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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 6/17/2005

File Folder MEETINGS WITH DOBRYNIN (1983-85)

FOIA

2001-061

Box Number 58

ZUBOK

5801

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15653	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO SHULTZ RE DOBRYNIN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN A MEETING [1 - 1]	1	1/18/1983	B1
15655	CABLE	310936Z JUL 84 [2 - 4]	3	7/31/1984	B1
15656	CABLE	261414Z JUL 84 [5 - 5]	1	7/26/1984	B1
15658	CABLE	280510Z JUL 84 [7 - 8]	2	7/28/1984	B1
15659	CABLE	281105Z JUL 84 [9 - 9]	1	7/28/1984	B1
15661	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MY MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN [23 - 25]	3	4/19/1985	B1
15663	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MY MEETING TODAY WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN [26 - 27]	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

INFO EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 222680

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR, US
SUBJECT: U. S. /SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

1. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS TEXT OF STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 27. IT SUPPLEMENTS PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT. POSTS MAY DRAW ON IT AS NECESSARY, BUT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND IT IN DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS FOR VIENNA MEETING.

2. BEGIN TEXT.
THIS MORNING'S TASS STATEMENT MISREPRESENTS OUR POSITION, WHICH IS THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA IN SEPTEMBER WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. OUR PREPARATIONS ARE CONTINUING VIGOROUSLY, AND WE EXPECT TO BE IN VIENNA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE, AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO DEAL WITH THIS SUBJECT IN PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

THE U. S. FINDS IT VERY DISTURBING THAT THE SOVIETS PORTRAY THE U. S. AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, WHEN THE WORLD KNOWS THE SOVIETS WALKED OUT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS. ALREADY EXISTING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS DESERVE OUR MOST URGENT ATTENTION. IF THE SOVIETS

DO NOT CHOOSE TO LISTEN TO OUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, THEY NEED NOT, BUT, FOR US, AND FOR MANKIND, THIS SUBJECT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO IGNORE. THIS U. S. APPROACH DOES NOT REPRESENT A PRECONDITION. WE WILL TAKE WHATEVER THE SOVIETS SAY ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS SERIOUSLY AND RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY. WE SIMPLY POINT OUT THAT WE WISH TO RESTORE EXCHANGES ON THE SUBJECT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS. THE WORLD HAS A RIGHT TO EXPECT THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

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EUR/SOV/SOBI:JJBORIS
07/27/84 EXT. 28720 1348DBJ
EUR:RBURT

EUR/SOV:JFSCHUMAKER
EUR:MPALMER
PA:AROMBERG
L/CA:RHENDERSON

EUR/SOV:TWSIMONS
CA/VO:DMORRIS
CA:EROWELL

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, LENINGRAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS:
BACKGROUND AND PRESS GUIDANCE.

1. AFTER CRT NOTES ARE INITIALLED AND EXCHANGED, WE ASSUME EMBASSY WILL ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO THE PRESS IN MOSCOW. WE WILL FOLLOW UP HERE AT MONDAY'S NOON PRESS BRIEFING. FOLLOWING ARE OUR SUGGESTED ANNOUNCEMENT AND Q & A'S. EMBASSY SHOULD NOTIFY US OF ANY MODIFICATIONS BY 00B 7/28.

(2. BEGIN ANNOUNCEMENT. ON JULY 30, 1984, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND THE CONSULAR DIVISION OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXCHANGED DIPLOMATIC NOTES CONCLUDING THE LATEST ROUND OF THE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS {CRT}. THE AGREEMENT BRINGS TO FRUITION A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS ON CONSULAR MATTERS CONDUCTED IN 1976, 1979, 1983, AND 1984, AND RESOLVES A NUMBER OF ISSUES RELATING TO VISAS AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. THE ISSUES INVOLVED WERE ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL ONES, TO BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

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| 2

THE AGREEMENT WILL FACILITATE THE TRAVEL OF PARTICIPANTS IN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, EXPEDITE THE ISSUANCE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF VISAS, AND IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR THE TRAVEL OF DIPLOMATS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY ALLOWING THEM TO ENTER AND LEAVE THROUGH TWO ADDITIONAL CITIES BEYOND THE THREE CURRENTLY PROVIDED FOR. THE TALKS WERE PROPOSED BY US AS PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORT TO EXPAND CONTACTS AND TO MOVE FORWARD ON BILATERAL ISSUES THAT CAN BE RESOLVED TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT, AS HE MENTIONED IN HIS JUNE 27 REMARKS ON US-SOVIET EXCHANGES, AND IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPROACHED THEM IN THE SAME SPIRIT.

4. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS LED BY RAYMOND F. SMITH, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS SECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY IVAN GOROKHOV, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CONSULAR ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.)

(5. BEGIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

Q: WOULD THE ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERIZE THIS AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD WITH THE SOVIETS?

A: NO. BUT THIS IS ANOTHER MODEST, USEFUL STEP THAT ILLUSTRATES THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO THEIR MUTUAL INTEREST.

B. Q: WHAT ARE THE PRECISE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT?

A. THE AGREEMENT FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON VISA QUESTIONS. IT BROADENS THE CATEGORIES OF RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ELIGIBLE FOR DIPLOMATIC VISAS {SUCH VISAS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONFER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES}. IT STREAMLINES THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO DIPLOMATS ON TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT, TO DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS, TO DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEES OF DIPLOMATS, AND TO PERSONNEL OF TRADE ORGANIZATIONS. IT ALSO DEALS WITH THE MAXIMUM VALIDITY OF VISAS FOR PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN OFFICIAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, AND SIMPLIFIES THE PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIALLY-SPONSORED REQUESTS FOR CHANGES OF VISA STATUS. FINALLY, IT INCREASES THE NUMBER OF ENTRY-EXIT POINTS AVAILABLE TO U.S. AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS, ADDING BREST {ON THE POLISH BORDER} AND NAKHODKA {IN THE FAR EAST} FOR U.S.

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| 3

DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE USSR AND BALTIMORE AND SAN FRANCISCO FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE U.S.

7. Q: WHAT ARE THE CURRENT ENTRY-EXIT POINTS?

A: MOSCOW, LENINGRAD AND VYBORG ON THE FINNISH-SOVIET BORDER FOR OUR PEOPLE THERE, WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND ROUSE'S POINT, NEW YORK ON THE US-CANADIAN BORDER FOR THEIR DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED HERE.

8. Q: WHY WAS THE CONSULAR AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW? AND AT A COMPARATIVELY LOW LEVEL?

A: THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS TO THE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS {CRT} HAVE MET ALTERNATELY IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. THE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED IN THE CITY IN WHICH THE DISCUSSIONS MOST RECENTLY TOOK PLACE, IN THIS CASE MOSCOW. THE LEVEL AND FORM OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WAS APPROPRIATE TO THE TECHNICAL SUBJECT MATTER.

9. Q: YOU SAY THE CRT DISCUSSIONS FIRST TOOK PLACE AS EARLY AS 1976. WHY DID IT TAKE EIGHT YEARS TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT?

A: THERE ARE SOME ISSUES THAT TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE BECAUSE OF THEIR TECHNICAL NATURE. AT TIMES IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FORWARD. AT OTHER TIMES, WE WANTED TO EXAMINE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW SUGGESTIONS.

10. Q: HOW DOES THIS CONSULAR AGREEMENT BENEFIT THE AVERAGE PERSON? IT SEEMS TO APPLY ONLY TO DIPLOMATS.

A: THE AGREEMENT WILL AFFECT NOT ONLY DIPLOMATS, BUT ALSO PARTICIPANTS IN OFFICIAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, CERTAIN BUSINESSMEN, AMERICANS WHO ARE ENGAGED AS HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEES BY U.S. DIPLOMATS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND SENIOR U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

11. Q: DOES THIS AGREEMENT BENEFIT THE SOVIETS MORE THAN IT DOES US?

A: OF COURSE NOT. CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL ISSUES DEALT WITH IN THE CRT MAY BE OF MORE CONCERN TO ONE SIDE THAN TO ANOTHER, BUT THE OVERALL PACKAGE OF ISSUES COVERED BY THE NOTES REPRESENTS A BALANCED PACKAGE THAT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST.

12. Q: HOW DOES THE CRT AGREEMENT TIE INTO THE ISSUE OF

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14

CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK?

A: IT DOES NOT; THAT ISSUE IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE THE ISSUE OF NEW CONSULATES, AND AS WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET POSITION THERE ARE NO BASIC OBSTACLES TO MOVING FORWARD.

13. Q: IS THERE ANY RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT AS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 27?

A: THE ONLY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES IS THAT THE CRT PROVIDES FOR EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF VISAS FOR EXCHANGEES UNDER OFFICIAL PROGRAMS. OTHERWISE, THE CRT AND THE NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT -- NEGOTIATION OF WHICH SHOULD BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- ARE TWO SEPARATE ISSUES.

14. Q: WILL THE AGREEMENT INCREASE THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES?

A: NO. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITS IN EFFECT FOR PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL. THE AGREEMENT DOES STREAMLINE THE PROCESS OF ISSUING VISAS TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF THOSE DIPLOMATS, JUST AS IT FACILITATES THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO CERTAIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE USSR.

15. Q. WILL THE ADDITION OF BALTIMORE AND SAN FRANCISCO AS NEW ENTRY-EXIT POINTS FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS AFFECT THE SYSTEM OF OPEN AND CLOSED AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES?

A: NO. THE AGREEMENT NEITHER OPENS NOR CLOSES ANY NEW AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION. ONLY TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN OPEN PORTIONS OF THOSE ENTRY-EXIT POINTS MAY BE UTILIZED BY THE DIPLOMATS OF THE SENDING STATE, UNLESS AN EXCEPTION FOR TRAVEL IN A CLOSED AREA IS REQUESTED AND APPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, ACCESS TO TWO NEW ENTRY-EXIT POINTS WILL IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONING OF U.S. AND SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS BY PROVIDING THOSE MISSIONS WITH GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE ROUTING OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IN AND OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

END PRESS GUIDANCE

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



14
MATLOCK

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Unclass PAGES 1
 FROM Bob Kimmitt 456 2224 WH / WW
 (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Press Guidance

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>State</u>	<u>C. Hill</u>		

REMARKS: This guidance was approved by Bud McFarlane
on board AF-1.

5799

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GUIDANCE FOR STATE PRESS SPOKESMAN

Q: This morning, Saturday in Moscow, the Soviets have repeated their charges that the U. S. position makes it impossible to go to Vienna. Yesterday there were reports that the U. S. was preparing a new message to the Soviet's response to the latest message. Have you sent a new message? Is the Soviet statement this morning a response?

A: We do not comment on content of messages in diplomatic channels, but our position is clear. As White House Press Spokesman Speakes said yesterday, we have accepted the Soviet proposal, we are serious about substantive talks in Vienna, we are prepared to go there and talk about outer space, including ASAT weapons, and we have no preconditions. We believe that US-Soviet exchanges on this subject should return to confidential diplomatic channels.

New Q: What are the prospects that a meeting will take place, now that the Soviets have said that the U. S. position makes them impossible?

New A: We do not believe that the Vienna talks are "impossible," if the Soviets are seriously interested in negotiation.

IF PRESSED MAY ADD:

Today in Moscow our Embassy delivered a U. S. response to the most recent Soviet message. Given the timing, it is clear that the Soviet public statements this morning do not take into account our latest message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING
10

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE//SI 6121 DTG: 281608Z JUL 84 PSN: 058331
SIT462 AN009319 TOR: 210/1542Z

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OP IMMED
DE WTE #6121 2101542
O 281608Z JUL 84
FM THE WHITE HOUSE//SITUATION ROOM

TO AF-1//THOMAS SHULL

*Bud cleared as
marked up.
Please get to state
Matthews.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WH06121

SITUATION ROOM

THOMAS SHULL

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THOMAS SHULL FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE.

BUD,

REQUEST CLEARANCE ON THIS PRESS GUIDANCE AS MODIFIED. GEORGE HAD
CLEARED THE STATE VERSION SO YOU MIGHT WANT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM.

[DRAFT] GUIDANCE FOR STATE PRESS SPOKESMAN

Q. THIS MORNING, SATURDAY IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATED
THEIR CHARGES THAT THE U.S. POSITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GO TO
VIENNA. YESTERDAY THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARING A
NEW MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS RESPONSE TO THE LATEST MESSAGE. HAVE
YOUR SENT A NEW MESSAGE> IS THE SOVIET STATEMENT THIS MORNING A
RESPONSE>

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 10/26/02

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OUTGO
17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE//SI 6121 DTG: 281608Z JUL 84 PSN: 058331

A. TODAY IN MOSCOW OUR EMBASSY DELIVERED A U.S. RESPONSE TO THE MOST RECENT SOVIET MESSAGE. GIVEN THE TIMING, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS THIS MORNING DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR LATEST MESSAGE. ~~WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE VIENNA TALKS ARE "IMPOSSIBLE," IF THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION, AND WE ARE CONTINUING TO DEAL WITH THIS SUBJECT IN PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. (JACK AND I RECOMMEND THIS ANSWER BE DELETED AND JUST CONTINUE TO NEXT ANSWER BELOW AS MODIFIED.)~~

~~Q. WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE NEW U.S. MESSAGE (DELETE)~~

content of
A. WE DO NOT ~~(WANT TO)~~ COMMENT ~~(ADD)~~ ON ^{content of} MESSAGES IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, ~~(ON IT,)~~ BUT OUR POSITION IS CLEAR. AS WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN SPEAKES SAID YESTERDAY, WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE TALKS IN VIENNA, WE ARE PREPARED TO GO THERE AND TALK ABOUT OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING ASAT WEAPONS, AND WE HAVE NO PRECONDITIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD RETURN TO CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

NEW Q. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS THAT A MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE, NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION MAKES THEM IMPOSSIBLE>

NEW A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE VIENNA TALKS ARE "IMPOSSIBLE," IF THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION.

END.

0373

If pressed may add:

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National Security Council
The White House

System #

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Package #

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room	<u>2A</u>	<u>BT</u>	<u>LOX</u>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

done
send draft (1) LOX ASAP to State -- do not
that is marked up.
(2) CC Matlock
Sims
Small
A. Lehman

9/20/84 Secret to
Historians, Pan-Am
Meyers
19
DRAFT Sims

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

EXCERPT FROM
INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY CONSERVATIVE DIGEST

July 27, 1984

The Oval Office

1:21 P.M. EDT

I'd like to ask two questions on foreign policy. We've really had sort of a hot war of words, which the Soviet Union has been waging against us, you, the U.S. In view of that, what kind of relations do you expect us to forge with the Soviets in the next two to four years?

THE PRESIDENT: I continue to be optimistic. And I think all of this talk about the great strain because of what we've said and so forth, I think that it has been useful, after all the years of attempted detente, to let the Soviet Union know that we're realistic about them, that we understand them. And I think it will make them not less, but more willing to sit down with us than they were in all those years when their subversive practices were pretty well hidden and the

American people didn't seem to understand when we were attempting unilateral disarmament and so forth. I think once they know that we're being realistic about them, they'll be willing to talk.

Q September 1st is the first anniversary of the shooting down of the civilian airliner, KAL 007, what are your thoughts on this occasion?

THE PRESIDENT: It was such a needless tragedy. But it certainly served to make a great many people in the world aware of the nature of the problem. First, they did try to deny it and then to pretend that it was a spy plane or military or something of the kind. And then, finally, when they came right out with the admission it was because it violated their air space and they'd do it again

if someone else violated their airspace. I think people realized something; it was not only for human rights, but for the sanctity of human life. And I hope that maybe they learned something from the reaction of the world to this deed.

DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR STATE PRESS SPOKESMAN

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Q This morning, Saturday in Moscow, the Soviets have repeated their charges that the US position makes it impossible to go to Vienna. Yesterday there were reports that the US was preparing a new message to the Soviets response to the latest message. Have you sent a new message? Is the Soviet statement this morning a response?

A. Today in Moscow our Embassy delivered a US response to the most recent Soviet message. Given the timing, it is clear that the Soviet public statements this morning do not take into account our latest message. We do not believe that the Vienna talks are "impossible," if the Soviets are seriously interested in negotiation, and we are continuing to deal with this subject in private diplomatic channels.

Q. What is the content of the new US message?

A. We do not ~~want to comment on it~~ *on messages in diplomatic channels,* but our position is clear. As White House Press Spokesman Speakes said yesterday, we have accepted the Soviet proposal, we are serious about substantive talks in Vienna, we are prepared to go there and talk about outer space, including ASAT weapons, and we have no preconditions. We believe that US-Soviet exchanges on this subject should return to confidential diplomatic channels.

INSPECTED BY.	APPLETON
POST-	B4-A
DATE/TIME	7-26-84
DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	1742

~~EYES ONLY~~ DIRECT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

matlock

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CAS 10/22/02

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TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 19 APR 85

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 10/22/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: SEC SHULTZ MTG W/DOBRYNIN 18 APRIL

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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	PTT			

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