

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Cable Files
Folder: Habib Trip 06/17/1982
Box: 46

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/23/2009

File Folder HABIB TRIP 06/17/1982

FOIA

F04-010/1

Box Number 46

SHAHAR

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65400	CABLE	STATE 166464 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	3	6/17/1982	B1
65402	CABLE	STATE 166582 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	4	6/17/1982	B1
65403	CABLE	STATE 166587 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	2	6/17/1982	B1
65405	CABLE	STATE 166589 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/17/1982	B1
65407	CABLE	STATE 166590 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/17/1982	B1
65408	CABLE	BEIRUT 4244 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	1	6/17/1982	B1
65409	CABLE	DAMASCUS 04312 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	2	6/17/1982	B1
65410	CABLE	BEIRUT 4250 R 7/2/2013 M370/2	6	6/17/1982	B1
65411	CABLE	TEL AVIV 09155 PAR 7/2/2013 M370/2	5	6/17/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: CABLE FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/23/2009

File Folder HABIB TRIP 06/17/1982

FOIA

F04-010/1

Box Number 46

SHAHAR

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65412	CABLE	STATE 167608 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	2	6/17/1982	B1
65413	CABLE	STATE 167664 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	3	6/17/1982	B1
65414	CABLE	TEL AVIV 09163 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	3	6/17/1982	B1
65415	CABLE	BEIRUT 4275 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	1	6/17/1982	B1
65416	CABLE	STATE 167814 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	1	6/17/1982	B1
65417	CABLE	BEIRUT 4258 <i>R</i> 7/2/2013 <i>M370/2</i>	2	6/17/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

2
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 620

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND LEBANESE LEADERS AND HAS BEEN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH ME THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. WE WERE GRATIFIED THAT A CEASE-FIRE WAS ANNOUNCED BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA ON FRIDAY. WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SEE THAT IT HOLDS AND THAT THE DANGER OF WIDER WAR IS AVERTED. ON MY INSTRUCTIONS, WE ARE ACTIVELY TRYING TO BROADEN THE CEASEFIRE AND TO HALT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PLO FORCES. WE WILL NOT REST UNTIL ALL OF THE GUNS ARE SILENT.

I AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOU THAT WHAT IS REQUIRED NOW IS AN "EMPHASIS OF LEBANON'S IDENTITY AND SOVEREIGNTY ON LEBANESE SOIL". THIS HAS BEEN ONE OF AMBASSADOR HABIB'S GOALS IN HIS CONSULTATION OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS WITH LEBANON'S LEADERS. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE, UNITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE WANT COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509 WITH ALL REASONABLE SPEED. WE SEEK A LEBANON REUNIFIED, STRONG AND FREE OF FOREIGN FORCES.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT RETURN TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PLO AGAIN CAN ROCKET OR SHELL ISRAEL'S NORTHERN VILLAGES OR IN WHICH ISRAELI FORCES, ONCE WITHDRAWN, WILL FIND A REASON TO ENTER LEBANON AGAIN. THIS WILL REQUIRE AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM TO POLICE AN ENLARGED ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. THIS PROBLEM DEMANDS IMAGINATION AND CREATIVE THINKING FROM ALL OF US.

FINALLY, THE RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON MUST SERVE ALSO TO REFOCUS OUR ENERGIES ON MAKING EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD SECURING--IN THE WORDS OF THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK--THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE RESUMING ITS EFFORTS TOWARD THAT GOAL AS SOON AS CONDITIONS SEEM PROPITIOUS. I EARNESTLY SOLICIT YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW THESE EFFORTS MIGHT BE MADE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

AS I TOLD YOU IN MY LAST MESSAGE, I VALUE YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND YOUR ADVICE, AND CONGRATULATE YOU ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION YOU HAVE TAKEN DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD. AS WE SEEK TO MOVE QUICKLY TOWARD OUR SHARED GOALS OF JUSTICE, SECURITY AND PEACE, I WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT AND COUNSEL.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 021

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

HIS MAJESTY

-- HUSSEIN I,

--- KING OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM

---- OF JORDAN,

----- AMMAN. END TEXT.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR DAMASCUS.

HAIG

BT

#6464

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65400

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 619

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE665
DD RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHJI RUQMYA RUEHDM RUEHTV
RUEHJM RUQMBE
DE RUEHC #6464 1680240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
U 170103Z JUN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7523
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6458
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7218
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 8530
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0542
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9574
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3332
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1261
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 166464
EXDIS, BEIRUT FOR HABIB AND DRAPER
EO12 12065 RDS-4 6/15/02 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)
BASS PSDC, JO, US
SUBJ LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 14. AS YOU KNOW FROM MY NOTE OF JUNE 12, I SHARE WITH ALL AMERICANS A DEEP SADNESS OVER THE ENORMOUS HUMAN AND MATERIAL LOSS WHICH THE INNOCENT LEBANESE PEOPLE AND PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS OF LEBANON HAVE SUSTAINED DURING THE TERRIBLE WEEK OF WAR. WE EXERTED OUR BEST EFFORTS DURING THE PAST YEAR TO MAINTAIN THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB, AND ISRAEL AND THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WELL UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION. AS YOU RECOGNIZE HOWEVER, WE CAN NOT DWELL ON THE PAST, BECAUSE THERE IS MUCH TO BE DONE. WE ARE DOING ALL THAT WE CAN NOW TO PUT AN END TO HUMAN SUFFERING.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65400

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

65402

4

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 615

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE684
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHC #6582 1680254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170207Z JUN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1257-8 IMMEDIATE
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6454-5 IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 7519-20
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0540-1
ZEN/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3328-9
ZEN/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7213-4
ZEN/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 8525-6
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9572-3
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 166582

NODIS

FOR HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 6/16/92 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M. JR.)

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PGOV, PINT, LE, US, IS, XF, PLU

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: U.S. GOALS

REF: BEIRUT 4233

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MARVELS IN BRINGING LEBANESE LEADERS INTO CONSENSUS BEHIND OUR GOALS. I BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT TODAY ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL AND SHARED WITH HIM SOME OF OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON HOW WE MOVE IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS, SUGGESTIONS, ADDITIONS TO THE FEW STEPS WE HAVE LISTED BELOW UNDER EACH OF THE U.S. GOALS YOU ENUMERATED IN REFTEL. WE WANT TO BE SURE WE HAVE CLEAREST POSSIBLE EXPRESSION OF YOUR VIEWS IN ORDER TO BE ABLE BEST TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORT. YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPTEL REPORT THAT MUCH OF WHAT YOU ALREADY ARE DOING FITS VERY WELL WITH WHAT EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALI HAS BEEN URGING ON US DURING HIS VISIT. REALIZE THIS FAST MOVING SITUATION MAKES SOME OF OUR EXCHANGES OBE VERY QUICKLY BUT WE NEED PERIODIC ROUND-UP SHARING OF VIEWS OF REFTEL VARIETY.

3. FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR COMMENT, IS KEYED TO REFTEL LIST

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 * 65402

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

PAGE 1 - 616

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF U.S. GOALS.

A. STRENGTHENING LEBANESE AUTHORITY;

-- USE CONTACT GROUP (LEBANON, FRANCE, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE U.S.) AND OTHER MEANS TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT.

-- URGE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO PULL IDF AWAY FROM PALACE AND OTHER CRITICAL POINTS TO GIVE LEBANESE SOME BREATHING ROOM AND TO AVOID APPEARANCE IT IS ACTING UNDER ISRAELI DURESS.

-- ENCOURAGE RAPID LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT WEST BEIRUT IN CONJUNCTION WITH "NORMALIZATION" OF CITY, INCLUDING RE-OPENING OF ACCESS IN PORT, BY ROAD, ETC.,

-- URGE LEBANESE TO CONTINUE TO PLAN FOR ELECTIONS.

-- AS SOON AS WAY IS CLEAR, URGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC PRESENCES IN BEIRUT IN ORDER TO GIVE VISIBLE AND ACTIVE SUPPORT TO LEBANESE.

B. "DRAMATIC REDUCTION" OF SYRIAN PRESENCE IN CONTEXT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

-- URGE BEGIN TO CEASE PUBLIC LINKAGE BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

-- URGE SYRIANS TO BE FLEXIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN TAKING EARLY STEPS (WITH ISRAEL) AND SEPARATING THEIR FORCES AT CRITICAL FLASH POINTS, (WITH LAF UNITS REPLACING SYRIANS AT DISENGAGEMENT POINTS).

C. END TO PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN A STATE:

-- CAPITALIZE ON CONSENSUS FOR DISARMING PALESTINIANS BY HAVING LEBANESE AUTHORITIES START EARLY DISCUSSIONS WITH PLO TO THIS END.

-- BE PREPARED TO URGE FLEXIBILITY ON BEGIN IF THE TRADEOFF FOR PLO DISARMAMENT HAS TO BE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN BEIRUT OF PLO LEADERS.

-- WORK WITH CONTACT GROUP AND OTHERS TO HELP ASSURE THAT ONCE DISARMED, THE PLO STAYS THAT WAY.

SENSITIVE

6
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 617

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- SIMULTANEOUSLY, WORK TO HAVE PHALANGE (AND POSSIBLY OTHERS) MILITIA PLACE THEIR FORCES UNDER CENTRAL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COMMAND AND PLACE HEAVY EQUIPMENT UNDER LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL.

D. AN END TO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE:

-- LEBANESE ARE PREPARED TO DEAL GENEROUSLY WITH HADDAD; WE WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN BEGIN'S ACCEPTANCE THAT HADDAD WILL HAVE TO GO, PARTICULARLY SINCE HIS "ENCLAVE" MAKES NO SENSE UNDER ENVISAGED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SOUTH

--SAM LEWIS BELIEVES SUBJECT OF HADDAD IS BEST DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE SOUTH. A VISION OF HADDAD'S MEN BEING INTEGRATED IN GOL ARMY AND BORDER UNITS IS ONE MOST LIKELY TO GET POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE..

-- YOU WOULD BEGIN SOON TO DISCUSS THIS WITH ISRAELIS AND GET DETAILS FROM LEBANESE ABOUT FUTURE REABSORPTION OF HADDAD'S MEN INTO LEBANESE SOCIETY.

E. STRENGTHENING THE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

-- MOVE QUICKLY WITH LEBANESE LEADERS AND BEGIN TO NAIL DOWN LEBANESE ACCEPTANCE OF 40 KILOMETER ZONE AND OUTSIDE PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN EXCHANGE FOR END TO HADDAD ZONE IN SOUTH (ABOVE).

-- BEGIN EARLY DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE ARMY ON THEIR NEEDS IN ORDER TO SHARE ROLE WITH MULTINATIONAL FORCE.

-- ENCOURAGE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO INITIATE MOBILIZATION OF POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN INFRASTRUCTURE TO ENTER AREAS OF LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL.

-- DECIDE SOON FOR OURSELVES HOW TO STRUCTURE PEACEKEEPING FORCE -- UNIFIL EXPANDED OR UNIFIL AUGMENTED, OR PURELY NON-UN FORCE.

-- DECIDE SOON FOR OURSELVES, SINCE IT IS ALREADY WIDELY DISCUSSED, WHETHER WE WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE.

4. SINCE DRAFTING FOREGOING WE HAVE HAD YOU MESSAGES

SENSITIVE

7
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 618

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ON THE ABDO PROPOSALS AND ON THE ABDO-EITAN CONVERSATION
AND WE ARE PROCEEDING HERE WITH THE ISRAELIS. WILL
ADVISE YOU SHORTLY RESULTS BY FLASH. HAIG

BT
#6582
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 613

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE724

OO RUEHC RUQMBE RUEHDM RUEHTV RUEHJM

DE RUEHC #6587 1680247

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

U D 170239Z JUN 82 ZFF

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1262

INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0544

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9576

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3333

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 166587

EXDIS FOR HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/16/02 (VEHICLES, N.)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO

SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM

REF: BEIRUT 4241

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE ACCEPTED YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS REFTEL AND ARE BEGINNING TO IMPLEMENT THEM THROUGH CONVERSATION WITH ARENS THIS EVENING USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

BEGIN TEXT:

-- WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD -- COMING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON -- THAT A POSSIBILITY HAS OPENED UP FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT.

-- THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR A 48-HOUR PERIOD IN WHICH TO START THIS PROCESS AND DURING WHICH THERE WILL BE AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE THAT NO MILITARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST WEST BEIRUT. THE 48-HOUR PERIOD SHOULD BEGIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BASED ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE LAF BUT, IN ANY CASE, NOT LATER

THAN 1200 LEBANON TIME JUNE 18.

-- THE AIM WOULD BE TO GET THE PLO TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS AND TO GIVE UP THE IDEA OF CONDUCTING A MILITARY STRUGGLE IN THE FUTURE.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65403

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

9
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 614

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NEEDS IS AN IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE FROM ISRAEL CONVEYED BY THE U.S. AND BACKED BY THE U.S. THAT YOU WILL NOT LAUNCH A MILITARY ASSAULT AGAINST WEST BEIRUT DURING THAT 48-HOUR PERIOD.

-- BASED ON WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME ABOUT ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THIS SITUATION, I WOULD HOPE, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S OKAY, TO GIVE THE LEBANESE THAT ASSURANCE, AND SAY THAT THE U.S. AS WELL AS ISRAEL STANDS BEHIND IT. THE DETAILS OF HOW THE FORCES ACT CAN BE WORKED OUT ON THE SPOT BETWEEN THE IDF AND LAF. AS YOU KNOW THEY ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT,

-- IF, DURING THIS 48-HOUR PERIOD, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COMES TO AN UNDERSTANDING ALONG THESE LINES THAT IS ACCEPTABLE, THEY WILL THEN WANT FROM ISRAEL AND THE U.S. THE FURTHER GUARANTEE THAT THE IDF WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH OR ATTACK THE LEBANESE ARMY AS IT MOVES INTO WEST BEIRUT AND NEGOTIATES A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE THERE.

-- IF THE LEBANESE DO NOT ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN THE 48 HOURS, WE WOULD THEN SIMPLY REVERT TO THE SITUATION WE ARE IN NOW -- A CEASE-FIRE -- AND WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AT THAT POINT.

-- I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT ISRAEL'S UNDERTAKING DURING THESE 48 HOURS WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT YOU WOULD NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. BUT SHOULD ANY HOSTILE ACT TOWARD THE IDF TAKE PLACE, THEN I HOPE YOU WOULD ORDER YOUR FORCES TO ACT WITH THE UTMOST RESTRAINT.

-- IN ADDITION, IT HAS TO BE AGREED THAT THE CHRISTIAN FORCES WOULD ALSO BE BOUND BY THE GUARANTEE DURING THIS PERIOD; THEY ALSO WOULD NOT ASSAULT THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT.

END TEXT.

3. AS REGARDS QUESTION OF WHAT U.S. WANTS FROM PLO, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND IN MANNER YOU SUGGESTED PARA 6 REFTEL. HAIG

BT

#6587

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65405 10

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 606

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE842
OO RUEHC RUEHCE
DE RUEHC #6589 1681359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
U 170314Z JUN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1271 IMMEDIATE
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6754
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0554
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9589
ZEN/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3342
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 166589
EXDIS
CORRECTED COPY (PARA 1 TEXT)
E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 6/15/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, LE, FR, US, IS
SUBJECT: GUTMANN MISSION

REF: PARIS 20686

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRENCH COUNSELLOR HERE SAYS GUTMANN IS BACK IN PARIS SAYING HE DID NOT MEET WITH HABIB IN BEIRUT (GIVING NO REASON). FRENCH HOPE THAT WHEN HABIB EN ROUTE U.S. HE WILL STOP IN PARIS FOR TALK WITH GUTMANN. SARKIS HOPES SUCH A MEETING CAN BE ARRANGED, GUTMANN REPORTS.

HAIG

BT

#6589

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65405

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

65407

11

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 624

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE661
ZZ RUEHC RUQMBE RUEHTV RUEHJM
DE RUEHC #6590 1680345
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z O 170340Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 1263
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 9579
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3334
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 166590
EXDIS FOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/16/02 (EAGLEBURGER, L.)
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, US, PLU
SUBJECT: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM

REF: BEIRUT 4241

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. ISRAELIS HAVE JUST INFORMED US THAT THE PROPOSAL
HAS BEEN SENT TO JERUSALEM FOR CONSIDERATION BY AN
EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE CABINET, AND THAT WE MAY NOT
HAVE AN ANSWER FROM THEM BEFORE 1300 OR 1400 YOUR TIME
JUNE 17. HAIG

BT
#6590
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65407

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 612

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA287

11111

ZZ RUEADWW

DE RUQMBE #4244 1680855

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Z 170850Z JUN 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7021

RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE FLASH

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4244

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/17/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, PLU, US

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM HABIB

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS ASKED THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE
 BE PASSED. WE ARE ALSO TRYING TO PASS IT BY SECURE PHONE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

--HABIB HAS SEEN ABDU AND CONVEYED ANSWERS TO THREE QUESTIONS.

--HABIB WILL SEE WAZZAN AT ABOUT 1030, GO OVER ANSWERS
 AND ASK WAZZAN FOR A BEGINNING HOUR FOR 48-HOUR STANDSTILL.--HABIB WILL PUSH FOR STARTING TIME SOMETIME TODAY,
 THURSDAY, JUNE 17.--ALL THIS MUST BE DONE ON BASIS THERE WILL BE A
 CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE" REPEAT "IN PLACE", ALONG WITH
 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BIARDA AREA AND NO REPEAT
 NO ISRAELI PATROLLING THERE.--PASS WORD TO WASHINGTON POLICY-MAKERS THAT WE
 SHOULD NOT OVERSTATE THE IMMEDIATE AIMS OF THE
 48-HOUR PERIOD: SEE STATE 166587. WE SHOULD NOT
 SAY THE AIM DURING THE 48-HOUR PERIOD IS TO GET THE
 PLO TO LAY DOWN ITS ARMS. THIS PROBLEM HAS TO BE
 HANDLED ON THE GROUND. DO NOT ADD THINGS. THE
 LIMITED OBJECTIVE IS TO GET THE PLO TO AGREE TO
 LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND TO START NEGOTIATIONS FOR
 BRINGING THE PALESTINIANS UNDER GOL AUTHORITY.

END TEXT

DILLON

BT

#4244

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65408

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 604

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR M370/2 #65409

MESSAGE:

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

HCE861
VSK815 510 STU9017
DD RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHDM #4312 1681126
ZNY SSSSS ZZH CCY ADO66775 STU8817 510 MCN NAR
O 171122Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6822
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0527
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3680
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6106
BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 04312

EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR HABIB

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y TEXT

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/17/02 (PAGANELLI, ROBERT P.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IS, LE, SY, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT

- PROBLEM - THE SYRIAN ANGLE

REF: (A) BEIRUT 4233, (B) BEIRUT 4240, (C) BEIRUT 4241,

- (D) DAMASCUS 4269, (E) STATE 166582

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. REPORTS THAT SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IN THE KHALDAH AND ASH-SHUWAYFAT AREAS EXCHANGED ARTILLERY FIRE LATE LAST NIGHT AND EARLY THIS MORNING LEADS TO THE NECESSITY FOR SOME DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES, AS URGED UPON US BY DEPUTY FONMIN QADDOUR IN HIS DEMARCHE TO ME JUNE 16 (DAMASCUS 4269).

3. I HAVE READ PHIL HABIB'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH QADDOUR'S APPROACH (BEIRUT 4240) BUT FEEL THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO EXPLOIT SARG'S DESIRE FOR DISENGAGEMENT TO ACCOMPLISH OUR POLILY OBJECTIVE OF A "DRAMATIC REDUCTION" OF SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON RATHER THAN TO SIMPLY TELL SYRIANS THAT DISENGAGEMENT IS UBE FOR NOW, BUT WE'LL WORK FOR IT LATER.

4. I SUGGEST AN APPROACH THAT WOULD DOVETAIL THE SYRIAN REQUEST FOR DISENGAGEMENT WITH PHIL'S EFFORTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO RESOLVE THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM (BEIRUT 4241). MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 1000 SYRIAN TROOPS STILL IN BEIRUT--THE 85TH INDEPENDENT BRIGADE UNDER THE COMMAND OF BRIGADIER HALLAL--AND THAT THE IDF ON JUNE 15 OFFERED THE SYRIAN FORCES SAFE PASSAGE

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 605

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OUT OF BEIRUT, A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS REFUSED BY HALLAL.
5. MY SUGGESTION IS THAT AS PART OF THE WAZZAN PROPOSAL FOR A TWO-DAY PERIOD FOR THE GOL TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PLO AND BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF INTO WEST BEIRUT, WE MAKE A SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH TO THE SARG IN WHICH WE PROPOSE THAT SYRIAN TROOPS BE REDEPLOYED OUT OF WEST BEIRUT TO ANOTHER POINT, SUCH AS ALAYH, AND REPLACED WITH THE LAF, AS PROPOSED BY ABDO AND WAZZAN. THE APPROACH TO THE SARG WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATED SYRIAN DESIRE FOR DISENGAGEMENT, FOR THIS PROPOSAL TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SYRIANS, THERE SHOULD ALSO BE SOME FACE-SAVING ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, IF ABDO'S ARRANGEMENTS RE HAVING LEBANESE G-2 FORCES TAKE OVER BEIRUT AIRPORT ARE SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PERSUADED TO PULL BACK TO POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE AIRPORT. THIS WOULD BE PRESENTED TO SYRIANS AS THE QUID PRO QUO FOR PULLING SYRIAN FORCES OUT OF BEIRUT, THIS SHOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO ISRAEL, BUT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO DROP THEIR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS LINKING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WITH A SYRIAN PULLBACK, AS ALSO RECOMMENDED BY HABIB. PROPOSAL HAS MERIT OF FURTHERING SEVERAL U.S. OBJECTIVES:
ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTION OF SECURITY AUTHORITY BY GOL AND DRAWBACK OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES FROM BEIRUT. IF WE CAN START THE PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT IN THIS WAY, IT COULD LEAD TO ADDITIONAL PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS IN LEBANON IN WHICH SYRIAN FORCES ARE DEPLOYED.
6. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, THERE IS A RECEPTIVITY HERE FOR A U.S. SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF FERMENT WITHIN SYRIAN LEADERSHIP CIRCLES WITH DEEP DISSATISFACTION BEING VOICED OVER SOVIET SUPPORT, AND ESPECIALLY SOVIET WEAPONRY, WHICH PROVED TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE AGAINST U.S. EQUIPMENT. THIS DISSATISFACTION, COUPLED WITH THE DESIRE FOR AN AMERICAN-MEDIATED SOLUTION TO THE LEBANESE PROBLEM, GIVES US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER A REAL BLOW TO SOVIET PRESTIGE IN SYRIA AND OVER THE LONG RUN BEGIN A GRADUAL REORIENTATION OF SYRIAN POLICY AWAY FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.
7. REQUEST HABIB'S AND DEPARTMENT'S URGENT REACTION TO THIS LINE OF APPROACH. PAGANELLI

BT

#4312

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65410

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 603

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA325

11111

ZZ RUEADWW

DE RUQMBE #4250 1681600

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Z 171530Z JUN 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE FLASH

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7028

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4250

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/17/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, SY, US, PLO

SUBJ: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT: CORRECTIONS TO TEXT

REF: BEIRUT 4247

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CORRECT PARA 2, 1ST SUB-PARA AS FOLLOWS:

--AS REGARDS YOUR MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALI,

I AM SURE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD PERSUADE

THE EGYPTIANS (RPT EGYPTIANS) TO OPEN A CONFIDENTIAL

DIALOGUE WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERS, EITHER BY SENDING A

TRUSTED EMISSARY TO BEIRUT OR SOME OTHER EFFECTIVE CHANNEL.

THE EGYPTIANS COULD CONCEIVABLY OFFER SOME NEW AVENUES

FOR DEALING WITH THE ASPECT OF THE PLO PROBLEM. THE

SAUDIS SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE AND I WILL FORWARD IDEAS

ON THAT SEPARATELY.

3. CORRECT PARA 3, 2ND SUB-PARA LINE 9 AS FOLLOWS:

OF PRESSURE ON THE PLO, BUT AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL...

4. PARA 4, SUB-PARA 1, LINE 11 SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

FUTURE. WHAT WE ARE WORKING FOR IS A NEGOTIATED DEAL...

--END CORRECTIONS.

DILLON

BT

#4250

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 *65410

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 609

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA307

!!!!

ZZ RUEADWW

DE RUQMBE #4247/01 1681250

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Z 171230Z JUN 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE FLASH

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7022

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 4247

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3,4 6/17/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, IS, SY, US, PLO

SUBJ: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

REF: WHITE HOUSE 4139

1. (8-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR GOOD WORDS OF SUPPORT. YOU AND
SECRETARY HAIG CAN COUNT ON ME TO DO MY BEST TO ADVANCE
AMERICAN INTERESTS AND TRY TO BRING PEACE AND
STABILITY TO LEBANON.

--AS REGARDS YOUR MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
ALI, I AM SURE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD
PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO OPEN A CONFIDENTIAL DIALOGUE
WITH THE LEBANESE LEADERS, EITHER BY SENDING A
TRUSTED EMISSARY OR SOME OTHER EFFECTIVE CHANNEL,
THE SYRIANS COULD CONCEIVABLY OFFER SOME NEW AVENUES
FOR DEALING WITH THE ASPECT OF THE PLO PROBLEM. THE
SAUDIS SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE AND I WILL FORWARD
IDEAS ON THAT SEPARATELY.

3. NOW, AS FOR YOUR QUESTIONS:

--ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE VICINITY OF BEIRUT,
WE HAVE TO ANALYZE THIS IN TWO TIME FRAMES. WITH
WASHINGTON'S AGREEMENT TO SECURE A 48-HOUR STANDSTILL
WHILE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATES WITH THE PLO
OVER THE LEBANESE ARMY'S INTRODUCTION INTO WEST
BEIRUT, IT WOULD BE ALRIGHT TO LET THE ISRAELIS STAY
WHERE THEY ARE FOR THE MOST PART, THIS WILL KEEP THE
PRESSURE ON THE PLO TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE LEBANESE
ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE NEUTRALIZATION. BUT MEANWHILE,
THE ISRAELIS SHOULD STOP FIRING AT AN HOUR TO BE AGREED.
ISRAELI BOMBARDMENTS LAST NIGHT WERE EXTREMELY HEAVY,
--IF A DEAL CAN BE SQUARED BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 610

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE PLO-AND WHILE THE ISRAELIS ARE BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED THROUGH THE LIAISON CHANNELS WITH THE LEBANESE WHICH I HELPED TO SET UP - THEN THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BEGIN PLANNING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CHRISTIAN HEARTLAND NORTH OF THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY AND MOVE BACK TO LINES SOUTH AND EAST OF BEIRUT AIRPORT. THEY THUS REMAIN WITHIN CLOSE STRIKING DISTANCE, AS A FORM OF PRESSURE, BUT AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER WILL HAVE BEEN LIFTED. THIS WILL SHOW THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN "DISENGAGE". WE AND THE ISRAELIS NEED TO THINK ABOUT SUCH FIRST STAGE DISENGAGEMENT NOW SO THAT WE CAN MOVE ON THAT SCORE WITHOUT DELAY. THE PLO AND THE PHALANGE ARE BEING OR CAN BE BROUGHT TO COOPERATE MUCH MORE READILY THAN THE SYRIANS. THE SYRIANS ARE GOING TO BE TROUBLESOME, THEY ARE RIGHTLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI CEASE-FIRES, AND WILL NOT WANT TO ACCEPT OR APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE VARIOUS ISRAELI DEMANDS AND ULTIMATA CONSTANTLY BEING BROADCAST.

--THE BEST WAY TO WORK ON THE SYRIANS AND THEIR WITHDRAWAL IS FOR US TO DO SO QUIETLY WITH A LEBANESE COMPONENT THAT PERMITS THE SYRIANS A WAY OUT WITHIN A LEBANESE CONTEXT. SARKIS HAS SPOKEN TO ME ABOUT THIS. HE WORRIES THAT SYRIANS CAN SABOTAGE ANYTHING THAT IS ARRANGED AND HAS SUGGESTED I TALK TO ASSAD AGAIN. I WILL DO SO, BUT FOR THE MOMENT NEED TO STAY HERE.

--IN ANY CASE, HOWEVER, IT IS ABSOLUTELY INDISPENSIBLE THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW THEIR TANKS, THEIR FORCES AND THEIR PATROLS FROM AROUND THE VICINITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S PALACE AND THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN THE B'ABDA REGION. THIS SHOULD BE DONE INSTANTLY - TODAY.

--AS FOR TANGIBLE US HELP FOR THE LEBANESE, I BELIEVE MY PRESENCE HERE ON YOUR BEHALF - DEMONSTRATING OUR STRONG COMMITMENT TO LEBANESE INTEGRITY - IS ADEQUATE FOR THE MOMENT. IT IS A MATTER OF WORKING OUT THE LEBANESE POLITICAL PROCESS, WHICH TAKES TIME AND PATIENCE. I WILL RECOMMEND FURTHER U S STEPS WHENEVER NECESSARY. RIGHT NOW THE LEBANESE ARMY MAY NEED SOME ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO DO THE JOB IT HAS SET FOR ITSELF. IF I DETERMINE THE NEEDS ARE REAL, I TRUST WE CAN MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY. I ASSURE YOU I WILL BE HARD HEADED ABOUT THIS, BUT I SUGGEST YOU HAVE OUR PEOPLE READY TO MOVE IF NECESSARY SO THAT WE CAN GET THIS STUFF IN WHEN IT WILL BE USEFUL.

--AS FOR THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, THE LEBANESE, OF COURSE, WANT THE SYRIANS OUT OF THEIR COUNTRY ALTOGETHER BUT THEY CERTAINLY WILL NOT WANT TO HAVE THE ISRAELIS

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 611

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

LINK SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR OWN WITHDRAWAL AS A
CONDITION. THE LEBANESE ALSO HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE
SYRIANS - WHETHER THEY LIKE IT OR NOT - AS A NEIGHBOR.
WE WILL HAVE TO HANDLE THIS EVOLVING SCENE WITH SOME FLEXIBILITY.
IN ANY EVENT, MR PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE WE CAN COUNT
ON A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM MOST OF LEBANON WHICH WILL
SATISFY OUR U S STATED POLICY GOAL OF A "DRAMATIC
REDUCTION" IN THE SYRIAN PRESENCE. ULTIMATELY, ALL
OF THEM WILL GO, BUT WITHIN A LEBANESE CONTEXT WHICH
I HAVE NOTED ABOVE. THEY ARE NO THREAT TO THE ISRAELIS
BUT THEY ARE A REAL PROBLEM FOR THE LEBANESE AND THE
ISRAELIS SHOULD LEAVE IT TO THEM. IF WE GET THE KIND
OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND LEBANESE PRESIDENT I AM
WORKING TOWARD OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, WE WILL BE IN
A MUCH BETTER POSITION ON THIS.

BT

#4247

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 607

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EIA308

IIII

ZZ RUEADWW

DE RUQMBE #4247/02 1681340

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Z 171230Z JUN 82 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE FLASH

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7023

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIRUT 4247

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HABIB

--I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING TALKS BETWEEN ARAFAT AND THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP WITHOUT IN ANY WAY VIOLATING OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL. THEY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH, AND THE OUTCOME HAS BEEN PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN'S PROPOSALS OF JUNE 16 FOR A 48-HOUR STANDSTILL GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. THIS WILL PERMIT LEBANESE-PLO NEGOTIATIONS ON NEUTRALIZING THE PLO IN WEST BEIRUT AND A BEGINNING TO ARRANGING A LEBANESE-PLO RELATIONS OVER A LONGER TERM ON AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

--WE SHOULD KEEP KING FAHD INFORMED SO THAT HE CAN WEIGHT-IN WITH ARAFAT AS HE SEES FIT IN SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS. AT THIS STAGE WE CAN USE THE LEBANESE AS A CONDUIT FOR CONVEYING OUR VIEWS DIRECTLY TO THE PLO WHEN NECESSARY.

4. --AS FOR SHARON'S INTENTIONS TOWARD BEIRUT, HE HAS THE CAPACITY NOW - HAVING BOTTLED UP THE PALESTINIANS IN WEST BEIRUT - TO LAY WASTE TO MUCH OF THAT PART OF THE CITY THROUGH BOMBARDMENT. I THINK SHARON KNOWS HE HAS THE PLO ON THE ROPES, BUT HE PREFERS TO HAVE SOMEONE ELSE FINISH THEM OFF. I DOUBT THAT HE WOULD WANT TO RISK THE ISRAELI CASUALTIES INVOLVED IN HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHTING. BUT I CANNOT RULE IT OUT. HE MAY TRY TO USE THE PHALANGE FOR THIS, BUT THAT WILL BE JUST AS BLOODY AND WILL MAKE PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE. ALSO WE ARE WORKING FOR A NEGOTIATED DEAL BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE PLO WHICH WOULD BOTH FORESTALL MASSIVE ISRAELI ATTACKS ON WEST BEIRUT AND AVOID MORE CASUALTIES - LEBANESE, PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI. IT WILL THEN BE POSSIBLE TO WORK FOR NEUTRALIZATION OF THE PLO FOR THE LONGER HAUL. EVERY BIT OF EVIDENCE I HAVE SUGGESTS THAT THE CORNERED PALESTINIANS WILL FIGHT UNLESS SHOWN AN ALTERNATIVE.

SENSITIVE

20
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 608

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IT WILL BE HARD MOPPING THEM UP BECAUSE THEY HAVE FANNED OUT THROUGHOUT WEST BEIRUT OCCUPYING BUILDINGS AND APARTMENTS WHERE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY LEBANESE WORK AND LIVE.

--AS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH BEGIN, I BELIEVE IT IS TIME TO BE FIRM WITH HIM. HIS SECURITY OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN MET. THE OUTCOME OF THIS SITUATION ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING COULD BE MOST HELPFUL FOR ISRAEL'S LONG TERM SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT HE MUST BE INDUCED TO COOPERATE WITH OUR OWN GOALS. ABOVE ALL HE MUST NOT LET US ARRANGE CEASE-FIRES WHICH HE INTERPRETS IN AN INCREDIBLE WAY AS ALLOWING THE ISREALIS THEN TO MOVE WHEREVER THEY CHOOSE.

--I CANNOT GIVE YOU ANY SENSE OF THE ACCURATE FIGURE FOR THE PALESTINIAN AND LEBANESE CASUALTIES. I BELIEVE THEY ARE HIGH. I WILL SEEK SUCH INFORMATION AS BEST AS I CAN. I AM SURE ALSO THAT THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE DISPLACED BY THE FIGHTING. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT - IN ACCORDANCE WITH AMERICAN TRADITIONS - THAT WE MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD - BEGINNING WITH YOUR PLEDGE OF \$25 MILLION.

-- AS FOR STRIKING A DEAL ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS PROBLEM, THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN USE THIS WAR NOW TO MAKE MOVEMENT IN THAT DIRECTION, DESPITE THE LESSONS THE SYRIANS HAVE LEARNED. THE SYRIANS WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS WHILE THE ISRAELIS ARE IN LEBANON. THEY MAY NOT NEGOTIATE AFTERWARD EITHER, BUT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS AND OTHER DAYS TO DEAL WITH THAT PROBLEM. 5. I WILL, OF COURSE, BE KEEPING YOU AND SECRETARY HAIG AS WELL INFORMED AS I CAN, ALTHOUGH YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN SENDING AND RECEIVING MESSAGES FROM BEIRUT. WE ARE TRYING TO CORRECT THIS. WITH RESPECT AND WARMEST BEST WISHES,

SINCERELY,
PHILIP C HABIB
DILLON

BT
#4247
NNNN

SENSITIVE

65411
21
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 595

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR M370/2 #65411

MESSAGE:

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

HCE068
UTS2807
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #9155/01 1681836
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
U 171833Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5923
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3431
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6631
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4875
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 09155

EXDIS

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS; BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 6/17/02 (BROWN, WILLIAM A.) UR-M
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGUV, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLO
SUBJECT: HABIB MISSION: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT AND
- OTHER PROBLEMS

REF: A. BEIRUT 4241, B. STATE 106587, C. BEIRUT 4242
1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING A CALL ON KIMCHE AND BAR-ON ON THE AFTERNOON
OF JUNE 17, THEY INFORMED ME THAT THE CABINET WAS
MEETING IN SPECIAL SESSION STARTING AT 1600 LOCAL
TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDED REPLY FROM BEGIN IN NEW YORK
TO THE SECRETARY ON THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE CONTAINED
IN REF B. THE CABINET WOULD SEND BEGIN ITS CONSIDERED
RECOMMENDATIONS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR HIM TO PUNDER
BEFORE HE GAVE THE SECRETARY THE FINAL REPLY.

3. KIMCHE THEN GAVE ME A READOUT OF SHARON'S MEETING
WITH ABDO ATTENDED ON THE ISRAELI SIDE BY KIMCHE AND
UMI SAGI THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. IT TRACKED REMARKABLY
WELL WITH THAT OF REF C:

-- SHARON OPENED BY STRESSING THAT ISRAEL WANTED NOT
A SINGLE CENTIMETER OF LEBANESE TERRITORY AND DESIRED
TO SEE A FREE INDEPENDENT LEBANON WITHOUT ANY FOREIGN
TROOPS. IT WAS COMPLETELY UP TO THEM WHAT SORT OF
ISRAELI HELP THEY DESIRED. THE PRIMARY ISRAELI
PROBLEM WAS THE PLO TERRORISTS. MOREOVER, AS LONG
AS THE SYRIANS WERE IN OR HAD ACCESS TO BEIRUT,
THE GOL WOULD NEVER BE TRULY FREE.

-- ABDO SAID THE GOL LEADERSHIP HAD ITS OWN PLANS

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 596

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BUT NEEDED ISRAELI HELP. AFTER RENDERING GREAT PRAISE TO THE IDF OPERATION, HE SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST SIX MONTHS BEFORE THE LAST FOREIGN ARMED FORCES LEFT LEBANESE TERRITORY AND THE LEBANESE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPLEMENT TRULY INDEPENDENT DECISIONS. IF THE PLO REMAINED IN BEIRUT THE NEW SCENARIOS WOULD SIMPLY NOT WORK. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE PLO WOULD INFILTRATE SOUTH FROM BEIRUT EVEN IF THERE WERE A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN PLACE. THE LEBANESE HAD TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT AND ACHIEVE THE PRIMARY GOAL WHICH WAS THE ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT WHO COULD HANDLE MATTERS STRONGLY AND "WE ALL KNOW" THAT THIS IS BASHIR. SARKIS LIKES BASHIR AND WOULD HELP HIM, BUT NEEDS MUSLIM SUPPORT AS WELL AS ISRAELI ASSISTANCE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A POLITICAL-MILITARY SOLUTION FOR BEIRUT, SUCH THAT THE PLO IS DISARMED AND THE PALESTINIANS ARE BROUGHT INTO A "POLITICAL SITUATION." LATER (AFTER BASHIR TAKES OVER AS PRESIDENT) THE GOL CAN MOVE TOWARD A FORMAL PEACE PROCESS WITH ISRAEL.

--

-- SHARON WONDERED HOW LONG THAT PROCESS WOULD TAKE. HE REQUESTED THAT THE GOL REDUCE THE PRESSURE ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS REGARDING AN IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS COULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO BEIRUT. TIME WAS VERY LIMITED. THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD TAKEN A DECISION NOT TO ATTACK BEIRUT. AS SOON AS APPROPRIATE, THE GOL COULD TAKE OVER BEIRUT AIRPORT.

-- ABDU STATED THAT THE GOL DID NOT WANT THE ISRAELI TO WITHDRAW QUICKLY. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE POINTED OUT THAT WHEREAS THE LEBANESE CABINET NORMALLY MEETS ON WEDNESDAYS, SARKIS, FEARFUL THAT SOME MUSLIM MEMBERS OF THE CABINET WOULD REQUEST IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, HAD CANCELLED THE CABINET MEETING FOR THIS WEEK. THE GOL NEEDED TIME. FORTY YEARS OF MUSLIM INFLUENCE COULD NOT BE OVERCOME IN A FEW DAYS. REGARDING THE SYRIAN PRESENCE, SARKIS WAS AFTER ALL COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ADF. IN THE PAST, HAD HE REQUESTED AN ADF WITHDRAWAL THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO A BOMBARDMENT. NOW SARKIS WAS IN A POSITION WHERE HE COULD ORDER THE ADF TO MOVE TO THE BEKAA AND/OR NORTHERN LEBANON. AT THAT TIME (UNSPECIFIED) HE WOULD ALSO ASK FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT, HOWEVER, SETTING A TIME LIMIT. AS FOR SYRIAN CALLS FOR DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 597

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE ADF AND IDF, IT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH A LEBANESE
MATTER THROUGH SARKIS AS CU OF THE ADF.

--

BT

#9155

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 593

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE069
STU0045
UD RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #9155/02 1681844
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
U 171833Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5924
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3432
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6632
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4876
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 09155

EXDIS

-- HERE THE DMI SAGI PRESSED ABDU FOR AN ATTACK ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADF.
-- ABDU RESPONDED THAT LEBANON WAS HALF MUSLIM AND DECISIONS HAD TO BE SHARED WITH MUSLIM LEADERS. THE PLO MUST BE DISARMED AND THE PALESTINIANS CHanneLED INTO A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. LATER, THERE COULD EVOLVE A SITUATION WHEREBY PALESTINIANS BECAME "INHABITANTS WITHOUT POLITICAL AIMS." MEANWHILE THE ISRAELIS SHOULD STAY PUT UNTIL THE SITUATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY RESTORED, E.G., A NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED, THE PALESTINIANS DISARMED. ABDU HAD SAID THIS TO HABIB AS WELL AS THE FRENCH, ITALIAN, GERMAN AND BRITISH AMBASSADORS. MEANWHILE, SARKIS HAD DECIDED TO APPOINT THREE LAF OFFICERS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH IDF OFFICERS ON LOCAL TACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

--

-- WHEN ABDU REQUESTED THE REMOVAL OF IDF TANKS FROM THE ENVIRONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AS WELL AS KHOURY'S RESIDENCE, SHARON READILY AGREED. SHARON ALSO AGREED TO ABDU'S REQUEST THAT THE LAF RETURN TO ITS MILITARY BARRACKS AT SIDON.
-- IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE FURTHER MEETINGS WITH ABDU IN ISRAEL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.
4. KIMCHE HAD ALSO MET WITH BASHIR ON JUNE 16 IN LEBANON. BASHIR WAS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL ACTION AND SAID THAT SARKIS SUPPORTED HIM ONE HUNDRED PERCENT IN HIS EFFORTS TO ENLIST MUSLIM SUPPORT. SAAB SALEM WAS ALSO ON BOARD.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 594

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATAGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

5. ON THE MARGINS OF THIS CONVERSATION, THE FOLLOWING ARE NOTEWORTHY POINTS:

-- WHEN WE ASKED WHY THE PHALANGE WAS SO HEAVILY INVOLVED IN MILITARY ACTION WHEN BASHIR, ABDO ET AL WERE SEEKING MUSLIM SUPPORT, KIMCHE RESPONDED THAT THE OBJECT WAS TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE PLO.

THE U.S. HAD TO REMEMBER, HE INSISTED, THERE WERE MANY MUSLIMS IN LEBANON WHO HATED THE PLO. THE SHIA WERE LITERALLY "UP IN ARMS" AND THERE WERE REPORTS THAT INDIVIDUAL MUSLIMS WERE FINGERING PLO NESTS FOR THE PHALANGISTS.

-- WHEN I CITED SHARON'S REMARKS ON THE JUNE 16 MOVED TV SHOW IN WHICH HE CALLED FOR TOTAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON, KIMCHE RESPONDED "DON'T TAKE THAT AS A DEFINITIVE POSITION."

-- SPEAKING PRIVATELY, KIMCHE STRONGLY ADVISED THAT WE LAY OFF COMMENTING ON THE HADDAD PROBLEM. BEGIN HAD TAKEN UMBRAGE AT OUR LATEST PRESENTATION ON THIS SCORE AND THE ISSUE WAS OF RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY ON THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE AGENDA. OUR POINT REGARDING HADDAD'S FUTURE COULD BE MUCH BETTER MADE IN A DIFFERENT MANNER: THAT THIS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE LEBANESE IN A LEBANESE CONTEXT.

-- BOTH KIMCHE AND BAR-ON WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE FORMULA THAT THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD BE ABSORBED INTO A FRAMEWORK RESPONSIVE TO GUL AUTHORITY AND THAT THEY SHOULD LIVE AS PEACEFUL RESIDENTS OF THE COUNTRY UNDER LEBANESE AUTHORITY.

6.

13576
E.O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

7. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. BROWN

BT

#9155

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65412

26

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 601

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA640
UD RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #7608 1681907
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
U 171839Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7737
RUEHCE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 1285
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 9619
ZEN/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 3360
ZEN/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS FLASH 0569
ZEN/USDEL SECRETARY FLASH 9313
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 167608
EXDIS//FOR HABIB
TOSEC 090006
E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 6/17/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE)
TAGS: MOPS, LE, IS, PLU, XF
SUBJECT: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT SITUATION

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CABINET'S DECISION, APPROVED BY BEGIN IN NEW YORK, JUST PASSED TO US BY AREN-.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS DECIDED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE MESSAGE OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE.

(2) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND HAS NO PLANS FOR CAPTURING BEIRUT. THE IDF WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON IN WHICH CASE IT WILL EXERCISE ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

(3) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE IDF BUT IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY OTHER ARMED FORCES IN LEBANON.

(4) THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DOES NOT SEE IN THE PLU A FACTOR FOR ANY SORT OF NEGOTIATION. END TEXT.

4. COMMENT: IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS PUT BY EAGLEBURGER AND VELIOTES, ARENS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ELABORATION:

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65412

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 602

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

-- POINT 1 CONTAINS THE BASIC REPLY;

-- POINT 2 SIMPLY CONFIRMS THE CEASEFIRE AND RESTATES THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION REGARDING THE IDF AND BEIRUT;

-- ON POINT 3, ARENS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAEL WOULD OF COURSE USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE PHALANGE TO REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTION. (WE PRESUME LAF WILL ALSO BE WORKING ON THE CHRISTIANS TO THIS END.);

-- POINT 4 ARENS SAID, WAS SIMPLY A RESTATEMENT OF ISRAEL'S STANDARD POSITION.

WE HAVE NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF TANKS AROUND BAABDA HERE TODAY IN VIEW OF SECTELCON REPORT FROM BROWN IN TEL AVIV THAT ABDU MADE DIRECT REQUEST TO SHARON LAST NIGHT TO GET TANKS AWAY FROM BOTH THE PALACE AND KHOURY'S RESIDENCE AND SHARON AGREED.

THE SECRETARY IS IN NEW YORK AND NOW LOOKING AT CABINET RESPONSE. IF HE HAS FURTHER COMMENTS THEY WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL. EAGLEBURGER

BT

#7608

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 590

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE130
OO RUEHC RUQMBE
DE RUEHC #7664 1682056
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
U 171952Z JUN 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1207
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 167664
EXDIS, FOR PHIL HABIB FROM THE SECRETARY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 06/17/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.)
TAGS: PEPR MILI IS LE
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHING A CONTACT GROUP

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS YOUR EFFORTS EVOLVE IN BEIRUT WE BELIEVE WE CAN USEFULLY BEGIN TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE CONTACT GROUP. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THE APPROACH WE MIGHT TAKE WITH THE SAUDIS AND FRENCH. WE CONTEMPLATE A FORMAL LETTER TO BOTH THESE PARTIES AS WELL AS A LETTER TO PRESIDENT SARKIS INDICATING THE NATURE OF OUR APPROACH, THE OBJECTIVES BEHIND IT AND SEEKING LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND DIRECTION OF OUR EFFORTS. THE ELEMENTS THAT WE WOULD WEAVE INTO THE LETTERS TO THE FRENCH AND SAUDIS FOLLOW:

- (A) RECOMMEND ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTACT GROUP OF THE LEBANESE, SAUDIS, FRENCH AND U.S. TO GENERATE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE AND THE ARAB WORLD AND TO COORDINATE ACTIONS BY OTHERS IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT. WE WOULD HAVE AS OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE STRENGTHENING THE LEBANESE AUTHORITY SUPPORTED BY ARAB AND WESTERN FRIENDS OF LEBANON.

- (B) THE BASIC DIRECTION FOR OUR EFFORTS WOULD COME FROM THE LEBANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. WE WOULD INDICATE THAT AS A RESULT OF YOUR EFFORTS THUS FAR THERE IS NEAR LEBANESE CONSENSUS ON THE FOLLOWING:

- -- MOVING TOWARDS PROMPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, POSSIBLY PHASED, WITH INITIAL EMPHASIS ON A DISENGAGEMENT FROM BEIRUT SO THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GAINS CREDIBILITY AS NOT BEING DIRECTED BY THE GUNS OF

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65413

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 591

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82/1236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OUTSIDE FORCES.

- -- PHASED DISARMAMENT OF THE PLU AND FACTIONAL ARMIES FIRST IN BEIRUT AND POSSIBLE INTEGRATION OF FACTIONAL FORCES INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES SHOULD ASSUME SECURITY DUTIES IN BEIRUT, FORTIFIED, IF NECESSARY, BY NEUTRAL ARAB OR OUTSIDE FORCES.
- -- ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS IN BEIRUT THROUGH WITHDRAWAL OF OUTSIDE FORCES, DISARMING OF THE PLU, AND INTEGRATION OF FACTIONAL ARMIES SO THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A LEBANESE ELECTION CAN BE MET AND A STRONG GOVERNMENT BE ESTABLISHED.
- -- ENDING THE PALESTINIAN STATE WITHIN A STATE WITH THOSE PALESTINIANS REMAINING IN LEBANON AS FOREIGN RESIDENTS SUBJECT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
- -- ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL FORCE UNDER LEBANESE AUSPICES, POSSIBLY WITH A UN ELEMENT, AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE ZONE BETWEEN LEBANON'S SOUTHERN BORDER AND 40 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH.
- -- PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM LEBANON WITH INITIAL EMPHASIS ON BEIRUT.
- -- BRINGING AN END TO THE HADDAD ENCLAVE ON AN HONORABLE BASIS.
- (C) WE WOULD INDICATE THE NEED FOR FRENCH AND SAUDI SUPPORT FOR FORMATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AS WELL AS WHATEVER HELP THEY CAN PROVIDE WITH LEBANESE FACTIONS, PLU AND, IN THE CASE OF FRANCE, ISRAEL. WE WOULD WANT TO PURSUE OUR EFFORTS SUCH THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WAS DIRECTING THOSE EFFORTS.
- (D) WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE CONTACT GROUP BE INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING COORDINATED PUBLIC POSTURE, JOINT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, COORDINATED EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WITH THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT IT NEEDS TO

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 592

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STRENGTHEN ITS DOMESTIC POSITION AND COMPLEMENTARY
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ACROSS THE BOARD.

- (E) FINALLY, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT AS SOON AS YOU
CAN USEFULLY BREAK AWAY YOU WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE
SAUDIS AND FRENCH ON THE BEST MEANS FOR MAINTAINING
COORDINATION OF OUR ACTIVITIES AND INCREASING OUR
IMPACT. WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE THAT SAUDI EFFORTS
WITH THE SYRIANS, PLO AND BAYT A-DIN MEMBERS DO NOT RUN
AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH YOUR EFFORTS.

3. OUR OBJECTIVES ARE OBVIOUSLY BROADER THAN THE
NARROW CONTEXT OF THE LEBANON CRISIS SINCE BY ENGAGING
THE SAUDIS AND FRENCH WE HOPE TO DEFUSE SOME OF THE
SEVERE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI INVASION BOTH IN
EUROPE AND IN THE GULF. WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER HOW
AND WHETHER WE CAN BRING OTHERS SUCH AS THE EGYPTIANS
AND JORDANIANS INTO OUR EFFORTS. EAGLEBURGER

BT

#7664

NNNN

SENSITIVE

65414

31

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 598

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE046
UTS2941
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHTV #9163 1682059
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 172043Z JUN 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5937
INFO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC// IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 9478
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 1493
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3439
RUFHQL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3224
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2576
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6636
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4887
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 5258
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2793
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8437
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1001
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2123
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0884
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TEL AVIV 09163

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

NEA FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/17/88 (HARE, PAUL) UR-M

TAGS: SOPN, MOPS, PEPR, IS, SY, LE, US, XF

SUBJECT: IDF OPERATION IN LEBANON: ATTENTION TURNING

- TO DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

--

2. DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING OVER THE SITUATION IN LEBANON HAS BEEN VERY MUCH ON EVERYONE'S MINDS HERE. THERE IS INTENSE INTEREST IN WHAT IS HAPPENING IN BEIRUT AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE HABIB MISSION. THE BELIEF IS WIDESPREAD THAT THE CREATION OF A VIABLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT IN ANY SETTLEMENT THAT LEADS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. ISRAELIS ARE FOCUSING ON WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN TO THE PLO PRESENCE IN WEST BEIRUT, PARTICULARLY AS IT APPEARS TO BE ONE OF THE IMPORTANT KEYS IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH LONGER IDF FORCES MUST

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65414

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 599

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FIGHT AND REMAIN IN LEBANON.

3. LIKEWISE, ATTENTION IS DIRECTED AT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THERE WAS SOME INITIAL CONCERN THAT THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED BY ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON, MANY OBSERVERS ARE COMMENTING THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR THAT AN ISRAELI LEADER HAS TRAVELED TO WASHINGTON WITHOUT HIS HAND OUT. SOME ARE ARGUING THAT ISRAEL HAS DONE THE UNITED STATES A FAVOR BY CREATING AN OPPORTUNITY TO STABILIZE LEBANON, NEUTRALIZE THE PLO, AND RESHAPE THE POLITICAL MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS A STRONG UNDERCURRENT HERE THAT ISRAEL HAS CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS THE STRONGEST POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

--

4. LABOR PARTY LEADERS ARE CONTINUING TO HINT OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE WAY THE WAR WAS HANDLED BUT CRITICISM IS STILL VERY MUTED. THERE IS SOME TALK AMONG LABOR PARTY REGULARS THAT CONSIDERATION OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO JOINING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IN A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT, NOT ONLY TO INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BUT ALSO TO PUT LABOR IN A BETTER POLITICAL POSITION.

5. WHILE THERE IS A FEELING THE WAR IS WINDING DOWN, ISRAELIS ARE STILL GLUED TO THEIR RADIOS TO LISTEN TO THE LATEST REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING AROUND BEIRUT, BUT HARD INFORMATION IS ELUSIVE. THE LACK OF RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS LED ONE COMMENTATOR (HAARETZ' ZEEV SCHIFF) TO URGE CAUTION IN REACHING CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING NEAR BEIRUT.

--

6. WITH A CONCERTED GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT REPORTS OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF HOMELESS AND LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, THERE APPEARS TO BE LESS PUBLIC OUTCRY ABOUT WHAT THE WAR HAS DONE TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF LEBANON. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, ISRAELIS ARE REACTING TO AN IDF ANNOUNCEMENT THIS AFTERNOON (JUNE 17) THAT 214 ISRAELI SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND 1,114 WERE WOUNDED (23 MISSING AND ONE CAPTURED) DURING THE FIGHTING BETWEEN JUNE 5 AND 15. THE CASUALTY FIGURE CONTINUES TO MOUNT BUT THEY HAVE NOT REACHED THE POINT OF STIMULATING A STRONG PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST THE OPERATION.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 600

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

1. MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. BROWN
BT
#9163
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 555

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE596
UTS4470
DD RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4275 1692100
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
U 172055Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7052
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1163
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4275
EXDIS
FROM HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/18/92 (HABIB, PHILIP)
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, PINT, LE, IS, US, PLU
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM
REF: (A) JIDDA 4716, (B) BEIRUT 4241
1. (8-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AS REF B MAKES CLEAR, PROPOSAL FOR A 48 HOUR NEGOTIATING PERIOD WAS CONVEYED TO US BY PM WAZZAN AND NOT REPEAT NOT VICE VERSA. WAZZAN SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT ONE OF THE TWO PRINCIPLE AIMS TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE 48 HOURS WAS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO WEST BEIRUT (THE OTHER BEING THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE GOL).
3. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT BEIRUT 4241 TO JIDDA BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.
DILLON
BT
#4275
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65415

BY KMI NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 587

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE144
DD RUEHC RUQMBE RUEHJI RUEHDM RUEHTV RUEHJM
DE RUEHC #7814 1682153
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O O 172141Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1289
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 7239
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0573
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9625
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 3364
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 167814
EXDIS//FUR AMBASSADOR HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 - 6/17/02 (SCHNEIDER, DAVID)
TAGS: MILI, LE, US
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SYRIAN CONTACTS WITH SAUDIS

DICK MURPHY HAS CALLED TO TELL US THAT SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE
PROBABLY KHADDAM, WILL MEET WITH SAUD IN TAIF SATURDAY
TO DISCUSS LEBANON SITUATION. SAUD HAS REQUESTED THAT
DICK TELEPHONE HIM FROM JIDDA BEFORE THE MEETING TO BRING
HIM UP TO DATE AND WE WILL PROVIDE DICK WHATEVER HE NEEDS
FOR SUCH A BRIEFING. IF, HOWEVER, YOU THINK THERE IS
SOMETHING SPECIFIC THAT DICK SHOULD SEEK TO DO WITH SAUD
PRIOR TO THE MEETING TO HELP ADVANCE YOUR EFFORTS, PLEASE
ADVISE HIM EARLIEST ON FRIDAY. EAGLEBURGER
BT
#7814
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65416

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

65417 36

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 588

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE143
UTS3008
OO RUEHC
DE RUQMBE #4258 1682230
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 172215Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7037
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2316
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 7641
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1669
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4258

EXDIS

FROM HABIB

E.O. 12065: RDS1,3 6/17/02 (HABIB, PHILIP)

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, PGOV, IS, LE, US

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: FURTHER JUNE 17 DEVELOPMENTS

1. (8-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHETHER PERSUADED BY MY LETTER APPEAL OR NOT, WALID JUMBLATT LEFT MUKHTARA AND CAME TO SEE ME AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE THIS AFTERNOON, JOINED BY HIS ESCORTS, PORTOFF CROCKER AND MINISTER HAMMADA. HE WAS IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL MOOD. HE REMAINS NEGATIVE TOWARDS JOINING THE NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THERE MIGHT BE A NEED FOR A NEW CABINET, IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD RECOMMEND A WIDER AREA OF PARTICIPANTS WHO WOULD RESIST BASHIR GEMAYLE'S DOMINATION (SALIM AL-HOSS, RASHID KARAMI, ETC.). HE INSISTED THAT HE WOULD ONLY STAY TWO DAYS IN BEIRUT. I PRESSED HIM TO DISCUSS HIS IDEAS WITH SARKIS AND HE PROMISED TO DO SO TONIGHT. HE IS DEEPLY RESENTFUL THAT THE LAF HAVE NOT PUT UP ANY FIGHT AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, AND FELT THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO CREDIBILITY UNDER THE FUTURE SCENARIO I OUTLINED FOR HIM, BEGINNING WITH AN LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO WEST AND EAST BEIRUT.

3. JUMBLATT WAS ALSO DEEPLY APPREHENSIVE THAT PLU LEADERS WOULD SOMEHOW BE TURNED OVER TO THE ISRAELIS OR TO THEIR LEBANESE-CHRISTIAN ENEMIES TO BE KILLED. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD NOT BE PARTY TO DIRTY ARRANGEMENTS. JUMBLATT SAID HE WOULD NOT BE THE MAN TO FIRE THE FINAL SHOT AT THE PLU.

4. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BIT OF ISRAELI "OVERKILL" IN THEIR APPROACHES TO HIM WHILE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M370/2 #65417

BY KML NARA DATE 7/2/13

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 589

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/24/82//236

SITUATION: HABIB
SUBJECT CATEGORY: TRIP

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HE WAS SURROUNDED BY THE IDF IN MUKHTARA; PERES VISITED HIM EARLIER TODAY.

5. I USED A COMBINATION OF CAJOLERY AND APPEALS TO HIS PATRIOTISM TO URGE HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT. WHEN HE CONTINUALLY PRESSED ME NOT TO PUT THE US CARDS ON BASHIR GEMAYEL, I EXPLAINED TOUGHLY THAT WE HAD BACKED NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BUT THAT WE FELT BASHIR- BECAUSE OF HIS POWER-SHOULD BE PART OF A SALVATION COMMITTEE OR ANY NEW CABINET. JUMBLATT SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE HUMILIATED AGAIN BY BASHIR, AS HAD OCCURRED ONCE PREVIOUSLY IN 1976 WHEN BASHIR URGED INVITING IN THE SYRIANS AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DEFEAT OF THE DRUZE AND NATIONAL MOVEMENT FORCES FIGHTING THE CHRISTIANS. BY HUMILIATION IN 1982, HE IMPLIED THAT BASHIR HAD SQUARED A DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS IN ADVANCE; IN FACT, HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT HAD DONE SO.

6. I BELIEVE I NUDGED HIM TOWARD TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE BUT WE SHALL SEE. HE REMAINS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF BASHIR, SUSPECTING HIM OF WISHING TO TAKE POWER IN A LEBANON TOTALLY DOMINATED BY THE CHRISTIANS. I EARLIER HAD MET WITH BASHIR, I MADE IT CLEAR TO BASHIR THAT THE PHALANGE SHOULD STOP JOINING WITH THE ISRAELIS IN ATTACKS AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN WEST BEIRUT (TWO PHALANGE FIGHTERS WERE KILLED LAST NIGHT AND ONE INJURED). HE PROMISED THAT THIS INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. I ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH BASHIR ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING HOPING THAT HE WOULD NOT MOVE OFF THE COURSE WE ARE TRYING TO CHANNEL WITH SARKIS AND WAZZAN.
DILLON

BT

#4258

NNNN

SENSITIVE