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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 6/17/2005

File Folder USSR: SEPTEMBER MEETING PRES/GROMYKO
MEETING SEPTEMBER 1984 (2)

FOIA

2001-061

Box Number 58

ZUBOK

5807

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15783	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO: BACKGROUND MATERIAL [1 - 1]	1	9/14/1984	B1
15798	MEMO	ANDREI GROMYKO: THE CONSUMATE SOVIET DIPLOMAT [3 - 7]	5	9/14/1984	B1
15784	MEMO	WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GROMYKO [8 - 12]	5	9/14/1984	B1
15803	REPORT	USSR [13 - 17]	5	9/13/1984	
15785	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO SIMPSON RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO [18 - 18]	1	9/14/1984	B1
15786	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO [19 - 19]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15799	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO [20 - 20]	1	9/12/1984	B1
15787	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO: ATTENDANCE [23 - 23]	2	9/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15789	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO: BACKGROUND MATERIAL [25 - 25]	1	9/15/1984	B1
15801	MEMO	ANDREI GROMYKO: THE CONSUMATE SOVIET DIPLOMAT (SAME TEXT AS DOC #15798) [26 - 30]	5	9/14/1984	B1
15790	MEMO	WHAT TO EXPECT FROM GROMYKO (SAME TEXT AS DOC #15784) [31 - 35]	5	9/14/1984	B1
15792	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO: BACKGROUND MATERIAL (SAME TEXT AS DOC #15783) [36 - 36]	1	9/14/1984	B1
15802	REPORT	DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT CONTINGENT UPON SOVIET PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE LATEST US PROPOSAL [37 - 37]	1	ND	B1
15793	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE YOUR BREAKFAST MEETING, SEPTEMBER 19, 1984 [38 - 38]	1	9/18/1984	

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
15794	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO MCFARLANE RE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE PRESIDENT'S UN SPEECH AND IN HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO [39 - 41]	3	9/14/1984	B1
15796	MEMO	STEARMAN TO MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE GROMYKO ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL [42 - 43]	2	9/18/1984	B1
15797	MEMO	KIMMITT TO RYAN RE LUNCHEON TO REVIEW STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS [47 - 48]	2	9/18/1984	B1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2
SYSTEM II
90977

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Gromyko: Background Material

As you begin thinking about your meeting with Gromyko, the two papers attached may be useful as general background. The first describes Gromyko as a person and negotiator and the second reviews the issues which Gromyko is most likely to have on his mind.

Attachments:

Tab A "Andrei Gromyko: The Consummate Soviet Diplomat"
Tab B "What to Expect from Gromyko"

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 10/22/02

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6857

VIA LDX

Sept 27 1984

Wallack

September 14, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Radio Address
on U.S.-Soviet Relations (C)

The President is planning to deliver a radio address on U.S.-Soviet relations on September 29. We recognize that changes may be required in the wake of the Gromyko meetings, but would appreciate receiving an initial draft no later than c.o.b. Tuesday, September 18. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By *CS* NARA, Date *10/22/02*

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

UNCLASSIFIED
with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

September 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Radio Address
for September 29, 1984

You have requested a draft radio address on the subject of U.S.-Soviet relations for use by the President on Saturday, September 29. It seems to me most appropriate to task State with the preparation of the initial draft.

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Charles Hill asking him to prepare a draft by Tuesday, September 18.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to Mr. Hill at Tab I.

Approve K Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Hill

Tab A Request for Draft

UNCLASSIFIED
with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

AS
3/22/85

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT ^{Bob}

SUBJECT: Radio Address -- September 29, 1984

Please prepare by c.o.b. Thursday, September 20, a draft radio address for use on Saturday, September 29. The theme of the address is "US-Soviet Relations." I recognize that changes may be required in the wake of the Gromyko meetings, but we want to ensure that Speechwriters receive an agreed framework for the address as early as possible.

Once reviewed by Bud, we will send the draft to Speechwriters and concerned agencies. You may, however, begin informal coordination with these entities immediately. (If you believe we should task State for a draft, please give me a Kimmitt to Hill ASAP.) Thanks.

cc: Don Fortier
Karna Small
Bob Sims
Steve Steiner
Bill Martin
John Lenczowski

CHERNENKO REMARKS

PRAVDA September 2, 1984

Question: Washington continues to proclaim its readiness to hold talks on space with the USSR. In your opinion, what are the actual prospects for the holding of talks on preventing the militarization of space?

Answer: Washington is not averse to talking somewhat about its readiness for negotiations and even expresses itself in the spirit of sending a delegation to Vienna. However, the U.S. Administration does not really want to resolve the problem of preventing the militarization of space -- its designs are aimed at concealing its negative stance from the world public and justifying the elaboration and implementation of its plans for space weapons.

Therefore, our proposal for holding space talks has not received a positive response from the American side. In discussing the aims of the talks, it has primarily endeavored to replace the very topic of the talks. Instead of clearly agreeing to discuss the question of banning space weapons, the United States has begun to insist on the examination there [in Vienna] of questions concerning nuclear arms in general. In other words, those issues on which negotiations were under way in Geneva and which were broken off as a result of the well-known actions of the United States.

What is the Soviet Union proposing to negotiate about? About excluding the possibility of extending the arms race into space, about completely rejecting strike space means [udarnyye kosmicheskiye sredstva], including antisatellite weapons. In other words, to ensure that there will be no military threat to the earth from space or to space from the earth and from space itself. We propose as a first step, simultaneous with the start of negotiations, the imposition of a reciprocal moratorium on the testing and deployment of strike space systems.

Such an agreement would not only avert an arms race in space but, no less important, would facilitate the solution of questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments. I would especially like to stress this.

The problem of space armaments cannot be resolved by half-measures or quarter-measures [napolovinu ili na chetvert]. It is impossible to ban one type of antisatellite weapon while allowing another, or to ban only antisatellite weapons while giving the go-ahead to other types of space weapons. In both cases we have that very space arms race. The U.S. position consists of the desire to actually legalize such a race. Evidence of this is provided by official statements made by American leaders both publicly and in contacts that have taken place with us.

Thus, the American side's approach to the problem of space and, accordingly, to the goals of the negotiations is directly opposite our approach. So, what then could be the point of negotiations? Negotiations are necessary not just for the sake of negotiations, but to achieve accords which would effectively prevent a space arms race.

I hope that an understanding of the need to adopt joint measures to prevent the militarization of space will prevail within U.S. leadership circles.

Question: The desire for a resumption of Soviet-American dialogue is being expressed in the political circles of many countries. What is your attitude toward a dialogue, toward talks in the current circumstances?

Answer: As I understand it, what people have in mind is a dialogue and talks on the major political issues -- the issues on whose solution the fate of the world depends. I have already said: There is no need to convince us of the benefit of such a dialogue.

We are always in favor of serious and specific negotiations. It is from these positions that we also approach the quest for solutions to existing issues with the present U.S. Administration. Unfortunately, we have come up against another attitude toward negotiations. Take such a most pressing issue as the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments -- strategic and medium-range armaments. For more than a year Washington sought any pretexts to not negotiate at all. This time was utilized for something else -- for setting in motion extensive new military programs.

When negotiations did begin in Geneva, it became clear very quickly that the U.S. representatives had come there by no means with constructive aims, but with the intention to reach decisions that would give the United States military advantages over the Soviet Union. Of course, there is no sense in such negotiations.

Serious and fruitful negotiations are only possible when the sides' equality and identical security are strictly observed. It was Washington's rejection of this principle that led to the breaking off of the Geneva negotiations. Washington torpedoed these negotiations.

Today too the issues in need of discussion and resolution are quite sufficient. They will have to be resolved.

I wish to confirm with all certainty our readiness for dialogue, for honest and serious negotiations aimed at finding accords that take the security interests of all countries and peoples into consideration.

Such is our understanding of dialogue.

EXCERPTS FROM GORBACHEV SPEECH IN SOFIA

PRAVDA September 10, 1984

The grim reality of the matter is that the world is at a fever pitch. The threat of war is not subsiding. The practical moves by imperialist reaction, and in the first place, by those who determine the foreign policy course of the United States, are clearly orientated towards further dangerously whipping up international tension. Obsessed with the use of brute force, Washington believes that it is permissible to dictate its will to everyone, everywhere and in everything, and that this goes even as far as overthrowing legitimate governments, establishing a policy of state terrorism, and waging undeclared wars. The United States, having embarked upon the deployment of nuclear missiles in a number of Western European countries, having broken off the talks in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons and strategic arms, and having essentially rejected constructive dialogue on preventing the militarization of space, is now giving assurances that it is in favor of curtailing the arms race and is allegedly willing to seek appropriate accords with the Soviet Union. Many people in the West echo the United States', asserting that virtually the only obstacle to dialogue is the hard line and obstinacy of the Soviet Union.

What is the purpose of this? Some do this in order to continue to build up the arms race under a veil of pseudo-peaceloving rhetoric. Others do it in order to in some way justify their complicity with militant reaction. As far as our country is concerned, the position of the Soviet Union on the crucial issues of the present-day international situation has been once again set out clearly and convincingly in the replies of Comrade Chernenko to questions by the newspaper PRAVDA.

We reject and will continue to resolutely reject a dialogue from a position of strength which is being imposed upon us, and attempts at an imperialist dictate. We do not intend to engage in deceiving people or to hold talks for the sake of talks. The USSR is willing to have a dialogue, but it must be an honest and serious dialogue aimed at reaching accords that take the interests and security of all countries and peoples into consideration.

The socialist countries have sufficient goodwill and determination to hold a constructive dialogue on all major international issues, including the single greatest problem of our day, that of ending the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race. And if the West shows understanding of the fact that in our time one can only engage in dialogue with the socialist world upon an equal basis, then of course, a turn for the better in the development of international relations will take place.

The world's slipping toward a nuclear catastrophe can be halted. It is now very important to offer the most determined resistance to the warmongers, through the joint efforts of the socialist countries, of the international communist workers' movement, and of the anti-imperialist and antiwar forces of all continents. The world does not want to live according to the standards imposed upon it by U.S. imperialism, nor will it do so. What is needed is a transition to the policy of realism and common sense, to businesslike cooperation in resolving the tasks facing mankind.

John - —

For your review.
Please call me on
this ASAP.

Thanks.

-Linas
x2741

DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, September 28

The President's scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko is being followed very closely in the East European-American communities, especially by Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian-Americans. While most of these groups have not expressed opposition to the meeting and trust the President to remain true to his principles, they nonetheless, urge him to remain realistic and firm.

Specifically, the Baltic and Ukrainian-American ^{meetings} have requested that the following issues be added to the agenda:

^{permission to} 1. Political Prisoners: The President is urged to request the release of political prisoners ~~from incarceration~~, and ^{the} granting of them and their families to emigrate to the West if they wish. They urge the President to make release of political prisoners a ~~test by which to measure~~ Soviet "good faith" ⁱⁿ future U.S./-Soviet relations. ^{intentions}

Though the Baltic and Ukrainian-Americans would like to see all political prisoners released, the major organizations have identified some priority requests (many of these being in especially poor health):

Estonians: Mart Niklus, Enn Tarto, Tiit Madisson

Latvians: Lidija Lasmane-Doronina, Ints Calitis, Gederts Melngailis

Lithuanians: Viktoras Petkus, Balys Gajauskas, Vytautas Skuodis

(Note: Vytautas Skuodis is an American citizen, born in Chicago, Illinois.)

Ukrainian: Yuriy Shukhevych

The groups stress that it is important for the President to mention these people by name or to hand Mr. Gromyko a list. Even if they are not released, the fact that the President specified these individuals will guarantee ^{them} more humane treatment.

DRAFT

DRAFT

2. U.S. Non-Recognition of Soviet Annexation of Baltic States: The Baltic-American communities ask that, in his "tour d'horizon" of international issues, the President inform Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. considers the Soviet presence in the Baltic States ~~issue~~ an unresolved matter.

-final
3. Family reunification: The President should ^{express ~~strong~~ U.S. ~~concern~~ displeasure} ~~urge~~ ^{at the ~~time of his leave-taking~~} the Soviets ~~to~~ to allow family members of American citizens living in the Soviet Union who wish to emigrate to the U.S. to do so. The Lithuanian community is especially interested in the case of Mrs. Marija Jurgutis, whose husband currently lives in Los Angeles.

4. Soviet Tariffs: Many ^{Americans} ~~families~~ of Baltic and Ukrainian birth or heritage continue to send packages of clothing, medicine and other supplies to their relatives in the U.S.S.R. Recently, the Soviet government has ~~greatly~~ increased the duty which the recipients must pay on packages from the West to a prohibitive rate. The President is asked to request a reduction of tariff rates.

cc: John Lenczowski

DRAFT