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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name JAMESON, LISA R.: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 6/23/2011

File Folder SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES (3)

FOIA

M430

Box Number 2

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions	
113639	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #7 OF 1988	8	3/31/1988	B1	B3
113640	CABLE	MOSCOW 09047 R 4/15/2013 M430/1	4	4/7/1988	B1	
113641	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF MAY 26, 1988	4	6/1/1988	B1	B3
113642	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #11 OF 1988	11	5/26/1988	B1	B3
113643	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF THE AMWG MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1988	5	10/4/1988	B1	B3
113644	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #19 OF 1988	8	9/29/1988	B1	B3
113645	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF THE AMWG MEETING OF OCTOBER 13, 1988	3	10/17/1988	B1	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
113646	MEMO	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #20 OF 1988	7	10/13/1988	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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RED TEAM OUTLINE:

"Victory Over Star Wars"
A Soviet Active Measures Campaign Against SDI.

File:
Soviet
Active
Measures

I. PURPOSE: A successful US Strategic "Star Wars" Defense (SDI) would neutralize the present and future Soviet ICBM/IRBM nuclear threat/deterrent, not only against the US but eventually NATO, China and Japan, with unacceptable domestic and international political, military, and economic costs to the USSR. The assessment of the CPSU International Department (ID) and Committee for State Security (KGB) unfortunately agrees with Reagan's, "that new technologies are now at hand which may make possible a truly effective non-nuclear defense...aimed at eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear armed ballistic missiles." More, the KGB and ID are convinced that the US scientific-technical establishment, particularly with the surging capabilities of its W. European and Japanese allies, is entirely capable of producing a workable SDI. Whether this assessment proves correct or not, the importance of the issue is such that we must, for the foreseeable future, presume that the Americans can and will do it, and act accordingly.

The USSR can place no faith in Reagan's cynical promise to share SDI technology, any more than we could in Eisenhower's "open skies". We could not, in any case, permit the future security of the nation to rest on the faint likelihood of future US administrations and congresses being bound by a Reagan promise.

II. PRIORITY: Only a foreign invasion, domestic national upheaval, or cataclysmic natural disaster, could be assigned a higher priority than the effort to eliminate the possibility of a successful SDI development and deployment by our glavnyy protivnik.

Our Party has diverted vast amounts of national treasure--human and financial--from other vitally necessary modernization programs for almost a half-century, to achieve the strategic nuclear threat which neutralizes much of our main enemy's economic, industrial, and scientific superiority, and on which rests so much of Soviet political influence and international prestige.

An American "Star Wars" victory would erase this achievement at a stroke, mandating radical restructuring of our forces and economy, and essentially rendering meaningless the sacrifices of two generations of our peoples. This would be a

blow no Soviet ruling group, particularly one as recently established and at such a parlous moment in our Party's history as at present, would likely survive.

III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

A. Strategic Aims: The precedent of a proven successful analogous campaign already exists--that employed against the Neutron Bomb. The weapon was prevented from being developed, rendering unnecessary campaigns against testing and deployment. We have done it before, and can do it again. The successful goal of that campaign was the identification of the proposed weapon as unacceptably inhumane, thus immoral, in the minds of those who would benefit most from its development and deployment--the US and W. European public.

With SDI already underway since 1985, considerable funds already appropriated voted by the US Congress, and a body of scientific/technical feasibility literature pro and con extant, the total, one-stroke kind of success achieved in the Neutron Bomb campaign is not immediately likely. Partial gains leading to a final victory, however--program and testing limitations, schedule stretchouts, budget cuts, manufacturing and testing site relocations, mandatory environmental impact studies, etc., are achievable, and can eventually strangle the project, meanwhile buying time for our scientists, assisted by the KGB and GRU's "technology transfer" efforts, to develop our own, successful SDI. The campaign will be a long one, but like none in our history, it must be remembered that in this one, first to the finish line with a successful anti-nuclear missile defense is the unchallenged winner. The benefits to the USSR of winning this contest are at least as great as the hazards of losing, as above.

The program will thus require continual monitoring and updating as presently unforeseeable targets of opportunity, setbacks, and scientific and political breakthroughs occur. "Victory Over Star Wars" has been accorded a premier place in the annual and current five-year KGB and CPSU International Department workplan.

Victory eventual or victory immediate, the object of engineering a negative perception of "Reagan's Star Wars" in the public and congressional mind, as was achieved with the Neutron Bomb, is central to our effort. The American people and their relevant allies must be brought to believe that "Star Wars" is:

1. Probably impossible of achievement and, even if achievable,

2. Prohibitively expensive, bleeding funds and talent and forcing the postponement or renunciation of other, more critically necessary domestic social programs.
3. Politically destabilizing and counterproductive, "forcing" a Soviet government at last disposed towards "rational arms control", "glasnost" and "perestroika" into another expensive type of arms race.

B. TACTICAL MEASURES: The campaign must utilize all Active Measures modalities and techniques experience has shown as effective. The below-listed action areas should be the focus of our principal attentions, although the list is not exclusive.

1. Diplomatic Activity: The Party and Government of the USSR will insure that the issue is injected into all appropriate negotiations with the United States and, where applicable, with its NATO and Pacific allies, with the purpose of building a perception of "Star Wars" as not without its price, and not worth the price. The US and its allies, in bilateral and multilateral fora, must be led to believe that great advances in peaceful cooperation with the USSR, in political, military and (importantly) commercial areas, are unfortunately being held hostage to a mad scientist's and an old politician's unrealistic scheme. No opportunity will be missed to inject this point in any negotiation, with emphasis on the "opportunities for peace and prosperity" that the era of glasnost and perestroika which the current Soviet leadership under General Secretary Gorbachev are making possible, but which "Star Wars" places at peril.

2. The Case: The USSR Academy of Sciences has been instructed by the CPSU International Department (ID) to provide the necessary material to conclusively prove the points in A1-3 above. The Academy will make its personnel available and bring the full force of its scientific journals, conferences, visits, exchanges and personal and media contacts in the West to bear on convincing scientists and the scientifically oriented public of the sad, dangerous, and wasteful futility of "Star Wars".

3. The Media: The CPSU Propaganda Department (PD) has ordered the print media and the State Committee for Radio and Television (Gostelradio) to accord priority status to the propagation of these arguments in the national media. NOVOSTI (APN) is to consider it priority distribution material in both overt and covert channels, as is TASS. The ID and KGB have given the necessary instructions to our Embassy information and press departments overseas to account priority attention to making

placements in friendly foreign journals worldwide, unattributed where possible, and a special allocation of funds for covert placements has been assigned until further notice.

TASS, Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress will carefully monitor domestic publications for appearances of important statements and articles on "Star Wars". TASS will be notified by APN and the Embassy information departments, as well as by the PD's media monitoring service immediately upon publication or broadcast by any journal or station, foreign or domestic, of any "Star Wars" material, to which these agencies will immediately give priority attention and worldwide coverage in the various language services. Note: wherever possible, stories will be attributed to non-Soviet sources. In the event that the source credited has not approached the story from the requisite, approved, angle, editors will take necessary measures to adjust the copy, making it appear that it was so covered in the original.

All Soviet media elements with bureaus abroad--TASS, APN, PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, LITGAZ, KOMPRVDA, RADIO MOSCOW, RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS, GOSTELERADIO, et al--will notify bureaus of the PD's priority coverage assignment, particularly in replaying anti-"Star Wars" events and stories, and especially in conjunction with Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SPC) and similar organizations' activities abroad. (See below.)

The ID has taken the necessary steps to insure that a similar media attack plan is in effect in each of the fraternal socialist countries, including Cuba and Nicaragua. Experience has shown that we can count on the valuable support and ingenuity of our fraternal comrades at PAP, TANJUG, Prensa Latina, et al, whose materials are often more acceptable and better tailored to regional markets than our own.

Discussions are underway with the information ministries and, where applicable, relevant political entities controlling the media in the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Experience has proven the worth of these allies' media, particularly the cooperative actions within the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool (NANA), and the Interpress (IPS) News Agency whose datelines tend to be more readily accepted by third-country editors and news agencies than do our own.

4. Mass Organization (Front) Activity: Opposition to "Star Wars" must not be seen by the peoples and media of the West to be confined to the East; our opposition is important, signifying the danger to peace and the negative impact on possible detente with the USSR and its allies, but victory will only be possible if public opinion in the West itself is mobilized against SDI.

5

Organized active measures on the enemy's home ground is thus absolutely essential. The ID has ordered that action plans be drawn up and put into effect immediately in the below-listed organizations, drawing upon the models of the Neutron Bomb, B-1 Bomber, and INF campaigns. The Soviet Committee for the Defence of Peace (SPC) has been assigned responsibility for coordination of the effort, via the World Peace Council.

The Soviet Peace Fund has been instructed to authorize a special allocation of hard currency funds for 1988, doubling the annual \$80,000,000 front group subsidy.*

* (check for latest estimate. base 1979 : \$63,000,000.

LEAD ORGANIZATIONS:

World Peace Council
International Institute for Peace
World Federation of Trade Unions
World Federation of Democratic Youth
Women's International Democratic Federation
International Association of Democratic Lawyers
World Federation of Scientific Workers
International Organization of Journalists
International Federation of Resistance Fighters
Christian Peace Council
Berlin Conference of European Catholics
International Federation of Resistance Movements
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace
International Radio and TV Organization
World Council of Churches
International Committee for European Security and Cooperation
Scientific Council on Research on the Problems of Peace and Disarmament
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
United States Peace Council
International Union of Students
World Federation of Teachers Unions
Generals for Peace and Disarmament
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

(Note: List includes only key organizations, and is not to be considered definitive.)

6

The U.S. Congress: As is obvious from the above list, the range of professional, religious, cultural, and scientific groups with whom our surrogates will interact is extremely wide. Public opinion in the United States is known for arising from the so-called democratic "grass roots", unlike the Leninist cadre-led society. Necessarily broad-based, front group activities must, however, remain focussed upon their raison d'etre--the defeat of "Star Wars"--and the levers, principally financial and legislative, which can effect this end. Those levers, in the end, lie in the hands of the US Congress, which, in the US system, authorizes and appropriates the funds without which no executive branch activity, be it research or war, can continue. Working with students, journalists, scientists, lawyers, clergymen, physicians, or whatever, in all corners of the nation, the activist must recognize that his eventual target is the Washington legislator or candidate and his trusted staff. All activity must have as its final aim effecting policy change in Washington. Be it organizing an anti-"Star Wars" demonstration in Montana or Lafayette Park, a forged letter-writing campaign to a community newspaper in Louisiana or to the Washington Post, the goal is to bring about or change a bill or a vote.

5. Agents of Influence: Agents of influence associated with the above-listed organizations and others, will be instructed in their roles in the campaign, with emphasis on those in media, academia, scientific, industrial, labor, and civic organizations. Deep-cover agents under KGB and GRU control will be activated as necessary; their activities, although important for the successful completion of the task, and coordinated with ID policies and goals, will be part of a separate plan. Similarly, the use of forged documents leaked to the press and falsely describing meetings between SDI-related Administration officials and members of the "military-industrial complex", implicating illegal transactions, etc. will be handled by KGB/GRU in a separate plan.

6. Non-Soviet Communist Party Participation: Participation in the campaign by the CPUSA is to be held to an absolute minimum. This fraternal party is unfortunately too closely identified in the US public mind as an arm of Soviet foreign policy to be effective in this particularly bilateral issue. The ID will produce action plans for individual communist and associated progressive-left parties in Western Europe, Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa and Asia, depending upon the objective and subjective conditions pertaining.

7. Friendship Societies: Soviet Friendship and Cultural Societies exist in some 80 nations around the world and are to be energized to the importance of the campaign, particularly in

those countries where the objective conditions pertaining limit the effectiveness of the host-country Comparty--the US, UK, FRG, and France are examples. The societies, coordinated by the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries (an ID/KGB element) will concentrate on "soft audiences" using the indirect, "more in sorrow than in anger" approach--that US development, production, and deployment of "Star Wars" technology can only be (a) destabilizing and injurious to the chances of maintaining international peace, and (b) can only be implemented at the cost of other, vitally-needed social programs.

Emphasis must be placed throughout that this sad waste by a misguided US Government (not people) is occurring at a historic moment in the superpower relationship--a time when the current leadership of the Soviet Union is consciously and obviously striving to eliminate the climate of mutual distrust and fear which has led to the superpower arms race. Emphasis is to be placed on Soviet INF "double zero" concessions, with appropriate photo displays, etc. showing Soviet missiles being dismantled and destroyed, and Soviet troops being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Again, "Star Wars" must be presented to this "soft" audience in the context of "peaceful" Soviet proposals for cooperative, "progressive" uses of high technology, like space exploration, and advanced medical research (the search for a cure for AIDS is a subject which surveys have shown meets with high levels of approval across most ethnic, cultural, and educational achievement lines.) Contrast should be drawn between the decline in US levels of funding for space exploration (with hints that the sad "Challenger" mishap may well have been caused by underfunding) and funds wastefully assigned to "Star Wars". Absence of US collaboration in worthy causes which should benefit mankind should be lamented, caused by diversion of huge amounts of funds, talent and energy into the useless "Star Wars", which has impeded the social, medical, and nutritional benefits that modern-day technology rightfully should be achieving not only for the populations of the superpowers, but for mankind, and particularly for the Third World, where the need is the greatest.

Drafted: INR/AMR:DFSHeehan
WANG # 0054q - 3/29/88

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SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES (3)

FOIA

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LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

Box Number

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File: 16
Soviet
Active
Measures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6-Apr-1988 10:11 EDT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Lisa R. Jameson
(JAMESON)

SUBJECT: USIA REPORT ON DISINFORMATION

The new USIA report on Soviet disinformation is an excellent effort. I have four copies (it is about 90 pages in length) for any of you who might want to read it. The attached cable is a brief summary of the report.

Distribution:

FOR: Fritz W. Ermarth	(ERMARTH)
FOR: Nelson C. Ledsky	(LEDSKY)
FOR: Rudolf V. Perina	(PERINA)
FOR: Tyrus Cobb	(COBB)
FOR: Jeremy Curtin	(CURTIN)
FOR: Peter Rodman	(RODMAN)
FOR: James F. Collins	(COLLINS)

SECRET
BY: [signature]
6/23/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5-Apr-1988 17:41 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JAMESON

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with RSCS id 8360
for JAMESON@VAXC; Tue, 5-APR-1988 17:41 EDT
Date: Tue, 5-APR-1988 17:40 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: JAMESON@VAXC

<DIST>
PRT: POPADIUK
SIT: CURTIN JAMESON VAX

<PREC>
IMMEDIATE
<CLAS>
UNCLASSIFIED
<OSRI>
RUEHIA
<DTG>
052100Z APR 88

<ORIG>
FM USIA WASHDC

<TO>
TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RUTADD/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
RUFHMD/AMCONSUL BARCELONA IMMEDIATE
RUFHDM/AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF IMMEDIATE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE
RUFHAM/AMCONSUL HAMBURG IMMEDIATE
RUFHOMN/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
RUFHOM/AMCONSUL PALERMO IMMEDIATE
RUEHAU/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO IMMEDIATE

RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER IMMEDIATE
 RUFHZG/AMCONSUL ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
 RUFHOM/AMCONSUL GENOA IMMEDIATE
 RUEH DU/AMCONSUL DURBAN IMMEDIATE
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE
 ALL POLADS POSTS IMMEDIATE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAL/AMCONSUL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE 2308
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC
 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3321
 INFO RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
 RUMVEA/RSC MANILA
 XMT AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
 AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
 AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
 AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
 AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 AMEMBASSY WARSAW
 AMCONSUL KRAKOW
 AMCONSUL POZNAN
 USINT HAVANA

<SUBJ>

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS ALERT NO. 88-15: USIA REPORT ON
 "SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE ERA OF GLASNOST"

-

<TEXT>

BT
 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USIA 23093
 USIA

W.H.-HOWARD; NSC-CURTIN, JAMESON; MBFR-STEWART; STATE-
 INR/AMR; FT BRAGG-USIA ADVISOR; PARIS ALSO PASS ARS AND
 OECD; USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES-PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS
 EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS ALERT NO. 88-15: USIA REPORT ON
 "SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE ERA OF GLASNOST"

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1. ON APRIL 4, 1988, THE WASHINGTON TIMES REPORTED THAT THE
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 COMMERCE, JUSTICE AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED
 AGENCIES HAD RELEASED A REPORT SUBMITTED TO IT BY USIA ON
 "SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE ERA OF GLASNOST." THE
 WIRELESS FILE IS CARRYING THE WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE AS AN
 FS ITEM. FOREIGN MEDIA ATTENTION IS EXPECTED AFTER A PRESS
 CONFERENCE ON THE REPORT'S FINDINGS AT THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN
 PRESS CENTER ON APRIL 6. INFORMATION ON THE REPORT FOLLOWS.

-

2. IN 1987, THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE REQUESTED
 THAT USIA PREPARE A "REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE NATURE OF

RECENT SOVIET DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS." THE REPORT WAS PREPARED BY P/G, AND USIS POSTS IN NEW DELHI AND LAGOS. A STUDY COMMISSIONED BY THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND COMPLETED IN JANUARY 1988 ON "SOVIET DISINFORMATION DURING PERIODS OF RELAXED EAST-WEST TENSION, 1959-1979" WAS ADDED AS AN APPENDIX. THE REPORT WAS FORMALLY SUBMITTED BY DIRECTOR WICK TO THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE DURING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THEM ON MARCH 8, 1988.

3. THE REPORT CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS:

OVERVIEW (3 PAGES)

DISINFORMATION IN THE MEDIA (47 PAGES)

FORGERIES (6 PAGES PLUS COPIES OF RECENT FORGERIES)

FRONT GROUPS AND SOVIET "MASS ORGANIZATIONS" (4 PAGES)

COVERT MEDIA PLACEMENTS IN NIGERIA (10 PAGES)

BT

#3093

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 USIA 23093

USIA

W.H.-HOWARD; NSC-CURTIN, JAMESON; MBFR-STEWART; STATE-

INR/AMR; FT BRAGG-USIA ADVISOR; PARIS ALSO PASS ARS AND

OECD; USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES-PUBLIC AFFAIRS

AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS

EO 12356 N/A

SOVIET DISINFORMATION IN INDIA (15 PAGES)

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORT TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

(5 PAGES)

APPENDIX: "SOVIET DISINFORMATION DURING PERIODS OF RELAXED

EAST-WEST TENSION, 1959-1979" (10 PAGES)

4. THE CHAPTER ON "DISINFORMATION IN THE MEDIA" CONTAINS

LENGTHY SECTIONS ON SOVIET DISINFORMATION ON THE 1978

JONESTOWN MASS SUICIDE, THE "ETHNIC WEAPON," AND

MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED SALE OF

LATIN AMERICAN "BABY PARTS." THESE SECTIONS INCORPORATE AND

UPDATE EARLIER CABLES AND WIRELESS FILE ITEMS ON THESE

SUBJECTS. THE CHAPTER ALSO CONTAINS A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE

USSR'S AIDS DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN, UPDATING THE IN-DEPTH

TREATMENT OF THE TOPIC IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT "SOVIET

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES: A REPORT ON ACTIVE MEASURES AND

PROPAGANDA, 1986-1987."

5. P/G IS IN THE PROCESS OF READYING THE REPORT FOR PRINTING

BY RSC MANILA, FOR DISTRIBUTION TO USIS POSTS. P/G PLANS TO

DISTRIBUTE 2500 COPIES, WITH POSTS RECEIVING APPROXIMATELY

HALF OF THE QUANTITY THEY RECEIVED IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER

1987 OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT "SOVIET INFLUENCE

ACTIVITIES: A REPORT ON ACTIVE MEASURES AND PROPAGANDA,

1986-1987."

6. THE FULL TEXT OF THE OVERVIEW CHAPTER FOLLOWS:

ACTIVE MEASURES ARE CAREFULLY CRAFTED INFLUENCE OPERATIONS,

OFTEN COVERT OR DECEPTIVE, WHICH THE SOVIETS USE, IN ADDITION

TO TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC AND INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES, TO SUPPORT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. THEY RANGE FROM THE CRUDE TO THE SOPHISTICATED, FROM VICIOUS ANTI-AMERICAN DISINFORMATION AND FORGERIES TO SOOTHING INFLUENCE OPERATIONS. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES INCLUDE:

"BLACK" KGB ACTIVITIES SUCH AS DISINFORMATION AND FORGERIES, THE USE OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AND COVERT MEDIA MANIPULATION;

"GRAY" ACTIVITIES RUN BY THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (ID) OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHICH INCLUDE THE ORCHESTRATION OF ACTIONS BY LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES, SOVIET-CONTROLLED INTERNATIONAL FRONT GROUPS, AND OSTENSIBLY INDEPENDENT SOVIET FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES, "MASS ORGANIZATIONS" AND FOREIGN-POLICY RELATED ACADEMIC INSTITUTES.

"WHITE" MEDIA REPLAY OF THESE ACTIVITIES AND ACTIVE MEASURES THEMES BY THE OVERT ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES APPARATUS, WHICH ARE DIRECTED BY THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: THE TASS AND NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCIES, RADIO MOSCOW AND RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS, OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET PRESS, AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENTS IN SOVIET EMBASSIES OVERSEAS. THESE "WHITE" ELEMENTS ALSO PROVIDE COVER FOR KGB AND ID OPERATIVES.

THIS REPORT CONCERNS THOSE OF THE ABOVE TOPICS THAT ARE OF THE GREATEST RELEVANCE TO USIA ACTIVITIES: FORGERIES, DISINFORMATION, MEDIA MANIPULATION, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF

BT

#3093

BT

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 USIA 23093

USIA
W.H.-HOWARD; NSC-CURTIN, JAMESON; MBFR-STEWART; STATE-
INR/AMR; FT BRAGG-USIA ADVISOR; PARIS ALSO PASS ARS AND
OECD; USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES-PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS

EO 12356 N/A

FRONT GROUPS AND SOVIET MASS ORGANIZATIONS.

SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT OF 1985, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS IN THE TACTICS OF "GRAY" SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND THE PERSONNEL DIRECTING THEM. THE CONCEPT OF THE BROADEST POSSIBLE "UNITED FRONT" TO OPPOSE THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND TO UNDERMINE U.S. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAS NOW BECOME THE MAIN THRUST OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN IN THE WEST. THIS HAS LED THE SOVIETS TO ADOPT A MUCH MORE SOOTHING TONE THAN IN THE PAST:

THE SOVIET-CONTROLLED INTERNATIONAL FRONT GROUPS, SUCH AS THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, HAVE ADOPTED A CONCILIATORY LINE, AIMED AT APPEALING TO THE BROADEST POSSIBLE SPECTRUM OF "PEACE" ACTIVISTS.

OSTENSIBLY INDEPENDENT SOVIET "MASS ORGANIZATIONS," SUCH AS THE SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE, HAVE INITIATED MANY DIRECT CONTACTS WITH WESTERNERS, HOPING TO USE THESE CHANNELS TO CONVINCE WESTERNERS OF THE LOGIC OF SOVIET VIEWS ON SDI AND DISARMAMENT.

THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO TAKEN A LEAD IN ORGANIZING NEW INTERNATIONAL "PEACE" FORUMS AND GROUPS, COMPOSED LARGELY OF PROFESSIONALS, ACADEMICS, PROMINENT PUBLIC FIGURES, AND BUSINESSMEN, IN AN EFFORT TO OPEN ANOTHER INFLUENCE CHANNEL TO WESTERN ELITES.

IN ALL AREAS, CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS RELY ON CULTIVATING A MORE OPEN IMAGE, AND TRYING TO UTILIZE POSITIVE WESTERN PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE PROCESSES OF "GLASNOST" AND "PERESTROIKA" TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE.

THESE ACTIVE MEASURES ARE COORDINATED BY THE NEW, ABLE LEADER OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, FORMER SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, ANATOLY DOBRYNIN. DURING DOBRYNIN'S TENURE, SOVIET "GRAY" ACTIVE MEASURES HAVE BECOME MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED

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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 USIA 23093
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W.H.-HOWARD; NSC-CURTIN, JAMESON; MBFR-STEWART; STATE-
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OECD; USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES-PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS
EO 12356 N/A
AND SUBTLE.

IN THE KGB ARENA, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS. VIRULENT ANTI-U.S. DISINFORMATION AND FORGERIES CONTINUE AS BEFORE, AS DOES THE MASSIVE SOVIET EFFORT TO COVERTLY MANIPULATE THE PRESS. INDEED, ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE FEATURES OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN THE PERSISTENCE OF THESE ACTIVITIES AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MOUNTING SOPHISTICATED INFLUENCE OPERATIONS CENTERED AROUND THE THEMES OF "GLASNOST" AND "NEW POLITICAL THINKING" IN THEIR BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE WEST.

THESE ACTIONS HAVE ALSO CONTINUED DESPITE THE STATEMENT BY SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO MORE LYING. NO MORE DISINFORMATION." SINCE THE DECEMBER 1987 SUMMIT, STATE-CONTROLLED SOVIET MEDIA HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED OR SUGGESTED THAT:

THE UNITED STATES MANUFACTURED THE AIDS VIRUS IN A U.S. MILITARY FACILITY AT FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND (RADIO MOSCOW,

FEB. 13, 1988);

THE UNITED STATES IS MANUFACTURING AN "ETHNIC WEAPON" THAT KILLS ONLY NON-WHITES (TASS, JAN. 9, 1988; JANUARY 1988 NOVOSTI MILITARY BULLETIN; RADIO MOSCOW, FEB. 5, 1988);

THE FBI ASSASSINATED REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, JAN. 20, 1988);

THE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, ARMANDO VALLADARES, WAS JAILED IN CUBA FOR BOMBING STORES (IZVESTIA, FEB. 6, 1988);

THE CIA ASSASSINATED SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME, INDIAN PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI, AND ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE POPE JOHN PAUL II (MOSCOW TELEVISION, FEB. 9,

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W.H.-HOWARD; NSC-CURTIN, JAMESON; MBFR-STEWART; STATE-INR/AMR; FT BRAGG-USIA ADVISOR; PARIS ALSO PASS ARS AND OECD; USUN-NEGEM; OTHER MILITARY ADDEES-PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR CIS

EO 12356 N/A
1988);

THE UNITED STATES HAS MILITARY ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN (TASS, DEC. 30, 1987).

THE CONTINUANCE OF AIDS DISINFORMATION IN THE SOVIET MEDIA IS PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE SOVIETS THAT THERE WILL BE NO DIRECT U.S.-SOVIET COLLABORATION ON AIDS RESEARCH AS LONG AS THIS CONTINUES. IN AUGUST 1987, THE SOVIETS TOLD U.S. OFFICIALS THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS WOULD CEASE APPEARING IN THE SOVIET MEDIA, AFTER WHICH TIME THEY DECREASED DRAMATICALLY. THEY STILL OCCASIONALLY APPEAR, HOWEVER, AS IN THE FEBRUARY 13, 1988 RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST.

THE CHAPTER ON COVERT MEDIA PLACEMENTS IN NIGERIA PRESENTS AN EXCELLENT STUDY OF HOW THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO MANIPULATE PERCEPTIONS BY PLACING SOVIET-WRITTEN ARTICLES UNDER FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS. IN THE CASE OF NIGERIA, SOVIET MATERIAL OFTEN APPEARS UNDER NIGERIAN BY-LINES, MAKING IT APPEAR AS IF THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE OF LOCAL RATHER THAN SOVIET ORIGIN. THE CASE STUDY BY THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE (USIS) POST IN LAGOS, NIGERIA IS A LANDMARK EXAMINATION OF A PHENOMENON WHOSE MASSIVE PROPORTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED.

THE USIS NEW DELHI REPORT ON SOVIET DISINFORMATION IN INDIA PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF SOVIET

DISINFORMATION AND USIS COUNTERMEASURES IN AN AREA WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR LARGEST PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION OPERATION IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. THE REPORT GIVES AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE STEADY STREAM OF SOVIET DISINFORMATION, AND THE VIGOROUS USIS EFFORTS AGAINST IT.

-
FINALLY, AN APPENDIX ON "SOVIET DISINFORMATION DURING PERIODS OF RELAXED EAST-WEST TENSION, 1959-1979" GIVES A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SOVIET DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES DURING EARLIER PERIODS OF IMPROVED RELATIONS. IT SHOWS THAT, MUCH AS IN THE PRESENT ERA, SOVIET DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES HAVE CONTINUED DESPITE RELAXATIONS OF TENSION IN OTHER AREAS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. (END TEXT OF OVERVIEW) (P/G)
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SECTION: 05 OF 05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7-Apr-1988 14:57 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PERINA
JAMESON
ERMARTH
RODMAN

*File: Sov.
Active
Measures*

FROM: VMS MAIL user HERBST
(HERBST@VAXA@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<DTG> 071421Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET NEWSPAPER INSINUATES EMBASSY
- HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS CIA AGENTS

<TEXT>
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 09047
LIMDIS
SAO PAULO FOR KAVALEC
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV/SOBI
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PROP, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET NEWSPAPER INSINUATES EMBASSY
- HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS CIA AGENTS
REF: MOSCOW 1860

/--
~BEGIN SUMMARY~
SUMMARY

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/--
1. (C) A RECENT ARTICLE IN "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY,"
THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ZNANIYE SOCIETY,
THE PARTY'S OFFICIAL INTERNAL PROPAGANDA
INSTRUMENT, ATTACKED ONE FORMER AND TWO CURRENT
EMBASSY HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS AS PART OF A
LARGER BROADSIDE AGAINST "CIA ACTIVITIES IN
MOSCOW." WHILE SUCH ATTACKS ARE NOT NEW, WE
FIND THIS ONE PARTICULARLY DISTURBING BECAUSE:
-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSITION
THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A LEGITIMATE BILATERAL
ISSUE;
-- THE ORGAN IN WHICH IT APPEARS ENSURES THAT

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BY RW NARA DATE 4/15/13

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THE ATTACK WILL BE REPEATED IN NUMEROUS OTHER DOMESTIC FORA; AND

-- IT WAS DIRECTED IN PART AGAINST AN OFFICER WHO STILL HAS WELL OVER A YEAR TO SERVE AT POST AND IS A CRUDE ATTEMPT TO REDUCE HER ABILITY TO PERFORM HER DUTIES, IN PART BY STRONGLY INSINUATING THE EMBOFF IS A CIA EMPLOYEE. WE INTEND TO PROTEST THIS ARTICLE AT THE MFA AND AT THE NEWSPAPER.

END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

/-----

/--

2. (LOU) UNDER THE NEW RUBRIC "THE KGB REPORTS AND COMMENTS," "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY" (NO. 14) (THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ZNANIYE SOCIETY, THE PARTY'S INTERNAL PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT) CARRIED AN ARTICLE BLASTING THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PRIMARILY ESPIONAGE, AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION ALLEGEDLY CONDUCTED BY CIA OFFICERS OPERATING UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER AT THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. (EMBASSY HAS POUCHED A COPY OF THE ARTICLE TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SOV.) IN ADDITION TO ASSERTING THAT THE CIA STILL CONSIDERED THE SOVIET UNION "ENEMY NUMBER ONE" AND BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE ACTIVITIES OF A NUMBER OF EMBASSY OFFICERS WHO HAD BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA IN RECENT YEARS, THE ARTICLE:

-- LISTED TWO CURRENT AND ONE FORMER HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS - SUSAN WAGNER, RICHARD STEPHENSON, AND KATHY KAVALEC - AS PERSONS "NOW CARRYING OUT THE MISSIONS OF THE SPECIAL SERVICES IN MOSCOW";

-- ALLEGED THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE AIMED AT "SECRETLY INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION, INSPIRING A CAMPAIGN AROUND IMAGINED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AROUSING NATIONALISTIC FRAMES OF MIND"; AND

-- WITHOUT NAMING HIM, REPEATED CHARGES THAT EMBASSY OFFICER SHAUN BYRNES WAS SEEKING TO INCITE CRIMEAN TATAR "EXTREMISTS."

/--

3. (C) AN MFA COUNSELOR (PROTECT) TIPPED US OFF PRIVATELY TO THE ARTICLE FEBRUARY 11, CONFIDING THAT HE HAD JUST SEEN THE DRAFT. THAT, HE SAID, HAD BEEN WRITTEN BY A FRIEND AT "NOVOSTI" AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE KGB. THE ARTICLE WAS PART OF THE CONTINUING "WAR OF THE SPECIAL SERVICES" AND WAS NOT AIMED PERSONALLY AT ANY

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LIMDIS

SAO PAULO FOR KAVALEC

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DEPT FOR EUR/SOV/SOBI
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PROP, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET NEWSPAPER INSINUATES EMBASSY
OF THE POLITICAL OFFICERS CITED, NAMING IN
PARTICULAR WAGNER AND BYRNES. MFA WAS NOT HAPPY
WITH THE ARTICLE, BELIEVING THAT ITS PUBLICATION
WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE. FURTHERMORE,
MFA "KNEW" WAGNER AND BYRNES WERE NOT CIA
OFFICERS AND SOUGHT TO HAVE THEIR NAMES DELETED
IN THE EVENT THE "AUTHORITIES" INSISTED ON THE
ARTICLE'S PUBLICATION. (NOTE: MFA EVIDENTLY
PARTIALLY SUCCEEDED AS BYRNES WAS NOT
EXPLICITLY MENTIONED.)

/--

COMMENT

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/--

4. (C) WHILE MEDIA ATTACKS ON EMBASSY OFFICERS
ARE HARDLY NEW - WAGNER AND STEPHENSON THEMSELVES
WERE CITED UNFAVORABLY IN "PRAVDA" ON FEBRUARY 1
(REFTEL)- WE FIND THIS MOST RECENT ATTACK
PARTICULARLY DISTURBING FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:
-- DESPITE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OUR PROPOSITION
THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A LEGITIMATE BILATERAL ISSUE,
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MECHANISM FOR REGULAR
OFFICIAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS, AND THE
OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS
CONTINUE PUBLICLY TO PORTRAY OUR EFFORTS TO
COLLECT INFORMATION FROM SOVIET CITIZENS ON
SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SINISTER ACTIVITY.
-- "ARGUMENTY I FAKTY," WHICH REPORTEDLY HAS A
CIRCULATION OF SOME NINE MILLION, IS INTENDED
PRIMARILY FOR PARTY ACTIVISTS, PARTICULARLY
THOSE ENGAGED IN PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION; THUS,
IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT THESE CHARGES WILL BE
REPEATED AT THE NUMEROUS PROPAGANDA FORA THAT
PROLIFERATE IN THIS COUNTRY. WE DOUBT THAT WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATING OF A MORE POSITIVE
IMAGE OF THE U.S. IN THE SOVIET PUBLIC AT A TIME
WHEN OUR RELATIONS ARE IMPROVING.

/--

IN NAMING WAGNER, THE ARTICLE IS ATTACKING
A HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER WHO STILL HAS WELL OVER
A YEAR TO SERVE HERE. (STEPHENSON COMPLETES
HIS ASSIGNMENT THIS SUMMER.) IN RECENT YEARS,
SUCH ATTACKS WERE GENERALLY DIRECTED AT HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICERS WITHIN A FEW MONTHS OF THEIR
DEPARTURE FROM POST AND THE DAMAGE TO
THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES WAS
MINIMAL. THIS ARTICLE, HOWEVER, APPEARS IN
PART AS A CRUDE ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE WAGNER'S -
AND THE EMBASSY'S - ABILITY TO COVER HUMAN
RIGHTS EFFECTIVELY FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS,

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IF NOT UNTIL HER DEPARTURE LATE SUMMER 1989.

/--

5. (2) WE INTEND TO PROTEST THIS ARTICLE BOTH
AT THE MFA AND AT THE NEWSPAPER.
6. (8) LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113641	MEMO	4	6/1/1988	B1
	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF MAY 26, 1988			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113642	MEMO	11	5/26/1988	B1
	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #11 OF 1988			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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113643	MEMO SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF THE AMWG MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1988	5	10/4/1988	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113644	MEMO	8	9/29/1988	B1
	SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #19 OF 1988			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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113645	MEMO SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF THE AMWG MEETING OF OCTOBER 13, 1988	3	10/17/1988	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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113646	MEMO SHEEHAN TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #20 OF 1988	7	10/13/1988	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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September 27, 1988

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA
Marvin L. Stone, Deputy Director, USIA
Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State
Ambassador Laurence W. Lane, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Australia
Ambassador Leonard H. Marks, former Director, USIA
Henry E. Hockeimer, Associate Director, Office of Management
Mark Blitz, Associate Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
Richard W. Carlson, Associate Director, Voice of America
G. Michael Eisenstadt, Director, Office of European Affairs
Herbert Romerstein, Active Measures Coordinator, USIA
Rick A. Ruth, Executive Assistant to the Director
Patricia Siemien, Special Assistant to the Director, USIA
Dennis Patrick, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., Director, Board for International Broadcasting
Bruce Porter, Executive Director, Board for International Broadcasting
Mark Pomar, Deputy Executive Director, Board for International Broadcasting
Peter Rodman, Senior Director for National Security Affairs, National Security Council
Thomas Robertson, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
Carol Doerflein, USSR Country Affairs Officer, Office of European Affairs, USIA (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Valentin M. Falin, Chairman, Novosti Press Agency
Vadim P. Perfil'yev, Deputy Chief of Information Administration, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Leonid N. Dobrokhotoy, CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department
Mikhail A. Gribov, First Deputy Minister of Culture of the USSR
Irina V. Mikheyeva, Chief Inspector, Foreign Relations Administration, USSR Ministry of Culture
Nikolai Neyland, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Latvian SS
Vadim I. Kuznetsov, Deputy Chief, Department of the USA and Canada, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dennis Patrick assured Falin that the American stations on 1040 AM are properly licensed by the FCC and registered with the ITU, and offered to instruct FCC experts to review the details with Soviet officials. He also assured the Soviets that the U.S. understands the Soviet desire for access to American markets, and that there is no objection in principle to Soviet broadcasts. It is the illegal harmful interference to which the U.S. objects.

Patrick then offered several options for discussing ways to facilitate Soviet medium wave access: (1) An American company can use Soviet radio programs. (2) To overcome the ruble convertibility problem, a barter basis may be possible in program exchange, or through the use of programming with commercial advertising. (3) The Soviets should look at cable which has gained use in 52 percent of American homes. (4) Also, the Soviets should not dismiss lightly the option of owning up to 20 percent of a broadcast entity, within U.S. law, or 25 percent of a holding company. American citizens of Soviet descent could establish a corporation, for example, and obtain a license, entering into a contractual relation with the USSR.

Henry Hockeimer briefly mentioned the offer by Director Wick in his meeting earlier in the day with Gosteleradio Chairman Aksyonov to loan a TVRO, to enhance Soviet WORLDNET utilization and other possibilities.

Falin commented positively on Mr. Patrick's observations, but noted that the central concern of the Soviet side would be that any Soviet programming, or indirectly any station in which the Soviets have an interest would not preserve the ability of the USSR to communicate with the American public in a crisis or extraordinary situation, so long as the American side has the power to stop the broadcasts. There is good weather and bad weather, he added, and the Soviet side needs an option for the bad weather.

Patrick agreed to explore the matter further.

After additional brief comments on this subject, USIA Deputy Director Stone recommended to Mr. Falin that the group divide into two, one dealing with the establishment of mechanisms to deal with disinformation and the other on broadcast issues.

The disinformation group discussed additional steps such as regular meetings between USIA and Soviet Embassy press staff, and P&C Moscow and Soviet officials, as well as the potential use of fax or computers for sending messages between USIA and Novosti regarding information issues.

0111A
draft: CDorflein, MSchneider
clear: MSchneider

September 28, 1988

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

American Participants

Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA
Marvin L. Stone, Deputy Director, USIA
Ambassador Leonard Marks, former Director of USIA
Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department
of State
Henry E. Hockeimer, Associate Director, Office of
Management
Mark Blitz, Associate Director, Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs
Richard W. Carlson, Associate Director, Voice of America
G. Michael Eisenstadt, Director, Office of European Affairs
Guy Brown, Director, Office of Cultural Centers and
Resources, USIA
Michael D. Schneider, Deputy Associate Director, Bureau of
Programs
Herbert Romerstein, Active Measures Coordinator, USIA
Patricia Siemien, Special Assistant to the Director, USIA
Bruce Porter, Executive Director, Board for International
Broadcasting
Peter Rodman, Senior Director, International Security
Affairs, National Security Council
Thomas Robertson, Office of Soviet Affairs, Department of
State
Dennis Patrick, Chairman of Federal Communications
Commission
Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., President and CEO, Forbes Magazine
and Director of Board for International
Broadcasting
Philip C. Brown, Public Affairs Counselor, P & C Moscow
Carol Doerflein, USSR Country Affairs Officer, USIA
Victor Jackovich, Cultural Affairs Officer, P & C
Moscow (notetaker)

Soviet Participants

Valentin M. Falin, Chairman, Novosti Press Agency
Vadim P. Perfil'yev, Deputy Chief of Information
Administration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Leonid N. Dobrokhotoy, CPSU Central Committee Propaganda
Department
Mikhail A. Gribanov, First Deputy Minister of Culture
Major General Ignat Danilenko, Ministry of Defense
Lt. Col. Shatalov, assistant to Maj. Gen. Danilenko
Lt. Col. Shkrylnik, assistant to Maj. Gen. Danilenko
Irina V. Mikheyeva, Chief Inspector, Foreign Relations
Administration, Ministry of Culture
Nikolai Vassilievich Neyland, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Latvian SSR
Sergey I. Divil'kovskiy, CPSU Central Committee
International Department
Vadim I. Kuznetsov, Deputy Chief, Department of U.S.
and Canada, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor G. Onushkin, Director, Research Institute of Adult
Education, Academy of Pedagogical
Sciences
Grigoriy Dmitriev, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences
Mikhail A. Sleptsov, Deputy Chief, Foreign Relations
Department, State Committee for Public
Education
Aleksandr V. Churlin, Deputy Chief, Administration on
Humanitarian and Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yasen Zasurskiy, Dean of Journalism Department,
Moscow State University
Vladimir F. Zhukov, First Secretary, Information
Administration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

TIME AND PLACE: Wednesday, September 27, 1988, 9:30 a.m.
- 12:45 p.m. at Novosti (Foreign Press Center)

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Information Talks:
Government-to-Government Panel, fourth (final) session

Schneider recounted a meeting he held yesterday with Messrs. Stone, Romerstein, Dobrokhotoy and others on establishing early-warning mechanisms on information issues. On the basis of this meeting, he recommended periodic gatherings of U.S. Embassy press representatives with Novosti and Soviet government officials and, on the other side, of Soviet Embassy officials with USIA representatives.

Perfil'yev claimed that working level contacts with both embassies were not being used sufficiently. He complained that sometimes Embassy personnel misread or misinterpret an article and communicate it to Washington before checking it out with Soviet sources. By the time a clarification is forthcoming, he claimed, the misinformation already attains wide circulation.

He advocated transmitting information directly on official briefings between Moscow and Washington. Noting the existence of a nuclear risk reduction center with direct phone lines, he said the MFA Information Administration has a similar hot line (tel. no. 244-4112), but that it had never been used by an American journalist or official. He also urged more briefings on both sides for each other's visiting delegations.

In this regard, the Director urged the Soviets to notify Washington early on in planning if special meetings are needed for traveling delegations.

Dobrokhotoy returned to the subject of public opinion polling. He named two Soviet organizations which are active in polling in the Soviet Union: the Institute of Social Studies and a new institute studying labor and trade unions. Their surveys are regularly published, he said, in the magazine "Social Research," which has more subscribers in the U.S. than in the Soviet Union. A joint organization for polling is the "Soviet-American Barometer of Peace." He also noted a cooperative pool recently conducted by the New York Times and the Institute of Social Studies on Soviet internal issues. He said the Soviets have also had joint projects with the Gallup and Yankelovich organizations.

NSC staffer Peter Rodman noted the strong interest in the Executive Branch for improvements in bilateral information flow. He said new breakthroughs in the information field would be an impressive demonstration of new political thinking. He hoped the Soviets would give full consideration to the many proposals presented in the various Panels. He saw good prospects for the future and called the Soviet invitation to hold the Information Talks a clear indication of Soviet intentions.

Maj. Gen. Danilenko noted new ideas and trends with the advent of perestroika and glasnost. He said the primary task now is to bring the new thinking to the attention of the public. He said he had learned from the Information Talks that there will be no war between us, "if God doesn't deprive us of common sense." He predicted that Soviet and American military establishments would continue to exist into the twentieth century, but not because of U.S.-Soviet relations. He said both sides should now be able to concentrate their power on solving other burning world problems, such as poverty and hunger. He told an anecdote from the Persian Gulf, where, he said, a Soviet ship had brought a mine to the attention of an American ship; the Soviet ship later received a message that the Americans had destroyed the mine. On another occasion, he related, there was no communication about a mine because there was no common language between the Soviet and American crews.

Director Wick described Maj. Gen. Danilenko's presentation as "eloquent" and requested that he participate in the closing press conference later that afternoon.

Falin immediately endorsed the Director proposal and asked Danilenko to speak at the press conference. He said we are far from joint military ventures, but any signs of change in security postures would be welcomed by the entire world. For a long time, he mused, we looked at each other through binoculars, but now we can have more productive meetings face-to-face.

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MFA representative Divil'kovskiy noted a new stage in bilateral cooperation. He said the American media appeared to be satisfied during the Moscow Summit with opportunities made available to them both with Soviet officials and with the general public. The resultant good reporting marked a high point in these relations, he said. The current Information Talks, he continued, now allow us to settle questions on a level originally achieved during the last Summit. He seconded the proposal, made earlier by Mr. Stone, of sub-groups meeting periodically on specific subjects, such as disinformation. In addition, he hoped the Information Talks themselves would be continued in the future.

Perfil'yev noted that Shultz and Sheverdnadze had already met 29 times, so, he quipped, the information specialists are lagging behind. He urged that experts meet before every Summit, or after every Summit, to discuss specific topics of interest.

Falin wondered if the Soviet Union of Journalists ethics panel could be looked to as a model for a similar joint commission to study Soviet and American media reporting.

The Director mentioned the presence at the Talks of Donald Kummerfeld and Watson Sims, who have worked professionally with these questions in the U.S.

Ambassador Leonard Marks demurred, explaining that the U.S. once had a Press Council which was quickly disbanded because newspapers felt it was an invitation to censorship. Now, he said, each organization has its own code but there is no enforcement mechanism. American journalists, he continued, would never cooperate in such a commission, if there was a government connection. Instead, he recommended a voluntary group with no government input.

Herbert Romerstein of USIA appraised the Talks as interesting and noted that in the past problems had been raised, whereas now solutions are being discussed. He said it would be good to establish and maintain direct contact between Soviet and American counterparts in Moscow and Washington.

Malcolm Forbes, Jr., Chairman of the Board for International Broadcasting, agreed with Ambassador Marks that there should be no government support for a joint journalists commission. As a parting comment, he said that the U.S. believes in the free flow of ideas and that an end to jamming would show real glasnost in the world arena.

The Director closed the Government Panel of the Information Talks by thanking Mr. Falin and his colleagues on behalf of the American panelists. He said it had been a wonderful experience. He said the Talks represented the underlying feeling of good will and good faith, as ordained by our two leaders as being in our own national interest and in the best interest of bilateral relations. He predicted that the Talks would continue in the future.

Mr. Falin said the Soviet participants were satisfied with the exchange of opinions that had taken place. He characterized the dialogue as intensive, constructive and productive. He said that the many ideas and proposals presented were worthy of consideration and, if implemented, could enhance good bilateral and multilateral relations.

We should help each other to better understand one another, Falin continued. He also predicted that the Talks would continue, since he recognized a need to enrich the bilateral dialogue at all possible levels. He further suggested that, in the future, the full meeting be preceded by smaller meetings which could resolve some specific issues in advance. He also proposed that each side recommend to its leader that the Talks be institutionalized.

Falin was especially grateful to the Talks participants for actively promoting an informal unofficial dialogue. but, he cautioned, modern diplomacy needs more clarity and action, not just beautiful words. He said the Soviet side is interested in the success of the American proposals and that the Americans should be interested in the success of Soviet plans and programs.

Finally, Falin expressed his gratitude to Soviet participants for their patience, attention and interesting ideas. He then thanked Director Wick and the American participants for their constructivism throughout the Information Talks.

September 26, 1988

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

Charles Z. Wick, Director, USIA
 Marvin L. Stone, Deputy Director, USIA
 Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State
 Henry E. Hockeimer, Associate Director, Office of Management
 Mark Blitz, Associate Director, Bureau of Educational and
 Cultural Affairs
 Richard W. Carlson, Associate Director, Voice of America
 G. Michael Eisenstadt, Director, Office of European Affairs
 Michael D. Schneider, Deputy Associate Director, Bureau of
 Programs
 Herbert Romerstein, Adviser on Soviet Active Measures, USIA
 Patricia Siemien, Special Assistant to the Director, USIA
 Bruce Porter, Executive Director, Board for International
 Broadcasting
 Peter Rodman, Special Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs, National Security Council
 Thomas Robertson, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department
 of State
 Philip C. Brown, Public Affairs Counselor, P & C Moscow
 Victor Jackovich, Cultural Affairs Officer, P & C Moscow
 Carol Doerflein, USSR Country Affairs Officer, USIA (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Valentin M. Falin, Chairman, Novosti Press Agency
 Vadim P. Perfil'yev, Deputy Chief of Information Administration,
 USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Leonid N. Dobrokhotoy, CPSU Central Committee Propaganda
 Department
 Aleksandr Ioseliani, Chief, Georgian Communist Party Central
 Committee
 Mikhail A. Gribov, First Deputy Minister of Culture of the USSR
 Irina V. Mikheyeva, Chief Inspector, Foreign Relations
 Administration, USSR Ministry of Culture
 Nikolai Neyland, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Latvian SSR
 Sergey I. Divil'kovskiy, CPSU Central Committee International
 Department
 Vadim I. Kuznetsov, Deputy Chief, Department of the USA and
 Canada, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Viktor G. Onushkin, Director, Research Institute of Adult
 Education, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences

Mikhail A. Sleptsov, Deputy Chief, Foreign Relations Department,
USSR State Committee for Public Education
Sergey V. Kaz'min, Senior Consultant, Foreign Relations
Department, USSR State Committee for Public Education
Grigoriy Dmitriev, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences
Aleksandr V. Churlin, Deputy Chief, Administration on
Humanitarian
and Cultural Relations, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vladimir F. Zhukov, First Secretary, Information Administration,
USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

TIME AND PLACE: Monday, September 26, 1988, 2:30 - 5:45 p.m. at
Novosti (Foreign Press Center)

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Information Talks: Government-to-Government
Panel, first session

SUMMARY: The first meeting of the Government-to-Government panel focused on disinformation. Led by USIA Director Charles Z. Wick, the U.S. delegation cited specific examples of Soviet disinformation and called on the Soviets to eliminate such activities, which the Director described as "part of the old thinking." While the Soviet delegation headed by Novosti Chairman Valentin Falin denied playing any role in the dissemination of disinformation, agreement was reached on the general proposition that both sides should distance themselves from any activities which could be construed as deliberate disinformation and that they should seek practical means to prevent the dissemination of disinformation. END OF SUMMARY.

Falin welcomed the U.S. delegation, noting that the continuation in Moscow of information talks begun last April in Washington constituted an important second step toward developing a system of inter-relationships which not only could help overcome individual problems and misunderstandings, but also provide an "early warning system" to prevent such difficulties.

Summarizing recent progress in bilateral relations, including the signing of the INF agreement at the December 1987 Washington Summit and the successful conclusion of the Moscow summit, Falin stressed that opportunities had been created by the U.S. administration and the Soviet leadership to make the world a less dangerous place. While noting that difficult, complex and urgent problems would be discussed, Falin expressed the conviction that the atmosphere over the next three days would be one of mutual understanding.

Director Wick thanked Falin for his warm welcome and said that face-to-face meetings such as this help to dispel stereotypes and reveal common human concerns that can be a catalyst to good faith. Unfortunately, such a catalyst was missing in the past. Now, thanks to Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Yakovlev, and Mr. Falin, it was possible to speak frankly to one another and to have a kind of INF agreement in the field of ideas. Referring to a letter he carried from President Reagan to General Secretary Gorbachev, the Director noted the President's view that the Information Talks represent a modest but nevertheless authentic breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Summarizing developments in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Moscow Summit, the Director said he saw some signs of progress, a number of unfulfilled potentialities, and a few examples of "old thinking." On the positive side, he cited: the opening of reciprocal traveling book exhibits; a series of joint ventures including book exhibits, translations and exchanges commemorating the year of the young reader; the opening in Moscow of an American book center which, he just learned, will sell books for rubles, rather than just for hard currency as originally agreed; the signing October 1 of a formal protocol for the President's U.S.-USSR High School Pairing Project; and agreement between Worldnet and Gosteleradio for 2-way televised dialogues beginning with an upcoming dialogue on libraries as cultural repositories.

Two undertakings with promise but need of fulfillment are Soviet agreement to a VOA Moscow bureau, including assurances that current difficulties in locating housing would soon be resolved; and Soviet agreement to begin negotiations on cultural centers on January 2 or 3rd.

On the negative side, the Director emphasized that Soviet disinformation continues to be the major impediment to better relations. With the removal of the problem of disinformation, he stated, only miniscule difficulties would remain. The Director described Soviet disinformation activities as reflecting "old thinking" which he said should be deplored by proponents of reform. Under the "new thinking," he wondered, how could the Soviet side knowingly approve the dissemination of such patently false and misleading stories as the alleged invention of AIDS in a U.S. military laboratory, the alleged invention by the U.S. of an "ethnic weapon," and the alleged responsibility of the U.S. for the Jonestown tragedy?

It is not enough, said the Director, to explain away such stories by saying that under glasnost the press cannot be controlled. The continuation of patently false stories when facts are readily available poisons the relationship between our two countries, contributes to the "enemy image" which Soviet representatives allege exists in the U.S. media, and robs our leaders and representatives of the element of trust that is needed to negotiate or conduct business between our countries.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons interjected that recent experience has shown it is possible to make progress on the issue of disinformation. He cited as an example the epidemic of stories last year alleging that the AIDS virus was created in a U.S. military laboratory and noted that once it became apparent the dissemination of this false story was impeding joint cooperation in AIDS research, the disinformation very substantially decreased.

Mr. Romerstein concurred that in the case of AIDS disinformation progress had indeed been made, but stressed that disinformation poisons the water we both have to drink and is difficult to deal with. For example, he said, the July 1987 issue of the Novosti Military Journal again carried the AIDS story, using as a source Hustler Magazine owner Larry Flynt and also citing U.S. Congressman Ted Weiss, who repudiated as a "gross misrepresentation" the quotation attributed to him in the publication. Mr. Romerstein described the further dissemination of the story in Africa and in India, where he noted its appearance under the signature of an Indian citizen who he said is an employee of Novosti in New Delhi.

Mr. Romerstein emphasized the importance of using reliable sources and verifying information before disseminating it worldwide. He agreed that an "early warning system" could be a useful way to head off the dissemination of false or misleading stories and pledged to make himself and his deputy available for discussion of such matters in Washington.

Falin argued that the AIDS story appeared first in the U.S. and other countries and was not picked up in the Soviet press for over six months. He said the Soviet Union should not be accused of disseminating disinformation. The article in the Novosti Military Journal, he stated, responded to repeated accusations that the USSR invented the story on the artificial development of AIDS and merely provided a timetable of publications on this issue. Falin denied that the USSR took special actions to encourage other countries to publish the AIDS story. We did not and will not take such actions, he emphasized.

Falin noted the publication in the U.S. of a report on "State-Sponsored Terrorism of the USSR," which he sharply criticized for blaming the majority of terrorist acts committed in 1987 (most notably in Afghanistan) on Soviet or Soviet-sponsored institutions or agencies. How many terrorist attacks were committed in Afghanistan by those sent from Pakistan armed with U.S. guns and missiles, he asked rhetorically, going on to link the U.S. to Israeli actions in Tunisia and to violence in Lebanon. After alluding to U.S. actions in Central America and to other "difficult subjects" such as yellow rain, Falin urged that the discussion move away from recrimination. Once let the genie out of the bottle, he cautioned, we may find he bites, and the bite is not pleasant.

Falin reiterated that even as Chairman of Novosti he could not influence the positions taken by Soviet journalists such as Yegor Yakovlev, editor of the Moscow News. Perfilyev interjected that the MFA in its briefings to journalists gave scrupulous attention to accuracy, in accordance with the principles of "new thinking." If something appeared in the press which was not "fully true," it should not be assumed that this happened with the encouragement of Soviet authorities, he emphasized. As proof of the growing independence of the Soviet press, Perfilyev offered that there had even been several recent criticisms of the MFA's Information Section.

Mr. Stone interjected that the discussion was beginning to sound like a UN debate, with everyone speaking in generalities. You miss the point, he told the Soviet delegation. The word used by Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons was "epidemic." It is the drumbeat, the steady campaign of disinformation, that concerns us. Referring to the U.S. publication on state-sponsored terrorism, Mr. Stone noted its one-time publication and pointed out that American editors do not take at face value second, third or fourth hand-information -- hence, no drumbeat. In contrast, even after scientific evidence refuting the artificial creation of the AIDS virus was presented, the drumbeat kept up. Mr. Stone urged the Soviets not to become party to disinformation campaigns that he emphasized will only hurt government relations.

Mr. Romerstein concurred with Mr. Stone's remarks and returned to the question of sources. He urged the Soviets to consider the nature of the sources before disseminating a story. Mr. Romerstein then provided several recent instances of citations from the U.S. "mass media" which in fact sourced minor or fringe publications, such as a monthly homosexual newspaper with a circulation so small that USIA had difficulty even locating a copy.

Dobrokhotoy commented that the AIDS story died because scientists, including Soviets, rejected it -- a welcome turn of events, he noted. Dobrokhotoy went on to express concern about U.S. media-sensationalism, citing a report in the New York Post that 250,000 people died in Chernobyl. How, he asked, could such a story be disseminated? And how could the USSR seek redress, when neither the USIA nor any other governmental organization could control the U.S. media?

Of course, he noted, there were information agencies subordinate to the U.S. government, such as the VOA, which he commented had improved its coverage of events such as the Chautauqua Conference in Tbilisi, while continuing dubious reporting on such matters as religious affairs in the USSR.

Speaking to this point, Dobrokhotoy said a recent VOA report that perestroika has had no effect on religion in the USSR is false. As proof, he offered the recent massive celebration of the millennium and the opening of some 100 churches, which he described as having a hand in charitable activities, education, and health care. Dobrokhotoy also cited the presence of religious representatives on the presidiums of the Cultural, Children's, Charity and Peace funds as evidence of the Church's direct participation in Soviet society.

Returning to the VOA, Dobrokhotoy sharply criticized recent broadcasts noting the return to Afghanistan of refugees said to have fled "the horror of Soviet occupation." Such phrasing, mildly put, is unfriendly and incorrect, he stated. He flatly denied that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had produced a refugee exodus, noting that the limited contingent of Soviet troops could not be said to "occupy" the country, one third of which did not have a single Soviet soldier present. Dobrokhotoy also took issue with VOA's figures on the number of Afghan refugees in 1978/79 and at present. He denied that the refugee flow in the late 1970's was in any way attributable to Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Dobrokhotoy concluded his digression by agreeing that some mechanism was needed to prevent the dissemination of false information.

The Director returned briefly to the New York Post story on Chernobyl, pointing out that several days passed before the Soviets issued any statement whatsoever on Chernobyl. When the Soviet authorities finally acknowledged the accident and provided basic information to the world media, the Post story looked ridiculous.

Mr. Carlson then said he wished to respond to Dobrokhotoy's comments on the Afghan refugees. He pointed out that Falin's statements on Pakistan and the refugee situation made last May were carefully researched and flatly rejected. He noted that the three major organizations dealing with refugees set the number of refugees at slightly over 3 million in Pakistan and over 2 million in Iran, for a total of 5 million. He cited figures showing that the increase in refugee numbers in the late 1970's was attributable to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Falin interjected that the two sides obviously were using different sources and different dates. While denying that the Soviet occupation was responsible for the flow of Afghans to Pakistan, Falin said he did not wish to go more deeply into the subject, but rather to pursue opportunities for more positive discussion of information issues. Falin stressed the importance of avoiding any direct or indirect government involvement in disinformation or the encouragement of what he described as unfriendly statements about the other side. Perfilyev reiterated that the MFA in its briefings for journalists carefully verifies information. Specialists were available for this purpose, he noted.

Dobrokhotoy interjected that his subdivision of the Central Committee Propaganda Department also was scrupulous in verifying information and seeing to it that information broadcast about the United States was thoroughly checked and true.

Mr. Rodman made the point that on a policy issue such as Afghanistan there were bound to be different viewpoints. Such issues differ, he emphasized, from such scurrilous and blatantly false stories as the recent allegations that Third World babies are being sold for dissection to provide body parts to Americans.

Divil'kovsky referred again to Mr. Stone's distinction between a continuous campaign or "drumbeat" and what he appeared to characterize as a one-time publication on state-sponsored terrorism by the USSR. Divil'kovsky asserted that allegations of Soviet involvement in terrorism are continuously spread by the U.S. media and that they have taken particularly unpleasant form in recent suggestions (such as that in the September 26 issue of U.S. News and World Report) that the USSR may be behind the plane crash that killed Pakistani President Zia, as well as in earlier accusations (notably by Claire Sterling) that the Soviets had a hand in the attempted assassination of the Pope. The latter allegations in his view constituted a full-fledged campaign of disinformation. Divil'kovsky urged that in such critical matters the State Department take a definite position, so as to prevent the spread of disinformation by the U.S. media.

Mr. Rodman pointed out that the U.S. government has avoided categorical statements on such matters due to the lack of evidence. ~~He~~ noted that the government has no authority to prevent others from drawing their own conclusions based on evidence which they find.

Falin noted that statements implicating the USSR in the assassination attempt on the Pope were also made by George Bush, whose opinion was bound to have a greater influence on journalists than that of Claire Sterling. Mr. Rodman responded that he was not familiar with this statement by Vice-President Bush, but he reiterated that the U.S. government has been scrupulous not to make statements in the absence of evidence.

Mr. Romerstein interjected that an Indian publication, "Patriot," established with the help of Mr. Sitnikov, actually charged the U.S. with blowing up President Zia's plane. He went on to describe the series of events which resulted in dissemination of the baby parts story by a Soviet front organization, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, even though the source retracted his statement and this retraction was promptly carried by Reuters, which had picked up the original story. Mr. Romerstein expressed disbelief that the Soviet Union could not control an organization for which it was the vanguard.

Falin traced the history of the baby parts story as he understood it, noting its publication in Honduras, Guatemala and Cuba long before Soviet media picked it up. He sharply criticized Americans for believing, as he put it, that the Soviet media constitute a second or third hand of the government, and reiterated that the Soviet media today enjoy far greater independence than ever before. He flatly denied censorship exists, admitting only to criticisms or reprimands after the fact for erroneous reporting. It is high time, he argued, that you start to realize the reports in our press do not reflect our positions and that in fact they sometimes run counter to those positions.

Falin observed that the two sides had come to the following conclusions: first, both sides agreed equally to distance themselves from any steps that could be construed as deliberate disinformation; second, the sides are prepared to reflect on a system of permanent regular contacts as a mechanism for preventing the dissemination of disinformation.

The Director agreed with these conclusions, noting that it should not be necessary to wait for special fora such as the Information Talks to address disinformation issues. Regular contacts, ~~such~~ as those offered by Mr. Romerstein, could prove an effective mechanism for preventing the dissemination of false or misleading stories, he said. Director Wick noted that a year and a half ago such discussions would have been impossible. He recalled a conversation with Aleksandr Yakovlev last year, in which Yakovlev told him the General Secretary was concerned that discussions of disarmament focused only on missiles, not on ideas.

Falin said he shared the conviction that ideas are more important than missiles, and reconstruction just as necessary in this sphere as in the military, if we are to survive as human beings on this planet. As illustration of the common problems faced by the world's population, Falin cited environmental concerns, speaking of a spiritual as well as a biological environment necessary to sustain man.

Divil'kovsky said it was important to cast out the old demons, and not to allow the illusions of yesterday to influence the development of modern policies. He used as an example of "old thinking" the alleged misunderstanding by the West of the role of the Central Committee's International Department, which is portrayed as an evil body behind all the scheming around the world. Divil'kovsky averred that the International Department is respected by hundreds of thousands of people, that it is engaged in important work and lacks the time to guide every communist or socialist organ around the world. He called on the policy-makers to abandon this "old thinking."

Falin concluded his discussion by citing the Soviet writer Leonid Leonov, who in a 1942 letter to an American friend wrote "All children in the world cry in the same language and express happiness in the same manner." These philosophic ideas, Falin said, were prompted by the meeting today.

The Director thanked Falin for his comments and stressed that it is the obligation of all to work toward realizing our goals for the future. Even the most finely-tuned instrument, he observed, must be tuned, and the most beautiful music requires a page-turner if it is to be completed.

Concluding discussion turned to the organization of the talks for the following day. Mr. Stone proposed that, since the U.S. side had put forward the topic for today, the Soviet side suggest the topic for discussion tomorrow. Both sides agreed to this proposal and the meeting adjourned at 5:45 p.m.

Drafted by: EU - Carol Dorflein
Cleared by: P - Michael Schneider
0093A

October 24, 1988

SOVIET DISINFORMATION

Annex:

Next, an editorial reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

The Soviet Union's principal disinformation campaign against the United States today is the recirculation of rumors about babies being purchased abroad by Americans for use as organ transplant donors. The Soviet Union denies that such a campaign exists, of course. But, *Radio Moscow* broadcast a lengthy and gory report on the subject to overseas audiences only last month. Only a few hours before this broadcast, the Soviet news service, *TASS*, had issued a report in which an official denied that the USSR was attempting to spread the story.

No government, no private organization, no international organization or investigative journalist has produced any evidence to support these rumors, which originated in Central America nearly two years ago. These facts are never mentioned in the Soviet stories, however.

The Soviet Union also uses the media of its satellites and Communist parties and groups outside the Soviet Bloc sympathetic to Soviet goals in its attempts to discredit the U.S. Earlier this year the so-called International Association of Democratic Lawyers [IADL], a Soviet "front group," presented a report to the United Nations which allegedly documented the traffic in children's organs. U-N Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar rejected the report in July as "lacking necessary corroboration," and based on "possibly fictitious reports." The IADL nevertheless sought and obtained publicity for its report in the Western media, proving once again that there are almost no limits to human gullibility.

Even the European Parliament has been fooled into passing a resolution calling for an investigation of the alleged trafficking in babies' organs. Last month's

File:
Soviet
Active
Measures

Lisa James
FXI
Judy Ma
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resolution, proposed by a representative of France's Communist Party, Madame Danielle De March, passed at a poorly attended legislative session. Madame De March failed to note that the European Parliament had considered and rejected a similar proposition in 1987, finding that the allegations had no basis.

Over the past two years, reports of trafficking in baby parts have been picked up in newspapers, on the radio and on television in at least fifty countries outside the Communist bloc. Every time the story has been in danger of dying a natural death, Soviet disinformation operatives have revived it. The campaign is effective because, even though people may be initially inclined to disbelieve so monstrous a story, its constant repetition eventually convinces some that it is true.

As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Shifter said recently, "Not a shred of evidence exists to indicate that a single infant anywhere has ever been killed to facilitate an organ transplant." An end to such disinformation by the Soviets would be more in keeping with the policy of "openness" proclaimed by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Anncr:

That was an editorial reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.