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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/26/2016

File Folder USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

417

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172807	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO J. POINDEXTER RE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN U.S. ELECTORIAL PROCESS (+ ATTACHED PAPER) R 5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-20-1-6	5	8/16/1984	B1
172808	CABLE	170507Z AUG 84 (W/EDIT)	3	8/14/1984	B1
172809	REPORT	RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN (INCL. COVER SHEET)	2	8/17/1984	B1
172810	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY/P. SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS	2	8/24/1984	B1
172811	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS (DRAFT) R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-20-5-2	1	ND	B1
172812	MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE INNER-GERMAN TIES R 5/31/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-20-6-1	3	8/18/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8406217

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 AUG 84 12

POINDEXTER

FROM LENCZOWSKI

1/26/86 GAD

DOCDATE 16 AUG 84

KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT. STATEMENT RE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN US ELECTORAL PROCESS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

6217

2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOTED

172807

August 16, 1984

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-25A-20-1-6
BY LCR NARA DATE 5/31/93

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the U.S.
Electoral Process

Per your request, attached at Tab I is the paper on Soviet intervention in the U.S. electoral process. Anything that you might need on this should ~~should~~ already be included in this paper. For purposes of a public statement, however, you may want to cross out selected paragraphs.

Attachment:

Tab I Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Soviet Intervention in the U.S. Electoral Process

The Administration is harboring a growing concern about Soviet attempts to intervene in the American election process and the effects this has on the international climate. We feel that the American people deserve to know the facts of this situation and the historical context in which they appear.

Recent Historical Context

There is a history of Soviet efforts to influence Western elections. Just last year, the world witnessed two of the most brazen attempts by the Soviets to affect the elections in Germany and Great Britain. These efforts included: Soviet support for "peace" and unilateral disarmament movements; the focusing of the considerable Soviet propaganda and disinformation apparatus toward the target countries; the issuing of a variety of threats -- especially of nuclear cataclysm -- should the wrong party be elected to office; and other methods. This intervention was not the figment of anyone's imagination. There has been broad consensus among scholars, experts and the electoral participants themselves that the Soviets in fact were engaging in the internal affairs of these states.

Soviet Consciousness of the U.S. Electoral Process

Today, we are witnessing a similar pattern of Soviet activities. These proceed from an unambiguous Soviet concern with the American electoral process. This concern manifests itself constantly in official statements by the Soviets, which portray various official acts by the President and the Administration as electioneering. For example:

- Various Administration efforts, many of several years' standing, to conduct a business-like dialogue with the Soviets have been branded by them as "peace-making cosmetics" for domestic electoral purposes.
- The President's trip to China and his participation in the D-Day ceremonies were scored as "electioneering."
- The President's annual responsibility in delivering his State of the Union message was also branded as electioneering.
- Soviet propaganda regularly cites U.S. public opinion polls that suit Soviet purposes and accuses the President of conducting policies designed to ameliorate temporarily his standing in these polls for electoral reasons.

Soviet Intervention in the U.S. Electoral Process

The principal method by which the Soviets attempt to influence American voters is by campaigning against the candidate and the Party they don't like. Their current campaign is designed to

portray the President as a threat to peace, to portray his policies as so unreasonable and aggressive that it is no longer possible to do business with him. Recognizing that there is widespread public support for East-West dialogue, they attribute the impasse to the President and try to engender the fear of war among the electorate.

The Soviets, using their disinformation and propaganda apparatus to which they devote billions of dollars worth every year, have focused on the American elections in a variety of ways:

- They attempt to convince American voters that the Soviets have something genuine to fear from U.S. military forces such as our INF deployments, when in fact the Soviets know that our forces are exclusively for defensive and deterrent purposes.
- They wildly exaggerate American involvement in Central America for the purpose of frightening Americans that we are in "another Vietnam."
- They accuse the Administration of sending the Korean civilian airliner on an aggressive spy mission.
- They accuse the President of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
- They have charged the Administration with using Sakharov as a pawn in a CIA-sponsored subversive operation.
- They have called bona fide arms reduction proposals by the Administration such as our chemical weapons ban mere "propaganda tricks."
- In their effort to show how the President is a "warmonger" and man with whom it is impossible to do business, they have likened him to Hitler and called America a fascist state.
- They have declared continuously that U.S.-Soviet relations are at their lowest and most dangerous levels in history.
- They have accused the President of not being truly interested or serious about arms control, but rather that his genuine sentiments favor a perennial arms race.
- They attribute the breakdown in the arms control negotiations to the President, when in fact it was they who walked out of the talks. (This propaganda is designed to distract public attention from the outrageous preconditions the Soviets maintain for resumption of these talks.)
- They have attempted to demonstrate the President's alleged lack of willingness to negotiate by proposing talks on space weapons and anti-nuclear weapons. When the President showed immediate interest, it was the Soviets who backpedaled away from these talks -- again blaming the President.

- They have accused the U.S. of violating various arms control agreements. (Such charges were meant to distract public attention from the undisputed credibility of the President's report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms agreements.)
- They have charged the President with preparing America both militarily and psychologically for war. The Administration has been called the most bellicose and militaristic in U.S. history.

As part of their effort to show how U.S.-Soviet relations are the worst ever:

- They barred Ambassador Hartman from delivering the traditional July 4 TV speech, accusing it of being part of the U.S. election effort.
- They have committed various acts designed to provoke the Administration into an angry reaction -- such as beating and imprisoning U.S. citizens and officials in Leningrad, imprisoning and possibly drugging Sakharov and ignoring the President's human rights demarches.
- They organized an international boycott of the Olympics largely for the purpose of showing that the low state of East-West relations and the attendant lack of security for athletes were the cause. The Soviets hoped here that the American public would blame the President for spoiling the Olympics.
- They engineered an "active measures" campaign of forgeries of Ku Klux Klan threats to athletes of Third World nations in order to bolster their claims of lack of security in Los Angeles and to widen the boycott.

Taking a different tack, and siding with the President's political opposition, the Soviets have praised the foreign policy planks of the Democratic platform. Pravda, for example, declared that the Democrats "are right on target" in their policies. They have also quoted approvingly various statements by Democratic candidates that were critical of the President's policies.

The most disturbing feature of the Soviet attempts to meddle with U.S. public opinion in an election year is their systematic campaign of intimidation. This has manifested itself in many ways that are profoundly destabilizing to the international climate:

- They have issued numerous threats of a variety of dire consequences if the President continues to conduct his foreign policies.

- These threats include the overall danger of nuclear war, the deployment of ever larger Soviet military forces, the prospect of a never-ending arms race, and the impossibility of every achieving arms control so long as President Reagan remains in office. (These threats are not only designed to influence U.S. voters, but also to induce U.S. Allies: a) to distance themselves from the U.S., b) to pressure the U.S. to make negotiating concessions, and c) to support the President's domestic political opposition.)
- They have been conducting military exercises that are increasingly large and offensive in nature.
- They have made a point of loud announcements of new missile and submarine deployments.
- They have increased their military presence in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in East Asia near U.S. shipping lines of communication.
- They have been brazenly developing new and macabre varieties of biological weapons in the face of public exposure of this activity and in spite of the fact that it is a violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Altogether, the Soviets devote a massive amount of resources to influence American voters over the heads of the government. Their activities not only constitute intervention into the internal affairs of our country, but have done a great deal to aggravate the international climate.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 6217

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	4	J	
Tom Shuil			7
Wilma Hall	5	✓	
Bud McFarlane	6	M	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	7		25
Situation Room			
Nosie	3	✓	Conventions

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

NI = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Bud,
This is a pretty good charge sheet.
Do you want me to talk to Bob
Sims, Karna and Walt Raymond on
how we use it.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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172808 CABLE

3 8/14/1984 B1

170507Z AUG 84 (W/EDIT)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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National Security Council
The White House

System # 11

Package # _____

84 AUG 20 9:24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	_____
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	3	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane ← To	4	M	I
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	_____
NSC Secretariat	6	_____	N
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

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172809 REPORT

2 8/17/1984 B1

RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN (INCL. COVER
SHEET)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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14
ID 8406293

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 18 AUG 84 15

1/26/86 COB

DOCDATE 18 AUG 84

TO

McFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

KEYWORDS GERMANY D R

USSR

GERMANY F R

EUROPE EAST

SUBJECT: SOVIET - EAST GERMAN TENSION OVER INNER GERMAN TIES

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 22 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

SESTANOVICH

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

COBB

~~SOMMER~~

COMMENTS

REF# 8423118

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<u>McFarlane</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>8/25</u>	<u>for Decision</u>		
	<u>C</u>	<u>9/10</u>	<u>McFarlane Noted</u>		<u>DO, PS</u>

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61
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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USSR (8/16/84-8/18/84)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172810 MEMO

2 8/24/1984 B1

P. DOBRIANSKY/P. SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE
INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Inter-German Relations (C)

We appreciate receiving State's memo on inter-German developments and their impact on Soviet-GDR relations. We fully share your view on the importance of ensuring that an impression does not arise that the FRG is taking any steps which are at variance with overall NATO objectives. We agree that we should maintain our public support and closely monitor the situation, and ask that you keep us posted in detail as we move toward the historic Kohl-Honecker meeting. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive SecretaryCONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

172811
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR748-25A-20-5-2
BY LSDB NARA DATES 30/13



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 6293

84 AUG 18 P 2: 29

August 18, 1984

172812

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 88-254-20-6-1

BY 10013 NARA DATE 5/31/16

Subject: Soviet-East German Tension Over Inner-German Ties

Despite apparent Soviet misgivings, preparations are going forward for an East-West German summit meeting in September. The East Germans have done nothing to suggest they plan to cancel Honecker's visit to the FRG, the first by an East German head of state. On August 10 they repeated earlier defenses of their course, and the GDR ambassador told us August 14 that he did not believe the Soviets would obstruct the trip. The FRG believes the visit will take place September 26-29 as planned.

The last two weeks have seen an intriguing public argument between the Soviets and their most important ally over their differing policies toward Bonn. The disagreement broke into the open following announcement of a second major credit from West Germany in late July, accompanied by limited humanitarian concessions by East Germany. Coming as it did atop increasing efforts by the GDR to strengthen ties to Bonn, the deal seems to have raised subliminal Soviet fears about "the Germans." Two days after Bonn announced it, Pravda warned against detente between the GDR and the "revanchist" Bonn regime.

East Berlin's official Neues Deutschland dutifully reprinted Pravda's article, but added one from Hungary supporting the GDR. On August 2, Pravda published a more pointed article entitled "On the Wrong Track." By indirectly criticizing Honecker as well as Kohl, the article cast doubt on whether the September meeting between the two would be allowed to take place.

There may be somewhat less to this than meets the eye. The GDR regime could not survive without support from Moscow, and the nineteen Soviet divisions stationed in the country help remind it of that fact. Nor is it about to liberalize internally. What it is seeking is maneuvering room within the Bloc to shield its special interest in continued inner-German economic and other ties from the overall East-West chill.

The Soviets must calculate, however, the effect of East Berlin's behavior on their other allies. Poland and Czechoslovakia are suspicious that both Germanies are somehow "up to something" with historic connotations. No less interesting is the fact that the GDR turned for support to Hungary, with which it finds itself increasingly aligned against more hardline allies in the Warsaw Pact.

The dispute insures that there will be no room for major breakthroughs if the visit does take place. Despite this, as the first official visit to West Germany by an East German head of state, the meeting will have an important symbolic impact on both states. The Germans' groping toward some form of limited accommodation in the midst of US-USSR tension will continue unless the Soviets take decisive steps to block it.

Much of the Soviets' current dilemma stems from the backfiring of their anti-INF strategy last fall. Their attempts to fan West German fears of nuclear confrontation fanned such fears in East Germany as well, and drove the two states closer together. One of the things which Honecker and Kohl are likely to do if their meeting does take place is issue a joint appeal to their allies to control the arms race.


It may be, as a Soviet diplomat in Berlin has hinted, that the Soviets have made their point, and will allow the visit to go forward -- in a less euphoric mood. Humiliating Honecker by forcing him to prove his loyalty by cancelling the visit now (as happened earlier with the Olympics) would cost the Soviets politically within the GDR. His policy of closer ties with Bonn is popular within his party, and he has the backing of his Politburo. Honecker also seems more sure of where he is going than are the Soviet leaders. Contradictory articles in Pravda and Izvestiya, for instance, suggest differing approaches in Moscow and uncertainty over how they should react to this new show of independence by a formerly docile ally.

US strategy has been to voice support for the overall goals of Chancellor Kohl's efforts with the GDR, while avoiding comment on the details of current developments. This public stance serves our interests by stressing the close integration of FRG goals with US and NATO efforts, and by placing the onus for any slowdown of inner-German relations clearly on Soviet shoulders.

Despite our confidence in Kohl's ability to manage the inner-German process in line with overall Alliance goals, there could be negative consequences for shorter term interests if the Federal Republic feels it necessary to tailor its public rhetoric to the needs of the GDR or the Soviets. The

Department will continue to monitor this aspect especially closely. In particular, public statements by senior German officials in the inner-German context which touch on questions such as non-use of force, US-Soviet relations or arms control issues could affect important current interests. It will be important to make clear to our German friends that they must consider these interests as well when determining their approach to inner-German issues.

We can best influence German behavior on these questions by maintaining our public support for their overall inner-German goals, while at the same time consulting privately on details such as non-use of force. The Department has undertaken such discussions on the non-use of force issue to ensure that German desires to highlight the issue during the Honecker visit do not contradict agreed Alliance strategy on CDE. We will monitor other aspects of the situation carefully and discuss them with the FRG as necessary.


for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary