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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/21/2016

File Folder USSR (6/19/84-6/27/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

399

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172523	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO J. POINDEXTER RE DOBRYNIN ON SUMMITRY	1	6/19/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-2-1-6			
172524	MEMO	SAME MEMO AS DOC #172523 (J. MATLOCK TO J. POINDEXTER RE DOBRYNIN ON SUMMITRY)	1	6/19/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-2-1-6			
172528	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #172526 (R. MCFARLANE TO G. SHULTZ, D. REGAN, AND M. BALDRIDGE RE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL COMMISSION)	1	6/26/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-2-2-5			
172526	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO G. SHULTZ, D. REGAN, AND M. BALDRIDGE RE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL COMMISSION	1	6/26/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-2-2-5			
172530	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION	1	6/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172531	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET TRADE COUNCIL	1	6/20/1984	B1
	R	5/31/2013			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-4-3
172533	PROFS NOTE	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET TRADE COUNCIL (SAME TEXT AS DOC #172531)	1	6/20/1984	B1
	R	5/31/2013			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-4-3
172534	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE JUNE 20 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	6	6/21/1984	B1
	R	5/31/2013			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-5-2
172535	WASHFAX RECEIPT		1	6/25/1984	B1
	PAR	10/8/2010			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-6-1
172537	REPORT	RE CHERNENKO	5	6/15/1984	B1
	PAR	10/8/2010			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-6-1
172538	CABLE	MOSCOW 7784	2	6/21/1984	B1
	R	5/30/2013			CREST NLR-748-25A-2-7-0

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8405034

RECEIVED 25 JUN 84 20

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

1/21/16 GDR

DOC DATE 19 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY

WALLACH, JOHN

SUBJECT: WALLACH CONVERSATION W/ DOBRYNIN RE SUMITRY^m

ACTION:	NOTED BY MCFARLANE	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES PA
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(J F)
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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 5034

84 JUN 25 P 2: 02

7

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172523

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

June 19, 1984

NLRR 148-25A-2-1-6

INFORMATIONBY OSB NARA DATE 5/31/83

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Dobrynin on Summitry

John Wallach of Hearst Newspapers called this afternoon to say that he had just had a fascinating conversation with Dobrynin. (He went over to talk about his plans to visit the Soviet Union this summer.) He found Dobrynin, he said, surprisingly upbeat on summitry. While Dobrynin initially said he doubted a summit would be possible this year, as the conversation wore on most things he said were positive. For example, he disputed Wallach's remark that he supposed August was out because the Soviets take their vacations then. "Oh no," Dobrynin retorted, "Gromyko is taking his vacation early this year and will be working in August."

Dobrynin went on to remark that with all the talk of quiet diplomacy, he was surprised that the Administration had not discussed the summit question with him. But he added that he had an appointment with Shultz tomorrow, and maybe we were saving the discussion for then. Dobrynin added that he personally liked the Baker idea of regular summits, since this would lower expectations and make everything easier.

Regarding what could be usefully discussed at a summit, Dobrynin said that they would be interested in ASAT and CTB. When Wallach suggested that we would doubtless be interested in nuclear arms, Dobrynin said sure, each side could talk about what it wanted. When Wallach mentioned in another context the Democratic Convention, Dobrynin commented that they did not consider it very important and it was unlikely to get much coverage in the Soviet Union.

Wallach concluded from all of this that Dobrynin and Shultz would be discussing agenda tomorrow. I offered no comment other than to say it was an interesting conversation and thanked him for filling me in.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8490701 ⁴

UN ^{CC} ~~UPON REMOVAL~~
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 JUN 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOC DATE 19 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . USSR

SUM *MIT*

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

WALLACH, JOHN

SUBJECT: WALLACH CONVERSATION W/ AMB DOBRYNIN RE US - USSR SUMMITRY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(B C)

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W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council 1213
The White House

System # II

Package # 90701

D

19 P 4: 41

5

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>A</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>has seen</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

84 JUN 19 P 4: 49

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90701

6

172524

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT: Dobrynin on Summitry

HR748-25A-2-1-6

DATE 5/31/83

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Declassify on: OADR

7

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8404951

REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 22 JUN 84. 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK 1/21/16 CAB

DOC DATE 21 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: US - USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 25 JUN 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW)

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	JUN 26 1984	<i>Mcfarlane sgd</i>		<i>index, JM, RO</i>

DISPATCH *ed COX* JUN 26 1984 *1 cen- 6/26*

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

TELETYPE UNIT

84/8339

8

AIO: 16

JM

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 1/24/66 BDD

PAGE NO. 744 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 1

ROBERT C. McFARLANE

(NAME)

(EXTENSION)

(ROOM NUMBER)

AGY. DESCRIPTION JOINT U.S.-SOVIET JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. BULTZ		
TREASURY	THE HONORABLE DONALD T. BEGAN		
COMMERCE	THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRICE		

FORM NR. 6951

ADDRESSEES HAVE REQUESTED DELIVERY OF THIS MEMO IMMEDIATELY.

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
1984 JUN 26 AM 10:17

9

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OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 1/21/16 CWB

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES

FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

(EXTENSION) (ROOM)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION JOINT U.S.-SOVIET JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

STATE

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

TREASURY

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN

COMMERCE

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRICE

REMARKS

NR. 4951

ADDRESSEES HAVE REQUESTED DELIVERY OF THIS
NRMO IMMEDIATELY.

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JUN 29 10 09 AM '84
WASHINGTON OFFICE

10.

JUN 26 10:16

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 1

MESSAGE NO. 244 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 1

FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION JOINT U.S.-SOVIET JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ</u>		
<u>TREASURY</u>	<u>THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN</u>		
<u>COMMERCE</u>	<u>THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE</u>		

REMARKS NR. 4951 ADDRESSEES HAVE REQUESTED DELIVERY OF THIS MRMO IMMEDIATELY.

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4951

11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA LDX

172528

June 26, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25A-2-2-5

BY LDJ NARA DATE 3/1/13

SUBJECT: Joint U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission (U)

As you are aware, we have proposed to the Soviet Union that the Long Term Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation be extended for another ten-year period.

(C)

In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would act as the U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Commercial Commission for which this agreement provides. Therefore, if the agreement is extended, the Department of Commerce should take the lead in preparing the U.S. position for a joint meeting of experts to prepare for a possible session of the Joint Commercial Commission. Preparations should be cleared through the normal interagency process and policy issues should be reviewed in the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy as appropriate. (C)

Coordinated negotiating positions should be submitted for NSC review before presentation to the Soviets. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 4951

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIED

DATE

Jun 26

12

Subject: Joint Commercial Commission

1/21/16 CDB

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
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_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
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CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
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THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMS/PA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

84 JUN 22 P 4: 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4951

14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA LDX

June 26, 1984

172526

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
Secretary of the Treasury

NLRR 48-25A-2-2-5

BY KOD NARA DATE 5/3/0

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM BALDRIGE
The Secretary of Commerce


SUBJECT: Joint U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission (U)

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FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA

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Box Number

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172530	MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION	1	6/21/1984	B1

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~~SECRET~~ 16

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4951

172531

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *Burd*
SUBJECT: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

NLRR 748-25A.2-4-3

BY COOZ

DATE 5/31/03

As you know, we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation Agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldrige called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz became Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 1981. As a near term matter, the Soviets are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 1981, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Secretary of Commerce as the US Chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive, "In 1981 the President decided that the Secretary of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..." Please coordinate with Roger Robinson.

Many thanks.

cc: Admiral Poindexter
Bob Kimmitt
Roger Robinson
Don Fortier

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSWGH --CPUA

06/20/84 17:01:24

-- SECRET --

EXPEDITE

172533

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

Subject: Joint US-Soviet Trade Council

NLRR 748-25A-2-4-3

BY LEDB NARA DATE 5/31/13

As you know we have agreed to extend the US-Soviet Economic and Industrial Cooperation agreement as a consequence of the Sushkov visit. Mac Baldridge called me today to note a possible bureaucratic hitch. When first established in 1974, Commerce chaired it on the US side. Then when George Shultz become Treasury Secretary he took it over. Now Treasury (staff level) is saying that they should remain in the chair. Mac says that he told the Russians that he was the US Chairman back in 81. As a near term matter, the Soviet are about to sign the agreement (it was initialed when Sushkov was here) and we need someone to sign for the US. Mac also says that back in 81, Ed Meese approved Commerce's resuming the chair although that was never put in writing. I think Commerce ought to be the US chair and believe we should put that in writing designating Sec Commerce as the US chairman. Mac is willing for the policy issues to be taken up in the SIG-IEP. Please think about this and get together a directive "In 1981 the President decided that the Sec of Commerce would chair the US side of the US-Soviet etc etc etc..."Plese coordinate with Roger Robinson

Many thanks

copy to Roger Robinson, Don Fortier

cc: NSJMP --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA

NSRMK --CPUA

EXPEDITE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 4951 **18**

Date Jun 26

Subject: Joint Commercial Commission

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

UNCLASSIFIED COPY TOTAL 1/21/16 CDD
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
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26 JUN 84

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INTL TRADE

SUBJECT: US - USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

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FROM SHULTZ, G ^{1/2 1/16 215}

DOC DATE 21 JUN 84

KEYWORDS . USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

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
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84 JUN 22 **P 7: 56**

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Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane		<i>has seen</i>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<i>K</i>	<u>I</u>
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Situation Room			
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Shultz gave President the original at 1330 22 June 84. Detailed MEMCON to follow. Authorized also to show to Ron Lehman.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NLRR 748-25A-2-4-2

BY COB NARA DATES 3/31/13

June 21, 1984

*RR (On mtg w/ Dobrynin)
I want to lay out
our conf to them about
their military buildup
and relieve their
over us being a
threat. 24*

172534

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*
SUBJECT: My meeting with Dobrynin June 20

We met for a little under three hours, and went through some 25 issues on the US-Soviet agenda. The meeting demonstrated that our dialogue is well enough established now for us to be able to move through successive topics in very businesslike fashion with an occasional sense of motion on details suggesting that some desire for progress is appearing on their side. I was accompanied by Rick Burt, Dobrynin by his Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov.

In the preliminaries at the outset of the meeting, Dobrynin expressed uncertainty about the meaning of your press conference statements. I told him that you are prepared as always to meet with Chernenko. I said you believe there should be content in such a meeting, and while we are not saying major agreements have to be reached, a significant, concrete agenda should be addressed. I added that perhaps some items on our agenda today could contribute to a summit agenda.

Dobrynin went on to say that they were interested in our response to Chernenko's last letter and talking points, but it developed that his main point, which he made early in the meeting and returned to at the end, was that it would be "good for you and good for us" if we concentrated on getting some negotiations going on one or two of the "big" security issues.

In our review of the US-Soviet agenda, I began with arms control issues, and it emerged from this discussion that Dobrynin's prime candidates for "big" issues to work on were nuclear testing and outer space.

-- On outer space, I explained your concerns about verification and your skepticism about negotiations, but told him that as a result of Chernenko's letters and our discussions you are taking a fresh look at the problem and would be making a decision soon. Dobrynin asked whether we were considering just anti-satellite weapons or all of outer space. I replied that we were looking at a range of things, and that verification was a real problem, but you were focussing on the most promising areas, and would be making a decision soon. At that point Dobrynin said he had just received a telegram calling him back to Moscow, and he would be leaving July 3. I noted I would be leaving for Asia shortly thereafter, and said I would try to get back to him before he left.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL. OADR

-- On the Stockholm talks he was evasive. I told him that the offer in your last letter of Chernenko and the Dublin speech to discuss non-use of force commitments together with our confidence-building measure proposals was a direct response to Chernenko, and that we are disappointed by the lack of an answer. His reply was that although they were "interested," they needed additional clarification and elaboration of what the offer means before they can respond.

-- On START and INF he was absolutely rigid. I reiterated that we considered their walkouts from the two negotiations unjustified, and that we remained prepared for private discussions on nuclear arms reductions. He replied that they are not prepared for such discussions while INF deployments continue, since they believe deployments have changed the strategic situation, and merely reiterated their position that they would reverse their "counter-measures" if we were prepared to withdraw our new missiles.

-- On chemical weapons and the MBFR talks in Vienna, he was not forthcoming either. I said that although verification is a major problem in both areas, our new proposals were meant to be constructive, and I urged them to negotiate. Dobrynin grumbled about our MBFR proposal, and his statement that they are prepared to make progress in both areas was pretty weak.

-- On nuclear testing, he pressed for resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, and I worked hard to explain how important it is to concentrate first on reducing the margin of error in verification of the threshold testing and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties (TTBT/PNET). That was why we had proposed very confidential discussions involving such measures as calibration tests, I said, and I stressed that progress on verification could help us move in another area where verification was difficult, namely anti-satellite weapons. But Dobrynin was very dug in on ratification of the two treaties first, calling it a "matter of principle" for the Soviets. Although he suggested that new verification proposals could be discussed in resumed CTB negotiations, simply getting us back into CTB talks was clearly his main purpose.

-- On strategic defense, I reiterated that this was a research program, that we have no intention at this time of departing from the ABM Treaty and that we remain prepared to have a confidential discussion about ballistic missile defense in START, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) or some other forum. Dobrynin said he took note of my

statement on abrogating the ABM Treaty and would get back on the question of discussions. I briefly touched on Soviet proposals concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, a code of conduct for nuclear powers and naval arms limitations, and rejected them all. He was not anxious to pursue them either.

-- On hotline upgrade, I pointed out they had our proposal for another round; Dobrynin said they would be getting back to us soon. I said we hoped this could be settled this round; he responded that it would be. Since both he and I would be out of town in July, I suggested that Gromyko and Art Hartman in Moscow might exchange the notes settling the issue. He said he would have to ask Gromyko about a Moscow venue but didn't think it would be a problem.

We discussed only two regional issues, southern Africa and the Middle East. On southern Africa I reminded Dobrynin of our offer to have Chet Crocker meet with his counterpart for an update, but he said that they think we owe them a reply to Gromyko's presentation to Art Hartman April 3 before they consider other meetings, and I promised to send Art in with our views. On the Middle East I sketched out our position on the Iran-Iraq war, and made the point that we have a common concern about Iraqi use of chemical weapons. I reminded him of my suggestion that experts join us for a special session. He replied that they also think the war "completely useless," and are also against any military movements in the area that could make the situation worse. On talks, they think any bilateral discussions should address the problems of an overall settlement; I replied that if they wanted a small-group discussion, it could discuss this problem too, and he appeared to agree.

Turning to human rights, I repeated that the Sakharovs were an issue of world concern and would remain one until the Soviets clarified their situation. I also mentioned a number of other human rights issues -- Soviet Jewry, harassment of Americans, problems in Leningrad and binational marriage cases -- and gave him your view that the way such issues are handled will have a big impact on our overall relationship. He groused about the contacts our diplomats there have with dissidents -- "they are looking for trouble" -- but made no other reply.

We concluded with a checklist discussion of bilateral issues:

-- I described the steps we propose to take to revitalize activities under our agreements on agriculture, housing and the environment. On health, I told him we are considering a number of steps, but the Soviet approach to Mrs. Bonner's request for foreign medical treatment is holding up initiatives to expand activities.

-- I told Dobrynin Art Hartman would be tabling our draft of a new exchanges agreement in Moscow soon.

-- On the Kiev/New York consulates, I repeated our request to send a study team to Kiev to look at our facilities there. Dobrynin replied by raising the resumption of Aeroflot flights. I said we are prepared to talk about it, but we are waiting for a Soviet reply to our February proposals in Montreal to improve air safety in the northern Pacific. In addition, I said, there may be a problem for Soviet planes under our noise abatement regulations, and American carriers flying to the Soviet Union would have to have a better deal than before. All in all, I suggested, we should move ahead on the consulates, while also talking about Aeroflot. Dobrynin said he would pass the suggestion back.

-- In this same connection, I noted that the Incidents-at-Sea talks between our two navies had gone well, and described the Soviet Navy's proposals we are looking at (Dobrynin appeared not to have heard of them). I suggested we might look at similar opportunities for other contacts between our two militaries, in keeping with the interest in such contacts you expressed in your March 6 letter.

-- On the Economic, Technical and Industrial Cooperation Long-Term Agreement, Dobrynin said they would have a reply soon to our proposal for a ten-year extension, and I said we were thinking of an eventual Joint Commission meeting in terms of cabinet-level participation.

-- On the Pacific maritime boundary talks, I proposed resumption July 23 (instead of in June, as they have proposed). He said they would be back to us, but there appeared to be no problem.

-- On fisheries, I said we would be getting to them soon and were working on an allocation for them, but it would be less than before. When Dobrynin grumbled, I said this was true for most countries.

In conclusion, I told him once again you wanted to see motion in the relationship, and noted that even if there is little on the "big" security issues, we do seem to be making progress on the bilateral side. Dobrynin reiterated that movement on one or two of the big issues we can talk about bilaterally would be good for both countries and once again identified outer space and nuclear testing as the prime candidates, and ones on which they would like an answer from us.

Looking at the meeting in the big picture, I think it was probably an important discussion, with some interesting implications for US-Soviet relations overall.

The most interesting is the way Dobrynin chose to play the two issues now at the top of the Soviet agenda, outer space and CTB. On substance, he had no new ideas to offer. But he defined these topics in the context of the desirable negotiations between the superpowers, negotiations that "would do you good, and would do us good." Getting talks going on such issues would show the world that the two superpowers are talking to each other, that both sides can address important problems, he observed. And, while he reiterated that the Soviets are not concerned with US domestic politics, he pointed out that if we cannot move on issues like these, by the end of the year there will be nothing to indicate that the two sides are working on major topics.

We should ask ourselves what this means.

Clearly, the Soviets would like to draw us into negotiations on topics they have long promoted. In CTB, they would like to blunt our technological potential in the field of nuclear testing, especially as it relates to our Strategic Defense Initiative. On outer space, they know we are catching up to their early lead, and here too they are worried about our superior technological capacity.

At the same time, this focus on getting arms negotiations underway this year may also reflect a change in Moscow's political approach to us. It could well mean that there are at least serious doubts in Moscow that "hibernation," the deep chill the Soviets suddenly reintroduced in our relations last months, is working, or will work for them over the rest of 1984. Your policy of firm but reasonable openness to dialogue and negotiation with the Soviets has given us the initiative in the eyes of world opinion. What the Soviets may now be saying, it seems to me, is that in face of your program for US-Soviet dialogue, small bilateral business will not be enough to preserve their credibility, and they have invested so much in being rigid on START and INF that their credibility would be further weakened by returning to these negotiations in the immediate future. Hence, they may now believe that, aside from START and INF, it is in their interest as well as ours to see movement on arms control between the superpowers, and they have chosen nuclear testing and outer space as the prime candidates.

As you know, I believe that the area where we ourselves can safely move is ASAT. By defining our objectives for talks clearly, we can protect our technological interests in any

ensuing negotiations. I do not believe we should pick up on the Soviet interest in resumed CTB negotiations; instead, we should continue to seek improvements of existing verification methods for the TTB/PNE treaties that would enable us to ratify them. That said, we should also be wary of creating any direct linkage between space arms control and improvements in verification of nuclear testing.

In general, however, it is worth pointing out that even though the meeting may have pointed to some evolution in the Soviet approach, it also demonstrated that our current posture is the correct one. We should keep plugging away on each item of our broad agenda with the Soviets. Progress on a number of these items could provide the basis for a constructive meeting between you and Chernenko. But, while we should be ready to engage them constructively on the range of issues between us, we must avoid appearing anxious to go to the summit. If we seem overeager to get there, we will be taking pressure off them to meet us half-way on the substance, and that should remain our primary objective.

National Security Council
The White House

30

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 June 1984

Chernenko on US-Soviet Relations

Two press interviews and a speech upon the conclusion of the CEMA Summit this week are the latest in a recent flurry of statements by Soviet leader Chernenko.

- Since early May, statements and appearances by Chernenko have been featured prominently in Soviet media, perhaps reflecting a concerted effort to build up his status for both foreign and domestic audiences.

Chernenko's interviews and authoritative press editorials have offered little new in either tone or substance on US-Soviet relations and on the prospects for renewed nuclear arms negotiations.

- They are in line with Moscow's current practice of rejecting US efforts to stimulate a dialogue and of dramatizing the poor state of bilateral relations.

In a 13 June Pravda interview Chernenko dismissed US appeals for renewed arms control talks as an election year tactic. He reiterated the now familiar call that Washington demonstrate a genuine readiness for talks through "concrete actions." While acknowledging in principle the value of negotiations, he contended that US missile deployments in Europe were increasingly blocking the possibility of talks. Negotiations would be possible, he said, if the US withdrew its "essentially preemptory conditions" for talks.

- He did not, however, explicitly call for the removal of US missiles from Europe.
- Nor did he make reference to President Reagan's offer to discuss the principle of non-use of force in the Stockholm Conference.

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NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or Comments may be addressed to Chief, Policy Analysis Division, [redacted]

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33

In his Pravda interview Chernenko also alluded to the issue of a US-Soviet summit, stating that Moscow was ready "at any moment" to engage in a dialogue provided that the talks were "serious." Soviet spokesman Zamaytin reiterated on Thursday that Chernenko would favor a summit, but he said that it would require careful preparation and that "a lot of demands" would have to be met.

- These references to summit conditions may be intended to exploit domestic political pressures on the President to reduce tensions with Moscow.

Chernenko's interview echoed a 7 June Pravda editorial, which provided Moscow's authoritative response to the President's Irish Parliament speech.

- The editorial dismissed US willingness to discuss the non-use of force principle as representing only a "semblance" of readiness for talks.

Chernenko's interview also singled out Soviet proposals on outer space arms control, claiming that they had been submitted to Washington and that the US had no interest in a dialogue on this subject.

- Moscow's statements alleging the US intends to militarize space and urging ASAT limitations probably are intended to influence Congressional deliberations on ASAT weaponry and probably reflect concern about the US ASAT program and strategic defense initiative.

Apparent Soviet preoccupation with the ASAT issue also was reflected in a 12 June Chernenko interview in Izvestiya in which he responded to an American journalist's questions.

- Chernenko reiterated Moscow's unilateral moratorium on launching ASAT weapons, which is conditioned on other countries refraining from placing such weapons in space.
- Such a moratorium, he proposed, would be "only the first step" toward a total ban on ASAT weapons.
- He called for "official" talks to begin immediately.
- He rejected the US contention that verification of such an accord was not possible and alluded for the first time to the use of radars and other electronic collectors in monitoring compliance.

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34

Annex of Recent Soviet Statements

7 June Pravda. "Serious Approach Still Unsighted."

- The US president failed to mention that "Washington is making Western Europe into a stage set for a nuclear war, putting ever new first-strike nuclear systems into full scale production, lavishing billions of dollars on militarizing outer space and refusing to hold any talks to curb the arms race."
- "In short, the West Europeans as well as the American voters were regaled with another portion of pseudopeaceful rhetoric."
- "As is known, and this was confirmed by the NATO council's recent session, no changes have occurred in Washington's stance on nuclear armaments in Europe."
- "What kind of talks would that be? They would not be concerned with the mutual reduction of armaments but with NATO's rearmament... The Soviet Union will not agree to such talks."
- "The President is apparently striving to create also a semblance of US readiness for talks on non-use of force. But this is only a semblance. In reality, the American representatives at Stockholm are unwilling to discuss this issue today."
- "The President's new European speech has been definitely conceived with a view to calming down the West Europeans and creating a semblance of respectability... in the conditions of election struggle in the US."

12 June Izvestiya, Chernenko answers to question from American Journalist Kingsbury-Smith.

- "The vote in the House of Representatives clearly reflects concern over the possibility of the arms race spreading to space... either the militarization of space is averted, or space will become the source of a terrible danger hanging over all mankind."
- Last year the USSR unilaterally assumed a commitment not to place ASAT weapons in space, in other

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words, a unilateral moratorium on such launches, as long as other states, the US included, refrain from placing any type of ASAT weapons in space."

- "This moratorium remains in force, and is only the first step toward a total ban on ASAT weapons, including the elimination of such systems that already exist. It is precisely for this reason that we are suggesting to the US that official talks begin immediately in order to reach an agreement on this."
- The Soviet Union is convinced that monitoring a freeze on ASAT weapons test is possible and moreover is extremely reliable above all through national technical means."
- "Effective monitoring...could be ensured by means of tracking objects in space... It would also be possible to use other radioelectronic facilities stationed on the ground, in the world's oceans, and in space... In uncertain situations an exchange of information and consultations could be effected. Should the need arise, other forms also could be found..."
- "Any questions, including questions of monitoring, could be successfully solved during the talks being proposed by the Soviet Union."

13 June, Chernenko answers the Pravda on London Summit.

- "Again the Soviet Union was urged to engage in a dialogue and talks... Regrettably, however, these intentions and appeals failed to be backed up with anything tangible. Why? It is considerations connected with the US presidential elections."
- "The dialogue and talks are mentioned since they need a screen to somehow cover up the transformation of Western Europe into a launching pad for new US missiles. The line of missile deployment remains unshakeable...and this is increasingly blocking the possibility of talks."
- "Is there a need for a dialogue and for talks? Both yesterday and today our answer has been the same-- Yes. But a dialogue which is honest, and talks that are serious. In these we stand ready to engage at any moment."

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36

- "We hold that these issues be considered in earnest at the negotiating table as soon as the American side withdraws its essentially preemptory conditions for talks."
- "I will single out as an example the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Our proposals on how to resolve this problem have been submitted to Washington. But it does not want to handle this problem, it does not want even to discuss it."
- "In all likelihood the US administration is fond only of its own ambitious stance whose essence is opening outer space to formidable armaments and thus trying to gain military superiority. We do not see a reciprocal desire for solid talks."
- "It is high time for the US and its allies confirmed by concrete deeds their share of the responsibility for peace...and display genuine readiness for dialogue... The USSR is not wanting in such readiness."

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # _____

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
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John Poindexter	2	<i>[Handwritten signature]</i>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	3	✓	_____
Bud McFarlane	4	M	I
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	_____
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TO: *Eyes Only Mr. McFarlane
 fm Schultz*

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PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 07784 211255Z
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BY COB NARA DATE 5/30/13

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

E. O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: ECON, UR
SUBJECT: STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE EXCHANGE

1. (U) AS YOU MAY RECALL, STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SRI) HAS AN ANNUAL JOINT SYMPOSIUM WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S INSTITUTE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO). THE NINTH SESSION HAS JUST ENDED IN MOSCOW, AND DESPITE THE TENSE BILATERAL CLIMATE, IT ONCE AGAIN PROVED TO BE A VALUABLE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.
2. ~~(C)~~ WE UNDERSTAND, ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, THAT SRI IS UNDER SOME PRESSURE FROM RICHARD PERLE TO DISCONTINUE THIS SERIES OF EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET ECONOMISTS. DEFENSE IS A MAJOR CUSTOMER OF SRI, SO SRI TAKES PERLE'S VIEW SERIOUSLY.
3. ~~(C)~~ THIS HIGH-QUALITY, UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE IS, VIEW, PRECISELY THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR WHICH WE SHOULD CONTINUE. THE SRI/IMEMO EXCHANGE NOT ONLY HELPS TO GET INFORMED AMERICAN VIEWS THROUGH TO

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40



PAGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 07784 211255Z

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SOVIET EXPERTS, THIS YEAR'S EXCHANGE DIRECTLY HELPED ME AND MY STAFF TO BROADEN OUR OWN CONTACTS AMONG THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS. THE US HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO LOSE BY IT.

4. (U) I WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND A WAY TO GET A MESSAGE TO SRI PRESIDENT WILLIAM F. MILLER. THE FOLLOWING POINTS COULD BE MADE IN YOUR BEHALF: BEGIN TEXT:

- -- AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HAS TOLD ME THAT SRI'S SYMPOSIUM WITH SOVIET ECONOMISTS IN MOSCOW WAS SUCCESSFUL. I GATHER YOUR OWN PARTICIPANTS FOUND IT VERY USEFUL.
 - -- THIS KIND OF UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE PERFORMS A GREAT SERVICE IN HELPING THE US PARTICIPANTS AND EMBASSY OBSERVERS TO STAY INFORMED ABOUT SOVIET VIEWS, AND HELPING TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM MISINTERPRETING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY -- PARTICULARLY NOW, WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE REDUCING CONTACTS WITH THE U.S.
 - -- HARTMAN ALSO WANTED ME TO MENTION THAT HE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED THE ENTREE WHICH THIS EXCHANGE GAVE HIM AND HIS STAFF TO A BROADER RANGE OF SOVIET ECONOMIC EXPERTS.
 - -- I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE THE SERIES. END TEXT.
- HARTMAN

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 27, 1984

FACT SHEET

U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

In his speech today to participate in the Smithsonian's Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, the President refers to several proposals we have made to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- New Exchanges Agreement: We have been discussing a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation and will present a draft to the Soviets for formal negotiations in the very near future. The previous agreement, often referred to as the "Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979. It was one of a series of two-year agreements going back to 1958. Our new draft would provide for presumptin of official support for inter alia exchanges of major exhibits, academic, cultural, and sports individuals and groups, and reactivation of film presentations. The American team in the formal negotiations will be headed by Ambassador Arthur Hartman in Moscow. #

-- New Consulates General: In 1974 the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to establish new Consulates General in Kiev and New York City. We already have a Consulate General in Leningrad and the Soviets have one in San Francisco. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. Government suspended the agreement for new consulates General. At the time of teh suspension, we had had an advance team in ¶Kiev fornearly twoyers and were approximately six months away from officially opening the Consulate. The Soviets had a similar team in New York. Both advance teams were withdrawn. Since that time, we have discussed the consultates issue on numerous occasions, focusing over the past year on concrete steps that could be taken to pave the way for opening these consulates. We have recently proposed to move forward and suggested we send a team to Kiev to inspect available property.

-- Environmental Protection Agreement: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection was signed at Moscow May 23, 1987. Activities under the Agreement have included seminars, joint publications, exchange visits, and joint projects in several topics including protecting endangered species, modeling of long-range air pollution, and earthquake prediction. EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S. co-chairmanship of the Joint Environmental Committee and will seek to use this forum as a means to reinvigorate the Agreement. Mr. Ruckelshaus is currently representing the United States at the Multilateral Conference on the Environment in Munich, where he has discussed the Agreement with Soviet officials.

-- Housing: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction was signed by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin on June 28, 1974, in Moscow. The Administrations decided in December 1983 to renew the Agreement for a third five-year period effective June 28, 1984. Besides exchange visits and seminars, the Agreement has supported joint projects in construction techniques in extreme climates and unusual geological conditions, sewage treatment in a permafrost environment, and fire prevention in the design of construction materials. The President's decision to expand the activities under the Agreement will lead to the convening of the first Joint Housing Committee meeting since 1978 and to an increase in the already extensive private sector involvement in joint projects. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce, will lead our efforts under this agreement.

-- Health: The United States and the Soviet Union entered into cooperation in the health area through two agreements signed in the early 1970s: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development (signed at Moscow June 28, 1974 by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health Agreement has been extended until May 23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart Agreement will run until June 28, 1987. The President has directed that steps be taken in the near future to strengthen cooperation under these

agreements through a renewal of high-level visits, joint committee meetings, and the initiation of new projects and possibly new agreements. The timing for such steps has not yet been set. The agreements have provided for joint research inter alia on laser treatment of glaucoma, congenital heart disease, mechanically assisted circulation in artificial hearts, and cancer treatment and prevention.

-- Agriculture: Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Foreign Minister Fromyko, the Agriculture Agreement has been extended three times and will not expire until June 19, 1988. The Department of Agriculture will now reactivate the Agreement which has been dormant the past several years through a Joint Committee meeting, high-level visits, and initiation of new projects. Earlier, the Agreement had supported plant, animal, and soil science research (germ plasm studies) and exchange of grain-related economic information. Exchange visits, especially those involving the private sector, had been particularly active. All of these programs will be reinvigorated.

-- Fishing Agreement: In April, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement (GIFA) for eighteen months (as opposed to the two previous 12 month extensions). Final approval is currently pending before Congress. The Fisheries agreement was initially signed in November 1976. The Soviet Union does not, however, have a directed fishing allocation. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States terminated allocations to the USSR to fish within our 200-mile zone. (The Soviet Union had been receiving a directed allocation of between 400,000 and 500,000 MT a year.) Soviet processing at sea of U.S-caught fish as part of an existing joint venture was allowed to continue since it benefited U.S. fishermen. The U.S. is currently reviewing the U.S.-USSR fishing relationship to determine whether mutually beneficial steps can be taken to increase cooperation.

-- Long-Term Cooperation Agreement: The U.S. has proposed to extend for ten years the U.S.-USSR Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. The Agreement was signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974 Moscow Summit. It is scheduled to expire June 28, 1984. The principal

provisions of the Agreement call upon the parties to use their good offices to facilitate cooperation in economic, industrial, and technical areas. In practice, the Agreement has been exclusively economic and has facilitated certain business dealings between the two countries. If the Agreement is extended, our expectation is that there will be a meeting of the Working Group of Experts under Article III to examine prospects for trade. If that meeting is successful, then a Joint Commercial Commission meeting will be held when practical.

-- U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA): The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea established certain "rules of the road" to govern special situations involving naval surface vessels and aircraft of the two nations. It also set up agreed-upon navy-to-navy channels for the prompt resolution of any problems arising under this agreement. Senior officers of the U. S. and Soviet Navies meet on an annual basis for a general review of the implementation of the agreement and discussion of ways in which it might be strengthened. The most recent review took place in Moscow in late May. At that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA agreement for another three years.

-- World Oceans Agreement: The World Oceans Agreement was signed in 1973 and renewed for three years in 1981. It has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research and has involved seminars, exchange visits, and joint ocean research cruises. The agreement comes up for renewal in December.

-- Maritime Boundary: The United States and the Soviet Union have a difference relating to the precise cartographic depiction and location of the 1867 Convention. (This is the line established by the 1867 Convention ceding Alaska.) The difference relates to the fact that the U.S. depicts the 1867 Convention Line as the maritime boundary by arcs of great circles, while the Soviet Union depicts the Convention Line by rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution to the issue. Three rounds of technical level discussions have been held and a fourth round is expected soon.

-- Space Rescue Mission: The U. S. proposal envisages cooperation between NASA and Soviet space officials on a joint simulated space rescue mission. A space shuttle would rendezvous with the Soviet space station to practice procedures that would be necessary to rescue each other's personnel. Details of the proposal would remain to be worked out.

-- Consular Review Talks: The session of U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks (CRT) currently underway in Moscow is the latest round of a series of discussions which began in 1976, when representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met to attempt to resolve a number of consular issues outstanding between the two countries. Those issues primarily involved visa questions and administrative matters relating to the functioning of our diplomatic missions. CRT discussions have taken place in Moscow in 1976, and in Washington in 1979 and 1983.

-- Search and Rescue Talks: In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard was authorized to take the initiative to open direct lines of emergency communications with the Soviet maritime rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a result of subsequent exchanges in June 1983, agreement was reached to hold a working level meeting on a broad range of search and rescue topics. This meeting was scheduled for early December 1983, but was postponed at the request of the Soviet side. We have proposed rescheduling this meeting.

-- U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements Talks: On the basis of the President's proposals of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with Soviet counterparts three times to discuss possible means by which U.S.-Soviet communications -- for use in both times of crisis and clam -- might be strengthened. The most recent meeting was in Moscow in late April. On the basis of those talks, significant progress has been made in working out agreement with the Soviets on the desirability of upgrading the existing Direct Communications Line (the Hotline) with secure facsimile transmission capabilities, which would increase the speed, reliability and versatility of that system. We expect another meeting shortly. Additionally, the U.S. side has put forward proposals to upgrade the communications capabilities of U.S. and Soviet embassies in each

other'scountreis, to establish a Joint Military Communications Link to handle the exchange of time-sensitive technical data, and to facilitate consultations in the event of anuclear terrorist threat or incident.

-- U.S.-Soviet Military Contact: With the exception of the special navy-to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA Agreement, therehas been no channel for high-level military exchange between the U.S. and Soviet Union outside of specifically arms control-related talks since the one-time meeting of the Secretary of Defense and Chief of the Joint Staff with their Soviet counterparts during the 1979 Vienna Summit. Earlier this year, the President suggested to the Soviet leadership the desirability of exploring the possibility of regularizing some form of contact and discussion between those responsible for defense matters on both sides for the purpose of increasing mutual understanding and minimizing the potential for misinterpretation and miscalculation.

-- Human Rights Cases:

- ANDREI SAKHAROV: Dr. Andrei Sakharov, a physicist and Academy of Sciences member played a major role in the development of the Soviet atomicbomb, has spoken out at length in defense ofhuman rights in the Soviet Union. In 1975 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts. Since 1980 he has been required to live in internal exile in the closed city of Gorky. In early Mayhe began a hunger strike to obtain permission forhis wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for necessary medical treatment; there has been no confirmed information of any sort on his health or his status since that time.

- YELENA BONNER: A doctor by training, Dr. Yelena Bonner is the wife of Sakharov, and was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. Shehas served as his main channel of communications to the outside world during his exile inGorky. She is also believed to have begun ahunger strike in erly May to obtain permission to travel abroad for vital medical treatment; she suffersfrom both a heart condition and serious eye problems.

- Yuriy Orlov: A founder and leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy Orlov was long active on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was a founding member of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and a participant in unofficial scientific seminars organized for refusenik scientists. He was arrested in February 1977 and convicted in May 1978 of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Earlier this year he completed seven years in a strict-regime labor camp and began five years of internal exile.

- ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY:

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on behalf of human rights and Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. A founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the Jewish emigration movement and a liaison between Western newsmen and Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was arrested and in July 1978 was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "treason". He is currently in Chistopol' Prison; his wife, Avital, lives in Israel.