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KDB 1/8/2016

File Folder USSR (3/8/84) (4)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

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378

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172189	MEMO	D. DORNAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSALS (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172177) PAR 12/31/2012 CREST NLR-748-25-27-1-0	3	4/13/1984	B1
172190	REPORT	RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-2-9	3	ND	B1
172191	MEMO	D. DORNAN AND K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS	4	4/3/1984	B1
172192	MEMO	ORIGINAL OF DOC #172186 (TO DEGRAFFENREID RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS)	2	4/3/1984	B1
172193	REPORT	RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS (COPY OF DOC #172187)	3	ND	B1
172194	MEMO	C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-6-5	1	3/19/1984	B1
172195	REPORT	RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-6-5	2	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172196	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR	2	3/28/1984	B1
172197	MEMO	TO NSC (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172188)	2	ND	B1
172198	MEMO	TO K. DEGRAFFENREID RE AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR ON CONTRACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172178)	2	4/12/1984	B1
172199	MEMO	TO NSC RE PROPOSED AGREEMENTS (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172179) PAR 11/2/2009 CREST NLR-748-25-27-10-0	2	4/12/1984	B1
172200	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT WITH USSR R 11/2/2009 CREST NLR-748-25-27-11-9	1	4/10/1984	B1
172201	MEMO	J. POINDEXTER TO J. MATLOCK RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-12-8	1	4/6/1984	B1
172202	MEMO	MATLOCK TO PONIDEXTER RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-13-7	2	4/9/1984	B1

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172203	MEMO	PONIDEXTER TO DEGRAFFENREID AND DORNAN RE REVIEW OF PACKAGE R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-27-14-6	1	4/6/1984	B1
172204	MEMO	DORNAN AND DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR	4	4/3/1984	B1

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National Security Council
The White House

1114

System #

Package #

II
90307
Add-on
#3

8 APR 13 P 6: 04

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Doman</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Deave: What John Poindexter is looking for is a consolidated memo on this subject from Jack, John, Ken, and you. He will be in on 4/18, so we should try for consolidated memo by then. Thanks.



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DISSEMINATED IN PART

DATE 12/18/84 BY 164748-25-27-1-0
BY 164748-25-27-1-0 DATE 12/18/12

April 13, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DIANE DORNAN DD

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Implications of Proposals
for (a) Consular Review Talks, (b) Cultural
Exchange Agreement and (c) Review of Agreement
on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation

In accordance with John Poindexter's instructions, IG(CI) members were asked Tuesday to comment on the CI implications of proposed negotiating terms for the above agreements by COB Thursday. They and the COMEX Staff were given previous State and FBI comments for reference, and some of them later received a State summary (Tab I) of the complete terms of reference for the Consular Review Talks (CRT). Due to the shortage of time, agencies responded individually and mostly by telephone. As instructed, DIA also submitted a written assessment of potential collection opportunities under the CRT.

My summary of previous views regarding the merits and liabilities of the CRT and the official State and FBI papers presenting their respective positions, and Jack Matlock's evaluation are at Tab II. Most agencies agreed with the FBI assessment of CI concerns regarding the CRT and highlighted the need for a net assessment of collection benefits vs probable CI difficulties. They focused on the entry/exit issue, endorsing all FBI views previously expressed, including the expectation that this would further strain CI resources. NSA elaborated on the problems which might be caused if this agreement effectively undercut our ability to deny entry at San Francisco and Baltimore to either ships or planes of Soviet or Soviet Bloc nationality. These could be fitted with ELINT collection gear and planes could also carry PHOTINT equipment. The problem would be particularly acute in Baltimore, where a ship would have a very extensive radio horizon and a perfect spot to intercept high-volume intergovernmental and defense contractor communications. Should Bloc ships be allowed to dock there, it would be necessary to establish a protected communications zone between the current two encompassing New York and Washington, an extremely expensive and complicated undertaking. The exception was OFM, which foresaw no significant CI problems with the proposed terms.

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Agencies responsible for collection, on the other hand, disputed the belief that the expansion of entry/exit points would provide the US with a net benefit because of its advantages for intelligence collection. The DIA analysis at Tab III discusses in detail why it would be doubtful that essential data would be collected -- partly because the Soviets would continue to minimize collection opportunities and partly because we already have normal access to the nonessential information we might secure. CIA also said regularization of access to Brest and Nakhodka would not affect its collection program.

Regarding the Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation (Cultural Exchanges),

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CIA indicated that such exchange agreements have not been useful to the US from an intelligence collection standpoint.

Most agencies had no comment on the desirability of renewing Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. They were largely unfamiliar with its terms and past operation (lack of familiarity was also a problem on the Cultural Exchanges issue, especially given time constraints), but most said they did not see obvious and major CI problems. DIA (Tab III, p. 2) objected, as has DOD generally, that the agreement as written offers opportunities for technology acquisition in the US; (

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DOD's general position is that it should be allowed to lapse but that if eventually revived it should be rewritten more carefully and specifically that it should give priority to Export Administration Act controls. FBI did not comment on this issue.

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Attachments

Tab I State Summary of the TOR for the
Consular Review Talks
Tab II A Dornan Summary of Contending Agreements
(in nonconcurrence of 4/3)
B FBI Objections to CRT
C State Support for CRT
D Matlock Support for CRT

DIA

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Tab IV FBI Analysis of Cultural Exchange Agreement
Tab V Analysis of CI Issues Under the
3 Proposed Agreements

cc: Jack Matlock

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TAB I

NLRR 748-25-27-2-9
BY (CIB) NARA DATE 4/8/13CONSULAR REVIEW TALKSObjective of Talks

After a high-level review of U.S.-Soviet relations, aimed in part at identifying areas where some progress might be possible during the coming months, Secretary of State Shultz informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on March 7 that the U.S. was prepared to resume the Consular Review Talks, which have been in recess since May, 1983. A successful conclusion to the Talks will serve U.S. interests by: (1) demonstrating that the two countries can negotiate constructive solutions to bilateral problems; (2) resolving a number of relatively minor, but nagging consular and administrative problems.

U.S. Agenda

The U.S. agenda comprised six visa issues, on which we sought either faster processing or revised terms of eligibility, and a proposal to expand the number of exit/entry points in each country by two. The most significant issue from our point of view was adding Brest and Nakhodka to the points of entry/exit for U.S. diplomats. Achieving this long-time U.S. goal would enable us to expand our contact with Soviet society, travel more broadly and report in greater detail on developments in two key areas along the Chinese and Polish borders. The visa categories for which we sought improved treatment were: dependents of U.S. diplomats; TDY personnel; guests of Embassy; exchange scholars; governesses; and persons seeking to change visa status while in the Soviet Union.

Soviet Agenda

The Soviet agenda also comprised six visa issues, on which they sought either faster processing or revised terms of eligibility. One of their major goals was to obtain U.S. agreement to issue diplomatic visas in the diplomatic passports of a number of high-level officials: Supreme Soviet deputies, Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the USSR, chairmen of State committees, and members of delegations headed by those officials. While such visas would not automatically confer diplomatic privileges and immunities on their bearers, it would remove a headache for the Foreign Ministry, which periodically gets complaints from high-ranking Soviets who travel to the U.S. on diplomatic passports, but do not get the U.S. diplomatic visa to which, in their eyes, their status entitles them. The Soviets sought improved visa processing for the following categories of personnel: Consulate General employees; diplomats and officials in transit; U.N. Mission employees; journalists; commercial representatives.

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Current Status of Negotiations

The April/May 1983 round of negotiations in Washington produced substantial progress toward agreement on a draft exchange of notes which would have addressed most, but not all, of the agenda items both sides put forward. It became impossible for the U.S. to conclude an agreement during that round of talks after interagency concurrence on expanding entry/exit points broke down. Specifically, the FBI entered objections to allowing the Soviets use of Baltimore as an entry/exit point by sea (to parallel Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast). We stalled the Talks on technicalities until the Soviets finally concluded that no agreement was possible during that round and returned to Moscow.

Prior to their departure, the Soviets indicated that in the context of a satisfactory overall agreement they would be prepared to do the following on our agenda items:

--add Brest and Nakhodka to the entry/exit point list in exchange for San Francisco and Baltimore;

--issue diplomatic visas within 3-7 working days to dependents of personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy and Consulate(s) General in the USSR;

--issue visas within 15 working days to TDYers applying in third countries;

--issue exit visas to exchange scholars and allow them to retain their passports while in USSR;

--issue visas within 10-15 working days to governesses and other household employees.

Two of the U.S. agenda items had not yet been resolved: guest of Embassy visas and processing requests for changes in visa status.

During that round, the U.S. side indicated that in the context of a satisfactory overall agreement we would be prepared to respond as follows to their agenda items:

--issue diplomatic visas to the categories of Soviet officials requested in return for issuance of diplomatic visas to members of Congress; heads of Federal Departments of the U.S. and their deputies; heads of Federal agencies of the U.S. and their deputies; and members of the delegations of those officials;

--issue visas within 3-7 working days to U.S. Mission personnel

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--issue visas within 3-7 days to Soviet diplomats in transit (but not other officials);

--issue visas within 3-5 days to personnel assigned to Consulate(s) General (in fact, this would simplify a long-standing practice of both sides and be of equal value to the U.S.);

--attempt to shorten visa processing time and simplify accreditation procedures for Soviet commercial representatives (in practical terms this vague statement of good intentions had no binding effect, but satisfied Soviet desire for some response on this item).

We had indicated during the talks that we would not be able to satisfy the Soviet request for specified, faster visa processing for their journalists. We had also declined to commit ourselves to 3-7 day transit visa processing for Soviet officials, although we were prepared to do so if the Soviets were more forthcoming on U.S. agenda items they had not yet addressed. Both sides agreed that commitments on visa processing times and issuance were contingent on the applicant's eligibility to receive a visa. In other words, both sides continued to have the right to refuse visas on security or other grounds. Discussions within the USG indicated that all necessary checks on visa applications could be made within the time periods specified in the draft agreement.

Prospects for Successful Conclusion of Talks

The draft language being negotiated was fully reciprocal on each agenda point where reciprocity was possible--i.e., we got diplomatic visas for members of Congress, etc. in return for giving them to Supreme Soviet deputies, etc. But a rough balance of concessions on the agenda items introduced by each side will be necessary if an agreement is to be reached.

The entry/exit point item is the key to a package which will be acceptable to both sides. The negotiating history of the Talks, which stretch back to 1976, implicitly links the diplomatic visas sought by the Soviets to the entry/exit point expansion. If both subjects are dropped from the agenda, the Talks will collapse because the Soviets view themselves as having been more forthcoming on the other visa issues than we have been. If we give them the diplomatic visas, the Talks will conclude successfully from their point of view, but we will have given up our most significant bargaining lever for a set of visa concessions which are of a lower order of significance than the diplomatic visa issuance or the exit/entry points.



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172191	MEMO D. DORNAN AND K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS	4	4/3/1984	B1

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172192 MEMO	ORIGINAL OF DOC #172186 (TO DEGRAFFENREID RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS)	2	4/3/1984	B1

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172193	REPORT RE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS (COPY OF DOC #172187)	3	ND	B1

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BY COB NARA DATE 11/8/13

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March 19, 1984

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR

In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the Soviets. The FBI subsequently withdrew its concurrence to one item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved travel and intelligence reporting opportunities, a long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.

Brick Knolly
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

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U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks

The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the Soviets eventually went home. The shutdown of the KAL aircraft delayed a resumption of the talks.

We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence. Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and depart the country, particularly by the overland routes which give us the greatest opportunity to penetrate Soviet society, make contacts which enable us to spread our ideas, and observe developments in areas of key military importance such as the Chinese and Polish borders. We would obtain entry/exit at Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).

The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part '...limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ...' had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore) would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment....The prolonged boarding procedure could cause difficulties in affording appropriate counterintelligence coverage."

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The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as entry points. The Department shares the FBI's concerns about the demands on its counterintelligence coverage, but we believe that in this instance they are exaggerated. The Soviets cannot bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow. Thus, the counterintelligence coverage needed would be essentially the same as before.

Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point (particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev) and the intelligence value of more frequent travel through the Soviet Far East, the United States will get considerably more out of this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits. In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject; or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating visa and consular issues.

The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172197	MEMO TO NSC (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172188)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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172198 MEMO

2 4/12/1984 B1

TO K. DEGRAFFENREID RE AGREEMENT WITH
THE USSR ON CONTRACTS, EXCHANGES, AND
COOPERATION (ORIGINAL OF DOC #172178)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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172199 MEMO

2 4/12/1984 B1

TO NSC RE PROPOSED AGREEMENTS (ORIGINAL
OF DOC #172179)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

TAB V

FBI REVIEWED 05-May-2009: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

12 APR 1984

172199

S-1409/OS-1

DIA REVIEWED 30-May-2008: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ATTENTION: DIANNE DORNAN

DIA Reviewed: 30 May 2008 - Refer to FBI

SUBJECT: Review of Proposed Agreements (U)

1. (C) Agreement with the USSR on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation.

- Attached to this agreement is a Program of Exchanges for 1984-1986, section I, paragraph (a) dealing with long-term advanced research indicating "that due consideration should be given to young scholars preparing dissertations, as well as, young instructors for purposes of nominations for this exchange. The term young is also used in other portions of the Program of Exchanges. As "young" is an undefined term it might be appropriate to define it to be those under a certain age (e.g. 28). Our experience in the past is that 70 to 90 percent of the Soviet exchange students hold the Soviet equivalent of a doctor's degree and have eight years experience in their research specialty, and are on the average 34.5 years of age.

25x1

25x1

2. (S) US-Soviet Consular Review Talks Entry/Exit Points Issue.

- We agree with the suggestion made by Mr. E. J. O'Malley, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI to the National Security Council dated April 3, 1984 that no concessions to the Soviets in the areas of visas and entry/exit points should be made until a study has been made of the collection opportunities in the USSR that might be made available versus the counterintelligence losses that would accrue to the U.S. through an increased number of entry/exist points.

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR


DECLASSIFIED IN PART
BY CA NARA DATE 4/8/13

ORONET

17

3. (S) Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation.

- From the counterintelligence point of view the most significant portion of this agreement is in Article IV, which contains the provisions for access. Of particular concern are the provisions for multiple entry visas and business travel in the territory of the receiving country. Given the Soviet proclivity for using such enterprises for intelligence collection and the current Soviet priorities for the systematic acquisition of technology, legally or illegally, it is our judgment that these arrangements, as written, offer enhanced collection opportunity for Soviet technology acquisition programs. Since the monitoring of Soviet nationals and their activities within the United States is the responsibility of the FBI, the provisions of Article IV impact most directly on their resource capability. Consequently, we recommend that these counterintelligence considerations be included in any net assessment undertaken as recommended on the Entry/Exit Point issue.



WILLIAM G. LEYDEN, JR.
IG/CI Member

17



~~SECRET~~

VIA LDX

SYSTEM II

90307

Add- on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-15-27-11-9

April 10, 1984

172200


SECRET

BY 1080 NARA DATE 4/4/0

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation (S)

In reference to your memorandum of March 23, 1984, the President has decided to proceed with the negotiation of an agreement on exchanges with the Soviet Union. The Department is requested to obtain the comment of the IG/CI on the draft negotiating position and the draft agreement and forward these to the NSC for consideration no later than April 13, 1984. (S)


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

31

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

0

RECEIVED

84 APR 10 P2:03

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/8/76 CDB

MESSAGE NO. 654 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 1
FROM R. Kimmitt
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION # 90307

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>C-H/1</u>		

REMARKS: _____

38

II

09037

APR 10 1984

A = Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

Should be seen by:

ASAP

Any problem?

4/9
1425

17a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob:

State has asked for a memo along these lines to implement John Poindexter's instructions. (See attached.)

Jack Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONre: 90307
Add on

DECLASSIFIED

172201

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 748-25-27-12-8

April 6, 1984

BY 6003 NARA DATE 4/8/10

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Cultural Exchange Agreement

As we discussed on the phone I think Ken and John have some points that need to be considered. Before I send the package in to Bud (I have discussed this with him) I think a compromise memo with options needs to be prepared to pull the whole issue together. One thing that must be kept in mind is that the President has two objectives -- improving the people-to-people relationship as well as improving the government-to-government relationship. John's points push too far in the direction of people-to-people while ignoring the government-to-government aspects. Some of John's points could be included in our transmittal memo to State as goals to work toward in actually implementing an agreement. On the intelligence aspects it seems to me that any agreement whatsoever has intelligence advantages and disadvantages. Since the President has already decided to proceed ahead with attempting to negotiate an agreement, as originally stated in NSDD 75, it is only a matter of getting the CI community comments on the proposed negotiating position. I would like to get back within a week the IG/CI comments on the document. This needs to move rapidly to avoid undue delay. We erred in not providing more explicit guidance to State on coordinating this issue even though it is sensitive.

cc: Ken deGraffenreid
John Lenczowski
Diane Dornan

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

System #

II

ED Package #

90307

84 APR 10 P12:23

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	PT	
Bob Kimmitt	2	L	
John Poindexter	3		I
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)



11 - 2.52

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90307
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

April 9, 1984

INFORMATIONREF 748-25-27-13-7
BY 1900 NARA DATE 4/8/8

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT:

Cultural Exchange Agreement

NOTED

I have prepared a memo instructing State to obtain the comments of the IG/CI on the draft Cultural Exchange Agreement by Friday, April 13.

Regarding John Lenczowski's comments, I believe it is inaccurate to view them in the context of government-to-government versus people-to-people exchanges. The basic fact is that any agreement on exchanges with the Soviet Union must be between governments. This may be an unpalatable fact, given the nature of the Soviet regime, but it is nonetheless a fact.

Secondly, I would point out that the State-USIA draft agreement does provide a framework which encompasses a wide variety of people-to-people contacts. The effect of exhibits, for example, is almost entirely people to people: our exhibits draw enormous crowds of Soviet citizens from all walks of life; people have not been prevented from attending in the past, though they often must wait hours in line (a result of the sheer popularity of these exhibits). And, when inside, they have the opportunity to speak with American guides -- and not infrequently strike up friendships with a follow-up outside. Of course the KGB watches the exhibits and attempts to monitor contacts, but has been quite unsuccessful in preventing the contacts which result.

This factor is present, mutatis mutandis, in all the other provisions, though less spectacularly so. We cannot force the Soviets to become a free society in order to have exchanges with us. The regime will try to control the contacts, and they will put ringers and watchdogs in most or all of their groups. But this by no means excludes "real people." If it did, we wouldn't have so many defections. The fact is, to make the exchanges credible at all, they must include real dancers, real musicians, real professors, etc., or else their prestige suffers greatly. And the counterpart organizations in the U.S. (with advice and support from the USG) can act to maximize the inclusion of the people we want by withholding approval of a particular exchange until the Soviets come up with a credible slate of participants.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

In sum, the problem should not be viewed as one of trading off government-to-government contacts for people-to-people contacts. Our aim must be to secure a framework which enables us to maximize people-to-people contacts with Soviet Government acquiescence. Without that acquiescence, there will be no substantial contact at all, given the nature of the Soviet system. And just as the charge of the light brigade was not necessarily the most effective tactical approach in achieving a military objective, confronting the Soviet regime head-on with our desire to exclude it in our contacts with its citizens hardly represents the most effective way to achieve our goal for exchanges. Flanking manoeuvres, deceptive strikes, and other military tactics have their counterparts in diplomacy, and if we exclude them on grounds of ideological purity, then this would be as shattering to an effective diplomacy as a military doctrine which allowed only frontal attacks on the most heavily fortified positions would be to effective military operations.

We must also be mindful of three other factors. First, exchange agreements have a long history in U.S.-Soviet relations, and given the conservative nature of the Soviet bureaucracy, it will be easier to negotiate provisions for which there is a precedent than those for which there is none. There are, therefore, direct trade-offs between innovations and delays in getting an agreement in place. Second, it has been my understanding that a cultural exchange agreement was considered by the President as one of the moves we could take to demonstrate that we can agree on something and to improve the working relationship. Steps on our part which unnecessarily result in delay undermine achieving this objective. Finally, if one subsidiary aim of negotiating this agreement is to convince the Soviets that we are serious about improving the relationship, then including quixotic demands is certain to convince them of precisely the opposite.

cc Lenczowski
De Graffenreid
Dornan

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONRe: 90307
Add on

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLR 748-25-27-14-6

April 6, 1984

172203

BY 6013 NARA DATE 4/8/83

MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DeGRAFFENREID/DIANE DORNAN

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Consular Review

I have reviewed this package and discussed it with Bud. This has to be considered from two aspects. First the President has already authorized Secretary Shultz to proceed ahead with the CRT's and secondly the CI community should have an opportunity to review and have their comments taken into account. I would like for you to go back to FBI with a copy of our proposed approval memo to assure the FBI that we are not approving ship visits and it would perfectly understandable if they caveated their position now that they would be opposed to approving ship visits to these ports. I also want you to go to DIA and get their assessment of the intelligence value of the two entry/exit points that we would get. I would like to have the package returned by the end of next week. Clearly the CI effort would be simpler if we did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but we do and the President wants to improve them. We need to insist on reciprocity and insure we do not take unnecessary risks that can not be adequately covered.

cc: Jack Matlock (as discussed)
Bob Kimmitt

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172204	MEMO DORNAN AND DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR	4	4/3/1984	B1

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