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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 6/20/2005

File Folder GENEVA MEETING: SHULTZ/GROMYKO JANUARY 7-8,
1985 (1)

FOIA

2001-061

Box Number 59

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5914

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
16172	MEMO	BASIC PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND USSR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE [1 - 2]	2	ND	B1
16170	REPORT	USSR-U.S. MOSCOW VOICES CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM AFTER SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS [8 - 9]	2	1/9/1985	B1
16173	CABLE	112137Z JAN 85 [10 - 15]	6	1/11/1985	B1
16174	CABLE	112137Z JAN 85 [16 - 21]	6	1/11/1985	B1
16175	CABLE	141534Z JAN 85 [22 - 25]	4	1/14/1985	B1
16178	CABLE	151559Z JAN 85 [33 - 38]	6	1/15/1985	B1
16179	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH SOVIET EMBASSY ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, THE MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER SUBJECTS [47 - 47]	1	1/16/1985	B1
16171	REPORT	USSR-U.S. GROMYKO STRESSES PRIMACY OF SPACE ISSUE IN NEW ARMS TALKS [48 - 53]	6	1/16/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO:

S-Orig & 3
Ms. Bova

Mr. Adelman
Mr. Burt
Amb. Carmen
General Chain
Mr. George
Amb. Hartman
Mr. Kalb
Mr. Lehman
Mr. Matlock
Mr. McFarlane
Amb. Lodge
Admiral Moreau
Amb. Nitze
Mr. Palmer/Simons
Mr. Perle
Mr. Rowny
EUR-2

SUBJECT: Replacement/To Be Provided Page(s)

Please insert the attached in the section of the book indicated below:

SCENARIOS

Monday, January 7

2. Second Meeting with Gromyko

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 10/27/02

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY SHULTZ'S MEETINGS
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
January 7, 1985
Geneva

SCENARIO

Second Meeting

- 2:15 p.m. Depart Intercontinental Hotel for U.S. Mission.
- 2:20 p.m. Arrive at the U.S. Mission (VIP entrance). Ambassador Carmen or his designated representative greets and escorts Secretary to Conference Room 123.
- 2:30 p.m. Greet the Soviet delegation arriving at the U.S. Mission (VIP entrance). Secretary or member of the U.S. delegation greets Mr. Gromyko at the VIP entrance and escorts him to Conference Room 123.
- 2:35 p.m. Five minute photo opportunity with selected pool of media representatives in Conference Room 123.
- 2:40-5:00 p.m. Second U.S.-Soviet meeting in Conference Room 123. There will be a large conference table in the middle of room with chairs on each side. There will be chairs behind each side of table for additional seating as required. Containers of water will be on the table. There will be a coffee bar set up in the conference room. A waiting area/lounge will be set up in lobby outside Conference Room 123 for U.S. and Soviet support personnel.
- 5:15 p.m. Guests invited to the U.S.-hosted reception will arrive via the VIP entrance and proceed to Conference Room 135.
- 5:30 p.m. Secretary and Mr. Gromyko proceed to Conference Room 135 for the reception to be hosted by the Secretary. There will be a 5-minute photo opportunity with selected media representatives in the reception area.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CIS NARA, Date 10/27/02

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2-~~

- 6:30 p.m. Soviet delegation departs the U.S. Mission (VIP entrance).
- 6:40 p.m. Secretary and U.S. delegation depart U.S. Mission for hotel.
- 6:45 p.m. Arrive Intercontinental Hotel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M UNCLASSIFIED

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RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY
RUDKFSQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02

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CN: 02021
CHRG: USIS
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USINFO

PAO/IO; FROM P/PFE

START, INF, CD, CDE, SCC DELS

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: NYT/HAIG ON GENEVA TALKS

EU-U06 01/08/84 (750)

(FOLLOWING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

JANUARY 8 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY ALEXANDER HAIG HEADED
"WHAT AMERICA SHOULD DO AFTER THE GENEVA TALKS:"

(BEGIN TEXT)

WASHINGTON -- EVEN AS SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ MEETS IN GENEVA WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO, WE ARE IN VERY SERIOUS DANGER OF FORGETTING WHAT THE WHOLE THING IS ABOUT.

BY NOW WE SHOULD HAVE LEARNED THAT ARMS CONTROL IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. NOR IS IT A PANACEA FOR EAST-WEST TENSIONS, AS ONCE WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE CASE. WHATEVER HAPPENS IN GENEVA, THE KEY TO NUCLEAR STABILITY HAS LESS TO DO WITH ANY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT THAN WITH THE UNITED STATES' DETERMINATION TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS IN BOTH MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLITICAL WILL.

THE UNITED STATES NEED NOT SEEK ABSOLUTE SYMMETRY IN EVERY CATEGORY OF WEAPON, BUT IT SIMPLY CANNOT CONTINUE TO PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO ACHIEVE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS.

THE NUB, THEN, OF TODAY'S PROBLEM IS THE DANGER OF DETERRENCE POSED BY THE DESTABILIZING IMBALANCES BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS' ARSENALS -- SPECIFICALLY THE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO DESTROY OUR MOST HARDENED LAND-BASED MISSILE SILOS AND ESSENTIAL COMMAND INSTALLATIONS, A CAPABILITY UNMATCHED BY A COMPARABLE AMERICAN FORCE.

SUCH IMBALANCE WILL NOT BE DISSOLVED BY RHETORICAL INVOCATIONS THAT WE ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO NEGOTIATE TODAY IN A WAY THAT WE WERE NOT IN 1981. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MILITARY PROGRAMS HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL TO IMPROVE OUR OVERALL CAPABILITIES, BUT OUR HARD TARGETS REMAIN AS VULNERABLE AS BEFORE TO SOVIET BALLISTIC THREATS -- AND IT IS SIMPLY NAIVE TO EXPECT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THIS ADVANTAGE.

NOR CAN WE ASSUME THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL SUCCEED

BECAUSE WE HAVE POTENTIAL BARGAINING CHIPS IN THE FORM OF SYSTEMS YET TO BE FULLY RESEARCHED, MUCH LESS DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED. THE BARGAINING CHIP PHILOSOPHY OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION IS DEEPLY FLAWED ON TWO VITAL COUNTS.

FIRST, COMMON SENSE AND THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL INDICATE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT YIELD EXISTING ADVANTAGES IN THE FACE OF LESS THAN CREDIBLE "POTENTIAL" WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SECOND, DETERRENCE DEPENDS ULTIMATELY ON HARD ASSETS AND REAL CAPABILITIES. TODAY AS IN 1981, DETERRENCE REMAINS THREATENED BY OUR INABILITY TO MATCH THE RUSSIANS' HEAVY BALLISTIC MISSILES -- AND THE CONTROVERSIAL MX MISSILE REMAINS THE ONLY REALISTIC NEAR-TERM OPTION TO REDRESS THAT WEAKNESS.

THE BARGAINING CHIP PHILOSOPHY HAS BROUGHT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE NOTHING BUT AGONY DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS OF TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS SUCH MODERN FORCES TO COUNTER THE SOVIET UNION'S FORCES -- NOT JUST ITS SS-20'S BUT OTHER MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT -- AND NO AGREEMENT WITHIN REALISTIC REACH CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR SUCH A BALANCE.

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE "STAR WARS" INITIATIVE PLAY IN ALL OF THIS? THIS INITIATIVE, POORLY TIMED AND ILL-DEFINED, IS STILL IN THE RESEARCH STAGE -- IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS ONLY AN EXPLORATORY OPTION. IT DOES HOWEVER --

UNCLAS SECTION 22 OF 02

TOGETHER WITH THE PROSPECT OF DEVELOPING A SMALL MOBILE MISSILE FORCE -- OFFER THE POTENTIAL TO PUT DETERRENCE ON A DIFFERENT, LESS OFFENSIVE AND MORE SECURE FOOTING. THE OPTION OUGHT TO BE PRESERVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. TO FOREGO SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES AT THIS POINT WOULD BE TO SACRIFICE A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT IMBALANCE.

WE MUST NOT SACRIFICE THE POTENTIAL OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEFENSE OR, PERHAPS EVEN WORSE, BE TEMPTED TO TRADE OUR HARD-WON BALLISTIC CAPABILITY IN EUROPE -- THE PERSHING 2'S -- TO PRESERVE OTHER AMERICAN OPTIONS.

TO AVOID THESE TRAPS, OUR NEGOTIATORS MUST CLEAR THEIR HEADS OF THE SEDUCTIONS OF "HISTORY," THE COMFORTS OF "INVINCIBLE OPTIMISM" AND THE WHISPER OF THIS OR THAT ADVISER. THEY MUST KEEP THEIR EYE ON THE BALL: A MORE STABLE DETERRENCE THROUGH REDUCTION OF THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN BALLISTIC MISSILES.

GIVEN THE IMBALANCE, OUR EXPECTATIONS MUST REMAIN MINIMAL. INDEED, WE SHOULD EXPECT LITTLE OR NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL UNTIL WE MOVE CREDIBLY TO RECTIFY OUR BALLISTIC DEFICIENCIES THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF BOTH THE MX AND THE REST OF THE PERSHING 2 MISSILES PLANNED FOR EUROPE.

THE KEY TO ACHIEVING AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT LIES NOT IN WALKS IN THE WOODS OR OTHER NEGOTIATED "TRADEOFFS" BUT RATHER IN THE RESUMPTION OF A DETERMINED AMERICAN MARCH TO COMPARABLE CAPABILITIES.

(END TEXT)

(PRECEDING FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

ITEM

BT



Washington, D.C. 20520

January 15, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Attendees at President's Meeting with Geneva Delegation


As discussed with members of your staff, the following will attend the President's Wednesday morning meeting for the Geneva delegation:

Principal Members of the Delegation

Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
Ron Lehman
Richard Burt
LGEN John T. Chain, Jr.
Richard Perle
VADM Arthur Moreau
Douglas George

Other Participants in the Geneva Meetings

Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Thomas Graham, General Counsel, ACDA
Ambassador Sol Polansky, Vice Chairman, US START Delegation
LTC John Gordon, Deputy Director, PM
Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Director for Multilateral and Security Affairs, EUR/SOV
Craig Dunkerley, Division Chief for Arms Control and Security Policy, EUR/RPM
Steven Pifer, Special Assistant to Ambassador Nitze
Louis Sell, Special Assistant to Ambassador Rowny
Michael Mobbs, OSD
MGEN Donald Aldridge, JCS
Dimitri Arensbarger, interpreter
Carolyn Smith, interpreter


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By OKS NARA, Date 10/27/02

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 2/15/84

Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED

MEETING WITH THE GENEVA DELEGATION

DATE: January 16, 1985

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 11:30-11:45 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE

To express appreciation to the Delegation members for the successful outcome at Geneva and the unity they displayed there, and to emphasize the importance of continued unity and discipline.

II. BACKGROUND

Despite press speculation on disunity among the agencies, our delegation worked together magnificently at Geneva, both in private and in their public pronouncements.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Secretary Shultz will present each Delegation member to you and make a few introductory remarks. I suggest you then express your appreciation for the contributions all members made to the successful outcome at Geneva, and for how well they worked together. Suggested talkers are at Tab B.


Prepared by:
Steven E. Steiner

Attachments

- Tab A List of Participants
- Tab B Suggested Talking Points

UNCLASSIFIED

cc: Vice President
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Mike Deaver



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List of Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Robert C. McFarlane

Delegation Members

Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Kenneth Adelman, Director of ACDA
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Admiral Arthur Moreau, JCS
General John Chain, Director, Politico-Military Affairs
(USMC)
Ambassador Jack Matlock, NSC staff
Mr. Ronald Lehman, NSC staff
Douglas George, CIA

Agencies' Supporting Staff in Geneva

Mark Palmer
Alexander Vershbow
Louis Sell
Steven Pifer
John Gordon
Thomas Graham
Craig Dunkerly
Michael Mobbs

NSC Staff

Robert Linhard
Sven Kraemer
Steven Steiner

TALKING POINTS

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- Asked for meeting so I could personally thank each of you for magnificent job in Geneva. I know each of you contributed to successful outcome of meetings. And I appreciate unity you showed in public pronouncements.

- By staying the course, we brought Soviets back to negotiating table. This is due to alliance unity on INF issue and our determination to do what we must to maintain the military balance.

- The talks ahead offer considerable promise, but none of us have any illusions that they will be easy. We have to stay firm at table with Soviets and continue our disciplined internal work on arms control. And we will also continue to pursue our broader agenda with the Soviets, pressing for progress in regional, human rights and bilateral issues.

- You all bring particular expertise to this process, and your perspectives may differ. Internally, this contributes to better decisions. But unity and discipline in our public pronouncements is vital, as you showed in Geneva.

- Keep up the good work. I am grateful to each of you.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Meeting with Geneva Delegation,
January 16, 11:30 a.m.

At Tab I for your signature is a memo to the President briefing him on the meeting with the Geneva Delegation, scheduled for the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, January 16, 11:30 to 11:45 a.m..

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President.

Approve Disapprove

§§§ { Jack Matlock, Bob Linhard, Bill Martin, Bob Sims and Sven Kraemer concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
 Tab A List of Participants
 Tab B Suggested Talking Points

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 15, 1985

FOR: RON LEHMAN
 JACK MATLOCK
 BOB LINHARD
 STEVE STEINER

FROM: KARNA SMALL

FYI -- In case you missed it -- this Wall Street Journal editorial and article about Gromyko are quite interesting -- and can help us make our case on SDI.

Gromyko vs. Gromyko

Wall St. Journal 1/15

You have to say this about last week's summit in Geneva: It has made Soviet objectives in the forthcoming arms talks crystal clear. The Soviets want to kill off America's plans to research and build Star Wars defenses against Soviet nuclear missiles. They are interested in other goals, such as limiting the offensive weapons that actually kill people, only insofar as they further this supreme objective.

Indeed, the virulence of Soviet objections to an American defense has convinced such eminentoes as Henry Kissinger, Charles Krauthammer, and Zbigniew Brzezinski that Star Wars, far from being a hopeless boondoggle, must have serious merit; else why would the Soviets object?

As a nearby excerpt from two of Mr. Gromyko's past speeches shows, however, the Soviets have not always taken the view that strategic defense is a supreme threat to world peace. Indeed, in two U.N. addresses during the Kennedy administration, Mr. Gromyko argued that allowing a defensive "cover" could be the key to successful agreements on offensive weapons, providing a cushion against the possibility of cheating by either side and leading the world away from the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine which, in a crisis, pushes both sides to contemplate a first strike.

Today, Mr. Gromyko argues that defensive weapons, many of which will be stationed in space, constitute a major stumbling block to arms control, threatening a U.S. first strike and "destabilizing" the balance of terror, indeed, initiating a new "arms race in space."

Forced to choose, we'd say Mr. Gromyko had it right in 1963. MAD is bad, and strategic defense is a step away from MAD; it will help, not hinder, arms control. The White House ought to be passing out free copies of the Gromyko speeches, for they argue eloquently that even imperfect Star Wars defenses would make the world much safer, and arms control more likely.

But the broader lesson is that the Soviets are not much interested in setting up any such framework. The Soviets are interested in saying anything that will help kill whatever system will help the U.S. the most. Mr. Gromyko's 1960s arguments for strategic defense, for example, were abandoned in 1969, when it became clear that the U.S. might actually begin to build one, beginning with Richard Nixon's Safeguard ABM system.

What truly mystifies, however, is not so much this Soviet behavior, but the fact that Soviet negotiators can shift course so radically without being laughed out of the room. What would our journalists say, by contrast, if one of our own presidents so brazenly contradicted himself?

Well, when Mr. Reagan merely mused recently that he might yield to an overwhelming congressional consensus to trim Social Security, every TV editor in the country went scurrying to the film banks for a clip of his Louisville, Ky., promise to "never" consider such a cut. Such changes in policy are considered fair game when they are made by an American politician, and rightly so. But will the same standard ever be applied to Soviet foreign ministers?

When the Soviets Liked Superpower Defenses

The remarks below are excerpted from a speech by Andrei Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 21, 1962. A related editorial appears today.

Policy-making officials in the United States . . . and other Western countries can often be heard saying that the best guarantee against a new war is the "balance of fear." Means of destruction and annihilation have become so powerful, argue the proponents of this view, that no state will run the risk of starting a nuclear war, since it will inevitably sustain a retaliatory nuclear blow. . . . And therefore, we are told, the higher the mountains of arms that are piled up, and the more destructive and murderous those arms become, the better it will be.

But to base the policy of states on a feeling of universal fear would be tantamount to keeping the world in a permanent state of feverish tension and eve-of-war hysteria. In such an atmosphere, each state would fear that the other side would lose its nerve and fire the first shot. This would be exactly like a duel of olden times when the opponents raised their pistols, aimed at each other's foreheads, and waited for the other's shot.

There is only one reliable way of preventing a new world war from breaking out, and that is to destroy the material apparatus of war. General and complete disarmament—such is the program of action which is now being advocated by no less than three-quarters of the world's coun-

tries. This program will be carried out sooner if fewer people are victims of the notion that the arms race and war are inevitable.

At the last session of the General Assembly, the Soviet government submitted a draft treaty calling for a general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. (But) suppose, the Western powers said, if in the process of disarmament and before all weapons are eliminated, someone goes and mounts an aggression. Might it not be better to preserve a certain number of nuclear rockets to deal with such an eventuality?

The proposals which the Western powers brought with them to Geneva were stuffed with all sorts of things, but the main thing was lacking—the willingness to scrap the war machines of states. These proposals are based, as before, on the desire to establish (mere) control over armaments, and not over disarmament. . . . The head of the Soviet government, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, stated in 1960 from this rostrum that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any proposals of the Western powers on control if the Western powers, for their part, would accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament. For two years now we have been waiting for a reply.

Taking into account the position of the Western powers, the Soviet government agrees that . . . during the first stage of disarmament, of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles an exception should be made for a . . . limited and agreed to number of . . . antimissile missiles and antiaircraft missiles of the "ground-air" type. . . . Means of defense would thus be retained . . . to guard against the eventuality, to which Western leaders have expressed anxiety, of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft.

With the Soviet Union and the United States retaining a limited number of rockets, the problem of confidence in the process of disarmament will turn out to be solved even under the most mistrustful approach on the part of skeptics in the West who reach the height of invention just to erect barriers in the way of disarmament.

The Soviet Union is making corresponding amendments to its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, which it is submitting for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations at its present session.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 15, 1985

FOR: BUD McFARLANE
JOHN POINDEXTER
BOB KIMMITT
PAUL THOMPSON
RON LEHMAN
JACK MATLOCK
PETER SOMMER
STEVE STEINER

FROM: KARNA SMALL

FYI



NBC MORNING NEWS SUPPLY -- JANUARY 14, 1985

NATO DEPLOYMENT - President Reagan will try to persuade the Prime Minister of Belgium to resist political pressure at home and go ahead with the deployment of cruise missiles this spring. (John Palmer)

ROBERT MCFARLANE INTERVIEWED BY BRYANT GUMBEL

Q. What aspects of the Geneva accord were of most concern to our allies?

A. I think they received the outcome from Geneva with gratification and a lot of support. They recognize that it's a first step, and it's going to be a long road. I think as we go into these things there is considerable solidarity and support from the allies. I think we will sustain this in the coming months.

Q. The Belgians have been a little hesitant on missile deployment. Will Belgian willingness to deploy those weapons serve as some kind of a litmus test for NATO solidarity?

A. Well, I believe that all of the five basing countries acknowledge the importance of keeping to the schedule for giving us the incentives that we need in Geneva for the arms control talks to succeed. I think our record in the past year in being able to go ahead with deployment has been an important factor in engaging the Soviet Union once more. I'm sure that's appreciated by the Belgian government.

Q. Are the missiles worth the change-over in government that they might force?

A. Well, I believe that all of the five basing countries acknowledge the importance of keeping to the schedule for giving us the incentives that we need in Geneva for the arms control talks to succeed. I think our record in the past year in being able to go ahead with deployment has been an important factor in engaging the Soviet Union once more. I'm sure that's appreciated by the Belgian government.

Q. Are the missiles worth the change-over in government that they might force?

A. Well, I believe it's out of place for us to speculate on that possibility. I think the governments in neighboring countries who have sustained the deployments have come away stronger and their opponents weaker.

Q. Mr. Gromyko said over the weekend that the talks would be blown up if the US began testing anti-satellite weapons. Did he make that clear in Geneva?

A. The short answer is "no." I think this is the kind of thing you can expect to see in the run up to formal negotiations. If you want to get rid of offensive nuclear weapons -- and that's the agreed position of both sides -- it doesn't make a lot of sense to talk about banning the very kinds of systems that make possible getting rid of offensive ones. To do that is like saying why don't we ban the cure for cancer.

Q. Will we go ahead with plans to test this weaponry in March.

A. Yes, we will. Bear it in mind that the Soviets have had their strategic defense program for many, many years and now they are suddenly saying that it's time to ban the US program which is only beginning. It is like saying what's Soviet is Soviet and what's US is negotiable.

Q. A final note. Yesterday, we had Secretary Weinberger saying one thing on one network and Secretary Shultz saying another thing on another network. At what point does it become necessary for the President to clear up a long dispute within his administration?

A. Bryant, I really don't think that there is a dispute. I believe that the position which is common to both Secretaries is this: The President and all of us acknowledge that it is important, indeed vital, that we do discuss how defensive systems can be integrated by both sides in a way that is stable over time. And that requires a considerable amount of discussion which includes what kind of systems will increase stability in the nuclear balance and what kind of pace. And there is no disagreement on that.

LEBANON - Two French military observers were killed this morning in Beirut when their car came under fire. Officials are not sure if the men were the target or simply got in the way of rival militias. (John Palmer)

CHINA-US RELATIONS - The Administration has reportedly decided to sell modern anti-submarine warfare equipment to China. The agreement is expected to be announced later this month when an assistant secretary of the Navy visits China. (John Palmer)

There could be few better illustrations of the improvement that has taken place in the relations between China and the US. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has arrived for a visit in China as guest of the government. Chinese military delegations have been visiting the US, and there are plans for

US naval ships to call at Chinese ports. General Vessey said in a speech at a banquet in his honor: Continued development of friendly relations between our two armed forces is in the interests of our two countries and is beneficial to peace and stability in this region and throughout the world. (Leonard Pratt)

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WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

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McFarlane		
Poindexter		
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Thompson		
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C : Copy

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