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#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY	FILE	With	hdrawer	
		KDB 1/8/20		
USSR (3/8/84) (5)				
25				
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Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR		3/28/1984	B1	
	1	ND	B1	
	5-28-2-	-8		
K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED	2	4/3/1984	B1	
AGREEMENT WITH USSR (PAGES 1-2)				
PAGE 3 OF DOC #172207 (K.	1	4/3/1984	B1	
COORDINATION ON PROPOSED				
AGREEMENT WITH USSR)				
TO DEGRAFFENREID RE US-SOVIET	2	4/3/1984	B1	
CONSULATE REVIEW TALKS (SAME AS				
DOC #172192)				
	USSR (3/8/84) (5) 25 Document Description J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-2. K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR (PAGES 1-2) PAGE 3 OF DOC #172207 (K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR) TO DEGRAFFENREID RE US-SOVIET	USSR (3/8/84) (5) 25 Document Description No of Pages J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE CONSULAR 1 REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-28-2 K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE 2 RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR (PAGES 1-2) PAGE 3 OF DOC #172207 (K. 1) DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR) TO DEGRAFFENREID RE US-SOVIET 2	KDHUSSR (3/8/84) (5)FO/ FO3- 2525SKII 379Document DescriptionNo of PagesDoc Date PagesJ. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR3R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR1R4/8/2013CREST NLR-748-25-28-2-8K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR (PAGES 1-2)2PAGE 3 OF DOC #172207 (K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR)14/3/1984TO DEGRAFFENREID RE US-SOVIET24/3/1984	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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<b>Collection Name</b>	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY	FILE Withdrawer
		KDB 1/8/2016
File Folder	USSR (3/8/84) (5)	FOIA
		F03-002/5
Box Number	25	SKINNER 379
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages
172211 MEMO	D. DORNAN TO J. MATLOCK RE COMMENTS ON PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR	1 3/28/1984 B1
172212 MEMO	DORNAN AND DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR (COPY OF DOC #172204)	4 4/3/1984 B1
172213 MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR (COPY OF DOC #172194)	R 1 3/19/1984 B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-2.	5-28-7-3
172214 REPORT	RE U.SSOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS (COPY OF DOC #172195)	2 ND B1
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172215 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSF (SAME MEMO AS DOC #172196)	2 3/28/1984 B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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National Security Council The White House APR 3 P1:51 System #

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Dep Exec Sec	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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UN APR 3 P2:03



April 3, 1984

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID

Bob,

It is my understanding that Jack Matlock may discuss this issue with Bud today at 4:00 p.m. I would very much appreciate it if Bud could have my memorandum available to him prior to that meeting.

I simply was unaware of this until a short time ago.

Thanks.

Kon

Attachment a/s

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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
17220	5 MEMO J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS WITH USSR	3	3/28/1984	B1

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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SUBJECT:

NLRR748-25-28-2-8 BY ICHI NARA DATEY 8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State


Consular Review Talks with the USSR (S)

The report transmitted with your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 19, 1984, containing recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union, has been reviewed. (S)

The Department is authorized to renew the Consular Review Talks with the USSR on the basis it recommends. It should be noted, however, that this approval does not constitute approval for Soviet ship visits to the Port of Baltimore, which should be treated as a separate issue. Any future recommendations in regard to such requests should be submitted following coordination with the FBI and other interested U.S. agencies. (S)

If the Soviets should accept the expansion of entry/exit points as a part of the package of U.S. proposals, the Department should insure that any arrangements made pursuant to the agreement meet the test of strict reciprocity, and that close coordination be maintained with the FBI and other counterintelligence agencies so that appropriate measures can be taken to minimize any potential intelligence benefits to the Soviet Union. (S)

> Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary



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I=Information 4=	Action R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
1722	08 MEMO	1	4/3/1984	B1
	PAGE 3 OF DOC #172207 (K. DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE COORDINATION ON PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH USSR)			

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]


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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE	OUNTRY FILE KDB 1/8/2016		16
File Folder USSR (3/8/84) (5)	F	<i>FOIA</i> F03-002/5 SKINNER	
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ID Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
172209 MEMO	2	4/3/1984	B1

- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions	
1722	10 REPORT RE U.SSOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS (COPY OF DOC #172187)	3	ND	B1	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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File Folder USSR (3/8/84) (5)	<i>FOIA</i> F03-002/5 SKINNER
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1984

84 MAR 20 A 7: 28

DECLASSIFIED NLRR 148-25-28-1-3 SECRE BY CODD NARA DATE 1/8/03

NAME HOUSE Situation room

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE /

Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR


In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the Soviets. The FBI subequently withdrew its concurrence to one item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved travel and intelligence reporting opportunities, a long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.

miek Charles Hill Executive Secretary

Enclosures: As stated.

DECL:





### DECLASSIFIED NLRR 7-48-25-28-7-3 BY 1000 NARA DATE 4/8/3 SECRET 172214

U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks

The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the Soviets eventually went home. The shootdown of the KAL aircraft delayed a resumption of the talks.

We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence. Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and depart the country, particularly by the overland routes which give us the greatest opportunity to penetrate Soviet society, make contacts which enable us to spread our ideas, and observe developments in areas of key military importance such as the Chinese and Polish borders. We would obtain entry/exit at Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).

The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part '...limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific entry/exit points; ...' had as its thrust the reduction of entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore) would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment...The prolonged boarding procedure could cause difficulties in affording appropriate counterintelligence coverage."

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
- 2 -The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to

merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as entry points. The Department shares the FBI's concerns about the demands on its counterintelligence coverage, but we believe that in this instance they are exaggerated. The Soviets cannot bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow. Thus, the counterintelligence coverage needed would be essentially the same as before.

Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point (particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev) and the intelligence value of more frequent travel through the Soviet Far East, the United States will get considerably more out of this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits. In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject; or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating visa and consular issues.

The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.

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ID	Document Type Document Description	No of pages	Doc Date	Restric- tions
17001	15 MEMO	2	3/28/1984	B1

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