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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**

January 13, 1984

Bob,

Attached are three items which I think will help to get ready for Bud's backgrounder tomorrow:

-- 20 Q&As on the speech which I have worked with State. I circulated them within the NSC, to Jack Matlock and others, and have received no comments back, so I assume they are okay.

-- A draft press handout for tomorrow, which reflects Jack Matlock's suggestions, but he has not yet seen this new cut.

-- A two-page Fact Sheet summarizing the speech, originally intended to hand out on an embargoed basis. Bob Sims' preference now is to use this simply for background by Administration officials. I have run it through Jack and others.

Steve



Attachments

② 2

EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 P.M., SUNDAY, JANUARY 15, 1984

President's Address on U.S.-Soviet Relations

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will give a major address on United States relations with the Soviet Union. The President will take this occasion to reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union, a dialogue designed to establish a stable and mutually beneficial long-term relationship.

The fundamental purpose of the President's address will be to present in a clear and comprehensive manner his objectives for improving this crucial relationship. The address comes on the eve of the opening in Stockholm of a promising new East-West arms control conference, the CDE, the objectives of which are to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe and to inhibit using arms for war or intimidation.

The address is also timed to help establish the framework for ~~the~~ resumption, in Stockholm on January 17, of the dialogue between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, which we also hope will help to move the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward.

It is also important to note in this context that the measures taken by the Administration to restore the credibility of our military deterrent, along with our policies to reestablish America's political and economic strength, have put us in the best position in years to achieve now the improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship which we all seek.

IV

SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

Q: Is Secretary Shultz delivering to Gromyko in Stockholm a special message from the President to follow up on the President's speech?

A: -- Although as a matter of course we do not provide details of diplomatic exchanges, Secretary Shultz will certainly convey the President's views on how to improve the Soviet-American relationship.

timely app. for an life  
infusion of new life

A

US-SOVIET SUMMIT

Q: Does the President's speech indicate an increased desire for a US-Soviet summit? Are there preparations underway for a summit? Is this a subject for discussion between Shultz and Gromyko at Stockholm?

A: -- As we and the Soviets both have said, a summit would have to be carefully prepared and have a prospect of meaningful results to be useful. Although there are currently no preparations underway for a summit, the President's speech is a serious effort to stimulate progress in bilateral relations.

5

RECENT REAGAN-ANDROPOV COMMUNICATIONS

Q: Have there been any recent direct communications between the President and Andropov?

A: -- The President and Mr. Andropov have periodically been in direct communication. I will not go into detail on the timing, form, or content of these confidential exchanges.

6

THE SPEECH AND THE USSR AS THE "FOCUS OF EVIL"

Q: How does the positive tone of the President's speech square with his earlier characterization of the USSR as the "focus of evil?"

A: -- The President has said (in his interview in the January 2 issue of TIME) that he does not wish to belabor this point. The Soviets have no compunction about publicly stating their negative view of U.S. society and therefore should not be surprised when we speak our minds. But the important point is that, despite our differences in values and political beliefs, it is necessary for the two countries to work together to reduce international tensions. The United States, as the President's makes clear in his speech, is committed to that task.



PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH AND ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

Q: Will the speech affect the Soviet decision to suspend the major arms control negotiations?

A: -- In the speech the President has restated the standing U.S. commitment to resume without delay all arms negotiations now suspended by the Soviet side. We would hope that the Soviets would match that commitment by returning as soon as possible to the negotiating tables in START, INF and MBFR. The U.S. remains prepared to meet the Soviets halfway in finding agreements that meet the objectives of both sides, if the Soviets are prepared to do likewise.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN AN ELECTION YEAR

Q: Is it realistic to expect progress in US-Soviet relations during an election year? Don't you think the Soviets will consider the speech a political ploy and simply wait to see the results in November?

A: -- International problems are not suspended in election years, and both we and the Soviets realize that we cannot afford simply to neglect the relationship until 1985. It is important to move forward in arms control and to resolve other issues troubling US-Soviet relations. The President's speech is a sincere expression of the U.S. commitment to work for progress in all areas of the relationship.

9

CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q: Why didn't the President offer any concrete proposals if he was really serious?

A: -- The concrete proposals already exist. The U.S. has placed serious proposals on the table in all of the major arms negotiating forums which have been suspended by the Soviets. In our bilateral discussions, we have expressed our detailed views on reducing international tensions and resolving several regional problems. In each case, we have stated that the U.S. position is not a "take it or leave it" proposition but is intended as a serious basis for discussion or negotiation. The President's speech is intended to demonstrate our commitment to a productive dialogue with the Soviets in all these areas.

10

LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE/LEADERSHIP UNCERTAINTIES

Q. Do we expect a favorable Soviet response in view of the leadership uncertainties in Moscow?

A. -- We expect the Soviet leadership to give careful consideration to what the President has said and to react to it in a manner which they feel will serve their interests best. We hope that there will be a favorable response, but we cannot guarantee this. As you know, we customarily do not comment on the internal leadership situation.

11

THE SPEECH AND ARMS CONTROL

Q: How is the President's expressed willingness to "meet the Soviets half way" reflected in U.S. arms control proposals?

A: -- On several occasions, the U.S. has modified its position in the START and INF, and the West has done so in the MBFR talks, in order to accommodate Soviet concerns. We have repeatedly made clear that U.S. and Western positions are not offered on a "take it or leave it" basis and that all points are negotiable. We have repeatedly expressed our willingness to resume all of these arms talks at any time without preconditions. We hope that the Soviet side will match this commitment by returning to the table at an early date to engage in the serious negotiations for which we are prepared.

12

RELATIONSHIP TO ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE REPORT

Q. How does the Administration reconcile its forthcoming charges of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements with the positive message contained in the President's speech?

A. -- The question of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements has been a major concern for many years. A special interagency study has been underway for nearly a year. The President is now submitting a Special Report to Congress on Soviet non-compliance in specific response to a Congressional request.

-- As we have continued to analyze particular arms control violations, we have simultaneously pressed the Soviets in diplomatic channels for more information and corrective actions. Our concerns have not been met, but we intend to continue to press for satisfactory resolutions of these problems.

-- At the same time our study of Soviet non-compliance has underscored the need to press for more effective arms control agreements with provision for effective verification. Such agreements can reduce the threat of war and enhance U.S. and global security. As the President stressed in his speech, the United States remains committed to negotiating such agreements with the Soviet Union.

DEFENSE BUDGET/STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Q: How do the President's defense budget and, in particular, the strategic defense initiative square with the conciliatory themes of the speech?

A: -- As the President emphasized, a strong defense forms the foundation for an effective policy toward the Soviet Union. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Maintaining America's military deterrent is thus a vital prerequisite for effectively managing our relations with the Soviet Union and seeking resolution of the problems that confront us.

-- There is no contradiction between the President's speech and the strategic defense initiative. The US has simply announced its intention to engage in long-term research on the feasibility of a future defense against ballistic missiles, based on technology which today is only theoretical. Such research is permitted by the ABM Treaty. The Soviets themselves have been engaged in this type of research for some time. Deployment of such a defense could only be undertaken many years from now after its benefits were adequately demonstrated, and we had engaged in close consultations with our allies and discussions with the Soviets.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS POST-KAL

Q: Are we pursuing the issue of the KAL tragedy, or has this more or less faded as a problem in US-Soviet relations?

A: -- We, along with many other nations, continue to demand that the Soviets provide a full accounting of the shootdown, and compensation for the victims of KAL 007. We also call upon the Soviet Union to cooperate fully with the ICAO investigation of the tragedy and to take the steps necessary to ensure that civilian air travelers need never fear a repetition of this tragedy.

-- The International Civil Aviation Organization has issued an investigation report which demonstrates conclusively that the Soviet Union has failed to observe that organization's procedures, in whose formulation the USSR participated. We expect that the ICAO Council will now act on these findings at their next regular session in January.



REGIONAL ISSUES IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q: Which regional issues have been the subject of formal US-Soviet discussions? What have been the results?

A: -- Regional issues remain an important element in the US-Soviet dialogue at all levels of contact. During this Administration we have had formal discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan and southern Africa as well as numerous diplomatic exchanges concerning the Mideast, the Caribbean and Central America, and Asia. Secretary of State Shultz has had and will continue to have such issues high on the agenda for his meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and there is a continuing dialogue maintained through regular embassy channels.

-- As you know, U.S. and Soviet approaches to many of these issues differ greatly, so even frequent and detailed discussions cannot be expected to lead to breakthroughs or agreement between the two sides. Nevertheless, we believe that continued dialogue is essential if both sides are to meet their shared responsibility to reduce international tensions and to avoid dangerous misunderstandings. The U.S. also maintains such a dialogue, of course, to probe Soviet willingness to engage in greater restraint and responsibility in its international behavior. As the President stated, we hope the USSR will join us in cooperative efforts to reduce regional tensions.

16

SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

Q: What is the status of efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is this still a high priority in U.S. policy and, if so, is the U.S. willing to compromise on this issue or does it wish to "bleed" the Soviets until they admit defeat?

A: -- The fact that the UNGA recently voted overwhelmingly -- for the fifth time -- for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan demonstrates the widespread international support for that objective. In line with these UN resolutions, the U.S. seeks an early and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, self-determination for the Afghan people, and a safe and honorable return of the millions of Afghan refugees. We continue to support the efforts of the Secretary-General's special representative to achieve a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan in line with these objectives. We also support Pakistan in its efforts to preserve its security and to push for a satisfactory negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.

17

THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Q: Do you believe the Soviet Union is sponsoring the escalation of fighting in Lebanon?

A: -- There is no question that the Soviets' massive shipment of arms to the Syrians has enabled Damascus, and the factions allied with it in Lebanon, to pursue a policy of armed confrontation in that country. The Soviets have publicly endorsed a ceasefire and negotiations aimed at reaching a reconciliation among Lebanese factions. We hope this is a serious Soviet commitment. We will continue to encourage the Soviets to take a more responsible approach to the area and to recognize that the interests of all parties, including those of the Soviet Union itself, would be better served by an effort to replace armed confrontation with negotiations to settle differences.

Q: As part of a negotiated settlement in Lebanon or in the Mideast in general, would the U.S. be willing to allow the Soviets a greater role in regional diplomacy?

A: -- The U.S. cannot "allow" or grant a regional role to anyone. The Soviets have made their own record in the Mideast and must live with the image they have created through their policies and actions. If the Soviets have less of a role in regional diplomacy than they may like, the reason is that many of their past actions have been disruptive and have not contributed to progress toward peace and stability in the region. We hope the USSR will act more constructively in the future.

18

SOVIETS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Q: What is the U.S. approach to the Soviet role in southern Africa?

A. -- The Soviet Union plays a significant role in southern Africa through the provision of military equipment and through its close relations with several countries of the region. We have discussed the dangerous situation in southern Africa with the Soviets on a number of occasions. As the President indicated in his speech, we would welcome Soviet cooperative efforts to help reduce conflict in the region and resolve southern Africa's problems through negotiated solutions.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR RADICALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Q: How do you assess the dangers of Soviet or Cuban support for insurgency in Central America and how do you intend to deal with it?

A: -- The interests of the U.S. and its allies and friends in this Hemisphere are vitally affected by Soviet/Cuban sponsorship of armed insurgency in Central America, as well as the threatening attitude of the Sandinista regime towards its regional neighbors. The U.S. is determined not to allow these attempts at intimidation to succeed and has taken steps in the economic, political and security areas to deal with these threats.

-- The President's Caribbean Basin Initiative and other economic assistance programs have been designed specifically to address the needs of the nations of the region for economic development and security.

-- We have promoted the development of democratic institutions in the region and moderation in the resolution of domestic political problems. We have provided strong support for the efforts of countries of the region to protect themselves from Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts at subversion. And we have encouraged diplomatic efforts to create a balance among regional nations based on mutual respect, restraint and non-interference.

23

CONSULATES AND EXCHANGES AGREEMENT

Q. Does the speech mean that the U.S. is going to reinitiate talks with the Soviets on new consulates and/or a new exchanges agreement, as had been under discussion prior to the KAL affair?

A. -- The speech does not really address these specific issues. However, a comprehensive review of our agenda items for possible discussions with the Soviets was presented by Secretary Shultz in a speech last June to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We remain willing to discuss all topics on the agenda.

21

HUMAN RIGHTS

Q. Is the U.S. downgrading the importance of increased Soviet respect for human rights as a prerequisite to improved bilateral relations?

A. -- Absolutely not. We will continue to stress to the Soviets that there is no higher issue of concern to the U.S. than improved human rights performance. That emphasis is reflected in the President's speech. It is also an accurate reflection of the importance that Congress and the American public as a whole attach to this issue. The Soviets must recognize the need to take those views into account.

22

US-Soviet Economic Relations

Q: Does the speech represent any change in U.S. policy on East-West trade and technology transfer

A: -- No, it does not. We continue to believe trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, does not subsidize the Soviet economy, and does not contribute to Soviet strategic or military capability. Grain is a good example of such trade. We do not have a policy of economic warfare. Our controls on exports to the Soviet Union are designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology.



PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will deliver a major address on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. While he will point out the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable long-term relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response.

The following are the main points of the President's speech:

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic, military and spiritual strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a far better position from which to establish a productive and mutually beneficial long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in values and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions -- both in bilateral relations and in other areas of the world. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and peaceful competition. This is a balanced policy that will protect Western interests, but it is also designed to establish the basis for constructive cooperation with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will set forth a framework for U.S. relations with the Soviet Union that concentrates on trying to achieve improvements in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on the full range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing force levels through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise.

-- The President will also stress the importance of human rights, noting that it is Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over the US-Soviet relationship. The President will urge the Soviet Union to live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act and other international covenants. The President will also call for Soviet cooperation in efforts to reduce regional terror, particularly in the Middle East.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable. More constructive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive steps to that end.

Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)

RCM HAS SEEN

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

*When we begin a new year, we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. ~~We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love~~ Now, as we enter into 1984, I want to share my*  
~~and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my~~

thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy <sup>civilization</sup> mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

### Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending ~~[by three to four percent]~~ every year. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when <sup>a government</sup> ~~one side~~ feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not military superiority.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong. Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized system is proving less able than the Western democracies to adapt to the challenges of a new era.

#### A Safer World

Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the

danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

#### Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward

the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

*Preventing* War, *for me,* is *my solemn responsibility.* ~~unthinkable~~ *public enemy number one.* The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes

solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

*(Does this  
invite them  
into the m.t.  
peace process?  
[NO])*

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives ~~the~~ arms races *everywhere it occurs.*

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a



Check to make sure these figures are accurate

little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to <sup>greatly</sup> radically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."

The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the

other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish greater mutual confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

#### Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings

were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

#### Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would

increase the security not only of our two countries, but, of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first

session of the conference in recognition of the importance we attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact will also attend.

Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions; our respective interests, and how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the

Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to <sup>cooperate.</sup> ~~collaborate.~~

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep - concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. ~~[We know that this is a sensitive area for the~~  
~~Soviets<sup>Governments</sup> and here too our approach is a flexible one.]~~ We are not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in



results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

#### A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,

productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna.

Furthermore,

Secretary Shultz <sup>is</sup> will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm <sup>two weeks from now, when the Conference on European Security convenes.</sup> ~~in January. If invited, he will~~ also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. ~~[And~~ ~~regular pattern of talks, hopes that this can be followed~~  
This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

~~as I have said~~

~~I would hope that, if these and other talks create the basis for real progress and concrete results in our relationship, I will be ready to meet with Soviet President Andropov. ]~~

### Conclusion

Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too. No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help

make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we *embark upon the New Year;* we must ~~look toward Christmas, we should reflect on~~  
~~the lessons of the past, and~~ rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

2740m

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PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH (1/16/1984) (3)

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0045

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 4, 1984

MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH

DATE: Thursday, January 5, 1984  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 4:00 P.M.  
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

You are scheduled to make the subject speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Edwin Meese III  
James A. Baker, III  
Michael K. Deaver  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Richard G. Darman  
David R. Gergen  
Jack F. Matlock  
Ben Elliott

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of others.

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12066, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA *stuf* DATE *2/30/07*

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/5/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ---

SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH (1/5/84)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McMANUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GERGEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HERRINGTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>KIMMITT</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>ELLIOTT</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

This will be discussed with the President tomorrow. (Please hold close.)

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

47  
(NSC/Myer/BE)  
January 5, 1984  
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet



Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level

of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call "constructive competition."

Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and making the world a safer place.

The world is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working

relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive, working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful

solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed

here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. But now is a time for opportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of

activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as



any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union, must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be

difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.