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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE		Witho MJD	frawer 7/27/2007			
File Fo	older	ARGENTIN	A (06/16/1982-06/30	/1982)	FOIA	112112001
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ID	Doc Type	Docun	nent Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
39608	CABLE	16023	5Z JUN 82	1	6/16/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-1-1		
39610	CABLE	17214	7Z JUN 82	1	6/17/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-2-0		
39612	CABLE	17143	5Z JUN 82	1	6/17/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-3-9		
39613	CABLE	17224	5Z JUN 82	1	6/17/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-4-8		
39614	CABLE	17143	5Z JUN 82	1	6/17/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-5-7		
39615	CABLE	17222	1Z JUN 82	1	6/17/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-6-6		
39616	CABLE	18022	8Z JUN 82	1	6/18/1982	B1
		R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-16-7-5		

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE			Withdrawer					
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39617	CABLE	18	0032Z	JUN 82		1	6/18/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-8-4		
39618	CABLE	18	1804Z	JUN 82		1	6/18/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-9-3		
39619	CABLE	18	2142Z	JUN 82		1	6/18/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-10-1	1	
39620	MEMO			IDER HAIG TO T KLANDS CRISIS	HE PRESIDENT	1	6/19/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-11-0		
39621	MEMO			NDER HAIG TO T	HE PRESIDENT	1	6/19/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-12-9	,	
39622	DRAFT LETTER			ENT REAGAN TO ER THATCHER	PRIME	1	ND	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-13-8	3	
39623	CABLE	22	22126Z	JUN 82		1	6/22/1982	B1
		R		11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-14-7	7	

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Collec	tion Name	EXE	CUTIVE	E SECRETARIAT, N	SC: COUNTRY FI	LE	Witho MJD	drawer 7/27/2007
File Fo	older	ARG	ENTIN	A (06/16/1982-06/30/	(1982)		FOIA	
							F1637	
Box N	umber	26					VEIG	EL
ID	Doc Type		Docum	nent Description		No of Pages		Restrictions
39624	MEMO			NSO SAPIA-BOSCH K RE SANCTIONS	H TO WILLIAM	1	6/22/1982	B1
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39625	CABLE		231610	6Z JUN 82		1	6/23/1982	B1
			R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-16-5		
39626	МЕМО			IAM CLARK TO SE E RE MESSAGE	CRETARY OF	1	6/28/1982	B1
			R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-17-4		
39627	MEMO			ER FONTAINE TO WESSAGE	VILLIAM CLARK	2	6/25/1982	B1
			R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-18-3		
39628	CABLE		30105	0Z JUN 82		2	6/30/1982	B1
			R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-19-2	,	
39629	NOTE		POINI	IY TO MCFARLAN DEXTER RE PRESI MENTS		1	7/1/1982	B1
			R	11/8/2017	NLR-748-26-1	6-20-0	,	

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION BOOM

PAGE Ø1 BUENOS AIRES 3596 SIT840 DATE Ø6/17/82

DTG: 1692352 JUN 82 PSN: 020473 TOR: 167/03162

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /801

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS PUBS FONT EOB: WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NC MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3598 1670247 O 160235Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC INMEDIATE NIACT 4134

INFO SOUTH ATLANTIC SITREP COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PANAMA USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA DIA WASHDC JSI-4A/JSI-4B/DB-3B/DB-3E/DC-4A BT

CONFILEENTE AL BUENOS AIRES 3598 CINCSO FOR INTAFF, CINCLANT FOR POLAD, ROME FOR VATICAN E.O. 12065: GDS 6-15-88 (KEANE, JF) OR-P TAGS: PBOR, UK, AR, FA SUBJECT: SOUTH ATLANTIC CRISIS: GALTIERI'S SPEECH

1. GALTIERI'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 15 (FBIS WILL CARRY THE TEXT) WAS DEFIANT AND THREATENING. THE PRESIDENT, WHO APPEARED 4Ø MINUTES AFTER THE SPEECH'S ANNOUNCED DELIVERY TIME, REPEATED THE NATIONALISTIC, TOUGH AND TIRED SLOGANS THAT HE AND OTHER MILITARY CHIEFS HAVE BEEN SAYING ALL ALONG: ARGENTINA'S VALIANT SOLDIERS UPHELD NATIONAL HONOR AND DIGNITY IN AN UNEQUAL FIGHT AGAINST A MAJOR POWER SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES. GALTIERI CALLED ON THE BRITISH TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT. OTHERWISE, ARGENTINA WILL CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS IS RECOGNIZED AND EFFECTED. HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT MEANS WOULD BE USED, I.E., WMETHER ARGENTINA WOULD ATTEMPT TO PRESS THE ISSUE MILITARILY, BUT HE DID NOT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

RULE IT OUT.

2. THE SECOND MOST TELLING PART OF THE ADDRESS WAS DIRECTED AT ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CRITICS. INVOKING ALLEGED MATIONAL UNITY THAT THE FALKLANDS CAUSE HAS FORGED, HE ISSUED BLUNT WARNINGS THAT NO DIVISIVENESS OR QUESTIONING WOULD BE TOLERATED. THERE WILL BE NO ROOM IN THE "NEW ARGENTINA" FOR THOSE WHO ENGAGE IN SPECULATION, DEFEATISM, DEMOGOGY, EXPLOITATION OF "THE WOUNDS AND EMOTIONS" OF THE PEOPLE, OR FAIL TO JOIN THE NATION IN ITS MARCH FORWARD.

3. BUT THERE IS PLENTY OF QUESTIONING. THE EVENING OF JUNE 15 AT 7 PM, GALTIERI WAS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS A CROWD -- WHICH THE GOA CLAIMS IT CONVOKED FOR THE OCCASION, BUT IN FACT HAS BEEN THERE ALL DAY PROTESTING THE FALKLAND'S SURRENDER--

CONFI ENTIAL

AT THE PLAZA DE MAYO IN FRONT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. AT 7:30 THE GOA ANNOUNCED THAT GALTIERI WAS PREVENTED FROM SPEAKING BY "A GROUP OF AGITATORS WHO SHOUTED OBSCENE SLOGANS AND INSULTS AND WHO SET FIRES AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO." THE CROWD HAD TO BE BROKEN UP WITH TEAR GAS. BUT WE SUSPECT GALTIERI'S INTENDED AUDIENCE WAS NOT SUCH ORDINARY DEMONSTRATORS. RATHER, HE WAS SPEAKING TO THOSE WHO ARE DRIVEN LESS BY EMOTION THAN AMBITION, PARTICULARLY POLITICIANS AND HIS COMRADES-IN-ARMS.

BUENOS AIRES 3598

DTG: 1602352 JUN 82 PSN: 028473

39610

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

PAGE Ø1 SECSTATE WASHDC 7816 DTG: 172147Z JUN 82 PSN: Ø23545 DATE Ø7/19/82 TOR: 168/2288Z SIT672

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: IT FONT RENT EOB FOR: WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #7816 1682208 0 0 172147Z JUN 82 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE 5830

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6334 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 4848 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 7011 WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7738 BT

SE STATE 167816

NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6-17-02 (ENDERS, T.O.) TAGS: UK, AR, FA SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE TROOPS

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BRITISH EMBASSY HERE HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN GOA AGREEMENT PERMITTING REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE TROOPS TO COMODORO RIVADAVIA OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PUNTA ARENAS, CHILE, RATHER THAN TO MONTEVIDEO. THE EMBASSY SAYS THE CANBERRA WILL BE READY TO SAIL WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND TROOPS WITHIN TEN HOURS AND THE UK MAY SEND OTHERS ON ANOTHER SHIP. THE MONTEVIDEO DESTINATION WOULD ADD SUBSTANTIAL DELAY, AND CONSEQUENT HARDSHIP FOR ARGENTINES INVOLVED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

3. THE UK HAS MADE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO THE SWISS AND BRAZILIANS AND IS APPRISING CHILE RE THE POSSIBLE USE OF PUNTA ARENAS. THE EMBASSY STRESSES THAT THE UK SEEKS HELP EXPLAINING TO THE GOA THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF GOING TO MONTEVIDEO. WHILE AN ARGENTINE PLEDGE OF SAFE CONDUCT FOR THE SHIPS IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL BY THE BRITISH, THE INSTRUCTION FROM LONDON SUGGESTS THAT THE IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT OF PRISONERS IS BEING UNDERTAKEN IRRESPECTIVE OF A LARGER

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

4. ASSISTANT SECERETARY ENDERS HAS INFORMED AMBASSADOR TAKACS OF HMG REQUEST AND URGED FAVORABLE GOA DECISION ON USE OF ARGENTINE OR -- IF REFUSED -- CHILEAN PORT. DEPARTMENT REALIZES THAT PROSPECTS NOT GOOD, AND OUR

INFLUENCE LIMITED AT BEST, BUT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE THAT YOU ALSO GET THIS MESSAGE TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES. IN SO DOING, YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE SIMPLY CARRYING A MESSAGE FROM THE UK TO THE GOA AND YOU SHOULD NOT PRESSURE THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE. PERHAPS ARMA OR ALUSNA WOULD BE BEST CHANNEL.

EAGLEBURGER

GRET

SECSTATE WASHDC 7816 DTG: 1721477 JUN 82 PSN: 023545

Authority NUR-745-2676-20 Authority NUR-745-2676-20 W UNARADATE 11/8/17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION BOOM

 PAGE Ø1
 BUENOS AIRES 364Ø
 DTG: 171435Z
 JUN 82
 PSN: Ø22813

 SIT673
 DATE Ø7/19/82
 TOR: 168/1518Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /881

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP PUBS SIT EOB EOB: FONT WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASN DE RUESBA #364Ø 1681436 Z 171435Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4168

SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3640 NODIS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS EO 12065: RDS-3 6/17/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR SUBJECT: BRITISH EFFORT TO OBTAIN CEASEFIRE REF: SECURE TELECON

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH YOU HEARD OF WHAT I WAS SAYING. I UNDERSTOOD PRACTICALLY NOTHING OF WHAT YOU SAID.

3. TO SUM UP, THE PROBLEM IN THE JUNTA IS NOT ONE OF INDECISION BUT RATHER A CALCULATED DECISION TO STONEWALL. I UNDERSTAND THAT ANAYA AND LAMI DOZO TOLD GALTIERI YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE FULL AND SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES. GALTIERI TOLD THE CABINET YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD NOT RPT NOT AUTHORIZED MENENDEZ TO SURRENDER AND DID NOT SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT THAT UNFORTUNATE GENERAL MADE WITH THE BRITISH. WE NOW HAVE THE REPORT FROM LONDON THAT THE GOA HAS REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE ARGENTINE PRISONERS OF WAR IN ARGENTINE PORTS.

4. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN BY ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A FORMAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

CEASEFIRE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT 18 OF 12 ACTIVE-DUTY MAJOR GENERALS IN THE ARMY VOTED YESTERDAY IN EFFECT AGAINST CONTINUING THE CONFLICT. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HERE IS IN DEEP = CRISIS AND I DOUBT THAT MUCH SUPPORT CAN BE FOUND IN THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC FOR CARRYING ON THE FIGHT. IN ANY EVENT, GIVEN GALTIERI'S DEMONSTRATED MORAL COWARDICE, AND AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, AN AGREEMENT WITH HIM WOULDN'T BE WORTH MUCH TO THE BRITISH. SHLAUDEMAN

Authority NUZ-748-7676-39

SECRET

BUENOS AIRES 3648

DTG: 171435Z JUN 82 PSN: #22913

4

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 BUENOS AIRES 3671 DTG: 172245Z JUN 82 PEN: 023623 DATE Ø7/19/82 SIT671 TOR: 168/2307Z DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001 _____ WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: SIT: EOB: WHSR COMMENT: MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS MESSAGE: IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3671 1682250 0 172245Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4191 INFO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE BT SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3671 NODIS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS EO 12065: RDS-1 6/17/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: MILI, UK, FA, AR SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE TROOPS REF: STATE 167816

1. S - ENTIRE TEXTS.

2. IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF REFTEL, I CALLED AMBASSADOR GUSTAVO FIGUEROA. HE TOLD ME THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS WORKING FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ALLOW THE CANBERRA TO PROCEED TO PUERTO MADRYN IN ARGENTINA. FIGUEROA BELIEVED THE MINISTRY WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN PUTTING ITS CASE TO THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. HE ADDED THAT PUERTO MADRYN WOULD BE MUCH PREFERABLE TO PUNTA ARENAS FROM THE MINISTRY'S POINT OF VIEW.

3. WE WILL TRY TO PASS THIS SAME MESSAGE ON TO THE MILITARY BUT, GIVEN THE GREAT CONFUSION AT THE MOMENT IN THAT QUARTER, IT MAY-BE DIFFICULT. SHLAUDEMAN

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED Anthonity/NIZ-74/2-26.76-4-8 W NARA DATE U

UNCLASSIFIED WHITE HOUSE SITUATION BOOM

5

DTG: 171933Z JUN 82 PSN: 023394 PAGE Ø1 BUENOS AIRES 36 SIT893 DATE Ø6/24/82 BUENOS AIRES 3649 TOR: 168/2037Z _____ _____ _____ DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001 WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP FONT PUBS SIT EOB EOB: FONT, RENT WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS MESSAGE: FLASH DE RUESBA #3649 1681945 Z O 171933Z JUN 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4175 INFO SOUTH ATLANTIC SITREP COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE USCINSCO QUARRY HTS PANAMA USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA DIA WASHDC JSI-4A/JSI-4B/DB-3B/DB-3E/DC-4A BT UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 3649 CINCSO FOR INTAFF CINCLANT FOR POLAD ROME FOR VATICAN E. O. 12065: N/A TAGS: PBOR, UK, AR, FA SUBJECT: SOUTH ATLANTIC CIRSIS: SITREP AS OF 1615 LOCAL JUNE 17 LOCAL WIRE SERVICE DYN IS REPORTING AT 1615 LOCAL TIME THAT FIRST CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL CRISTINO NICOLAIDES WILL REPLACE GALTIERI AS ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF TOMORROW MORNING, ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES. THIS DECISION REPOR-TEDLY WAS TAKEN BY SENIOR ARMY GENERALS THIS MORNING. ACCORD-ING TO THE SOURCES CITED BY DYN THE GENERALS OFFERED THE CINC JOB TO ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF JOSE ANTONIO VAQUERO FIRST, NEXT IN LINE OF COMMAND AFTER GALTIERI, BUT HE TURNED IT DOWN. WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THIS REPORT. DYN HAS NOT REPORTED WHO WOULD REPLACE GALTIERI AS PRESIDENT, PRESUMING THAT WOULD BE THE CASE. SHLAUDEMAN

UNCLASSIFIED

6

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

	BUENOS AIRES 3662 DATE 06/24/82	DTG: 172014Z JUN 82 PSN: TOR: 168/2041Z	023400
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WHTS ASSIGNE	DISTRIBUTION:		
SIT: WPC MCF EOB: FONT, RE WHSR COMMENT		IT EOB	
MESSAGE ANNO	DTATIONS:		
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MESSAGE:			
Z 172014Z JU	3662 1682017 UN 82 ZFF4 Y BUENOS AIRES		
TO SECSTATE	WASHDC FLASH 4183		
USCINCSO QUA	ATLANTIC SITREP COLLECTIVE IN ARRY HTS PANAMA NORFOLK VA JSI-4A/JSI-4B/DB-3B/DB-3E/DC-		
CINCSO FOR E. O. 12065: TAGS: PBOR,	OS AIRES 3662 INTAFF, CINCLANT FOR POLAD, F GDS N/A UK, AR, FA UTH ATLANTIC CRISIS: SITREP A		
WILL BE REP OF INTERIOR MILITARY SO	SERVICES REPORTS AT 4:45 P. M LACED AS PRESIDENT TEMPORARIL GENERAL ALFREDO SAINT JEAN, URCES. HOWEVER, ANSA WIRE SEF ER HAT AFCINC LAMI SOZO WILL	Y BY THE CURRENT MINISTE ACCORDING TO VICE REPORTED	ER
VAQUERO INF ARMY HAS RE PRESENT THA ACCORDING T UNTIL THE J REPORTS THA	G TO DYN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF ORMED GALTIERI THAT THE HIGH GUESTED HIS RESIGNATION AS PE T RESIGNATION TO THE MILITARY O DYN, GENERAL SAINT JEAN WIL UNTA CHOSES A NEW PRESIDENT. T GALTIERI IS CONVOKING THE G THAT THEY CONTINUE IN THEIR (COMMAND OF THE RESIDENT AND GALTIERI W JUNTA. L TAKE OVER DYN ALSO CABINET MINISTERS	ILL
MESSAGE (CO	NTINUED) :		
UNTIL THE N	NEW PRESIDENT IS NAMED.		
DYN REPORT PRESIDENT C ROTATES EVE THE REPUBLI	THER HAND ANSA REPORTED SUBSI THAT LAMI DOZO, WHO IS CURREN F THE JUNTA (THE PRESIDENCY RY 3 MONTHS) WILL ASSUME THE C, ALTHOUGH ANSA DOES NOT IN ASSUME HIS NEW DUTIES.	NTLY THE OF THE JUNTA PRESIDENCY OF	
HAS OFFERED	P.M. THE ARMY OFFICIALLY ANN HIS RESIGNATION AS ARMY COM COLAIDES WILL ASSUME THE CIN	MANDER IN CHIEF AND THAT	

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE AL BUENOS AIRES 3640 DTG: 1714357 JUN 82 PSN: 022913 SITSØ5 DATE 06/24/82 TOR: 168/15182

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION.

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP PUBS SIT EOB EOB: FONT WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE .

FLASH DE RUESBA #364Ø 1681436 Z 171435Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4168

SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3640 NODIS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS EO 12865: RDS-3 6/17/82 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: PBOR, MILI, UK, FA, AR SUBJECT: BRITISH EFFORT TO OBTAIN CEASEFIRE REF: SECURE TELECON

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2. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH YOU HEARD OF WHAT I WAS SAYING. I UNDERSTOOD PRACTICALLY NOTHING OF WHAT YOU SAID.

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4. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BRITISH HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN BY ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A FORMAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

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LNARADATE /

BUENOS AIRES 3640

DTG: 1714352 JUN 82 PSN: 822913

39614

CONELDENTIAL WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE B1 DTG: 1722217 JUN 82 PSN: 023616 BUENOS ALRES 3678 S T887 DATE 06/24/82

TOR: 168/3304Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /BØ1 -----

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #367Ø 1682225 0 172221Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4198

INFO USHISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 618 AMEMBASSY BRASILLA PRIORITY 5284 AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 4892 AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 4381 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1362 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 8261 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 5937 BT

CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES 3678 EO 12865: GDS 6/17/88 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: PDEV, PGOV, PINS, PINT, AR SUBJECT: GALTIERI'S DEMISE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. GALTIERI WAS DUMPED OVER THE SIDE FASTER THAN I THOUGHT HE WOULD BE. THE REASONS:

- HE LIED AND COVERED UP IN DEALING WITH THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT FROM BEGINNING TO END. HE DECEIVED MUCH OF THE OFFICER CORPS AS WELL AS THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE TRUTH WHEN IT EMERGED AFTER THE FALL OF PORT STANLEY CAME AS A SHOCK OF BLAST-LIKE PROPORTIONS

- HE DISPLAYED STUPEFYING POLITICAL INEPTITUDE IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE DISASTER AT PORT STANLEY. HE (AND THE JUNTA) SIMPLY HAD NOTHING TO SAY FOR 24 HOURS WHILE THE COUNTRY SEETHED WITH DOUBT AND FEAR. HE THEN CONVOKED THE PUBLIC TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

PLAZA DE MAYO WHERE HIS ENEMIES ON THE LEFT WERE ALREADY PRE-PARING A RIOT. THIS ACT, WHICH PROBABLY MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE BROUGHT ABOUT HIS DOWNFALL, REFLECTED THE CONVICTION THAT THE PEOPLE WERE WITH HIM, A MOST PATHETIC DELUSION. HE THEN DELIVERED HIS DEFIANT TELEVISION SPEECH WHICH TOLD THE NATION NOTHING AND WHICH CONTAINED NOT A SINGLE WORD OF COMPASSION OR REGRET. - HE CALLED IN THE MAJOR GENERALS, THE "BARONS" OF THE ARMY, AND DEMANDED THAT THE WAR CONTINUE. THE GENERALS, WHOSE SENSE OF REALITY WAS SOMEWHAT STRONGER, WANTED NO PART OF THAT AND OFFERED THEIR CINC "VOLUNTARY" RETIREMENT.

3. WE HAVE NO MEANS OF CALCULATING AT THE MOMENT WHETHER TOMOR-ROW'S ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ANY BETTER EQUIPPED THAN TODAY'S TO DEAL THE HARD DECISIONS THAT MUST BE MADE. THE HARDEST, OF COURSE, IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE MEN ON THE ISLANDS AND THE BRITISH DEMAND FOR A FORMAL CEASEFIRE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

CONFIDENTIAL

WE DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE EVENTS OF THIS TURBULENT DAY MEAN THAT THE MODERATES IN THE ARMY HAVE THE UPPER HAND AND THAT THE RISK OF RENEWED COMBAT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS CLEARLY RECEDING. SHL AUDEMAN

RUFNOS AIRES 3670

DTG: 1722217 JUN 82 PSN: Ø23616

Authority NUZ -748-746-6-6 BY_CV_NARA DATE 71/8/17

SEGRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 BUENOS AIRES 3672 DTG: 180228Z JUN 82 PSN: 024025 DATE Ø7/19/82 TOR: 169/0351Z SIT668 _____ _____ DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001 _____ _____ ----WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: SIT: SIT FONT RENT EOB EOB: WHSR COMMENT: MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS MESSAGE: IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3672 1691433 O 180228Z JUN 82 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4192 INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE BT

SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3672 NODIS FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/17/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M REF: A) BUENOS AIRES 3671 B) STATE 167816

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. ARMA MET WITH ARMY DEPURTY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL WEHNER. DURING MEETING WEHNER STEPPED OUT MOMENTARILY TO CONFER WITH CHIEF OF STAFF JOSE VAQUERO AND NEW ARMY CINC NICOLAIDES. WEHNER INFORMED ARMA HE WOULD CALL HIM WHEN HE HAD AN ANSWER. TWO HOURS LATER, WEHNER CALLED AND GAVE ASSURANCES THAT UK HAS SAFE CONDUCT FOR CANBERRA AND ANOTHER SHIP, IF NECESSARY, TO PROCEED TO PUERTO MADRYN AND DISEMBARK ARGENTINE TROOPS. SHLAUDEMAN

DECLASSIFIED Authority NUL-748-76767-5 BY CM NARA DATE 11/8/17 SECREI

SEGRET

39617

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 SECSTATE WASHDC 8048 DTG: 180032Z JUN 82 PSN: 023809 SIT669 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 169/0057Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUEHC #8048 1690057 O 1800322 JUN 82 ZFF FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9331

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7739 BT

SECRET STATE 168048 TOSEC 090018

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER E.O. 12065: GDS 6/17/88 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.) TAGS: PEPR, SREF, UK, AR, UY SUBJECT: FALKLANDS PRISONERS

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. NICKO HA PASED ON THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. THE BRITISH HAVE 8-980U PRISONERS IN HAND. THEY ARE ROUNDING UP OTHERS ON WEST FALKLANDS, ALL OF WHOM HAVE STOPPED FIGHTING. THE TOTAL WILL BE WELL BELOW THE 15,80U THAT THE ARGENTINE COMMANDER REPORTED. THE MAIN PROBLEM IS NOT STARVATION BUT EXPOSURE. THEY ARE NOW LOADING AS MANY AS 7000 ON THE CANBERRA AND ANOTHER SHIP IN ORDER TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE RELIEF FROM THE ELEMENTS.

3. THE ARGENTINES HAVE REPLIED THROUGH THE SWISS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT REPATRIATION AND WANT IT DONE THROUGH URUGUAY "WITHOUT PRECONDITION". HMG WILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

HAVE TO DECIDE NOW WHAT TO DO. THE PREFERENCE REMAINS TO SENO THEM INTO ARGENTINE PORTS, BUT THAT IS EXCLUDED BY THE ARGENTINE NON-RESPONSE ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, UNLESS HMG RELAXES ITS CONDITION. ANOTHER OPTION IS TO SEND THE 7888 BACK THROUGH URUGUAY.

4. EVEN IF A WAY IS FOUND TO RETURN THE 7800, AND POS-SIBLY MORE, THE UK WILL KEEP 10 PERCENT (OFFICERS, IN-CLUDING MENENDEZ); IT IS NOT CLEAR WHERE THEY WILL BE KEPT OR UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS T;EY WOULD BE RETURNED. HENOER-SON THOUGHT THAT ANY US ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT BE REQUESTED WOULD BE IN CONNECTION WITH THOSE PRISONERS (I.E., T E 90 PERCENT) THAT HMG IS TRYING TO REPATRIATE AS SOON AS POSIBLE. 5. THE BRITISH EMBASSY LATER APPROAC ED US ASKING T AT WE ENCOURAGE THE GOA TO PERMIT SAFE PASSAGE TO AND OFF-LOADING AT THE CLOSEST ARGENTINE PORT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PUNTA ARENAS IN CHILE RATHER T; AN THE MUCH LONGER TRIP TO MONTEVIDEO. MG HAS ALSO BEEN 1N TOUCHWITH THE SWISS AND BRAZILIANS IN THIS REGARD, ST,ESSING THE PRACTICAL NEED TO MOVE THE POWS. THUS, IT APPEARS THE BRITISH HAVE DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON ARGENTINE CONFIRMATION OF A GESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND WILL ACCEPT ASSURANCES OF SAFE PASSAGE IN T'IS CASE. THE CANBERRA I; EXPECTED TO BE FULLY LOADED TONIGHT. TOM ENDERS HAS CONTACTED AMBASSADOR TAKACS. UE ALSO ARE ASKING OUR EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES TO APPROACH MILITARY CONTACTS, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT WE ARE SIMPLY FORWARDING A MESAGE FOR THE UK AND ARE NOT PRESING THE ARGENTINES TO AGREE.

6. MEMO FOLLOWS, A YOU REQUESTED, ON HOW TO ANDLE MATERIEL SUPPORT, SANCTIONS, AND POSSIBLE DISCUSSION WIT THATCHER NEXT WEEK. EAGLEBURGER

SECSTATE WASHDC 8048 DTG: 180032Z

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SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BUENOS AIRES 3681 DATE Ø7/19/82 PAGE Ø1 DTG: 181804Z JUN 82 PSN: 024977 SIT666 TOR: 169/1907Z DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001 _____ WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB FOR. WHSR COMMENT: MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS: NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS MESSAGE: IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3681 1691810 0 1818Ø4Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4198 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1363 BT SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3681 NODIS EO 12065: RDS-1 6/18/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: MILI, PEPR, AR, UK, FA SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF ARGENTINE TROOPS REF: A) LONDON 13429, B) BUENOS AIRES 3673 AND 3672 1. S - ENTIRE TEXT. PUERTO MADRYN HAS ONE LARGE DEEPWATER PIER WHICH CAN BERTH 2.

SEVERAL SHIPS. TUG SERVICES ARE NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, CANBERRA AND NORLAND WOULD BE ABLE TO OFFLOAD TROOPS WITH SMALL BOATS SHOULD PIERSIDE NOT BE ADVISABLE DUE TO WIND OR SEA CONDITIONS OR LACK OF TUGS.

3. FOR LONDON: GOA NEEDS TO KNOWN ROUTE OF UK SHIPS, ESTIMATED DATE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL AND NUMBER OF TROOPS ABOARD EACH. SHLAUDEMAN

DECLASSIFIED SECRET BY (N NARA DATE 11917

SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OFFICE AT 6: 30 PM. SHLAUDEMAN

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File # 4291



Call Un in NY

DI THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Alexander M. Haig, or. From:

Subject: Falklands Crisis

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FORN: 05 17

FOR: Our objectives at this point are to end hostilities and to begin to heal the wounds in US/Latin American REMARK relations, while continuing to give the British as much support as possible.

> The uncertain political situation in Buenos Aires may make it impossible for the Argentines to agree to end hostilities, though they do not appear to have the stomach actually to go on fighting. There is, however, a chance the new junta will come to terms. Most of the top army generals are reported to support an end to hostilities.

In London, Prime Minister Thatcher is understandably riding the crest of the wave. Thus far, we have not pushed her on the longer-term aspects of the Falklands crisis, recognizing her need to deal with the immediate military problems. However, the time is now approaching when we must discuss with Mrs. Thatcher issues such as the U.S. sanctions against Argentina, levels of future US support for UK activities and long-term British plans for the Islands.

Mrs. Thatcher currently plans to arrive in New York June 22 for the SSOD. I suggest you invite her to stop in Washington on her way home to discuss the Falklands. She is lunching with the Secretary-General on Wednesday but would be available for a meeting in Washington Wednesday afternoon or evening.

If you agree to a meeting, I could issue the invitation quickly through Ambassador Henderson.

RDS-1 6/19/02

Approve

BY CIV MARA DATE 11 18/17

Authority NR-748 -261671-0

Disapprove

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON



A7 JUN21 A9: 16

June 19, 1982

WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

82 JUN 20 A 6: 19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Alexander M. Haig, or.

From:

Subject: Falklands Crisis

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If you agree to a meeting, I could issue the invitation quickly through Ambassador Henderson.

Disapprove Approve

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

Dear Margaret:

In view of the need for continuing close consultations between us on the situation in the Falklands, I would like to invite you to stop in Washington on June 23 as you return to London from the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

This would be an excellent opportunity for us to exchange views on the overall situation in the South Atlantic, including the sanctions which the United States is currently applying against Argentina, US support for future UK activities and longer-term political developments in the area.

Our discussions here would also enable us to review developments in Argentina and to consider the options open to the United Kingdom and the United States for working together to achieve a resolution of the crisis.

I hope that we can meet in Washington next week.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ronald Reagan

Authority NUZ-746-76-16-3-8

4305 Add-on

MW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 22, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY

SUBJECT: Lifting Economic Sanctions on Argentina

I concur with Al Sapia-Bosch's recommendation in his memorandum to you of June 22 (copy at Tab I).

Attachment

Tab I Sapia-Bosch Memo of June 22

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)



SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION BOOM

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PAGE B1 BUENOS AIRES 3765 DTG: 222126Z JUN 82 PSN: 030564 SIT689 DATE 06/24/82

TOR: 174/00102

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP FONT SIT EOB EOB: WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE .

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3765 1732138 0 222126Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4245

SECRET BUENOS AIRES 3765 EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS EO 12865: RDS-1 6/22/82 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M TAGS: PDEV, PGOV, PINT, MILI, AR SUBJECT: REACTION TO THE NEW PRESIDENT

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE SHOULD BE MOST CAUTIOUS IN MY VIEW ABOUT HOW WE REACT TO THE DESIGNATION OF A NEW ARGENTINE PRESIDENT. FIRST HE WILL HAVE TO BE ABLE TO TAKE OFFICE AND A LOT CAN HAPPEN HERE BEFORE JULY 1 WHEN BIGNONE IS SUPPOSED TO RECEIVE THE SASH. I CAN'T IMAGINE ANYTHING THAT WOULD DO HIM MORE HARM THAN AN INDICATION OF USG SYMPATHY OR ONE OF THOSE STATEMENTS ABOUT LOOKING FORWARD TO WORKING WITH HIM. THE POLITICIANS HERE ARE BEATING THE ANTI-YANKEE DRUM WITH ENTHUSIASM THESE DAYS AND THE OFFICER CORPS IS NOT MUCH MORE FRIENDLY.

3. ONE PROBLEM WE HAVE IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A BETTER ATMOSPHERE WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS THE SANCTIONS WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN. I HAVE JUST SEEN A REPORT OF THE NOTE QUIJANO DELIVERED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 28TH MFM DECLARING NO "TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES" UNTIL THE UK WITHDRAWS ITS "OCCUPATION FORCES" AND CALLS OFF THE BLOCKADE. I ASSUME THAT MEANS WE WILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

BE UNABLE TO LIFT OUR SANCTIONS. AN ATTEMPT AT A FRIENDLY GESTURE OF SOME KIND TOWARD THE GOA WHILE THE SANCTIONS ARE STILL IN FORCE COULD WELL BACKFIRE.

4. I STRONGLY FAVOR NO REPEAT NO COMMENT FROM THE SPOKESMAN ON BIGNONE'S DESIGNATION BEYOND A REASSERTION OF OUR HOPE TO RESTORE GOOD RELATIONS IN TIME WITH ARGENTINA, IF THE QUESTION ASKED MAKES THAT KIND OF RESPONSE APPROPRIATE. HE MAY ALSO GET A QUESTION ABOUT ELECTIONS IN VIEW OF THE JUNTA'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE COUNTRY WILL BE "INSTITUTIONALIZED" BY EARLY 1984. WE SHOULD BE AS NEUTRAL ABOUT THAT PROSPECT AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT SEEMING TO BE AGAINST DEMOCRACY. MORE THAN A FEW MILITARY OFFICERS STILL THINK WE WERE CONSPIRING TO OVERTHROW GALTIERI SO THAT ELECTIONS

COULD BE HELD.

5. IN GENERAL I THINK WE WILL SERVE OUR INTERESTS BEST BY GOING SLOW UNLESS WE CAN OFFER SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL SUCH AS A WORKABLE SCHEME TO BRING MRS. THATCHER TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, ARGENTINA IS STILL IN A STATE OF SHOCK. WE NEED TIME FOR PASSIONS TO COOL. THERE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE WHEN AND IF BIGNONE IS INAUGURATED. BUT IT SHOULD BE FORMAL AND RESERVED. AFTER THAT, IF THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS STABLE AND OUR SOUNDINGS FAVORABLE, WE CAN CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRIVATE EMISSARY TO GET THE DIALOGUE GOING. SHL AUDE MAN

Authority NUZ-748-26 16-14-7 BY_ (N NARA DATE 11/8/17

227 National Security Council The White House Package # RECEIVED allo ----82 JUN 22 P8: 44 SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION John Poindexter **Bud McFarlane** Jacque Hill Judge Clark John Poindexter Staff Secretary Sit Room I/Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch DISTRIBUTION VP Meese Baker Deaver , cc: Other COMMENTS



4305

34624

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Lifting Economic Sanctions on Argentina

The sanctions on Argentina should be lifted without delay. As you know, the European Community has already done so. From the U.S. perspective the sanctions are symbolic. The de facto ceasefire between the two belligerents probably will hold, as there seems to be little disposition on the part of Argentina again to take up arms. State's position is to use the sanctions issue to derive a larger gain from Prime Minister Thatcher, e.g., agreement to negotiate with Argentina over the final dispositon of the Islands. Additionally, State would like to deal with a functioning government. Both of these are good points; State does not expect much success with Thatcher, however.

If we lift the sanctions after her visit with the President it will be viewed in Argentina and Latin America as if we needed her permission to go ahead. Alternatively, if we act now we would give a signal that we are taking a more neutral position on the sovereignty question. We will eventually lift the sanctions, so our objective should be to derive the most benefit for our side from the timing. By taking the initiative immediately we would: reduce strains between the U.S. and Argentina; strengthen the hand of the moderates in Argentina; assist the U.S. banking community, thereby speeding up the restructuring of the Argentine debt; perhaps bring some stability to the Argentine government, whatever it turns out to be; prevent a further shift toward anti-Americanism among the military; and, finally, remove sanctions as an issue.

Lifting the sanctions is not without danger. Mrs. Thatcher probably would not like it. She could hardly suggest that we have been unsupportive, however. There is always the danger that some Argentine leader will misinterpret our action. Notwithstanding these problems, I urge that you suggest to the President that the sanctions be lifted soon.

cancellation of the orginal sanctions decision, a product of inter-agency deliberations, is a significant step which needs to be thoroughly addressed in existing inter-agency fora, preferably NSC, but perhaps in this case the NSPG.

CONFIDENTIAL Review on June 22, 1988

National Security Council The White House RECEIVED Package # 4305

82 JUN 22 P1: 30

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	2	m	
Jacque Hill	3	/	
Judge Clark	4	_1/_	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _

RCM HAS SEEN

COMMENTS

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			BAILEY			22	JUN	82	de.

KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA

SANCTIONS

ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: LIFTING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON ARGENTINA

ACTION:	FOR DECISION	DUE: 25 JUN 82 STATUS X FILES	
	FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO	
	CLARK		

COMMENTS

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT FOR-WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3773 1741645 0 231616Z JUN 82 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4253

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CUNPIDENILAL BUENOS AIRES 3773 **ZIDX3** E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/23/02 (SHLAUDEMAN, HARRY W.) OR-M

TAGS: PDEV, PGOV, PINT, MILI, AR SUBJECT: U.S. INTERESTS AND THE NEW GOA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE STRUCTURE OF FUTURE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN ARGENTINA AS IT EMERGES FROM THE ACRIMONIOUS DEBATES AMONG THE MILITARY SERVICES OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS IS NOT REASSURING IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS. THE ARMY HAS ACHIEVED NOMINAL CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. BUT THE JUNTA AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (THE THREE COMMANDERS, PLUS THE PRESIDENT) REMAIN IN PLACE TO DECIDE ON "ISSUES - WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF THE NATION" IN THE WORDS OF YESTERDAY'S AIR FORCE COMMUNIQUE. THE PRSPECT OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE JUNTA, AS THE DEAL WAS FIRST REPORTED, HELD OUT HOPE FOR A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

STRONGER AND MORE COHERENT GOVERNMENT THAN WE HAVE SEEN THE LAST 18 MONTHS. BUT NOW THE ARMY IS TO BE SADDLED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY'S DISASTROUS ECONOMIC AND LABOR SITUATIONS WHILE THE OTHER TWO SERVICES RETAIN THEIR RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY.

3. THE NAVY'S COMMUNIQUE IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THAT REGARD. IT ANNOUNCES THAT THE NAVY WILL HAVE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING ITS OWN LEAD-ERSNIP UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THUS ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK THE ARMY'S DESIRE TO HAVE ANAYA SACKED WHILE FORMALIZING THE EXISTENCE OF THREE ANTONOMOUS MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, ANSWERABLE TO NO CENTRAL AUTHORITY. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO DECLARES THAT THE "CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WILL END ONLY

AFTER THE NATION ACHIEVES RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MALVINAS, GEORGIAS AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS." ANY DISPOSITION THERE MIGHT BE ON THE PART OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO MOVE TOWARD A DECLARED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD CLEARLY RUN INTO DETERMINED OPPOSITION IN THIS QUARTER.

4. THE PROBLEM OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ASIDE. WE ARE LIKELY FOR VARIOUS REASONS TO HAVE GREAT DIFFICULITY IN DEALING WITH THIS NEXT GOA IN A CONSTRUCTIVE FASHION. -- BIGNONE COMES TO THE PRESIDENCY AS A REPRE-SENTATIVE OF THE VIDELA/VIOLA CLIQUE IN THE ARMY WITHOUT ANY REAL POWER BASE OF HIS OWN. THE DEGREE OF HIS SUPPORT BELOW THE MAJOR GENERAL RANK IS PROBABLY NOT HIGH, TO SAY THE LEAST. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE THE MODERATE AND RATHER UNASSUMING BIGNONE WORKING VERY WELL FOR VERY LONG WITH HIS ARROGANT CHIEF, ARMY CINC NICOLAIDES. -- WITH THE DISSENSION WITHIN AND AMONG THE SERVICES. POWER IN THIS COUNTRY IS LYING AROUND, NOT IN THE STREETS, BUT IN THE GARRISONS AND MILITARY CAMPS. MORE THAN EVER THE COMING GOA IS LIKELY TO BE AN AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT WITHOUT AUTHORITY

-- THE POLITICAL THEME IS THE DAYS AND MONTHS AHEAD WILL CONTINUE TO BE INTENSE, BITTER NATIONALISM. THE POLITICIANS, PARTICULARLY THE PERONISTS, WILL BE RETURNING TO THE STAGE AND THEIR ANTI-U.S. LINE HAS NOT CHANGED. A WEAK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :


FTOENTIAL

GOVERNMENT, PRECARIOUSLY INSTALLED AND CONFRONTED BY AN ECONOMY IN DESPERATE STRAITS, WILL LOOK TO THE TRUSTWORTHY FORMULAS OF NATIONALISM FOR SUPPORT. THE USG WILL NEED TO DISPLAY BOTH GREAT PATIENCE AND FIRMNESS IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

5. ARGENTINA'S CURRENT SITUATION CALLS TO MIND A PARTICULAR CURIOSITY. ONE CAN STILL PLAINLY SEE ON THE FACADE OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY BUILDING MARKS OF THE SHELLING THE NAVY ADMINISTERED TO DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES DURING ITS 1955 STRUGGLE WITH PERON'S ARMY. SHLAUDEMAN

BUENOS AIRES 3773

DTG: 2316167 JUN 82 PSN: #31661



SECRET

4400

39126

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

June 28, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: A Message from Argentina's General Nicolaides

General Nicolaides has transmitted a message via informal channels to my office. The message, I believe, is genuine.

General Nicolaides made three points:

- First, he wanted better U.S.-Argentina relations, but the current situation is difficult. Opinion among officers and civilians is still embittered.
- Second, the critical short term problem for the military, especially the army, is the return of the remaining Argentine POWs held by the British on the Falklands.
- Third, if the U.S. could persuade the British to release them without a formal written armistice then "the door would be open for good relations."

We may have an opportunity here. The British are beginning to be more flexible on this question. A nudge from us might do it. But we need to act quickly if we are going to get any credit with the Argentines. I know the President would appreciate your thoughts and recommendations on this.

SECRET

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

SECRET/SENSITIVE Review on June 28, 1988

DECLAGOLENET Authority NU TY UN NARA DATE



12.

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MEMORANDUM

WPC HAS SEEN LOG NO. 4450

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

June 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. FONTAINE

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Message from Nicolaides

At John Poindexter's suggestion, I am relaying to you a message from General Nicolaides, Argentina's new strongman. That message was transmitted via my friend Jorge Juarez Dover this morning in a phone call from Buenos Aires. Jorge Dover had just spoken to Nicolaides for an hour, and Nicolaides wanted to make these points.

First, the general wanted better U.S.-Argentina relations but the current situation is difficult. Opinion among officers and civilians is still embittered.

Second, the critical short term problem for the military (read Army) is return of the remaining Argentine POWs being held by the British on the Falklands.

Third, if the U.S. could persuade the British to release them without a formal written armistice "the door would be open for good relations."

Jorge repeated that message three times and asked me to pass it on to you.

I think this is important and gives us an opportunity. The British seem to be increasingly flexible on this question, but if we move fast we can get some credit with the new government for having brought it about -- and we should get that credit.


Admiral Poindexter suggested (and I strongly concur)that a message from you to the Secretary of State sharing the contents of this message would be the next step. Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the Secretary of State on this matter. If we move expeditiously, I believe we can start repairing the damage faster than earlier anticipated.

SECRET/SENSITIVE Review on June 25, 1988



DECLACOFIED Authority MR.746-26-16-3 BY (N NAPA DATE 11/8/17






RECOMMENDATION

Recommend you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State describing the content of the Nicolaides message.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Secretary of State for signature





National Curity Council 235 The White House RECEIVED Package # 82 JUN 25 P4: 09-SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION John Poindexter **Bud McFarlane Jacque Hill** Judge Clark John Poindexter Staff Secretary Sit Room I-Information A-Action R-Retain B-Dispatch . * DISTRIBUTION Meese Baker Deaver cc: VP Other COMMENTS rela

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SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE #1 RUENOS ALRES 3982 SIT807 DATE \$7/87/82

DTG: 3010507 JUN 82 PSN: 040719 TOR: 181/1138Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS FOB: WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #3982/81 1811188 0 3010502 JUN 82 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4343

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 8289 BT

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 3982 E.O. 12065: GDS 6/29/88 (BUSHNELL, J.A.) OR-M TAGS: PTER, AMER, ASEC, AR SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF SECURITY SITUATION REF: (A) STATE 176826, (B) BUENOS AIRES 3820

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AS OF JUNE 38, ALL SECTIONS OF EMBASSY BELIEVE SITUATION FULLY JUSTIFIES RETURN OF EVACUATED EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS. DURING PERIOD OF FALKLAND CRISIS THERE WERE THREE POTENTIAL THREATS TO US OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS: OUT-OF-CONTROL MOB FOCUSED ON US IN' FRUSTRATION WITH ARGENTINE LOSSES; TARGETTED OPERATIONS OF UNITS OF SECURITY FORCES IN FRUSTRATION WITH US SUPPORT OF BRITISH; GENERAL DETERIORATION OF LAW-AND-ORDER. WITH DE FACTO END OF HOSTILITIES AND DEFINITIVE MOVEMENT TO POST-FALKLAND STAGE OF POLITICAL MANEUVER AND CHANGE, THE FIRST TWD THREATS HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY REMOVED; EMOTIONS OF POTENTIAL MOB WOULD BE MUCH LESS AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE FOCUSED ON ARGENTINE LEADERS WHO ARE INCREASINGLY BEING CRITI-CIZED FOR POOR JUDGEMENT AND WORSE; SIMILARLY RECENT REPORTING REFLECTS SWITCH OF CONCERN WITHIN SECURITY FORCES TO THEIR OWN CURRENT OR PREVIOUS LEADERS. FINALLY WE BE-LIEVE POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN ESTABLISHING GOVERNMENT OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

TRANSITION TO ELECTIONS AND DIALOGUE WITH MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS MEANS ALL MAJOR GROUPS HAVE INTEREST IN PRESERVING ORDER AT LEAST FOR NOW. MOREOVER, ALL POLITICAL ORGANIZA-TIONS INCLUDING EACH ARMED FORCE AND EACH POLITICAL GROUPING NOW HAVE MUCH WORK TO DO IN SETTING THEIR POSITIONS AND ORGANIZATION FOR WHAT IS A NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL PERIOD. POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY WILL REMAIN HIGH IN ARGEN-TINA AND POTENTIAL THREAT TO US PERSONNEL MAY GROW OVER NEXT MONTHS AS POLITICAL EVENTS UNFOLD IN WAYS UNSATISFAC-TORY TO MAJOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY GROUPS. BUT THE CURRENT STAGE OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION PROVIDES MORE THAN NORMAL SECU-RITY TO OFFICIAL AMERICAN PERSONNEL. EMBASSY STRONGLY RE-COMMENDS EVACUATED PERSONNEL BE AUTHORIZED TO RETURN IMME-DIATELY SD THAT SOME, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN MONTEVIDED, CAN RETURN BEFORE TRAVEL DIFFICULTIES OF LONG WEEKEND. END SUMMARY.

3. AMONG POLITICAL FACTORS SUPPORTING ABOVE ASSESSMENT ARE: -- LAST WEEK'S WELLING UP OF SPECULATION ABOUT REVOLTS AND COUPS IN THE ARMY AND PERHAPS THE NAVY HAS TAILED OFF IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. DOUBTS THAT BIGNONE HAD SIFFICIENT SUP-PORT IN THE ARMY TO TAKE OVER ON JULY 1 HAVE DISPERSED. -- HARDENING THE PROSPECT THAT HE WILL ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY WAS HIS SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH THE POLITICIANS THE NIGHT OF JUNE 24. HE SEEMS TO HAVE PERSUADED THEM THAT THE ARMY IS IN FACT COMMITTED TO A RETURN TO POPULAR RULE VIA ELECTIONS BY MARCH 1984. THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO THIS COURSE. THE RELIEF IN THE HIGH STATE OF TENSION THAT REIGNED UP TO JUNE 24 MEETING HAS BEEN ALMOST PALPABLE.

--FOR THEIR PART, THE CIVILIAN POLS HAVE MADE IT WIDELY EVIDENT THAT THEY NOW BELIEVE THEY HAVE A STAKE IN HAND-HOLDING THE BIGNONE REGIME, OR SOME OTHER MODERATE ARMY COMBINATION, AT LEAST FOR NOW. THEIR REFUSAL, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, TO START THE FINGER-POINTING AND BLAME-LAYING FOR THE DEFEAT, AT THIS TIME IS A CLEAR SIGNAL THEY WANT BIGNONE AS FIRMLY SEATED AS IS POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTAN-CES, SO THAT THE TRANSITION MAY INDEED BEGIN. THEIR ESSEN-TIAL INTEREST IS TO CONTROL THEIR OWN ULTRAS, OF LEFT AND RIGHT, TO INSURE SOME MEASURE OF STABILITY IN THE COMING MONTHS SO THEY MAY TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT AT A TIME-CERTAIN DATE.

4. ON THE NARROWER QUESTION OF THE PRESENT BAD STATE OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

SECRET

OUR BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND HOW WE ARE VIEWED HERE, WE NOTE:

-- IT APPEARS POTENTIAL MILITARY DISSIDENTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMY, ARE NOW COMING TO THE REALIZATION THAT ARGENTINA'S COLLAPSE WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE US (OR EVEN THE UK,

BUENOS AIRES 3902

DTG: 301050Z JUN 82 PSN: 040719

DECLASSIFIED Authority NUR-748-76-16-79-2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE Ø1 BUENOS AIRES 39Ø2 SIT8Ø6 DATE Ø7/Ø7/82

TOR: 18

DTG: 3010502 JUN 82 PSN: 040720 TOR: 181/11402

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT EOB: WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE DE RUESBA #39*92/8*2 181111*0* O 3*8*185*9*2 JUN 82 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4344

INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 8298 BT

SECTION #2 OF #2 BUENOS AIRES 39#2 WHICH SIMPLY WAS UP FOR THE JOB IN ARGENTINA WASN'T). RA-THER, WE THINK A CONSENSUS IS DEVELOPING THAT THE BLAME LIES IN THEIR OWN DIPLOMATIC-MILITARY INEPTITUDE AND TITALLY MISMANAGED WAR WEFORT. THE POPULAR "LIFE"-STYLE DIETE DIAS IS OUT THIS PAST WEEKING WITH AN EXTRA CARRYING PAGE AFTER PAGE OF DEVASTATING, EVEN HUMILIATING PHOTO-COVERAGE OF THE FIGHT-ING AND SURRENDER IN "THE WAR WE NEVER SAW." -- WE HAVE HAD APPRACHES IN RECENT DAYS FROM REPRESENTA-TIVES OF TWO MAIN CURRENTS OF PERONISM, ALBEIT AT A LOW LEVEL BUT UNDOUBTEDLY WITH THE APPROVAL OF THEIR BOSSES. THEIR DISCREET OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK REESTABLISHMENT AND BROADENING OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH US. -- FINALLY, THE MAN ON THE STREET, WITH A FEW ISOLATED EX-CEPTIONS AND CRANK CALLS AND THREATS, HAS SHOWN NO PATTERN OF HISTILITY TOWARD THIS MISSION OR AMERICANS IN GENERAL, OFFICIAL OR NONOFFICIAL. THE ONLY REAL MANIFESTATION AGAINST US CAME JUNE 12, WHEN A SMALL CLAQUE SPLIT OFF FOR THE HUGE CROWDS IN FRONT OF THE EMBASSY FOR THE POPE'S OPEN-AIR MASS AND CHANTED SLOGANS BRIEFLY IN FRONT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. IT WAS QUICLY DISPERSED BY THE POLICE. THE JUNE 15 PLAZA DE MAYO DISTURBANCES WHICH AP-PARENTLY GOT MUCH ATTENTION IN THE US MEDIA WAS ALMOST

WHOLLY ANTI-GALTIERI. MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. IN THIS REGARD. RSO STRESSES HE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE ABOVE-AVERAGE RESPONSES FROM THE OPERATING LEVELS OF BOTH FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL POLICE FORCES TO ALL REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. HE REPORTS HIS CONTACTS WITH POLICE COMMIS-SIONERS, ON AT LEAST A WEEKLY BASIS, GO FORWARD ON A CLOSE PROFESSIONAL BASIS, WITH LITTLE IF ANY ANTIPATHY DEMON-STRATED FROM THE COMMISSARIAT ON DOWN TO SUBOFFICIALS. RSO SAYS BOTH IN HIS REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND INITIATIVE RESPONSES TO THEIR OWN VIEW OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED, THEY ACT WITH INTEREST AND IN A FASHION HE SAYS CAN BE DESCRIBED AS ENERGETIC. ROS ADDS THAT THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE 23RD DISTRICT, WHICH HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CHANCERY AND THE RESIDENCE, HAS STATED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS SUPERIORS TO MAKE CERTAIN "THAT NOTHING HAPPENS TO THE AMERICANS." IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT BOTH FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL POLICE BY DECISION

OF THE GOA HAVE ASSIGNED UNIFORMED OFFICERS TO EVERY RESI-DENCE OF USG EMPLOYEES RECORDED IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

6. OTHERS HERE SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT. US FIRMS WHICH SENT PEOPLE OUT ARE RAPIDLY RETURNING THEM; SOME COMMENT THAT THE ONLY RESTRAINT ON FULL RETURN IS FACT USG HAS NOT DONE SO AND WE ARE ASSUMED TO KNOW SOMETHING THESE PRIVATE FIRMS DO NOT. MOST OTHER OFFICIAL MISSIONS INCLUDING EEC NEVER WITHDREW PEOPLE BUT THEY DID INCREASE SECURITY CONSCIOUS-NESS; THEY NOW SEE THE SITUATION AS NORMAL.

7. OF COURSE ARGENTINE POLITICS WILL CONTINUE TO BE A VOLATILE AND UNPREDICTABLE. AS IN MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLO, THERE ARE SOME POTENTIAL DANGERS FOR OFFICIALS AMERICANS. CONTINUED EXPANDED SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. WE DO NOT INTEND TO SUGGEST THAT THE ADDITIONAL POLICE PROTECTION WE NOW RECEIVE BE REMOVED. THERE WILL BE SOME DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST US AND PRESS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CRITICAL (WHAT ELSE IS NEW IN THE FOREIGN SERIVICE?).

8. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THE PROMPT RETURN OF BOTH FAMI-LIES AND STAFF. WE REQUEST THAT THIS DECISION BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND COMMUNICATED TO THOSE AFFECTED ON THE SAME PRIORITY BASIS. REF A STATES THE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE PRE-PARED TO ISSUE SUCH INSTRUCTION AUTHORIZING RETURN START-ING JULY 3. WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT DATE FALLS DURING HOLIDAY WEEKEND, WHICH COULD COMPLICATE RETURN TRAVEL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

PLANS, AS INDICATED IN REF B. WE WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE MONTEVIDEO-BUENOS FERRY DOES NOT RUN ON SATURDAYS, WHICH IS TO SAY THERE WILL BE NO SERVICE ON JLY 3 AVAILABLE TO DEPENDINTS NOW HOLDING IN MONTEVIDEO. WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT RETURN BE AUTHORIZED TO BEGIN JULY 1. SHLAUDEMAN

BUENOS AIRES 3982

DTG: 301050Z JUN 82 PSN: 040720



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39629

#468.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON RCM panel info verbelen to Englanza.

5:55 p.m.

July 1, 1982

Mr. McFarlane/Admiral Poindexter:

Per Dick Morris on secure, below are Presidential comments on:

1. Daily Report (Memo for the P, dated today) Section on Gromyko/Hussein Meeting:

"All of this should be used to persuade Israel of the rightness of our befriending Jordan, et al. RR"



Memo for the P from Haig; Subj: Rebuilding Relations with Argentina

End of memo has Approve/Disapprove blocks. The P did not check a block, but made the following comments:

"I'd like to have British agreement on the prisoner return and on the sanctions. In view of the fuss over the pipeline, I would like to know the UK would have no reluctance about our lifing sanctions other than mil. of course.

"Asking them to let us be the intermediary on prisoners on the basis that if and when they (UK) are ready it could help us with our other Latin Am. interests. RR"

Kathy

Authority NLZ-762 NARA DATE

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ID 8204681

RECEIVED 03 JUL 82 10

DOCDATE 30 JUN 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMANAL

FROM HAIG, A

1007 JU107

PRESIDENT

YWORDS: ARGENTINA

GREAT BRITAIN

CM

BJECT: REBUILDING RELATIONS W/ ARGENTINA

TION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 06 JUL 82 STATUS C FILES PA FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO FONTAINE RENTSCHLER SAPIA-BOSCH WHEELER

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