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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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| ID     | Doc Type | Document Description                                                             | No of Pages                    | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| 172228 | MEMO     | W. STEARMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE<br>NEW SOVIET BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR<br>RESTRICTIONS | 2                              | 3/9/1984  | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-1-6</b> |           |              |
| 172229 | CABLE    | USBERLIN 0722                                                                    | 5                              | 3/8/1984  | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-2-5</b> |           |              |
| 172230 | MEMO     | C. HILL TO R. MCFARLANE RE<br>PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT                             | 1                              | 3/12/1984 | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-3-4</b> |           |              |
| 172231 | MEMO     | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET<br>RESERVATIONS IN BERLIN AIR<br>CORRIDORS        | 1                              | 3/15/1984 | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-5-2</b> |           |              |
| 172232 | MEMO     | C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET<br>RESERVATIONS IN BERLIN AIR<br>CORRIDORS        | 3                              | 3/13/1984 | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-6-1</b> |           |              |
| 172233 | REPORT   | SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST RE<br>BERLIN AVIATION                                   | 1                              | 3/8/1984  | B1           |
|        | <b>R</b> | <b>4/8/2013</b>                                                                  | <b>CREST NLR-748-25-30-7-0</b> |           |              |

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| ID Doc Type | Document Description                                             | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 172234 MEMO | J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE<br>PROPOSED BAN ON SOVIET PRODUCTS | 1           | 3/13/1984 | B1           |

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RECEIVED 10 MAR 84 14

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 09 MAR 84

KEYWORDS. BERLIN

USSR

NAVIGATIONAL FREEDOM

AVIATION

SUBJECT. NEW SOVIET - BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR RESTRICTIONS

ACTION. FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8402094

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DECLASSIFIED

March 9, 1984

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-25-30-1-6

BY 1603 NARA DATE 4/8/17

NOM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT:

New Soviet Berlin Air Corridor Restrictions

The Soviet "air reservation" restrictions introduced on February 20 pose a potentially serious problem and bear close watching. A tough, united Allied position should cause the Soviets to back off and would prevent a significant erosion of Allied air access rights.

These new restrictions on flight altitudes within the Berlin air corridors bear the hallmark of the kind of Soviet "salami tactics" on Berlin access which we have experienced off and on for the better part of four decades. Embassy Moscow, Embassy Bonn, the French and, I gather, some at State basically see these new restrictions as essentially military initiatives (to provide greater freedom for Soviet air maneuvers in the GDR) taken with no or only lower level political clearances. After years of close involvement with Berlin access problems, I find this difficult to believe. U.S. Mission Berlin (USBER) shares my skepticism.

USBER makes a good and well-documented case that these restrictions have been developing over the past year as a matter of policy with political approval -- although the military may have provided the initial impetus (see Tab I). A new GDR aviation law, which entered into force on February 1, 1984, asserts that the GDR has "exclusive sovereignty" over all air space above its territory. Soviet moves may be in support of this GDR assertion -- as well as facilitating their own air maneuvers. In any case, the Soviets last year claimed authority to allocate corridor airspace and to give Soviet military requirements priority.

USBER and Embassy Moscow both agree that the Soviets do not want a Berlin crisis at this time. This could jeopardize the bigger "peace" game they are now playing in Western Europe; however, USBER points out (correctly, I believe) that these apparently insignificant "technical" measures designed to enhance air safety in the corridor may, the Soviets calculate, not be considered by the Allies as sufficiently serious to complicate relations with the USSR in other areas. The Soviets may also calculate that disunity among the Allies may lead to an eventual accommodation with the new restrictions. After all, this tactic of slicing off thin, "insignificant" slices of access rights has worked time and again in the past. Why not try it now?

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If we dig in our heels now, the Soviets will most likely back off because they certainly do not want to make a big issue of this at the present time. In fact, demarches to the Soviets in the three Allied capitals (February 27 and 28) may have already had the necessary impact. There have been no reservation notices since March 2, and recently Soviet aircraft have uncharacteristically avoided crossing the corridors during exercises.

*equal* | Should the Soviet replies to our demarches (not yet received) be unsatisfactory, and should the new reservations be continued, we should, as Art Hartman recommends, "escalate the level of protest as necessary and ... make it clear that we cannot consider Berlin in isolation from broader questions of bilateral relations and arms control." (Embassy Moscow's 6002 of March 8.)

Attachment:

Tab I      Cable from U.S. Mission Berlin No. 8891, March 8

cc: Jack Matlock  
Peter Sommer  
Ty Cobb  
John Lenczowski  
Don Fortier  
Richard Beal

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A

172229

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 USBERLIN 0722

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, PREL, BZ, BGG, UR, GE, GC

SUBJECT: BERLIN AVIATION: NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS

REF: STATE 65568

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS TELEGRAM PROVIDES MISSION VIEWS ON THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEPARTMENT (REFTEL) REGARDING NEW SOVIET AIR RESERVATIONS. IN OUR VIEW:

- (A) THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT MADE A MERE TECHNICAL ADJUSTMENT OR FINE-TUNED PAST AIR RESERVATIONS PRACTICE, BUT MORE LIKELY HAVE MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO SEEK CHANGES IN THE BERLIN AIR REGIME FAVORABLE TO THE GDR AND THEMSELVES.
- (B) THE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEK A NEW BERLIN CRISIS. RATHER, THEY ARE COUNTING ON THEIR OWN POLITICAL FINESSE, ON CURRENT WEST GERMAN DESIRE FOR CALM AND AN IMPROVEMENT IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, AND ON THE DIFFICULTIES OF ALLIED COORDINATION TO ACHIEVE WHAT THEY WANT.
- (C) THUS FAR, THE NEW MOVES HAVE COST THE SOVIETS NOTHING. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TEST THEIR DETERMINATION AND THEIR INTENTIONS BOTH AT THE DIPLOMATIC AND TECHNICAL LEVEL.

END SUMMARY.

3. DETERMINING SOVIET MOTIVES IS NEVER EASY, AND WE WERE IN BERLIN MAY NOT BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO DO SO. WE DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY ACTION THE SOVIETS TAKE THAT AFFECTS BERLIN MUST BE ASSESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AND RESPONDED TO ON ITS MERITS. THE FIRST QUESTION WE MUST ASK IS HOW SOVIET ACTIONS AFFECT THE STATUS AND WELLBEING OF THIS CITY, AND OUR OWN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES HERE. SOVIET MOTIVATION IS AN IMPORTANT, BUT OFTEN SECONDARY CONSIDERATION FOR US. IN THAT SPIRIT, MISSION BERLIN WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

4. THE RECENT SOVIET MOVES REFLECT A JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY EFFORT. THE MILITARY IS HEAVILY INVOLVED AND MAY EVEN HAVE PROVIDED THE ORIGINAL IMPETUS, BUT THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON ALLIED RIGHTS, AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED, ARE TOO GREAT TO HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. RECENT STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICERS INDICATE THEY ARE WELL INFORMED AND ACTIVELY INVOLVED.

5. WE DO NOT THINK RECENT SOVIET INITIATIVES WERE CONCEIVED OVERNIGHT. THERE HAS BEEN DISAGREEMENT FOR DECADES OVER THE NATURE OF ALLIED RIGHTS IN THE CORRIDORS AND BERLIN CONTROL ZONE (BCZ), BUT OVER THE LAST YEAR THE SOVIETS HAVE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS REASSERTED UNEQUIVOCALLY THEIR POSITION ON THE SUBORDINATION OF ALLIED AIR RIGHTS TO SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND GDR SOVEREIGNTY.

- (A) ON 2 APRIL 1983 THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED THE TOTAL CLOSURE OF ONE OF THE CORRIDORS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MORE THAN A DECADE. THE

- SOVIETS REJECTED ALLIED DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS, USING LANGUAGE THAT IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOCATING AIRSPACE IN THE CORRIDORS FOR FLIGHT SAFETY REASONS AND COULD, IF THEY SAW FIT, GIVE PRECEDENCE TO THE NEEDS OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT.

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C D N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 USBERLIN 00722

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, PREL, BZ, BQG, UR, GE, GC

SUBJECT: BERLIN AVIATION: NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS

- (B) DURING THE SUMMER OF 1983, THE SOVIETS IN THE
- BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER (BASC) ARTICULATED
- A PARTICULARLY HARD LINE ON DEVIATIONS FROM
- THE CORRIDORS BY ALLIED AIRCRAFT DURING PERIODS
- OF BAD WEATHER.

(C) ON THE BASIS OF SIGHTINGS, THE NUMBER OF EASTERN AIRCRAFT IN THE CORRIDORS INCREASED IN 1983. INCLUDING ONE CASE IN WHICH A FIGHTER REPEATEDLY CIRCLED A SMALL PRIVATE U.S. AIRPLANE IN THE SOUTH CORRIDOR. (03 USBERLIN 2051) PAST ASSURANCES BY SOVIET CONTROLLERS THAT THEIR PILOTS WERE REQUIRED TO PASS AN EXAM ON HOW TO STAY CLEAR OF THE CORRIDORS AND VIRTUAL APOLOGIES FROM THE SOVIETS FOR EARLIER NEAR-MISSES (E.G., 03 USBERLIN 1963) GAVE WAY IN MID-1983 TO A MUCH TOUGHER SOVIET LINE. AT TIMES, THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE ALLIES' FACTUAL ASSERTIONS; ON OTHER OCCASIONS, AND PARTICULARLY AFTER SEVERAL NEAR-MISSES IN EARLY 1984, THE SOVIETS ADMITTED THE INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED, BUT MADE CLEAR THAT SOVIET AIRCRAFT HAD THE RIGHT TO USE THE CORRIDOR AIRSPACE WITHOUT NOTIFICATION IN THE BASC.

(D) THIS INCREASE IN AIR ACTIVITY IN THE CORRIDORS

WAS PARALLELED BY AN INCREASE IN EASTERN HELICOPTER FLIGHTS IN THE BC2. THERE WERE UNUSUAL FLIGHTS BOTH BY SOVIET HELICOPTERS OVER THE WESTERN SECTORS IN SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER AND GDR HELICOPTERS OVER EAST BERLIN BEGINNING IN JULY. WHILE WE CANNOT BE SURE WHAT THESE HELICOPTER FLIGHTS MEAN, IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT, IN REJECTING ALLIED PROTESTS, THE SOVIETS ASSERTED THAT THE AIRSPACE ABOVE EAST BERLIN WAS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE GDR "CAPITAL," THAT THE GDR HAD THE RIGHT TO FLY IN THIS AIRSPACE, AND THAT THE WESTERN PROTESTS WERE AN ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE GDR.

(E) IN A MOVE THAT IN RETROSPECT SUGGESTS A SOVIET/GDR EFFORT TO BUTTRESS THEIR LEGAL POSITION ON THE STATUS OF THE CORRIDORS AND BC2, THE GDR VOLKSKAMMER PASSED A NEW AVIATION LAW ON 27 OCTOBER 1983 THAT ENTERED INTO FORCE ON 1 FEBRUARY 1984. THE LAW ASSERTED THAT THE GDR HAD "EXCLUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY" OVER ALL AIRSPACE ABOVE ITS TERRITORY AND INCLUDED A NUMBER OF FORMULATIONS THAT WERE BROADER IN THRUST -- AND MORE OBJECTIONABLE TO THE ALLIES -- THAN THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIOR 1963 STATUTE.

F) IN LATE 1983 AND EARLY 1984 THE SOVIET CHIEF CONTROLLER MADE A NUMBER OF RIGIDLY DOCTRINAIRE STATEMENTS IN THE BASC. FIRST, HE ASSERTED THAT SHALL ALLIED AIRLINES REQUIRED THE PERMISSION OF THE GDR TO FLY IN THE CORRIDORS. SECOND, HE REFUSED TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF AN ALLIED CALIBRATION FLIGHT

DURING A PERIOD OF SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY ON THE EXPRESS BASIS THAT SOVIET ACTIVITIES TOOK PRECEDENCE OVER ALLIED FLIGHT REQUIREMENTS. FINALLY, ON FEBRUARY 3 THE SOVIET CHIEF CONTROLLER PROTESTED TWO LOCAL FLIGHTS IN

BT

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C D N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 USBERLIN 00722

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, PREL, BZ, BQG, UR, GE, GC  
SUBJECT: BERLIN AVIATION: NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS  
LANGUAGE THAT LABELLED THE AIRDROME TRAFFIC  
ZONES (ATZ'S) IN THE 1946 FLIGHT RULES "OBSOLETE"  
AND INADEQUATE FOR "MODERN REQUIREMENTS". HE  
THREATENED CONSEQUENCES IF THERE WERE FUTURE  
"INTRUDERS."

6. WHILE THE ABOVE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS APPEAR IN  
RETROSPECT TO BE PART OF A PATTERN, WE CANNOT BE SURE.  
WE DO, HOWEVER, THINK THEY SUGGEST THAT SOMETIME IN 1983,  
THE SOVIETS AND GDR MAY HAVE MADE A DECISION TO SEEK  
CHANGES WITH REGARD TO THE BERLIN AIR REGIME. WE  
BELIEVE A POLICY DECISION -- NOT SIMPLY TECHNICAL  
CONCERNS -- IS BEHIND THE NEW SOVIET AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS  
ANNOUNCED ON FEBRUARY 20 AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PROPOSALS  
OF FEBRUARY 29. WE WOULD SUM UP THE STEPS THEY APPEAR  
TO HAVE TAKEN AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, THE SOVIETS AND GDR  
HAVE FORCEFULLY REASSERTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE  
CORRIDORS AND BCZ (OUTSIDE WEST BERLIN) FORM A PART  
OF GDR AIRSPACE OVER WHICH THE GDR ENJOYS ULTIMATE  
SOVEREIGNTY. SECOND, THE SOVIETS HAVE ARTICULATED  
THE PRINCIPLE THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR FLIGHT SAFETY IN THE CORRIDORS, THEY HAVE THE  
AUTHORITY TO ALLOCATE AIRSPACE. THIRD, THE SOVIETS  
HAVE ADVANCED THE NEW PRINCIPLE, IN THE BASIC AND ON

THE POLITICAL LEVEL, THAT, WHERE THEY DEEM IT NECESSARY,  
ALLIED AIR ACCESS TO BERLIN MUST BE SUBORDINATED TO  
SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. FINALLY -- AND MOST  
IMPORTANT -- THE SOVIETS AND GDR HAVE DEMONSTRATED  
THROUGH THEIR WRITTEN RESERVATIONS AND THEIR FLIGHTS  
ACROSS THE CORRIDORS AND IN THE BCZ THAT THEY ARE  
PREPARED TO STAND BY THESE LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN ACTUAL  
PRACTICE.

--  
DOES THE ABOVE ACCORD WITH PRESUMED SOVIET GOALS  
WITH REGARD TO US-USSR RELATIONS, SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS,  
AND FRG-GDR RELATIONS? THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY DO NOT  
WANT A BERLIN CRISIS AT THIS TIME. THEY STILL HOPE  
TO UNDERMINE NATO SOLIDARITY AND INFLUENCE EUROPEAN  
PUBLIC OPINION. THEY SEEK TO PROJECT THEMSELVES  
AS COOPERATIVE AND PEACESEEKING, AND PLAY TO THE  
DESIRE AMONG MANY WEST EUROPEANS TO BELIEVE THAT THE  
SOVIET UNION NO LONGER POSES A DIRECT MILITARY OR  
SERIOUS POLITICAL THREAT. NONETHELESS, IN OUR VIEW,  
THE SOVIETS PROBABLY BELIEVE THEIR CURRENT EFFORT TO  
ALTER THE AIR REGIME IS NOT LIKELY TO ENDANGER  
BROADER SOVIET GOALS. THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO  
CHARACTERIZE THE ISSUE AS MILITARY-TECHNICAL IN NATURE,  
AND HAVE INSISTED THAT THEIR MOTIVATION IS MERELY TO  
ENSURE AIR SAFETY -- SOMETHING THE ALLIES HOLD THEM  
RESPONSIBLE FOR. THEY WOULD LIKE US AND ANYONE ELSE  
-- INCLUDING PRESS AND PUBLIC SHOULD THIS BECOME A  
PUBLIC ISSUE -- TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR FEBRUARY 20  
ANNOUNCEMENT, AND FEBRUARY 29 PROPOSALS, WERE IN  
RESPONSE TO OUR PROTESTS OVER NEAR-MISSES IN THE  
CORRIDORS. THEY HAVE PLAUSIBLE ANSWERS TO COUNTER  
ALLIED ARGUMENTS. WHEN WE OBJECT ABOUT STEEP GLIDE  
PATHS INTO BERLIN, THEY PRESENT DETAILED DIAGRAMS OF  
APPROACH AND DEPARTURE PATTERNS WHICH ATTEMPT TO SHOW  
THE PROBLEM IS NOT SERIOUS. WHEN WE SAY THEY ARE

ATTEMPTING TO INFRINGE ON OUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND SET NEW  
PRECEDENTS, THE POINT OUT THAT SINCE WE HOLD THEM  
RESPONSIBLE FOR FLIGHT SAFETY, IT LOGICALLY FOLLOWS  
THAT THEY MUST HAVE THE RIGHT TO ALLOCATE FLIGHT LEVELS;  
MOREOVER, THEY SAY, WE HAVE ACCEPTED THIS OVER THE PAST  
FEW YEARS -- ERGO, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THEIR RIGHT TO DO  
SO NOW.

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TAGS: PGOV, FAIR, PREL, BZ, BOG, UR, GE, GC

SUBJECT: BERLIN AVIATION: NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS

8. THE SOVIETS MAY BE COUNTING ON THIS APPROACH AND ON THE TECHNICAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM TO CLOUD THE ISSUES OF ALLIED RIGHTS AND UNHINDERED ACCESS TO BERLIN. MOREOVER, THEY ARE PROBABLY HOPING THAT OFFICIALS IN ALLIED CAPITALS AND IN BONN, PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER MATTERS, WILL NOT LET A SMALL BERLIN PROBLEM COMPLICATE RELATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THEY ALSO MAY HOPE -- NOT UNREASONABLY -- THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO AGREE ON A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION, AND AS TIME GOES ON, THE ALLIES AND AIRLINES WILL ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO THE NEW PRACTICE, AND IT WILL BECOME A FAIT ACCOMPLI.

9. IF THE SOVIETS CAN GET THE ALLIES TO ACQUIESCE IN THEIR FEBRUARY 20 RESERVATIONS POLICY, THEY WILL HAVE IMPOSED UPON US UNREASONABLE FLIGHT PRACTICES. BY SO DOING THEY WILL HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARD PROVING WHAT THEY HAVE CONTENTED FOR SOME TIME: THAT THEY HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER THE AIR CORRIDORS. THE SOVIETS WILL THEN BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO IMPOSE FURTHER CONDITIONS ON OUR USE OF THE CORRIDORS, GRADUALLY ERODING THE ALLIED ROLE IN THE AIR REGIME AND MAKING AIR ACCESS, A BASIC ELEMENT IN THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIABILITY OF WEST BERLIN, EVER MORE DIFFICULT.

10. WE ARE NOT SURE HOW COMMITTED THE SOVIETS ARE TO THEIR NEW AIR INITIATIVES OR HOW IMPORTANT THEY FEEL FULL ALLIED ACCEPTANCE IS AT THIS TIME. THIS COULD BE A LONG-TERM EFFORT WHICH THEY ARE PREPARED TO WORK ON OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS, GRADUALLY ALTERING THE CORRIDOR REGIME IN THEIR FAVOR. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR RISKED VERY LITTLE. IF THE ALLIES REFUSE TO GO ALONG, OR IF THE SOVIETS COME UNDER PUBLIC PRESSURE, THEY CAN EXTRICATE THEMSELVES EASILY WITH THE EXPLANATION THEY WERE ONLY RESPONDING TO ALLIED COMPLAINTS ABOUT AIR SAFETY. IN FACT, THEY MAY EVEN NOW BE RECONSIDERING THEIR POSITION IN LIGHT OF ALLIED REACTIONS SINCE FEBRUARY 20: AFTER A SPATE OF RESERVATIONS LAST WEEK, THERE HAVE BEEN NO NOTIFICATIONS SINCE MARCH 2, AND THE SOVIETS ARE EXERCISING THEIR FORCES NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE CORRIDORS, UNCHARACTERISTICALLY AVOIDING FLYING ACROSS THEM.

11. THIS IS, HOWEVER ONLY SPECULATION. UNTIL WE SEE CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE RECONSIDERED, WE BELIEVE WE MUST KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. WE PROPOSE A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH:

- (A) WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TELL THE SOVIETS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY THAT WHAT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO IS SERIOUS AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE ALLIES.
- (B) WE SHOULD FLY THROUGH THE RESTRICTED AREA TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SIMPLY ACQUIESCING IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE AIR REGIME.
- (C) WE SHOULD PROBE THE SOVIETS AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL IN THE BASC, ATTEMPTING TO ASCERTAIN THEIR MOTIVATIONS, PERCEIVED FLIGHT NEEDS, AND THEIR

DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE COURSE THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN.

12. MISSION IS PREPARING SEPTEL WHICH ADDRESSES THE ATTITUDES OF THE ALLIES HERE, PRESS ASPECTS, AND THE BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01  
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, EAIR, PREL, BZ, BQG, UR, GE, GC  
SUBJECT: BERLIN AVIATION: NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS  
BRIEFING OF GERMAN OFFICIALS.

13. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE U. S.  
COMMANDER, BERLIN.  
LEDSKY  
BT

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ID 8402046

TO

McFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

RECEIVED 13 MAR 84 10

DOCDATE 12 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: PRES STATEMENT RE INTL DAY OF CONCERN FOR SOVIET JEWS 15 MAR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 13 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

MATLOCK

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RAYMOND

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REF# 8407386

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McFarlane approved

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PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE  
INTERNATIONAL DAY OF CONCERN FOR SOVIET JEWS  
MARCH 15, 1984

Today is the International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews. It marks the seventh anniversary of the arrest of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy for his activities on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. His courage and determination to stand up for those rights have earned him the respect and admiration of countless people worldwide. But he would not want this day to be dedicated solely to him. Rather it is a day when men and women of good will reflect on all the aspects of the situation of Jewry in the U.S.S.R. That situation has deteriorated over the past year. Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has fallen to its lowest levels since the late 1960s; officially-tolerated anti-Semitism, manifesting itself in broadcasts, articles, and the widely-publicized formation of an "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public", has increased; and individual refuseniks continue to be subjected to harassment.

All in all, this is a grim picture. But we will not be disheartened. Soviet Jews value the support of concerned individuals and organizations all over the world. In our country this support reflects the broad, grassroots concern which abuse of human rights elicits in the American public. Outrage where human rights are violated is one of the best American traditions. I endorse the International Day of Concern, and the goals for which it stands.

The United States Government shares these goals. It has actively supported the right of Soviet Jews to practice their cultural traditions freely and to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. if they so choose. This point has been emphasized to the Soviet authorities in many fora and at all levels; it has been conveyed to the new Soviet leadership. It is our sincere hope that the Soviets will ease their repressive human rights policies and fulfill the solemn international obligations they have undertaken, *including their commitment under the Helsinki Accords.* In our dialogue with the Soviet authorities, we have no higher priority. Those who care about the fate of Soviet Jews should know that we are with them today, and will be with them tomorrow.



DECLASSIFIED

S/S 8407386  
United States Department of State

NLRR 14825-30-3-4

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY LCDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

March 12, 1984

2046

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4 MAR 12 10: 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement in Support of the International Day  
of Concern for Soviet Jews, March 15

In response to a number of requests, the Secretary of State met with leaders of major American Jewish organizations in Washington on Thursday, March 8, to review the situation faced by Soviet Jewry. The leaders were basically supportive of the Administration's efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry, and appreciated the chance to meet with the Secretary and voice their concerns. They expressed particularly strong interest in a Presidential statement in support of the upcoming International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews, March 15. That date marks the seventh anniversary of the arrest of noted refusenik and human rights activist Anatoliy Shcharanskiy.

We recommend that the President issue the requested statement for the March 15 commemoration. Such a statement would underscore the Administration's commitment to this aspect of human rights, and would usefully reinforce the positive reaction of the Jewish community leaders to the March 8 meeting. The President has issued statements on Soviet Jewry on a number of other occasions. The attached draft statement draws on some of those previous remarks.

*Covey*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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12/18, as amended

March 13, 1984

Declassify on: OADR, Sept 11, 2008  
DATE 1/8/16ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Presidential Statement in Support of the  
International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews,  
March 15

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from the Department of State forwarding a Presidential statement in support of the upcoming International Day of Concern for Soviet Jews, March 15. Secretary Shultz met with leaders of the major American Jewish organization in Washington on March 8 to review the situation faced by Soviet Jewry. The leaders were basically supportive of the Administration's efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

*WR* *3L*  
Raymond and Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Presidential statement be issued as drafted by the Department of State as amended on page 2.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I Memo from State with Presidential statement

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Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council  
The White House

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cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other

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Prepare memo to RCM due 3/13

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15  
ID 8402094

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

RECEIVED 14 MAR 84 09

DOCDATE 13 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR  
AVIATION

BERLIN

SUBJECT SOVIET AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS IN BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 16 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

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MATLOCK

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JM

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National Security Council  
The White House

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4 MAR 16 P 1: 59

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

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March 15, 1984

INFORMATIONBY COB NARA DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Reservations in Berlin Air Corridors

RCM HAS SEEN

State's report on the situation in the Berlin air corridors and the action taken is at Tab I.

In State's opinion, the series of reservations which have been posted recently by the Soviets for the air corridors is most likely related to expanded Soviet military air exercises which cross the corridors, rather than a calculated effort to undermine the Quadripartite Declaration on Berlin.

We have protested these actions both in Berlin and in our capitals and have refused a low-level Soviet offer to renegotiate the system of altitude allocations. Since a reservation was cancelled March 2, no new reservations by the Soviets have taken effect, although one was announced for March 10 and cancelled at the last minute.

State has convened an inter-agency meeting to discuss implications of the actions. In the meantime, it opposes discussing the issues involved with the Soviets so long as the new "policy" of reservations is in effect. If the Soviet response to our diplomatic protests is not satisfactory, other avenues will be considered, such as using military aircraft to fly through reserved space.

I believe these actions are appropriate for the moment, and we shall continue to monitor the situation closely.

*IL* Lenczowski, *PRS* Sommer, *TD* Dobriansky, and *2* Levine concur.

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill to McFarlane Memo on Soviet Airspace Reservations in Berlin Air Corridors, March 13, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



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S/S#8407649

United States Department of State

NLRR 748-25-30-6-1

Washington, D.C. 20520

BY KOU NARA DATE 4/8/83

March 13, 1984

172232

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

84 MAR 13 P10:47

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Soviet Airspace Reservations in Berlin Air Corridors

Procedures which have governed operations of the Berlin air corridors since 1945 provide for use of the airspace by all four powers, including the USSR. Since 1980, the Soviets have increasingly been exercising this "right" to close off segments of the Berlin air corridors (usually lower altitudes) in order to conduct military air exercises without risking collisions with Allied civilian airliners. These Soviet reservations have at times been a matter of controversy with the Western allies, but in general the system functioned satisfactorily.

On February 20, the Soviets began applying a more restrictive approach on Berlin air corridor "reservations." Instead of reserving only the lower levels of some segments of the corridors, the new reservations extend throughout the entire corridors at lower altitudes, necessitating steeper landing and take-off patterns for Allied aircraft. Without time consuming adjustments to the flight pattern, which have now been adopted, this new pattern of reservations would raise a potential danger to the safety of allied flights, since the landing approach to West Berlin would be too short to allow a normal approach.

While this new pattern of reservations does not violate our rights of air access to Berlin as such, it does represent a unilateral Soviet change in agreed procedures which is unacceptable to us. Such unilateral changes are foreclosed by the so-called "Quadripartite Declaration" of November, 1972 in which the four Powers (including the Soviets) agreed to avoid altering existing procedures unilaterally.

There are thus both legal and practical reasons to oppose the Soviet move. As is normal in Berlin matters, the Allies have protested both in Berlin and in capitals. (Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov was called in to the State Department February 27, and a follow-up was made March 9). We have also refused to respond to a low-level Soviet offer to renegotiate the entire system of altitude allocations which would in effect close lower altitudes permanently to allied

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- 2 -

aircraft. Our rationale in refusing to respond was: a) that we do not wish to begin negotiations under pressure from the Soviets and b) the question of altitude allocations is too complicated to discuss on short notice. Since a reservation which was abruptly cancelled March 2, no new reservations have taken effect, although one was announced for March 10 and cancelled at the last minute.

In response to a request for their views, Embassies Bonn, Moscow and Berlin and Mission Berlin have suggested that the Soviet moves in Berlin do not appear to be related to any larger pattern of Soviet actions; indeed, pressuring Berlin appears to run counter to Soviet efforts to appear as a peace-maker in Western Europe. The Soviets have other means of pressuring the FRG which would not run the risk of producing a dispute with the FRG and the Allies in Berlin. We thus do not believe that these steps are the precursor of a broader Soviet effort to pressure the West in Berlin.

While difficult to evaluate, the reasons for the Soviet actions appear to be based primarily on efforts by the Soviet military to obtain additional airspace for low level military air support exercises in the GDR. The main Soviet training areas lie below the air corridors and we do know that the Soviets have during the past four years introduced new concepts of close air support as more modern aircraft have been deployed with the GSFG. Over the past years, we have noticed increased pressure by the Soviet military in East Germany on their counterparts in the Soviet Embassy to push military concerns in Berlin. In the current instance, the Embassy officials have provided full support for the military demands, although they have taken pains to stress that this is a "technical matter" with no political implications.

Another indication that the military is the primary mover behind the changes was the visit of two high ranking Soviet generals to the Berlin Air Safety Control Center soon after the Allied protest in Washington. The generals asked openly why the Allies were so concerned about the reservations and said we should be able to reach agreement on organization of air space.

The Department will continue to monitor Soviet activities carefully while working with our posts in Germany and our British and French allies to formulate an adequate response to the Soviet moves. We have convened an inter-agency meeting to discuss implications of the actions, including the importance of low-level altitudes. In the

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- 3 -

meantime, we believe strongly that the West should not discuss the issues involved with the Soviets as long as the new "policy" of reservations is in effect. If we receive no satisfactory response to our diplomatic protests, we will have to consider other avenues which are open to us -- such as flying through reserved airspace with military aircraft.

The Department will inform you regularly of further developments on this matter.

*for* *BMCKinley*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1984

FOR: → JACK MATLOCK  
RON LEHMAN

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

Attached with RCM note:

"I agree with this. What is  
State's reaction?"

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

March 8, 1984

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLISTCONFIDENTIALBY KOB DATE 4/8/83Berlin Aviation: New Soviet Restrictions

According to our mission in Berlin, Moscow's new air corridor restrictions do not reflect an attempt by the Soviets to merely adjust or fine tune past practice, but rather a conscious decision to seek changes in the Berlin air regime favorable to the East Germans and themselves. 172233

- o The Soviets are counting on their own political finesse, current West German desires for calm and an improvement in inner-German relations, and the difficulties of allied coordination to achieve what they want.

In a separate assessment, our embassy in Moscow can perceive no compelling reason why the Soviet leadership should see it in their interests to ignite a controversy over Berlin at the present time. While erosion and ultimate elimination of Allied rights in Berlin may well continue to be a long-term Soviet goal, bringing matters to a head would surely complicate if not undermine current Soviet strategy towards Europe and the U.S.

- o The course of the air corridor dispute to date indicates that the higher Soviet foreign policy actors -- Gromyko, Chernenko and Ustinov -- have not been engaged in the issue.
- o The embassy does not believe the Soviet leadership would be prepared to see this issue lead to a full-blown controversy with its many negative ramifications.

Our goal, according to the embassy, should be to engage them to make them realize that any minor gains they might hope to make over Berlin would be outweighed by the negative consequences for bilateral relations and for efforts to resume the East-West dialogue.

- o The U.S. and its Allies should stand tough, escalate the level of protest as necessary, and make it clear that we cannot consider Berlin in isolation from broader questions of bilateral relations and arms control. (C)

USBerlin 722, Moscow 2838, PSN 25720, PSN 25888

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TO

McFARLANE

KEYWORDS USSR

IMPORT CONTROLS

SUBJECT: CUSTOMS BAN ON USSR PRODUCTS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

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172234 MEMO

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J. MATLOCK TO R. MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED  
BAN ON SOVIET PRODUCTS

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