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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: NORTH, OLIVER: Files

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File Folder: Falkland Islands (Malvinas) [2 of 2] Box 97 103

Date: May 14, 1997

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Charles Hill to Clark re Interagency Study on South Atlantic Contingencies (1 pp.) P, 5/9/00, NLSF96-003-1 #50	5/5/83	P1
2. report	Interagency Study on South Atlantic Contingencies (20 pp.) D, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003-1, #51	n.d.	P1
3. memo	Hill to Clark re Stanford Hill memorandum on South Atlantic Contingencies. (1 pp.) R, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003, #52	5/6/83	P1, B
4. memo	John Stanford to Hill re Final Draft, Interagency Study on South Atlantic Contingencies (2 pp.)	5/4/83	P1, P5
5. notes	handwritten notes re Falklands (2 pp.) R, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003, #53	n.d.	P1
6. cable	231703 (1 pp.) P, 5/9/00, NLSF 96-003-1, #54	7/23/82	P1
7. summary	p. 17 only re United Kingdom: Falkland Lessons (1 pp.) PART. 9/18/02 NLSF96-003 #55	7/26/82	F2 , F3
8. memo	Weinberger to the President re Military Lessons from the Falklands (4 pp. total; pp. 1 and 4 all; pp. 2 and 3, partial) P, 5/9/00, NLSF96-003-1, #56 P 11/23/05 M1426 #4	7/19/82	P1
9. memo	Robert Helm to Clark thru Richard Boverie re military lessons (2 pp.) R. 11/23/05 M1426 #2	6/21/82	P1
10. memo	Clark to Weinberger Military Lessons (1 pp.)	n.d.	P1
11. summary	pp. 7-8 only, re Argentina-UK: UK Naval Air Defense Capability (2 pp.) D. 7/18/02 NLSF96-003 #59	5/21/82	F1
12. memo	North to McFarlane re Falklands (2 pp.)	5/20/82	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: NORTH, OLIVER: Files

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: Falkland Islands (Malvinas) [2 of 2] Box ~~97~~103

Date: May 14, 1997

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. NSC checklist	re Falklands (1 pp.) <i>R, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003/1, #61</i>	5/19/82	P1
14. memo	North to Roger Fontaine re input for SIG meeting (1 pp.) <i>R 12/10/99 NLSF96-003/1 #62</i>	5/19/82	P1
15. handwritten notes	re Falklands (1 pp.) <i>R 12/10/99 NLSF96-003/1 #63</i>	n.d.	P1
16. talking paper	re Capabilities of Argentine and British Forces (3 pp.) <i>D. 7/18/82 NLSF96-003 #64</i>	4/13/82	P1 F1
17. memo	North to McFarlane re the Falklands (1 pp.)	4/6/82	P1
18. analysis	by North re Falklands (2 pp.) attachment to item #17	4/6/82	P1, P5
19. background paper	for Chairman, JCS re British options in the Falkland Islands Dispute (1 p.) <i>R, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003/1, #66</i>	n.d.	P1
20. background paper	for the Chairman, JCS re current assessment of forces in the Falkland Islands Dispute (4 pp.) <i>R, 5/8/00, NLSF96-003/1, #67</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 3/29/2007

File Folder FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) ²(1 OF 2)

FOIA

M1426

Box Number 103

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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9
~~2~~ MEMO HELM TO CLARK THRU BOVERIE RE ^{my 4 3/28/08} 2 3/9/1983
~~DOD INTERIM REPORT (M1426 #2)~~



May 5, 1983

~~SECRET~~

(With ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Interagency Study on South Atlantic Contingencies

Attached for CPPG disposition is the final report on South Atlantic Contingencies, cleared by participating agencies with the exception of Defense (OSD) which to date has not commented on this version of the report.

All comments received in the April 8 clearance round have been accepted. Changes from the previous draft are identified by underlines on pages 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the main text, and page 5 of Tab A.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Interagency Study for CPPG

cc: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
CIA - [REDACTED]
DOD - COL John Stanford
JCS - LTC Dennis Stanley

~~SECRET~~
(With ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE Attachment)
DECL: OADR

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NLS E96-003-1, #50
By dlb, NARA, Date 5/1/00

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ID 8303053

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 05 MAY 83 13

TO

CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 05 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

ARGENTINA

MILITARY POSTURE

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY STUDY ON SOUTH ATLANTIC CONTINGENCIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 09 MAY 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

FONTAINE

SAPIA-BOSCH

KRAEMER

NORTH

MYER

RUSSELL

DUR

COMMENTS

This document has been placed in the contingency file for CPMG action in the event required. No further action need be taken at this time. North

REF# 8313603

LOG

NSC/FID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Fortier S 5/7 Reclad of prepare memo for Clark same

North S 6/8 Transfer memo for Fortier 6/11

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

May 6, 1983 MAY 6 P11:05

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMSubject: Stanford-Hill Memorandum on South Atlantic
Contingencies

The attached commentary received May 5 from the Department of Defense relates to our memorandum No. 8313603 submitted to you the same day. The commentary is furnished for attachment to your copy of the interagency study.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:Stanford-Hill Memorandum of May 4, 1983
(I-22342/83)**SECRET**

DECL: OADR

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F96-003-1, #52

BY

dlb

NARA, DATE

5/9/00

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F96-003-1, # 53

dlb

5/9/00

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IDA)

- INTEL
- SAGE OPS
- DINA/GCODES
- NAVY GROUP
- NDI / NAVWAR Com.

19 MAR - 2 APR

APR 8 first SSN in (S) Atlantic

NAV-8 w/Am9L-22 Argies A/C

MAY 1 - Attack on Stanley by

- S-209 German Sub

APR 30 Total Exclusion Zone

- 90% A/C Availability throughout

- Tower has requested briefing

Attacks

Argies always thought there would be a political settlement.

Dennis

- Lord Trenchard/Commander Terry Thompson

15-17 Nov - Brit. General/Commander

14 Dec - Knott White Paper on Falklands
Told to keep warship shut

LEBANON

IAF → Marshall going

- Jack Verona - Combat Assessment Group. (5x per).
- Going for 4-6 weeks

Verona

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC// PRIORITY ZEN/USMISSION USNATO POUCH

BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS BE 04670

CITE: 427/82

FOR CHAIRMAN JCS; DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF; J-5;
USDOCOSOUTH FOR ADMIRAL CROWE; USLOSACLANT FOR ADMIRAL
TRAIN; USNMR FOR GENERAL ROGERS AND GENERAL LAWSON;
USCINCEUR FOR GENERAL SMITH; DIA FOR DI-2

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: MILITARY COMMITTEE MEETING, 22 JULY 1982 (U)

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE COVERS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY, 22 JULY 1982. CHIEF, FRENCH
MILITARY MISSION WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT.

2. PART I, ITEM 1, BRIEFING ON CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BY
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, IMS. TEXT OF BRIEFING PASSED TO
MODS VIA NATO SITCEN MESSAGE.

-- BE REP (DEDEURWAERDER) INQUIRED AS TO THE SIZE,
STRENGTH AND TYPE OF ISRAELI FORCES SURROUNDING BEIRUT.
BRIEFER AGREED TO PROVIDE THIS DATA, AS WELL AS DATA ON
THE OPPOSING PLO FORCES, AT THE NEXT MEETING.

-- CMC (FALLS) ASKED IF FURTHER CONFRONTATIONS HAD
OCCURRED IN THE BEKKA VALLEY, AND IF THE SYRIANS WERE IN
A POSITION TO ENGAGE ISRAELI FORCES. BRIEFER ADVISED
THAT SYRIAN FORCES WERE CAPABLE OF SMALL SCALE ENGAGE-
MENTS, BUT THAT ANY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST THE ISRAELIS
WOULD ONLY BE TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON THE PLO FORCES
IN BEIRUT.

3. (S) ITEM 2, BRIEFING ON THE CONFLICT IN THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS. UK ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF
(POLICY) AIR VICE MARSHALL GILBERT BRIEFED. A COPY OF
THE BRIEFING WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH
THE BRIEFING WAS SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN TO THE MAC BY
SIR FRANK COOPER AS REPORTED IN USNATO 4642, DTG 221752Z
JUL 82. QUESTIONS BY VARIOUS MILREPS ELICITED THE
FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FINAL DISTR BY AGENCY PER MR GOOD OCJCS/23 JUL 82/RAD

ACTION USMCLO(1) DIA/SPEC(8) J5(2) SECDEF:(*) (M)
INFO CJCS(4) DJS:(*) SECDEF(9) USDP(15)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 39

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PLS F96-003-01, # 54

By dlb NARA Date 204/03010 OR=82204/1706Z

5/9/00

-- AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING PROVED TO BE A CRITICAL REQUIRE-
MENT, AND VARIOUS AIRCRAFT WERE MODIFIED TO PERMIT THIS
ACTIVITY. C130 HERCULES (3) WERE CONVERTED INTO DE FACTO
TANKERS.

-- THE UK HAD INSUFFICIENT FORCES, AS WELL AS
INSUFFICIENT SURVEILLANCE, TO COMPLETELY CLOSE THE
EXCLUSION ZONE, PERMITTING LIMITED RESUPPLY OF
ARGENTINE FORCES.

-- APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF OF THE ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT LOST
WERE DESTROYED BY VARIOUS GROUND SYSTEMS, WHILE THE
REMAINDER, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE PLANE POSSIBLY
DESTROYED BY CANNON, WERE DOWNED WITH THE AIM 9LCS

-- THE 66 AND 81 MM ANTI-TANK WEAPONS WERE VERY USEFUL
AGAINST POINT TARGETS. MORE ORGANIC MACHINE GUNS
WERE REQUIRED.

-- THE BLOW PIPE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS "NOT COMPLETELY
SUCCESSFUL." RAPIER PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE BUT EXTENSIVE
TIME WAS REQUIRED TO PREPARE THE SYSTEM FOR COMBAT AFTER
MOVEMENT.

-- BRIEFERS STATED THAT MORE INFORMATION WOULD BE
PROVIDED AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS. THE MC EXPRESSED BOTH
PLEASURE AND SATISFACTION WITH THE BRIEFING.

-- THE TASK FORCE WAS GRANTED, THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, ALL REQUESTED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
EXCEPT FOR ONE (UNSPECIFIED). TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S
INSTRUCTIONS WERE RELATIVELY BROAD, I.E. RETAKE THE
FALKLANDS.

-- PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES
INDICATED THE HIGH VALUE OF NIGHT FIGHTING AND MOVEMENT,
TAKING ADVANTAGE ALSO OF INCLEMENT WEATHER TO MASK
OPERATIONS. "YOU CAN NEVER HAVE ENOUGH HELICOPTERS"
WAS STATED WITH UTTER CONVICTION. NAVAL GUNFIRE,
IN COMBINATION WITH AIR AND GROUND ORDNANCE, WAS EXTREMELY
EFFECTIVE DUE TO CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN ALL ELEMENTS.

BT.

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4A 4D

Q. A. McLawton
T/CHIEF SIGNATURE

25 JUL 1982

TAC=82204/1718Z CDSN=MAJ205

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UNITED KINGDOM: Falklands Lessons. (U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ British representatives on 20 July briefed NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the Falklands campaign and the preliminary lessons learned.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The British stressed the conclusions were preliminary and more complete judgments would be available this fall. This briefing most likely was offered to reassure the Allies that no significant effects on UK NATO commitments are foreseen.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The principal "lessons learned" were the need for attention to training, fitness, and morale and, most important, the need for deterrence. Concerning the first point, the evaluation may result in some changes in the Ministry of Defense's Training Command. This possibility is supported by the report that some of the soldiers, particularly the Welsh Guards, fought poorly because of a lack of tactical training and bad physical conditioning. Regarding the other lesson, reviewers noted that adequate in-place forces and the ability to convince a potential foe that aggression will be resisted are essential elements in assuring that deterrence works.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Britain's final judgments on the lessons of the Falklands crisis should not be drastically different from the ones briefed to the NAC. But London's ability to protect its South Atlantic interests without hampering its Alliance obligations is less certain. As long as current funding arrangements continue -- payment of garrison costs outside the defense budget -- the effect on NATO should be minimal. This arrangement is controversial, however, and Treasury officials will continue to oppose it.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Additionally, the Falklands operation has reopened the debate on the 1981 reduction of the Navy's budget. The government has already been forced to make some concessions to the Navy as a result of the Falklands, and an increase in funds for it without a rise in the military budget would be at the expense of the other services. Consequently it would have an impact on NATO. The cost of the Falklands garrison will become increasingly difficult to justify within Prime Minister Thatcher's economic recovery program. Parliament will be forced ultimately to make difficult decisions that balance Alliance obligations with the protection of its South Atlantic interests. (Revw 23 Jul 12)

DIADIN 204-12A as of 2130 EDT 23 Jul 82

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By 121, NARA, Date 7/18/02

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478



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

82 JUL 23 AM 11:41

19 JUL 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Lessons from the Falklands (U)

(✓) As reported to you in my activity report of 4 June 1982, we have begun to study the issues and implications of the battle in the Falklands. A long-term study effort has been established along the lines of our analysis of the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. While an interim report is expected in mid-September, some very early observations are now possible.

(TS) The first conclusion evident from the experience in the Falklands is the danger of attempting to draw conclusions too quickly. The widely-mentioned "lesson learned" concerning vulnerability of ships with aluminum superstructures, which followed the sinking of HMS SHEFFIELD, is a case in point. In the rush to draw conclusions, many supposedly knowledgeable people assumed that the SHEFFIELD had an aluminum superstructure.



(✓) We intend to proceed carefully in arriving at lessons learned and using them in briefings or other communications. I have established the appropriate mechanisms in DOD to achieve these objectives.

(S) The progress of our study effort will depend on the pace with which the British and Argentines go about collecting, organizing, and analyzing pertinent data and reports from those that participated in the conflict. The British are well along in organizing their lessons learned effort which will be a centrally controlled, integrated MOD study. We can expect that the British will be helpful in conveying to us what they are learning.

(U) There appears to be consensus on the following preliminary lessons:

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Review on 18 Jul 88

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BY dlp
Date 5/9/00

COPY 1 OF 5 COPIES.

Sec Def Cont Nr. X20765

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2

(S) -- Flexible and skilled forces capable of multiple tasks can be decisive. Although the British had inadequate or no contingency plans for such an effort, they did extremely well in developing ad hoc plans, devising appropriate operations and tactics, and carrying out their objectives. They were able to load depot stocks aboard 58 civilian ships by the end of May using requisition, charter, and conversion where necessary. Furthermore, the first elements of the Task Force sailed in five days, two days less than the British thought necessary for a contingency in Europe.

(U) -- The usefulness of naval forces has been reconfirmed in dealing with contingencies like the Falkland's conflict. British actions demonstrated the need to be able to project naval power to remote geographic areas and to engage in amphibious operations, for which British operational concepts and tactics proved very successful, especially in the assault and ground actions.

(S) -- The importance of gaining and maintaining air superiority in maritime/amphibious operations was also reconfirmed. The British used small carriers capable of deploying limited numbers of Sea Harrier aircraft, but lacking any bases close enough to the action to be usable, the small carriers provided only a small volume of air offense and defense. In fact it was the lack of long-range air defense warning systems, and air attack systems, that made this such a close-run thing. One of the first lessons seems to be the inestimable value of large carriers, with their air defense provided by ships of the carrier groups, in such situations. If the British had not been lucky in several instances when Argentine MK-82 bombs struck six ships and did not explode, the outcome would have been much worse. We do not currently know the reasons for these Argentine failures, but we are looking into the following possibilities:

- o fuzes may have been defective
- o Argentine pilots may have delivered the bombs at too low an altitude

(S) -- The ability to improvise in the midst of conflict resulted in many unplanned successes. Britain modified quickly a large number of commercial ships for use as mine-sweepers, troop carriers, aircraft transporters, hospital ships and other purposes. The Argentines managed to improvise the mating of the EXOCET missile to the delivery aircraft, without prior training, and after the French technicians had left. And they also appear to have launched the land version of this missile under much the same handicaps.

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3

[REDACTED]

British logistics capabilities were severely stressed by the long distances involved, and their stocks of some conventional warfare materials were quite limited, especially so for the latest, higher technology items. This required [REDACTED] the use of Ascension Island.

[REDACTED]

(U) In addition to these lessons, the following observations and preliminary assessments now seem noteworthy:

(S) -- Mobile and man-portable surface-to-air U.K. missiles systems, such as Rapiere and Blowpipe, were quite effective. These systems are currently credited with downing a large number of Argentine aircraft. Realizing that about seventy percent of all free world produced anti-ship missiles have been exported to the Third World, we should not be too surprised that the Argentines also downed at least two U.K. helicopters using Blowpipes previously supplied by the British.

(S) -- The value of good training was demonstrated. The value of good leadership was even more conclusively demonstrated. The outnumbered British forces outperformed and defeated conscript Argentine ground forces in defensive positions. The British believe this high level of performance was due to the rigorous and active training their troops undergo, and the excellent leadership qualities of their officers and NCOs. By contrast, Argentine officers were widely reported, by Argentine soldiers, to have neglected the soldiers' welfare.

(S) -- The need for timely and secure communications was evident.

[REDACTED]

(S) -- The British set and conveyed clear objectives that were understood and implemented by the British military leadership. This allowed necessary authorities to be delegated, unequivocal rules of engagement to be established, and on-scene field commanders to proceed as they believed required.

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U.S. F96-003-1, #59

dlb Date 5/5/02

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4

(S) In the final analysis, the battle for the Falklands appears to have been a closer call than many would believe. The British won primarily because their forces, inferior in numbers at first, were superior in training, leadership and equipment. But luck also played a significant role. The failure of the Argentine bombs is but one example; others exist. The British prevailed and pushed to victory just in time as they were critically low on artillery rounds and other supplies (8 rounds per barrel of artillery and no helicopter fuel) when they retook Stanley.

REDACTED

RE

REDACTED

REDACTED

ACTED

REDACTED

Jap

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NLS F96-003-1, #59

By dlb, NARA, Date 5/9/00

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~~MEMORANDUM~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*
FROM: BOB HELM *W*
SUBJECT: DoD Interim Report of U.S. Lessons Learned
in the Falklands

DoD has referred the Interim Report of U.S. lessons learned in the Falklands (Tab I). It is based upon detailed information obtained from the British. The final report is scheduled for completion in the summer.

Preliminary Findings:

- Quality of leadership and manpower was the decisive factor in the British victory;
- Flexible and reliable weapons systems and logistics were major contributors to British success;
- The versatility of the British Harrier (vertical/short take-off and landing aircraft) was a critical factor;
- The lack of airborne early warning and control aircraft and adequate fighters prevented the British from keeping Argentine aircraft away from the fleet.
- Large carrier aircraft with airborne early warning and a sizeable force of high-performance fighters are essential to create an effective barrier defense against attacking aircraft.
- Battlefield reconnaissance by manned aircraft is increasingly not viable because of air defense systems. This means that other ways, such as remotely piloted vehicles, are needed for timely tactical intelligence;
- The performance of the Rapier air defense missile warrants its consideration for use by U.S. forces;

Wonder what were going for

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NLS M142642

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/23/00

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2

- ° New weapons like Exocet have put a sting back into the coastlines of third-world countries. U.S. naval forces should take account of this in future activities near hostile coasts.

Future analysis will focus on British experience with secure voice communications equipment, close-air support tactics, cost-benefits of ski-jump Harrier launching ramps on U.S. ships operating Marine Harriers, and the application of British ship damage control and point defense to U.S. ship design and operating techniques.

You had also asked DOD to assess the military lessons of the Israeli Lebanon conflict. This initiative became snared in political controversy involving U.S. willingness to negotiate an equitable information sharing arrangement with Israel. There has been a good deal of press about this issue. Secretary Weinberger has tabled an alternative draft to the lengthy and complicated memorandum of understanding drawn up by Ambassador Arens for the Lebanon Lessons Learned study. We have yet to receive an Israeli response to Cap's draft, but expect that additional consultations will be required before the exchange can begin.

Dur, Sapia-Bosch, and Blair concur.

Attachment

TAB I DOD Interim Report of U.S. Lessons Learned in
the Falklands

I'm holding if you want to see.
J

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Director's Staff Group

21 May 1982

Oliver
Memo For

DICK CHILDRESS

The attached Defense Intelligence Notice . . .
may be of use during the coming days.

cc:
Rich Levine
Roger Fontaine

Nils B. Ohman
NILS B. OHMAN
Lt Colonel, USAF
Senior Intelligence Analyst

DI-1-291/82

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

May 19, 1982

Admiral Poindexter:

Attached is for use in connection
with the SSG meeting tomorrow.

AI Adams

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Department of State
10:00 a.m., 5/19/82

NSC CHECKLIST

The NSC agenda should have two parts:

- I. How should we react to immediate questions, pressures, and results?
- II. What is our strategy for facilitating a settlement after a British assault?

PART I

A. Public Posture

- What do we say about the British landing?
- What would we say if the British strike mainland bases?

B. UN

- What should we do if the SYG puts forward a new proposal of his own aimed at delaying British action?
- How should we handle pressures for prompt UNSC meeting/action?
- What becomes of 502?

C. Congressional

- How do we head off pressures for a ceasefire resolution?
- Game plan for consultations.

D. British Requests for Increased Materiel Support

- What can we expect?
- How should we respond?

Part II - Strategies

- A. Scenario -- British success on the Islands; focus on cessation of hostilities and prevention of conditions which make eventual political resolution more difficult.
- B. Scenario -- Military stalemate; focus on whether, when, and how to take new diplomatic initiative.

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NLS

596-003-1, #61

RDS-3 5/19/02

BY dlb

NARA, DATE 5/9/00

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

May 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROGER FONTAINE

FROM: OLIVER NORTH *N*

SUBJECT: Input for SSG Meeting -- Status of Evacuation
Planning for AMCITS

- State Department Interagency Working Group, chaired by Sayers, is meeting regularly to determine options.
- Current numbers provided by Ambassador Shlaudeman are as follows:
 - 133 Official Americans
 - 57 Official Dependents
 - Approximately 6500 non sponsored AMCITS
- Current plan as approved by Working Group:
 - Postal notification messages have been prepared and are on hold.
 - Additional consular officers provided to Buenos Aires to assist.
 - Improved warden and contact system through American organizations in Argentina activated. U.S. companies, Chamber of Commerce, American Legion are cooperating.
- Additional notification measures using VOA and other media being explored.
- Problems with Montevideo as safe haven have resulted in dual designation of CONUS and Montevideo as dual safe havens.
- No military options presently being considered.

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Review on 5/19/1988

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 12/10/99

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IG/T Re Negative Situation

Probs Re Active Program:

- Ongoing Diplomatic Efforts
- Prog Activities of 601 Bn.
- Perceptions Re U.S./Brit
- Argentine Promises Re U.S. Cit - Protection

- 200 Am.
14 Departed } OFFICIAL

7042 U.S. Cit REGISTERED w/ Am.Emb.
6-8k + POSSIBLE ADDL. w/o COMM -

Ambs. HAS met w/ Am. Legion's CHAIR. of Comm.

DECIDED THAT A STRUCTURED PROGRAM UNWORKABLE
WARDEN SYSTEM UNWORKABLE

- HOW TO NOTIFY:

VOA

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

- JOHN STEINFEL - DIR STATE OPS CTR.

- SAFEGUARDING

- AIR CHARTER A/C IDENTIFIED - 12 WKS. MAX.
- ROAD NETWORK EGRESS ROUTES IDENT.
- BRAGUAY/VENEZUELA AS 3d COUNTRY ALTERNATIVE ASST.

DECLASSIFIED/Released

NLS F96-003/1 #63

BY SMF NARA, DATE 12/10/99

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Background Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: British Options in the Falkland Islands Dispute (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with information for his use.

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (~~S~~/NOFORN) The UK will continue to seek a diplomatic solution during the lengthy transit of the Royal Navy Task Force. This effort will likely continue for a while after the task force is in the area, with the latter standing off in a show of force. If some amenable compromise cannot be achieved within a reasonable time, however, London appears intent on military action. Its precise measures will be limited by the fact that, although the Royal Navy enjoys a surface force superiority, it will be severely constrained by inadequate air cover and stretched supply lines. It is 4,000 miles to the small US facility on Ascension Island, where the UK does not maintain a garrison or prestocked supplies. The Royal Air Force will probably stage some items there for resupply as the task force passes by, however the distance precludes continuous effective resupply during operations. The British are looking at the possibility of obtaining base rights closer to the Falklands, however, there is little likelihood of this. Brazil and Uruguay have already stated they would not grant such a request. Chile has remained silent. Although alarmed that a successful Argentina may next turn to the disputed Chilean territory in the Beagle Channel, Santiago is unlikely to provide logistical support to the Royal Navy. However, should the British inflict substantial damage to the Argentine fleet, Chile may become more receptive to a British request.

b. (~~S~~/NOFORN) Given a decision to take military action, the most likely British response is a blockade of the Falklands. The task force's inadequate intercept capability will be a major drawback in preventing Argentine resupply by air. In addition, logistic constraints will again be an inhibiting factor in such a war of attrition. British actions against the Falklands will likely be coupled by an attempt to retake South Georgia. This island's distance from the mainland poses great logistics problems for Argentina and gives London an opportunity to achieve a psychological victory.

c. (~~S~~/NOFORN) A third, although unlikely, option is to engage the Argentine Navy to gain control of the seas off the Argentine coast. However, land-based aircraft from Southern Argentina will give Buenos Aires air superiority which may suffice to offset the Royal Navy's surface force advantage. Only two submarines, including one nuclear-powered, are known to be in the task force. Should additional subs be dispatched to augment the force, this option would become viable.

d. (~~S~~/NOFORN) A final option is an amphibious landing, either opposed near Port Stanley or unopposed elsewhere along the coast. The Royal Marine force numbers approximately 2,500 combat troops. At least some of these are mountain and arctic qualified. However, the approach of winter weather will create additional hazards for this option if it is not exercised quickly.

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Background Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Current Assessment of Forces in the Falkland Islands Dispute (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with information for his use.

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (~~S~~/NOFORN) Argentine military capabilities:

-- The major liability of the Argentine forces is low sustainability due to the age and diversity of equipment as well as poor logistic practices.

-- Army

-- Estimated strength of 85,000 troops tactically oriented around 12 brigades.

-- Army capabilities include full range of combat arms and combat support units.

-- Normal deployment of Army orients on perceived Chilean and Brazilian threats.

-- Mobile air defenses are primarily operated by the Army and include 20-mm through 40-mm air defense guns, mobile surface-to-air missiles, and Oerlikon Skyguard acquisition and fire control systems.

-- Navy

-- Operational ship strength of 3 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, and 10 principal surface combatants.

-- Personnel strength of some 36,000 includes nearly 50 percent conscripts who have just begun their training cycle.

-- Naval capability will trail off rapidly when forces are confronted due to low sustainability.

-- Naval air defense is provided primarily by A-4 aircraft although several combatants include ADA guns and Seacat and Sea Dart SAMs.

-- Air Force

-- Strategic air limited to 10 Canberra B-6 bombers (B-57).

-- Air defense is a strength of the Air Force with 17 Mirage III's and 33-35 Mirage V's. Combat radii of these aircraft are believed to be in excess of 650 nautical miles.

-- Tactical assets are 56 A-4 Skyhawks and more than 60 indigenously produced IA-58 Pucarás. Some A-4s include the Israeli "Shafrir" air-to-air missile.

-- Two KC-130 tankers provide air-to-air refueling capabilities for A-4 aircraft.

b. (~~S~~/NOFORN) Argentine military options:

-- Defend Argentine territory, to include the Falkland Island group.

-- Attack the British task force before it moves into position off the coast of Argentina.

-- Withdraw from the Falkland Islands when the British Fleet arrives.

-- The Argentines are more likely to adopt the defend-in-place option. They will use submarines to detect and track the British fleet, respond to moves by the fleet, but ultimately defend from attack all territories with its fully mobilized armed forces.

c. (~~S~~/NOFORN) British capabilities:

-- Ascension Island

-- No POL prestocked.

-- One asphalt runway (10,000' X 150') in good condition.

-- Some communications capability.

-- May send Royal Marine Commando company.

-- Royal Marines Third Commando Brigade in British Task Force.

-- Manpower approximately 2500-3000 in three commandos-- the 40th, 42d and 45th.

-- Training Basically infantry, with emphasis on special operations.

-- 42d and 45th Commandos are both mountain and arctic warfare trained.

-- Armament is standard NATO small arms plus three heavier weapons (each commando):

- 19 81-mm mortars
- 60 51-mm mortars
- 100 84/120-mm antitank weapons
- 63 Milan antitank missiles
- 18 105-mm howitzers

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-- Each commando is a lightly equipped infantry unit, with a minimum of administrative detail, trained for cliff and assault landings and raids, or landings on difficult beaches.

-- Almost no capability for sustained combat operations since their normal deployment anticipates British Army control, heavy weapons, and administrative/logistic support. A reinforced commando is capable of limited operations for 30 days, relying solely on shipborne supply. A major logistics problem lies in second-line support for commandoes when in the field.

-- Ships capabilities:

-- Royal Navy Task Force is forming and will include the following ships, some of which deployed on 5 April.

-- Antisubmarine warfare carrier Invincible with 5 Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft, 9 Sea King helicopters and twin Sea Dart SAM.

-- Helicopter carrier Hermes normally embarks 1 commando (800 men) and can embark an additional commando in an emergency (about 1600 total); it can also carry 3213 tons fuel oil, 815 tons diesel fuel, 51 tons AVGAS, 4 LCVP, 16 Wessex assault helicopters and 4 Gazelle assault helicopters; one leg is 5,950 nm steaming at 20 knots.

-- LPD assault ship Fearless normally can carry 319 marines, an additional 700 in an emergency by putting 300 on the tank deck; can also carry 2300 tons of cargo, 4 LCM (1 Chieftain or 2 Centurion tanks in each); one leg is 7,500 nm steaming at 17 knots.

-- Sir Lancelot class logistics landing ships (LSLO each can carry 340 troops, 1000 tons palletized cargo, 120 tons POL, 1200 tons fresh water, provisions for 28 days for crew and troops and 17 tanks and trucks; one leg is 9,800 nm steaming 17 knots.

-- 5 guided missile destroyers:

-- 2 County class with 2 4.5" guns, 4 Exocet SSM, 1 twin Seaslug and 2 quad Seacat SAMs.

-- 3 Sheffield class (type 42) with 1 4.5" gun and 1 twin Sea Dart w/SS capability.

-- 13 Frigates

-- 3 Type 22 with 4 Exocet SSM and 2 6-tube Sea Wolf SAM.

-- 4 Rothesay class with 2 4.5" guns and 1 quad Seacat SAM.

-- 2 Type 21 with 1 4.5" gun, 4 Exocet SSM and 1 quad Seacat SAM.

-- 4 Leander class with SAM, 1 quad Seacat, and 1 Limbo anti-ship weapon.

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-- 1 Fort Class AOE Fort Austin capable of carrying 3500 tons of armaments/victuals.

-- 1 Hudson Class AO Appleleaf.

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