

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Green, Max:
Files, 1985-1988
Folder Title: [Arms Control Treaty -
December 1987] (3 of 7)
Box: 4

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

APPENDIX A

Date: August 17, 19.
Time: 12:30-12:45 p.m.
Place: Soviet Embassy,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: U. S. USSR

Mr. Paul H. Nitze
Dr. Harold Brown

Academician A. N. Shchukin

< 2. Brown asked Shchukin what his reaction was to Article 6 which we had presented today. Had we made it clear that in the first paragraph we were talking about a ban on the deployment, but not on the development and testing, of future kinds of systems, not using the usual components? Shchukin replied he would have to look at the text carefully. Nitze pointed out that Shchukin himself had raised the possibility of future kinds of systems in informal conversations.

Shchukin said that there might be some difficulty in getting the politicians and diplomats to consider this problem, because if one could not point to specific systems in or near development status, the politicians and diplomats would probably not be interested in future possibilities. Brown said that such a ban on present ABM systems ten years ago would have eased our present problems. Shchukin said that in 1961 ABM missiles and radars already existed, so he disagreed. Brown said that in that case, fifteen years ago would have been the right time. Shchukin's reaction was that it might be all right to include such a ban, but the whole subject was not very important. The wording and terminology covering such things, would have to be determined in the end by the diplomats, advised by the rest of us.

1. Persons Present:

Amb. Smith
Parsons
Nitze
Allison
Garthoff
Graybeal
Shaw
Stoertz
Weiler
Aldridge
S. Smith
Twombly
Germond
Lavroff

Min. Semenov
Ogarkov
Shchukin
Pleshakov
Grinevsky
Kishilov
Gryzlov
Afonsky
Karpov
Skoptsov
Perfilyev
Baranovsky
Buyanov
Fayekov

The proposals of the Soviet Union proceed from the premise that those systems of each side should be limited, that were specially developed to counter strategic ballistic missiles and their components in flight trajectory.

Taking this into account, the obligations of the sides would extend to long-range acquisition radars, tracking and ABM guidance radars, ABM launchers and ABMs.

Further, agreed quantitative limitations of launchers and ABMs would be established, as well as limitations on the maximum distance of ABM systems from the center of the target defended.

Obviously, it is precisely these components, taken together, that constitute an ABM defense system. Therefore, it is enough to extend the obligations of the sides to the totality of the above-mentioned components in order to solve the problem of limiting the deployment of ABM systems effectively and reliably.

US/USSR MINI-PLenary MEETING NO. 8
US Embassy, 1100 hours, August 24, 1971

Persons Present

Ambassador Smith
Ambassador Farley
Parsons
Nitze
Brown
Allison
Graybeal
Ifft
Krimer

Minister Semenov
Shchukin
Trusov
Timerbaev
Kishilov
Anyutin
Paekov

Academician Shchukin said that it was his view that as a result of the negotiations the sides had achieved an understanding that limitations should cover such systems of ABM defense as radars, launchers, and ABM interceptor missiles. In this both sides proceeded from the premise that these systems could be detected by national technical means, could be distinguished from other systems, and so on. In other words the treaty should have for its subject ABM systems which could be technically described and determined and therefore could be controlled by national technical means.

On August 17, the US Delegation introduced new language for Article 6. It is proposed in Paragraph 1 that the sides be obligated not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars to perform the functions of these components. This is an entirely new provision and the Soviet side is not clear on its meaning and substance. What did the US have in mind in speaking of such ABM systems and such devices?

Ambassador Smith replied that this was an important point and he wished to give it some study before replying. The US side would certainly reply to this question. The question had been so short that perhaps the Soviet side wished to keep the floor.

Minister Semenov observed that the length of a question was not determined by the number of words it contained.

Ambassador Smith said that he was more concerned about depth than about length.

Minister Semenov said that he would give the floor again to Academician Shchukin.

Academician Shchukin said that he had another question relating to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6. He had just spoken about the prohibition on the development of some kinds of ABM systems. Article 2 of the US draft also contained a paragraph to the effect that limitations should extend to cover ABM systems undergoing development. Would it be possible for the US to clarify its understanding of the notion of "development" and of the practical application of limitations at this stage?

Ambassador Smith said the US side would undertake to answer this question also.

Academician Shchukin asked what the US side had in mind with regard to the manner of verifying development to ensure confidence in compliance with the above provision, if it were accepted by the sides. He was using the term "development" in the sense that it was usually used in the Russian language.

Ambassador Smith said that the US side would be glad to clarify this trinity of questions. >

Persons Present

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Farley	Shchukin
Nitze	Trusov
Brown	Karpov
Allison	Fackov
Garthoff	
Krimer	

Minister Semenov noted that paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the US draft was new, and contained a new concept of limiting devices other than ABM launchers, missiles, and radars. He said the Soviet side would study the considerations put forward by Dr. Brown in that connection. But, he continued, it was his impression that it was doubtful if it properly applied to the subject matter of an agreement on ABM limitation.

Ambassador Smith remarked that if such future systems were not covered, uncertainties would increase, and the result would be an arms race in other ABM systems with the opposite result from that which we sought in an arms control agreement. He noted that the US and USSR had agreed in the Outer Space Treaty and the Seabeds Treaty to ban various future weapons of mass destruction in its environments. Why should we make an exception in the present case?

Minister Semenov said that he would comment at a later time. In the meantime, he proposed assigning paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Article V(B) of the Soviet draft) to the Ad Hoc Committee. Ambassador Smith agreed.

We would like to respond at this time to the questions posed by Academician Shchukin in connection with Article 6 of the US text.

With regard to paragraph 1 of our Article 6, Academician Shchukin asked what is meant by "ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components." By this we refer to any present or future system which employs other means or devices to perform the functions of interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars in rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory. Our objective in this Article 6 is to establish a commitment that neither side will deploy ABM systems--including possible future types of ABM systems--which might not use ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars. Surely we would not want an agreement which would permit either side to deploy an ABM system both thick and nationwide simply because the system did not use interceptors, launchers, or radars. Paragraph 1 of Article 6 is an undertaking not to do so, thus preventing systems or components using such new concepts from being used to circumvent the ABM agreement.

[Academician Shchukin noted that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6, as well as paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the US text, refer to limitations on "development." In this connection, he asked for our views on the meaning of "development" and the practicality of limitations on development. By "development" we have in mind that stage in the evolution of a weapon system which follows research (in research we include the activities of conceptual design and laboratory testing) and which precedes full-scale testing. The development stage, though often overlapping with research, is usually associated with the construction and testing of one or more prototypes of the weapon system or its major components. In our view, it is entirely logical and practical to prohibit the development--in this sense--of those systems whose testing and deployment are prohibited.]

HELSINKI, FINLAND

Date: August 31, 1961
Time: 1155 to 1255
Place: U.S. Embassy,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

USSR

Captain W. O. McLean
Lt Col F. P. DeSimone

Lt Gen K. A. Trusov
VAdm P. V. Sinetsky
Col V. N. Anyutin
Mr. Yu. K. Bardin

Trusov said that he would like to return to clarification of paragraph 1, Article 6 of the U.S. draft ABM Agreement which General Allison had promised him at the end of their last conversation. He wanted to know what we had in mind when we spoke of an ABM system which does not include launchers, interceptor missiles and radars, and asked for an example. I told him that I could not give a concrete example, and that was an important part of understanding the reason for the paragraph in question. Since both sides agree that the ABM limitations we develop will be long-lasting and that we can only specifically limit the systems and components which exist today, the U.S. side feels that there should be a provision to take account of the fact that it is reasonable and desirable to prohibit the deployment of components which might perform the ABM mission tomorrow but which are not in existence today. Trusov said that he did not consider it reasonable or necessary to include a provision covering what he called undefined ideas, maintaining that the provision in both the U.S. and Soviet drafts for review and amendment would be sufficient. He said that development, testing and deployment of such future systems would be observed by our national means of verification and the review process could take care of the necessary prohibition or limitation. He went on to say that a provision of the kind which the U.S. side has proposed would add an undesirable element of vagueness to our ABM agreement.

I agreed with Trusov that the process of review would be necessary to take account of developments and to reexamine the ABM agreement in light of those developments and stated that we had such a provision in our text. However, we also feel a need to avoid channeling arms competition in a new direction with the search by either side for ABM means not specifically constrained in the agreement. Paragraph 1 of our Article 6 was directed toward filling this need. Trusov said that his understanding of paragraph 1, Article 6 was that it referred to deployment and he repeated his argument that the possibilities it foresees could be dealt with by national verification means and the review process. >

September 1, 1971

SALT V

US/USSR AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 1

U.S. Embassy, August 31, 1971, 1500 Hours

Persons Present: U.S.

USSR

Graybeal
Shaw
Wade
Leard
Krimer
FitzGerald

Karpov
Fedenko
Obukhov
Artemyev

Karpov agreed to this approach and to proceeding with Article 2 (II). He stated that because of the nature of the two articles, our two drafts proceed from different premises. The U.S. paragraph 1 of Article 2 is devoted to definitions of terms the U.S. intends to use later. The Soviet paragraph 1 contains a more concise list of systems covered by the obligations of the treaty. Both have in common that they deal with the ABM systems to which the provisions will extend. The Soviets do not think that the Article should cover obligations other than ABM systems--only those systems subject to restrictions.

In general, paragraph 1 should contain a definition of the scope of systems to be covered by the obligations of the treaty; i.e., ABM systems, ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars. Paragraph 2 should contain definitions of categories of ABM systems contained in paragraph 1. The Soviets would consider the possibility of adding to their paragraph 2 mention of ABM systems under construction and undergoing tests.

He then read a sample introduction to Article 2, paragraph 1 as the Soviets would like to see it and presented it to the U.S. (See Annex 1.)

It applies to ABM systems specially constructed and deployed to counter strategic ballistic missiles.

Graybeal stated that the U.S. will review the paragraph carefully, but that it appeared to be quite similar to the old Soviet text in specificity. He asked Dr. Wade to present a brief U.S. rationale for paragraph 1 of Article 2.

Persons Present:

Amb Smith
Amb Parsons
Mr. Nitze
Gen Allison
Dr. Garthoff
Col FitzGerald
Mr. Krimer
(Interpreter)

Min Semenov
Acad Shchukin
Gen Trusov
Mr. Timerbaev
Mr. Kishilov
Col Fedenko
Mr. Faekov
(Interpreter)

Minister Semenov then turned the floor over to General Trusov.

General Trusov said that Para 1 of Article 6 of the U.S. Draft provides that each Party undertake obligations not to deploy ABM systems using a device other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components. Dr. Brown, on August 27, in answering Academician Shchu'kin's question as to what systems are meant by this paragraph, said that this applies to any present or future system which employs other physical mechanisms or devices to perform the functions of interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars in rendering ineffective strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory. Frankly speaking, General Trusov believed that such a reply referring to any present or future systems, which employ devices other than those known to the Delegations, does not cast any light on the problem. If such systems exist, then they should be named and the subject would be made more clear and could become the subject of further discussion. The U.S. side's objective in including a paragraph in Article 6 to provide obligations not to deploy ABM systems, including future systems, which use components other than ABM launchers, interceptors and radars, it not clear. What is, in fact, involved is conjectural systems, i.e., some possible future systems not now known to anybody. So far, the sides have been discussing limitations on concrete existing systems or systems whose reality is adequately known for the future and can be clearly defined in an agreement. Now the U.S. side proposes to include in a draft treaty limitations on the deployment of such systems or components not known to anybody. The Soviet side does not believe that it is correct to include such limitations. Such a provision in

a treaty could have reference to something that is amorphous and not subject to a clear determination of what is to be limited. Both sides are equally interested in the viability of an agreement to limit ABM systems. However, Para 1 of Article 6 acts in the opposite direction, in General Trusov's view, and gives rise to unnecessary misunderstandings.

General Trusov believed that it was not by accident that both sides -- the U.S. in Para (e) and (f) of Article 11, and the Soviet side in Para (f) and (g) of Article X -- provided for proposals aimed at increasing the viability of the agreement, to include proposals for amendments or additions for curbing the race in ABMs. The appearance of any new system not employing the components which the sides are not discussing, would be discovered by national technical means. This would be especially true of the testing of such new systems. Therefore, both sides would be able, in the context of the above noted paragraphs, to consider concretely and completely any questions linked to ABM systems and their components which would ensue from the treaty obligations.

As regards Ambassador Smith's comments on the Sea-beds Treaty and the Space Treaty, this was a somewhat irrelevant analogy. The obligations assumed in those treaties referred to actually existing systems. It was clear what systems were involved. Para 1 of Article 6 speaks about possible future systems which are completely conjectural. Therefore, inclusion of Para 1 of Article 6 is not necessary.

Ambassador Smith said he would make a few observations regarding General Trusov's intervention. He stated that, if the two sides had been dealing only with present systems, their work would have been completed long ago. Most of the problems encountered in our discussions on limiting ABM systems, for example, the problem of radars, are problems of the future. Such problems are the most difficult to put into an international agreement in such a way as to provide methods of gaining assurance for the future. The device that General Trusov suggested for handling this problem -- a problem which Ambassador Smith considers to be a central and very serious one -- would be a device for putting the problem into the pocket of an amendment clause or a clause for future discussion, perhaps in the Standing Commission. This would be tantamount to sweeping an existing question under the rug.

A fundamental question before the sides is whether we are trying to limit ABM systems or just ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars. It would seem that those on the Soviet side who have watched the developments that have taken place in technology over the past 20 years would not agree that, for an indefinite future, the functions of ABMs will be carried out only by systems based on technology dating back to perhaps the early fifties.

which nobody has any notions at the present time. He has a higher estimate of the capabilities of Soviet weapon designers than that. Anybody reading the unclassified literature in this field knows that there are other possibilities.

As regards General Trusov's view that the analogy to the Seabeds and Space Treaties was irrelevant, Ambassador Smith believed that his analogy had been directly to the point. As he recalled the early U.S. drafts on these treaties -- he would like to check the record before being called in error on this -- these drafts were based on obligations that the parties not deploy nuclear weapons in space or on the seabeds. It was at Soviet insistence that other weapons of mass destruction were included in the space agreement. At that time, none of us then knew what other systems could be placed in space and the Soviet words indicated the ignorance we all had on this subject. But since the U.S. wished to cover all possible ways for deploying [weapons of mass destruction in space, we agreed to include these "other" weapons in the treaties. Consequently, the precedent in the case of the Space and Seabeds Treaties was clearly in favor of including in an agreement a wider range of ABM systems, rather than merely limiting ABM launchers, interceptors, and radars.]

Speaking personally, Ambassador Smith believed that, in the event that Para 1 of Article 6 should not be included in an agreement, it would be a cruel illusion to the peoples of both nations to say that we had concluded an agreement on ABM systems. We should more properly say that there had been an agreement to limit ABM launchers, interceptors, and radars. This would be a far cry from what the U.S. side means when it speaks about limiting ABM systems.

Ambassador Smith also wanted to add one additional consideration. It has been our experience that it is less difficult to control weapons systems before they are invented and deployed. The sides could lose a good opportunity if they were to postpone to the future control over systems which he had been speaking about.

Minister Semenov thought that the viewpoints of both sides had been made sufficiently clear. If there were no objections from the U.S. side, he would propose to turn discussion of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the U.S. Article 6 over to the Karpov-Graybeal Ad Hoc Committee since it already has Paragraph 3 of that Article. The statements made by Ambassador Smith and General Trusov could serve as good material to assist the committee in comparing the texts to be discussed.

Ambassador Smith agreed.

been turned over to the Special Working Group and the latter has already begun discussion of the question. At the same time, in view of the significance of this problem, it is possible that further discussion by the Delegates might assist the Special Working Group in making progress toward reconciliation of the two texts.

If Minister Semenov correctly recalled the course of the negotiations to date, the question of the possibility of modernization and substitution had been repeatedly discussed by the sides. This possibility is provided for in Soviet Article VI. The U.S. Draft lacks a similar article. The exchanges of views up to now, in the Soviet understanding, have demonstrated that the sides are in agreement in principle on this question. On August 27, the U.S. side had said it was as equally interested in modernization as is the Soviet side and Soviet Article VI clearly reflects this mutual interest.

Today, Minister Semenov wanted to emphasize the importance of modifying and replacing ABM components. He also wanted to point out that the Understanding of May 20 makes direct provision for modernization, even under the conditions of a freeze.

Of course, under the Soviet Draft, modernization and substitution could only be effected in accordance with the provisions of Articles II, III, IV, and V. In other words, the Parties would be able to effect modernization and replacement only in strict compliance with the agreement on ABM limitations. In particular, modernization of ABM systems, as permitted by Soviet Article VI, would not involve mobile ABM systems, or rapid-reload launchers, or launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor at a time.

Thus, bearing in mind the agreement of the two sides on the essence of the problem of modernization and replacement, the Soviet side considers it necessary to include its Article VI in an ABM agreement. This would increase the clarity of the agreement and insure its viability which is in the interests of both sides.

September 3, 1971

SALT V

US/USSR AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 2

Soviet Embassy, September 2, 1971, 1100 Hours

Persons Present: U.S.

Graybeal
Wade
Leard
Krimer

USSR

Karpov
Fedenko
Obukhov
Artemyev

Karpov welcomed the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet Embassy. He opened by presenting a Soviet draft of Article II which he stated takes into consideration the U.S. Article and the views expressed by both sides at the last meeting, and contains all the necessary provisions required in Article II to insure the effectiveness of a treaty on ABM's. He said that the text contains precise definitions of systems and components that are the means to which obligations should extend.

Graybeal stated that he would give the draft careful study. He then commented that a major issue involves the fundamental point of lead-in to Article 2; namely, the "definitional" approach versus the "obligational" approach. He said it would be helpful if he knew the Soviet objection to the definitional approach. He said that he saw the purpose of the definitional approach as being to clearly define what are and what are not ABM systems and ABM components. He noted that the Soviet working paper also reflects the need for definitions, but that the Soviet definitions were not as comprehensive. In addition, the obligational approach and the use of the words "shall apply to" indicate that Article II contains all of the obligations. In both texts there are other articles that contain obligations not included in this approach. If the obligational approach were adopted, would it not be necessary to list all obligations contained in the agreement?

Karpov responded that when speaking about approaches, Mr. Graybeal did not quite correctly express the substance of the Soviet formula. In dealing with Article II, we do not specify obligations as such; rather, the obligations of the sides shall apply to the means listed in paragraph 1 of Article II and explained in paragraph 2. The systems defined in paragraph 1

give a precise concept of the subjects for the obligations of both sides on ABM systems. This article is a means of ensuring confidence in compliance of the sides by listing the subjects for control; not the method controlling them. The definitional approach is an unnecessarily complicated structure for the agreement. The best approach to definitions is one in which whatever is to be limited or defined is accompanied by a corresponding definition where it first appears in the treaty. It is our opinion that it is unnecessary to define other than ABM terms until they first appear in the article. So if this article is to define the composition of the systems to be covered by the obligations of each side, then the definitions should be limited to those necessary to the content of the article.

Graybeal stated that a fundamental difference of approach still remains. However, the Soviet definitions provided in their working paper are a step in the right direction. If the obligational approach were adopted, would it not be necessary to include all the obligations of the treaty? For example, the obligations under U.S. Article 8 on non-transfer would need to be included.

Karpov stated that this would not be necessary if the provisions of Article 8 are covered by the phrase at the beginning of Article . It seems clear the Soviet version precisely expresses no obligations, but the systems that should be covered by the obligations.

Graybeal asked if the obligations would apply only to the systems listed in Article II.

Karpov responded that the fundamental basic obligations which deal with numerical limitations in the Soviet Article III would be applied to these systems. It does not mean that there will not be other obligations listed in the treaty which will cover other systems. For example, the Soviet Article IV, which has a counterpart in U.S. Article 5, would place obligations on each side. However, it is a concept not covered in Article II. Also, Soviet Article V, which corresponds to paragraphs 2 and 3 of U.S. Article 6, is a concept covered by the obligations under the Soviet Article V.

Graybeal stated that the explanation had been helpful and that he would respond at the next meeting.

Wade then asked (in connection with paragraph 1 of Article II of the Soviet working paper) for clarification of the words "counter" as used under systems, "destroy" as used under missiles, and "ensure destruction" as used under radars.

Karpov answered that to "counter" is more comprehensive than the term "destruction". Therefore, where the question of ABM interceptors arises, we use the word "destruction". Since radars don't destroy ballistic missiles,

we use the term "to ensure destruction". "Counter" includes both of the terms and also covers "rendering ineffective".

Wade then asked how the Soviets would handle a missile whose purpose may not be the destruction of an incoming ballistic missile?

Karpov responded that we must decide what we are talking about. The main thing is to define systems that are really ABM systems. In Article II, paragraph 1, ABM systems are defined as a whole, and specific means for limiting components are included in the following paragraph. So Dr. Wade's question as to the meaning of "destroy" (i.e., a direct hit or any other means of destroying ballistic missiles) is not significant. It is most important to define deployed systems in terms of the tasks set for ABM systems. For example, in order to define ABM interceptors, the Soviets use the criteria listed in their subparagraph (b).

Graybeal then remarked that he still considered the definitional approach desirable in the lead-in paragraph. He stated that his questions are designed to identify differences pertaining to definitions and to merge them where possible. He stated that in Article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a), he had taken into account "constructed or deployed to counter" and as a definition for "ABM system" proposed ad referendum the following definition: "An ABM system is a system constructed or deployed to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory."

Karpov stated that in comparing the two drafts, Mr. Graybeal had suggested that "specially" be deleted and that "construct or deploy" be used instead of "construct and deploy".

Graybeal answered in the affirmative.

Karpov responded that the Soviet side had already stated that "specially constructed" more clearly defined the nature of systems used as ABM systems and that the question of converting SAM's into ABM's is not a practical question--it is an artificial problem. Besides, a system, whatever it might be, if it is tested in an ABM mode it is an ABM system. Therefore, the question of initial purpose should not arise. The combination of "specially constructed and deployed" gives the criterion for a precise definition that these systems are ABM systems. If an ABM system is deployed as an ABM system, then it has been tested in an ABM mode and such testing could be detected by national means of verification which would help to determine that it is clearly an ABM system. The term "specially constructed" includes the element of defining ABM systems through tests undertaken in an ABM mode. Therefore, he believed that the combination of these definitions makes it possible to define to the greatest extent that a system is an ABM system. "Specially constructed" includes the concept of having been tested in an ABM mode. He

Date: September 8, 1971

Time: 1:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Place: Soviet Embassy and
Capital Theater, Helsinki

SUBJECT: New Soviet ABM Proposal; "Other Devices"

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.USSR

Col. C. G. FitzGerald

Lt Col R. E. Leard (part-time)

Col Gen A. A. Gryzlov

(part-time)

Col A. A. Fedenko

During the portion of the conversation at which Lt Col Leard was present, Col Fedenko repeated the arguments Mr. Karpov had made in favor of excluding paragraph 1 of U. S. Article 6. He declared that the sides are in agreement (with the exception of OLPARs and MARCs) on the ABM components (sredstva) to be limited. These are spelled out in Article 2 of the Soviet Draft, which specifies the components to be limited, namely, ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars. The sides have no intentions of limiting the computers or communications associated with ABM systems, or ABM depots (sklady). At the same time, if ABM means different from those presently known -- for example, some new power source, or source of light, or some new searchlight (prozhektor), such as was employed in early AAA systems -- should be detected by national means, the problem could be examined by the Standing Commission. He noted that in the early days of air defense, AAA crews had to rely on sound ranging equipment. Now, everybody clearly recognizes that fire-control radars are an integral element in air defense systems. The same situation would prevail in the future as regards other means that might be used for ABM systems. He concluded that, these "other means" should be identified if they are known at the present time.

I suggested that perhaps he might ask what General Ogarkov had in mind in his September 3 article in Red Star. The General had emphasized the need for the Soviet military to keep up with the latest advances in science and technology and for long-term imaginative development of weapons systems. Obviously, he was thinking in terms of new weapons, as yet unknown.

I then asked, apart from "other devices" how the Soviet side visualizes how the Standing Commission will operate. Mr. Karpov had used the words "examination" and "resolution" (resheniye) in describing how the question of "other devices" would be handled in the Standing Commission. Did this mean that the Commission would have the power of decision? Col Fedenko replied in the negative. The Commission would consult and examine various questions and would attempt to arrive at agreed-on recommendations or language to be submitted to the two governments. The final solution to problems would, however, rest with the governments.

Col Fedenko concluded the discussion of Para 1, Article 6 by saying that the Soviet side realized the U.S. side had required a long time to arrive at its formulation of this paragraph and consequently, the Soviet side would require some time to understand the need for including such a paragraph.

Col Fedenko also argued in favor of the Soviet version of Para 1 of Article 2, which specifies only interceptors, launchers, and radars as the ABM means to be limited. I argued against exclusion of MARCs and OLPARs but Col Fedenko insisted that these definitions should be discussed in the context of the articles in which they initially appear. Article 3 in the case of MARCs and Article 4 in the case of OLPARs. I continued to disagree. He then observed that the U.S. side had not chosen a good military term when it had selected "complex" to describe the deployment area for ABM radars. He said that an agreement covering weapons systems should use military terminology as much as possible. In response to my question, he suggested "assembly area (rayon sosredotocheniya)" as a possible better military term.

H. Lush. A. S.

September 9, 1971

SALT V

US/USSR AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 4

Soviet Embassy, September 8, 1971, 1100 Hours

Persons Present: U.S.

Graybeal
Leard
Barlow
Carnesale
Krimer
FitzGerald
Zarechnak

USSR

Karpov
Fedenko
Obukhov
Artemyev

Graybeal made the following points:

-- Our Article 6 is not intended to supplement the U.S. Article 7 in any respect; rather, it is intended to address future ABM systems that would utilize components or devices other than launchers, interceptor missiles, or radars.

-- The U.S. paragraph 1 of Article 6, which has no counterpart in the Soviet text, would prohibit the deployment of future ABM systems or components other than those fixed land-based components defined in Article 2; that is, ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars. This paragraph would in no way restrict modernization of the components listed in Article 2. It is my belief that it is the intention of both sides to limit the arms competition in the future as well as at present. Inclusion of this paragraph would represent a step toward that goal.

-- It is my belief that if future systems are not covered, uncertainties would increase, and the result could be an arms competition in ABM systems with the result opposite from that which we seek in an arms control agreement. The question is: Are we trying to limit ABM systems of all types, or just current ABM radars, ABM launchers, and ABM interceptors?

Karpov addressed the formulas used to identify systems limited under paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 6. He noted that this act envisages the undertaking of the Parties "not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components." He believed that the subject matter of this provision was outlined in such an unclear manner, in terms of legal science, that it could not be accepted. He said that if the U.S. side believes that such systems exist in reality, then it should identify and name them so that the possibilities to limit them could become clear. He stated that both sides are equally interested in the viability of an ABM agreement; however, the agreement cannot be amorphous with regard to the subject matter of the means to be limited. He believed it was wrong to limit means not known to anyone. Up to now, he noted, the subject of our discussions was limitations on concrete and specific ABM systems, on ABM systems which might exist and could be verified by national means. He believed that we should adhere to this subject in the future too. He said that he could not agree to an approach designed to prevent deployment in the future of certain systems when the systems to be limited are undefined. He recognized that in the future, questions may arise about ABM systems which are not covered in this Agreement or Treaty. He noted that appropriate procedures for handling these questions are envisaged in both the USSR and U.S. draft texts. In this connection, he referred to paragraph F of the USSR Article X and to subparagraph (e) of Article 11 of the U.S. text. He quoted that portion of the Soviet text which states that the Standing Commission would "consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for additions and amendments to the Treaty in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty", and noted that a counterpart provision is contained in the U.S. text. Thus, he said, the possibility of questions arising in the future is fully covered by the appropriate paragraphs in the U.S. Article 11 and the USSR Article X. Furthermore, he said, the paragraphs which follow (subparagraph (f) of U.S. text and subparagraph C of USSR text) eliminate the need for paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the U.S. text.

Graybeal stated that he was a technician rather than a lawyer, and that he would deal with the substance and intent of the U.S. paragraph 1 rather than with legalities. With regard to Karpov's remarks about naming future ABM systems, he found it difficult to identify those systems which the scientists and engineers of our two countries might invent in the future. He asked whether, if such systems were to be developed, they were to be left uncontrolled, and did we want to leave an opening for scientists and engineers

to find ways to bypass the limitations under the Agreement. He said that if he understood Karpov, the Soviet side intended to limit only ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars. He wondered if we would be doing a service to either side or to the world if we were to enter an agreement which limited only existing systems and did not attempt to limit future systems. He believed that the concern regarding future systems was recognized in both the Seabeds Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. These Treaties limited "other weapons of mass destruction"--the intention being to limit not only existing systems but future systems as well. He did not believe that the problem of future systems could be handled adequately through the U.S. Article 11 or the USSR Article X. He noted that the lead-in to the U.S. Article 11, which was similar to the lead-in in the corresponding Soviet article, starts with "To promote the objectives and assist in the implementation of the provisions of this agreement," and expressed the belief that one of the objectives of the Agreement should be to limit future systems. If this were the case, he said, then the U.S. Article 11 and the USSR Article X could be useful in promoting this objective.

Karpov returned to the legal side of the question, saying that it was clear to him that legal documents of importance such as this should be precise to the maximum extent and should not create a basis for friction between our two countries in the future. On the contrary, he said, it should promote the strengthening of relations between our two countries--at present and in the future. If there is no clear-cut definition as to what would be limited by paragraph 1 of U.S. Article 6, then in the future there would remain a vast field for disagreement and doubt. As an example, he used a case in which one of the two sides said that in its opinion the other side deployed an ABM system using devices other than ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, or ABM radars, and the other side categorically denied such deployment, saying that the system was designed for purposes having nothing in common with ABM systems. He was not referring to the capability of national means to distinguish ABM systems; rather, he was pointing to the problem that might exist when there were agreed definitions as to what an ABM system was, but there was not agreement on what an ABM system was if it used devices other than ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, or ABM radars. He said that in the hypothetical example he had just given, the entire Treaty would be in doubt because one side would have doubts about compliance by the other side. In this connection, he believed that the provision of the USSR Article X and U.S. Article 11 would make it possible to handle such questions of future systems as may be regarded by the sides to be subject to limitations. Since the purpose of the Treaty is to limit ABM systems, the question of future systems would be a matter for the Standing Commission. Without a precise definition in the Treaty or Agreement as to what would be covered by the obligations of the sides, he did not believe it possible to include the present form of paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 6 in the Agreement or Treaty. With regard to the comparison made by Graybeal to the Treaties on Seabeds and Outer Space, he did not believe that this could

serve as a useful analogy to the present Treaty. He expressed the belief that Ambassador Smith recognized in his remarks yesterday that these other treaties did not refer to some unknown future system. The term "other weapons of mass destruction" is clear, he said, and means those nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that can be designed at present.

Graybeal expressed the view that paragraph 1 of Article 6 would serve to strengthen the relationship between our two countries and would avoid misunderstandings in the future. He said that while we were not yet in agreement, at our level, on the definition of an ABM system, we were close. He referred to the wording in the U.S. working paper of September 6; namely, "An anti-ballistic missile system is a system constructed or deployed to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory." He said that this definition would apply also to paragraph 1 of Article 6. Whether or not such systems exist at present is not the key issue, he said. It is the concepts and technologies which do exist and with which both sides are familiar that are of importance. Our objective is to limit ABM systems, and our definition of ABM systems would include future systems as well as present ones. He stated that paragraph 1 of the Article 6 would avoid just the kind of misunderstandings that Karpov had referred to in his remarks. He believed that if we could make clear the intent of the Agreement, which in our view is to limit ABM systems, then we could help the Standing Commission fulfill its role. If the intent were only to limit present systems, and to leave to the Standing Commission the matter of limiting future systems, then we would be inviting misunderstandings. He asked if it is the intent of the Soviet side to limit ABM systems or just to limit present ABM systems.

Karpov believed that our intent is to limit ABM systems and that we have a mutual understanding between ourselves on that score. The difference is in our approach--how to do it in the most effective way and, at the same time, to guarantee the two sides that the agreement would be complied with. He could not imagine how an agreement could bring the two sides closer together if it dealt with systems which could not be clearly defined. He said that the subject of an agreement is determined by at least three elements: the presence of physical or legal entities entering into the agreement, the subject matter of agreement, and the guarantees of compliance with the obligations. He could admit the existence of an agreement without guarantees, but not without the first two elements. The U.S. draft, he said, contains no legal definition of what it deals with. He did not agree with the definitions in the U.S. Article 2. On the other hand, he said, Article 2 of the Soviet draft gives a clear-cut definition of ABM systems; namely, "The means specially constructed and deployed to counter strategic missiles and their components in flight trajectory." This definition would enable one fully to verify by national means compliance with an agreement. It is essential that an agreement include a precise definition of the means to be covered by the obligations. He wished to note also that paragraph 1 of Article 6 in its present form could not

p. The U.S. intent of precluding possible misunderstandings in the future. This paragraph did not make it possible for national means of verification to determine clearly if systems are ABM systems or not, and, since paragraph 1 would be an integral part of the Agreement or Treaty, compliance with the entire Treaty would be questioned. He asked if it would not be better for us to refer the questions of future systems to the Standing Commission. He thought that this would be the most rational approach to limiting those ABM systems which cannot be defined in technical or legal terms.

Graybeal assured him that this paragraph had been reviewed by lawyers and that it did serve a useful function in the text. He thought that there was a difference in the views of the two sides regarding the adequacy of the definitions in paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 2. He thought that these definitions were adequate to deal with all ABM systems, while paragraph 1 of USSR Article XI dealt only with ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars. He asked if he was correct in believing that in Karpov's opinion the U.S. definitions were inadequate.

Karpov responded that Graybeal was correct and that the Soviets had proposed to limit systems which use ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars.

Graybeal said that there also seemed to be a difference in our views on the role of operative articles versus the role of the Standing Commission. He felt that an operative article indicating clearly the obligations with regard to improvement of existing ABM systems and with regard to future systems would be far more useful than merely referring these questions to the Standing Commission. He also noted a difference in views reflected in Karpov's comments on the analogy to the Treaties on Seabeds and Outer Space. He referred to Ambassador Smith's statement of yesterday in which Ambassador Smith said that he found that the authorship of the phrase "other weapons of mass destruction" was not as clear as had previously been suggested. Smith went on to say, however, "but what is clear, and relevant, is that in these Treaties our two Governments have accepted obligations banning deployment of 'weapons of mass destruction' not specifically identified." Graybeal believed that the term "weapons of mass destruction" referred to any weapon of mass destruction, including any that might be developed in the future. Thus, he believed that the analogy was a useful one. Biological and chemical weapons were used as examples of other weapons of mass destruction and not as the only ones. He noted that he had participated in the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty and that he could not recall either side trying to define what was meant by "weapons of mass destruction".

Karpov expressed the belief that both sides recognize that the Treaty cannot cover all possible cases in limiting ABM systems, and that we could not envisage everything that will appear in the future. He agreed that there had been no need to define precisely what "weapons of mass destruction" were,

claiming that there was an understanding between the Parties to the Outer Space Treaty as to what were such weapons. He said that they were weapons capable of destroying masses of people or masses of material things, and that such weapons are precisely defined by these criteria. He claimed that, as a matter of fact, the very name "weapons of mass destruction" indicates the criteria. Unfortunately, he said, the term "ABM defense" cannot determine whether specific means belong to such a system.

(There was a recess at this point.)

Graybeal agreed that not all future ABM systems could be identified now; however, he disagreed with the contention that an agreement could not cover all possible future ABM systems. He pointed out that, with an understanding of what is an ABM system, we could prohibit the deployment of future systems or devices. He then turned to paragraph 2 of the U.S. Article 6 and its counterpart, paragraph A of the USSR Article V. He noted that the texts were similar, with two exceptions. First, the U.S. text would prohibit the development, production, testing, and deployment of these systems while the Soviet text would prohibit only testing and deployment. He believed this difference could be resolved. Second, the U.S. text refers to future devices, and reflects the basic difference in view which we have been discussing in relation to paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 6.

Karpov tabled a working paper (attached) in which the Soviets attempted to merge the language of paragraph A of the USSR Article V and paragraph 2 of the U.S. Article 6. He noted the addition to the Soviet language of the words "not to construct" rather than the U.S. words "not to produce". He also pointed out that, for reasons previously discussed, the Soviet side did not use the U.S. phrase "not to develop". He suggested that the U.S. side look at the language and he hoped that it would find it acceptable.

Graybeal stated that he would certainly study the working paper. As he understood it, the Soviet phrase "not to construct" encompasses the U.S. phrase "not to develop and not to produce", and the Soviet phrase "specially designed for" could be interpreted as "specially created for".

Karpov confirmed these interpretations. >

Graybeal asked whether the language of the Soviet working paper covered devices other than ABM launchers, interceptors, and radars, and whether transportable systems or components would be considered as mobile systems or components.

Karpov asked what was meant by transportable systems.

Graybeal responded that in the U.S. we use the term "mobile" to refer to systems which could be constantly in motion; but, in this provision, we

intend to include systems which could be readily transported from one place to another. He called on Barlow to amplify these remarks.

Barlow said that by "transportable systems" we mean interceptors, launchers, and radars designed to be moved frequently during their service life. He said that a system transported from a factory to a site would not necessarily be considered a transportable system.

Karpov said that he did not quite understand any difference between mobile and transportable systems if both could be moved frequently.

Graybeal said that if that was the case, he thought we were in agreement on this point.

Barlow said that in U.S. usage, a mobile radar has wheels or tracks; that is, it is self-propelled. He noted that the terms "mobile" and "transportable" are used in contrast to fixed permanent installations.

Karpov said that he would review the U.S. remarks and would respond at a later time. He wished to ask, however, whether the term "mobile" included the term "transportable".

Graybeal responded that it did.

Karpov asked if this also applied to sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems.

Graybeal responded that, by definition, sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems are mobile systems.

Karpov said that he would return to the subject at a later time.

Graybeal said that he had nothing more to discuss today.

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

A-498

Helsinki (Sat)

Date: September 13, 1971
Time: 1230-1300 hours
Place: U. S. Embassy
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Early Warning Radars; ICBM Defense; and
Future ABM Systems

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Col C.G. FitzGerald
Maj William Barlow

USSR

Col A. A. Fedenko
Mr. Obuhkov

Future Systems

Col Fedenko reiterated the standard Soviet arguments against including any general provisions on future undefined ABM systems. The Standing Commission could handle such problems if they ever arose. The alternative, he felt, was for the U.S. to specify and define in Article II what systems, components or mechanisms it had in mind. If the U.S. could define what it was talking about, then national means could probably verify such activities because presumably it would be mandatory to test such conceptual devices. The Soviet side would then be in a position to determine whether such systems should be in an ABM Treaty.

DATE: September 15, 1971

TIME: 10:00 - 11:30 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy

SUBJECT: Discussion of Articles 2 and 6 (V)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

USSR

Mr. S. N. Graybeal
Col. Charles FitzGerald

Mr. Viktor Karpov
Mr. A. A. Fedenko


At the September 15 meeting between Graybeal and Karpov, accompanied by FitzGerald and Fedenko, the Soviets tabled new Articles 2 and 6(V). (See attachment.)

The discussion started with Article 6(V). Karpov argued that the new formulation of Soviet paragraph 1 (U.S. paragraph 2) of Article 6(V) obviates the requirement for the phrase "other devices for performing the functions of these components" appearing at the end of U.S. paragraph 2. The Soviets were proposing to eliminate specific listing of ABM system components (launchers, interceptors, and radars) and substitute the word "components" (using the literal Russian word (komponenty) for this instead of the word for "components" (sredstva) used in Article 2 when referring to launchers, interceptors, and radars. Karpov agreed with Graybeal's interpretation that the Soviet text meant "any type of present or future components" of ABM systems.

Karpov said they would give favorable consideration to Graybeal's suggestion that the phrase "specially constructed for such systems" be dropped from the Soviet wording.

Agreement was also reached that, consistent with the "new Article 6", the Soviet text would use "and" between systems and components, while the U.S. text would retain "or" between systems and components.

Graybeal said he would take the new Soviet formulation into consideration and refer it to the U.S. Delegation. It was agreed that paragraph 1 of U.S. Article 6 would remain bracketed as a U.S. proposal.



After a brief break, the discussion turned to Article 2. Karpov refused to accept the U.S. wording "indistinguishable from" or "of a type tested in an ABM mode". He argued that "new Article 6" forbids testing non-ABM components in an ABM mode. To include these phrases in Article 2 implies that there can be a breach of the treaty. Therefore, inclusion of either wording in Article 2 is incompatible with "new Article 6" since definitions must not conflict with obligations. The Soviet side could understand the requirement for this language in Article 2 if there were no prohibition on such testing, but inclusion of the phrase in Article 2 would call "new Article 6" into question.

Karpov also said the U.S. approach to Article 2 is unacceptable with or without the phrases "indistinguishable from" or "of a type tested in an ABM mode".

Graybeal argued the need for clear and concise definitions to include the above phrases. He saw no incompatibility between U.S. Article 2 and "new Article 6". In fact, he argued, two Articles are complementary to each other when the U.S. wording is used.

The final result was to leave each side's version of the entire Article 2 in brackets.

It was also agreed that Karpov and Graybeal would make only individual reports to their respective Heads of Delegation, and the remaining problems would be discussed further at the new mini-troika (Parsons, Garthoff, and Graybeal with Timerbaev, Kishilov, and Karpov).

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 15, 1971

TIME: 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.

PLACE: Capitol Theater,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Further Progress in SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US USSR

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov

As I was leaving the theater, Semenov engaged me in conversation for a few minutes in which he emphasized the desirability of removing some of the non-substantive bracketed disagreements in the Joint Draft Text being developed by the two Delegations. I mentioned in particular Article 2, and urged that we find a solution which did not prejudice the different substantive positions of the two sides over the article on future kinds of ABM systems. Semenov agreed, and also thought that we should be able to find a neutral formulation which would not prejudice the views of either side.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 17, 19

TIME: 12:30 - 12:50 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Smith-Semenov Post-Mini-Plenary Conversation,
September 17

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov
Mr. V. Ya. Faekov,
Interpreter

Semenov said he hoped that Smith had noticed that in today's Soviet statement Semenov had paid special attention to Article 2. It seemed to him that there was an opportunity here to try and remove some differences on language for this Article. In his view Article 2 and Article 3 formed the main basis for the ABM agreement. He quite understood that in regard to Article 3 we faced some serious problems that would require additional reflection with a view to narrowing differences. On the other hand, looking at Article 2, he came to the conclusion that there were possibilities for reaching mutually agreed language. At one time it had appeared to him that such agreed language would be easily achieved, but then somehow the two sides had started moving away from each other. It was the Soviet view that inclusion of the word "indistinguishable" cast doubt on the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. In this connection he would recall that when he had reported on the state of our negotiations at a meeting of his Government in Moscow, one of the fundamental questions asked of him related to national means of verification. He was asked how this matter would be settled between the two Delegations. He had replied that it was his general impression that the US Delegation had a very good understanding of this general situation. At that same meeting some views had been expressed to the effect that this issue of national technical means might prove to be a stumbling block. He would say that inclusion of any provision that would enlarge the shadow of doubt about verification would

Helmut A S

September 9, 1971

SALT V

US/USSR AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 4

Soviet Embassy, September 8, 1971, 1100 Hours

Persons Present: U.S.

Graybeal
Leard
Barlow
Carnesale
Krimer
PitzGerald
Zarechnak

USSR

Karpov
Fedenko
Obukhov
Artemyev

Graybeal made the following points:

-- Our Article 6 is not intended to supplement the U.S. Article 7 in any respect; rather, it is intended to address future ABM systems that would utilize components or devices other than launchers, interceptor missiles, or radars.

-- The U.S. paragraph 1 of Article 6, which has no counterpart in the Soviet text, would prohibit the deployment of future ABM systems or components other than those fixed land-based components defined in Article 2; that is, ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars. This paragraph would in no way restrict modernization of the components listed in Article 2. It is my belief that it is the intention of both sides to limit the arms competition in the future as well as at present. Inclusion of this paragraph would represent a step toward that goal.

I then asked, apart from "other devices" how the Soviet side visualizes how the Standing Commission will operate. Mr. Karpov had used the words "examination" and "resolution" (resheniye) in describing how the question of "other devices" would be handled in the Standing Commission. Did this mean that the Commission would have the power of decision? Col Fedenko replied in the negative. The Commission would consult and examine various questions and would attempt to arrive at agreed-on recommendations or language to be submitted to the two governments. The final solution to problems would, however, rest with the governments.

Col Fedenko concluded the discussion of Para 1, Article 6 by saying that the Soviet side realized the U.S. side had required a long time to arrive at its formulation of this paragraph and consequently, the Soviet side would require some time to understand the need for including such a paragraph.

Col Fedenko also argued in favor of the Soviet version of Para 1 of Article 2, which specifies only interceptors, launchers, and radars as the ABM means to be limited. I argued against exclusion of MARCs and OLPARs but Col Fedenko insisted that these definitions should be discussed in the context of the articles in which they initially appear. Article 3 in the case of MARCs and Article 4 in the case of OLPARs. I continued to disagree. He then observed that the U.S. side had not chosen a good military term when it had selected "complex" to describe the deployment area for ABM radars. He said that an agreement covering weapons systems should use military terminology as much as possible. In response to my question, he suggested "assembly area (rayon sosredotocheniya)" as a possible better military term.

serve as a useful analogy to the present Treaty. He expressed the belief that Ambassador Smith recognized in his remarks yesterday that these other treaties not refer to some unknown future system. The term "other weapons of mass destruction" is clear, he said, and means those nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that can be designed at present.

Graybeal expressed the view that paragraph 1 of Article 6 would serve to strengthen the relationship between our two countries and would avoid misunderstandings in the future. He said that while we were not yet in agreement, at our level, on the definition of an ABM system, we were close. He referred to the wording in the U.S. working paper of September 6; namely, "An anti-ballistic missile system is a system constructed or deployed to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their components in flight trajectory." He said that this definition would apply also to paragraph 1 of Article 6. Whether or not such systems exist at present is not the key issue, he said. It is the concepts and technologies which do exist and with which both sides are familiar that are of importance. Our objective is to limit ABM systems, and our definition of ABM systems would include future systems as well as present ones. He stated that paragraph 1 of the Article 6 would avoid just the kind of misunderstandings that Karpov had referred to in his remarks. He believed that if we could make clear the intent of the Agreement, which in our view is to limit ABM systems, then we could help the Standing Commission fulfill its role. If the intent were only to limit present systems, and to leave to the Standing Commission the matter of limiting future systems, then we would be inviting misunderstandings. He asked if it is the intent of the Soviet side to limit ABM systems or just to limit present ABM systems.

Karpov believed that our intent is to limit ABM systems and that we have mutual understanding between ourselves on that score. The difference is in our approach--how to do it in the most effective way and, at the same time, to guarantee the two sides that the agreement would be complied with. He could not imagine how an agreement could bring the two sides closer together if it dealt with systems which could not be clearly defined. He said that the subject of an agreement is determined by at least three elements: the presence of physical or legal entities entering into the agreement, the subject matter of agreement, and the guarantees of compliance with the obligations. He could admit the existence of an agreement without guarantees, but not without the first two elements. The U.S. draft, he said, contains no legal definition of what it deals with. He did not agree with the definitions in the U.S. Article 2. On the other hand, he said, Article 2 of the Soviet draft gives a clear-cut definition of ABM systems; namely, "The means specially constructed and deployed to counter strategic missiles and their components in flight trajectory." This definition would enable one fully to verify by national means compliance with an agreement. It is essential that an agreement include a precise definition of the means to be covered by the obligations. He wished to note also that paragraph 1 of Article 6 in its present form could not

promote the U.S. intent of precluding possible misunderstandings in the future. This paragraph did not make it possible for national means of verification to determine clearly if systems are ABM systems or not, and, since paragraph 1 would be an integral part of the Agreement or Treaty, compliance with the entire Treaty would be questioned. He asked if it would not be better for us to refer the questions of future systems to the Standing Commission. He thought that this would be the most rational approach to limiting those ABM systems which cannot be defined in technical or legal terms.

Graybeal assured him that this paragraph had been reviewed by lawyers and that it did serve a useful function in the text. He thought that there was a difference in the views of the two sides regarding the adequacy of the definitions in paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 2. He thought that these definitions were adequate to deal with all ABM systems, while paragraph 1 of USSR Article XI dealt only with ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars. He asked if he was correct in believing that in Karpov's opinion the U.S. definitions were inadequate.

Karpov responded that Graybeal was correct and that the Soviets had proposed to limit systems which use ABM launchers, ABM interceptors, and ABM radars.

Graybeal said that there also seemed to be a difference in our views on the role of operative articles versus the role of the Standing Commission. He felt that an operative article indicating clearly the obligations with regard to improvement of existing ABM systems and with regard to future systems would be far more useful than merely referring these questions to the Standing Commission. He also noted a difference in views reflected in Karpov's comments on the analogy to the Treaties on Seabeds and Outer Space. He referred to Ambassador Smith's statement of yesterday in which Ambassador Smith said that he found that the authorship of the phrase "other weapons of mass destruction" was not as clear as had previously been suggested. Smith went on to say, however, "but what is clear, and relevant, is that in these Treaties our two Governments have accepted obligations banning deployment of 'weapons of mass destruction' not specifically identified." Graybeal believed that the term "weapons of mass destruction" referred to any weapon of mass destruction, including any that might be developed in the future. Thus, he believed that the analogy was a useful one. Biological and chemical weapons were used as examples of other weapons of mass destruction and not as the only ones. He noted that he had participated in the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty and that he could not recall either side trying to define what was meant by "weapons of mass destruction".

Karpov expressed the belief that both sides recognize that the Treaty cannot cover all possible cases in limiting ABM systems, and that we could not envisage everything that will appear in the future. He agreed that there had been no need to define precisely what "weapons of mass destruction" were,

aiming that there was an understanding between the Parties to the Outer Space Treaty as to what were such weapons. He said that they were weapons capable of destroying masses of people or masses of material things, and that such weapons are precisely defined by these criteria. He claimed that, as a matter of fact, the very name "weapons of mass destruction" indicates the criteria. Unfortunately, he said, the term "ABM defense" cannot determine whether specific means belong to such a system.

(There was a recess at this point.)

Graybeal agreed that not all future ABM systems could be identified now; however, he disagreed with the contention that an agreement could not cover all possible future ABM systems. He pointed out that, with an understanding of what is an ABM system, we could prohibit the deployment of future systems or devices. He then turned to paragraph 2 of the U.S. Article 6 and its counterpart, paragraph A of the USSR Article V. He noted that the texts were similar, with two exceptions. First, the U.S. text would prohibit the development, production, testing, and deployment of these systems while the Soviet text would prohibit only testing and deployment. He believed this difference could be resolved. Second, the U.S. text refers to future devices, and reflects the basic difference in view which we have been discussing in relation to paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article 6.

Karpov tabled a working paper (attached) in which the Soviets attempted to merge the language of paragraph A of the USSR Article V and paragraph 2 of the U.S. Article 6. He noted the addition to the Soviet language of the words "not to construct" rather than the U.S. words "not to produce". He also pointed out that, for reasons previously discussed, the Soviet side did not use the U.S. phrase "not to develop". He suggested that the U.S. side look at the language and he hoped that it would find it acceptable.

Graybeal stated that he would certainly study the working paper. As he understood it, the Soviet phrase "not to construct" encompasses the U.S. phrase "not to develop and not to produce", and the Soviet phrase "specially designed for" could be interpreted as "specially created for".

Karpov confirmed these interpretations. >

Graybeal asked whether the language of the Soviet working paper covered devices other than ABM launchers, interceptors, and radars, and whether transportable systems or components would be considered as mobile systems or components.

Karpov asked what was meant by transportable systems.

Graybeal responded that in the U.S. we use the term "mobile" to refer to systems which could be constantly in motion; but, in this provision, we

intend to include systems which could be readily transported from one place to another. He called on Barlow to amplify these remarks.

Barlow said that by "transportable systems" we mean interceptors, launchers, and radars designed to be moved frequently during their service life. He said that a system transported from a factory to a site would not necessarily be considered a transportable system.

Karpov said that he did not quite understand any difference between mobile and transportable systems if both could be moved frequently.

Graybeal said that if that was the case, he thought we were in agreement on this point.

Barlow said that in U.S. usage, a mobile radar has wheels or tracks; that is, it is self-propelled. He noted that the terms "mobile" and "transportable" are used in contrast to fixed permanent installations.

Karpov said that he would review the U.S. remarks and would respond at a later time. He wished to ask, however, whether the term "mobile" included the term "transportable".

Graybeal responded that it did.

Karpov asked if this also applied to sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems.

Graybeal responded that, by definition, sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems are mobile systems.

Karpov said that he would return to the subject at a later time.

Graybeal said that he had nothing more to discuss today.

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

A-498

Helsinki (Sect)

Date: September 13, 1971
Time: 1230-1300 hours
Place: U.S. Embassy
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Early Warning Radars; ICBM Defense; and
Future ABM Systems

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Col C. G. FitzGerald
Maj William Barlow

USSR

Col A. A. Fedenko
Mr. Obuhkov

Future Systems

Col Fedenko reiterated the standard Soviet arguments against including any general provisions on future undefined ABM systems. The Standing Commission could handle such problems if they ever arose. The alternative, he felt, was for the U.S. to specify and define in Article II what systems, components or mechanisms it had in mind. If the U.S. could define what it was talking about, then national means could probably verify such activities because presumably it would be mandatory to test such conceptual devices. The Soviet side would then be in a position to determine whether such systems should be in an ABM Treaty.

DATE: September 15, 197

TIME: 10:00 - 11:30 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy

SUBJECT: Discussion of Articles 2 and 6 (V)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

USSR

Mr. S. N. Graybeal
Col. Charles FitzGerald

Mr. Viktor Karpov
Mr. A. A. Fedenko

At the September 15 meeting between Graybeal and Karpov, accompanied by FitzGerald and Fedenko, the Soviets tabled new Articles 2 and 6(V). (See attachment.)

The discussion started with Article 6(V). Karpov argued that the new formulation of Soviet paragraph 1 (U.S. paragraph 2) of Article 6(V) obviates the requirement for the phrase "other devices for performing the functions of these components" appearing at the end of U.S. paragraph 2. The Soviets were proposing to eliminate specific listing of ABM system components (launchers, interceptors, and radars) and substitute the word "components" (using the literal Russian word (komponenty) for this instead of the word for "components" (sredstva) used in Article 2 when referring to launchers, interceptors, and radars. Karpov agreed with Graybeal's interpretation that the Soviet text meant "any type of present or future components" of ABM systems.

Karpov said they would give favorable consideration to Graybeal's suggestion that the phrase "specially constructed for such systems" be dropped from the Soviet wording.

Agreement was also reached that, consistent with the "new Article 6", the Soviet text would use "and" between systems and components, while the U.S. text would retain "or" between systems and components.

Graybeal said he would take the new Soviet formulation into consideration and refer it to the U.S. Delegation. It was agreed that paragraph 1 of U.S. Article 6 would remain bracketed as a U.S. proposal.

After a brief break, the discussion turned to Article 2. Karpov refused to accept the U.S. wording "indistinguishable from" or "of a type tested in an ABM mode". He argued that "new Article 6" forbids testing non-ABM components in an ABM mode. To include these phrases in Article 2 implies that there can be a breach of the treaty. Therefore, inclusion of either wording in Article 2 is incompatible with "new Article 6" since definitions must not conflict with obligations. The Soviet side could understand the requirement for this language in Article 2 if there were no prohibition on such testing, but inclusion of the phrase in Article 2 would call "new Article 6" into question.

Karpov also said the U.S. approach to Article 2 is unacceptable with or without the phrases "indistinguishable from" or "of a type tested in an ABM mode".

Graybeal argued the need for clear and concise definitions to include the above phrases. He saw no incompatibility between U.S. Article 2 and "new Article 6". In fact, he argued, two Articles are complementary to each other when the U.S. wording is used.

The final result was to leave each side's version of the entire Article 2 in brackets.

It was also agreed that Karpov and Graybeal would make only individual reports to their respective Heads of Delegation, and the remaining problems would be discussed further at the new mini-troika (Parsons, Garthoff, and Graybeal with Timerbaev, Kishilov, and Karpov).

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 15, 1971

TIME: 5:00 - 5:15 p.m.

PLACE: Capitol Theater,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Further Progress in SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US USSR

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov

As I was leaving the theater, Semenov engaged me in conversation for a few minutes in which he emphasized the desirability of removing some of the non-substantive bracketed disagreements in the Joint Draft Text being developed by the two Delegations. I mentioned in particular Article 2, and urged that we find a solution which did not prejudice the different substantive positions of the two sides over the article on future kinds of ABM systems. Semenov agreed, and also thought that we should be able to find a neutral formulation which would not prejudice the views of either side.

SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 17, 1971

TIME: 12:30 - 12:50 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Smith-Semenov Post-Mini-Plenary Conversation,
September 17

PARTICIPANTS:

US

USSR

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

Deputy Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov
Mr. V. Ya. Faekov,
Interpreter

Semenov said he hoped that Smith had noticed that in today's Soviet statement Semenov had paid special attention to Article 2. It seemed to him that there was an opportunity here to try and remove some differences on language for this Article. In his view Article 2 and Article 3 formed the main basis for the ABM agreement. He quite understood that in regard to Article 3 we faced some serious problems that would require additional reflection with a view to narrowing differences. On the other hand, looking at Article 2, he came to the conclusion that there were possibilities for reaching mutually agreed language. At one time it had appeared to him that such agreed language would be easily achieved, but then somehow the two sides had started moving away from each other. It was the Soviet view that inclusion of the word "indistinguishable" cast doubt on the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. In this connection he would recall that when he had reported on the state of our negotiations at a meeting of his Government in Moscow, one of the fundamental questions asked of him related to national means of verification. He was asked how this matter would be settled between the two Delegations. He had replied that it was his general impression that the US Delegation had a very good understanding of this general situation. At that same meeting some views had been expressed to the effect that this issue of national technical means might prove to be a stumbling block. He would say that inclusion of any provision that would enlarge the shadow of doubt about verification would

make consideration of what had been discussed here in Helsinki very much more difficult and might also create additional difficulty at the next phase in Vienna. He would therefore ask the US side take this fact into consideration. It was quite possible that he was himself at fault in this respect, perhaps not having been convincing enough in expressing the views of the Soviet side on this issue. His argumentation on the efficiency and adequacy of national means and the complete unacceptability of on-site inspection would perhaps require some further presentation. He had a voluminous dossier on this question and apparently he would have to make use of it at the next Vienna phase, presenting his considerations and reasons in support of the Soviet position in greater detail. However, he wanted to express the hope that perhaps we could work the problem out while we were still here and remove the unnecessary difficulties caused by inclusion of the word "indistinguishable."

Smith said that in regard to the Article 2 problem, as he understood it, the Soviet side had not wanted to say anything in Article 2 that might prejudice the Soviet position on SAM upgrade. He had thought that this concern had been resolved between Garthoff and Kishilev when they discussed Articles 4 and 7 of the draft text. But lately he had the feeling that the Soviet position on Article 2 reflected a desire that nothing be done to prejudice the Soviet position on the issue treated in paragraph 1 of Article 6. It seemed to him that we should be ingenious enough to draft Article 2 in such a way as not to prejudice the position of either side in regard to paragraph 1 of Article 6. Smith wanted to emphasize to Semenov the great importance that the US Government attached to this issue. It was his belief that without such a provision, which was similar to analogous provisions included in other treaties, an agreement between us might prove to be simply an illusion. We might think that we had concluded an agreement on limiting ABM systems, only to find that in fact we had only limited launchers, interceptors and radars. He hoped that he had been able to convey to Semenov the great importance we attached to that issue.

Semenov said that in regard to Article 2 he would have no objection to a further search by our Executive Secretaries for possible language that would not prejudice our respective positions on paragraph 1, Article 6. However, Article 2 spoke for itself. He did not really know in what sense Article 6 had a bearing on Article 2, since the latter dealt with definitions and in his view this was quite enough for that particular Article. With reference to the US position on Article 6, which had been advanced here in Helsinki for the first time, naturally the Soviet side had carefully listened to the considerations expressed in support of the US position. At this moment he would not care to say any more than had already been said on this issue. Obviously this problem would be kept in his field of vision during the preparation in Moscow for the next Vienna phase.

Frankly, it was his Delegation's impression that inclusion of the word "indistinguishable" in Article 2 would make the entire agreement quite uncertain. What was indistinguishable from launchers, missiles, and radars? This concept in his view was too ill-defined and arbitrary for inclusion in an agreement on ABM's that we have been working on. Furthermore, when we spoke of reaching an agreement to limit ABMs in our two countries, it was his impression that we intended such limitation to be at a minimum level and this in his view was an essential consideration in seeking mutually acceptable positions. In his goal he saw the main basis and the soul of our discussions. Smith was right in his belief that the Soviet side was seriously interested in reaching an ABM agreement. For his part, he proceeded from the same premise regarding the intentions of the US side. Therefore he believed that in this matter we should each take a broader view of the matter, bearing in mind that inclusion of uncertainties in an agreement would surely lead to all sorts of misunderstandings in the future. He emphasized that after concluding an ABM agreement we would be faced with the necessity of solving a number of other questions that were no less difficult than this one. Therefore he believed we should give a green light to the work that lies ahead of us and that that work should be based on the growing mutual trust between our two sides. He asked Smith to note that he had not spoken in these terms in the past, but in the context of recent events and of our work here he was doing so now.

Smith replied that he would like to think over Semenov's suggestion that our Executive Secretaries take over Article 2. This might be acceptable, but before saying any more on the subject he would like to consult with his colleagues.

Semenov said he would be very reluctant to leave Article 2 in brackets. This would create an undesirable impression when he reported to his leadership upon coming home.

SECRET-EXDIS

Helsinki
A-532

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SALT DELEGATION
HELSINKI, FINLAND

DATE: September 20, 1971

TIME: 3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,
Helsinki

SUBJECT: Joint Draft Text of an ABM Agreement

PARTICIPANTS: US USSR

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff Minister R. M. Timerbaev
Mr. N. S. Kishilov

I noted that the package trade-off which I had outlined would, if accepted, remove a great deal of underbrush from the draft agreement. There would remain seven points of difference: whether the agreement would be a Treaty or Executive Agreement; ABM levels and deployment limitations; a provision to cover future "unconventional" ABM systems; large-phased array radars, other than ABM and early-warning radars; non-transfer; explicit link to the offensive limitations; and withdrawal in the event of lack of success in follow-on offensive negotiations. Our Delegation did not see solutions to these problems here at Helsinki, and they would presumably remain for later resolution. After probing the firmness of our position on the link to offensive limitations, and the special withdrawal provision, the Soviet participants agreed that this list of issues would remain.

1. Persons Present:

Amb. Smith
Parsons
Nitze
Allison
Garthoff
Graybeal
Shaw
Stoertz
Weiler
Aldridge
S. Smith
Twombly
Germond
Lavroff

Min. Semenov
Ogarkov
Shchukin
Pleshakov
Grinevsky
Kishilov
Gryzlov
Afonsky
Karpov
Skoptsov
Perfilyev
Baranovsky
Buyanov
Fayekov

The proposals of the Soviet Union proceed from the premise that those systems of each side should be limited, that were specially developed to counter strategic ballistic missiles and their components in flight trajectory.

Taking this into account, the obligations of the sides would extend to long-range acquisition radars, tracking and ABM guidance radars, ABM launchers and ABMs.

Further, agreed quantitative limitations of launchers and ABMs would be established, as well as limitations on the maximum distance of ABM systems from the center of the target defended.

Obviously, it is precisely these components, taken together, that constitute an ABM defense system. Therefore, it is enough to extend the obligations of the sides to the totality of the above-mentioned components in order to solve the problem of limiting the deployment of ABM systems effectively and reliably.

SALT VI

US/USSR Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 4
Soviet Embassy
1100 hours, November 30, 1971

Persons Present:

Ambassador Smith	Minister Semenov
Ambassador Parsons	Academician Shchukin
Mr. Nitze	General Trusov
General Allison	Mr. Grinevsky
Dr. Garthoff	Mr. Kishilov
Mr. Shaw	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Parr	(Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	Mr. Novikov
Mr. Krimer	(Interpreter)
(Interpreter)	

Academician Shchukin said that thanks to the joint work on preparing a draft text of a Treaty (Agreement) on the Limitation of ABMs, the sides had been able to agree on a number of provisions. The results of this work had been confirmed in Moscow during the interval between Helsinki and Vienna. In this connection, it was of fundamental importance to have reached agreement on the text of a provision in which each party undertook not to develop, test, or deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems or their components. This provision in particular confirmed the importance both sides attached to preparing a draft which excluded the possibility of the deployment of ABM defenses of the territory of a country. The next provision was to the effect that each Party undertook not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Apart from this, the Soviet side cannot recognize as well-founded the proposal of the US involving an obligation not to deploy ABM systems using devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars to perform the functions of these components. The subject of a Treaty (Agreement) could only be a specific and concrete limitation of ABM systems. It would seem that prohibiting something unknown, as proposed by the US side, would create uncertainty as to the subject of the Treaty (Agreement) on limiting ABMs. Such had never been done in a serious agreement. If systems based on different technical principles should subsequently appear, they could be discussed additionally, as provided by the draft Treaty.