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File Folder USSR (7/25/84-7/31/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172694	MEMO	J. POINDEXTER TO M. ARMACOST RE SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON	1	8/14/1984	B1
	R	6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-1-7			
172696	MEMO	FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM	1	8/9/1984	B1
	PAR	1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-2-6			
172697	MEMO	W. CASEY TO BUD RE THE ATTACHED	1	8/9/1984	B1
	R	1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-2-6			
172699	REPORT	SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON	7	8/7/1984	B1
	PAR	1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-2-6			
172700	MEMO	P. DUR TO R. MCFARLANE RE THE SOVIETS AND LEBANON	1	8/13/1984	B1
172702	MEMO	J. POINDEXTER TO W. CASEY RE THE SOVIETS AND LEBANON	1	7/27/1984	B1
	R	1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-4-4			
172703	FORM	NSC DISTRIBUTION RECORD	1	7/27/1984	B1
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172706	MEMO	P. DUR TO R. MCFARLANE RE THE SOVIETS AND LEBANON	2	7/25/1984	B1
172708	MEMO	C. HILL TO D. GREGG RE BUSH'S JULY 27 MEETING WITH ALEKSEY SEMYONOV	3	7/26/1984	B1
		R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-7-1			
172709	CABLE	MOSCOW 9528	2	7/28/1984	B1
		R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-8-0			
172711	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS	1	7/31/1984	B1
		R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-10-9-9			

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Subject: Soviet Policy Lebanon

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NLRR 74825A-10-17

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward Lebanon (U)

At Tab A is an intelligence assessment on this subject prepared at our request by the Central Intelligence Agency. The assessment suggests there is some likelihood of an initiative in the UN which could coincide with the expiration of the current UNIFIL mandate. (S)

In view of the potential ramifications of such an initiative, and the broader implications of heightened Soviet activity in Lebanon, it would be useful if the State Department could convene and chair an interagency group to consider our options for dealing with Soviet policy toward Lebanon. (S)



J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

Tab A - Interagency Intelligence Assessment

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172696 MEMO

1 8/9/1984 B1

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172697 MEMO

1 8/9/1984 B1

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

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
84 AUG 9 P 5: 31

9 August 1984

Dear Bud,

I forward herewith a copy of an Interagency Intelligence Assessment on "Soviet Policy Toward Lebanon." As you requested, it deals with recent Soviet activities toward that country, both directly and in the broader regional context. It also discusses the relationship that Soviet policies toward Lebanon bear toward Soviet-Syrian relations.

Yours,


William J. Casey

Enclosure

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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172699	REPORT SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON	7	8/7/1984	B1

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
7 August 1984SOVIET POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

DECLASSIFIED REPORT

NLR 0851

BY CU NARA DATE 1/13/12Summary

Recent Soviet contacts with Lebanese factional and governmental leaders represent an effort by Moscow to capitalize on US setbacks in Lebanon and the fluid situation there. Lebanon still does not occupy a high priority in the USSR's Middle Eastern policy, but the US military withdrawal and the formation of a new government have opened opportunities for the Soviets to build contacts there. Ideally, the Soviets would like to see some kind of leftist coalition emerge that would serve their interests independent of Syria but they are not sanguine about the prospects. Assets for the Soviets in Lebanon become more important as uncertainty about President Assad's health grows. 25

Moscow thus far is being careful not to overstep itself and antagonize Damascus, which jealously protects its predominant position in Lebanon. The increased Soviet activity risks reviving underlying Soviet-Syrian differences over Lebanon but such frictions are likely to be manageable. The Syrians, moreover, have the assets to undermine Soviet moves in Lebanon if necessary. The USSR is also concerned that tensions in Lebanon not increase to the point of sparking Syrian-Israeli hostilities, which would risk drawing the Soviet air defense forces in Syria into the fighting, endanger the Soviet military buildup of Syria and cause another loss of Soviet prestige. 25

During the next few months, the Soviets will attempt to manipulate Arab resentment over the continuing Israeli presence in southern Lebanon to embarrass the US. The renewal of the UNIFIL mandate in October provides an opportunity for such an effort. The Soviets, in principle, oppose the expansion of UNIFIL, but they may suggest to the Lebanese that they would consider the idea, calculating that if the issue is brought before the Security Council the US would be forced to veto. Moscow, however, will follow Damascus' lead on the issue, as it did when the issue was debated in the UN earlier this year. The Syrians may prefer to leave UNIFIL as is fearing that its expansion would complicate their efforts to impose a solution on Lebanon and its removal would lift some constraints on Israeli options in southern Lebanon and increase the risk of a Syrian-Israeli clash. On balance, however, they will probably not foreclose their options on this issue. 25

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for NES. It was drafted by CIA and coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, State/INR, and NSA. Information as of 7 August 1984 was used in preparing the assessment.

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Leftist Lebanese factional leaders hope to use Moscow's increased interest in Lebanon to bolster their own power. Most take their direction from Damascus, however, and will consult the Syrians about greater cooperation with the Soviets. Lebanese governmental leaders probably will carefully respond to Soviet overtures for fear of a Christian backlash, and because they understand that Soviet freedom of action and leverage are distinctly limited. [REDACTED]

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More Active Soviet Role

1. The Soviets, in an attempt to build their influence in Lebanon, have increased contacts with the Lebanese Government and with factional leaders since the US Marines withdrew from Beirut and President Gemayel abrogated the 17 May 1983 Lebanese-Israeli agreement in February and March respectively. They have:

- Sent the CPSU's top Middle Eastern specialist, Karen Brutents, in April to Lebanon, where he met with Gemayel and other Lebanese leaders.
- Reported formation of the Arab Democratic Union to coordinate among Soviet supported elements and the more radical elements.
- Praised Prime Minister Karami's new government in May and sent him a message from the Soviet Council of Ministers.
- Hosted visits in July by Druze leader Junblatt and Shia Amal chief Barri.
- Sent the head of the Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, Vladimir Polyakov, to Beirut in early August.

Moscow may also be seeking to develop a modest military relationship with the new government. It suggested that a Soviet military official accompany Polyakov, according to the Lebanese Charge in Moscow, but Beirut refused. []

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2. In addition, the USSR has kept up its traditional ties with leftist factions, such as the Lebanese Communist Party. The Soviets consult closely with LCP General Secretary Hawi and presumably encouraged the party's move in June to create a "National Democratic Front" with Junblatt's Progressive Socialist Party and other, minor, Lebanese factions. []

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3. This stepped-up activity coincides with a broader Soviet effort to improve ties with other moderate Arab states, such as Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait. The Soviets are trying to capitalize on Arab frustration with US policy. Their probings in Lebanon are an attempt to take advantage of the US failure to arrange an internal Lebanese settlement. They evidently hope to rebuild the smaller leftist factions whose power has been curtailed since the beginning of the civil war and Syrian intervention in 1975-76. Moscow also appears to be seeking to develop its own ties--independent of Damascus--with the more important Lebanese factional and governmental leaders. The Kremlin has long sought independent lines of influence in Lebanon and probably believes there is a greater necessity to establish these now, with the uncertain health of Syrian President Assad and the possibility of leadership instability in Damascus. The Soviets, however, are likely to pursue such contacts carefully to avoid alienating Syria, realizing that Syrian influence with Lebanese leaders is far greater than theirs, and that the Moscow-Damascus relationship is of paramount importance. []

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~~SECRET~~Lebanon in Soviet Middle Eastern Strategy

4. Lebanon is important to the Soviets because of the Palestinian and Syrian presence and the US interest in it rather than for its intrinsic significance. They do not have vital interests at stake there. They have sought influence with both the central government and the factions but have never been a major actor. Similarly, the Soviets have attempted-- unsuccessfully--to play some role in the international efforts to resolve the Lebanese problem. This has stemmed more from a desire to head off a US-brokered solution and find another entree into Middle Eastern affairs than a genuine interest in getting involved in the Lebanese quagmire. The Soviets fear that successful US mediation of the Lebanese problem would enhance Washington's capabilities for brokering a broader Arab-Israeli peace settlement that left no role for the USSR. []

25;

5. Although Moscow's long-term objective may be the establishment of a leftist, pro-Soviet regime in Lebanon, it has no illusions that this is likely to occur soon. More realistically, it probably hopes that leftist groups can increase their voice in Lebanese affairs and prod the central government toward closer ties with the USSR. A primary Soviet aim is to ensure that the government is not closely tied to the US or Israel. The Soviets have long opposed partition because they fear it would lead to the creation of Christian and Muslim mini-states dominated by Israel and Syria, respectively. []

25;

6. The USSR has benefited, at times, from tensions in Lebanon, most notably from the fighting in and around Beirut in late 1983-early 1984 that led to the withdrawal of the MNF. The Soviets gained a propaganda windfall from the US military intervention against Lebanese factions and the eventual abrupt pull-out of the Marines. They also exploit the continuing Israeli presence in southern Lebanon to rally Arab opinion against Israel and the US. []

25X1 7. Nonetheless, turmoil in Lebanon has created almost as many problems as opportunities for Moscow, including acts of violence directed against Soviet facilities. Soviet influence in the country, never great, dwindled once the civil war began. The Soviets' relations with Damascus were severely strained by the Syrian intervention in 1976 and by their inability to prevent Israel's June 1982 defeat of Syrian forces in Lebanon. Moscow realizes that, as long as Syrian and Israeli forces sit only a short distance apart in the Bekaa Valley, the risks remain high of another war, into which it might be drawn. The presence of Soviet forces manning the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles in Syria and the likelihood that they would become involved in a major Syrian-Israeli war in Lebanon makes the limitation of tensions all the more important to the USSR. The likely future turnover of control of the SA-5s to the Syrians will decrease Soviet stakes, but the remaining extensive Soviet involvement would continue to give Moscow good reason for wanting to avoid major hostilities. []

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The Syrian Factor

8. The increased Soviet commitment to Syria--reflected by the presence of the SA-5 units--highlights the central position Damascus occupies in Moscow's Middle Eastern policy and strongly suggests that the Kremlin, while probing to build independent influence in Lebanon, will continue deferring to the Assad regime there. Soviet-Syrian views on how to proceed tactically in Lebanon apparently are closer than they have been in years. The Soviets praised Syria's role at the Lausanne Conference and after in putting together a government of national unity. Soviet officials also have emphasized in public over the last year that Damascus has legitimate security interests in Lebanon--something Moscow has not made explicit in the past.

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9. Soviet-Syrian differences persist, however, over broader strategy toward Lebanon. A Soviet Defense Ministry briefing earlier this year, for example, reportedly stated that Moscow still does not want to see Lebanon dominated by Damascus and hopes that Syrian troops eventually are removed. The Soviets evidently also have made it clear to Assad that they do not consider themselves obligated to protect the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During periods of tensions, Soviet public statement of support for Syria invariably omit any hint that the Kremlin will defend the Syrian presence there.

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10. Future Soviet-Syrian frictions might arise over a number of issues concerning Lebanon. Syria's desire to involve the United States in brokering alternate security arrangements for southern Lebanon could lead to the most significant differences. Moscow would not want to see Washington score a major diplomatic success while the USSR was left on the sidelines and thus might press the Syrians to move discussion of the issue to a UN forum. The Soviets would have little choice, however, but to acquiesce if Syria proved determined to involve the US, and, in this case, they could only hope that Washington's efforts backfire and lead to another setback to US interests in Lebanon.

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11. Additional frictions in Soviet-Syrian relations over Lebanon, while unlikely to be major, could develop over the issue of expanding or curtailing the mandate of UN forces in Lebanon. The Syrians also would not countenance an aggressive Soviet effort to develop an independent power base in Lebanon and probably would use their own Lebanese surrogates to hinder Soviet attempts. Moscow, in turn, would argue against a Syrian decision to put significantly greater pressure on Israeli forces in Lebanon, fearing this would risk renewed hostilities.

251

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251

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 13^{25:}Lebanese Response to Soviet Overtures

12. The Lebanese set policy only after close consultation with the Syrians, and talks between Beirut and Damascus presumably cover Soviet-Lebanese ties. Junblatt and Barri, for example, stopped off in Damascus after their separate visits to Moscow in July. Government leaders in Beirut do not appear to be alarmed by Soviet contacts in Lebanon and probably view Soviet activities as part of a tandem effort with Syria to impose stability and get Israeli troops out of the south. [redacted] 25:

13. Karami's recent public statement that he has no qualms about purchasing Soviet military equipment probably is a ploy to encourage the US to be more forthcoming in training and equipping the Lebanese Armed Forces. Lebanese leaders are sensitive to the potential Christian backlash if the government moves too far in its ties with Moscow. In any case, apart from ammunition for a few Soviet artillery pieces acquired in the 1970s, the LAF has no current need for Soviet arms, except as a political gesture to assert Lebanon's non-aligned status. [redacted] 25:

Implications for the United States

14. Lebanon is unlikely to become a high priority area for Moscow. Soviet policy in the Middle East will continue to place greater emphasis on Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, the Palestinian issue and the broader Arab-Israeli peace process. We can expect the Soviets, however, to continue to be more active in Lebanese affairs than in recent years, especially if the Lebanese Government responds positively to their approaches. Arab diplomats in Moscow believe that Karami will soon visit the USSR, although this has not been confirmed. The Soviets will attempt to exploit such contacts, probably with minimal success, to undercut US-Lebanese relations and increase pressure for Israeli withdrawal from the south. They will portray the continued Israeli presence to Arab audiences as a result of US designs to prevent the creation of a unified "Arab Lebanon" and will attempt to claim credit for any Israeli withdrawal. [redacted] 25:

15. Moscow may well use the issue of UNIFIL's presence in the south to embarrass the US. UNIFIL's six-month mandate expires on 19 October, and, as usual, its future will be debated in the UN in the preceding weeks. During the last mandate renewal debate in April, the Soviets attempted to limit extension of UNIFIL's mandate to three months and hedged on the Lebanese Government's idea of expanding UNIFIL's area of operation. They let the US bear the onus, however, for scuttling the expansion idea, and, ultimately, the mandate was renewed with no changes for the usual six months. The Kremlin is again likely to try to maneuver the US into appearing obstructive. Although the Soviets oppose, in principle, the use of UN forces in internal security situations, they might, for instance, hint to Lebanese leaders that they would favorably consider the idea of expanding UNIFIL in the south, a scheme for which Nabih Barri has been lobbying. [redacted] 25X

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 25:

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

14 253

16. The Soviets, even if they decided that Barri's scheme was the best way to undercut the US and get the Israelis out, would not seriously push for it unless Syria agreed--which is highly unlikely. Recent reports indicate Damascus wants the Lebanese Army to expand its area of control and eventually draw up a detailed plan for deployment to the south in order to deprive Israel of the justification for its presence. Conversely, the Syrians probably would also oppose a plan to end the UNIFIL mandate before the LAF is ready for an expanded role. The Syrians' past support for UNIFIL suggests they believe its presence imposes some constraints on Israeli policy options. [REDACTED]

253

17. Despite a probable Soviet aim of increasing influence in Lebanon without butting heads with Syria, Moscow's more active stance is bound to lead to some frictions with Damascus. We believe, however, that these will remain manageable, primarily because the Soviets are likely to back off rather than risk souring their relationship with the Assad regime. The one issue with the potential to create serious differences is a Syrian willingness to engage the US in arranging a Lebanese settlement. Moscow has had to countenance this in the past, and the extent of its concern will depend upon how well Damascus keeps it informed about such negotiations with the US. Whatever their concern, the Soviets would be hard pressed to block a US-Syrian agreement on Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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August 14, 1984

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Kay
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1 7/27/1984 B1

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July 27, 1984


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Soviets and Lebanon (U)

Recent reports suggest that the visits of Lebanese Ministers, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri to Moscow may have prompted the Soviets to reassess their policy and objectives toward Lebanon. In the wake of the Israeli election and the closure of the Israeli Liaison office in Beirut, prospects for progress on a negotiated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon seem bleak. In short, we may soon have to contend with a Soviet initiative toward Lebanon, perhaps in the UN. (S)

In light of the above, it would be most useful if we could have a brief intelligence assessment of Soviet objectives in Lebanon. It would also be useful if the assessment would examine where Syrian and Soviet objectives may diverge and likely Syrian reactions to a more active Soviet role in Lebanon. (S)


for Robert C. McFarlane

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

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SIT

DOM

SUBJECT: Vice-President Bush's meeting with Andrei Sakharov's stepson, Aleksey Semyonov, July 27, 2:00 P.M.

Background

Sakharov family members in the United States have long desired a meeting at the highest level of the USG to press their case for increased activity on behalf of Dr. and Mrs. Sakharov, and the meeting with the Vice President will satisfy that wish. In the past, Sakharov family members have sometimes been critical of the USG for being too quick to give credence to Soviet assertions about the state of health of the Sakharovs, and they were long critical of our reluctance to release copies of the letters Mrs. Bonner had left with our Embassy officers on April 12. These issues have been resolved, however, by strong USG statements calling on the Soviets to prove their assertions, and by our agreement to release to the family one of the three letters, an appeal by Sakharov to friends throughout the world.

Based on our contacts with family friends, we expect that Aleksey Semyonov will seek the Vice President's agreement to an increased public effort on behalf of the Sakharovs, and will perhaps suggest that the USG consider trading a captured Soviet Bloc agent, such as Kostadinov (Bulgaria), Treholt (Norway), or Gerhard (South Africa) for Mrs. Bonner's travel abroad, a move which would end the crisis.

Status Update

On May 2nd, Sakharov began a hunger strike in Gor'kiy, his place of exile, to protest the Soviet authorities' refusal to allow his wife, Yelena Bonner, to go abroad for medical treatment. The Soviets then accused Bonner of slandering the Soviet state and threatened to charge her with treason, a crime punishable by death. Bonner reportedly joined Sakharov in the hunger strike on May 12th. However, there are unconfirmed reports that Mrs. Bonner was sighted earlier this month on a Gor'kiy street, in good health, accompanied by two KGB "escorts."

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- 2 -

Both Sakharov and Bonner have serious heart conditions, which their hunger strike has undoubtedly aggravated. While all of us hope that they are in satisfactory condition and receiving adequate medical care, there is no possibility of confirming Soviet assurances to this effect since Moscow has steadfastly refused to allow any independent observers to assess their condition.

Recent reports about Dr. Sakharov's health have been particularly disturbing. On July 10, both Keston College and UPI issued reports that Sakharov was being held in an isolated ward of the V. S. Semashko Hospital in Gor'kiy and treated with psychotropic drugs. During the last week, prominent Soviet dissidents have said that they have reason to believe that Sakharov and Bonner are being force-fed. Lev Kopelev, a Soviet writer, told a German radio correspondent on July 25 that reliable sources in Moscow had affirmed that Sakharov was being drugged.

U.S. Efforts on Behalf of the Sakharovs

We have repeatedly stressed to the Soviets the importance of a successful outcome of the Sakharov case for U.S.-Soviet relations. Through diplomatic channels, the U.S. government has sought to encourage a more forthcoming Soviet response. Before the hunger strike began, Under Secretary Eagleburger warned Ambassador Dobrynin about its potential effects on our relations. Secretary Shultz has raised the Sakharov case with Dobrynin on a number of occasions. We have also sounded out the Soviets concerning the possibility of a trade for the Sakharovs, thus far without result. Publically, President Reagan has referred to the case on several occasions, most recently on July 17th, when he called attention to the tragic fate of Sakharov and Bonner and stated "The world demands to know the fate of these two good and courageous people."

Many nations share our outrage and concern over the plight of the Sakharovs. Ambassador Walter Stoessel has just returned from a second mission on the President's behalf to focus attention on Soviet human rights issues. He spoke with government officials and opinion makers in France, West Germany, Denmark and Switzerland about the status of the Sakharovs, and all agreed that their condition was a matter of serious concern and required continued Western action and attention.

The U.S. Congress has also involved itself with the Sakharov case. On June 29, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions expressing the sense of Congress that the Soviet Union should come forth with specific information as to the whereabouts, health and legal status of Sakharov and

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- 3 -

Bonner. Several Senators have also expressed an interest in renaming the portion of 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where the Soviet Embassy is located "Andrei Sakharov Avenue." While this last measure is certainly well-intended, we cannot support it because it not only would it violate D.C. law but it would also clearly conflict with our responsibility under the Vienna Convention to "prevent impairment of dignity" of foreign missions in Washington and lead to Soviet retaliation.

Private organizations and individuals have also been trying to help the Sakharovs. The Andrei Sakharov Institute, for example, has established a campaign in Europe, Canada and the United States to save the lives of Sakharov and Bonner. The National Academy of Sciences recently cancelled talks with its Soviet counterpart (of which Andrei Sakharov is a member) to set up a new exchange agreement to express their concern for Sakharov.

Future Efforts

The Vice-President can reassure Semyonov that the U.S. government is doing everything in its power to press the Soviets for independent confirmation of the Sakharovs' status; to involve its allies in focussing international attention on their plight; and to encourage private organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences and the Andrei Sakharov Institute to continue their efforts on their behalf. If he presses for trading offers, the Vice President should say that this is not something he is in a position to discuss, but can add that it is certainly among the options we have considered, although there is unfortunately little reason to expect the Soviets to respond positively. Suggested talking points for the Vice-President's use are attached.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

172709

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 9528
SIT454 AN009311

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TOR: 210/1410Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SHUL VP SIT EOB /010
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BY 6013

DATE 6/5/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0757

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 09528

NODIS
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S JULY 27 LETTER TO CHERNENKO DELIVERED
REF: STATE 222775

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN THE ABSENCE OF HIGHER-LEVEL MFA OFFICIALS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON JULY 28 HANDED OVER TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JULY 27 LETTER TO CHERNENKO, ALONG WITH NEW USG DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT ON VIENNA TALKS, TO USA DEPT SENIOR DEPUTY TARASENKO. STRESSING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESIDENT'S APPROACH, POLCOUNS MADE THE POINTS TRANSMITTED PARA TWO REFTEL.
3. TARASENKO READ THE LETTER AND DRAFT STATEMENT AND TOOK CAREFUL NOTES ON TALKING POINTS. HIS ONLY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT WAS TO NOTE THE USE OF THE TERM "MILITARIZATION OF SPACE" IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND PREVIOUS USG CORRESPONDENCE. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, HE NOTED, RELATED TO "PREVENTING"

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 9528

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THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE. HE HOPED THIS WAS ONLY A PROBLEM OF TRANSLATION. POLCOUNS SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT BEYOND THE ORAL POINTS HE HAD CONVEYED.

4. TARASENKO UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND DRAFT STATEMENT TO THE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. HE ASSURED POLCOUNS THEY WOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY.

HARTMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

35
ID 8490845

UN ~~SECRET~~ UPON REMOVAL
F CLASS ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 31 JUL 84 13

TO

McFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOC DATE 31 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

EXCHANGES

FISHING

SUBJECT: US - USSR BILATERAL ISSUES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

McFARLANE

COMMENTS

RLF#

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(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C AUG 03 1984	McFarlane noted		Jm

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

AF

System # II

ED Package # 90845

1270

36

UL31 P 1:16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>		<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt		<u>AB</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room	<u>4</u>	<u>DO</u>	<u>DACOM</u> <u>to Bud</u>

<u>I</u> = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

John: Bud called, and I passed to him the info in paragraph #1. Also decided to DACOM this prior to your return.

84 JUL 31 P 1: 28

#90845 37

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

1/25/16 CDB

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

PAGES

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 78

RELEASER

PRIORITY

NON-SECURE FAX #

DTG

ROUTINE

TTY #

311812Z JUL 84

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

ML 1. TOM SHULL FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE / SANTA BARBARA / SITTO # 71 / 311827Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

#90845

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CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172711

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DECLASSIFIED

July 31, 1984

NLRR 148-254-10-49

INFORMATIONBY CDR NARA DATE 6/5/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

U.S.-Soviet Bilaterals: Consular Review Talks,
Fishing and Other

In response to your note, you should know that conclusion of the consular review talks has been postponed once again, until tomorrow, August 1. The Embassy, however, feels that the cause of the delay is not political but was the result of the fact that the Soviet official who was to sign (Bessmertnykh) was out of town.

The Soviets have continued to address some of the comparatively minor bilateral measures. Sokolov came in this morning at his request to see Mark Palmer, at which time he delivered a note which makes final the arrangements for a limited fishing quota for the Soviets (that is, they accepted the obligation to buy an equivalent amount of fish from American fishermen). Dobrynin told Hartman in Moscow that the Soviets were working seriously on the navigation aids proposal before ICAO. Also, Sokolov conveyed Soviet agreement to a proposal we had made to hold bilateral talks on the protection of seals. Regarding the cultural exchanges agreement, Sokolov said the problem was that several of their key people are on vacation in August, and asked unofficially whether early September would be acceptable to us for the start of negotiations.

During Sokolov's call, Palmer took the occasion to tell him that he hoped his government understood the seriousness of our approach to Vienna and would respond in an equally serious vein. Sokolov said he had no instructions on the matter but that personally he thought there were "significant new elements" in our position.

In sum, it would appear that the Soviets have decided to proceed in reasonably businesslike fashion on some of the bilateral issues. At the moment, it would seem that a decision has not yet been made to write off the Vienna proposal totally, but I believe that we will see, at a minimum, further efforts to move our position on the talks closer to theirs.

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Declassify: OADR