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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder ACTIVE MEASURES (1)

FOIA

M430

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions	
113679	CABLE	301455Z JUN 83	1	6/30/1983	B1	B3
113680	CABLE	SAN JOSE 05553 <i>R 4/15/2013 M430/1</i>	2	8/17/1983	B1	
113681	MEMO	SEMAKIS TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP MEMBERS MINUTES: ACTIVE MEASURES MEETING OF 9/14/83	2	9/14/1983	B1	B3
					B6	B7(C)
113682	MEMO	SEMAKIS TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP MEMBERS MINUTES: ACTIVE MEASURES MEETING OF 9/13/83	2	9/13/1983	B1	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PROP, CS
SUBJECT: SOVIET AND SOVIET PROXY ACTIVE MEASURES AND
DISINFORMATION AGAINST COSTA RICA
REFS: (A) STATE 206540, (B) SAN JOSE 4943, (C) STATE
219003, (D) FBIS CHIVA CHIVA 080455Z AUG 83

1. ~~1.~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
REGARDING INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET AND SOVIET PROXY
ACTIVE MEASURES (REF A), EMBASSY IS NOT AWARE OF ANY
SUCH ACTIVE MEASURES DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO USSR
OR BLOC EMBASSIES IN COSTA RICA. HOWEVER, NICARAGUAN,
SOVIET, AND CUBAN PRESS REPORTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS
CAN BE DOCUMENTED.

2. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES REQUESTED REF C FOLLOW:

A. ON DECEMBER 20, 1982, RADIO HAVANA BROADCAST A
REPORT CITING THE "COMMITTEE OF SOLIDARITY WITH COSTA
RICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS" LOCATED IN MEXICO CITY WHO
REPORTEDLY CLAIMED THAT COSTA RICA HAS A 30,000 MAN
ARMY WHICH INCLUDES 5000 FORMER SOMOZISTA GUARDSMEN,
AND THAT THERE IS "A PREVALENCE OF THE USE OF VIOLENCE,
ARBITRARY ARRESTS, TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM
AGAINST THE COSTA RICAN PEOPLE." USIS SENT COPY OF
REPORT TO COSTA RICAN MEDIA DIRECTORS AND FOREIGN
MINISTER. IN ENSUING CONTROVERSY ABOUT THIS BESMIRCHING
OF THE COSTA RICAN NAME, EVEN COMMUNIST DEPUTY
WAS FORCED TO ADMIT PUBLICLY THAT THIS WAS FABRICATION.
B. JANUARY 24, 1983, "BARRICADE" IN MANAGUA CARRIED
A STORY ACCUSING COSTA RICANS OF PARTICIPATING IN COMBINED
MILITARY MANEUVERS WITH THE U.S. AND PANAMA IN THE
SOUTHERN PART OF COSTA RICA. USIS SENT EMBASSY DENIAL
TO MAJOR MEDIA IMMEDIATELY.
C. DURING WEEK OF APRIL 12, 1983, RADIO HAVANA REPORTED
THE PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA OF A DETACHMENT OF SEABEES
WHO THEY REFERRED TO AS "SAPPERS." SEABEES WERE IN
GUANACASTE PROVINCE FOR THREE MONTHS, AT THE REQUEST OF
THE GOCR, TO DRILL 30 WELLS IN THAT DROUGHT-AFFECTED

AREA. THE REPORT CLAIMED THAT "THE COSTA RICAN PRESS
HAS CHARGED THAT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IS PART
OF A LARGE PLAN THAT IS BEING DEVELOPED BY THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION TO DESTABILIZE THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION."
THE ONLY "PRESS" IN QUESTION, OF COURSE, TO COME OUT
AGAINST THE SEABEES WAS THE COMMUNIST WEEKLY "LIBERTAD."
USIS SENT COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF RADIO HAVANA BROADCAST
TO MEDIA. COVERAGE OF SEABEE OPERATION REMAINED
EXTENSIVE AND FAVORABLE THROUGHOUT DURATION OF THE PROJECT
BY ALL COSTA RICAN MEDIA OUTLETS EXCEPT "LIBERTAD."
D. IN MAY U.S. AMBASSADOR IN VENEZUELA WAS ASKED BY GOV
OFFICIAL IF IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE WAS A "1000-MAN
ENGINEER BATTALION IN COSTA RICA DIGGING DITCHES." SOURCE
OF RUMOR WAS GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRAT HANS JURGEN
WISCHNEWSKI WHO HAD GOTTEN IT FROM SANDINISTAS WEEK
EARLIER IN NICARAGUA. EMBASSY QUICKLY INFORMED AMEMBASSY
CARACAS OF TRUE NATURE OF 22-MAN SEABEE FORCE IN COSTA
RICA.
E. MOST RECENT EXAMPLE OF DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN WAS
REPORTED BY FBIS (REF D). HAVANA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
CLAIMED THAT COSTA RICAN WEEKLY "UNIVERSIDAD" HAD CON-
DUCTED POLL SHOWING "A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF COSTA
RICANS REJECT U.S. MILITARY MANEUVERS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
WATERS." REALITY IS THAT "UNIVERSIDAD" ASKED FIFTEEN,
REPEAT FIFTEEN, PEOPLE ON CAMPUS "WHAT IS YOUR OPINION
OF THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN FLEET IN CENTRAL AMERICA?"
TEN RESPONDENTS INDICATED SOME DEGREE OF DISAPPROVAL
RANGING FROM DEFINITE TO VERY QUALIFIED; FIVE EXPRESSED
OUTRIGHT APPROVAL. OPINION PAGE IS REGULAR FEATURE OF
"UNIVERSIDAD," BUT FIFTEEN PEOPLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
"POLL," NOR DO TEN NEGATIVE RESPONSES EQUAL "A
CONSIDERABLE NUMBER." SAME CUBAN REPORT INDICATED THAT
COSTA RICAN OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER RAFAEL ANGEL CALDERON
HAD SAID IN INTERVIEW THAT "... EXERCISES DO NOT HELP
PROMOTE DIALOGUE IN THE REGION." IN LENGTHY INTERVIEW

WHAT CALDERON SAID WAS, "... THE UNITED STATES
CONSTANTLY CONDUCTS MILITARY MANEUVERS IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IT IS CONVENIENT AT THIS
MOMENT SINCE WE'RE LIVING IN A TENSE SITUATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA." IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION, HE SAID,
"I CAN'T SAY WHETHER (THE MANEUVERS) IMPEDE PEACE OR
BT

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BY RW NARA DATE 4/15/13

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PROP, CS
SUBJECT: SOVIET AND SOVIET PROXY ACTIVE MEASURES AND
DISINFORMATION AGAINST COSTA RICA
DIALOGUE, BUT THEY DO INCREASE THE TENSION."

3. WHILE WE ARE ABLE SPEEDILY TO COUNTER THIS DISINFOR-
MATION IN LOCAL MEDIA, WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER HOW IT
IS REPLAYED IN MEDIA OUTLETS ELSEWHERE. WINSOR
BT

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USSR
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(U) USSR: THE COUNTERPROPAGANDA APPARATUS IN
THE UKRAINE

Summary

The Soviet authorities have expanded their counterpropaganda work in the western borderlands of the USSR--particularly in what they describe as the "extremely exposed" Ukrainian SSR. In response to events in Poland, Western broadcasts in local languages, and indigenous religious and nationalist activities, the authorities have reorganized local agitation and propaganda work, established new coordinating bodies at both republic and local levels, and provided these bodies with new guidance.

These developments in themselves do not represent a significant change in grassroots propaganda work. They do, however, highlight the areas of greatest Soviet concern in this region: ideological disaffection among the young and a convergence of religious and national identities within many strata of the population.

* * * * *

Counterpropaganda has been an integral part of Soviet ideological work since the 1917 revolution, but the current upsurge and greater focus on nationality issues date from the November 1981 Central Committee plenum. That meeting described counterpropaganda as "one of the important spheres" of party work and called on party committees across the Soviet Union to devote more attention to it. Moscow has organized three major conferences since then to discuss ways and means of improving counterpropaganda effectiveness on nationality issues--at Riga in June 1982, Tallinn in October 1982, and Kishinev in April 1983. In addition, the party organizations of the western republics have developed a variety of new institutional forms for such

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Report 694-CA
October 12, 1983

work. Those in the Ukraine appear to have undergone the fullest elaboration and certainly have received the greatest attention in the press. They presumably are to serve as a model for counter-propaganda work throughout the Soviet west, but at the same time they reflect the special ideological problems of that republic and region.

The Challenge

Both Kiev and Moscow obviously judge those problems to be serious. According to the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee department responsible for propaganda and agitation, the Ukrainian Republic is now "extremely exposed to the sources of enemy propaganda" for the following reasons:

- The location of the republic on the western border of the Soviet Union makes it an easy target for Ukrainian-language broadcasting from abroad. In addition, many of its citizens--as a result of political and border changes over the last 50 years--know foreign languages well and therefore have additional opportunities to obtain information from non-Soviet sources.
- The population of the Ukraine includes a remarkably large number of religious believers. At present, according to the same official, "more than one half" of all the USSR's Orthodox and denominational associations (congregations) are in the Ukraine. Many believers are in fact followers of the suppressed Uniate Catholic Church, which considers its authority to be the Vatican rather than the Moscow Patriarchate and which sees itself as a Ukrainian national church.
- The republic must contend with a group of emigrés from the Ukraine with extensive personal ties to relatives and others still living there. Ukrainian emigrés, who now number more than 3 million including numerous anti-Soviet elements, maintain close ties with the Vatican and various Western governments and represent a continuing source of support for Ukrainian-language broadcasting abroad.

Each of these factors, the Soviet authorities insist, gives a special form and urgency to ideological work in this area.

Counterpropaganda work in the Ukraine currently is conducted according to a plan developed jointly by two departments of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus: the Department for Propaganda and Agitation, headed by Leonid M. Kravchuk, and the Department for Foreign Relations, headed by Anatoliy V. Merkulov. The first department has primary responsibility for domestic propaganda, although Kravchuk did say at the Riga

conference that his agency also has a sector for foreign policy information. The second apparently is responsible for programs concerning Ukrainian communities abroad. Given the key role played by emigrés in the foreign propaganda which the Soviets seek to counter, the importance of this department probably is much greater in the Ukraine than in other republics.

The Response

The Ukrainian counterpropaganda plan, according to press reports, coordinates the work of the following institutions in Kiev: the Ukrainian filiation of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, the Ukrainian Council on Religious Affairs, a special journalists group at the Ukrainian Radio and Television Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Scientific Coordinating Council for Problems of the Atheistic Indoctrination of the Population, special offices in the judicial and police agencies, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute for the Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries, the republic's Znaniye Society, and regular party and Komsomol propaganda units. These institutions are directed to "analyze systematically the context, areas, and new trends in clerical nationalist propaganda," to study "the degree of influence of foreign propaganda on believers and priests," to assist in the preparation of media materials in these areas, and to provide direction to oblast and local groups working in these areas.

The main counterpropaganda effort is carried out at the oblast level and below. Special coordinating councils on counterpropaganda have been established in the oblasts, and additional staff positions have been created in the oblast party committee apparatuses for their directors. These commissions, one oblast party secretary has reported, include representatives from party, Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, as well as journalists and academics. They are responsible for:

- overseeing sociological research on the current attitudes of the local population;
- preparing "up-to-date" information on major events of domestic and international life to guide local propagandists; and
- providing "daily help" to party, Soviet, and other organizations on counterpropaganda questions.

Analogous commissions are being established at the city and rayon levels, at least in the western oblasts. These bodies reportedly include a similar mix of representatives, have the same functions, and are chaired by the local party secretary responsible for ideological work. Counterpropaganda work at the

primary party organization level is carried out directly by the committee's information bureaus or groups.

Soviet Concerns

These changes do not represent a radical break with the past as far as ideological work is concerned; nor does the limited quantity of counterpropaganda material which has reached the West appear to promise any greater successes for agitprop officials. Nevertheless, the attention given to the counterpropaganda network and the messages it should carry do highlight current Soviet concerns in the Ukraine. These include, first, a rise in "clerical nationalism" and, second, growing ideological disaffection among the young. The first concern refers to the conjunction and mutual reinforcement of religion and national identity in the minds of many Ukrainians. According to one Ukrainian official:

"The process of the politicizing of religion itself is intensifying, religious organizations are taking an active part in political activity, and political clericalism is more and more assuming an anti-communist nature...a new variety of nationalism--religious nationalism--has appeared."

In the Ukrainian case, the chief symbol of this fusion is the Uniate Catholic Church, which was forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church following World War II but which, even Soviet sources concede, still has significant support among Ukrainian believers as a symbol of Ukrainian identity. At present, its emigré contingent enjoys the patronage of Pope John Paul II and supports extensive radio broadcasting on religious and social questions to the Ukraine. As a result, Kiev officials warn, the fight against this kind of nationalism must be directed against emigrés as well as against the domestic audience and must deal simultaneously with religious and nationality issues.

The second problem--a growing disaffection among the young--is one that concerns Soviet officials throughout the USSR. It pervades many recent Ukrainian party pronouncements. In his speech to the June 1983 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, for example, Ukrainian First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitskiy pointedly noted that:

"...it is impossible to overlook the fact that a proportion of young people have an unconscientious attitude toward learning, and evince moral immaturity and a consumerist attitude toward life. Such phenomena--and this came to light during the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee discussion on the report by the Lvov University party committee--are largely explained by grave omissions in teaching and the educational process."

Later in his speech, Shcherbitskiy called for an increased use of "public opinion in labor collectives" to counter what he termed "ideological subversion," clearly another task for his republic's counterpropagandists.

Prepared by Paul Goble, Anna Worobij
632-9187

Approved by Martha C. Mautner
632-9536

FORGERY

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FROM THE REPORT
OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
TO A CONFIDENTIAL MEETING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NOVEMBER 25, 1983

THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A SHIFT TO STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN THE U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY IS A HISTORIC EVENT. MARCH 23, 1983, WILL BECOME A WATERSHED BETWEEN FEAR AND FREEDOM. IN THE AMERICA OF THE 21ST CENTURY OUR CHILDREN AND OUR CHILDREN'S CHILDREN WILL ENJOY THE BLESSINGS OF A FUTURE WHICH, TO QUOTE THE PRESIDENT, "OFFERS HOPE."

THE SDI IS A LOGICAL CONTINUATION OF THE RESOLUTE EFFORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESTORE AMERICA'S MIGHT AND RESOLVE WHICH WERE LOST IN THE 1960S AND 1970S. THE MEASURES ALREADY ADOPTED SINCE 1981 HAVE LAID A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING IN THE NEAR FUTURE PREVALENCE OVER THE SOVIET UNION AT ALL LEVELS OF SHORT-TERM CONFLICTS (INCLUDING CONTROLLED NUCLEAR EXCHANGE) AND OF PROTRACTED MILITARY OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE MEASURES REDUCE CONSIDERABLY THE PROBABILITY OF A NUCLEAR STRIKE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, THEY DO NOT ELIMINATE SUCH A THREAT COMPLETELY. ONLY BY TURNING THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES INTO A NUCLEAR SANCTUARY CAN WE PROVIDE AN ASSURED GUARANTEE AGAINST THE GRUESOME

CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR. AND THAT IS THE ULTIMATE AIM OF THE SDI. THE COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDI PROGRAM WILL ENABLE US TO PUT AN END TO THE INTOLERABLE DEPENDENCE OF THE VERY SURVIVAL OF THIS COUNTRY ON EXTERNAL FORCES WHICH WE CANNOT CONTROL. IT WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNITY OF NATO, AND PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNFAVORABLE TENDENCIES IN THE ALLIANCE.

THE CREATION OF A RELIABLE SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL ENSURE EFFECTIVE AMERICAN CONTROL OVER OUTER SPACE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. WE WILL OUTPACE THE RUSSIANS BOTH IN KNOW-HOW AND IN THE BUILDING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEMS. THE SHORT-TERM AND MEDIUM-TERM GOALS OF THE SDI ARE BOUND TO IMPRESS THE SOVIETS, PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE MOSCOW, AND GIVE THE ADMINISTRATION THE POSSIBILITY TO TALK TO THE SOVIET LEADERS IN THE ONLY LANGUAGE THEY UNDERSTAND -- FORCE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDI PROGRAM WILL PROBABLY ENABLE US TO PUT AN END TO THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT ONCE AND FOR ALL, I.E., TO DO AWAY WITH THE MAIN CONTRADICTION IN OUR STRATEGY OF GLOBAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR -- THE RECOGNITION OF THE DANGEROUS GROWTH OF THIS THREAT AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY RELIABLE INSTRUMENTS TO COUNTER IT.

WHEN WE SPEAK OF RESTORING AMERICA'S MIGHT AND CREATING A SAFETY FACTOR TO SECURE PEACE AND FREEDOM, WE DO NOT HAVE IN

MIND A RETURN TO THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OF THE 1950s. A RETURN TO THE PAST IS IMPOSSIBLE. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSILES DO NOT HAVE MUCH ADDITIONAL MILEAGE IN THEM FOR SERIOUS QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. JUDGING BY THE LATEST SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES, THE POWER OF A COUNTRY IN THE 21ST CENTURY WILL BE DETERMINED NOT SO MUCH BY ITS NUCLEAR FORCES AS BY POST-NUCLEAR TYPES OF WEAPONS BASED ON THE LATEST TECHNOLOGIES AND ON OTHERS WHICH WILL BE DEVELOPED IN THE FUTURE. DEPLOYED AT VANTAGE POINTS IN SPACE, THEY WILL ENFORCE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER THE ENTIRE EARTH-MOON SYSTEM. GIVEN A SUFFICIENT RESOLVE ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENTS AND THE UNITY OF THE NATION, WE CAN ACHIEVE SUCH POWER.

EVEN TODAY, THE SDI PROVIDES THE UNITED STATES WITH A RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN ITS CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW FACING A PROBLEM WHICH THEY ARE INCAPABLE OF SOLVING WITHOUT INCREASED MILITARY SPENDING AND DRASTIC CHANGES IN THEIR DEFENSE AND EVEN CIVILIAN STRUCTURES. THIS POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME. THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAS ALREADY PUSHED ITS MILITARY SPENDING TO THE LIMITS, WILL BE FORCED TO FOLLOW IN OUR FOOTSTEPS AND START CREATING A SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEM, IN SPITE OF THE SERIOUS TECHNOLOGICAL GAP. THUS, THE SDI PROGRAM WILL ENABLE US TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP MORE EFFECTIVELY. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDI WILL MAKE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR ONGOING

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4

TRANSITION FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE EFFORTS. THE SOVIET RULERS MUST BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THE CREATION OF A SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE WILL GIVE THE UNITED STATES INCONTESTABLE SUPERIORITY, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION WITH A KNOCK-OUT BLOW. THE GUIDELINES AIMED AT PREVENTING THE EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE WILL AT LAST RECEIVE SUBSTANCE. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE GUIDELINES HAS ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF OUR MAJOR GOALS IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL SECURITY. WE SHALL BE IN A POSITION TO COERCE THE SOVIET UNION TO BEHAVE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND MAKE A PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE LIBERATION OF ALL THE NATIONS ENSLAVED BY COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM, INCLUDING, POSSIBLY, EVEN THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES.

MEANWHILE, THE SDI PROGRAM MUST NOT DETRACT FROM OUR EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS AND IN MAINTAINING OUR MILITARY FORCES AT A HIGH LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY.

OUR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS MUST VIGOROUSLY PURSUE IMPORTANT NEW TECHNOLOGIES SO THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDI WOULD RESULT IN TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS. OTHERWISE, WE SHALL FACE THE DANGER OF LONG-TERM STAGNATION OF THE ECONOMY, A SHARP GROWTH IN BANKRUPTCIES AND IN UNEMPLOYMENT.

THE SDI WILL BE A BOOSTER FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY OVER THE FORTHCOMING DECADES, A GUARANTEE THAT U.S. CORPORATIONS WILL KEEP THEIR LEAD IN TECHNOLOGY AND CONSEQUENTLY REMAIN AHEAD OF THEIR RIVALS.

ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN THE UNITED STATES MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN ITS LEADING ROLE IN THE WORLD.

Re: Forged document purporting to be a section of a report by Sec. of Defense Weinberger to a "confidential" meeting on November 25, 1983.

1. The Sec. of Defense never made such a speech nor did he make the statements attributed to him.
2. No such meeting ever took place.
3. The concepts used in the document do not reflect U.S. Government thinking, but are in fact what the Soviets want West Europeans to believe about U.S. views.
4. It is not in the format, of any official U.S. Government document.
5. It was made available to West European officials and journalists without any explanation of its origin.
6. Parts of the document appear to be written by a person that does not have English as a first language. For example:

1st para, 1st sentence: The use of the word "the" in "the U.S. nuclear policy" is not normal usage. The phrase would normally read--in U.S. nuclear policy.

2nd para, 5th line. The word prevalence is used incorrectly. It does not mean superiority, if that was intended, nor does it come from the word prevail. It means usualness, commonness - something in general use or acceptance.

2nd para, line 6 (including controlled nuclear exchange) The term controlled nuclear exchange is not normally used for "limited nuclear war".

7. From the point of view of substance:

The overall purpose of the forgery is to convince the public in Europe that U.S. policies behind the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative are aimed at bringing about U.S. military superiority over the USSR and the U.S. domination of its NATO allies. This is to be accomplished largely by the U.S. control of space through the implementation of SDI which is described as an offensive system with offensive purposes.

The document uses the following false themes among others that the Soviet wants West Europeans to believe about the U.S. Government views.

Falsehood 1. That the U.S. wants military "prevalence" (superiority) over the Soviet Union to achieve victory in a "controlled nuclear exchange" (limited nuclear war) or a protracted war.

Falsehood 2. That the U.S. would use SDI to "prevent the development of unfavorable tendencies" in NATO, and to control its allies.

Falsehood 3. That SDI will enable the U.S. "to threaten the Soviet Union with a knock-out blow"

Falsehood 4. That SDI would enable the U.S. "to coerce the Soviet Union "and" make a practical contribution to the liberation of all nations enslaved by Communist totalitarianism, including, possibly, even the Russians themselves."

Falsehood 5. That SDI will enable the U.S. to maintain a technological lead over its "rivals" in the free world.

Falsehood 6. That the Soviets do not have their own form of SDI.

The 1st sentence, second para sets the basis for all the falsity and distortion that follows.

In the 2nd sentence, supposedly through measures already taken, U.S. military superiority lost can be regained at all levels of conflict in the short-term--conventional or nuclear. The purpose is to show the aggressive warlike stance of the U.S., willing to accept limited nuclear war. The theme is then developed that even with the threat of a nuclear strike diminished, the U.S. is going to turn itself into fortress America under its protective shield.

"And that is the ultimate aim of SDI" is stated to indicate to the rest of the world that the U.S. cares only for its own security and with SDI will not have to heed unnamed "external forces" including those within NATO that might object.

Page 2, 2nd para is devoted to the theme of U.S. scientific superiority over the Soviets in outer space and how this superiority will force the Soviets to the bargaining table. The interesting point is that the theme conveys the impression that the USSR has no SDI program of its own. This is contrary to anything the Sec/Def would say, but it is a point the Soviets are anxious for the public to accept. It is a clear tip-off of forgery.

Page 3, para one. The theme is to show long term planning for the U.S. control of space and the domination of our planet through "post nuclear types of weapons". It also indicates falsely that the U.S. is not sincere about disarmament.

Page 3, para 2. Here again the theme is to show that SDI threatens the USSR, which has no SDI or ABM systems in progress.

On to page 4: Superiority is again stressed and the point made that SDI can be used offensively, and that overall U.S. policy is to force the Soviets to accept U.S. domination.

The final point made follows the Soviet propaganda line that without SDI the U.S. faces an economic depression.