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Folder Title: 05/21/1986 S.J.R. 316
[Prohibiting the Proposed Sale of Certain Missiles to
Saudi Arabia] – Veto (3 of 3)

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(Rohrabacher)

May 15, 1986

6:00 p.m.

Received 58
1025 MAY 15 10 06 25

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: VETO OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 316

Last week, both Houses of Congress voted to halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia. Today, I am vetoing that legislation. I will not permit Congress, shortsightedly, to do great damage to our vital strategic, political, and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. And, it is not being done at anyone's expense.

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact which is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It's been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security which has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we haven't sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own

credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

It is argued that weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia might find their way into terrorist hands. This charge is without substance. The Saudis, unlike some other friends, have never allowed the unauthorized transfer of U.S. weapons. Just last month, a report to Congress by its own GAO investigators concluded that Saudi security procedures are as tight or tighter than U.S. or NATO standards.

And behind the scenes, the Saudis have aided the effort to combat terrorism, which is as much, if not more, of a threat to them as it is to us. Recently, they refused Qadhafi's requests for aid. Several times in recent months, they've been instrumental in offsetting unjust criticism of the United States and preventing radical states from undertaking joint action against our country.

The Saudis have proven their friendship and good will. They have assisted our efforts to support moderate governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. They have worked quietly in the search for peace in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Iran-Iraq war. They also provide impressive assistance to the government of Pakistan, to Afghan refugees, and to the Afghan freedom fighters themselves.

If the U.S. fails to stand by the Saudis now in a time of peril, why should anyone trust us? This precipitous move by Congress could do more to undermine our credibility than all the

rantings and ravings of Qadhafi and Khomeni. It would make us less able to act as a peacemaker in the Arab-Israeli dispute. And, over time, it will mean the loss of commercial, political, and security access to the Middle East.

The Congress is playing with fire. I cannot permit our bridges of influences in that region to be burned. The stakes are higher than many Members of Congress seem to understand.

Preventing this sale in the long run will be bad for America, bad for Israel, bad for Saudi Arabia, and bad for the cause of peace.

It is vetoed. I ask responsible members of both parties to sustain this veto and to join me in protecting our country's vital interest.

(Rohrabacher)

May 15, 1986

5:00 p.m.

Received 5:00
MAY 15 5:16 25
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: VETO OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 316

I am returning today to the Senate S.J. Res. 316 without my approval. I am vetoing this legislation because the failure to complete the proposed sale of air defense and anti-ship missiles to Saudi Arabia would damage U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Middle East. It would undermine the balanced policy the United States has followed in the area for over 30 years.

Recent Libyan efforts to incite the Arab world combined with Iranian gains in the Iran-Iraq war make this a pivotal moment in the history of the Middle East. It is imperative, therefore, that we stick by our friends and help them meet their legitimate defense needs. Who will trust us if we don't?

Saudi Arabia has enjoyed friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the United States for over 40 years. Providing Saudi Arabia the means to defend itself, its Arab Gulf neighbors, and the Persian Gulf sea lanes is vital to U.S. economic and strategic interests.

The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since. Congress cannot be permitted shortsightedly to dismantle this policy. Saudi Arabia has worked closely with the United States to ensure the free flow of oil so critical to our economic well-being and that of our European allies and Japan. Saudi Arabia, in the face of fanaticism, has been a force for security and stability in the Gulf region. Within the context of

intra-Arab politics, the Saudis have played a positive role, seeking to move the Arab world away from confrontation and, in some cases, toward conciliation with Israel. Saudi Arabia, if treated as a friend, will continue its moderate and responsible course.

This sale will increase the chances of maintaining peace and serve the interest of all our friends. Professionals have evaluated the impact of the sale, and the Israelis themselves are confident that it in no way will jeopardize the security of Israel. What would threaten Israel is a weakened U.S. influence in the region or a radicalization of moderate Arab regimes; interfering with this sale would do both.

In summary, if this legislation is enacted, it will not advance U.S. objectives in the area, it will not strengthen Israel's security, and it will not reduce the level of arms in the region. It will mean lost U.S. jobs and export earnings and will diminish U.S. influence among moderate Arab states. We must never lose sight that these moderate Arab leaders, who are friends of the United States, are key to achieving a lasting Israeli-Arab peace. If we cast them aside, which is what this legislation does, -- the moderate Arabs can look at it in no other way -- it will do great harm to the chances for peace. Further, it will encourage radical state-sponsored terrorism and bolster Iranian advances. I am determined to avoid such a foreign policy disaster.

Finally, I would note that this is the resolution of disapproval pursuant Section 36 (b) of the Arms Export and

Control Act to be enacted by the Congress. I regret that Congress, by enacting S.J. Res. 316, has forced a showdown that successive Administrations and Congresses have heretofore avoided. I veto this legislation, confident that its enactment would gravely harm vital U.S. national security interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 14, 1986

RECEIVED
OMB MAY 14 PM 3 25

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM:

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Enrolled Resolution S. J. Res. 316 -- Prohibiting
the Proposed Sale of Certain Missiles to Saudi
Arabia

The NSC has reviewed and approves the OMB recommendation to veto S. J. Resolution 316. The draft veto statement is approved as amended at Tab A. Tab B is an annotated version of the original draft veto statement showing the extent of the changes. The NSC recommends holding a veto ceremony in the Oval Office with press coverage in order to give the President's position additional visibility.

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Veto Statement

Tab B - Original Draft with Changes

cc: Chew

TAB

A

DRAFT VETO MESSAGE

I am returning today to the Senate/House S.J. 316/H.J. 589 without my approval. I am vetoing this legislation because I am convinced that failure to complete the proposed sale of air defense and anti-ship missiles to Saudi Arabia would damage important U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East. It would undermine the balanced policy the United States has followed in the area for over forty years.

Recent events have increased the danger to moderate states in the Middle East from religious fundamentalists and radical forces. These trends, together with the heightened threat from Iran in the Gulf war, require a meaningful U.S. response now. We can make such a response by showing our tangible support for the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia, a country with which the U.S. has enjoyed friendly and mutually beneficial relations for over forty years. Providing Saudi Arabia the means to defend itself, its Arab Gulf neighbors and the vital Persian Gulf sea lanes is important to U.S. economic and strategic interests. We have evaluated the impact of this sale and I can assure you that it in no way jeopardizes the security of Israel.

The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia has been endorsed by every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943. I cannot allow Congressional action to begin the dismantling of this

policy. Saudi Arabia has promoted the security and stability of the Gulf region in the face of Iranian radicalism and Soviet expansionism. Within the context of intra-Arab politics, the Saudis have sought to move the Arab world away from confrontation and toward conciliation with Israel. Saudi Arabia in particular has made significant contributions toward the search for peace and regional stability. In addition, the Saudis have worked closely with the United States to ensure the free flow of oil so critical to our interests and those of our European allies and Japan. If this legislation were to be enacted, it would weaken the credibility of U.S. commitments throughout the Middle East and would undermine Israel's security by encouraging the introduction of non-U.S. weapons which are not subject to our stringent controls. This would diminish U.S. influence among moderate Arab states who are key to a lasting Israeli-Arab peace, encourage radical state-sponsored terrorism, increase the threat from Iran, and, ultimately, would mean lost U.S. jobs and export earnings. I am determined to avoid this result.

Finally, I would note that this is the first resolution of disapproval pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export and Control Act to be enacted by the Congress. I regret that Congress, by enacting S. J. Resolution 316 and H. J. Resolution 589, has forced a showdown that prior Administrations and Congresses have heretofore avoided. I veto this legislation because its enactment would gravely harm vital U.S. national security interests.

TAB

B

DRAFT VETO MESSAGE

I am returning today to the Senate/House S.J. 316/H.J. 589 without my approval. I am vetoing this legislation because I ~~firmly believe~~ ^{am convinced} that failure to complete the proposed sale of air defense and anti-ship missiles to Saudi Arabia would damage important U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East. It would undermine the balanced policy the United States has followed in the area for over ~~thirty~~ ^{forty} years. ~~Recent events have increased the danger to moderate states in the Middle East from religious fundamentalists and radical forces. These trends, together with the heightened threat from Iran in the Gulf War~~ ^{Recent Libyan efforts to radicalize the Arab world} ~~combined with Iranian gains in the Iran-Iraq war~~ require a meaningful U.S. response ^{now.} ~~at this time~~. We can make such a response by ~~meeting~~ ^{showing our tangible support for} the legitimate defense needs of Saudi Arabia, a country with which the U.S. has enjoyed friendly and mutually beneficial relations for over forty years. Providing Saudi Arabia the means to defend itself, its Arab Gulf neighbors and the vital Persian Gulf sea lanes is important to ~~vital~~ U.S. economic and strategic interests. We have evaluated the impact of this sale and I can assure you that it in no way jeopardizes the security of Israel.

The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia ~~was~~ ^{has been} started by ~~President Roosevelt in 1943 and~~ ^{Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943.} endorsed by every President since. I ~~will~~ ^{cannot} allow congressional action to begin the dismantlement of this policy. ~~Saudi Arabia has~~ ^{In addition, the} Saudi Arabia ~~has~~ have worked closely with the United States to ensure the free flow of oil so critical to our interests and those of our European allies and Japan. Saudi Arabia has promoted the security and stability of the Gulf region in the face of Iranian radicalism and Soviet expansionism. Within the context of intra-Arab politics, the Saudis have sought to move the Arab world away

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p. 2, line 3

insert from
p. 1.

from confrontation and toward conciliation with Israel. Saudi Arabia in particular has made significant contributions toward the search for peace and regional stability. If this

legislation were to be enacted, it would ~~not advance U.S. objectives in the area, would not strengthen Israel's security and would not reduce the level of arms in the region. It would~~ mean lost U.S. jobs and export earnings, would diminish U.S. influence among moderate Arab states who are key to a lasting Israeli-Arab peace, ~~and would~~ ^{increase the threat from Iran, and, ultimately, would} encourage radical state-sponsored terrorism, ~~and further Iranian advances~~. I am determined to avoid this result.

Finally, I would note that this is the first resolution of disapproval pursuant to section 36 (b) of the Arms Export and Control Act to be enacted by the Congress. I regret that Congress, by enacting SJ Resolution 316 and HJ Resolution 589, has forced a showdown that ~~successive~~ ^{prior} Administrations and Congresses have heretofore avoided. I veto this legislation ^{because} ~~confident that~~ its enactment would gravely harm vital U.S. national security interests.

weaken the credibility of U.S. commitments throughout the Middle East and would undermine Israel's security by encouraging the introduction of non-U.S. weapons which are not subject to our stringent controls. This

(Rohrabacher)

May 15, 1986

6:00 p.m.

~~PRESENTER'S~~ MARKS: VETO OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 316.

Last week, both Houses of Congress voted to halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia. Today, I am vetoing that legislation. I will not permit Congress ^{and I} to ^{dismantle} ~~shortsightedly~~ ^{this longstanding policy,} to do great damage to our vital strategic, political, and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. And, it is not being done at anyone's expense.

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact which is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It ^{has} ~~s~~ been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security which has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we haven't ^{not} sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own

The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since.

credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

It is argued that weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia might find their way into terrorist hands. This charge is without substance. The Saudis, unlike some other friends, have never allowed the unauthorized transfer of U.S. weapons. Just last month, a report to Congress by its own GAO investigators concluded that Saudi security procedures are as tight or tighter than U.S. or NATO standards.

And behind the scenes, the Saudis have aided the effort to combat terrorism, which is as much, if not more, of a threat to them as it is to us. Recently, they refused Qadhafi's requests for aid. Several times in recent months, they ^{have} ~~we~~ been instrumental in offsetting unjust criticism of the United States and preventing radical states from undertaking joint action against our country.

The Saudis have proven their friendship and good will. They have assisted our efforts to support moderate governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. They have worked quietly in the search for peace in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Iran-Iraq war. They also provide impressive assistance to the government of Pakistan, to Afghan refugees, and to the Afghan freedom fighters themselves.

If the U.S. fails to stand by the Saudis now in a time of peril, why should anyone trust us? This precipitous move by Congress could do more to undermine our credibility than all the

rantings and ravings of Qadhafi and Khomeni. It would make us less able to act as a peacemaker in the Arab-Israeli dispute. And, over time, it will mean the loss of commercial, political, and security access to the Middle East.

The Congress is playing with fire. I cannot permit our bridges of influence^s in that region to be burned. The stakes are higher than many Members of Congress seem to understand.

Preventing this sale in the long run will be bad for America, bad for Israel, bad for Saudi Arabia, and bad for the cause of peace.

It is vetoed. I ask responsible members of both parties to sustain this veto and to join me in protecting our country's vital interest.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Received
MAY 16 7 23 AM

DATE: 5/15/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 am, Fri., 5/16/86

SUBJECT: VETO MESSAGE FOR S.J. RES. 316 - PROHIBITING PROPOSED SALE OF CERTAIN MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA (May 15 - 8:30 pm draft)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>CLERK</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>ELLIOTT</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

May we please have your comments on the attached by 9:00 tomorrow morning. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

OK AS per memo

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE AND EOP STAFF

FROM: Christopher Hicks *CH*

SUBJECT: New USSS Worker and Visitor Entrance System
(WAVES)

Effective Friday, May 16, 1986, a new automated system for clearing appointments into the White House complex (OEOB and NEOB) will become operational. The new system, called WAVES (Worker and Visitor Entrance System), will provide faster and more efficient processing of previous Control Center and Appointment Center responsibilities by combining them into a single office responsible for all appointments coming into the complex.

The following changes in procedure are important to note:

1. All visitors will be requested to submit their date of birth. This is a new requirement, but will help avoid confusion at the post of entry.
2. Requests for appointments over the phone by a passholder outside the complex will not be accepted.

The Secret Service WAVES Center has issued a booklet explaining in detail the procedures for clearance of non-passholders, workers and press into the complex. A copy of that booklet has been forwarded to your administrative contact.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/15/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 am, Fri., 5/16/86

SUBJECT: VETO MESSAGE FOR S.J. RES. 316 - PROHIBITING PROPOSED SALE OF CERTAIN MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA (May 15 - 8:30 pm draft)

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW →	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>CLERK</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>ELLIOTT</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No

REMARKS:

May we please have your comments on the attached by 9:00 tomorrow morning.
Thank you.

RESPONSE:

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Returning without my signature

~~Last week~~, both Houses of Congress voted to halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia, and today I am ~~vetoing~~ } S.J. Res. 316. The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since.

CAN

I will not permit Congress to dismantle this long-standing policy, damage our vital strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. *And, it is not being done at anyone's expense.* *NO underline*

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact which is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It has been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security which has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we have not sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

It is argued that weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia might find their way into terrorist hands. This charge is without substance. The Saudis, unlike some other friends, have never allowed the unauthorized transfer of U.S. weapons. Just last month, a report to Congress by its own GAO investigators concluded that Saudi security procedures are as tight or tighter than U.S. or NATO standards.

no underline

XB And behind the scenes, the Saudis have aided the effort to combat terrorism, which is as much, if not more, of a threat to them as it is to us. Recently, they refused Qadhafi's requests for aid. Several times in recent months, they have been instrumental in offsetting unjust criticism of the United States and preventing radical states from undertaking joint action against our country.

The Saudis' have proven their friendship and good will. They have assisted our efforts to support moderate governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. They have worked quietly in the search for peace in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Iran-Iraq war.

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responsibility

They also provide impressive assistance to the government of Pakistan *and* to Afghan refugees, ~~and to the Afghan freedom fighters themselves.~~ *the*

? →

If the U.S. fails to stand by the Saudis now in a time of peril, why should anyone trust us? This precipitous move by Congress could do more to undermine our credibility than all the (rantings and ravings) of Qadhafi and Khomeni. It would make us less able to act as a peacemaker in the Arab-Israeli dispute. And, over time, it will mean the loss of commercial, political, and security access to the Middle East.

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Aggravates that

The Congress is playing with fire. *We must not* (I cannot) permit our bridges of influence in that region to be burned. The stakes are higher than many Members of Congress seem to understand.

Preventing this sale in the long run will be bad for America, bad for Israel, bad for Saudi Arabia, and bad for the cause of peace.

[It is vetoed.] I ask responsible members of both parties to sustain this veto and to join me in protecting our *under* country's vital interest.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1986


Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. Yesterday I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

Today I am signing a message to the Senate vetoing S.J. Res. 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If my veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale but will not include the 200 Stinger launcher systems and the 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of their request for Stingers would require the submission of another notification of the sale to the Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

It is my sincere hope that with this modification of the Saudi request, the Congress will agree to this sale. It remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1986

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a letter to Senator Dole informing the Senate that if your veto is sustained, the Saudi request for Stingers will be withdrawn.

You should sign the Dole letter prior to signing the veto message.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "DAVID". The letters are in all caps and have a cursive, slightly slanted appearance.

David Chew

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1986

KATHERINE:

If the Bob Dole Saudi letter was not sent last night, I've prepared another with today's date, which reflects that the President "Yesterday" met with the Saudi Ambassador.


Dan Marks

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1986

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. This morning, I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

I will shortly sign a message to the Senate vetoing S.J. Res. 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If my veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale but will not include the 200 Stinger launcher systems and the 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of their request for Stingers would require the submission of another notification of the sale to the Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
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United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
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May 21, 1986

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It is my sincere hope that with this modification of the Saudi request, the Congress will agree to this sale. It remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

5/21
1:05p
Final

To KL 8:30am



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1986

KATHERINE:

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n the Middle East.

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1986

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. Yesterday I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

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It is my sincere hope that with this modification of the Saudi request, the Congress will agree to this sale. It remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

*per KL
5/21/86:osp*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1986

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. This morning, I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

5/20
6:35P

New #1

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Both Houses of Congress voted to halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia, and I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 316. The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since.

I cannot permit the Congress to dismantle this long-standing policy, damage our vital strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is not being done at anyone's expense.

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact that is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It has been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security that has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we have not sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

5/20
G.35P

{ It is argued that weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia might find their way into terrorist hands. This charge is without substance. The Saudis, unlike some other friends, have never allowed the unauthorized transfer of U.S. weapons. Just last month, a report to the Congress by its own GAO investigators concluded that Saudi security procedures are as tight or tighter than U.S. or NATO standards. }

Behind the scenes, the Saudis have aided the effort to combat terrorism, which is as much, if not more, of a threat to them as it is to us. Recently, they refused Qadhafi's requests for aid. Several times in recent months, they have been instrumental in offsetting unjust criticism of the United States and preventing radical states from undertaking joint action against our country.

The Saudis have proven their friendship and good will. They have assisted our efforts to support responsible governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. They have worked quietly in the search for peace in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Iran-Iraq war. They also provide impressive assistance to the government of Pakistan and to Afghan refugees.

{ If the United States fails to stand by the Saudis now in a time of peril, why should anyone trust us? This precipitous move by Congress could do more to undermine our credibility than all the accusations and threats of Qadhafi and Khomeni. It would make us less able to act as a peacemaker in the Arab-Israeli dispute. And, over time, it will mean the loss of commercial, political, and security access to the Middle East.

The Congress is playing with fire. We must not permit our bridges of influence in that region to be burned. The stakes are higher than many Members of Congress seem to understand. And to what avail? These U.S. weapons are already in the Saudi inventory. If we refuse to live up to our commitments, they will turn to other suppliers for equivalent arms. }

this SALE
~~this sale~~ good
good

~~Preventing this sale~~ In the long run, will be bad for
America, ~~bad~~ for Israel, ~~bad~~ for Saudi Arabia, and ~~bad~~ for
the cause of peace.

I ask ~~responsible~~ members of both parties to sustain
this veto and to join me in protecting our country's vital
interest.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

To Chew 5/20 noon

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1986

being transferred to any
country

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. This morning, I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. ~~After careful consideration of all options and the consequences of a possible veto override,~~ Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular ~~political~~ sensitivity of ~~the~~ Stingers and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

I will shortly sign a message to the Senate vetoing S.J. Res. 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If my veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale but will not include the 200 Stinger launcher systems and the 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of their request for Stingers would require the submission of another notification of the sale to the Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. In light of the Saudi request, and given recent developments in the area, I do not currently foresee circumstances that would necessitate transfer of these weapons under the expedited emergency procedures provided for in ~~that~~ Section of the Act.

It is my sincere hope that ^{with} ~~in light of~~ this modification ^{of} to the Saudi request, the Congress will agree to this sale. It remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Blue changes from Katherine Ladd 5/20 1pm

Dear Bob,

to the U.S.

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~~Within the next day~~, I will ^{shortly} sign a message to ^{the Senate} Congress vetoing S. J. ^{RES.} 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If ^{my} ~~this~~ veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale ^{but will not include} ~~less~~ the 200 Stinger launcher systems, ^{the} and 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of ^{their} ~~its~~ request for Stingers would require ^{the submission to another} ~~normal prior~~ notification of the sale to ^{the} Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

In light of the ~~Saudi Request~~ ^{my} and given ~~recent developments in the area~~ ^{the}, I do not currently ~~envison that circumstances in the Persian Gulf~~ ^{foresee circumstances that} would necessitate the ~~emergency~~ transfer of these weapons.

~~how do we justify this statement in light of our argument that the current situation is so volatile that this is~~
 It is my sincere hope that, ^{in light of} with this modification to the Saudi request, ^{the} Congress will agree to this sale, ^{it} which remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Under the expedited emergency procedure provided for in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, it is possible that this is needed for their defense.

x 7353 Jim Stank

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 21, 1986

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE MAJORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE

May 21, 1986

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. Yesterday I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

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It is my sincere hope that with this modification of the Saudi request, the Congress will agree to this sale. It remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1986

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United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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ob

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~~of the Act~~

Sincerely,

ob

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:30 today

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO SENATOR BOB DOLE RE SAUDI ARMS

		ACTION	FYI			ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to my office by 11:30 this morning. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Dear Bob,

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~~In light of the Saudi request, and given recent developments in the area,~~ I do not currently ~~envision that circumstances in the Persian Gulf~~ ^{foresee circumstances that} would necessitate the emergency transfer of these weapons.

~~It is my sincere hope that, with this modification to the Saudi request,~~ ^{the} Congress will agree to this sale, ^{in light of} which remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

Under the expedited emergency procedure provided for in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, it is possible to transfer these weapons to the Saudis.

x 7353 Jim Stank

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1986

Dear Bob:

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. This morning, I met with the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular sensitivity of Stingers being transferred to any country and the importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, has decided to withdraw its request for Stingers.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
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Washington, D.C. 20510

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Both Houses of Congress voted to halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia, and I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 316. The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since.

I cannot permit the Congress to dismantle this long-standing policy, damage our vital strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is not being done at anyone's expense.

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact that is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It has been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security that has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we have not sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

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The Congress is playing with fire. We must not permit our bridges of influence in that region to be burned. The stakes are higher than many Members of Congress seem to understand. And to what avail? These U.S. weapons are already in the Saudi inventory. If we refuse to live up to our commitments, they will turn to other suppliers for equivalent arms. }

this SALE
~~this sale~~ good

~~Preventing this sale~~ ^I In the long run, will be ~~bad~~ ^{good} for
America, ~~bad~~ ^{good} for Israel, ~~bad~~ ^{good} for Saudi Arabia, and ~~bad~~ ^{good} for
the cause of peace.

I ask ~~responsible~~ members of both parties to sustain
this veto and to join me in protecting our country's vital
interest.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:30 today

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO SENATOR BOB DOLE RE SAUDI ARMS

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to my office by 11:30 this morning. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Dear Bob,

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Within the next day, I will sign a message to Congress vetoing S. J. 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If this veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale, less the 200 Stinger launcher systems and 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of its request for Stingers would require normal prior notification of the sale to Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. I do not currently envision that circumstances in the Persian Gulf would necessitate the emergency transfer of these weapons.

It is my sincere hope that, with this modification to the Saudi request, Congress will agree to this sale, which remains a vital and timely symbol of U.S. security commitments in the Middle East.

x 7353 Tim Stank

Dear Bob, DOLE

For the past two weeks, I have shared your concern for our ability to gain necessary Congressional support for the Saudi missile sale in its present configuration. This morning, I met with the Saudi Ambassador, His Royal Highness Prince Bandar bin Sultan, to discuss this issue. After careful consideration of all options and the probable consequences of a veto override, Prince Bandar informed me that the Saudi Government, recognizing the particular ^{for} political sensitivity ^{being transferred to any} of the Stinger and the ^{country} importance of the sale to the security of the Persian Gulf area, had decided to withdraw its request for Stingers ^{if case} ~~if the Congress sustains~~ ^{the Congress} ~~approves~~ ^{approves} the sale.

Within the next day, I will sign a message to Congress vetoing S. J. 316, which would disapprove the sale of all missiles included in this notification: AIM-9L, AIM-9P, Harpoon, and Stinger. If this veto is sustained, I will proceed with the sale, less the 200 Stinger launcher systems and 600 missile reloads. A subsequent Saudi renewal of its request for Stingers would require normal prior notification of the sale to Congress in accordance with Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. I do not currently envision that circumstances in the Persian Gulf would necessitate the emergency transfer of these weapons.

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RR

Q: Wasn't this withdrawal of Stinger a U.S. initiative, taken after it became apparent that you couldn't sustain a veto of the entire package? Aren't the Saudi's simply responding to a request from the President?

A: No. This was a Saudi initiative from the very beginning. King Fahd recognized the importance of this sale as a signal of U.S. commitment to Saudi security. Consequently, he empowered the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar, to request withdrawal of one or more elements of the sale if that would be helpful to the President. This morning, Prince Bandar discussed this offer with the President and decided to withdraw the earlier Saudi request for Stinger missiles if the Presidential veto is sustained.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK
TRACKING SHEET FOR PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

TITLE: Veto Message - S.J. Res. 316
Prohibiting Sale of Missiles to Saudi Arabia

TYPE DOCUMENT:

PROCLAMATION

LETTER (S)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS/SENATE

MEMORANDUM

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

DECISION MEMORANDUM

SIGNING STATEMENT

OTHER:

8:00 NSC chgo

RECEIVED: (Advance: 5/13/86)
5/19/86

Time: 5:29 a.m./(p.m.)
Time: 5 a.m./(p.m.)

for 4:30p meeting

SENT TO CORRESPONDENCE FOR TYPING IN FINAL:

8:30 NSC chgo

(Advance: 5/14/86)
Date: 5/19/86

Time: 9:20 a.m./(p.m.)
Time: 5:10 a.m./(p.m.)

TO DAVID L. CHEW'S OFFICE:

Date: 5/19/86

Time: 5:40 a.m./(p.m.)

INFO, INCLUDING STENCIL, TO PRESS OFFICE:

Date: / / 86

Time: a.m./(p.m.)

POSTED: / / 86

Time: a.m./(p.m.)

NOTIFICATIONS:

① SK
(initial)

Each time a report or message is transmitted to the Congress, call Jane Moody, ext. 2230.

(initial)

N.S.C., when appropriate (Brian Merchant, ext. 2585).

② SK
(initial)

247p
call Don Sablo, NSC, x. 3046

③ SK
(initial)

247p
Liz at Senate

OTHER INFORMATION:

5/15 KL says Mallin is reviewing NSC rewrite of veto msg. I told her that we're preparing it in advance final "awaiting instructions." (and that we had to send it) -- 12:20p - so, KL says speechwriter is reviewing.

Ninety-ninth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the twenty-first day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six

Joint Resolution

Prohibiting the sale to Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles and related defense services.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the issuance of a letter of offer with respect to any of the following proposed sales to Saudi Arabia (described in the certifications transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate pursuant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act on April 8, 1986) is hereby prohibited:

(1) The proposed sale of AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, and related defense articles and defense services (Transmittal Numbered 86-29A).

(2) The proposed sale of AIM-9P4 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and related defense articles (Transmittal Numbered 86-29B).

(3) The proposed sale of basic Stinger air defense guided missile systems, and related defense articles and defense services (Transmittal Numbered 86-29C).

(4) The proposed sale of air launched Harpoon missiles, and related defense articles and defense services (Transmittal Numbered 86-29D).

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Pro Tempore

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate Pro Tempore



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 21, 1986

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am returning herewith without my approval S.J. Res. 316, a resolution that would halt the proposed sale of defensive missiles to Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. defense relationship with Saudi Arabia was started by President Roosevelt in 1943 and endorsed by every President since. I cannot permit the Congress to dismantle this long-standing policy, damage our vital strategic, political and economic interests in the Middle East and undermine our balanced policy in that region.

The American people and their representatives should understand that this sale is in our interests. It is not just a favor to our friends in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it is not being done at anyone's expense.

The security of Israel remains a top priority of this Administration. This sale will not endanger Israel's defenses, a fact that is underscored by Israel's decision not to oppose the sale.

Stability of the oil-rich Persian Gulf is another goal of great importance. In a region living in the shadow of the tragic and gruesome Iran-Iraq war, and threatened by religious fanaticism at its worst, we cannot afford to take stability for granted. Saudi willingness to stand up to Iranian threats has been key in preventing the spread of chaos. It has been Saudi Arabia's confidence in our commitment to its security that has allowed it to stand firm.

But Saudi Arabia produces no weapons of its own and we have not sold the Saudis new arms in almost 2 years. If we suddenly shut off that supply, it will weaken our own credibility, as well as the Saudis' ability to defend themselves. It would send the worst possible message as to America's dependability and courage.

Behind the scenes, the Saudis have aided the effort to combat terrorism, which is as much, if not more, of a threat to them as it is to us. Recently, they refused Qadhafi's requests for aid. Several times in recent months, they have been instrumental in offsetting unjust criticism of the United States and preventing radical states from undertaking joint action against our country.

The Saudis have proven their friendship and good will. They have assisted our efforts to support responsible governments in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. They have worked quietly in the search for peace in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Iran-Iraq war. They also provide impressive assistance to the government of Pakistan and to Afghan refugees.

more

(OVER)

In the long run this sale will be good for America, good for Israel, good for Saudi Arabia, and good for the cause of peace.

I ask members of both parties to sustain this veto and to join me in protecting our country's vital interest.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 21, 1986.

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