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arms control

A Reply to Nixon and Kissinger

"We should collect our winnings" at a summit

by George P. Shultz

The arms-control deal that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev are expected to sign at a summit later this year was sharply criticized by Richard Nixon in an interview two weeks ago in TIME *and in a syndicated article he co-authored with Henry Kissinger. The Secretary of State offered this reply for* TIME:

The U.S. and the Soviet Union appear to be nearing an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Such an agreement is not assured—our negotiators still have important work before them—but if it is concluded, it would constitute the first time in 25 years of U.S.-Soviet arms-control talks that significant *and verifiable reductions* in any category of offensive nuclear weapons had taken place. Now some are questioning whether an agreement along the lines emerging would be in our interest. The Administration's judgment is that it would be decidedly so.

In the mid-1970s Moscow began to deploy the SS-20, a highly accurate missile with three nuclear warheads that could reach London in twelve minutes. The U.S. had withdrawn its last INF missile from Europe more than a decade earlier. In 1979 we and our NATO allies agreed that our objective in response to the SS-20s was to get the Soviets to pull them out. Failing that, we should counter these missiles with NATO deployments.

When, in 1981, President Reagan first proposed the zero option, a plan to eliminate longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles, we had not yet deployed a single weapon of this type. The Soviets were not willing to bargain. In 1983 we proposed an interim agreement: equal U.S. and Soviet levels worldwide below NATO's planned deployment of 572 LRINF warheads. The Soviets still said no. By last October a sizable number of the U.S. missiles was in place.

At his meeting with the President in Reykjavík, General Secretary Gorbachev said he was now prepared for an interim agreement—a limit of 100 LRINF missile warheads for each side, all deployed *outside* Europe. This was consistent with the U.S. interim proposal, although key issues remained. Thus NATO's resolve may have brought us to the point of success.

To reach the equal levels, the Soviet arsenal would be reduced by more than 1,300 LRINF missile warheads and ours by some 200. For the first time since the 1950s no Soviet LRINF missiles would be deployed in Europe. In Asia, Soviet LRINF warheads would be reduced by more than 80%.

Former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger are concerned that such an outcome would render our overall deterrent capabilities more vulnerable. Others have expressed concern that it would lead to the "denuclearization" of Europe or the "decoupling" of the U.S. from its security commitments to the Continent. These are avowedly the objectives of Soviet policy. We are not going to accede to them. But it is not necessary to abandon the quest for nuclear arms cuts to defeat these Soviet aims.

For two decades NATO's strategy of flexible response has depended on three elements: strong conventional forces in place in Europe, balanced nuclear forces deployed in support of allied forces on the Continent, and U.S. strategic systems as the ultimate deterrent force. Today this doctrine is firmly established among Western allies, and we are determined to sustain it.

Even after an INF agreement, NATO would retain a robust deterrent. More than 4,000 U.S. nuclear weapons would still be in Europe, on aircraft that could retaliate deep into the Soviet Union and on remaining missiles and nuclear artillery. NATO is planning or undertaking modernization of several of these systems. Also, several hundred submarine-launched ballistic-missile warheads would remain available to the Supreme NATO Commander. Thus, even after eliminating LRINF missiles, we could continue to discourage a Soviet attack without relying exclusively on strategic systems. Perhaps even more significant are our 40 years of shared political and defense goals, integrated command structure, technological know-how and military preparedness. These factors, together with the continued deployment in Europe of more than 300,000 U.S. troops, inexorably link the U.S. to Europe in a way that will continue to deter Soviet adventurism on the Continent.

We and our allies are working to meet the threat posed by the long-standing imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, both by strengthening our defenses and by discussing with the Soviets new conventional arms-control talks that would cover the whole of Europe. But linking an INF agreement to conventional force reductions would distort the reason for the decision to deploy U.S. LRINF missiles in the first place. The intent was to offset the SS-20s or, preferably, to secure their removal, not to provide NATO's sole means of compensating for the conventional imbalance. This linkage would also mock our negotiators' persistent efforts to break the Soviet linkage between INF and SDI as well as other issues, a tactic that stalled progress in Geneva and Reykjavík. To add a new demand now that an INF agreement be linked to conventional reductions, which will undoubtedly take many more years to negotiate, would be tantamount to introducing a "killer amendment."

One must ask whether we wish to deny ourselves the success we have achieved in the negotiations and leave Europe in the shadow of the Soviet SS-20s, with far more of them facing our Asian friends and allies as well.

Working with our allies, we have been careful to ensure that an INF agreement would be beneficial in its own right. We have insisted that it result in an equal outcome for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., that it be global in scope and not simply shift the threat of missile deployments from Europe to Asia, and that it be verifiable. If the Soviets meet our terms, we should not forgo the benefits of such an agreement, even as we seek the stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms that are our highest priority and as we work to redress the conventional imbalance.

We are on the right course toward the goal set by NATO. We should stick with it, collect our winnings, take pride in the success that NATO's steadiness has produced, and move on to further building of alliance strength and cohesion.

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SUPPLEMENTAL: WEDNESDAY, 13 MAY 1987

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Strengthening NATO by cutting back US troops in Europe

By Kevin Michel Capé

THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which marked its 38th anniversary last month, finds itself in that Dickensian paradox of "the best of times" and "the worst of times."

On a positive note, the alliance rarely has been in better shape in a technical sense. Cooperation among alliance armies in the field is better than ever. Most outside observers give high marks to Secretary General Lord Carrington and military commander Gen. Bernard Rogers.

Despite well-known European complaints about Reagan administration foreign policy, polls show public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic still as resolutely pro-NATO as ever. Yet there is widespread feeling in the United States that Washington should "punish" its NATO allies for anti-Americanism, both real and imagined.

This is a reaction partly to the nonnuclear defense policy of the British Labour party, and to the calls from the West German Social Democrats' left wing for a neutral Federal Republic. Neither view is likely to take concrete form in any prospective British or West German government, but such ideas are nevertheless symptomatic of pervasive anti-Reaganism in Europe.

In fairness to the Reagan administration, though, European reaction to US presidents is rarely very generous, the last warm period having been the Nixon years. (Cynical Europeans believe politicians are supposed to be Machiavellian.) During the Carter administration, the European press complained bitterly of the "drift" and "lack of leadership" in Washington. One remembers the famous German cartoon, playing on President John Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech, that showed the hapless Carter declaring, "I am a Frankfurter." The European complaint now is the historically familiar "America doesn't consult us."

In return, Washington today is even grumpier than usual with the NATO allies. "Enough is enough," says one official, taking aim at European complaints. Democrats such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, have proposed that 100,000 US troops be withdrawn from NATO countries. Indeed, Georgia Sen. Sam Nunn, long known for prodding Europeans to spend more on defense, has suggested that Congress could well approve cuts in the number of troops the US contributes to NATO.

Yet when a future administration decides to reduce US troops in Europe, the Pentagon will have to be dragged along kicking and screaming. The US defense bureaucracy has been startlingly unwilling to cut US troops even in those countries – notably Spain and Greece – whose governments have been pleading for years for such a reduction. A case in point is Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's visit to Spain in March, when he resisted repeated Spanish requests for a reduction in some 10,000 US personnel, stationed mainly at the Torrejon and Zaragoza air bases. Weinberger contended that Spaniards are incapable of taking over support functions for US aircraft, a statement that did not win America any friends in Spain. Indeed, the Pentagon seems oblivious to the fact that continued Spanish membership in NATO is contingent on Premier Felipe González's ability to negotiate cuts in US troops in his country.

The issue of the bases has also reared its head recently in a confrontation between Greece and Turkey over mineral rights in the Aegean Sea. Greek Premier Andreas Papandreou put pressure on Turkey by threatening to close a US communications center at Nea Makri, underlining the vulnerability of US bases abroad in a crisis.

Pentagon bureaucrats seem to see only the benefits of stationing troops abroad, not the liabilities. Yet the most anti-Soviet European country is France, where US troops are absent. Similarly, West Germany, where US troops are the most visible, is where neutralist sentiment is growing most rapidly. Americans underestimate the effects of omnipresent foreign troops. West Germans must contend not

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only with over 250,000 GIs, but also with British and French contingents, each about 50,000-strong.

So Washington, indeed, should reduce US troops in Europe, not as a reaction to European disaffection, but because it is in the long-term interest of both the US and Western Europe that Europe's defense be in European hands. One sensible target would be for the US to reduce its troops in Europe by 5,000 to 10,000 each year over the next decade. Naturally, such reductions would result in some impairment of NATO readiness, but this risk would be more than offset by subsequent gains at the political level.

One immediate gain would be to give current Franco-German military cooperation a further nudge forward. This spring, France and Germany have planned joint maneuvers unprecedented in size and scope. Similarly, negotiations are under way for French guarantees of West German territorial integrity and an eventual move of Hades French tactical nuclear missiles to the East German border.

The ironic conclusion is that modest reductions today in America's European contingent actually would strengthen NATO in the longer term.

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GREENBOOK: AC Developments 1981-87 Working Draft 2

Following a comprehensive review of its security requirements, the United States began in 1981 to put forward a series of arms control proposals aimed at dramatically reducing the size of existing arsenals and reducing the risk of war.

Nuclear Weapons Reductions: In November 1981, the President proposed joint US-USSR talks to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) weapons. In May 1982, the President called for joint US-USSR strategic arms reduction talks (START) aimed initially at reducing strategic ballistic missile warheads by a third, or half the number in the existing US stockpile.

In 1983, the US offered two interim solutions at the INF negotiatons which would permit reduced INF missile deployments on both sides. Rather than accept any US INF missile deployment, the Soviet Union walked out of the talks. The same year, the US relaxed and modified its START position by incorporating a Congressionally suggested "build-down" formula. In December 1983, the Soviet Union suspended its participation in the START negotiations.

By 1985, the US and USSR agreed to a new agenda of talks incorporating strategic arms (START), intermediate-range nuclear (INF) forces and space and defense issues. The later forum would be used for discussing a new US strategic concept calling for radical reductions in nuclear weapons over a 10-year period and transition to "defense-reliant deterrent." In November 1985 the US proposed 50 percent reductions in strategic forces, a low-level interim formula for INF and mutually "open laboratories."

In October 1986, at the Reykjavik mini-summit, the US and USSR made extraordinary progress in narrowing their

differences. The two sides agreed in principle to not withdraw from the ABM treaty for 10 years, to 50 percent reductions in strategic warheads over five years, followed by the complete elimination of ballistic missiles over 10 years.

SDI: In an address to the nation on March 23, 1983, the President announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, a research program designed to study the feasibility of using defensive systems to prevent nuclear attack, rather than relying solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to maintain the peace. Since the announcement of the initiative, great progress has been made in this research program.

Space Weapons: In a March 1984, the Administration reported to Congress that there is no way "to design a comprehensive anti-satellite ban." However in June, 1984, the Administration did agree to begin talks with the USSR in Vienna on "preventing the militarization of space" to review the whole area of space arms control. While the Soviets initially backed away from their own proposal to talk, by November 1984, the US and USSR and agreed to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and outer space weapons.

Chemical Weapons: In 1984, Vice President Bush proposed a complete ban on chemical weapons to the UN Committee on Disarmament. A year later, the US submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty banning the development, production, acquisition, transfer stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. In March 1986, as Conference on Disarmament negotiations continued, the US and USSR began a series of

meetings bilateral to further ban the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Conventional Forces: In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which began in 1972, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were at an impasse concerning the number of Pact forces in the area of proposed reductions. In December 1985, NATO dropped its demand for prior agreement on forces in the zone and accepted the Pact's framework for an agreement: a US-Sovietr first phase withdrawal with a freeze on other forces in the area. Since then, the talks have again bogged down over the Pact's refusal to accept verfication measures. However, in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), agreement was reached in 1986 on a Western package of confidence- and security-building measures, including advanced notification and observation of large military activities, exchange of annual calendars and inspections to monitor compliance.

Risk Reduction Measures: In July 1984, the US and USSR agreed to improve the "hot-line" direct communications link between Washington and Moscow. In September 1984 and again in May 1985, the President proposed a series of risk reduction measures for use in Europe. And in May 1986, the first of a series of US-USSR expert-level meetings was held to discuss nuclear risk reduction centers.

Nuclear Weapons Testing: In 1983, the United States offered to begin expert level talks to resolve verfication issues preventing ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. In March 1986,

the President proposed reciprocal on-site nuclear test inspections and invited Soviet experts to US sites with Soviet instruments. By mid-1986, expert level talks were underway in Geneva.

Soviet Non-Compliance: In January 1984, the President reported seven specific cases of certain, probably or likely Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. In February 1985, the President reported six new cases of Soviet non-compliance with the Interim Agreement (SALT I), the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 10, 1987

THE PRESIDENT'S UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

The following is the text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate transmitting the President's report, in classified and unclassified versions, on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements as required by PL 99-145:

Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President):

In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.

Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.

I believe the additional information provided, and issues addressed, especially in the more detailed classified report, will significantly increase understanding of Soviet violations and probable violations. Such understanding, and strong congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control, will do much to strengthen our efforts both in seeking corrective actions and in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ronald Reagan

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

At the request of the Congress, I have, in the past three years, provided four reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. These reports include the Administration's reports of January 1984, and February and December 1985, as well as the report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance, their adverse effects to our national security, and our attempts to resolve the issues. When taken as a whole, this series of reports also provides a clear picture of the continuing pattern of Soviet violations and a basis for our continuing concerns.

In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:

> The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet non-compliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under, or political commitment to, the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I further stated:

> At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.

I have also expressed my personal concerns directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again this past October in Reykjavik.

Another year has passed and, despite these intensive efforts, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues.

Compliance is a cornerstone of international law; states are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken.

In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:

> Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
>
> Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
>
> Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve

> noncompliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

Congress has repeatedly stated its concern about Soviet noncompliance. The U.S. Senate, on February 17, 1987, passed a resolution (S. Res. 94), by a vote of 93 to 2, which:

> ... declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violations of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar sited at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ...

Compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements. As I have stated before:

> In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.

I have also said that:

> Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.... The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

The ABM Treaty

Today I must report that we have deep, continuing concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. For several reasons, we are concerned with the Krasnoyarsk radar, which appeared to be completed externally in 1986. The radar demonstrates that the Soviets were designing and programming a prospective violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States.

The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPAR) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining gap in the Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking screen; its location allows it to acquire attack characterization data that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces and deciding timely offensive responses -- a standard role for such radars.

All LPARs, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, but also have the inherent capability,

depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.

LPARs have always been considered to be the long lead-time elements of a possible territorial defense. Taken together, the Krasnoyarsk radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concerns that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Some of the activities, such as construction of the new LPARs on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system, appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The construction of the radar near Krasnoyarsk, however, is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty, while other Soviet ABM-related activities involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. These other issues, discussed fully in the body of the report, are:

The testing and development of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years;

The concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components;

The development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities; and

The demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time shorter than previously noted.

Soviet activities during the past year have contributed to our concerns. The Soviets have begun construction of three additional LPARs similar to the Krasnoyarsk radar. These new radars are located and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provision on ballistic missile early warning radars, but they would increase the number of Soviet LPARs by 50 percent. The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars suggests that their primary mission is ballistic missile acquisition and tracking.

This year's reexamination of Soviet ABM related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. It is the totality of these Soviet ABM-related activities in 1986 and earlier years that gives rise to our continuing concerns that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of an ABM system for the defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense. As I said in last December's report:

> This would have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility.

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

The integrity of the arms control process is also hurt by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Information obtained during the last year reinforces our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements. Progress toward an agreement banning chemical weapons is affected by Soviet noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of the record of Soviet noncompliance with past agreements, we believe verification provisions are a matter of unprecedented importance in our efforts to rid the world of these heinous weapons -- weapons of mass destruction under international law.

The Soviets have continued to maintain a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability. We are particularly concerned because it may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have no defense. The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities. Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort. Even though there have been no confirmed reports of lethal attacks since the beginning of 1984, previous activities have provided the Soviets with valuable testing, development, and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

The record of Soviet noncompliance with the treaties on nuclear testing is of legal and military concern. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) came into force over twenty years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the aims of the Treaty by regularly permitting the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the USSR. Even though the debris from these Soviet tests does not pose calculable health, safety or environmental risks, and these infractions have no apparent military significance, our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been continually rebuffed. Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.

During their test moratorium, the Soviets undoubtedly maintained their sites because they quickly conducted a test soon after announcing intent to do so. Furthermore, there were numerous ambiguous events during this period that can neither be associated with, nor disassociated from, observed Soviet nuclear test-related activities.

Soviet testing at yields above the 150 kt limit would allow development of advanced nuclear weapons with proportionately higher yields of weapons than the U.S. could develop under the Treaty.

The United States and the Soviet Union have met on four occasions during the past year for expert-level discussions on the broad range of issues related to nuclear testing. Our objective during these discussions consistently has been to achieve agreement on an effective verification regime for the TTBT and PNET. I remain hopeful that we can accomplish this goal.

The Helsinki Final Act

In 1981 the Soviet Union conducted a major military exercise without providing prior notification of the maneuver's designation and the number of troops taking part, contrary to its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act.

During the past year, we have reached an accord at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures that contains new standards for notification, observation, and verification of military activities, including on-site inspection. We will be carefully assessing Soviet compliance with these new standards, which went into effect January 1, 1987.

Recent Developments

At the end of 1986 and during the early weeks of 1987, new information pertaining to some of the issues in this report became available, but it was judged that the data did not necessitate a change in any of the findings. This was partially due to the developing nature of the information at

the time and certain ambiguities associated with it. Furthermore, the Soviet Union resumed underground nuclear testing on February 26, 1987.

SALT II and the SALT I Interim Agreement

The Soviet Union repeatedly violated the SALT II Treaty and took other actions that were inconsistent with the Treaty's provisions. In no case where we determined that the Soviet Union was in violation did they take corrective action. We have raised these issues for the past three years in the SCC and in other diplomatic channels.

The Soviets committed four violations of their political commitment to observe SALT II; they were:

- The development and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a prohibited second new type of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM);

- Extensive encryption of telemetry during test flights of strategic ballistic missiles;

- Concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing; and

- Exceeding the permitted number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs).

In addition, the Soviets:

- Probably violated the prohibition on deploying the SS-16 ICBM;

- Took actions inconsistent with their political commitment not to give the BACKFIRE bomber intercontinental operating capability by deploying it to Arctic bases; and

- Evidently exceeded the agreed production quota by producing slightly more than the allowed 30 BACKFIRE bombers per year until 1984.

Concerning the SALT I Interim Agreement, the Soviets used former SS-7 ICBM facilities to support deployment of the SS-25 mobile ICBM, and thereby violated the prohibition on the use of former ICBM facilities.

Soviet Noncompliance and U.S. Restraint Policy

On June 10, 1985, I expressed concern that continued Soviet noncompliance increasingly affected our national security. I offered to give the Soviet Union additional time in order to take corrective actions to return to full compliance, and I asked them to join us in a policy of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I stated that future U.S. decisions would be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their noncompliance, reversing their military buildup, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

The December 23, 1985, report showed that the Soviets had not taken any actions to correct their noncompliance with arms control commitments. In May 1986, I concluded that the Soviets had made no real progress toward meeting our concerns with respect to their noncompliance, particularly in those activities related to SALT II and the ABM Treaty. From June 1985 until May 1986, we saw no abatement of the Soviet strategic force buildup.

The third yardstick I had established for judging Soviet actions was their seriousness at negotiating deep arms

reductions. In May 1986 I concluded that, since the November 1985 summit, the Soviets had not followed up constructively on the commitment undertaken by General Secretary Gorbachev and me to build upon areas of common ground in the Geneva negotiations, including accelerating work toward an interim agreement on INF.

In Reykjavik, General Secretary Gorbachev and I narrowed substantially the differences between our two countries on nuclear arms control issues. However, the Soviets took a major step backward by insisting that progress in every area of nuclear arms control must be linked together in a single package that has as its focus killing the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Furthermore, it became clear that the Soviets intended to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive than it is on its own terms by limiting our SDI research strictly to the laboratory.

It was, however, the continuing pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that I have outlined above that was the primary reason why I decided, on May 27, 1986, to end U.S. observance of the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and SALT II. The decision to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the Interim Agreement (which had expired) and the SALT II Treaty (which was never ratified and would have expired on December 31, 1985) was not made lightly. The United States cannot, and will not, allow a double standard of compliance with arms control agreements to be established.

Therefore, on May 27, 1986, I announced:

> In the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance and especially in a flawed SALT II Treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Responding to a Soviet request, the U.S. agreed to hold a special session of the SCC in July 1986 to discuss my decision. During that session, the U.S. made it clear that we would continue to demonstrate the utmost restraint. At this session we stated that, assuming there is no significant change in the threat we face, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. We also repeated my May 27 invitation to the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. The Soviet response was negative.

In my May 27 announcement, I had said the United States would remain in technical observance of SALT II until later in the year when we would deploy our 131st Heavy Bomber equipped to carry air-launched cruise missiles. The deployment of that bomber on November 28, 1986, marked the full implementation of that policy.

Now that we have put the Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements, which have been studied and reported to the Congress in detail in the past, are not treated in the body of this report. This is not to suggest that the significance of the Soviet violations has in any way diminished. We are still concerned about the increasing Soviet military threat.

A number of activities involving SALT II constituted violations of the core or central provisions of the Treaty frequently cited by the proponents of SALT II as the primary reason for supporting the agreement. These violations involve both the substantive provisions and the vital verification provisions of the Treaty. Through violation of the SALT II limit of the one "new type" of ICBM, the Soviets are in the process of deploying illegal additions to their force that provide even more strategic capability.

Soviet encryption and concealment activities have, in the past, presented special obstacles to verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The Soviets' extensive encryption of ballistic missile telemetry impeded U.S. ability to verify key provisions of the SALT II Treaty. Of equal importance, these Soviet activities undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new treaties and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be effectively verifiable.

Soviet Noncompliance and New Arms Control Agreements

Soviet noncompliance, as documented in this and previous Administration reports, has made verification and compliance pacing elements of arms control today. From the beginning of my Administration, I have sought deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and have personally proposed ways to achieve the objectives in my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. If we are to enter agreements of this magnitude and significance, effective verification is indispensable and cheating is simply not acceptable.

I look forward to continued close consultations with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around the national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

Obligation: To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each Party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the December 1985 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of credible alternative explanations have reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

Obligation: Paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the December 1985 report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the USSR's development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

Obligation: The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them in "an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM and ABM system components is prohibited.

Issue: The December 1985 compliance report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems

Obligation: Under subparagraph (a) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty, each party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...."

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

Obligation: The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. Paragraph 2, Article V, of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested, or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Territorial Defense

Obligation: The ABM Treaty and Protocol allow each party a single operational site, explicitly permit modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognize the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the December 1985 report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Our concern continues.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are Parties. Soviet actions not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

Obligations: The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligation in relation to weapons, equipment and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the first use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Issues: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1986 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm the conclusion of the December 1985 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Kampuchea, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1986 according to our strict standards of evidence. Although several analytical efforts have been undertaken in the past year to investigate continuing reports of attacks, these studies have so far had no positive results. Therefore, there is no basis for amending the December, 1985, conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Kampuahea, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under internaticnal law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit

Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified by either Party but neither Party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated they would observe the 150-kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

Obligation: The Treaty prohibits beginning March 31, 1976, any underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: During the past year, the U.S. Government has been reviewing Soviet nuclear weapons test activity that occurred prior to the self-imposed moratorium of August 6, 1985, and has been reviewing related U.S. Government methodologies for estimating Soviet nuclear test yields. The work is continuing. In December 1985, the U.S. Government found that: "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." At present, with our existing knowledge of this complex topic, that finding stands. It will be updated when studies now under way are completed. Such studies should provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing past Soviet compliance. Ambiguities in the nature and features of past Soviet testing and significant verification difficulties will continue, and much work remains to be done on this technically difficult issue. Such ambiguities demonstrate the need for effective verification measures to correct the verification inadequacies of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its companion accord, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

Treaty Status: The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) (LTBT)) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

Obligations: The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether the USSR's underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the December 1985 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action.

Helsinki Final Act

Helsinki Final Act Notification of Military Exercises

Legal Status: The Final Act of the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This document represents a political commitment and was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, along with 33 other States. Soviet actions not in accord with that document are violations of their political commitment.

Obligation: All signatory States of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to give prior notification of, and other details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 troops.

Issue: The December 1985 report examined whether notification of the Soviet military exercise "Zapad-81" was inadequate and therefore a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment under the Helsinki Final Act. We have reexamined this issue.

Finding: The U.S. Government previously judged and continues to find that the Soviet Union in 1981 violated its political commitment to observe provisions of Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act by not providing all the information required in its notification of exercise "ZAPAD-81." Since 1981, the Soviets have observed provisions of the Helsinki Final Act in letter, but rarely in spirit. The Soviet Union has a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act, and Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. The Soviets have notified all exercises requiring notification (i.e., those of 25,000 troops or over), but have failed to make voluntary notifications (i.e., those numbering fewer than 25,000 troops). In their notifications, they have provided only the bare minimum of information. They have also observed only minimally the voluntary provision providing that observers be invited to exercises, having invited observers to only fifty percent of notified activities.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release March 6, 1987

PRESS BRIEFING
BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
FRANK CARLUCCI,
AMBASSADORS MAX KAMPELMAN,
RONALD LEHMAN AND
MAYNARD GLITMAN

The Briefing Room

1:03 P.M. EST

MR. CARLUCCI: I have a brief Presidential statement and then I'll turn the podium over to Ambassador Kampelman and his two colleagues.

The President has just met with Ambassadors Kampelman, Glitman and Lehman to hear their report on the nuclear and space talks in Geneva. The level, intensity and seriousness of the effort in Geneva have brought us closer to significant reductions in nuclear arms.

As you know, the Soviet Union has recently offered to move ahead with an agreement to cut longer-range INF missiles. This is something the United States and our allies have long urged. This week, at the President's direction, the American delegation in Geneva proposed a draft treaty incorporating the understandings which General Secretary Gorbachev and the President reached on this subject at Reykjavik.

Because of the opportunities -- the opportunities for progress that are opening up, he asked Ambassador Glitman to return to Geneva immediately. He and his team will continue working hard to resolve the remaining obstacles to an INF agreement. We hope this will, in turn, spur progress in other aspects of the Geneva negotiations, particularly agreement on deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

The President is determined to maintain the momentum that has been generated. And for that reason, Secretary of State Shultz will go to Moscow to meet with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The Soviet government has agreed that this visit will take place from April 13th to April 16th.

These talks will provide a good opportunity to review the entirety of our relationship, including regional conflicts, human rights and bilateral issues, and to consolidate the progress we have made.

Most important, we hope these discussions will result in recommendations to the President, and General Secretary Gorbachev, on further steps we might take to move forward in all aspects of our relations, including the Geneva negotiations.

Now, let me turn it over to Ambassador Kampelman --

Q -- say what the possibility is of a summit meeting this summer, perhaps, to sign a treaty? Is that something that --

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, I'm sure this is one of the things that the Foreign Ministers would discuss when they meet.

Q So that is a possibility now, especially if there are no --

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, if there is progress and, as I've just indicated, developments look promising, that would certainly be a possibility.

Q And would signing this treaty on medium-range missiles be a sufficient reason for a summit meeting -- for Gorbachev to come to Washington?

MR. CARLUCCI: Andrea, I wouldn't be prepared to make that kind of judgment at this point until we see how the negotiations unfold.

Max?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Thank you, Frank. Instead of making a statement, why don't we just throw it open to questions since I remember the last time I was here there were some

who didn't have the opportunity to ask their questions, let's use the occassion now. But, who will designate --

Q You.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: All right, I'll make the selections, which means it's very clear I will never again run for public office. (Laughter.)

Bill.

Q Max, can you tell us the tone of the report that you gave the President today and his response to what you had to say to it?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, we tried to be quite realistic about it because in negotiating with the Soviets there's always and there's down and the fever is up and then it's down again. So, we wanted to be realistic about it. But, the fact of the matter is, we do have a good shot at agreement. I've said this here before. I repeat it again. And we went through really in quite some detail all three of the negotiating areas that are the subject matter of the Geneva negotiations.

Andrea.

Q It's -- some impressions -- some concern among some people -- particularly in the conservative wing of the Republican party -- the President might be overeager for an agreement at this point because of his problems with Iran and the Contra diversion. Is this an effort by the White House to trump up something that isn't quite there or do you really think that this is a good possibility for an agreement to -- it's warranted?

AMBASSADOR: Well, I know you don't intend to reflect on the integrity of the negotiators, Andrea, but I would say to you that we began earnestly to negotiate two years ago. It is now two years. Each time I have met with you I have been realistically portraying what movement has been. We are accurately reflecting this to the President. I saw absolutely no indication of an undue anxiety or rush about this.

On the other hand, we all realize how important it is to achieve drastic reductions in these nuclear missiles and we're pursuing that task.

Q What -- you were going to talk about --

Q What did the President tell you after you reported to him? I mean, what kind of guidance did you get from him about what he wants you to do next?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I don't want to report on what the President may or may not have said other than to express not only a keen interest in the details he learned but, also, I think some encouragement that he felt as a result of our report. And he encouraged us to proceed and to go forward and he's asked Ambassador Glitman here to return as soon as possible because that aspect of the negotiations -- that aspect dealing with INF is continuing in Geneva. And Ambassador Glitman's team is there now and he'll be rejoining them -- we just left yesterday -- he'll be rejoining them quickly.

Q Why the particular encouragement?

Q -- why John Erickson, one of the leading Kremlinologists in the world from the University of Edinburgh went on record yesterday saying that he thinks that this latest Soviet offer is a massive Soviet strategic deception or why General Rogers would have characterized the idea of the INF deployment at this time as being madness?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I really don't care to attribute any reasons for what they may say. I know John Erikson well. I know General Rogers well. They're fully aware of what we're doing and if that is their judgment, I would simply say, we disagree with it.

Q Ambassador Kampelman, can you tell us please what you see as the primary obstacles, at this point, to the agreement -- an agreement?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Yes, there are a number of areas that have yet to be -- or that will have to covered.

The question of the shorter-range missiles and the verification issue are the two in particular that we are going to have to resolve. I want to just add that the time to table the treaty was right because of the situation we had reached inside the negotiations and not because of any external events. And your question leads me to make this point because we had gotten to this point in the negotiations where the framework, if you will, was pretty much in place. We had reached a lot of general agreements. And for the U.S. part, we felt the time had come to get into detail, and the best way to do that is with the treaty text and to start negotiating in that context. So that's why we wanted to table when we did.

Q What do think, then, about the time required to work out some of those problems? Senator Dole said earlier today, six to eight months was a framework. Do you have any thoughts on that?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: My thought is that we get a good agreement and we take the time necessary to bring back to the American people, and our allies, a good solid agreement. And that's what'll be driving me, not some other timetable.

Q Ambassador Kampelman, can you say -- can you say there's any parallel progress in the other two areas? There's been talk about movement in the SDI field -- ABM nuclear defense issues with the dropping of the word "development". Can you discuss that? And can you say whether there's any progress in Ambassador Lehman's field as well?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, will have Ambassador Lehman comment on the progress, if any, in his area. I'll say about the space and defense negotiation in which we're engageed, I think this round was a rather good one, not because of substantive agreements, which, regretably, were not arrived at, but because we very much clarified sharply, and clearly, and unmistakably our differences and explained them to one another. And that's very important in a negotiation. And we did that by coming up with a draft working paper, which, in itself, is virtuous because it gets us together in the idea of writing together -- and we did that. But, significant differences remain there.

Now, Bob, you referred to the Gorbachev speech of February 28, which interested us immensely because in the single reference in that speech to the space negotiations there was an expressed Soviet concern that they would not be in favor of the START reductions unless they somehow could be persuaded that the deployment of space weapons was dealth with. And it was interesting that they limited -- Mr. Gorbachev limited this restriction to deployment and not to testing or other things. Now, we, obviously, are exploring that. I have discussed it with Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov and we will do everything we can to see just what that means.

Now, Ron?

AMBASSADOR LEHMAN: As you know, there was tremendous progress last Fall in START. So much so that I think the outlines of an agreement for 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms is relatively obvious -- both sides. This was a youthful round, very businesslike round and we made a lot of progress in clarifying exactly what each side's

understanding was of areas where we agree and areas where we disagree. There was some minor movement on both sides, but nothing comparable to the breakthroughs of the last round.

As you know, the Soviet side has withdrawn two of its proposals for sublimits and this was a major step backwards. We think this is for tactical reasons and if they can reverse those steps, then I think things could fall into place rather quickly.

Q Ron, can you say what the minor movement is, whatever the little bit happened, happened? What was that?

AMBASSADOR LEHMAN: Yes. With respect to the basic principles of verification, we have made a lot of progress on language describing that. But I should point out that the devil really is in the details and it remains to be seen whether the explicit implementation of that language will be as good as the general language. But the general language has been very good.

There's also been some clarification on the question of counting rules. And, as you know, you can make a lot of progress in general principles and then suffer setbacks with respect to such specifics as definitions and counting rules. And here, I think we've made some real progress.

Q Ambassador?

Q Ambassador Kampelman, since you and your associates routinely communicate sensitive material from Geneva to the White House by secure telex and telephones, why was it necessary for you to come home, if not to help the President restore his image?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, let me say that Ambassador Lehman and I were scheduled to come home within the next few days anyhow. Our original closing date was to be Wednesday, this Wednesday that just passed. We did agree to prolong it in INF for a number of weeks and Ambassador Glitman will talk to a Soviet colleague and arrive at some decision on that. We agreed to continue our negotiations through today in Geneva and then to have a break so -- now.

But let me also say to you that there is -- you do report facts and you report facts in great detail, and we do it daily. That's quite different from reporting on impressions, prognostications, analysis. And the President was, quite understandably, interested, as all of you are. Witness, your presence here. And I think, therefore, we found -- at least I know I can speak for the three of us -- we found it very valuable, and I hope he found it valuable, that we meet.

Q Ambassador, what kind of reaction are you getting from the allies? Are you not concerned about their trepidation, their feelings of insecurity involved in this negotiation? How are you alleviating that?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I don't recognize -- and then I'll ask Ambassador Glitman to comment on this because of the INF aspect -- I don't recognize the anxieties among the allies. Let me say to you that we meet with the allies regularly. Every round we meet at least in the beginning of the round and again at the end of the round -- every single round -- keep them fully informed.

I find encouragement in the support and encouragement they give us. In addition, Ambassador Glitman meets with them specifically on INF questions beyond the two meetings around that I've just reported to you. And perhaps let's ask him to comment on it.

Q What about your meetings yesterday? Maybe both of you can comment --

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: I was just going to say that we had a meeting yesterday with the allies and I thought the reaction was very positive and I was quite encouraged and pleased with the reaction we got, frankly.

Q Which was?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: I won't tell you because it was flattering and you wouldn't believe me. (Laughter.)

Q What concerns do they have? What outstanding concerns?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: Well, they're concerned that we get a good treaty,

they're concerned that there be adequate verification and so on. This is -- as far as INF is concerned, I have been meeting with the allies at least once a month since 1981, and sometimes more often.

Q On verification, Ambassador, is there a foolproof method of verifying a treaty that calls for inventory controls?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: We will try to have as close to foolproof a verification regime as we can have, but if you're going to ask for 100 percent certainty, I don't think you can get that.

Q How do you verify the existence and non-existence of small -- small mobile missles?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: Well, let me say that I will not get into the details of the verification regime, which we are going to be negotiating with the Soviets. I'm satisfied that it will be as complete a regime as the U.S. has ever put forward.

Q Can I just follow up by asking whether everybody on our side is now in agreement on a verification procedure which would allow the Soviets to hunt for cruise missiles here?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: The United States has got to recognize that if we want to go and involve ourselves in on-site inspections of Soviet territory, which we will have to do, we have to give the corresponding right to the Soviet side, and I see no problems on the side of the administration on that score.

Q Has everybody agreed now on those verifications?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: Within the U.S. administration? Yes.

Q Can you tell me when that agreement came about? Can you tell me when that agreement came about?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: I don't recall a specific date. Again, you're talking about a process that's been going on for a long time -- trying to put it together, working up various

programs, subjecting them to cheating scenarios and then trying to straighten that out.

Q Are these objections remaining on our side?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: Not that I'm aware of.

Q Ambassador Kampelman, how important --

Q Can you say what the allies --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Let me go in the back.

Q How important is the trip of Mr. Shultz to Moscow? I mean, is there something that he can -- some hurdle he can get the process over that you're not able to deal with in Geneva, or is this more to -- this trip merely to show our interest?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, as you know, it's been the U.S. position for some time, and particularly Secretary Shultz' position after the Geneva meeting, that it would be highly desirable for the foreign ministers to meet on a regular basis. We've got lots of problems to talk about, and it's a great deal better to talk about them face-to-face at that level than it is to issue press releases about one another. We have many regional problems to talk about. There are other areas of conflict between the two countries that cause tension. We have to deal with those.

Obviously the subject of arms control will be one of the major subjects they'll talk about. It will not be the only subject. And I would hope that some of the differences that have been clarified in this round -- I would hope maybe they can be either dealt with and resolved or at least further having those differences narrowed. I do know that Secretary Shultz will be going there with that intent and with the desire that this meeting can help move things faster.

Q But will --

Q Mr. Ambassador --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Somebody who has not --

Q Kenneth Adelman said this morning that the United States could not agree to an INF treaty unless short-range INF systems were included in it. Is that our position?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I'll turn it to the expert.

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: There is a provision in the treaty that deals with short-range INF systems -- particular types of short-range INF systems -- and we will not be able to have a treaty that does not include them.

Q That's SS-12s and SS-23s?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: That's correct -- Scaleboard and SS-23.

We have also agreed with the Soviets -- again, there is nothing in writing, but we have agreed orally that there will be a follow-on negotiation to deal with the remaining SRINF systems to deal with their reduction.

Q We were told here two days ago that there are approximately 1,500 SS-21s that would not be included in this treaty. Wouldn't this treaty then leave the Soviets with a massive Soviet nuclear advantage in Europe, as the senior administration official here conceded a couple of days ago?

AMBASSADOR GLITMAN: That is a situation that exists with our without a treaty. The important point is that if we can reach constraints on the systems that we are trying to deal with now, we will have achieved something useful for U.S. and Western security, as well as for world interests. And we will have to go on to deal with the other systems in one manner or another, but it doesn't change that.

Q Ambassador Kampelman, how would you gauge the President's absorption of the facts that you presented to him, sir?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I don't understand the question at all.

Q Let me --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I would say he showed keen and intense interest, and I obviously don't want to in any way contribute to any suggestions or inferences to the contrary.

Let me also say that I have been advised at my right here to go this way, and so I'm going this way, and I wish you all well, and thank you for your patience.

Q Let me ask, Secretary Henry Kissinger said that -- he wrote it in Newsweek -- "The removal of American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to devastate Europe with short-range missiles and ICBMs. It eliminates the American ability to retaliate from Europe." Could you --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: We've discussed that here, as a matter of fact, alreay, I believe.

MR. HOWARD: It's already been answered.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: It's been answered in effect by -- thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:21 P.M. EST

NST

Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals

January 15, 1987
Beginning of Round VII

	UNITED STATES	SOVIET UNION
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks		
General Approach:	50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner and completed by the end of 1991.	50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms by 1991, and the total elimination of remaining strategic offensive arms by the end of 1996.
	This agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.	Agreement on 50 percent reductions by 1991 contingent upon the resolution of defense and space issues, commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB), and U.S. acceptance in principle of the elimination of all strategic offensive arms by 1996.
SNDVs:	1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). SNDVs include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.	Same as the U.S. position.
Warheads:	6,000 warhead ceiling, to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.	Same as the U.S. position.
Sublimits:	Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.	Withdrew proposals for sublimits of 80-85 percent of warheads on ballistic missiles and 60 percent of warheads on any one leg of the Triad. (Triad refers to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.)
		Sublimits to be established only on heavy missiles.
Heavy ICBMs:	There must be substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs would be included in the 1,650 sublimit.	Overall cuts in strategic offensive arms would include significant reductions in ICBMs.
Throw-Weight:	50 percent reduction from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.	The Soviets claim that an approximately 50 percent reduction in each side's throw weight level would result from their overall proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.
Mobile ICBMs:	Banned.	Permitted.
Heavy Bombers:	Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit. Each ALCM carried on a heavy bomber would count as one warhead in the 6,000 ceiling.	Same as the U.S. position.
Verification of Compliance:	Include an exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of the reduction of weapons, and effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.	Both sides shall agree on reliable methods and means of comprehensive verification, involving national technical means, as well as a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data on arms, both prior to reductions and thereafter, and effective monitoring (including on-site inspection) of the remaining nuclear missile systems, aircraft and relevant facilities.
	Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.	Defer negotiating details.
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces		
LRINF Warhead Ceiling:	Phased reduction in longer range land-based INF (LRINF) warheads to a global ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads for each side by the end of 1991.	Zero for each side in Europe within five years. Timeframe for reductions to 100 longer range land-based INF warheads in Soviet Asia unspecified.
	U.S. LRINF warheads permitted in U.S. territory, including Alaska, and Soviet LRINF warheads permitted in Soviet Asia.	Soviet LRINF warheads in Soviet Asia reduced to 100 warheads deployed beyond striking distance of the United States. LRINF warheads in U.S. territory reduced to 100 warheads deployed beyond striking distance of the Soviet Union (ie. no deployments in Alaska).
	LRINF warheads in Europe reduced to zero for each side by the end of 1991.	LRINF warheads in Europe reduced to zero for each side by the end of 1991.
	Agreement on INF reductions not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside INF negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.	
	Agreement contingent upon the resolution of Defense and Space issues and commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB).	
SRINF Missiles:	Global constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) within range band of SS-23 to Scaleboard to the current Soviet level. Ban on SRINF missiles between range band of Scaleboard and Pershing II.	U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe with ranges of less than 1,000 kilometers frozen at existing levels, leaving the United States at zero and the Soviet Union with a substantial number. No constraints placed on shorter-range INF (SRINF) in Asia.
	Negotiations on SRINF reductions would begin within six months after an initial INF agreement is reached.	Negotiatinns on SRINF reductions in principle to begin immediately after initial INF agreement achieved, but no schedule for negotiations provided to the United States.
Verification of Compliance:	Exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of elimination of weapons, and an effective monitoring arrangement for facilities, including on-site inspection, following the elimination of weapons.	Agreement in principle to many aspects of the U.S. proposal for verification of compliance; but, since tabling their proposal, the Soviet Union has declined to confirm acceptance of on-site observation of elimination of weapons.
	Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.	Defer negotiating details.
Defense and Space		
Strategic Defenses:	Mutual commitment, through 1996, not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the purpose of deploying advanced strategic defenses; and during that period to observe all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.	Mutual commitment, effective for 10 years, not to withdraw from the antiballistic missile (ABM) Treaty for any reason while strictly observing all the treaty's provisions; agreement on an additional ban on testing in space of all space elements of an anti-missile defense except research and testing conducted in laboratories.
	Mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty conditioned upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996.	Agreement in defense and space contingent upon resolution of START and INF issues and commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.
	Acknowledgment that either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.	After 1996, the sides would begin special talks to reach a mutually acceptable decision on how to proceed further.
	The right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for reasons of supreme national interests or material breach would not be forfeited by the above commitment.	
	All of the above elements are to be incorporated in a new treaty. Alternatively, the U.S. proposal set out in President Reagan's July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the	

NST

U.S. Arms Control Proposals

January 15, 1987
Beginning of Round VII

START
(Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)

GENERAL APPROACH:



50 percent reduction to equal levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner and completed by the end of 1991.

This agreement not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside START negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.

SNDVs:

1,600

1,600 ceiling on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs). SNDVs include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.

WARHEADS:

6,000

6,000 warhead ceiling, to include ICBM and SLBM warheads and long-range ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles), and with each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) counting as one warhead.

SUBLIMITS:



Sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

HEAVY ICBMs:

There must be substantial reductions in heavy ICBMs. Heavy ICBMs would be included in the 1,650 sublimit.

THROW-WEIGHT:



50 percent reduction from the current Soviet throw-weight level, to be codified by direct or indirect limits.

MOBILE ICBMs:

Banned.

HEAVY BOMBERS:

Each heavy bomber counts as one SNDV. Each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one warhead in the 6,000 limit. Each ALCM carried on a heavy bomber would count as one warhead in the 6,000 ceiling.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE:



Include an exchange of comprehensive and accurate data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of the reduction of weapons, and effective monitoring of remaining inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.

INF
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces)

LRINF WARHEAD CEILING:

100

Phased reduction in longer range land-based INF (LRINF) warheads to a global ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads for each side by the end of 1991.

U.S. LRINF warheads permitted in U.S. territory, including Alaska, and Soviet LRINF warheads permitted in Soviet Asia.

LRINF warheads in Europe reduced to zero for each side by the end of 1991.

Agreement on INF reductions not contingent upon the resolution of other issues outside INF negotiations, as was agreed to by General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 1985 Geneva summit.

SRINF MISSILES:



Global constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) within range band of SS-23 to Scaleboard to the current Soviet level. Ban on SRINF missiles between range band of Scaleboard and Pershing II.

Negotiations on SRINF reductions would begin within six months after an initial INF agreement is reached.

VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE:



Exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place, on-site observation of the elimination of weapons, and an effective monitoring arrangement for facilities, including on-site inspection, following the elimination of weapons.

Negotiations on the details of verification should take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

STRATEGIC DEFENSES:



Mutual commitment, through 1996, not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the purpose of deploying advanced strategic defenses; and during that period to observe all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty conditioned upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms by the end of 1991 and the total elimination of all remaining offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996.



Acknowledgement that either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1996 if it so chooses, unless the parties agreed otherwise.



The right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for reasons of supreme national interests or material breach would not be forfeited by the above commitment.

All of the above elements are to be incorporated in a new treaty. Alternatively, the U.S. proposal set out in President Reagan's July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev remains on the negotiating table.


December 1986/January 1987
AIR&SPACE
Smithsonian

By Fred Reed

The Electric Jet

You can think of the F-16 as a first step toward the "smart" airplane. For its pilots, flying may never be the same again.

With its astonishing ability to turn on an aerial dime, the F-16 fighter is widely regarded as the U.S. Air Force's most maneuverable operational airplane. General Dynamics' small, sleek jet has been a huge success and is prized by all the air forces in which it serves. The United States owns most of the approximately 1,600 F-16s that have been produced since the airplane entered service in 1979, but 14 other nations either have it in operation already or are obtaining some version of it. Many others would dearly love to get their hands on it but have been turned down. Politics.

The F-16 came into being partly because of the performance of Air Force fighters in combat over Vietnam, where their success was at best only about one third as good as it had been in Korea. Air Force analysts began to wonder why. The cause was rooted in the years between the two conflicts, when U.S. military planners had decided that the traditional dogfight had become obsolete. Future fighter combat, said these seers, would be conducted at long range, with missiles. As it happened, they were wrong.

The McDonnell F-4 Phantom II was the front-line "fighter" in Vietnam, but it was originally designed as a combination interceptor and attack bomber for the Navy. The Phantom's

Photographs by George Hall



performance also impressed the Air Force, which bought a large number. Interceptors are supposed to stop bombers; fighters are supposed to counter other fighters and dominate the battlefield. The two are very different.

The supersonic Phantom was built to carry a crew of two and a powerful, long-range radar with missiles to match—but no gun. It turned out to be ill-equipped for the style of combat engaged in by North Vietnam's MiGs, which were lighter, single-seat, gun-equipped fighters that too often managed to close with the Phantoms and force a dogfight. The Phantom was large and its engines smoked, and those drawbacks made it too easy to spot at a distance. Both faults are more serious than they might seem: something like 80 percent of airplanes lost in combat never see their attacker. Phantoms eventually got their own cannon, but the airplane's size and weight remained liabilities.

Out of this experience, a group of Air Force proponents of a small, fast, extremely maneuverable fighter drew considerable encouragement. The "lightweight fighter" program gained sufficient momentum to award contracts to General Dynamics and Northrop, and both companies began building competing prototypes. The winner could look forward to a huge contract

to produce thousands of airplanes, with enormous sales potential overseas. General Dynamics' single-engine YF-16 (the Y prefix identifies a prototype airplane) won and became the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Northrop's entry, the twin-engine YF-17, rebounded later as the Navy/Marine F/A-18 Hornet, on which Northrop partnered with McDonnell Douglas.

But the lightweight fighter had to clear still more hurdles: within Pentagon circles where wrangles over weapon systems are conducted, proponents of the agile fighter charged that between the YF-16 and the F-16, the Air Force "heavied up" the fighter too much with extra electronics, particularly radar, so that the F-16 could do more work. The "fighter mafia" (the name given to the group of lightweight fighter zealots) regarded the changes with scorn. But the radar stayed and has even been enhanced over the years.

The "multiple role" F-16 that finally emerged represents a fusion of competing doctrines. But the argument about the best way to build a fighter has become moot because the airplane is clearly more than just a better fighter; in fact, it has



nullified the debate by redefining the way a fighter flies. The F-16 is a remarkable conceptual leap for the Air Force. It embodies a wholly new approach to aircraft control and maneuverability made possible only by computers. Computers actually determine how the airplane flies; indeed, without their electronic supervision the F-16 cannot be flown.

The aerodynamics of maneuverability is at once a black art, depending on the designer's taste and intuition, and a fearfully mathematical enterprise that can gobble weeks of time on the fastest computers available. Yet the fundamental concepts, including those that make the F-16 unusual, can be comprehended without a lot of math.

A good fighter should turn like a sports car and be faster than a bullet. You'd therefore think it should have maximum lift and thrust with a minimum of drag. But the design of any fighter is a product of trade-offs because of the way the airplane's desirable qualities tend to work against each other. For example, lift by its very nature produces drag: if you give an airplane large wings that provide lots of lift at low speeds and also provide a lot of surface to grab the air for tight turns, you get too much drag at high speed. If you use movable wings that can vary their sweep to obtain the best lift characteristics for a given speed—as the B-1, F-111, and F-14 do—the airplane's weight goes up sharply. Even more frustrating, airplanes behave quite differently at supersonic speeds, so that an airplane

designed for good subsonic performance may have excessive drag at supersonic speeds. So engineers compromise.

One of the most important factors affecting maneuverability is how fast an airplane's control surfaces can move it around its axes of motion. In the Korean war, pilots made the unwholesome discovery that Soviet MiGs were superior to the North American F-86 Sabre at some aspects of combat maneuvering. However, the Sabre could "transition"—go from a left turn to a right turn—more rapidly, in part because it had hydraulically assisted control surfaces. Sabre pilots learned that if they could force their adversaries to change direction rapidly, the Sabre could outmaneuver them.

Most aircraft have mechanical linkages—cables are typical—to move the control surfaces as the pilot moves the controls in the cockpit. The *distance* the pilot moves the control stick or pedals directly determines how far a control surface will deflect. Pilots may not be strong enough to move the surfaces of very fast or very large aircraft against the force of the passing airflow, so hydraulic systems are added to multiply their strength and help pull on the cables.

The F-16 departs from traditional mechanical controls. It is controlled with a "fly-by-wire" system in which electronics sense the *force* of the pilot's pushing and pulling on the controls and send electrical signals to hydraulic actuators that move the control surfaces. Replacing mechanical linkages with electrical circuits reduces weight. More importantly, it allows a computer to be inserted in the electrical circuit—the perfect place for supervising the pilot and preventing his doing things that might lead to loss of control. For example, if a pilot were to pull up too sharply at a low speed, the aircraft would "stall"—lose lift and go out of control. To avoid stalls in an older-generation fighter, the pilot had to watch an instrument that displays the "angle of attack" between the wing and the passing air—and pilots don't like to watch instruments when they're in a dogfight. By contrast, an F-16 pilot can maneuver with abandon, knowing the control computers won't let him pull the nose up enough to cause a stall. The computers also automatically adjust the flaps on the leading edge of the wings according to speed and angle of attack so that the airflow remains smooth and the wing won't stall.

But a more important peculiarity of the F-16 is that it is inherently unstable in flight. Making an airplane uncontrollable by humans seems to be a mistake, but there are good reasons for it, and all future fighters will probably be intentionally designed to be unstable.

Fighter face-off: F-86 Sabre versus . . .



Illustrations by Ken Dallison





Subsonic in the 1940s—a piece of cake

The North American F-86 Sabre typifies post-World War II design in a single-seat fighter. Its wing and tail arrangement follows traditional practice in order to achieve aerodynamic stability: the effective center of lift (symbolized by an arrow pointing upward from the wing) is located aft of the center of gravity (symbolized by the circled cross). To balance the airplane in flight, the Sabre's horizontal tail surfaces produce a force acting downward; the combined forces keep the fighter stable.

Supersonic in the Sabre—a handful

When the Sabre exceeds the speed of sound—Mach 1—the conventional design becomes a handicap despite its inherent stability. At supersonic speeds, the center of lift shifts rearward. Now the airplane has a strong tendency to pitch nose down, and to compensate, the horizontal tail must work harder to produce a balancing downward force to keep the nose level. To create this increased force, the tail deflects more of the passing air, which creates drag and slows the Sabre down.

. . . F-16 Fighting Falcon







A new arrangement—the Fighting Falcon

The F-16's design benefits from years of experience with supersonic aerodynamics. Its wing is arranged so that the center of lift is forward of the center of gravity, which tends to lift the airplane's nose. To balance that, the horizontal tail creates a lifting rather than downward force. Making both wing and tail surfaces create lift is inherently efficient—but unstable. A computer restores the stability artificially, and the airplane's configuration now confers an overall plus: improved maneuverability.

Today's technology—even happier at Mach 1

When the F-16 transitions to supersonic speed and its center of lift moves rearward—just as it does on the F-86—that rearward shift acts to reduce the work the horizontal tail must perform. With the lift now acting through a point closer to the center of gravity, the airplane has less tendency to pitch upward. In turn, the tail has less work to do keeping the airplane in balance. Less work means less drag to slow the fighter down when it's flying faster than the speed of sound.

George Hall

Life at Six Gs

Five hundred feet over South Carolina at 500 knots. Below us, isolated farms and patches of forest whip past. A mile to the right, our wing man hangs in space, hardly seeming to move. The oxygen mask presses against my face like the heel of a clammy hand and, I know from experience, will shortly begin itching unreachably. The cockpit is small, the canopy large and very close around my shoulders. The effect from where I sit is one of flying *on* the airplane rather than in it.

Flying the F-16 is brutal. Accelerative G-forces, generated whenever this nimble airplane maneuvers, are crushing if you are not accustomed to them. The seats recline at a 30-degree angle to increase the pilot's tolerance to Gs, but the improvement is marginal. Aeromedicine says the best angle is perhaps 65 degrees, but it is not clear how to fly or use the ejection seat when you're lying down.

We are wearing G-suits—"speed jeans," to the fighter jocks. The worst effect of G-forces is to force blood from the head into the lower extremities, causing blackout. The suit's legs are therefore very tight and cinched with elaborate laces to make sure they stay that way. Their pressure makes it difficult for blood to drain into the legs. This suit, fitted to me this morning, is almost painfully tight at flight time. "People who don't fly much get psyched up," the sergeant had told me. "Adrenaline dilates blood vessels and your legs swell. Really." That's how tight they are.

The G-suit also has a rubber bladder that lies firmly against your abdomen, and a hose connects the bladder to an air outlet near the seat. When a sensor detects increasing G-forces, the bladder inflates, keeping blood from pooling in the abdomen. It is becoming clear that the limit to the F-16's maneuverability is the pilot.

Our biggest worry on this mock bombing mission is hitting a bird. At over 500 mph, an encounter with one duck would knock the fighter out of the air. The pilot, Air Force Major Greg Robinson, keeps a sharp lookout for anything dressed in feathers. He also monitors the HUD, or Head-Up Display, which projects data onto a glass plate on top of the glare shield so that he doesn't have to look down at his gauges. The HUD provides all sorts of great information—speed, altitude, bearing, where the bad guys are, the Dow-Jones averages.

If the F-16's radar detects an airplane ahead, a small green box appears on the HUD. The pilot just looks through the box, and when the airplane is close enough to see, that's where he'll find it. The radar is good, but it won't pick up ducks.

The ride is smooth, maneuvers effortless. Whatever the engineers did with this airplane, it worked. The F-16 can attack from an altitude of 300 or even as low as 100 feet to avoid hostile radar and ground fire. This requires a very good pilot, which Greg is. Would that I were a braver passenger—looking down at trees is one thing; looking up at them is another.

The electronics are a gadgeteer's dream. The computers provide every conceivable bit of information: ranges, bearings, time-to-target, when to turn, and lots more. The bombing system consistently wins in competition. Pilots say they were initially suspicious of the complexity but aren't now.

The screen says we are approaching the target: time to hold on tight. We are going to pop up briefly to find the target and then dive to bomb it—a standard maneuver. Maneuvers in the F-16 are sharp and crisp, which means violent and uncomfortable. The miles-to-target counter goes to zero. "Popping up," says Greg as casually as if we were doing something reasonable. Pilots are . . . "self-confident" is an inadequate description. They divide the world into fighter pilots and people to be treated courteously despite their inadequacies.

The nose shoots up sharply, a great weight falls on me from nowhere, and the Earth recedes. "There—rolling in!" The airplane leaps on its side, turning hard and down, and suddenly the Earth sails over the cockpit: because G-forces push you into the cockpit, "down" is sensed in relation to the airplane. More weight, several Gs. I tighten my stomach muscles and grunt hard—standard behavior to hold the blood high, but not calculated to add to the dignity of the enterprise. This stuff is physical. The ground comes charging up at us.

Unnh! Five or six Gs as we bank hard to avoid imaginary ground fire and scream down toward the forest to escape at low level. A concrete truck parks on my chest. My arms won't move. I force my head back. It weighs 75 pounds at five Gs, and if I lean forward, it will land in my lap and I won't be able to lift it.

We finally straighten out, flying smoothly, once again alert for birds. South Carolina is lovely in the bright sunlight.

—Fred Reed

Stability depends directly on how the airplane is balanced in flight and has a lot to do with maneuverability. An airplane's center of gravity—engineers shorten it to CG—is a theoretical point at which all its mass is concentrated and which can be thought of as its balance point. All maneuvering motion takes place around the CG, as if it were a kind of central pivot. For example, when the pilot pulls back on the stick to raise the nose, everything in front of the CG rotates upward and everything behind it rotates downward.

Every airplane also has a center of lift, which is not as easy to visualize as the CG. The center of lift is the point at which all the lift acts as if it were concentrated. On most airplanes, all the lift comes from the wings. But on the F-16, both the wing and fuselage contribute; the engineers use the term "wing-body lift." The single point through which the sum of all the lift appears to act is the center of lift. Whereas the CG is fixed by the airplane's mass, maneuvers and variations in speed cause the center of lift to move around.

The relative positions of the center of gravity and the center of lift affect how the airplane is balanced in flight and are absolutely crucial to stability. On a conventional airplane with its horizontal stabilizer in back, the center of lift, acting upward, is behind the CG's pivot, and the downward force of the tail balances the airplane. If a gust of wind should disturb the airplane and cause it to pitch up and climb, it will slow down. Now the balancing force of the tail decreases because the air flowing over it has slowed. The force of the wing's lift, acting behind the center of gravity, pitches the airplane's nose down and restores it to level flight. This airplane is easily controlled, but it doesn't want to maneuver sharply. It likes sedate, steady flight, and engineers describe it as stable.

Now consider the situation in which the center of lift is in front of the CG. If the nose rises even slightly, the wing's lift, which is ahead of the CG's "pivot," can't restore it to level flight; instead, the lift pushes the nose even higher, rotating it upward around the CG, so that the airplane, left to its own devices, would flip over backward, out of control. In theory, the pilot could use the controls to bring the nose back down, but in practice his reflexes aren't fast enough. The airplane is unflyable. It wants to maneuver sharply but overdoes it—catastrophically. Older books on airplane design say this "static instability" is unequivocally bad.

The advent of small, powerful, reliable computers changed things greatly. "Aha!" engineers said in effect a few years back, "computers think very quickly indeed. Suppose we put computers into the control system together with sensors so they could tell what the airplane was doing. The computers could move the control surfaces almost instantaneously to correct for the airplane's tendency to diverge from normal at the slightest touch. Then the pilot could get the very quick turns that result from instability, but the computers would keep the airplane from going out of control—the best of both worlds." Being engineers, they rushed off for their pliers and wire and things, and discovered that the idea worked. And the F-16 was the first fighter to take advantage of it.

The F-16's three computers (a fourth acts as a spare) manage the controls, judging what the pilot wants to do from the forces on the stick and rudder pedals. Sensors measure the pressure of the passing air against the airplane, which allows the computers to calculate its speed. Other sensors measure the angle of the airflow, from which the computers derive the airplane's attitude with respect to the relative wind passing it. In short, the pilot's commands and the airplane's performance information are resolved in the computers.

This method is more radical than it would first appear. With the computer helping out, the pilot has much less to think about. For example, the F-16's cannon is mounted off to one side, so its recoil tends to skew the airplane slightly off course. In the heat of combat, considerable skill and attention would be needed to offset that sideward kick. When the F-16's computer senses that the trigger has been depressed, it automatically deflects the rudder to offset the recoil. Should the airplane be carrying external bombs or fuel tanks that change its response to the controls, the computer can adapt to keep the airplane within safe handling limits. In effect, the computer determines the airplane's handling qualities, which means that it can make the F-16 fly more like a fighter when it is stripped for action or more like an attack bomber when it is laden with ordnance. The role the airplane fills is no longer defined by its design but by what the computer says it is. And that's what has blurred the definition of it as a "fighter."

George Hall



Because the F-16's center of lift is ahead of its CG throughout the subsonic speed range where it spends most of its time, the airplane's horizontal tail balances the airplane by producing its own upward lifting force, similar in effect to a small wing. On traditional fighters with conventional stability, the CG is ahead of the center of lift, and the tail pushes downward—in an airplane trying to stay *up*, a most counterproductive direction—to maintain the airplane's balance. The picture gets even worse when the traditional fighter goes supersonic. The center of lift invariably moves rearward, and now the fighter gets really nose-heavy. It takes a considerable amount of extra work by the horizontal tail to maintain balance. In the process, the tail creates lots of drag. But when the F-16 goes supersonic, the center of lift shifts rearward—closer to the CG—and the tail's job is made easier as drag is reduced.

Although the computers confer advantages, the obvious worry is that they might fail, leaving the airplane uncontrollable. But the engineers thought about that, too, and designed a system in which all the computers "vote." If one computer goes awry and comes up with a different answer, the other two

override it and call the back-up computer into action. Despite all the precautionary built-in duplication, some people still worried that unreliability of the electronics might lead to accidents. In fact, reliability has not been a problem for the F-16.

Just tinkering with stability isn't enough to achieve maximum maneuverability, however. Two important though less obvious factors are the airframe's weight and strength. In turns, an airplane is subjected to "G force" that has the apparent effect of increasing its weight. In a two-G turn, an airplane's apparent weight doubles; in a four-G turn, it quadruples. The wings have to support the increased weight; if they can't, they may simply break off.

The more sharply an airplane turns, the greater the loads imposed and, therefore, the greater the penalty imposed by extra weight. In a nine-G airplane like the F-16, every extra pound of weight translates into nine pounds that the wings have to support in hard turns. The ratio of total weight to the surface area of the wings is called "wing loading," and it should be as low as possible. One way to reduce the ratio is to increase the wing area, but that produces increased drag; the only other way is to lighten the airplane.

Another factor important to maneuverability is the engine's thrust: a light, powerful airplane can climb and accelerate faster. The F-16's big engine confers what might be called "vertical maneuverability"—the airplane has more thrust than weight and can therefore climb straight up. If an enemy fighter gets behind you and you can climb at a higher speed and angle than it can, then it can't follow.

Mi Seitelman



Further, "excess power"—meaning power above that needed to maintain speed in level flight—permits sustained turns. High-G turning requires a lot of lift to oppose the greatly increased weight, but that same lift creates drag that bleeds off speed rapidly. Consequently a moderately powered craft may be able to turn briefly at eight Gs, but it slows down so much that it has to straighten out quickly or fall out of the air. Slow-moving airplanes also make easy targets, so a pilot who finds himself at low airspeed wants to "get his energy up"—*now*. This, not a desire for high maximum speeds, is why fighters have large engines. (A fighter may be able to reach Mach 2.5 but will drink enormous amounts of fuel doing so, and most combat takes place at "transonic" speeds—a little above and below the speed of sound.)

The F-16 uses an afterburner-equipped turbofan, the Pratt & Whitney F-100-PW-200, which has 23,840 pounds of thrust—a lot of engine. Soon it may get an even more powerful engine: the General Electric F-110-GE-100, a modification of the 30,000-pound-thrust engine used on the B-1B bomber. Given that the F-16 weighs only 22,000 pounds at combat weight, it is well-powered. The little fighter will hold a nine-G turn without losing altitude until it runs out of fuel—a horrible thought to anyone who has tried prolonged high-G flight.

The F-16 has been an extremely successful fighter, performing well in combat. And its performance may never be improved upon, because its maneuverability already pushes the limits of human tolerance. Pilots cannot stand acceleration forces much in excess of nine Gs, at which point a 200-pound man weighs 1,800 pounds. Looking at it another way, he is supporting the weight of eight other men like himself. Aircraft can be strengthened, but pilots can't, and the point eventually comes at which internal organs begin to tear loose. Pilots are beginning to suffer hematomas, small purple spots on the skin caused by bursting of blood vessels. There will be no piloted 15-G airplanes.

However, the principle of unstable flight is being extended, at least for research purposes. The Grumman Corporation has successfully flown its X-29, a strange-looking craft with wings swept sharply *forward*. It is intuitively obvious to almost anyone looking at the X-29 that it would be uncontrollable without some help, and its dependence on computers will be even greater than the F-16's. The X-29 is still experimental, but Grumman reports promising results.

Computers are doing more and more of the work of flying these new breeds of aircraft, and some critics say that pilots are in danger of becoming mere advisors to the electronics. The next step in aviation may be even more revolutionary: unmanned fighters flown by remote control. Pilots don't like the idea at all, and argue, correctly for the moment, that technology can't produce an unmanned airplane as effective as a manned one. Yet such airplanes could be far smaller, lighter, and stronger, and maneuver far more sharply. That way, sooner or later, lies the future.

Arms control

NEW YORK TIMES 11 DECEMBER 1986 Pg. B-16

Joint Chiefs of Staff Shifting Gears

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10 — Amid the thud of hammers and the shriek of circular saws, the offices of the staff serving the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon are being reconstructed, as is the staff itself.

Under the Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which went into effect in October after years of debate over what role the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have, the senior staff of the armed forces is making changes, some sweeping, some minor, but all evolutionary. The process will take three years to complete.

One objective of the reorganization is to make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President, not just the first among equals, as has been the case. Other members of the J.C.S. are the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Improving Military Advice

Another objective is to improve the quality and timeliness of military advice. In hearings before Congress and in numerous analyses, critics have asserted that the Chiefs, under the old system, too often provided military advice that was little more than a bland consensus.

The measure further seeks to strengthen the authority of field commanders whose forces include troops from several services, thus reducing interservice disagrement. And it calls for more attention to strategy, roles and missions of the forces and for more efficient use of resources, including money.

The reorganization measure was pushed through Congress by Senator Barry Goldwater, the Arizona Republican who is about to retire as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and by Representative Bill Nichols, an Alabama Democrat. Of changes that it has already started bringing about, perhaps the most important is an intangible.

A New Attitude

The officer supervising much of the change, Maj. Gen. Howard D. Graves, speaks of a new attitude. "There is a new orientation here," he said. "Before, we were struggling for consensus. Now the word is to solve problems and to get things done."

The continuation or evaporation of that attitude likely will determine whether the changes mean genuine improvement or add up to little more than sound and fury.

One key early change, officers say, will be the nomination of Gen. Robert T. Herres of the Air Force to the new post of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is expected soon. General Herres currently heads the Space Command in Colorado.

But just what his duties will be, beyond acting as chairman when the Chairman is away, is undecided. So is the place where he will sit when the chiefs meet three times a week in the Gold Room, which is called that for its décor but is better known as the "tank."

The Vice Chairman's place may seem a small point, but it is important in symbolism and protocol.

At the Table or at the Side?

Legally, the Vice Chairman is not a member of the J.C.S. and has no vote except when acting as Chairman. So the question has arisen: Does he sit with the five Chiefs at the oblong table in the center of the heavily protected room, or does he sit in the single row of chairs for senior staff members at one side?

Over the long run, it is the staff of 1,600 officers from all four services that will be critical to the success of the reorganization. The staff, which formerly reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole, is now controlled by the Chairman alone and is being reorganized under his direction.

A new directorate will oversee the drafting of deliberate war plans and contingency plans and will devise exercises to train the forces to execute those plans. That group will also be charged with fostering coordination among the forces by developing joint doctrine and tactics.

Another new directorate will provide advice on the military budget and recommend forces needed to execute war plans. This addition, perhaps the most radical step in the new law, is intended to bring the Joint Chiefs of Staff further into the budget process. More than anything else, it is control of money that determines the shape of the forces.

Until now, budgets have been largely the province of the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, with final decisions in the Pentagon made by the Secretary of Defense. But the new J.C.S. section will provide separate judgements on how much is spent and on what, and it will draw heavily on the views of field commanders.

Elsewhere, the operations directorate will narrow its focus to current operations and crises and continue to run the National Military Command Center, into which intelligence flows and out of which orders are transmitted to the field. Similarly, the strategy directorate will concentrate on its specialty,

A new procedure, according to General Graves, is the way advice is presented to the President.

Under the previous procedure, the Chairman was bound to present a position agreed upon by all the chiefs, or to report what was known as "split paper." Usually, the chiefs have tried to avoid split papers in favor of the lowest common denominator.

'Contentious Issues'

Today the Chairman may present his own advice, noting which of the chiefs agree and which differ. The dissenters, under the new law, have the right to present their views verbally or in writing. In addition, no chief may delay a report by holding back his dissent.

"This changes the way you handle contentious issues," said General Graves, the Army officer who is deputy director of the joint staff.

An issue almost certain to be contentious in the future will be a review of missions and geographic boundaries of the field commands. In the past, the vaguest hint that turf was to change hands resulted in bloody battles.

The new law directs the chiefs to consider putting under one command all the Air Force's intercontinental missiles and bombers and all the Navy's submarines armed with ballistic missiles — a suggestion that is sure to be resisted by the Navy.

A New Command

Similarly, the chiefs have been instructed to consider a new combatant command in Northeast Asia, now part of the Pacific Command; to shift part of the European Command to the Central Command, whose area of operations is the Middle East; and to revise the area for which the Southern Command is reponsible in Latin America.

Lastly, the new law directs the services to send their best officers to the joint staff for certain periods. Until now, each service has sought to keep its best people to itself.

General Graves said a new system being worked out would seek to have those people serve both as commanders in their own services and then in Washington on the joint staff. But he acknowledged that "we're trying to put 15 years of experience into a 10-year career."

At the moment, shifting people and offices has caused mild chaos.

An office is being carved out for the Vice Chairman along the E Ring of the Pentagon, and other offices are being chopped up or expanded to accommodate new staff sections.

A corridor that runs through the joint staff's domain is chock-a-block with furniture in transit — and not a few bewildered looks on the faces of staff members.

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Secretary Lehman and His Spaniels

Navy Secretary John Lehman is among the most effective service secretaries in years. But his skin is strangely thin and his sensibility thick when Navy policies come under criticism. Far from welcoming dissent, he prefers to stifle it.

Last February Lawrence Korb, vice president of Raytheon, publicly suggested that Mr. Lehman's goal of a 600-ship Navy might prove unaffordable. Navy officials immediately complained to Raytheon, which has many contracts with the Navy, and Mr. Korb was soon dismissed. As the Pentagon's Inspector General concludes in a review of this episode, conducted at the request of Representative Denny Smith of Oregon, the Navy abused both its economic power over Raytheon and Mr. Korb's rights of free speech.

The Inspector General reports that Mr. Lehman didn't ask for Mr. Korb's head but merely criticized his reported views at a staff meeting. Like Henry II's knights who galloped off to murder Archbishop Becket, Mr. Lehman's minions were galvanized by this expression of imperious displeasure. Assistant Secretaries Everett Pyatt and Melvyn Paisley immediately called senior Raytheon executives to yap about Mr. Korb's speech. Mr. Paisley wrote, in a following letter, "The Navy objects strongly to officers of our contractors ... speaking as company officers, attacking President Reagan's Defense program."

Messrs. Paisley and Pyatt have their facts as wrong as their principles. Mr. Korb spoke as a member of a private group. Even had he identified himself as a Raytheon executive, he had every citizen's right to differ with Pentagon policies. The premise that defense contractors should police employees' opinions of the Pentagon is simply repugnant. Mr. Lehman's spaniels broke no law by intimidating Raytheon. But as the Inspector General notes, that the Pentagon should not quash private individuals' expression "is so self-evident as to not require regulation."

It's not so self-evident to Messrs. Lehman, Pyatt and Paisley. Amazingly, the Inspector General reports, they continue to believe "that it is inappropriate for executives of Defense contractors to offer public opinions contrary to Defense policy." What volumes that speaks about the relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors. In a healthy commercial relationship, the buyer cares about price and quality and doesn't give a fig about his vendor's political opinions. Were it that way in the Navy too, Mr. Lehman would have nothing at all to fear from those who criticize the cost of the Navy's ambitions.

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KEY LEADERS BACK NASA AND ITS CHIEF

By JOHN NOBLE WILFORD

Two senators who will assume leading roles on space issues in the new Congress said yesterday that they "strongly" supported the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its head, Dr. James C. Fletcher, in their efforts to redesign the space shuttle's flawed booster rockets.

In a statement issued in Washington, the Senators, Ernest F. Hollings and Donald W. Riegle Jr., said: "We strongly support Dr. Fletcher's efforts as Administrator of NASA and have confidence that he and his new team at NASA can and will produce the needed results. In the Senate, we intend to establish a very active oversight of NASA and the shuttle booster rocket design activities."

Senator Hollings, who previously criticized what he called a "Utah conspiracy" involving Dr. Fletcher in the award of the shuttle booster rocket contract, said through a spokesman, that he did not believe Dr. Fletcher should remove himself from decision-making for future contracts. Dr. Fletcher, commenting on his part in the award of the contract to Morton Thiokol Inc., has said that the decision was "squeaky clean" but that he would "seriously consider" removing himself from all future decisions on booster contracts.

In Line for Key Posts

Senator Hollings, a South Carolina Democrat, is in line to be chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology when the new Congress convenes in January. Senator Riegle, a Michigan Democrat, is expected to head the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, which oversees the civilian space agency.

The two lawmakers issued their joint

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arms control issues, said today:

"In the wake of the President's decision to exceed the SALT 2 limits and in the aftermath of both the Reykjavik summit and the current controversy over Iran arms sales, this approach will receive far more attention and support in the Senate than last year."

He said that, while there would be reservations about the Constitutional role of the Senate, "such questions are relative in this sense to the great damage that can be done by allowing the President to pursue this policy."

An aide to Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, who will be the Democratic majority leader in the new Senate, said the Senator supported the idea of legislation that would force compliance with the treaty limits. Senator Byrd does not support across-the-board legislation requiring adherence by limiting funding for certain weapon systems.

Limits Were Breached Nov. 28

The Administration breached the numerical ceiling of the treaty on Nov. 28 by activating the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles. This put the United States above the combined ceiling of 1,320 on bombers with cruise missiles and on ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

The Soviet Union then announced that it would still comply with the treaty "for the time being." But Moscow noted that the Americans' action gave it the grounds "to regard itself free from its commitment."

Supporters of the caucus resolution said they had moved because they were worried that the breaching of the weapons limits was not getting the attention it needed because of the Iran affair.

The resolution was backed by Representative Jim Wright of Texas, who will be the new Speaker, and by Representative Thomas S. Foley of Washington, the new majority leader. The chairmen of the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees also supported the proposal.

Administration is Criticized

The caucus resolution contends that the Administration decision ignores the vote in Congress this year to continue to comply with the treaty terms, that it will create "confusion and concern among our allies" and that it adds an unnecessary complication to the arms negotiations in Geneva.

"It not being noticed," the caucus chairman, Representative Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, said of the Administration's move. "We don't want it to be lost in all the goings on about the Iran questions."

Representative Norman D. Dicks, Democrat of Washington, said voluntary compliance should continue until "we get a new arms control agreement with the Soviet Union."

He said that the danger of abandoning the treaty was that the Soviet Union "has the ability to add a lot more launchers and missiles in the near term than we have."

The Administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated the 1979 treaty so often that it is not worth adhering to it.

NEW YORK TIMES 1 FEBRUARY 1987

While We Talk, SALT II Beats No Treaty at All

To the Editor:

In attacking members of Congress who would revive the second strategic arms limitation treaty (Op-Ed, Jan. 18), Bob Dole, the Senate's minority leader, has invoked the image of Dr. Frankenstein's monster. But when all Senator Dole's invective is digested, the fictional character who comes first to mind is Pinocchio.

Senator Dole resurrects lies and half-truths promulgated over years by die-hard Soviet-bashers and opponents of arms control in any form. In so doing, he distorts the intent and record of SALT II, and ignores ample evidence, including inconvenient testimony by Reagan Administration officials, of Soviet compliance with arms control treaties.

Among the many whoppers: that President Reagan "gave the Soviets chance after chance to correct their longstanding, serious violations." But "Moscow turned a deaf ear." The Reagan Administration refused to make use of the Standing Consultative Commission, created to resolve questions of treaty compliance, preferring to deal with any such question by bombast and accusation. Rather than turn a deaf ear, Moscow tried to revive the commission. In response, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger ridiculed the commission as "an Orwellian memory hole into which our concerns have been dumped like yesterday's trash," and ordered Gen. Richard Ellis, the U.S. commissioner, to use the commission solely as a forum to accuse the Russians of violating SALT.

Senator Dole decries the Russians' "long record of cheating on SALT II and every other arms control agreement," ignoring advice from the Central Intelligence Agency and many other experts. Gen. John T. Chain, for example (now commander of the Strategic Air Command), testified in 1985 that "they have complied with the large majority of the treaties."

Senator Dole scoffs that over the next few years the Russians could add 5,000 to 6,000 new warheads under SALT II. While that figure appears grossly inflated, it is true that SALT II has not stopped either the United States or the Soviet Union from adding some nuclear warheads. But without SALT II, according to C.I.A. testimony, the Russians could add as many as 10,000 nuclear warheads by 1990.

He ignores the benefits SALT II gives us in requiring the Russians to dismantle old weapons when they deploy new ones (to stay within SALT limits, the Russians have dismantled over 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 200 submarine missile launchers, for example) and, even more important, the enormous benefit we gain from SALT prohibitions on interference with satellite reconnaissance and other means of keeping an eye on the Soviet Union.

Does Senator Dole really prefer a Soviet Union unconstrained by any limits on strategic offensive forces, able to blind our satellites with impunity, to keeping an imperfect treaty while our negotiators try to work out a better one? It's no wonder that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified in favor of SALT II when it was submitted to the Senate and that so many other military leaders see that we are better off with SALT II than without it.

Senator Dole declares we'd be handing Moscow a victory on a silver platter if we resurrect SALT; we're handing ourselves a major defeat if we don't.

THOMAS A. HALSTED

Manchester, Mass., Jan. 19, 1987

The writer was director of public affairs, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977-81.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY 18 JANUARY 1987 Pg.10

Cold comfort convoy

IT IS COMFORTING, but not very, to learn that no danger to the public arose from the accident in Wiltshire last week when a couple of weapons transporters went off a road which, since it was icy and ungritted, they should not have been using in the first place. Comforting because it is obvious that a nuclear weapon — assuming to the point of certainty that such a weapon or component was involved — would not knowingly be transported in such a way that could spill serious radioactivity. But not very, because mistakes do occur and the Ministry of Defence itself got so excited about the overturned and slewed transporters that marines were sent in to seal off a wide area around the depot at Dean Hill.

Sometimes in the arguments about nuclear defence it is assumed that we are talking only about the heavy stuff — mainly Polaris and cruise. But there is much more besides. Both the army in Germany and the fleet are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Given the composition of the convoy through Wiltshire it is a reasonable assumption that this was a nuclear weapon or component on its way to storage for routine checking at the nuclear engineering works at Burghfield, near Reading. That alone, rather than any physical danger from the crashed convoy, could explain the MoD's excitement because the components which go to Burghfield are supposedly to be highly secret and it does little good to the Ministry's reputation if parts are damaged or go astray en route. Yet a moment's thought about the need for routine checking, plus the knowledge shared by perhaps thousands of servicemen and women about the nature of the convoys or their contents, allows the Ministry's secretiveness — and occasional hyperactivity — to give the opposite impression from that intended.

Supposedly this was a nuclear weapon, or the component of one, what would it most probably be? The Royal Navy has an unstated number, probably in the dozens, of depth charges originally modelled on an American pattern but now home-made. They are designed to be dropped from helicopters on submarines or possibly in missile form on surface ships. They are not strictly part of the nuclear deterrent — that is a different argument — but much more like very highly upgraded conventional weapons with yields which can be as low, comparatively speaking, as a few kilotons of TNT equivalent. If they are war-fighting weapons rather than a deterrent, why do we need them? Surely the job could better be done by modern homing torpedoes? In what circumstances short of all-out war are we likely to drop them on enemy ships? And if all-out war is the prospect, is not the destruction of a few enemy vessels something of a nicety? The number of Nato battlefield nukes in Europe has been cut from 6,000-odd to 4,600, but as long as first-use remains Nato policy they may not be cut much further. But a purely British nuclear attack force represented by depth charges is an element of grandiosity we can well manage without. Are these not dangerous toys from which the MoD needs to be weaned?

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 9 FEBRUARY 1987 Pg.45

As diplomats bog down, war heats up

Kuwait

■ The U.S. warships cruising just offshore were a welcome symbol of support for jittery Arab leaders at the summit of 44 Islamic nations in this oil-rich sheikdom last week. But the worrisome reality for the assembled emirs, kings and presidents was Iran's apparent continued gains in bloody battles against Iraq only 50 miles from the Kuwaiti capital.

There was ample reason for concern. A 3-week-old Iranian drive across southern Iraq has not yet exploded into Teheran's long-threatened "final offensive" to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But reports that Iranian troops were storming defense lines within 4 miles of Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, were alarming enough. The geopolitical implications were sufficient to keep strategists glued to their maps from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and the United States.

Would Kuwait be next?

The primary concern is that the fall of Basra—or consolidation of Iran's grip on southern Iraq—would soon make the Islamic extremists in Teheran the dominant force throughout the Gulf. This would pose serious threats to the stability and pro-Western alignment of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that have invited the wrath of Iran's ruling mullahs. Collectively, these countries have provided billions of dollars for the Iraqi war effort. Any Iranian muscle-flexing against them, such as the overt move against Kuwait that some analysts expect, could produce a sudden and dramatic increase in world oil prices.

None of these worries was alleviated by the actions of the Islamic conference, which was held in a palatial, heavily fortified convention center that symbolized both the Gulf's oil wealth and its political weakness. Efforts by Jordan's King Hussein to organize a peace mission to Teheran and Baghdad fizzled into a toothless resolution urging a cease-fire in the 6½-year-old war. The chief beneficiary of the conference, in fact, was an Arab leader relatively immune to Gulf turmoil: Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak. Not long ago, he was ostracized by many in the Mideast because Egypt had signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. But last week, he walked into the conference hand in hand with Syria's President Hafez Assad, who still opposes peace deals with Israel but now appears much less bitter toward Mubarak.

Even some Arab leaders who often criticize the U.S. were privately reassured by the presence of the American destroyers nearby. Teheran boycotted the conference, and Iranian-backed terrorists had threatened disruptions, which failed to materialize. But the U.S. was happy for an opportunity to make its weight felt. Emphasizing U.S. concern, an official in Washington said the ships had been sent to the northern end of the Gulf for the first time during the war as "a sign of support for our friends in the region and as a deterrent signal to Iran." Other U.S. vessels guarded the Strait of Hormuz at the southern entrance of the Gulf, and the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* was ordered to move to the Arabian Sea from the Pacific Ocean. In fact, no one expected the U.S. to apply force without direct provocation. But a senior White House aide noted that "we want to be prepared if our strategic interests are threatened."

The awful litter of war

The failure of a pan-Arab initiative to stop the war between two Moslem nations was reflected bleakly on the killing grounds around Basra. Some 35,000 men have been killed and 30,000 more wounded during three weeks of savage fighting. The battlefield resembled France in World War I. Wrecked tanks and armored troop carriers littered miles of barren mud flats. Abandoned trenches and occasional scorched palm trees dramatized the widespread destruction. In the still waters of Fish Lake, a family of white-billed ducks glided past the bloated bodies of Iraqi soldiers.

Iran, using human-wave attacks, has paid the highest toll in blood. Poorly armed schoolboy volunteers wearing dungarees and red headbands charge into battle fortified by written pledges of a place in heaven if they die. Though Basra could hold out for weeks or even months, Iranian officers appear to command the human fodder to keep hammering away as long as necessary. Compared with the direct victims of a war in which neither side can look with confidence to victory, the diplomats with their briefcases and their geopolitical concerns had it easy in Kuwait. ■

by John Barnes with Dennis Mullin in Washington

INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

21 JANUARY 1987 Pg.3

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Israeli schoolchildren recently carried out exercises in preparing for chemical warfare. Israel is now acutely aware of the dangers of nerve gas being used by the Arabs.

Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran marked a departure from the usual rules of war in the Middle East.

Syria is believed to have made its own chemical weapons after buying aspects of the technology from West Germany and Switzerland.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL 3 FEBRUARY 1987

REVIEW & OUTLOOK

arms control

Is SALT Harmful?

In his State of the Union address a week ago, President Reagan vowed to veto any arms-control legislation that "undercuts" national security and U.S. negotiating leverage. He said: "Enacting the Soviet negotiating position into American law would not be the way to win a good agreement." Less than 48 hours later, four senators began doing precisely that by introducing a bill to severely curtail new military deployments.

Sens. Dale Bumpers (D., Ark.), Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), John Chafee (R., R.I.) and John Heinz (R., Pa.) offered legislation to bar funding for military deployments that exceed the SALT II limits—a treaty the Senate never ratified and that has expired. This follows on a December action in which 57 senators signed a letter urging President Reagan to reverse his decision to stop abiding by the SALT treaty.

These efforts come despite clear evidence of Soviet violations. Specifically, the Soviets are deploying more than one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile—namely, the SS-24 and SS-25. They are encrypting telemetry data on test missiles and they are exceeding the overall limit of 2,504 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

The Senate's grand efforts to legislate arms control comes at the same time that two significant assessments of the limitations of the arms-control process are appearing. One, by the Kennedy School of Government, was recently discussed in this space ("Lessons of Arms Control," Dec. 22). Now a new study is making the rounds in Washington. "Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties," commissioned by the U.S. government, was written by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., a Virginia-based national security affairs consultant.

At the core, the Douglass study says, the U.S. and Soviet Union bring two fundamentally different views to the arms-control process. While the U.S. sees it as an effort to restrain new weapons deployments and lessen bilateral tensions, the Soviets view the process as an integral part of their program of military modernization and expansion. They want to constrain U.S. military rebuilding, but at the same time permit the Soviet Union to conduct the research, development and deployment it had always planned to do.

The main goals are to "debilitate U.S. defense planning and acquisition," split the Western alliance, rally Western anti-military sentiment and "promote the Soviet image of peace-loving and that of the United States as war-mongering." The Kremlin also uses arms control as a lever to facilitate trade, foreign credits and technology transfer.

The Soviets prefer to structure treaties so that only the U.S. is constrained. But "the Soviets will violate or otherwise cheat on any treaty when it is determined to further their interests," Mr. Douglass says. "Soviet planning for cheating and deception on arms control agreements begins well in advance of any specific agreement," he says. This encompasses hiding R&D work, concealing tests and deployments and misleading the U.S. about the nature of Soviet programs. This has occurred, Mr. Douglass adds, not only in strategic nuclear forces but also in biological and chemical weaponry.

One former Czech official, for instance, tells of a 1966 address by Marshal Andrei Grechko, then-commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, to East-bloc defense ministers and military chiefs. Marshal Grechko said that any arms-control accords had to conceal Soviet military capabilities and must be used against the Western military-industrial complex.

There are no doubt points on which Mr. Douglass and the authors of the recent Kennedy School report from Harvard would significantly disagree. What they share in common, however, is that both raise serious questions about the integrity of the process as it is generally represented to the public and its utility for U.S. interests.

These questions deserve to be discussed and debated openly, and there was a time when one might have expected that process to be generated on Capitol Hill. But no such seriousness of effort or thought emanates from the Senate, the World's Greatest Deliberative Body. The WGDB can do little more than resuscitate an expired treaty, with little more supportive argument than that it will all work out fine if the U.S. unilaterally conforms to the restraints of a nuclear treaty negotiated by Jimmy Carter.

Somehow the public deserves better from the senators in the WGDB. Those favoring SALT II should explain how continued adherence would further U.S. security and stop the Soviets from programmed cheating. Two major studies have now said that many of the assumptions behind the traditional arms-control process are flawed. The senators may, if they wish, stick their heads in the sand of SALT II, but they shouldn't complain too loudly if the president or the public doesn't join them.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 3 FEBRUARY 1987 Pg.5

A bureaucrat and expert on Soviets

By Dusko Doder
Washington Post

WASHINGTON — Robert M. Gates told colleagues eight years ago that there was one job he would really like to have. Yesterday, President Reagan nominated him to fill it.

If confirmed by the Senate, Gates, 43, will become the youngest person ever to head the Central Intelligence Agency. He has been acting director since Dec. 18, when Director William J. Casey underwent surgery for a brain tumor.

Sen David L. Boren (D., Okla.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said confirmation hearings on Gates' nomination would begin Feb. 17. He said the committee planned to question Gates "very thoroughly" about his previous testimony on the Iran-contra affair.

Boren said Gates, as acting CIA director, had been "very candid and forthcoming" and had indicated a readiness to undertake a joint effort to rebuild mutual trust that was eroded during Casey's tenure.

Congressional sources said that Gates was expected to undergo some tough questioning on his role in the Iran-contra scandal, particularly about whether he knew of reported illegal diversions of Iran arms sales profits to help the contras.

Robert M. Gates, 43, will face close questioning by the Senate Intelligence Committee about his previous testimony on the Iran-contra affair and what the CIA's William J. Casey knew of it.

In December, Gates told the committee that Casey knew only "bits and pieces" about the possible diversions. The panel's report, released last week, revealed that Casey knew much more than that when he appeared before the committee on Nov. 21.

Gates would succeed Casey in the twin roles of CIA director and director of central intelligence. The latter embraces overall responsibility for the entire U.S. intelligence community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and various intelligence branches of the armed services.

People who have worked with Gates over the years described him yesterday as intelligent and well organized. Critics, however, charged that Gates was a bureaucratic climber — as one of his former colleagues put it, a "modern American apparatchik."

But senior officials Gates worked for in the 1970s, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, and Rep. Dick Cheney (R., Wyo.), who was President Ford's chief of staff, said they expected Gates to do "the kind of outstanding job as CIA director as he had done in the past."

Brzezinski described Gates as a man of "good judgment" and said he was "well versed in Soviet affairs, which is rather unusual" for a CIA director.

A rival described Gates as a "tough bureaucratic infighter." But he said Gates was also extremely careful and conscientious — an "almost ideal bureaucrat."

Gates, a native of Wichita, Kan., graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1965, completed a master's degree in Russian history from Indiana University in 1966, then joined the CIA, where he served was an intelligence analyst and intelligence adviser for the strategic arms limitation talks. He received a doctorate from Georgetown University in 1974. His dissertation dealt with the question of Soviet assessments of China.

In 1974, he joined the National Security Council staff and served Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. People who knew Gates in those years described him as a workaholic; one said he was "not a warm guy, not the kind of guy you'd like to spend a weekend with."

Gates returned to the CIA in January 1980 as national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union. He later served as Casey's executive secretary for a year before being appointed deputy director of intelligence in January 1982, which put him in charge of the entire analytical branch of the agency.

Sources said that by 1985, Casey was talking privately about Gates as a future CIA director. Casey also took Gates to the White House a good deal and made sure that he developed relations with senior administration figures.

Gates, one of his intelligence associates said yesterday, "is a creation of the National Security Council staff system and Bill Casey."

NEW YORK TIMES 3 FEBRUARY 1987

Two Captives

Iran and Lebanon have become swamps into which outsiders venture at their peril. This was well understood by Terry Waite, the Anglican envoy last seen in Beirut on Jan. 20. Indeed, he left instructions that no attempt be made to rescue him if he was taken captive. And every Western correspondent knows the risks of accepting even an official invitation to Iran, with its hostile regime of feuding clerical rulers.

Witness the ordeal of Gerald Seib, Middle East correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, now detained for undisclosed reasons at an undisclosed place in Iran. That Mr. Seib did anything to justify this outrageous treatment is inconceivable to colleagues who know him as a prudent, experienced reporter. Mr. Seib was among 57 Western journalists invited for a guided tour of Iran and the front in the war with Iraq. Unless he is promptly released, it will be impossible for anyone to take Iran's word seriously about war claims, or anything else.

The worst-case surmise is that Iran and its extremist allies in Lebanon are grabbing fresh captives to extort yet more TOW missiles from President Reagan. If so, that's bad news for Mr. Seib and Mr. Waite, since no such deal is imaginable. If so, that's also bad news for the President, for it would rub his nose in the error of undue eagerness to free imprisoned Americans.

There remains nevertheless the possibility of confusion and error, of pragmatic second thoughts about abducting an emissary or a journalist. Every hostage incident has its singularities and each needs to be judged in its context. With calm and reason, Mr. Seib's captors may come to recognize that they have no grievance with him and can release him in the knowledge that he is a professional journalist who has done no more than his job — indeed done so at their Government's invitation. Likewise, as Mr. Waite's presumed captors honor courage, they will honor his by promptly freeing him.

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Arms Control December 9, 1986

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT II

The recent announcement by the Soviet Union that it "will continue to adhere to the SALT II Treaty" is disingenuous and represents a Soviet propaganda effort. It overlooks the fact that for several years the Soviets have violated, and continue to violate, some of the central provisions of SALT II. The US decision of May 27, 1986, to end adherence to the unratified and expired SALT Agreement was taken in direct response to these Soviet violations. The US Government has repeatedly sought correction of Soviet noncompliance and gave the Soviets over a year and a half to correct that situation. They failed to take the necessary steps to do so.

The Soviet statement comes as no surprise since the SALT Agreements, even if fully complied with, did not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities. We believe that absent SALT II the Soviets would not necessarily expand their forces significantly beyond the increases already projected with SALT II. Soviet forces are already very large and would appear to be more than enough to meet reasonable military requirements.

US force deployments (e.g. deployment of the 131st ALCM carrier) in response to these violations represent implementation of the President's May 27 decision. At that time he stated that, in the future, the US must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT agreement the Soviets have violated.

If the Soviets are serious about exercising restraint, the US government would welcome it. As President Reagan has stated, the US will continue to exercise the utmost restraint as we pursue agreements leading to significant reductions in strategic offensive arms.

Soviet violations include:

1. SS-25 Deployment

Based on convincing evidence about the SS-25, the US Government judges that the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-25 mobile ICBM exceeds by more than 5 percent the throw-weight of the Soviet SS-13 ICBM and cannot therefore be considered a permitted modernization of the SS-13 as the Soviets claim. Indeed, the throw-weight of the SS-25 is roughly twice that of the SS-13. Since the SS-X-24 is a new type of ICBM, the SS-25 is a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM. Its testing, therefore, is

a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The continuing deployment of this missile, begun in 1985, constitutes a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

2. Encryption of Test Missile Telemetry:

In his decision of May 27 the President noted that Soviet encryption practices constitute a violation of legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of their political commitment since 1982. The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new ballistic missiles impedes US verification of Soviet compliance. Despite US requests for corrective action, the Soviet Union continues to deliberately impede verification of compliance by national technical means.

3. Exceeding Limits on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles:

The US Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs--at a level of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. Despite their public statement that they would not be the first to exceed SALT II limits, they have continued to exceed the SALT II cap of 2,504 SNDVs.

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12/9/96

KEN ADELMAN GUEST EDITORIAL

FOR THE

NORTHERN VIRGINIA SUN

COMMENTS/CLEARANCE BY COB 12/11

THANKS

Matt Murphy

647-8715

Staying the Course in Arms Control

Over the last six years, critics of the Administration's arms control policies have found fault with alleged "unrealistic proposals," "disunity among policy makers," and "lack of results," in that, no arms control agreements have been signed.

What such critics fail to realize is that the Administration wants agreements which actually reduce arms rather than ones which permit both sides to increase the numbers of their nuclear weapons. There has been discussion and, at times disagreement, as to the specific means to achieve our ends but our goals, deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in US and Soviet weaponry, have remained a constant.

The Administration has measured the potential value of an arms control agreement against four major criteria. First, it must actually reduce weapons, as opposed to ratifying force levels already in existence, or permitting them to grow to even higher levels. Secondly, it must eliminate the threat of "first strike" against ours and our Allies' retaliatory forces. This is the threat which Soviet strategic and intermediate range ballistic missiles pose today. Next, it must provide for effective verification of the obligations assumed by the party signing the treaty. Today, while we <u>know</u> the Soviets have violated some major provisions of arms control treaties, we <u>suspect</u>, but cannot confirm, because of inadequate verification procedures, that they have violated additional ones. Finally,

it must assist the transition to deterrence based primarily on defensive systems, rather than on offensive retaliation, which would inflict enormous death and destruction on an aggressor and his society.

The question is, has the Administration's constancy in staying the course in its approach to arms control produced results? The answer is: "Yes".

After more than a decade and a half of "arms control" agreements which saw the numbers of nuclear weapons double almost every five years, the Soviet Union accepted at Iceland our criterion of deep reductions. We and the Soviets are presently engaged in negotiations in Geneva aimed at significantly reducing strategic nuclear weapons and eventually eliminating longer range intermediate range missiles.

Such reductions will eliminate the "first-strike" threat to US and NATO retaliatory forces, a threat which past "arms control" efforts enabled the Soviets to acquire.

We have gotten the Soviet Union to acknowledge at last that both we and they have been for some time engaged in strategic defense. We hope they realize that they should now join with us in discussion as to how we both manage the transition to deterrence based primarily on defensive systems.

Recently, the US and 34 other participating states of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, adopted a package of concrete measures designed to help reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of

military activities. This is the first major East-West Accord for over a decade. Among other things, participating states, including the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are committed to accept ground or air inspection on their respective territories in Europe.

Only an Administration aware of the true purpose of arms control, to create military stability between the United States and the Soviet Union so that political solutions can be found to the issues dividing us, and only an Administration with the courage to persevere over time to achieve its goal could have made the progress we see today. However, there are still many difficult issues to resolve and the negotiating process will require patience and persistence. We are prepared to stay the course. We hope the Congress and the American people are too.

Comments to: Dan Mozena 647-3861
PM/SNP

DRAFT

A CHRONOLOGY

RECENT US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS

Nuclear and Space Talks

-- August 11-12 in Moscow
-- September 5-6 in Washington
-- December 2-5 in Geneva at the negotiator level

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks

-- August 6-7 in Moscow
-- September 10-11 in Washington

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

-- August 14-15 in Stockholm

Chemical Weapons (CW)

-- March 5-6 in Bern (CW non-proliferation)
-- August 18-20 in Geneva
-- September 4-5 in Bern (CW non-proliferation)
-- October 27-November 12 in New York City

Nuclear Testing

-- July 25-August 1 in Geneva
-- September 4-18 in Geneva
-- November 13-25 in Geneva

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

-- May 5-6 in Geneva
-- August 25 in Geneva

US Arms Control Initiatives

Strategic Offensive Forces (START)

During their October meetings at Reykjavik, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle on 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms over 5 years to 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6000 warheads on those delivery vehicles. The two sides made important advances in rules for counting bombers and reached agreement in principle on the requirement for "significant cuts" in Soviet heavy ICBMs, the most destabilizing missiles of all.

Our negotiators in Geneva promptly tabled new US proposals reflecting the areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik, as well as our other proposals. On November 7, the Soviet Union took some new steps as well, by tabling proposals that partially reflect the headway made at Reykjavik. It is our hope that these areas of agreement can serve as the starting point from which US and Soviet negotiators can hammer out significant arms reduction treaties.

In early December negotiators from both sides met for between-round discussions in Geneva. While there was no narrowing of differences, we believe that these talks did contribute positively to our preparations for the next round in that they made limited, but useful progress in terms of clarifying points of agreement and disagreement. In the next round of NST talks, which begins in January, our task will be to build upon the accomplishments achieved in Reykjavik and the proposals tabled in Geneva during the last round of NST.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

At Reykjavik there was significant progress in narrowing US-Soviet differences on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The US and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to a global limit of 100 LRINF missile warheads for each side, with none in Europe. Remaining missiles would be deployed in Soviet Asia and on US territory. The Soviets explicitly dropped their longstanding insistence that British and French INF be included in such an agreement. Both sides also agreed to constrain shorter-range INF systems and to hold follow-on negotiations at Geneva for their reduction. Following the Reykjavik meeting, our negotiators in Geneva promptly tabled a new US proposal incorporating the areas of agreement reached at the summit and delimiting the areas of disagreement which still needed to be negotiated. While the

Soviets subsequently tabled their version of a new proposal based on the events of Reykjavik, they have stepped backward from their earlier agreement to conclude a separate interim agreement on INF: they now are trying to link INF to other arms control areas, insisting that their arms control proposals are a "package of compromises" and cannot be separated.

Defense & Space Issues

At Reykjavik, in response to the Soviet proposal that we provide a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the US offered to accept such a commitment for the ten-year period through 1996, during which research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, would continue, coupled with:

-- A 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces of the US and the Soviet Union during the first five years;
-- Elimination of all US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles of whatever range or armament during the second five years; and
-- Agreement that either side could deploy advanced strategic defenses after the ten-year period, unless both agreed not to do so.

The Soviets, however, sought to make the ABM Treaty more restrictive by banning testing outside of laboratories. This, in effect, would have killed the US SDI program -- something the President could not accept.

Previously, the US also proposed an Open Laboratories Initiative - a confidence-building program of reciprocal briefings and site visits to strategic defense facilities. US finds comprehensive ASAT ban unverifiable, but has offered to consider proposals for specific ASAT arms control measures.

Chemical Weapons

The US proposed a draft treaty to ban completely chemical weapons, coupled with requirements for effective inspection to deter cheating. Separately, we have discussed CW proliferation issues with the Soviets, particularly in conjunction with CW use in the Iran/Iraq war.

Nuclear Testing

The US first priority in the nuclear testing area is improvement of the verification protocols of the existing Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). At the Reykjavik meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we proposed that the US and the Soviet Union begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations would first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with the TTBT and PNET. Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the US and USSR would immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

While there are indications that the Soviets might agree to address our concerns, there has yet been no agreement on priorities in these negotiations. At the third session of expert level discussions on nuclear testing, the Soviet delegation backed away from an orderly step-by-step approach to negotiations. We have proposed that these expert-level meetings resume in January; we hope the Soviets will respond positively to this proposal.

The President also indicated to Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland that if the Soviets will agree to essential verification improvements to the TTBT and PNET, he will, when the 100th Congress convenes, request the advice and consent of the Senate to their ratification. If the Soviets fail to agree to the needed verification improvement prior to the convening of the 100th Congress, the President will still seek the advice and consent of the Senate, but with an appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure that they not take effect until they are effectively verifiable.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

The 35 nation Stockholm CDE Conference adjourned September 22 with the adoption of a set of concrete measures designed to limit the possibility of accidental war. These measures are built around NATO-proposed measures, but also reflect Soviet interest in emphasis on non-use of force principle. They provide

for prior notification of all military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops, annual forecasts of upcoming military maneuvers, and on-site air and ground inspections.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

US proposal for measures to upgrade Hotline communications was agreed to by the Soviet Union and is now being implemented. US proposal for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers is now being considered by the Soviet Union. CBM initiatives on military-to-military exchanges, and on notifications of ballistic missile launches and strategic military exercises have also been proposed by the United States.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

On December 5, 1985, NATO proposed a new initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal called for a time-limited first phase withdrawal of 5,000 US and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a three year no-increase commitment. It also eliminated the Western demand for prior data agreement on Eastern forces, which the Soviets had claimed was the primary roadblock to agreement. Residual force levels would be monitored by 30 annual on-site inspections. Thus far, the Soviets have not responded seriously to the Western initiative.

NATO High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control (HLTF)

The HLTF presented its report on the direction of NATO's arms control policy for the future to the North Atlantic Council on December 11. The HLTF endorsed renewed efforts at arms control to increase stability at lower levels in Central Europe.

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White House Press Guidance
December 5, 1986

Themes

-- Our negotiators went to Geneva with limited objectives: to take stock of the progress already achieved and to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement, thereby contributing to the preparations for productive negotiating in the upcoming round of talks.

-- The discussions were useful in this regard. They entailed four days of intensive talks in which we met seventeen times. While there was no narrowing of differences, we believe that the talks did contribute positively to our preparations for the next round in that they made limited but useful progress in terms of clarifying the points of agreement and disagreement.

-- In that round, our task will be to build upon the accomplishments achieved in Reykjavik, Iceland and the proposals we have tabled in Geneva based on Reykjavik. These accomplishments demonstrate how far we have come toward agreement on 50 percent cuts in strategic arms and a global ceiling of 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles.

-- We are under no illusions that such agreements are easily attained. And without Soviet willingness to meet us halfway, of course, they cannot be attained.

-- That is why we continue to underscore the need for patience as we proceed with negotiations. Only through firm bargaining and perseverance can we hope to achieve our goal of deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms.

Q. What was the purpose of the NST negotiators' meetings in Geneva this week?

A. American and Soviet negotiators held four days of discussions to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement and to prepare for the next round of negotiations in the Nuclear and Space Talks that begins on January 15, 1987.

Q. What was accomplished this week?

A. Four days of very intensive discussions were held, including 17 meetings. Limited, but useful progress was made in terms of clarifying the points of agreement and disagreement. While there were no substantive changes or narrowing of differences between the sides, we believe the meetings helped our preparations for the next round of NST negotiations.

Q. What were the major differences between the sides?

A. In START and INF there remain serious differences on some important issues, for example, the need for sublimits in START and equitable limits on shorter range systems in INF.

In the Defense and Space area, the Soviets, despite their own longstanding and extensive strategic defense programs, continue to insist on provisions that would effectively kill the U.S. SDI program.

Finally, in contrast to their position prior to the Reykjavik meetings, the Soviets are holding agreement in INF as well as START hostage to US acceptance of their position in Defense and Space.

Q. Were the Soviets serious? Did they stonewall in some groups? Did Obukhov's trip to Belgium mean that less progress was made in START?

A. The U.S. was serious and in four days we held 17 meetings with the Soviets in all three negotiating areas. While we were disturbed to learn of Obukhov's intention to be absent for one of the four days, we worked around this obstacle by scheduling extra meetings in START on other days.

Q. Is it true that the United States has withdrawn its proposal for eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles in 10 years?

A. No. The President's proposal at Reykjavik which includes provision for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles during the next ten years was reaffirmed in his October 13 address to the nation and remains on the table in Geneva.

Q. What are the next steps? Will there be an "experts meeting" or any other meetings before the next round?

A. The sides confirmed the opening date of January 15 for the next round and discussed possible dates for ending the next round and beginning the following round. Thus a steady negotiating process is in train. No other inter-round meetings are scheduled at this time.

Q. Was there any effect on the meetings from the U.S. deployment of the 131st ALCM carrying bomber?

A. No. Our deployment of the 131st ALCM carrying bomber did not appear to have any effect on the meetings.

The Soviets had been given a full explanation of the US decision when it was made in May 1986 and again in July at a special session of the SCC. Therefore, the deployment was no surprise to the Soviets and, in our opinion, had the positive effect of demonstrating US concern over Soviet violation of the SALT and other arms control agreements.

Q. Was SDI the main stumbling block at the meeting?

A. SDI is not a stumbling block to arms control. It was, in fact, vital in getting the Soviets to return to the negotiating table in March 1985 after their walkout in late 1983. The stumbling block is Soviet insistence -- despite their own extensive programs in strategic defenses -- both on killing a U.S. program that (unlike the Soviet case) is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty and that holds out the promise of eliminating the threat of offensive nuclear ballistic missiles, and on holding progress in other areas hostage to this position.

Q: Does the fact that no substantive progress was made confirm recent reports of US pessimism on arms control prospects?

A: Our assessment has not changed, and it is not pessimistic. This Administration has always recognized that the path to meaningful agreements that bring deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable nuclear arms reductions is not an easy one. At the same time, a great deal of progress has been made, and we continue to believe that with patience and perseverance agreements remain fully possible.

Q: What impact has the Iran controversy had on arms control, and particularly on the recent meetings in Geneva?

A: None. We continue to believe that stabilizing arms reductions could enhance both U.S. and Soviet security, and we hope the Soviets see equal merit in such reductions. As long as they do, we believe progress in arms control is possible.