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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Lenczowski, John: Files

Withdrawer

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File Folder ACTIVE MEASURES (13)

FOIA

M430

Box Number 1

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

21

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
113965	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #8 OF 1986	5	6/4/1986	B1	B3
113979	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #9 OF 1986	5	6/18/1986	B1	B3
113980	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 6/19/86	3	6/20/1986	B1 B6	B3 B7(C)
113981	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #10 OF 1986	4	7/2/1986	B1	B3
113982	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/8/86	3	7/8/1986	B1 B3	B2 B6 B7
113983	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/31/86	2	7/31/1986	B1 B3	B2 B6 B7
113984	MEMO	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #11 OF 1986	5	7/31/1986	B1	B3

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Definition

The term active measures is a literal translation from Russian, aktivnyye meropriyatiya, which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities undertaken by every government. The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and perceptions of individuals, governments, and/or publics.

We define ...

The key factor in an active measure is the element of deception which is evident in all of the activities we commonly treat as active measures: forgeries, use of front groups, clandestine radio broadcasting, agents of influence, and disinformation campaigns. An appropriate, short working definition for active measures in general might be "psychological warfare."

Covertly implemented active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, which works in close coordination with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. All Soviet field agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet Active measures campaigns. Techniques include the following:

o Disinformation and Forgeries

Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceive public or governmental opinion, can be oral and/or written. Forged documents are frequently used in attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, or policies in such a way as to damage US foreign policy interests.

o Front groups and Friendship Societies

The ID coordinates activities of front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as local fronts and friendship societies. Fronts normally present themselves as non-governmental, non-political organizations engaged in promoting desirable goals such as world peace. People who are reluctant to participate in openly pro-Communist organizations are more willing to participate in fronts.

o Political Influence Operations

Agents of influence and unwitting contacts are used to insinuate the official voice of the USSR into foreign

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government, political, press, business, labor and academic circles. This is accomplished in a nonattributable or seemingly unofficial manner.

o Media Manipulation

The Soviets or other opponents of the US frequently place falsely attributed or nonattributed material in print and broadcast media. These articles, which appear without any indication of their real source, may contain propaganda and/or disinformation.

Although the term active measures itself is taken from Russian and we generally think of active measures against the US as being Soviet in origin, active measures may be generated by others, either Soviet satellites or other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses active measures techniques as extensively or as effectively as the USSR.

In studying active measures it is important to make the point that propaganda and other efforts to influence public perceptions -- such as cultural and exchange programs, radio broadcasting, and publications -- are not active measures in themselves, but are often the vehicles used to promote and sustain active measures. For example, a forgery might surface accusing the US of plotting to assassinate a foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the US as a forgery, the content of the forged document may be repeated as part of a Soviet propaganda campaign in Soviet publications and elsewhere. For this reason, propaganda and public diplomacy efforts and means must be taken into consideration when examining active measures.

II. The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

Propaganda policy is decided from the Politburo with inputs from the International Department and other party and government bodies. A large highly centralized organization ensures that propaganda supports policy and is generally flexible enough to meet policy changes. The ID has the primary responsibility for accomplishing this task of coordination.

The Soviets devote major resources to disseminate anti-Western propaganda to a world wide audience. The primary vehicles are radio broadcasting (over 2200 hours per week in over 80 languages), and news services (TASS has offices in 126 countries and Novosti news service distributes information to at least 5000 press and information organs in 110 countries). Cultural activities, scholarships (over 55,000 Third world students in the USSR), film, television, and book and magazine publication also play a part.

III. Soviet Active Measures in the United States

Soviet active measures in the United States are designed to discredit the US government, promote Soviet foreign policy objectives, and influence US public opinion against US military, economic, and political programs. The primary Soviet vehicles for this are the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, the two most prominent of which are the United States Peace Council (USPC) and the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets place extensive reliance on these groups to support active measures and propaganda campaigns within the US.

Soviet KGB officers responsible for covert active measures operations are in frequent contact with officials of these groups. The Soviet fronts in the US have been particularly instructed to devote considerable attention to the US peace movement. CPUSA and its fronts have (along with several non-communist organizations) been involved in the organization of several mass demonstrations against US government policies, including the April 20, 1985 "April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice".

The KGB also is keenly interested in religion in the US as a potential vehicle for the exercise of political influence and, more recently, as a means of manipulating opposition against US disarmament policies, particularly increased spending for SDI. Also, as part of its campaign against US security policies, the KGB seeks to cultivate and target influential US citizens, particularly government officials, journalists, and political activists.

IV. Soviet Front Organizations

Since the early 1920's the USSR has used front organizations as a means of gaining worldwide support for its policies. Fronts are designed to appeal to a broad range of opinion and attempt to conceal their links to the USSR and international communism. They invariably support Soviet propaganda themes, attack the West, and never criticize the USSR.

The best known and largest front is the World Peace Council (WPC). Founded in Paris in 1949 as the World Committee of Partisans for Peace, the WPC has been based in Helsinki since 1968. It now contains over 140 affiliates including the Peace Council and the British Peace Assembly. The WPC maintains extensive links to other communist fronts, purportedly representing trade unions, women, youth, students, journalists, etc. Although it claims otherwise, most of its expenses are met by the Soviets and their East European allies. Like all of the other Soviet fronts, the WPC operates under the general direction of the ID.

There are several other major fronts, literally fronts for everyone. Virtually every profession and interest group has an appropriate front: organized labor, scientists, lawyers, Third World peoples, women, youth, students, journalists, etc. We also have the phenomenon of "fronts of fronts," groups established by parent fronts to address particular issues. A good example of this activity is found in the Generals for Peace which is a front of the WPC.

Fronts are extensively utilized the UN system via consultative membership in the UN as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Thirteen fronts, including the WPC, have differing types of NGO status in one or more of the UN councils and agencies.

Soviets have tried to use the fronts to influence the West European peace movement toward unification on an exclusively anti-US platform, but this effort has not been successful. They find it difficult to cooperate with groups who have criticized Soviet as well as Western policies.

V. Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures

Few states have used forgeries to affect public opinion as extensively over the long term as the Soviet Union. Soviet use of forgeries has, we believe, increased in recent years, and has become increasingly more sophisticated. Our best evidence that the Soviet government is a source of forgeries comes from numerous KGB defectors, but in many cases we can not be absolutely certain that a given forgery is Soviet and are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence.

Forgeries can be easily exposed as fakes but denial may never entirely offset the initial damage, which can be compounded by repeated references to the original forgery in Soviet or pro-communist media, often months or years after the primary surfacing.

Forgeries are prepared by KGB specialists under the supervision of the Active Measures Section, Service A, of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, except for certain cases where timeliness is so important that the fake may be prepared by the local KGB residency and take on an imperfect character associated with a "rush job." But given sufficient time, virtually any type of document can be forged. Still, even the best forgery can be unmasked by analysis and contains errors that one experienced in the wording of US government documents can detect.

The effectiveness of a forgery often depends more on the predisposition of the recipient than on the quality of the forgery. A reporter who is suspicious and hostile towards the US is far more likely to credit a forgery than one who is not. Because of increasingly sophisticated journalists, many forgeries never achieve uncritical publication and appear only in communist or communist-dominated media.

(section on agents of influence here)

OVERVIEW

1st page, last para, 1st sentence delete "primarily" and change so that text reads, "The conclusion to be drawn from this report is that there is a massive and highly organized effort, by the Soviet Union, to influence world opinion on behalf of its own policies and objectives and to undermine the U.S. position. While these efforts include public diplomacy to enhance the Soviet image abroad they also include a persistent, widespread....."

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1st para under Definition, amend last sentence to read, "The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and perceptions of individuals, governments, and/or publics to cause a specific response."

~~2nd para, 1st sentence amend to read, "The key factor in an active measure is the use of front groups, clandestine radio broadcast, agents of influence, front organizations, and disinformation campaigns."~~

3rd para, last sentence, "All Soviet field agencies....", delete field.

5th para under Front Groups and Friendship Societies, amend first sentence to read, "The ID coordinates activities of those Communist Parties under Soviet control, international front organizations such as the"

2nd page, under Media Manipulation, 2nd para change to read:

Although the term active measure itself is a translation from Russian and we generally think of active measures against the US as being Soviet in origin, some active measures may be generated by Soviet satellites or surrogates.

2nd page under The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus, change 1st sentence to read, "Propaganda and active measures policy....."

2nd para add, "In addition to active measures, the Soviets devote major....." in the 1st sentence.

3rd page, under Soviet Active Measures in the US, 3rd para, 1st sentence change to read, "The KGB also is keenly interested in religious groups in the US as a potential....."

4th page, 2nd para, last sentence change "Thirteen" to "Eleven", so that it reads, "Eleven fronts...."

Under Forgeries: An instrument of Active Measures, 1st para last sentence change to, "Our best evidencebut in many cases we do not have public information that a given forgery is Soviet...."

Chr. comm of Mothers + Relatives of Prisoners

Comm of Families for the Liberty of the Disappeared - - -

Continental Front of Women vs Aggression

For PP

Cuban propaganda Schools 6 schools

Nat. Assoc of Farmers

Cuban Women's Fed

Nico Lopez Nat. Training School

etc.

The attached is a copy of a summary paper on U.S. foreign policy approved by the National Security Council in February, 1985.

S.S.

FORGERY

- 1985-1988

to safeguard peace
maintain superior
interdiction of

curity requires a
ould give us firm
ilitate exploitation
cal potential of our
e Free World must be
Soviet expansionism.

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our favor. This
economic and
...e lost their social

- appear, and their expansionism is maintained
only by their military power. By contrast, our own performance
has been one of spectacular growth.

It is in the interest of the United States to deny the Soviets the prospect of future prosperity under Communism by taking advantage of Western technological achievements. Our attitude in this respect might be modified only if the Soviet Union gave convincing proofs that it was changing its international behavior. In view of long-standing Communist claims to world domination, such a change is highly improbable. Therefore, active opposition to Communism must continue to be the long-term policy of this Administration.

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy in Foreign Policy, 1985-1988

The supreme aim of U.S. foreign policy is to safeguard peace through strength. To that end, we must maintain superior military capability to ensure successful interdiction of Communist expansion.

Strategic Domination and the Soviet Union

An effective guarantee of U.S. national security requires a system of military-political blocs which would give us firm control of strategic raw materials and facilitate exploitation of the economic, scientific and technological potential of our allies. The policies of all nations of the Free World must be closely coordinated in rigid opposition to Soviet expansionism.

During the first term of the present Administration, the world balance of power has swung significantly in our favor. This is due, in part, to Soviet backwardness in economic and technological performance. The Soviets have lost their social and political appeal, and their expansionism is maintained only by their military power. By contrast, our own performance has been one of spectacular growth.

It is in the interest of the United States to deny the Soviets the prospect of future prosperity under Communism by taking advantage of Western technological achievements. Our attitude in this respect might be modified only if the Soviet Union gave convincing proofs that it was changing its international behavior. In view of long-standing Communist claims to world domination, such a change is highly improbable. Therefore, active opposition to Communism must continue to be the long-term policy of this Administration.

In pursuit of that policy, strong measures must be taken to undermine and weaken Soviet influence wherever it is seen to operate. Nations of the Free World should be encouraged to heightened awareness of, and opposition to, Soviet subversion. States affected by Soviet behavior should unhesitatingly apply the appropriate economic sanctions and political reprisals.

Strategic superiority is a key element of U.S. security, and our lead in strategic weapons must be maintained. Priority must be given to vigorous development of new generations of weapons systems rather than to strategic parity or to so-called "strategic stability." It must be kept in mind that progress in military technology may suggest the feasibility of, or even demand, a pre-emptive strike. Our strategic doctrines and technological initiatives should pay due regard to such a possibility, while at the same time guaranteeing a reliable defense of U.S. territory.

A pre-emptive strike potential, together with guidance, communications and intelligence systems of high sophistication, would guarantee our security to a degree which would permit us to exert severe pressure on the Soviet Union, to the point of issuing an ultimatum if necessary. In order to minimize chances of retaliatory strikes against U.S. territory, offensive actions in the European, Middle Eastern and Asian theaters must be considered.

The President's SDI should be implemented to the full in order to add space-based ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite weapons to the existing strategic nuclear arsenals. Accelerated implementation of SDI should ensure the establishment of an effective first-strike capability by the year 1995 which would mean victory in a nuclear war and survival thereafter. Further advantages to be gained by persisting with SDI are the ruinous effects on the Soviet economy which would result from any attempt to match our effort, and the accretion of strength which it would yield to U.S. negotiators vis-a-vis their Soviet counterparts.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons should continue. They help to maintain our lead in arms control issues and to restrain pressures at home, from our NATO allies, the Third World and world public opinion. On the other hand, such talks should in no way curb our freedom to develop new weapons systems. If negotiations fail, responsibility must be shifted on to the Soviets alone. Our allies must be persuaded to accept our view that the Soviets have already breached SALT II and the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union should be exposed to the Free World as a constant offender against standard international behavior and against the human rights of their own peoples. It should be

forced to permit free emigration for Jews, Christians and peoples of the oppressed minorities. We are responsible to history for the elimination of the menace represented by the Soviet Empire.

Central Europe

The time has come to reassess our attitude to the situation in Europe which emerged as the result of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. The decisions adopted at the conferences are symbolic of a past which must be rethought for the sake of a free world in the future.

We must exert growing pressure on the Soviet Union to grant its satellites more independence and free initiative in both domestic and foreign affairs. This should encourage increasing restlessness among the East Europeans, the widening of fissures in the communist community and, ultimately, fragmentation of the Warsaw Pact.

We should use our considerable political and economic leverage to advance this strategy. There is a tendency in the Warsaw Pact countries for greater autonomy and pluralism in Central Europe which should be encouraged by using the appeal of Western material and spiritual values. Soviet difficulties can be significantly increased by enlargement of the list of trade restrictions on strategic items and sophisticated technology, and by reduction of the flow of Western credits to Moscow and its allies. Such difficulties could be compounded by intensification of the arms race which, by diverting resources from consumer-orientated industries, must increase dissatisfaction throughout the Soviet bloc, thus reinforcing the wish for economic ties with the West and speeding the destabilization of the Warsaw Pact.

These economic pressures must be powerfully reinforced by vigorous political insistence on the compliance with all international agreements on human rights, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights.

Western Europe

It is an axiom of American policy that Soviet domination of Western Europe would constitute a fatal danger to the United States. At the same time, the Administration has grave reservations on the emergence of Western Europe as a new force which might develop political, economic and military policies conflicting with those of the United States.

Western Europe must realize that the Soviet military threat can be met only by the integrated power of NATO. The U.S. deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)

in Europe is a reliable protective shield against any Soviet policy of intimidation. It also serves as a vital positive factor in preserving the unity of the Western alliance by stimulating the readiness of our allies, particularly the non-nuclear nations, to conform to U.S. policies. This constitutes a powerful rationale for implementing the project for deploying American INF in Europe.

The nations of NATO seek a common objective, but their interests are not identical. The most striking difference lies in the global nature of American interests while those of Europe are mainly of more modest regional scope. For that very reason, the United States must resolutely insist on its leading role in NATO. Any strengthening of centrifugal forces within NATO would present grave dangers for the Free World. We must seek maximum support from our Western allies in all aspects of East-West relations, especially in the sphere of an augmented European contribution to our common defense. West European support for SDI is of the utmost importance in this respect.

The scope of NATO activity should be extended beyond Europe into the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia. U.S. strategic interests require a permanent NATO military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area. Efforts should be made to establish multinational rapid deployment units under the NATO Command.

Within NATO, we should pay special attention to our relationship with West Germany. The continued division of Germany and German discontent with the situation suggest that West Germany will become America's principal ally and the vanguard of Western defense in Europe.

Reservations about NATO principles which are becoming evident in Greece, the Netherlands and Denmark, and the emergence of neo-Gaullist trends in France, are totally inadmissible. All the nations concerned should understand clearly that the guarantees of West European security are in the hands of the United States alone. sm

The independent attitude of the Greek leadership represents a significant danger. The infrastructure of NATO's southern flank needs to be broadened, particularly in Turkey and Cyprus. In this context, the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Greece would set a highly undesirable precedent. The Administration is entitled to expect that its European allies would join it in exerting the necessary influence on Athens. The deployment of Pershings in Turkey would help secure the southern flank.

In the same connection, political, economic and military pressures on Turkey with a view to upgrading our cooperation to the strategic level would do much to enhance the effectiveness of our policies in the Middle East and toward the Soviet Union.

At the other end of the Mediterranean, the adhesion of Spain and the return of France to the integrated military structure of NATO are both highly desirable goals.

Switzerland, Austria and Sweden lack the means to maintain an adequate defense. We must take measures to integrate their economic, industrial and human resources into the NATO framework in the event of critical confrontation with the East.

The levels of national discussion on nuclear-free zones, demilitarized corridors and bans on chemical weapons are reaching dangerous proportions in West European countries. We must neutralize such talk which plays into the hands of Soviet-dominated European anti-nuclear movements.

Latin America and the Caribbean

The short-term and long-term goals of U.S. security policy in Latin America require a reappraisal of inter-American relations and a strengthening of the Rio Treaty.

The basic threat to democracy in the Western hemisphere remains the Marxist regime in Cuba. Castro retains his past interest in the export of Communism and terrorism. It is unlikely that the regime will evolve in a direction satisfactory to U.S. interests or that it will be overthrown by internal forces even after Castro's departure from the political scene. In reply, we must adopt an uncompromising stance against this breeding ground for Marxism, to the point of blockade if necessary.

An even higher priority of the present Administration is the elimination of an increasingly totalitarian Nicaragua. The major destabilizing factor menacing the Sandinista government is the military threat from the Nicaraguan armed resistance. We are working to secure broad support and recognition for the Nicaraguan armed resistance by West European and Latin American governments. As a last resort, U.S. military intervention cannot be ruled out, keeping in mind the lesson of Grenada.

Repeated outbreaks of guerrilla activity in El Salvador, controlled and directed from Moscow, Managua and Havana, and incessant efforts to destabilize Guatemala necessitate an increase of military aid to friendly regimes in Central America and the strengthening of the U.S. military presence there.

The necessity of gradually involving Latin American states in our military and political programs requires that resolute steps be taken to ensure that Mexico, and nations which have overthrown their military dictatorships (Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay), refrain from policies inimical to our interests. They must be made aware that the Monroe Doctrine is still the strongest foundation for U.S. policy throughout the hemisphere, and that the United States disposes of the power to exert heavy economic pressure.

In recent years, the activities of the OAS have often run counter to U.S. interests. This is a tendency which must be curbed. The Organization should be made to accord with our national interests, leaving the inter-American treaty system as a whole unchanged.

As in the past, the centrist forces in the Latin American states are likely to be our most dependable allies in the struggle against Communism. We must maintain close relations with the military elites and other elements with the will and ability to promote our interests in the region. High priority must be given to the speedy creation of mobile regional forces capable of averting dangers to freedom and democracy and of uniting all regional states against our common enemy.

Asia and the Pacific

Our national security and our interests in Asia are endangered by the Soviet Union, North Korea and Vietnam. In reply, the Administration must implement programs for providing aid and security to the front-line states of South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan, for maintaining and modernizing defense facilities in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and for increasing the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean.

Major attention should be paid to Pakistan, our main ally in Asia. It provides an instrument for influencing Indian domestic and foreign policies and for channeling assistance to the freedom fighters of Afghanistan in their efforts to block a solution of the Afghan problem on terms agreeable to Moscow and the present regime in Kabul. It is possible to envisage circumstances in which Pakistan might actually become a theater of war for the United States and its allies.

Efforts to weaken ties between India and the Communist bloc should be continued. Our main leverage in India would be its gradual involvement in the economic system of the West and a more generous injection of Western capital under appropriate guarantees. The sale of modern armaments to India by the United States and Western Europe would help to ensure a measure of Indian dependence on NATO.

While Pakistan is our main ally in Asia, Japan, because of its strategic position, economic might and military capabilities, is the cornerstone of our security system in Asia and the Pacific. To reinforce our potential for deterrence, the Japanese government must be pressed to agree to the deployment of stronger American forces in Japan. The growth of Japan's own military power should be closely linked to the purchase of U.S. arms and to increased financial support for the maintenance of our forces in Japan.

The concept of a Pacific Basin community could become an effective factor in strengthening our influence in Asia. The first step in this direction must be support for Japan in a leading role as a political instrument. Support for this concept among non-Communist states in the Pacific, even allowing for some reservations in ASEAN, would attach them more closely to political and military plans for ensuring U.S. security interests in Asia.

A negotiated settlement of the Cambodian problem between Vietnam and ASEAN in no way corresponds with U.S. interests. ASEAN governments must be left in no doubt about our attitude. Meanwhile, we must substantially raise the level of our direct assistance to anti-government groups in Cambodia.

CHINA

China is a factor which contributes to the prevention of further Soviet penetration into Asia and to the diversion of Soviet resources which might be deployed elsewhere. But we must not repeat past mistakes in overestimating China's ability to provide an effective counterbalance to Soviet policy. It will not be realistic in the foreseeable future to consider China as a potential strategic ally in view of its unpredictable political future and the absence of stable power succession procedures.

Furthermore, successful implementation of the modernization program designed by the Chinese leadership to make China a new superpower might lead to rivalry and even confrontation with the United States.

Today China plays a useful role in keeping alive the Afghan and Cambodian problems and curbing Vietnamese expansionism. It also mounts a significant challenge to Soviet influence in the Third World and in the Communist movement itself. The Administration should seek to hold China to policies corresponding with U.S. global interests.

We could acquire important leverage by the further integration of China in the economic and financial systems of the Free

World. Ultimately, we have in mind a situation when China's trade, economic and financial relations with the industrial West become a decisive factor in the modern functioning of the Chinese economy. The transfer of advanced technology, including dual-purpose systems, should be considered as a means of securing the long-term attachment of China to Western interests, without fostering the growth of its military potential to a threatening degree.

None of this should occur at the expense of Taiwan. Adequate defense capabilities for Taiwan require modern arms systems which we should continue to supply. Our attitude is that Taiwan lies in the sphere of vital American interests, and that further concessions to China on Taiwan are unacceptable in view of those interests and of our long-term strategic goals.

The development of economic relations between China and the Soviet Union in their current form is inevitable, and it is unlikely to harm U.S. interests. But a political and ideological rapprochement between the two Communist giants, permitting them to coordinate their actions on a global scale, would be a different matter. Alongside the above-mentioned economic and military measures designed to draw China into the Western orbit, the Administration should try to nurture the deep-rooted distrust in Sino-Soviet relations and to contribute to its growth.

The Middle East

To preserve and encourage recent favorable developments in the Middle Eastern situation, we must intensify our efforts to exclude the Soviet Union from the search for a long-term solution of the problems of the region. This implies further isolation and weakening of the radical regimes in Syria, Libya and South Yemen and the continued neutralization of the PLO as an independent political force.

The strongest measures toward the leaders of totalitarian regimes such as Libya are wholly justifiable. Nothing short of Qadhafi's assassination will bring any significant change in Libyan policies of support for international terrorism.

We must continue pursuit of constructive American initiatives and secure the consolidation of the position of Israel in the region and beyond. It is necessary to maintain and strengthen Israel's military edge over any possible combination of Arab states. While using Israeli capabilities to support U.S. interests, we should retain some leverage over the Jerusalem government to prevent it from launching uncontrolled ventures which might result in detriment to U.S. policy.

Our approaches to the Arab states must be governed by the bilateral relationships existing between us, the overriding consideration being the interdiction of a united Arab front against Israel. Of primary importance is the diminution of Soviet influence in Damascus, and the involvement of Syria in the Camp David peace process.

The Middle East is of major strategic importance to the United States. An enhanced U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is necessary to ensure effective control of its wealth from oil. By arousing the apprehensions of the Arab states bordering the Gulf, the Iran-Iraq war offers us favorable opportunities of making our weight felt. Special attention should be paid to the use of bases in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and other Gulf states for pre-emptive operations of the Rapid Deployment Forces whenever a threat to our interests may arise.

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan gives us a propaganda bonus which must be exploited to inflict political, economic and military damage on the Soviet Union. The invasion convincingly demonstrates Soviet expansionist aims in Asia, and gives irresistible credibility to our claim that Soviet aggression justifies the strengthening of our own military and political positions in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and even the restoration of American influence in Iran.

Africa

The main lines of U.S. policy in Africa require stable access to its mineral resources, increased U.S. investments, and support and assistance to those African regimes which share our ideals and deserve our credit.

At present, our attention is directed to the south of the continent, a region of vital interest to the United States. The policy of constructive engagement with Pretoria has justified expectations. It has ensured the stability of the regime and strengthened our position throughout the region.

The basic principles of a settlement in Namibia are threefold: the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; the rule of representatives of all strata of society chosen on the basis of free and fair elections; the interdiction of Marxist SWAPO participation in any future administration. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia is outdated and no longer reflects the actual situation or the wider interests of the Free World.

We should encourage the dialogues which the governments of Angola and Mozambique are conducting with South Africa. Solution of their problems depends on their outcome. The Administration should urge the Angolan and Mozambican leaders to adopt a more balanced and independent course. In the name of national reconciliation, they should open negotiations with opposition movements for the creation of democratic coalition governments which would win wider recognition from American and world public opinion. Meanwhile, our assistance to the opposition movements should be increased and coordinated with that of Pretoria.

An actual U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa and East Africa is necessary now. We should contribute to the creation of a political and military alliance of Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Egypt to defend our common interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and to isolate the Marxist regime in Ethiopia.

The United States favors strengthening the regimes of Zaire, Morocco, Liberia and Cameroon, and pursuing with them a coordinated political course on the African continent. Although the internal situation in Nigeria is unstable, the prospects for widening and strengthening the American presence there are highly favorable. We must seek to develop economic and military cooperation and to influence internal political processes, exploiting in this connection the capabilities of Nigerian emigrants.

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TO: Representative											
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REVIEW WORKSHEET

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APPEALMENT

DOCUMENT NUMBER:							AGENCY RESPONSIBLE		AGENCY ACTION				
TYPE: MEMO													
FROM: Charles Hill													
TO: Mr. Fawcett													
SUBJECT:							REASON WITHHELD		MARKING APPLIED				
FILE NUMBER:							NAMES						
TAB NO.	DAY	MO.	YEAR	NO. OF COPIES	PAGES EACH	CLASSIFICATION							
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USSR/Active Measures 25

COMMUNIQUE #1

The enclosed letter has been sent to each member of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate on the eve of the debate over renewed funding for the CIA-directed contras waging war in Nicaragua. ?

It is sent by Americans for Peace and Freedom, a new organization which has two purposes: 1) To further the causes of freedom and democracy, peace and human dignity in the world and 2) to discourage governments from the practice of terrorism and murder by, if necessary, making the individuals who fund, direct and carry it out, personally responsible for their deeds. We are at present considering what action it is appropriate to take in regard to those individuals.

Though we are most deeply concerned and dismayed with the murder and terrorism funded and directed by our own government, we are also profoundly disturbed at its practice by governments in Moscow, the Mideast and Latin America.

We seek to encourage public debate and commentary on state-sponsored murder and terrorism against innocent people.

Copies of this letter are being distributed to hundreds of news organizations, alternative media and college publications throughout the United States and to independent news organizations throughout the world. ?

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Dear Representative:

Please read this letter very carefully. It is a plea to you to save lives. It is a request that you act to remove a stain from our country's honor. It is an appeal to conscience. We are a newly formed organization with members in many states. We are asking you to take steps to return American government to the guiding principles and ideals upon which our nation was founded.

Please note that our letter is not accompanied by any destructive or violent act. We hope to gain your attention without that kind of activity. This letter is not a threat, though our actions are obviously linked to the actions that you as Congressmen take. Many among us have argued that simply sending a letter to the members of Congress, unaccompanied by any other action, is foolish and naive. Still, this is how we've agreed to begin.

The triggering event leading to this letter is the impending legislation to send another \$100 million to the contras to continue waging war in Nicaragua. As you are no doubt well aware, the bill is widely viewed as being similar to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which authorized, though never declared the Vietnam War. People in Nicaragua, mostly civilians, many of them women and children, will be murdered, some will be tortured and mutilated by the contra army this bill funds. Since the CIA first organized them from the remains of Somoza's army the contras actions have earned them a reputation as thugs, murderers and rapists.

We are ashamed that elected representatives of the people of the United States of America are even considering funding more murder in Nicaragua. The transparent fiction about some of it being "humanitarian" aid is particularly deceitful.

Whether the massacres are in airports in Europe, villages in Afghanistan or coffee fields in Nicaragua -- those who hire others to murder innocent people are terrorists. That's true whether the people who do the hiring are in the Libyan government, the Soviet government, or like you, are in the U.S. government. We will not let this murder and terrorism go unopposed. We especially will not let our own government murder, in our name, unopposed.

For too long the trend in American governments has been to focus the nation's energies more and more on a global struggle with the Soviet Union and with communism. For too long the furtherance of democracy, liberty, human dignity and human caring in the world have been sacrificed

to "security interests" by American governments obsessed with the Soviet Union. Along that road it has become common practice for people in American government to lie and deceive the American public, to support dictators with our wealth and power, to covertly murder and torture. They say they do these things to protect America. Their actions are actually poisoning her heart and soul, preparing a bitter legacy of confusion and shame for our children.

Opposition to this war our government is waging in Nicaragua is the most urgent point on which our organization has crystallized. People are being killed and we can't ignore it. The issue cuts to the heart of the question about what course our nation will steer in the years ahead. We ask you to lead us on a course we can be proud of.

WHY WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACT

It's simple. We can't take it any more. As individuals our consciences demand that we act to oppose the murders being committed in our name. We mean to disown these actions of our government. We will no longer collaborate by inaction. As Americans we will not quietly let our government betray the ideals and principles our country stands for.

America was founded on a vision of what human beings could be, of what a free people could accomplish. Our Revolution was a great shout of hope that echoes yet in the world. Our Constitution proclaims human rights and seeks to shield us from the tendency of all governments to become tyrannies over their own citizens. The men who made that Revolution and structured our form of government gifted us with a vision of what we could be and a solid foundation on which to build. The contras have nothing in common with them. Sadly, neither does Ronald Reagan.

America is in the heart and in the mind, it is a promise and an idea, as well as the land its citizens draw their nourishment from. That promise, that idea which America is, is under relentless attack -- from its own government.

When even school children know that the President of the United States regularly lies about matters of great importance, and we accept it as a matter of course, America is under relentless attack -- from its own government. When American government intervenes and tells a sovereign people that they cannot choose their own way of governing themselves, when an American government supports dictators with our wealth and might -- then America is relentlessly attacked -- by its own government. When an American government treats liberty and democracy as mere pawns secondary to an obsessive global power struggle with the Soviets, then America is under relentless attack -- from its own government. We are searching for ways to defend America against these relentless attacks on who she is and what she stands for. We will fight our own forgetful, paranoid and brutal government if need be.

What action is demanded when people are being killed unjustly? Talk is not enough when our government is making us accomplices to murder. History

does not follow from "We will fight!"

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is not kind to those who claimed not to know what was happening, or who just followed orders, or who just went along because they didn't know what else to do. Nor do we serve America when we let our government betray the moral foundation of our country.

Many of us argue that it is not fitting that those men of wealth and power who make war on the peasants of Central America should themselves be free from the personal sting of that war. Some argue that we should bring that war to their doorsteps — those who hire an army of thugs who rape and murder are responsible for that army's actions.

[We have the capability to see that those who make war in Central America personally taste its bitter fruit here in the United States. We hope to avoid those kind of actions. Yet, we are presented with a cruel choice. We can stand by and watch the killing and terrorism proceed in Central America unopposed, or we can bring the war to those responsible for it in Congress and in the Reagan Administration.

We will no longer stand by and watch. The purpose of this letter is to let you know that. As of yet, beyond this letter, we have not decided on future action. We are holding to the hope that there are more of those in Congress who have the courage to make peace than those who insist on making war.


We do not see ourselves as revolutionaries. We have no self-deluding plans to overthrow the government. We feel the free enterprise system has great merit. We're men and women with a wide variety of occupations and experiences — teachers, clergy, ranchers, professionals, soldiers, veterans of three wars, office workers and students. Many of us have children — and it is with thought to their future that we take this step. We have in common a painful love for our country and a feeling of responsibility for her actions. We share a vision of what America could do. We could feed and shelter our homeless. We could champion human rights and dignity throughout the world. We could assist other peoples in poorer countries to feed themselves. We could remove the awful shadow of nuclear war from our lives and the lives of our children. We could declare war on the diseases which presently lay us waste. We could make the exploration of space an adventure in which all humanity can share.

All of these things are within America's capability right now. Tackling these challenges would contribute far more to our national security than our present empty and fearful reliance on weaponry and a ruinous military budget. We could move the arena of superpower competition to these areas where there is something real to be gained. That makes sense, trampling Central America does not.

Finally, let us say that it is not our intention to coerce or threaten you. We do intend to reawaken an awareness of how important your decisions are. Particularly, when they fund the deaths of others. We also wanted you to be informed of our commitment to act and to be aware of how our actions are inescapably linked to yours.

[In the end, there is only this. We ask you to examine this war you are making in Central America. We ask you to end it. Stop paying the contras. Lead us out of this murderous dead end. To those who are promoting this war, to those opposing this war, we ask the same thing. We ask only that you listen to that small, still voice of conscience within. Do what you see as best for America. As will we.

AMERICANS FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM



Billy Tauzin
House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515
PERSONAL & URGENT



Buddy Roemer
House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515
PERSONAL & URGENT

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113979	MEMO	5	6/18/1986	B1
	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING			B3
	GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #9 OF 1986			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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113980	MEMO BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 6/19/86	3	6/20/1986	B1 B3 B6 B7(C)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
113981	MEMO	4	7/2/1986	B1
	BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #10 OF 1986			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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113982	MEMO BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/8/86	3	7/8/1986	B1 B2 B3 B6 B7(C)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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113983	MEMO BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP MEETING OF 7/31/86	2	7/31/1986	B1 B2 B3 B6 B7(C)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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113984	MEMO BAILEY TO ACTIVE MEASURES WORKING GROUP RE ACTIVE MEASURES MEMO #11 OF 1986	5	7/31/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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*Lencowski*NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508*File USSR
Active
Measures*

August 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press Manipulation

The NSC has reviewed and approved the revised Active Measures Report. The President has approved the suggestion that he recommend the establishment of a permanent interagency monitoring office within the Department of State. As required by Public Law 98-93, Section 147, this recommendation is to be included in the Secretary's Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist Disinformation and Press Manipulation.

*Robert Pears*Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Active Measures Report



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 5042 reopen

August 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press Manipulation

The Report has been revised to reflect comments in Mr. McDaniel's memorandum of July 18, 1986. The revised version is attached.

Nicholas W. Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: M. ELISE NEIL *MEN*
VINCENT M. CANNISTRARO *VC*

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press Manipulation

In response to Rod McDaniel's July 18 memorandum to Nicholas Platt, State has made the requested revisions to the Active Measures Report. As required by Public Law 98-93, Section 147, the Secretary's report must include recommendation by the President on the advisability of establishing a permanent interagency monitoring entity within the Department of State.

The attached State report recommends the formal establishment of the Office of Disinformation Analysis and Response. This is the first time an Administration has demonstrated such public support for this work on active measures. Since this is the first full report to Congress, this could help to make a major mark by ensuring the continuation of active measures work.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature to the President recommending that he approve the establishment of a permanent interagency monitoring office at State.

AF John Lenczowski, *unavailable* David Major, *in Draft* Walt Raymond and *MS* Ron Sable concur.

Recommendations

USIA concurs, per UR.

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove ✓

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to return the approved report to State for submission to Congress.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____


Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Executive Summary
Tab II Memo to Platt
Tab III Platt memo to Poindexter 8/9/86

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER 
SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press Manipulation

Issue

Recommendation on the advisability of establishing a permanent office of Soviet disinformation and press manipulation within the Department of State.

Facts

The Active Measures Report is mandated by Public Law 98-93, Section 147 for submission by the Secretary of State to the Congress. This is the first in-depth report prepared on active measures.

Discussion

The report reviews Soviet efforts at covertly influencing world public opinion, weakening traditional Western alliances, and discrediting U.S. institutions and policies. Based on the analysis, the report recommends to you that a permanent interagency monitoring entity be established within the Department of State. Your recommendation would ensure the continuation of the progress made by the current working group in the effort to effectively respond to Soviet active measures. This is the first Administration to demonstrate such public support for active measures.

Recommendation

OK

NO



That you recommend the establishment of a permanent office of Soviet disinformation and press manipulation within the Department of State.

Attachment:

Tab A Executive Summary

Prepared by:
M. Elise Neil

This report has been prepared in response to a Congressional Requirement that the Secretary of State provide an examination of Soviet and communist disinformation and press manipulation with respect to the United States. The purview of the report has been expanded in two respects. First, "communist disinformation and press manipulation" activities has been expanded to include all types of active measures, such as forgeries, front groups, and propaganda campaigns. Second, the focus is not only on active measures with respect to the United States alone; it includes any active measures designed to affect US policy interests in other areas of the world.

This report begins with a recommendation by the President to establish an Office of Disinformation Analysis and Response within the Department of State. This is followed by an executive summary of the report, and by a description of the Active Measures Working Group. The Working Group is an interagency effort which has had the primary responsibility of responding to active measures to-date, and will continue under the direction of the new Office. This is followed by a substantive report on selected aspects of Soviet active measures.

Because this report is a product of an interagency effort, it is comprised of several separate papers rather than a single document. The report includes sections on the following areas: the Soviet propaganda apparatus, including an appendix describing the anti-SDI campaign; active measures in the United States; Soviet front groups; forgeries suspected of being produced by the USSR and/or its allies; and, agents of influence. An appendix contains transcripts of presentations by scholars and journalists on the subject of active measures given in a State Department-sponsored seminar series in conjunction with preparation of this report.

The conclusion to be drawn from this report is that there is a massive and highly organized effort by the Soviet Union and its proxies to influence world opinion. This effort includes public diplomacy to enhance the Soviet image abroad and to further Soviet policy objectives. It also includes a persistent, widespread program of disinformation and deception designed to discredit the US image abroad and disrupt US foreign policy objectives. This program has achieved successes in the past and without effective responses by the US, it constitutes a threat to our national interests.

Soviet active measures have shown no diminution since General Secretary Gorbachev came to power. In the past year, virtually the entire Soviet leadership directly responsible for active measures has changed; the new leaders have a more eclectic view of world politics and are younger. Also, the International Department, which is directly responsible for active measures, has been reorganized. These changes indicate a renewed emphasis on active measures, and perhaps an increase in both quantity and quality of active measures for the foreseeable future.

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-2-

RECOMMENDATION

The President of the United States recommends that a permanent Office on Disinformation Analysis and Response be established within the Department of State. The specific goals of this Office will be to monitor active measures in the US and worldwide, and to respond appropriately.

This Office will be staffed at a level sufficient to meet the challenges of increasing active measures against the US and its interests. The Office shall: continue to provide an executive secretary for the interagency Active Measures Working Group; regularly produce reports on active measures for release to the public; provide regular interagency briefings to appropriate US and foreign governmental and non-governmental bodies; assure efficient and timely US Government responses to active measures, both unilaterally and in concert with friendly governments.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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I. Definition

The term active measures is a literal translation from Russian, aktivnyye meropriyatiya, which denotes covert or deceptive operations conducted in support of Soviet foreign policy. Active measures are distinct both from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and informational activities. The goal of active measures is to influence opinions and perceptions of governments and/or publics to achieve a specific response.

Deceptiveness is the essence of active measures -- disinformation and forgeries, front groups, influence operations, media manipulation, and clandestine radio broadcasts. Often these measures involve covert activity, but not necessarily so.

Covertly implemented Soviet active measures are the responsibility of Service A of the KGB First Chief Directorate, which works in close coordination with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. All Soviet agencies and representatives abroad are potentially available to support or participate in Soviet active measures campaigns. Techniques include the following:

- Disinformation and Forgeries

Disinformation, a deliberate attempt to deceive public or governmental opinion, can be oral and/or written. Forged documents are frequently used in attempts to discredit individuals, institutions, or policies in such a way as to damage US foreign policy interests.

- Front Groups and Friendship Societies

The ID coordinates activities of front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as local fronts and friendship societies. Fronts normally present themselves as non-governmental, non-political organizations engaged in promoting desirable goals such as world peace.

- Non-ruling Communist and Leftist Parties

The ID is also responsible for liaison with non-ruling communist and leftist parties, including socialist and social democratic parties. Contacts with these parties are usually overt, and are used to persuade the parties to carry out specific political action or propaganda campaigns on behalf of the USSR.

- Political Influence Operations

Agents of influence disguise their KGB connection while taking an active role in their nation's governmental, political, press, business, labor, or academic affairs. Their object is to convert their influence in those realms into real policy gains for the Soviet Union. At times, the Soviets use unwitting contacts to achieve similar results.

- Media Manipulation

The Soviets or other opponents of the US frequently place falsely attributed or nonattributed materials in print and broadcast media. These materials, which contain propaganda and/or disinformation, may appear in a variety of media, such as regular publications, clandestine broadcasts, or specially printed brochures.

Although the term active measures is taken from Russian and we generally think of active measures as being Soviet in origin, active measures may occasionally be generated against the US by other foreign powers. Yet, no state uses active measures techniques as extensively or as effectively as the USSR.

In studying active measures it is important to understand that propaganda and other efforts employed by the Soviets to influence public perceptions -- such as cultural programs, radio broadcasting, and publications -- may not be active measures in themselves, but may be the vehicles used to promote and sustain active measures. For example, a forgery -- definitely an active measure -- might surface accusing the US of plotting to assassinate a foreign leader. Even after being exposed by the US as a forgery, the content of the forged document may be repeated, for instance, by Novosti news agency. Thus, Novosti, an official propaganda and information organ, is used to promote an active measure. For this reason, Soviet propaganda and public diplomacy efforts and means must be taken into consideration when examining active measures.

II. The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus

The policies for propaganda, as well as for active measures, are decided by the Politburo, with inputs from the International Department (ID) and other party and government bodies. This large, highly centralized structure was reorganized in the spring of 1986, with the apparent intent of streamlining decisionmaking. The new head of the ID, the former Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoliy Dobrynin, brings to his job considerable knowledge and experience of how to deal with open societies. With these changes, it is quite possible that not only the quantity of active measures and propaganda will increase, but also the quality and sophistication.

The Soviets devote major resources to disseminate anti-Western propaganda to a worldwide audience. The primary vehicles are radio broadcasting (over 2200 hours per week in over 80 languages), and news services (TASS has offices in 126 countries and Novosti news service distributes information to at least 5000 press and information organs in 110 countries). Cultural activities, scholarships (over 55,000 Third world students in the USSR), film, television, and publication of books and magazines also play a part.

III. Soviet Active Measures in the United States

Soviet active measures in the United States are designed to discredit the US government, promote Soviet foreign policy objectives, and influence US public opinion against US military, economic, and political programs. The primary Soviet vehicles for this are the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and its front groups, the two most prominent of which are the United States Peace Council (USPC) and the National Council of American Soviet Friendship (NCASF). The Soviets place extensive reliance on these groups to support active measures and propaganda campaigns within the US.

Soviet KGB officers responsible for covert active measures operations are in frequent contact with officials of these groups. The Soviet fronts in the US have been particularly instructed to devote considerable attention to the US peace movement. CPUSA and its fronts have (along with several non-communist organizations) been involved in the organization of several mass demonstrations against US government policies, including the April 20, 1985 "April Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice."

The KGB also is keenly interested in religious groups in the US as a potential vehicle for the exercise of political influence and, more recently, as a means of manipulating opposition against US disarmament policies, particularly increased spending for SDI. Also, as part of its campaign against US security policies, the KGB seeks to cultivate and target influential US citizens, particularly government officials, journalists, and political activists.

IV. Soviet Front Organizations

Since the early 1920's the USSR has used front organizations as a means of gaining worldwide support for its policies. Fronts are designed to appeal to a broad range of opinion and attempt to conceal their links to the USSR and international communism. They invariably support Soviet propaganda themes, attack the West, and never criticize the USSR.

The best known and largest front is the World Peace Council (WPC). Founded in Paris in 1949 as the World Committee of Partisans for Peace, the WPC has been based in Helsinki since 1968. It now contains over 140 affiliates including US Peace Council and the British Peace Assembly. The WPC maintains extensive links to other communist fronts. Although it claims otherwise, most of its expenses are met by the Soviets and their East European allies. Like all of the other Soviet fronts, the WPC operates under the general direction of the ID.

There are several other major fronts; virtually every profession and interest group has an appropriate front: organized labor, scientists, lawyers, Third World peoples, women, youth, students, journalists. There are also "fronts of fronts," groups established by parent fronts to address particular issues. A good example of this activity is the Generals for Peace, a front of the WPC.

Fronts are extensively utilized the UN system via consultative membership in the UN as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Eleven fronts, including the WPC, have differing types of NGO status in one or more of the UN councils and agencies.

Soviets have tried to use the fronts to influence the West European peace movement toward unification on an exclusively anti-US platform, but this effort has not been successful. The fronts find it difficult to cooperate with groups who have criticized Soviet as well as Western policies.

V. Forgeries: An Instrument of Active Measures

Soviet use of forgeries has, we believe, increased in recent years, and has become more sophisticated. Our best evidence that the Soviet government is a source of forgeries comes from numerous KGB defectors, but rarely can we be absolutely certain that a given forgery is Soviet and are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence, analysis of the document itself, and the determination of whom the forgery ultimately benefits.

Forgeries can be easily exposed as fakes but denial may never entirely offset the initial damage, which can be compounded by repeated references to the original forgery in Soviet or pro-communist media, often months or years after the primary surfacing.

Forgeries are prepared by KGB specialists under the supervision of the Active Measures Section, Service A, of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, except for certain cases where timeliness is so important that the fake may be prepared by the local KGB residency and take on an imperfect character associated with a "rush job." But given sufficient time, virtually any type of document can be forged. Still, even the best forgery can be unmasked by analysis of errors that one experienced in the mechanics and wording of US government documents can detect.

The effectiveness of a forgery often depends more on the predisposition of the recipient than on the quality of the forgery. A recipient who is suspicious of and hostile toward the US is far more likely to credit a forgery than one who is not. Because of increasingly sophisticated journalists, many forgeries never achieve uncritical publication and appear only in communist or communist-dominated media.

VI. Agents of Influence

Agents of influence are individuals who support and promote Soviet interests, either openly or covertly. Often, the KGB is involved, but agents of influence may come from virtually any profession. Often, these individuals are recruited early in their lives and are not called upon to represent Soviet interests until they have achieved an influential position in government, business, academia, or media.

Agents of influence are motivated by a variety of factors. Some may be blackmailed, but many support the USSR for other reasons such as ideological affinity, ego, political expediency, or financial reward.

Arne Treholt, a former Norwegian government official, provides one of the best examples of a recent agent of influence. Recruited in his early years, he was activated by the Soviets after he took on a responsible government position years later. He actively advocated Soviet policies and positions in the conduct of his responsibilities, and helped the Soviets to receive favorable results during negotiations on several issues. In 1985, Treholt was convicted and jailed as a Soviet spy.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK~~

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Soviet and Communist
Disinformation and Press ManipulationIssue

Recommendation on the advisability of establishing a permanent office of Soviet disinformation and press manipulation within the Department of State.

Facts

The Active Measures Report is mandated by Public Law 98-93, Section 147 for submission by the Secretary of State to the Congress. This is the first in-depth report prepared on active measures.

Discussion

The report reviews Soviet efforts at covertly influencing world public opinion, weakening traditional Western alliances, and discrediting U.S. institutions and policies. Based on the analysis, the report recommends to you that a permanent interagency monitoring entity be established within the Department of State. Your recommendation would ensure the continuation of the progress made by the current working group in the effort to effectively respond to Soviet active measures. This is the first Administration to demonstrate such public support for active measures.

RecommendationOKNO

That you recommend the establishment of a permanent office of Soviet disinformation and press manipulation within the Department of State.

Attachment:

Tab A Executive Summary

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