEGRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES, AND THEREFORE BETWEEN LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES. THIS PRINCIPLE WAS RECOGNIZED IN THE SALT I PROCESS WHEN THE ABM TREATY WAS SIGNED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SIDES WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LIMITS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE US BELIEVES THIS DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED AND THAT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE MUTUAL EFFECTS OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES WILL AID US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. BUT IT IS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE HOW SUCH DISCUSSIONS MIGHT AFFECT THE FORCES OF EITHER SIDE.

Q. WOULD SUCH TALKS BE PART OF THE "UMBRELLA" OR SEPARATE?

A. -- WE CANNOT GO INTO THAT KIND OF DETAIL NOW.

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7369 DTG: 270405Z SEP 84 PSN: 041240

CLEARLY, HOW THE TALKS MIGHT BE ARRANGED IS A MATTER WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS.

Q. THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR TALKS BY THE END OF THE YEAR OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. WILL THE US BE READY TO TALK BY THEN?

A. -- WE SAID WE ARE READY TO TALK ANYTIME OR ANYPLACE. THAT OFFER STANDS.

ASAT

Q. HAS THE US POSITION ON ACCEPTING THE SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL CHANGED?

A. -- THE US POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MEASURES OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT, BUT THIS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE TALKS THEMSELVES. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO ACCEPT ANY SUCH MEASURES AS A PRECONDITION FOR TALKS, OR TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF TALKS.

MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WITH THE USSR

Q. IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, HE PROPOSED THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION "INSTITUTIONALIZE" MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WHAT DOES THE US HAVE IN MIND?

A. -- I CAN'T GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT SPECIFIC MEETINGS WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE, BUT I KNOW THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ PLANS TO DISCUSS THE TOPIC WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. WHAT SHOULD BE CLEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS IS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES ARE UNDENIABLY SUBSTANTIAL, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT REGULAR HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WOULD HELP NARROW THOSE DIFFERENCES, AVOID MISCALCULATION AND HELP RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND REDUCE TENSIONS.

Q. IS THERE ANYTHING PLANNED ALONG THESE LINES?

A. -- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR CABINET-LEVEL EXCHANGES FOLLOWS UP ON REMARKS HE MADE ON JUNE 27 OF THIS

YEAR, WHEN HE CALLED FOR BROADER CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES AND THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE US UP ON THIS OFFER FOR A MORE VIGOROUS MINISTERIAL-LEVEL DIALOGUE.

Q. THE PRESIDENT ALSO MENTIONED "POLICY-LEVEL" CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS. CAN YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT THIS?

A. -- THIS IS SOMETHING TO WHICH THE TWO SIDES WOULD HAVE TO AGREE. IN RECENT YEARS WE HAVE HAD EXPERTS' DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE. OUR NEW PROPOSAL IS TO INTENSIFY AND BROADEN THIS DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

IF PRESSED:

Q. DOES THIS APPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. -- SECRETARY SHULTZ ADDRESSED THAT QUESTION YESTERDAY. HE SAID THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONE OF THE AREAS WHERE IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. I AM NOT GOING TO GO BEYOND THAT.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL VISITS BY US AND SOVIET EXPERTS TO MEASURE THE YIELDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS?

A. THE PROPOSAL DEMONSTRATES THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IF THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD AGREE TO IMPROVE PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION OF THE 150 KILOTON LIMITATION FOR THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATIES. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF VISITS IS A CONCRETE STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

Q. WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT MEAN BY "MEASURING DIRECTLY" THE YIELDS OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

A. CURRENTLY, MONITORING OF THE THRESHOLD LIMITATION DEPENDS ON INDIRECT SEISMIC MEANS, AND BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER INDIVIDUAL TESTS BY THE OTHER ARE WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS. MONITORING BY DIRECT MEANS WOULD BE MUCH MORE ACCURATE, AND COULD THEREFORE, ENHANCE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES FOR DIRECT MEASUREMENT, AND DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BILATERALLY.

Q. DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOW PREPARED TO RATIFY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY?

A. THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT. WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WITH THE SOVIETS AND SEE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT.

Q. WHAT DOES THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER MEAN FOR UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON ALL NUCLEAR TESTS?

A. OUR POLICY REGARDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN HAS NOT CHANGED--THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO VIEW A CTB AS A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF DEEP, VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXPANDED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES. IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS GIVEN PRIORITY TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE EXISTING TTBT AND PNET AGREEMENTS.

Q. DOES THE ADMINISTRATION REALLY THINK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT LET US ON TO THEIR TEST SITES, GIVEN THEIR AVERSION TO ON-SITE INSPECTION?

A. IT IS INDEED A FAR-REACHING PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH OPENESS IS WARRANTED GIVEN THE INTEREST OF ALL CONCERNED IN REAL PROGRESS TOWARD MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL. ONE PRECEDENT WHICH WENT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PRESIDENT IS ALREADY IN THE PNET PROTOCOL, AGREED TO BY THE USSR, WHICH CALLS FOR ON-SITE PRESENCE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. DAM

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34

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 1, 1984

TO:

WALT RAYMOND
JACK MATLOCK
TY COBB
JOHN LENCZOWSKI
PETER SOMMER
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
RON LEHMAN
SVEN KRAEMER
BOB LINHARD
STEVE SESTANOVICH
STEVE ROSEN

FROM:

STEVE STEINER



35

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1984

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The Briefing Room

2:30 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan had a useful and intense interchange of views with the Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gromyko. The meeting lasted around an hour and a half altogether, including the working luncheon, and it was --

Q How long?

Q How long, sir?

Q -- three and a half hours --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Three and a half hours -- is that what I said?

Q You said one hour and a half --

Q You said one and a half.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you. Well, I always look to the press to keep things accurate. (Laughter.)

Q Ohhhhhh.

Q That's why we're here.

Q When -- when did you start doing that?

Q Am I glad there not -- (Laughter.)

Q Go ahead, sir.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The meeting was a very strong personal interchange between two individuals. And while some others had occasional things to say, it was very basically a meeting between two men.

The President's purpose was to put forward to Mr. Gromyko, representing the top level of the Soviet leadership, the President's view that we need to have a more constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; and to express the many ways, again, that he believes this can be done.

And through this lengthy interchange and conversation, I feel sure that, from the President's point of view, and our point of view, this position that we have was made clear.

So, I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q Sir, can you tell us how Mr. Gromyko reacted to this position that you just outlined?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think you have to ask Mr. Gromyko for his reactions. I'm not going to try to characterize them, except to say that from our standpoint,

MORE

34

it was a very strong and useful interchange, and Mr. Gromyko, of course, expressed his views very powerfully and aggressively, as he always does. And the President listened to him carefully.

Q Was there any --

Q What was the agenda -- what did they talk about, and what do you mean "strong"? What do you mean by "strong"?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Forceful and direct. So that -- there was a desire, I think, on the part of both parties to try to be as clear as possible and not to dress up a subject at all. So, these discussions were very direct. It started with the President making a statement of his views, and then Mr. Gromyko made a statement of his, and then the interchange started, and as I say, carried on through the lunch period.

Q What was the subject?

Q Mr. Secretary, you use the word "intense". Are you suggesting that they argued? Was the atmosphere angry?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It wasn't angry. It was calm and deliberate and businesslike throughout. But, by intense, I mean that both men were really engaged in this conversation and were, both, I think, fully aware of the importance of it. And, so, in that sense it was a strong and intense interchange.

Q Mr. Secretary, did anything -- did anything come out of this meeting that would lead to further meetings between either you and Mr. Gromyko or the President and Mr. Gromyko, or a summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The objective of the President was to put forward his view, which would continue to be his view if he is reelected, and as far as an outcome is concerned, at the end, of course, as I think the President said as he was leaving, we agreed to stay in touch and I'm sure that we will.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything out of this meeting that would lead you to think that there would be a likelihood of the Soviets returning to any of the arms talks, or of talks beginning on the space weapons?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to try to predict the start of any particular talks. The object wasn't to try to focus on any particular thing of that kind, but to try to clear the air of general issues involving where we think this relationship should go; involving the importance of coming to grips with the ~~problem~~ of immense nuclear arsenals and doing something to reduce them -- those broad and very significant questions. Question of preventing the militarization of outer space and issues of that kind were all discussed in the course of the meeting.

Q Do you think the relationship was changed as a result of this conversation, or these conversations today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it remains to be seen, of course. I would -- was -- I'd have to say, very impressed with the

MORE

31

spirit and knowledge and intensity of the President's discussion, and I think it simply must have come through --

Q Sounds like --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- that this was a man talking with great conviction and a sense of importance of what he said.

Q Mr. Secretary did Mr. Gromyko respond either positively or negatively to any of the specific suggestions that the President made in his United Nations speech? Number one. And number two: Can you tell us a little bit about the session that the two men had alone in the Oval Office when the rest of you headed off for lunch?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There were some references to the President's UN speech, but I don't want to characterize it beyond that.

The brief meeting that the two men had alone was something that the President wished to do, and he had some things that he wanted to say privately to Mr. Gromyko. And that's as much as I care to say about it.

Q -- you know what they were --

Q -- were discussed, Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything that you heard there -- any suggestion from the Soviets, any surprises about anything that Mr. Gromyko had to say that suggested something that you didn't already know or hadn't heard before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that an interchange like this is always an educational thing for all parties. And I felt privileged to have been there. But I can't put my finger on some particular insight that I'd care to single out.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you detect any change of positions on the Soviets' part on anything?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The object wasn't to test out a question of their position on this, that or the other, but rather to set out general objectives and the confidence of the President in wishing to try to obtain those objectives, to put behind that confidence, as he did in his UN speech, the many substantive suggestions that are out there for negotiation and discussion as well as the procedural ideas that were contained in the President's UN speech.

Q What do you mean by "stay in touch," Mr. Secretary? Does that mean there are no specific plans for any further meetings? Does that mean that the idea the President had for multi-level, Cabinet-level exchanges was not accepted?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are all sorts of ways to stay in touch. And just exactly how this will come about remains to be seen. Of course, we have regular and continuing dialogue at the Ambassadorial level, both Ambassador Hartman in Moscow and with Ambassador Dobrynin here. And that represents a continuing vehicle for organizing any further discussions that might be needed.

Q -- nothing came out of this?

Q Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday at the United Nations that you were sad and disappointed at Mr. Gromyko's speech. You said that, as the President had said several days before, that the United States would

MORE

38

continue to try to get the Soviet Union to behave in a constructive way in international relations in the cause of peace. And I want to recall that to you. Do you believe that this meeting today in any way advanced the cause of peace? Wasn't Gromyko constructive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In my opinion, the meeting definitely advanced the cause of peace and I think when you have a genuine and intense discussion between two people at the top of these two most important governments, and it is a genuine, calm, businesslike, but intense discussion, that's sure to be helpful.

Q Did it clear the air, as far as you're concerned?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, clear the air -- there are lots of -- there's lots of distrust, there's lots of apprehension, there's lots of differences of opinion, and I don't think one discussion is going to clear the air completely. But I think it undoubtedly made some progress in that direction.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister, in his speech at the UN, said that the United States would have to back its words with concrete deeds. Is that still the Soviets' position, and is it still his view that the United States has to do something in certain areas for the Soviets will reciprocate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think both the United States and the Soviet Union -- although I'll only speak for the United States -- feel that what counts is what is done, deeds. And that is why, as the President has approached this relationship, right from the beginning of his administration, he has concentrated on substantive matters. And by this time, there is a very long list of substantive suggestions, proposals, treaties. And he added some in his UN speech. So I think that it's perfectly correct to focus on deeds, not that the general atmosphere that can be created by discussions isn't a positive thing to do. But the essence of the matter is what is actually going to be done.

Q Are both sides going to follow this meeting now with some deeds?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The agreement at the end of the luncheon was that we will stay in touch, and how one side or the other will come to grips with specific suggestions will emerge from that process. But I remind you that from the area of nuclear armaments to space to chemical warfare to confidence-building measures to nuclear tests sites, there is a wide array of substantive proposals -- deeds, if you will -- that the United States, the President has put on the table for the consideration of the Soviet Union.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to sum up by saying that the two men spoke forcefully about their known

positions, and that nothing is really likely to come in any concrete fashion until after the election?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that wouldn't be my summary, no. I don't know just when further discussions may take place.

Q What about the first part?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you caught me so much at the end, that you'll have to repeat the first part -- but I'll think I'll stand on a summary. I've been trying to summarize in the brief statement I made in the beginning and in response to your questions.

Q Did the President raise human rights?

Q Do you think the President's attitude about the Soviets has changed at all as a result of his personal meeting with Mr. Gromyko? He's been pretty hardline toward the Soviets in the past.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the President has consistently had a -- a set of ideas that have guided his policy. And they've really been pretty consistent throughout his Presidency. He has, from the beginning, insisted that we have to be realistic about the differences between our systems and other aspects of Soviet behavior. He has, from the beginning, been consistent in saying that we must be -- build our strength, our military, our economic, our spirit -- and he has said from the beginning that we also must be ready to negotiate. And there is an interplay among those three things, and that remains the case today. And I don't think the President has changed at all during the course of this period. Right now, particularly given the fact that many of the problems that were present at the start of his administration have been dealt with, or are in the process of being dealt with, certainly there is a great emphasis on the importance of negotiation about the many overriding issues that are before us.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Did the President raise human rights in any fashion to the Foreign Minister?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q How did he do that?

Q Question, sir?

Q What was the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well the President -- the question was: Did the President raise human rights? -- and the answer is: Yes, he did, certainly. And I think, again, the President has said from the beginning that in all meetings with the Soviet Union, this subject will be raised; and he did so.

Q Sakharov?

Q Can you tell us what he said -- can you elaborate in any way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think it -- I just will --

Q Sakharov?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- be glad to give you subjects that were talked about, but as to the content individually --

Q Sakharov?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- I'm not going to give the names that he mentioned or anything of that kind.

Q Mr. Shultz, do you think that this meeting will help President Reagan for his reelection? (Laughter.)

Q Ahhhhhh. (Laughter.)

Q Now there's an interesting question --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no idea. (Laughter.) That's not my field. From the standpoint of the -- but from the standpoint of this meeting, it is a meeting that the President and I started talking about some time ago. The President has thought about the substance of it very carefully --

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undertook it in the spirit of a person, a human being who is President of the United States and who is dealing, as he deals with the Soviet Union, with matters of overriding importance. So, it was, as I've said, a very serious, businesslike but intense meeting dominated by important substance throughout.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take George and --

Q Did this meeting --

MR. SPEAKES: -- Maureen and Helen and close there.

Q Did this meeting cover --

MR. SPEAKES: George.

Q Would you list the subjects? Just list the subjects that they covered.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, a great deal of the time was spent, at the beginning, on stating views and having discussion of these overriding issues of the nature of our relationship, where is it heading, the importance of dealing with the nuclear threat and things of that kind. So, it was, in a sense, philosophical, but, nevertheless, connected to overriding issues. And both men discussed that, and I don't recall just how much time, in total, was spent on that.

There was a considerable amount of time spent discussing, in particular, but not negotiating about, just discussing the problems of nuclear weapons and what could be done about them.

There was some discussion of regional issues and particularly the Iran-Iraq situation, the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian issues. So, those were basically the kinds of topics covered. And, as I said earlier, the President explicitly did bring up the problems of human rights concerns.

Q Was there anything on which they agreed and, if so, could you itemize?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I said that they agreed to keep in touch. And that was the --

Q Was that it, in terms of --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- the end point. And I think that, at the end of an intense discussion like this, it's not the sort of thing where you agree, "All right. We'll do X, Y and Z." But rather that an effort has been made, on both sides, I'm sure, I know from the President's side, to get across, on a very personal level, his own convictions and his own views and depth of feeling about this subject. And, at least from my perspective, he did a very good job of it.

Q Why did he want to talk to Gromyko alone? And what -- Do you think it was to convey this personal view of his? Over and beyond the official --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: He had some things -- points that he wanted to make to Mr. Gromyko alone, and he did it that way because he felt that just two individuals, all by themselves in a room, even though the others of us who were sitting around were not too numerous, nevertheless, there's something about a close one-to-one statement that perhaps carries special weight. And so he had some things that he wanted to give that weight to.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:50 P.M. EDT

WARSAW PACT, SOVIET STATEMENTS POINT TO THAW, DIPLOMATS SAY
BY DOUGLAS HAMILTON

BONN, OCT 17, REUTER - STATEMENTS BY THREE WARSAW PACT LEADERS THIS WEEK AND A DIRECT OVERTURE TO THE UNITED STATES YESTERDAY BY SOVIET PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO POINT CLEARLY TO A SOVIET BLOC WISH TO REVIVE EAST-WEST CONTACTS, WESTERN DIPLOMATS SAID TODAY.

THE STATEMENTS, WHILE NOT SEEN AS PARTS OF AN ORCHESTRATED PLAN BY MOSCOW AND ITS ALLIES, WERE VIEWED AS A SIGN THAT THE KREMLIN IS READY TO SOFTEN ITS UNYIELDING STANCE ON CONDITIONS FOR RESUMING ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT ITS ALLIES ARE RELIEVED BY THE SHIFT, THEY SAID.

THE DIPLOMATS WERE COMMENTING ON VISITS BY ROMANIAN PRESIDENT NICOLAE CERUDESCU TO BONN AND HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT JANOS KADAR TO PARIS, WHICH COINCIDED WITH A TRIP BY EAST GERMAN LEADER ERICH HONECKER TO HELSINKI.

THE INTERVIEW GIVEN BY CHERNENKO TO THE WASHINGTON POST NEWSPAPER AT THE KREMLIN YESTERDAY CONFIRMED THE IMPRESSION OF A NEW CONCILIATORY TONE FROM THE EAST, THEY SAID.

THE THREE VISITING LEADERS SPOKE OUT ON THE URGENT NEED FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE WHICH BROKE DOWN BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, FOLLOWING NATO MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SUBSEQUENT SOVIET SUSPENSION OF THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF LAST YEAR.

MOSCOW TOOK A STEP TOWARD ENDING THE FREEZE THREE WEEKS AGO WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO HELD OVER EIGHT HOURS OF TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND U.S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON.

ONE DIPLOMAT SAID THE WESTERN ALLIES HAD EXPECTED A SLOW, GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, BUT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT MOSCOW WAS MOVING FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED.

ANOTHER CAUTIONED AGAINST EXCESS OPTIMISM, BUT ADDED, "THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW WITH THE U.S. PAPER SHOWS THEY ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE AND THAT INDICATES A REALIZATION OF WHAT A BAD POSITION THEY ARE IN ON ARMS CONTROL."

HE SAID MOSCOW PAINTED ITSELF INTO A CORNER BY REFUSING TO RESUME THE GENEVA TALKS UNTIL NATO REMOVED ITS PERSHING 2 MISSILES FROM WEST GERMANY AND CRUISE MISSILES FROM BRITAIN AND ITALY, AND HE NOTED THAT THIS DEMAND WAS NOT REPEATED BY CHERNENKO.

WHITE HOUSE WELCOMES CHERNENKO'S REMARKS BUT CALLS FOR DEEDS
BY RALPH HARRIS

WASHINGTON, OCT 17, REUTER - THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY DESCRIBED
THE TONE OF NEW FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS BY SOVIET PRESIDENT
KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO AS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT REJECTED HIS CALL FOR
CHANGES IN U.S. POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL.

SPOKESMAN LARRY SPEAKES SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS
READY TO NEGOTIATE ISSUES RAISED BY CHERNENKO IN A PUBLISHED
INTERVIEW, "BUT WE CANNOT CONCUR IN THE APPARENT SOVIET VIEW
THAT IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE UNITED STATES TO PAY A PRICE SO
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COME BACK TO THE NUCLEAR NEGOTIATING
TABLE."

A FORMAL STATEMENT BY SPEAKES, WHICH WAS APPROVED BY PRESIDENT
REAGAN, ALSO SAID, "WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO MOVE
FROM PUBLIC EXCHANGES TO PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCRETE
AGREEMENTS, THEY WILL FIND US READY."

ANSWERING QUESTIONS AFTER READING THE STATEMENT, SPEAKES SAID
THE WHITE HOUSE DID NOT FIND ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN SOVIET
POSITIONS IN CHERNENKO'S REMARKS, "BUT WE DO WELCOME THE
CONSTRUCTIVE TONE."

CHERNENKO SAID IN THE INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST THAT
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED IF REAGAN SHOWED
GENUINE INTEREST IN REACHING EQUITABLE AGREEMENTS IN "AT LEAST
ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS" OF ARMS CONTROL.

HE REPEATED SOVIET CALLS FOR A MORATORIUM ON DEVELOPING
ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AS A CONDITION FOR HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS
ON BANNING SPACE WEAPONS, A FREEZE ON U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR
ARSENALS, RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF TREATIES ON
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, AND A PLEDGE BY WASHINGTON NOT
TO BE THE FIRST COUNTRY TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN HIS FORMAL STATEMENT, SPEAKES NOTED THAT IT WAS THE SOVIET
UNION, NOT THE UNITED STATES, THAT HAD WALKED OUT OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE AND STRATEGIC MISSILES.

IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION FOLLOWING HIS STATEMENT, SPEAKES
SAID OF THE TIMING OF THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW, "WE FIND IT
INTERESTING." HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE.

BUT OTHER OFFICIALS SAID CHERNENKO WAS PUSHING ARMS CONTROL AS
A MAJOR ISSUE ONLY THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 6
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND MAKING SURE THAT HIS VIEWS WERE
INJECTED INTO NEXT SUNDAY'S TELEVISED DEBATE BETWEEN REAGAN AND
DEMOCRAT WALTER MONDRAI F.

45
1. Fly
2. Save for Jack

46

SPEAKES SIGNALLED NO CHANGE IN U.S. POSITIONS IN THE FOUR AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL THAT THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW RAISED.

HE NOTED THAT WASHINGTON HAD TAKEN UP A SOVIET OFFER TO DISCUSS A BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS BUT HE SAID REAGAN STILL REFUSED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS SUCH AS AGREEING TO A MORATORIUM ON TESTING BEFORE SUCH TALKS BEGAN.

SPEAKES SAID REAGAN CONTINUED TO OPPOSE A NUCLEAR FREEZE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD PRESERVE AN UNSTABLE ARMS BALANCE AND SERIOUSLY INHIBIT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ON THE QUESTION OF U.S. RATIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TEST TREATIES, SPEAKES SAID VERIFICATION REMAINED A SERIOUS PROBLEM.

HE SAID WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW WERE CONSULTING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING TALKS ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION BUT NO TIME OR PLACE HAD BEEN DECIDED ON SO FAR.

SPEAKES UNDERLINED THE U.S. REFUSAL TO FOLLOW MOSCOW'S EXAMPLE OF RENOUNCING THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAYING THAT "THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES HAVE STATED WE WILL NOT USE ANY WEAPONS EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION."

HE ALSO MENTIONED REAGAN'S OFFER, IN A SPEECH IN DUBLIN ON JUNE 4, TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IF THE KREMLIN WOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON A WESTERN PROPOSAL DEALING WITH STEPS TO ENHANCE EAST-WEST CONFIDENCE AND REDUCE THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK IN EUROPE.

SPEAKES SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD PURSUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE KREMLIN, AS REAGAN PROMISED AFTER HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO ON SEPTEMBER 28.

"WE AGREE WITH PRESIDENT CHERNENKO THAT THERE IS NO SOUND ALTERNATIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES," SPEAKES SAID.

"WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE THE EMPHASIS HE PUTS ON POSITIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED THAT WE ARE READY FOR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION."

SOVIETS STRESS CHERNENKO'S UPBEAT LINE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, OCT 17, REUTER - THE SOVIET EMBASSY WENT OUT OF
ITS WAY TODAY TO EMPHASIZE AN UPBEAT REMARK ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS WHICH THE WASHINGTON POST DROPPED FROM ITS ACCOUNT OF
AN INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO.

THE POST TOLD REUTERS IT HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SOVIET
AUTHORITIES ABOUT THE DROPPED LINE IN WHICH CHERNENKO STATED
BETTER RELATIONS WERE POSSIBLE AND SAID IT WOULD RUN ANOTHER
STORY ON THE INTERVIEW RESTORING THE LINE.

JIM HOGLAND, THE POST'S ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR IN CHARGE
OF FOREIGN NEWS, SAID: "THE LINE WAS INADVERTENTLY DROPPED IN
TRANSMISSION."

THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF
ISSUING THE WHOLE TEXT TO MEDIA OVER A PUBLIC RELATIONS WIRE
WHICH TRANSMITS TEXTS AND STATEMENTS FOR A FEE.

IN THE INTERVIEW YESTERDAY, THE POST'S MOSCOW BUREAU CHIEF
JUSKO DOBER ASKED IN A WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BEFORE THE
MEETING BEGAN IF THE SOVIET LEADER HAD ANY THOUGHTS ON A
WIDEIPREAD VIEW THAT BETTER EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE POSSIBLE.

CHERNENKO RESPONDED THAT UNFORTUNATELY THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN
ANY REAL BASIS FOR SUCH A SHIFT AS A FACT OF LIFE.

HE THEN ADDED THE LINE THE POST DROPPED: "IS IT POSSIBLE? I
SHALL GIVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION: YES, IT IS
POSSIBLE."

THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY DESCRIBED THE TONE OF THE INTERVIEW AS
CONSTRUCTIVE.

REUTER 1756

48

WESTERN DIPLOMATS SEE NO POLICY SHIFT IN CHERNENKO COMMENTS
MOSCOW, OCT 17, REUTER - WESTERN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW SAID
TODAY THEY SAW NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN AN INTERVIEW GIVEN BY
PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO TO THE WASHINGTON POST.

MOST DIPLOMATS ALSO SAID THEY BELIEVED THE INTERVIEW HAD BEEN
TIMED TO INFLUENCE A TELEVISED DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER WALTER
MONDALE SCHEDULED FOR SUNDAY.

CHERNENKO TOLD THE NEWSPAPER THAT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD
IMPROVE IF WASHINGTON SHOWED A "GENUINE DESIRE" TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL AND ADDED THAT
WASHINGTON WOULD HAVE TO SHOW ITS GOODWILL THROUGH "REAL
DEEDS."

HE SET OUT A LIST OF POSSIBLE AREAS OF ACCORD, INCLUDING A BAN
ON THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE, A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE
AND THE RENUNCIATION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE FIRST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

"CHERNENKO IS REPEATING WHAT HAS BECOME A STANDARD SOVIET
DEMAND IN THE PAST MONTHS: THAT THE U.S. MAKE SOME CONCESSION
IN ORDER TO ENTICE MOSCOW BACK TO A DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS
ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS," ONE WEST EUROPEAN DIPLOMAT SAID.

OTHER DIPLOMATS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO STRUCK A MUCH
MILDER TONE THAN THAT USED IN RECENT KREMLIN STATEMENTS, HIS
COMMENTS INDICATED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDES
AND NO READINESS FOR COMPROMISE.

THE DIPLOMATS SAID CHERNENKO APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO OFFER
MONDALE AMMUNITION BY PUTTING ALL THE BLAME FOR THE BREAKDOWN
OF U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ON REAGAN.

THE DIPLOMATS SAID THE LIST OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS
PRESENTED BY THE SOVIET LEADER APPEARED SPECIALLY TAILORED TO
INFLUENCE THE SUNDAY DEBATE.

CHERNENKO'S CALL FOR A NUCLEAR FREEZE AND TALKS ON SPACE
WEAPONS WERE BOTH DEMANDS WHICH HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY MONDALE
AND STRONGLY OPPOSED BY REAGAN.

THE DIPLOMATS ALSO NOTED THAT CHERNENKO HAD OMITTED TO MENTION
ALL AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAD
LAUNCHED RECENT INITIATIVES, SUCH AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

"THIS LOOKS LIKE A PRETTY CLEAR ATTEMPT TO GIVE MONDALE A
SHOT IN THE ARM AND ENABLE HIM TO ARGUE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE
TO DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS," ONE DIPLOMAT SAID.

CHERNENKO TOLD THE POST THAT ALTHOUGH REAGAN HAD DECLARED A
READINESS FOR ARMS CONTROL TALKS, THE WHITE HOUSE HAD NEVER
BACKED UP HIS RHETORIC WITH REAL DEEDS.

Jack Matlock

4/1

FYI,

Steve

SOVIETS STRESS CHERNENKO'S UPBEAT LINE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, OCT 17, REUTER - THE SOVIET EMBASSY WENT OUT OF
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THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY DESCRIBED THE TONE OF THE INTERVIEW AS
CONSTRUCTIVE.

REUTER 1756

50
TASS SAID PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS AIDES HAD HASTILY FORMULATED A REACTION TO CHERNENKO'S COMMENTS TO HEAD OFF "THE IMMENSE INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT."

IT SAID THE U.S. PRESS HAD NOTED THAT CHERNENKO'S COMMENTS HAD MADE A GREAT IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC BECAUSE THEY PRESENTED A REALISTIC PICTURE AND SHOWED WHO WAS REALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT STALEMATE IN U.S.-SOVIET TIES.

TASS CHARGED THAT SPEAKES HAD REFUSED TO ANSWER A DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER WASHINGTON ACCEPTED OR REJECTED THE SOVIET LEADER'S PROPOSALS.

"AT THE SAME TIME HE TRIED TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION, WITH OBVIOUSLY FEIGNED OPTIMISM, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION, WHILE SEEING NO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION, NEVERTHELESS NOTICED CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN THE TONE OF THE STATEMENTS," IT ADDED.

SOVIET DIPLOMAT CALLS CHERNENKO PROPOSALS "LIE-DETECTOR TEST"

UNITED NATIONS, OCT 18, REUTER - A SENIOR SOVIET DIPLOMAT SAID TODAY FOUR PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO THIS WEEK COULD BE REGARDED AS A "LIE-DETECTOR TEST" OF U.S. SINCERITY.

"WE SEE IN THEM A SORT OF LITMUS TEST OF THE SINCERITY OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN THEY SAY THEY ARE WILLING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS," SOVIET DEPUTY U.N. REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD QVINNIKOV TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE.

HE ADDED, "LIE-DETECTOR TESTS ARE POPULAR IN THIS COUNTRY. YOU COULD REGARD THESE PROPOSALS AS A LIE-DETECTOR TEST."

QVINNIKOV WAS REFERRING TO COMMENTS CHERNENKO MADE THIS WEEK IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST.

CHERNENKO TOLD THE POST THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS COULD BE IMPROVED IF WASHINGTON SHOWED AN INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON ANY OF FOUR TOPICS:

- PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE;
- A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
- U.S. RATIFICATION OF TREATIES SIGNED BY THE TWO COUNTRIES IN 1974 AND 1976 ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS;
- A PLEDGE BY THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A PLEDGE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY MADE.

WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ROBERT MCFARLANE YESTERDAY WELCOMED THE TONE OF THE SOVIET LEADER'S REMARKS BUT SAID THEY OFFERED NOTHING NEW IN SUBSTANCE.

51

TASS ACCUSES WHITE HOUSE OF EVADING REPLY TO CHERNENKO
MOSCOW, OCT 18, REUTER - THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS ACCUSED
THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY OF EVADING AN ANSWER TO PRESIDENT
KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO'S PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

COMMENTING ON A STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN LARRY
SPEAKES, TASS SAID HE HAD SHOWN THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
DID NOT INTEND TO RESPOND TO CHERNENKO'S SUGGESTIONS.

"IT IS CLEAR FROM THE REPLIES OF THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN
... THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF REVISING ITS
OLD NEGATIVE APPROACH TO THE PROPOSALS FORMULATED IN THE
(CHERNENKO) INTERVIEW," TASS SAID.

"THE ADMINISTRATION HAS GIVEN NO POSITIVE REPLY TO THE USSR
WHILE INDULGING IN MANEUVERS OF AN OBVIOUSLY ELECTION-EVE
CHARACTER, INCLUDING ... OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF DIALOGUE."

IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED YESTERDAY,
CHERNENKO SAID U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS COULD IMPROVE IF REAGAN
SHOWED GENUINE INTEREST IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE
AREA OF ARMS CONTROL.

CHERNENKO LISTED FOUR AREAS WHERE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE: A
BAN ON SPACE WEAPONS, A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS, U.S.
AGREEMENT TO JOIN MOSCOW IN PLEDGING NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE
ATOMIC WEAPONS, AND U.S. RATIFICATION OF TWO UNDERGROUND
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATIES.

IN REPLY, SPEAKES WELCOMED WHAT HE CALLED THE CONSTRUCTIVE
TONE OF CHERNENKO'S COMMENTS BUT SAID THE UNITED STATES DID NOT
CONSIDER THAT IT HAD TO "PAY A PRICE" TO GET THE KREMLIN BACK
TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

TODAY'S TASS REPORT WAS BILLED AS A SUMMARY OF U.S. MEDIA
REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS, BUT IT INCLUDED INDEPENDENT
CRITICISMS MADE BY THE AGENCY ITSELF.

IT SAID THE WHITE HOUSE WAS REFUSING TO ANSWER CHERNENKO'S
PROPOSALS BECAUSE IT WAS "UNCOMFORTABLE" AND WAS ISSUING A
"SET OF OLD PROPAGANDA STEREOTYPES" ABOUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
AND ITS COMMITMENT TO PERCE.

Cont.

SOVIETS-CHERNENKO

MOSCOW (AP) -- THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY SAID THURSDAY THAT THE WHITE HOUSE CONCEDES THERE IS "NO SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE" TO KONSTANTIN U. CHERNENKO'S CALL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

TASS ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SHOWN NO WILLINGNESS TO REVISE ITS "NEGATIVE APPROACH" TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS CHERNENKO PUT FORTH IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE WASHINGTON POST THIS WEEK.

IN A MOSCOW-DATELINED REPORT ON REACTIONS TO THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW, TASS SAID THE INTERVIEW STIRRED "IMMENSE INTEREST" AMONG AMERICANS, CITING WHAT IT CALLED EXTENSIVE U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE.

THE COMMENTARY CALLED THE MEDIA REACTION A SIGN THAT CHERNENKO'S PROPOSALS "PRESENT A REALISTIC PICTURE OF THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS AND SHOW WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT STALEMATE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WHICH IS NOW IN EVIDENCE."

TURNING TO THE WHITE HOUSE REACTION, TASS SAID:

"IT IS REPORTED THAT A SPECIAL MEETING TOOK PLACE IN THE WHITE HOUSE AT WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND HIS LIEUTENANTS HASTILY FORMULATED THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE INTERVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMMENSE INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT.

"THE RESULT OF THE MEETING WAS FORMULATED, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL, IN A STATEMENT MADE BY THE OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN.

"IT ADMITS THAT TODAY, AS KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO STRESSED IN HIS INTERVIEW, THERE IS NO SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S.A., AND NOTES THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT CALLS FOR A CAREFUL EXAMINATION."

THE TASS REPORT SAID THE WHITE HOUSE HAD NOT SHIFTED ITS POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO THE CHERNENKO'S CALL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON AT LEAST ONE MAJOR ARMS CONTROL ISSUE.

AP-WX-10-18-84 1917EDT

PRAVDA PHOTO SPARKS DOUBTS ABOUT GORBACHEV'S POSITION

BY MARK WOOD

MOSCOW, OCT 19, REUTER - AN OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PUBLISHED TODAY SHOWED SECOND-IN-COMMAND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ON THE FRINGE RATHER THAN IN THE CENTER, PROMPTING SPECULATION ABOUT HIS STANDING AS HEIR-APPARENT.

GORBACHEV, 53, WHO HAS STOOD ALONGSIDE OR CLOSE TO PRESIDENT KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO IN OTHER RECENT LEADERSHIP LINE-UPS, WAS ON THE FRINGE OF THE RULING POLITBURO IN TODAY'S PORTRAIT, PUBLISHED IN ALL DAILY NEWSPAPERS.

ONE WESTERN DIPLOMAT SAID, "POSITIONS IN THE KREMLIN LINE-UP ARE SELDOM ACCIDENTAL. GORBACHEV'S PLACE IS VERY PUZZLING AND COULD BE A SIGN THAT HE IS IN DIFFICULTY."

OTHER WESTERN KREMLIN-WATCHERS SAID THEY ALSO CONSIDERED THE PICTURE COULD BE A FIRST INDICATION THAT GORBACHEV IS FACING PROBLEMS, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THEY WANTED TO AWAIT FURTHER EVIDENCE BEFORE DRAWING FIRM CONCLUSIONS.

GORBACHEV WAS BEING GROOMED FOR SUCCESSION BY CHERNENKO'S PREDECESSOR YURI ANDROPOV.

HE LOST OUT TO HIS OLDER RIVAL WHEN ANDROPOV DIED LAST FEBRUARY, BUT SOVIET SOURCES SAID HE WAS GIVEN THE POSITION OF "CROWN PRINCE" AS PART OF A COMPROMISE DEAL TO AVOID A POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN RIVAL KREMLIN FACTIONS.

VIKTOR AFANASYEV, EDITOR OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY PRAVDA, CONFIRMED TO JAPANESE JOURNALISTS LAST WEEK THAT GORBACHEV WAS EFFECTIVELY SECOND-IN-COMMAND.

BUT WESTERN DIPLOMATS SAID IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT HE COULD HAVE RUN INTO POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF THE POOR STATE OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS DUE TO HOLD A PLENUM NEXT WEEK DEALING CHIEFLY WITH AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS AND THE DIPLOMATS SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT GORBACHEV HAD COME UNDER FIRE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE MEETING.

AFTER ACHIEVING ENORMOUS SUCCESSES WITH FARMS IN HIS HOME DISTRICT OF STAVROPOL IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS, THE PORTLY RUSSIAN WAS BROUGHT INTO THE POLITBURO IN 1980 TO STRAIGHTEN OUT SOVIET AGRICULTURE AS A WHOLE.

DESPITE HIS ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE REFORMS AND MORE EFFICIENT WORKING METHODS, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE IMPROVEMENT.

THIS YEAR'S SOVIET GRAIN HARVEST IS EXPECTED BY WESTERN EXPERTS TO TOTAL ONLY 170 MILLION METRIC TONS, SOME 20 MILLION TONS DOWN ON LAST YEAR AND 70 MILLION TONS BELOW THE KREMLIN'S TARGET.

REUTER 1216

JM-53

MATLOCK

RUSSIA TELLS/RECEIVED

AM-CAMPAIGN-SOVIET

MOSCOW ATTACKS REAGAN'S DEBATE COMMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL

MOSCOW, OCT 22; REUTER - THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS TODAY ATTACKED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL IN YESTERDAY'S TELEVISED U.S. ELECTION DEBATE AND SAID HE HAD SHOWN NO READINESS TO TAKE A REALISTIC ATTITUDE ON THE SUBJECT.

IN AN ANALYSIS OF REAGAN'S EXCHANGES WITH DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGER WALTER MONDALE, THE AGENCY ALSO ACCUSED THE PRESIDENT OF DEFYING ELEMENTARY LOGIC WHEN HE DEFENDED HIS DECISION TO DEVELOP SPACE WEAPONS.

"REAGAN...DID NOT FORMULATE A SINGLE CONCRETE PROPOSAL WHICH EITHER IN DEEDS OR WORDS WOULD INDICATE A READINESS TO SHOW A REALISTIC APPROACH TOWARDS THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE ARMS RACE OR TOWARDS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION," IT SAID.

TASS SAID MONDALE HAD DELIVERED "ANNIHILATING CRITICISM" OF REAGAN'S "STAR WARS" PROGRAM AND IT INDICATED APPROVAL FOR THE DEMOCRAT'S CRITICISM OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO DRAW UP ANY NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW.

BUT THE AGENCY ALSO INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED MONDALE, SAYING HE ARGUED FOR A MILITARY BUILD-UP AND DEFENDED THE USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS.

IN THE DEBATE, REAGAN SAID HIS "STAR WARS" PROGRAM OF ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES MIGHT HELP PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO TALK PEACE, ADDING: "MY ULTIMATE GOAL, MY ULTIMATE DREAM, IS THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD."

MONDALE CALLED THE "STAR WARS" PLAN "MADNESS," BUT REJECTED VIEWS THAT HE MIGHT BE TOO SOFT TO DEAL WITH MOSCOW BY SAYING, "THEY (THE SOVIETS) ARE A TOUGH AND RUTHLESS ADVERSARY AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO MEET THAT CHALLENGE AND I WOULD."

TASS REACTED BY SAYING REAGAN HAD IGNORED KNOWN FACTS AND ELEMENTARY LOGIC BY ARGUING THA HIS PLAN TO DEPLY A SPACE-BASED DEFENSE SYSTEM WOULD MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE ANINGO TO THEIR LIQUIDATION.

6

"ACCORDING TO REAGAN IT SEEMS THAT THE PATH TO HUMAN HAPPINESS AND A HALT TO THE ARMS RACE LEADS THROUGH TRANSFERRING THIS RACE TO THE COSMOS," THE AGENCY SAID.

TASS REITERATED SOVIET ARGUMENTS THAT REAGAN'S SPACE WEAPONS PROJECT WAS AIMED AT ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO DELIVER A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE. IT ATTACKED THE U.S. LEADER FOR SAYING IN THE DEBATE THAT IT WOULD BE A MORE HUMAN FORM OF DEFENSE.

TASS ACCUSED REAGAN OF MAKING ABSURD STATEMENTS THAT THE U.S. LAGGED BEHIND THE SOVIET UNION IN A WIDE RANGE OF WEAPONRY, INCLUDING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE.

IT SAID HE HAD OPENLY DISTORTED WELL-KNOWN FACTS BY BLAMING THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE EAST-WEST ARMS BREAKDOWN OF DISARMMENT TALKS.

MOSCOW MAINTAINS THAT IT IS READY TO RESUME AN ARMS DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES BUT INSISTS THAT WASHINGTON MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS FIRST.

THE TASS REFLECTED EARLIER SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON THE U.S. CAMPAIGN BY FIERCELY CONDEMNING REAGAN'S STATEMENTS WHILE REFLECTING MOST OF MONDALE'S COMMENTS IN A NEUTRAL OR FAVORABLE WAY.

BUT BY NOTING THAT MONDALE SHARED REAGAN'S VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR A STRONG U.S. MILITARY, IT INDICATED THAT MOSCOW WOULD BE CRITICAL OF MUCH OF THE CHALLENGE MONDALE WOULD FACE.

THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THE KREMLIN WOULD LIKE TO SEE MONDALE EMERGE AS VICTOR IN THE NOVEMBER 6 POLL.

MOST WESTERN DIPLOMATS SAY THE KREMLIN HAS BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE HIS CHANCES BY MAKING CLEAR IT WOULD FIND IT EASIER TO DEAL WITH MONDALE IN THE WHITE HOUSE THAN WITH REAGAN.

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