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Last Updated: 02/06/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/14/2016

File Folder USSR (3/21/84-3/28/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

389

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172348	CABLE	MOSCOW 3406	5	3/21/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>4/8/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-25-39-1-7</i>			
172349	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE CABLE (W/ADDED NOTE)	1	4/16/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>4/8/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-25-39-2-6</i>			
172350	MEMO	COPY OF DOC #172349 (MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE CABLE, W/ADDED NOTE)	1	4/16/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>4/8/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-25-39-14-3</i>			
172352	LETTER	E. ABRAMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE ATTACHED CABLE	1	3/23/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>4/8/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-25-39-3-5</i>			
172353	CABLE	MOSCOW 3269	1	3/23/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>4/8/2013</i> <i>CREST NLR-748-25-39-4-4</i>			
172354	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE CABLE	1	4/5/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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Withdrawer

KDB 1/14/2016

File Folder USSR (2/21/84-3/28/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

389

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172355	MEMO	G. RYE TO MCFARLANE RE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS ON OUTER SPACE ISSUES	1	4/10/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-6-2		
172356	CABLE	MOSCOW 4200	3	4/5/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-7-1		
172357	MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET RESPONSE TO SPACE RESCUE PROPOSAL	1	3/23/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-8-0		
172358	NON-PAPER	RE SOVIET RESPONSE (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #172357)	2	3/13/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-8-0		
172359	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SPACE (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	2	1/27/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-9-9		
172360	MEMO	J. TILLMAN TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONSE TO WICKER COLUMN (W/ADDED NOTE)	1	4/3/1984	B1

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FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

389

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172361	PROFS NOTE	FROM MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO THE TIMES (W/EDIT)	1	3/27/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-11-6		
172362	SCHEDULING MEMO	FROM MCFARLANE RE 3/28/84 MEETING WITH AMB. HARTMAN (INCL. TALKING POINTS AND CARD)	3	3/27/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-12-5		
172363	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE VISAS	1	4/18/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-13-4		
172364	MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE VISAS	1	3/28/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-13-4		
172365	MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE VISAS	1	4/4/1984	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-25-39-13-4		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

172348

PAGE 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 3406
SIT505 AN004894

DTG: 211609Z MAR 84 PSN: 055771
TOR: 081/1947Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF KIMM VP PUBS SIT EOB /009
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS CHECKLIST

OP IMMED
STU3387
DE RUEHMO #3406/01 0811612
O 211609Z MAR 84 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-391-7

BY CDR N RA DATE 4/8/83

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6420

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03406

NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PHSA MOPS US UR NU
SUBJECT: SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROTEST ON MINE DAMAGE TO
TANKER OFF NICARAGUA

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO SUMMONED CHARGE AT 5:00 P.M. ON MARCH 21 AND HANDED OVER NOTE FROM SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO USG (A NOTCH ABOVE USUAL SOVIET FORMAT OF MFA NOTE TO EMBASSY). NOTE, TEXT BELOW, PLACED RESPONSIBILITY ON USG FOR MINE EXPLOSION THAT DAMAGED SOVIET TANKER "LUGANSK" AND WOUNDED UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF CREWMEN ON MARCH 20 NEAR NICARAGUAN PORT OF SANDINO.
3. GROMYKO HAD AN INTERPRETER PROVIDE ORAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF NOTE WHILE CHARGE SCANNED TEXT IN RUSSIAN.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 3406

DTG: 211609Z MAR 84 PSN: 055771

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WHEN TRANSLATION WAS FINISHED, GROMYKO SAID CONTENTS OF NOTE WERE SELF-EXPLANATORY. HE SAID SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD PUBLISH CONTENTS OF NOTE, COMMENTING THAT WESTERN MEDIA HAD ALREADY REPORTED THE SHIP INCIDENT. HE ASKED THAT THE NOTE BE TRANSMITTED ASAP TO WASHINGTON.

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4. CHARGE SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND THAT ANY COMMENT, PRELIMINARY OR DEFINITIVE, WOULD COME FROM WASHINGTON. GROMYKO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND THAT HE HAD NOTHING ELSE TO RAISE.

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5. PRESENT WITH GROMYKO WERE VICE MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV, USA DIVISION CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH, AND AN INTERPRETER. CHARGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ADCM KAMMAN. ATMOSPHERE WAS SOBER BUT NOT HOSTILE OR HIGHLY CHARGED. KOMPLEKTOV BANTERED A BIT WITH CHARGE BEFORE GROMYKO WAS READY TO RECEIVE HIM.

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6. COMMENT: CHERNENKO HAS MADE LATIN AMERICA A HIGH PRIORITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY REALM. THE VERY TOUGH LANGUAGE OF THE NOTE AND THE FACT THAT GROMYKO DELIVERED IT PERSONALLY UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECT THIS PRIORITY. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, SOVIETS HAVE MAJOR NAVAL UNITS EN ROUTE TO THE CARIBBEAN--A FACT WHICH THEY UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECT US TO SEE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS STRONG PROTEST.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF NOTE.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS STATES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE FOLLOWING:
ON MARCH 20, 1984, WHILE APPROACHING THE NICARAGUAN PORT OF SANDINO, THE SOVIET TANKER

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 3406

DTG: 211609Z MAR 84 PSN: 055771

"LUGANSK" SUSTAINED A MINE EXPLOSION AND WAS DAMAGED. THERE ARE INJURED AMONG MEMBERS OF THE VESSEL'S CREW.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS GRAVE, CRIMINAL ACT OF BRIGANDAGE AND PIRACY UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA.

IT IS GENERALLY KNOWN, AND THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION ITSELF DOES NOT HIDE, THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTING DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA, AND IS CONDUCTING AN UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA. OFFICIAL AGENCIES OF THE USA FINANCE, TRAIN AND SUPPLY BANDS OF MERCENARIES AND TERRORISTS, WHO ARE INVADING THE TERRITORY OF NICARAGUA, INFLECTING BRIGANDAGE AND VIOLENCE, AND KILLING PEACEFUL INHABITANTS. IT IS KNOWN AS WELL THAT AMONG THE PERSONNEL OF SUCH GROUPS ARE REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN SPECIAL SERVICES. THUS, THE UNITED STATES IN PRACTICE IS CONDUCTING A POLICY OF STATE TERRORISM.

ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST FOREIGN VESSELS CARRYING OUT COMMERCIAL VOYAGES TO NICARAGUA AND CLOSE TO ITS SHORES HAVE BECOME A NEW, EXTREMELY DANGEROUS MANIFESTATION OF SUCH A POLICY. IN THE OPEN OCEAN AREAS ADJACENT TO NICARAGUA, IN NICARAGUA'S TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND EVEN ITS PORTS, MINES ARE BEING EMPLACED, AND OTHER KINDS OF EXPLOSIVE DEVICES ARE BEING USED, WHICH HAVE ALREADY CAUSED EXPLOSIONS INVOLVING SEVERAL FOREIGN VESSELS. ATTACKS ARE BEING MADE ON MERCHANT SHIPS EN ROUTE TO NICARAGUAN PORTS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 3406
SIT506 AN004895

DTG: 211609Z MAR 84 PSN: 055773
TOR: 081/1948Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS CHECKLIST

OP IMMED
STU3388
DE RUEHMO #3406/02 0811613
O 211609Z MAR 84 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6421

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 03406

NODIS
E.O. 12356- DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PHSA MOPS US UR NU
SUBJECT: SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROTEST ON MINE DAMAGE TO
THE CHARACTER AND SCALE OF THESE CRIMINAL
OPERATIONS LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE BEING
CARRIED OUT WITH THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF
AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL UNDER THE CONTROL OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA, WHICH IS THUS
GUILTY OF VIOLATING ONE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW--THE RIGHT OF FREE NAVIGATION.
ALL THESE ILLEGAL ACTS OF THE USA CREATE A
DANGEROUS SITUATION AND CANNOT BE TOLERATED.
THEY ALSO DEMONSTRATE IN REALITY THE VALUE
OF STATEMENTS BY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION
ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THE USA TO WORK FOR
REDUCING INTERNATIONAL TENSION, AND ITS APPEALS
FOR RESTRAINT AND FOR THE NON-USE OF FORCE
OR THE THREAT OF FORCE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 3406

DTG: 211609Z MAR 84 PSN: 055773

THE SOVIET UNION CONDEMNS IN THE MOST CATEGORICAL MANNER THE POLICY OF TERROR, ARBITRARINESS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT STATES BEING CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF LAW AND MORALITY, AND AS CREATING A THREAT TO PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; AND IT INSISTS THAT THIS POLICY BE ENDED.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR STRONGLY PROTESTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIMINAL ACT AGAINST THE SOVIET VESSEL "LUGANSK" AND WARNS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES WITH WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH ACTION IS FRAUGHT.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DEMAND THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE INJURED SOVIET CITIZENS AND INDEMNIFICATION FOR MATERIAL DAMAGES TO PROPERTY OF THE USSR.
MOSCOW, 21 MARCH, 1984.

END TEXT.

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RECEIVED 26 MAR 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ABRAMS, E

DOCDATE 23 MAR 84

DECLASSIFIED WITH REMOVAL
OF ALL RESTRICTIONS(S)
1/14/16 KOB

KEYWORDS. USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

BEGUN, IOSIF

SUBJECT: FWDS CY OF CABLE RE IMPRISONED JEWISH DISSIDENT BEGUN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 29 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~MATLOCK~~

~~LENCZOWSKI~~

RAYMOND

ROBINSON

Lenzowski

oot

FORTIER

STEINER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8401194 8401793 NSCIFID (JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>X 4/5</i>	<i>Fwd. To Pres for Info</i>	<i>4/5</i>	
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP APR 16 1984</i>	<i>Informative</i>		<i>VP</i>
	<i>C APR 16 1984</i>	<i>Pres noted - No further Action</i>		<i>JL</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA MEN

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

1100 ~~1000~~

1

ED

System #

I

Package #

2490

8 APR 5 P 6:50

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3	✓	
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5/6	B	D/N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

05 APR 5 P 8: 55

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74825-39-2-6

BY 1008 NARA DATE 4/8/0

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen

Received SS

1984 APR 16 PM 12:13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Cable on Imprisoned Soviet Dissident

*RR if I could find
how him home.
RR 172349*

Elliott Abrams has shared with us a cable from Embassy Moscow reporting on the good effects of your recent remarks about Iosif Begun. You might like to see the cable.

Attachment:

Tab A Cable from Embassy Moscow No. 03269

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

MEM 748-25-39-143

BY COB MAR. DATE 4/8/83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen

Rec 2490 SS

1984 APR 16 PM 12:13

6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 16, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Cable on Imprisoned Soviet Dissident

*RR if I don't find
turn him loose. 172350
RR*

Elliott Abrams has shared with us a cable from Embassy Moscow reporting on the good effects of your recent remarks about Iosif Begun. You might like to see the cable.

Attachment:

Tab A Cable from Embassy Moscow No. 03269

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2490

172352

March 23, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-25-39-3-5

BY LODB NARA DATE 4/8/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Robert McFarlane
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bud:

I wanted to be sure you saw the attached cable, which notes the gratitude of the family of Iosif Begun to the President. It occurred to me that you might want to bring this to the President's attention so that he knows the message gets through right to the Soviet Union, and has a real effect.

Sincerely,



Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Attachment:

~~Confidential~~ State Cable, Moscow 03269

EA:ksr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OADR

172358

IIKINS ROSE M
84 MOSCOW 3269

03/23/84 163003 PRINTER: WU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03269 191525Z
ACTION HA-08
INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-00 CIAE-00 NEA-06
NSAE-00 /025 W

-----017177 200227Z /60

R 191518Z MAR 84
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6325
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
USIA WASHDC 6715
AMCONSUL MUNICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 03269

F.C. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR

SUBJECT: CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS FOR IOSIF BEGUN IMPROVE
REF: MOSCOW 03063

1. (0 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BORIS BEGUN AND INNA SPERANSKAYA, SON AND COMMON-LAW WIFE OF IMPRISONED JEWISH DISSIDENT IOSIF BEGUN, TOLD EMBOFF MARCH 17 THAT TWO LETTERS FROM IOSIF ARRIVED MARCH 10 AND 15, MAILED FROM THE IABOR CAMP IN PERM WHERE HE IS INCARCERATED. INNA SAID THAT IT WAS APPARENT FROM THE LETTERS THAT IOSIF'S HEALTH AND MOOD WERE GOOD. IOSIF WROTE THAT FOOD AND GENERAL CONDITIONS WERE GOOD IN PERM (SHE INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN "BETTER" THAN IN THE PRISON IN VLADIMIR) AND THAT HE WAS BEING ALLOWED TO RUN FOR PHYSICAL EXERCISE. INNA NOTED THAT SHE HAD RECEIVED TWO LETTERS FROM IOSIF IN FEBRUARY AND TWO IN MARCH, INDICATING THAT PRISON AUTHORITIES THUS FAR ARE COMPLYING WITH REGULATIONS THAT PERMIT PRISONERS TO SEND TWO LETTERS PER MONTH.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03269 191525Z

3. EMBOFF BRIEFLY RECOUNTED TO THE BEGUN FAMILY THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 13 REMARKS TO THE YOUNG LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO IOSIF BEGUN. INNA EXPRESSED THE FAMILY'S GRATITUDE ADDING "THIS WORKS FOR IOSIF ... THIS MAKES THE DIFFERENCE, EVEN IN LITTLE

THINGS LIKE FOOD."

4. INNA AND BORIS PLAN TO TRAVEL TO PERM AGAIN AS SOON AS THEY RECEIVE A LETTER FROM IOSIF TELLING THEM TO COME, PRESUMABLY AFTER THE INFLUENZA OUTBREAK IN THE AREA ABATES AND THE QUARANTINE ON THE CAMP IS LIFTED (REFTEL).
ZIMMERMANN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-25-39-4-4
BY GDB NARA DATE 4/8/03

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172354	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE CABLE	1	4/5/1984	B1

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8490393

12

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 24 MAR 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

1/14/16 CDB

DOCDATE 23 MAR 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

SPACE PROGRAMS

SOKOLOV, O

PALMER, M

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR SPACE RESCUE PROPOSAL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RYE

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

REF# 8408906

LOG

NSCIFID

(K / K)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>IX</i> APR 11 1984	<i>no further</i>		
	<i>C</i> APR 16 1984	<i>Mcfarlane Noted</i>		<i>RL, Rye</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

1129 ~~84~~ 13

System # II
ED Package # 90393

84 APR 11 PI2: 31

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>RT</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter		<u>DD</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

HAS SEEN

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)



11 #2. 56.

~~SECRET~~

172355

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 10, 1984

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NLRR 748-25-39-62

FROM: GILBERT D. RYE *gil*

BY 1903 NARA DATE 4/8/03

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Soviets on Outer Space Issues

You will recall that in preparation for the President's State of the Union Address, we discussed with the President the potential for a space initiative with the Soviet Union. At that time it was suggested that rather than unilaterally announcing such an initiative during the Address, it would be better to discuss cooperative possibilities more informally with the Soviets. As a result, State used the talking points shown at Tab III as the means for suggesting a U.S./Soviet space rescue mission during informal discussions in late January 1984. In March, we received the Soviet response (Tab II) which links any agreement on a space rescue mission with U.S. acceptance of the Soviet offer to negotiate an ASAT agreement. As you know, our most recent report to Congress highlights the serious difficulties (most notably in the area of verification) associated with formally negotiating either an ASAT agreement or a broader agreement to ban weapons in space. In view of the Soviet attitude, the potential for a joint space rescue mission as the first step toward more serious discussions in other space-related areas seems highly unlikely.

At Tab I is a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relating apparent disagreement between Dobrynin and Gromyko concerning the Soviet position toward U.S./Soviet informal discussions on space. In a previous conversation between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin, Secretary Shultz apparently suggested that informal discussions to explore opportunities for ASAT negotiations might prove useful and Dobrynin agreed. I understand you were advised of Secretary Shultz's plan to propose this invitation to Dobrynin. Apparently Gromyko takes a harder line, although the Soviets have formally tabled a treaty to ban weapons in space (including the U.S. Space Shuttle!) at the United Nations.

Based on the above, no further action appears appropriate.

Jack Matlock and Sven Kraemer concur.

John P. Lehman - We need to discuss.

OK RCM

Attachments

- Tab I U.S. Embassy Moscow Cable
- Tab II State Memo, dtd March 23, 1984
- Tab III State Memo, dtd January 27, 1984

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

15





SECRET
Department of State

S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 04200 051518Z
ACTION NODS-00

001/05 009341 NOD449

INFO OCT-00 /000 W

-----127561 051520Z /40

O 051517Z APR 84 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6995

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 04200

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: FURTHER EXCHANGE ON THE OUTER SPACE ISSUE

REF: (A) STATE 99071 (B) MOSCOW 4092 (C) STATE 96101

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING AN APRIL 5 MEETING BETWEEN THE DCM AND BESSMERTNYKH ON OTHER ISSUES, ZIMMERMANN SAID THAT HE HAD CHECKED WITH WASHINGTON AND OUR UNDERSTANDING REGARDING DOBRYNIN'S AGREEMENT TO PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS ON SPACE WAS EXACTLY AS WE HAD CONVEYED IT TO GROMYKO AND BESSMERTNYKH (REFTEL B).
3. BESSMERTNYKH ASKED IF THE U.S. VIEW WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT TO START DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES ON OUTER SPACE. ZIMMERMANN REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
4. BESSMERTNYKH THEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE PURPOSE OF THE EXCHANGES. HE RECALLED THAT A TOP-LEVEL SOVIET LETTER HAD SUGGESTED A DISCUSSION ON PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE POSSIBLY BEGINNING WITH TALKS IN DIPLO-



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

14
S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 04200 051518Z

001/05 009341 NOD449

MATIC CHANNELS. HE ASKED IF THAT WAS WHAT THE U. S. HAD IN MIND. ZIMMERMANN RECALLED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD REFERRED GENERALLY TO THE ISSUE OF SPACE AND HAD NOT MADE ANY CONNECTION WITH THE SUGGESTION MADE IN THE SOVIET LETTER. THE AGREEMENT WAS FOR A DISCUSSION ON OUTER SPACE ISSUES IN PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

5. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE THRUST OF MINISTER GROMYKO'S MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR HARTMAN WAS THAT THE USSR WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE WAY WAS BEING OPENED TO AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE BECAUSE OF THE NEGATIVE U. S. ATTITUDE ON THE BASIC ISSUES. ZIMMERMANN SAID THAT GROMYKO'S MESSAGE WAS CLEAR. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THEY WOULD GET BACK IN TOUCH IF THEY HAD ANYTHING TO ADD, BUT THAT PROBABLY NOT MUCH WAS NEEDED.

6. COMMENT: WHILE BESSMERTNYKH'S COMMENTS WERE OPAQUE, HE PASSED UP AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISAVOW DOBRYNIN'S AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SPACE ISSUES PRIVATELY AND CONFIDENTIALLY. BESSMERTNYKH SEEMS TO BE TRYING TO RECONCILE GROMYKO'S HARD-LINE ATTACK ON OUR POLICY WITH DOBRYNIN'S MORE OPERATIONAL APPROACH.
HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

System #

II

Package #

90453

90393

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Stuff to eye for action
 Munklock for comment
 Info RCM / JMP (red tag)





SYSTEM II
90393

ES SENSITIVE
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United States Department of State

21

DECLASSIFIED

Washington, D.C. 20520

172357

NLRR 748-25-39-8-0

BY 150B NARA DATE 4/8/13

March 23, 1984

MAR 23

PIO: 49

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Response to Our Space Rescue Proposal

Soviet Embassy DCM Oleg Sokolov has given Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer the Soviet response to our January proposal for a simulated joint space rescue. A translation of the Soviet non-paper is attached.

In their non-paper the Soviets link any discussion of the space rescue proposal to negotiation of an ASAT agreement. The Soviets contend that fruitful cooperation in a space rescue mission can only take place within the framework of an agreement to prevent the militarization of space.

The Department of State believes that we must now wait until the Interagency Group on ASAT Arms Control completes its current study, before anything further can be done on the space rescue proposal.

Attachment: As Stated.

BMCK
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

22
172358

NLRR 748-25-39-8-0

BY 6013 NARA DATE 4/8/13

Soviet Non-Paper of March 13, 1984

The issue of securing the safety of spacecraft crews and stations could be one of the directions of peaceful cooperation in the exploration of outer space. The Soviet side has always been in favor of such cooperation.

It is evident, however, that this particular question could hardly be viewed, all the more in a practical way, in isolation from the overall situation which is determined by the policies of states with respect to outer space. A real basis for fruitful cooperation in this matter can only be found if one is certain that outer space will remain peaceful.

The saturation of outer space with arms, however, would not only fail to create such a basis, but, moreover, would in general undermine the possibilities of continuing man's creative activities therein. In other words, the safety of outer space researchers and actions aimed at turning outer space into an arena of military confrontation -- these two things are not compatible at all.

Yet this is exactly the way it looks if one takes into account the concrete actions of the American side regarding outer space, actions that are directly opposite to the interests of limiting and reducing arms, and of preventing the projection of the arms race to where there has so far been none. These actions include the work being done in the U.S.A. on a comprehensive ABM system, as well as plans aimed at creating all kinds of means meant to hit and destroy outer space objects, including those which might be manned.

~~SECRET~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

23

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

That is why the issue of man's safety in outer space cannot be reliably solved in alienation from the main and primary task of preventing arms race in outer space. Otherwise, any simulation of cooperation in rescuing astronauts would only be misleading.

In this connection, we would like to draw once again the attention of the American side to the immediate necessity of beginning to seek in a practical way agreement aimed at prohibiting the use of force both in outer space and from outer space with regard to Earth. There are concrete proposals advanced to this effect by the Soviet side, as well as suggestions on how to solve radically the problem of antisatellite weapons. An important asset in this regard would be the American side's agreement to abide by a moratorium prohibiting the placement in space of any kind of antisatellite weapons.

We urge the American side to respond in a practical way to these proposals and to manifest a business-like and constructive approach towards ensuring truly peaceful cooperation in outer space. Consequently, the question of coordinated actions in rescuing astronauts could be solved within the framework of a principled agreement and practical efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space. We would like to hope that the American side will manifest its readiness to follow this course of action.

~~SECRET~~

2A



WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Clearance
Passed on
30 Jan 84* 25

84 JAN 27 P3:09
URGENT

84 JAN 27 P 3: 12

URGENT
SITING ROOM

B

S/S # 8402720

MESSAGE NO. 1232 CLASSIFICATION SECRET UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFICATION REG(S) No. Pages 2 *1/14/86 (013)*

FROM: BMcKinley S/S 23126 7224
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Hill-McFarlane: Simulated Space Rescue
Mission with Soviet Union.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Bill Martin	395-3044	
	<i>Bye</i>		
	<i>Matlock</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY TO ADDRESSEE. ADVANCE COPY --
ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW VIA COURIER.

S/S Officer: *BMK* *WKP*

III



Washington, D.C. 20520

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NLRR 748-25-39-9-9

BY KDR NARA DATE 4/8/13

172359

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Simulated Space Rescue Mission with Soviet Union

Attached are talking points and the text of a non-paper on a US-Soviet simulated space rescue mission that we would plan to use with the Soviets.

Attachment:
As stated.

Tom McKinley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

27

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Talking Points:

-- Our proposal for a joint mission to develop space rescue techniques, as conveyed to Mr. Sokolov on January 21, is a serious concept.

-- As we told you earlier this week, President Reagan decided not to include this project in his Message on the State of the Union in order to give you time to consider the proposal.

-- I have a non-paper giving more details on our idea. I hope your government will consider the idea carefully.

Non-paper:

The U.S. and the Soviet Union are the only two countries with manned space programs. The U.S. believes it would be useful for each side to demonstrate its capability to rescue the other's astronauts in the event of an emergency in space.

Such a simulated space rescue mission could take many forms. The exact form would, of course, be subject to negotiation. The following is our preliminary thinking on one possible approach.

Each country would launch its own crew in the normal fashion. The U.S. crew would be aboard the shuttle; the Soviet crew would be launched in a Soyuz spacecraft which would carry them to the Salyut.

The shuttle and the Salyut would rendezvous. A Soviet cosmonaut would be "rescued" by transfer to the shuttle. A U.S. astronaut would be "rescued" by transfer to the Salyut.

A docking of the shuttle and Salyut is not envisaged since both countries have demonstrated their capability for EVA (extra vehicular activity).

If possible, each "rescued" party would return to earth aboard the spacecraft which "rescued" him. That is, the Soviet cosmonaut would return to earth on the shuttle and the U.S. astronaut would return in the Soyuz.

If the Soviet side is interested in pursuing the concept of a simulated space rescue mission with us, I suggest we arrange for our technical experts to meet to discuss what form such a mission might take.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8402510

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ALL ENCLAVES ENCLOSURE(S)

1/14/16 KDB

RECEIVED 27 MAR 84 12

TO KIMMITT

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 27 MAR 84

TILLMAN

29 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: NICARAGUA

EL SALVADOR

WICKER, TOM

USSR

TERRORISM

MEDIA

SUBJECT. LTR TO TIMES ON WICKER 27 MAR OPED PIECE / REAGAN'S TERRORISTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 27 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURGHARDT

STEINER

SMALL

NORTH

MATLOCK

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Kimmit</i>	<i>X 3/29</i>	<i>for Decision</i>		
<i>Mcfarlone</i>	<i>X 4/03</i>	<i>for Decision</i>		
	<i>APR 07 1984</i>	<i>Mcfarlone disapproved</i>		<i>etc.</i>

(Handwritten signature)

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Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172360	MEMO J. TILLMAN TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONSE TO WICKER COLUMN (W/ADDED NOTE)	1	4/3/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Barzilay:

Mr. Wicker's column ("Reagan's Terrorists", March 27) omits many relevant facts and presents a one-sided version of some key foreign policy issues confronting the United States. This concerns me because his piece seems to legitimize the efforts of the anti-democratic forces in Central America to impose their totalitarian ideology on the people of this region and seems, as well, to relieve the Soviet Government of its responsibility for refusing to negotiate balanced agreements for nuclear arms reductions. The realities and the facts support quite different conclusions.

Fact: The guerrillas in El Salvador were invited to participate in the elections held there recently. They not only refused but instigated widespread violence to impede the democratic process. Does this decision by the guerrillas in El Salvador suggest that they are inspired by the fundamental democratic principle that governments derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed, or, rather, that they are operating on the Leninist principle that a self-appointed minority has the right to seize power by force?

Fact: The situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua, when compared, reveal sharp contrasts. In El Salvador, democratic forces are attempting to wage a simultaneous struggle against violence from the extreme left and extreme right, and against the conditions of poverty and social injustice inside their country. The violence impedes solution of the fundamental problems of that society, and the triumph of either extreme by force of arms will doom the valiant efforts to establish a more just and democratic society.

But what do we see in Nicaragua? We see a Sandinista regime which has consistently betrayed the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people and has declared war on free institutions, trying to subject independent trade unions, open political parties, a free press and a non-political educational system to centralized and totalitarian control by a small group of self-appointed leaders. Further, we also see a regime unwilling to allow its neighbors to live in peace and to try to resolve their problems in their own way, but, rather, one which persists with ample assistance from Havana and Moscow in providing arms, training, and support to totalitarian forces in El Salvador. Is it any wonder that many Nicaraguans who, seeking democracy, joined the Sandinistas in their fight against the Somoza regime are continuing their struggle against the totalitarianism which replaced it?

In another area, Mr. Wicker cites some comments made by French President Mitterrand during the latter's recent visit here, but does this so selectively as to distort the overall thrust of the President's statements.

Fact: We and the French concur that we must strive to improve East-West relations in realistic and concrete ways. It is ironic that French President Francois Mitterrand's warning against producing new causes of dissension between the superpowers was cited. Ironic because the French President has strongly endorsed the NATO decision to deploy INF missiles and thereby prevent a Soviet monopoly in this field. Ironic because the French President also warned against offering Moscow concessions in order to bring them back to the arms control tables. Ironic because the French President also stressed the necessity of rejecting Soviet attempts to create an atmosphere of hysteria in international relations.

Fact: It was not the United States that "pushed through deployment rather than making a deal both sides could accept". The governments of the NATO countries decided that deployment was unavoidable in the face of Soviet unwillingness to agree either to eliminate intermediate range missiles in Europe, or to hold them to a lower, balanced level. It is still our objective to reach a fair and balanced agreement in this area. Our proposal to remove all the intermediate range nuclear missiles stands as does our offer to negotiate significantly lower levels. Polemical rhetoric should not be allowed to obscure the fundamental and obvious fact that it is the Soviet Union which is refusing to negotiate, not the United States.

This Administration does not operate in a dream world, and we do not base policy on fanciful reasoning. We have consistently made clear to the Soviets that we are ready for a full "give and take". We have consistently made clear to all factions in Central America our desire and willingness to reduce tensions in that region. But we will not sell out our principles, our values, or our commitments--in Europe, Central America, or anywhere else.

Goals, principles, plain facts, and concrete actions do serve useful purposes in eliminating confusion. But one does need to open one's eyes to see them.

Sincerely,

Mr. Robert Barzilay
Editor, New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSRMK --CPUA
To: NSRMK --CPUA

172361
03/27/84 10:55:26

DECLASSIFIED

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NLRR 148-25-79-116

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to the Times on today's Wicker OpEd piece

BY 6013 NARA DATE 4/8/03

Ray Burghardt

Please ask ~~Constantine~~ to discuss Wicker's piece today in the Times with Steve Steiner and Karna and determine whether it is not sensible for us to write, in my name a very stiff rejoinder. The flaccid sliding over of facts, such as the stark difference between legitimate governments (in both Lebanon and El Salvador) being subject to terrorism and the situation in Nicaragua where a tyrannical regime which represses Labor, the Church and minorities engenders a grass roots opposition, ought to be made clear. Separately we should make the obvious points in the US-Soviet context, that the refusal by the Soviet Union of our several efforts to engender sensible discourse do not represent a comment on the Reagan policy of outreach--quite the contrary--it is a comment upon the sincerity of the Soviet declaratory policy of wishing to solve problems. There are other points in the article. Perhaps we give it too much notice by responding to it but it is so outrageous that a reply seems to me in order. They should also talk to Jack Matlock.

Reagan's Terrorists

By Tom Wicker

Here's one clear and welcome issue between Ronald Reagan and either of his likeliest challengers: Both Walter Mondale and Gary Hart say they would put an end to Mr. Reagan's support for the "contras," who are trying to overthrow the recognized Government of Nicaragua.

The recent mining of a Soviet tanker in the harbor of Puerto Sandino demonstrates again that this is an urgent issue. The President's efforts to overthrow the Government in Managua violate international covenants and stain the integrity of a nation supposedly devoted to law at home and self-determination abroad. And this lawless policy further complicates the thoroughgoing mess Mr. Reagan has made of Soviet-American relations.

The mines were sown at Puerto Sandino by "contras" who are funded, armed, supported, partly trained and largely organized by the Central Intelligence Agency for the express purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government. The Reagan Administration piously denied any responsibility for the mines, but that's like saying Mr. Reagan is not responsible for the C.I.A.

Who's President? Who sanctions the contras? Who periodically seeks funds for them from Congress? Ronald Reagan does, and it's outright dishonesty for his spokesmen to wash their hands and his of responsibility for what verged on a serious international incident. (Five Soviet crewmen were wounded; suppose they'd died?)

It's sheer hypocrisy, too, for Mr. Reagan to push a guerrilla insurgency against Nicaragua while denouncing such tactics in El Salvador and condemning "state terrorism" directed against U.S. forces in Lebanon. What does he imagine the efforts of the C.I.A.-directed contras amount to, if not "state terrorism"?

And if Moscow should use the Soviet tanker incident as a pretext for supplying minesweepers to Nicaragua, does Mr. Reagan think that the Marxist regime in Managua will become less dependent on the Russians? His strong-arm pressures on Managua may be producing the opposite effect.

François Mitterrand, the strongly anti-Communist French President, concluded his visit to Washington with a warning against just such "new causes of dissension or conflict," at a time when the Soviet Union may be reassessing its arms control position — and at a time, he might have added, when the Reagan Administration professes so earnestly to seek renewed diplomatic discussions with Moscow.

That won't be easy, even assuming

Mr. Reagan is not staging a mere election-year show of kiss-and-make-up with the "evil empire." Just recently a private American envoy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who made it known he was carrying a personal letter from Mr. Reagan, was flatly refused an interview with Konstantin Chernenko, the Soviet leader. What more persuasive evidence is needed of the low esteem in which Moscow holds Mr. Reagan as a bargaining partner?

Some Administration officials attribute the continued Soviet hostility to an unwillingness in Moscow — particularly since the Democratic Presidential race has heated up — to do anything that might be helpful in re-electing Mr. Reagan. Others say the recent change of leadership there produced a continuing struggle for power, during which new policy developments are not to be expected. Leslie Gelb of The New York Times, who reported the rebuff to General Scowcroft, also found speculation within the Administration that the Russians meant what they said when they pledged to break off negotiations if the U.S. deployed medium-range missiles in Europe; and now mean what they say when they refuse to return to arms control talks unless Washington withdraws the missiles.

There's no real reason to doubt the third of these explanations: over a period of four years, Moscow has repeatedly made clear its profound opposition to U.S. missiles in Europe. But Ronald Reagan insisted that only when the missile deployment began would the Russians see that the U.S. was determined; only then would they begin to talk seriously about arms control. He was wrong.

He may have been just as wrong, therefore, in pushing through the deployment rather than making a deal both sides could accept — a deal that many arms control specialists believe could have been made, had Mr. Reagan wanted it more than he wanted the missiles. And even now, while ostensibly trying to get Soviet-American relations back on track, the Reagan Administration is divided along State Department-Pentagon lines on the question whether to seek Senate ratification of two relatively minor treaties governing underground nuclear testing.

Both sides have observed the treaties for years, although both charge occasional violations. Mr. Chernenko has said he would regard ratification as evidence of peaceful U.S. intentions; but what he gets, instead of even this small step toward better relations, is one of his oil tankers blown up by Mr. Reagan's terrorists.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2510

NOTE TO ROBERT KIMMITT
FROM: JACKIE TILLMAN *JT*

Thank you for letting this go forward informally --
hopefully Judy will be back tomorrow.

This draft was coordinated with Matlock,
Steiner, Ty Cobb, Karna saw drafts of it,
and Ben Elliott of Speechwriters gave it
a good read.

We decided that since Wicker's attack was
directly aimed at the President, a direct
response was appropriate. It could be
either an Op-Ed piece or a Letter to the
Editor. It looks like the latter to me.

If Bud likes it, with any comments and
changes he might have, we could hustle
tomorrow and try to get it in Sunday's
paper.

3/29

25

Proposed letter to the editor, McFarlane Response to Wicker op-ed

Mr. Wicker's editorial ("Reagan's Terrorists," 3/) seems to legitimize the efforts of the anti-democratic forces in Central America, and to blame the present lack of US-USSR nuclear arms control negotiations on the party which actually stayed at the tables and is earnestly striving to secure reductions in global tensions and meaningful arms control agreements. That party is the United States. It is, of course, the Soviets who walked away.

Mr. Wicker also fails to make any moral or practical distinction between the guerrilla forces operating against the democratically elected government of El Salvador and those opposing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. For example, he omits mentioning that the guerrillas in El Salvador were invited to participate in the elections held there recently. They not only refused but instigated widespread violence in order to prevent people to vote thereby demonstrating their undemocratic posture. Should we stand by and allow the totalitarian forces to impose their will on a nation clearly and courageously committed to change through democratic means? Should we not attempt to provide the El Salvadoran armed forces the means to repel the insurgent forces supplied and financed by Managua, Havana, and Moscow? Should we simply ignore the fact of El Salvador's proximity to the US?

Contrast the situation in El Salvador with that in Nicaragua where the Sandinista regime has consistently betrayed the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people, failed to honor their pledges to implement a democracy, and declared war on all representative institutions: independent trade unions, open political parties, a free press, a depoliticized educational system and churches of all demoninations. Consider, also, that it is the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua which actively promotes insurgency against all of Nicaragu^a's neighbors, actively supporting the overthrow of the democratically elected government in El Salvador, not the other way around. In stark contrast to El Salvador's guerrillas, Nicaragua's democrats desire democracy, desire the ability to participate in a fair, free, democratic electoral process.

Mr. Wicker also expresses concern over the state of East-West relations, and, ironically, chooses to quote French President Francois Mitterand's warnings against producing new causes of dissension between the superpowers. We and the French concur on the desire to improve East-West relations. However, Mr. Wicker should have also noted President Mitterand's strong endorsement of the Western Alliance decision to deploy INF missiles to redress the dangerous imbalance created by the continuing Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles directed against Europe and Asia. Surely Mr. Wicker read or heard the French President warn against offering Moscow concessions to bring them back to the arms control tables, and his rejection of Soviet attempts to create an atmosphere of hysteria in international relations.

And, contrary to what Mr. Wicker asserts, it is not the United States that "pushed through deployment rather than making a deal both sides could accept." Indeed, as Ambassador Paul Nitze has made clear, the deployment decision was an Alliance resolution, and second, the US has demonstrated considerable flexibility in the negotiations. Is Mr. Wicker still unaware that it is the Soviet position which has remained inflexible? To this day, the Soviets insist that any agreements should grant them monopoly in this important area of the military balance.

This administration does not operate in a dream world and we do not base policy on fanciful reasoning. We have consistently made clear to the Soviets that we are ready for a full "give and take." We have consistently made clear to our adversaries in Central America our desire and willingness to reduce tensions in that region. But we will not sell out our principles, our values or our commitments --- in Europe, in Central America, or anywhere.

Goals, principles, plain facts and concrete actions do serve useful purposes in eliminating confusion. /But one does need to open one's eyes to see them. I regret that Mr. Wicker seems unwilling to do so./

[or instead of sentences bracketed in / /, substitute:
We are not confused about any of this at all.]

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8402515

31

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF UNCLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 27 MAR 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

1/14/16 (COB)

DOC DATE 27 MAR 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

AP

HARTMAN, ARTHUR

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR PRES MTG WITH AMB HARTMAN

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 27 MAR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	X 3/27	for info		
	C MAR 28 1984	Pres noted		JM ✓

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

National Security Council
The White House

1076 int 390

System # I

Package # 2515

CEIVED

8 MAR 27 P 2:13

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>Handcarry to Durham</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

MAR 27 1992

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Bud / John

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd 2515

1984 MAR 27 PM 5:23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 27, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

172362

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: March 28, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 - 2:30 P.M.
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RMK for*

NLRR 748-25-39-12-5

BY *KDR* NARA DATE 4/8/13

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and to provide guidance to Amb. Hartman for his future contacts with Soviet officials. Hartman plans to return to Moscow this coming weekend.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary Shultz
- Robert C. McFarlane
- Ambassador Hartman
- Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House staff photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS


-- I'm glad we have a chance to meet while you are in town. Why do you think the Russians still seem to be giving us a cold shoulder?

-- What sort of tactics should we be following over the coming months? Have they really decided finally that they will not deal this year, as some are saying?

-- Do you think the Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?


-- Is there anything we can do to give you more ammunition in your dealings with Gromyko and the other Soviet leaders?

-- I know you have a tough job in Moscow, and I get nothing but good reports on the Embassy's fine performance. Please let your staff know that we really appreciate what you are doing for us there.




MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- GLAD WE HAVE CHANCE TO MEET WHILE YOU ARE IN TOWN. WHY DO YOU THINK RUSSIANS STILL SEEM TO BE GIVING US COLD SHOULDER?
- WHAT SORT OF TACTICS SHOULD WE BE FOLLOWING OVER COMING MONTHS? HAVE THEY REALLY DECIDED FINALLY THEY WILL NOT DEAL THIS YEAR, AS SOME ARE SAYING?
- DO YOU THINK SOVIET LEADERS REALLY FEAR US, OR IS ALL THE HUFFING AND PUFFING JUST PART OF THEIR PROPAGANDA?



2.

- IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO GIVE YOU MORE AMMUNITION IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH GROMYKO AND THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS?
- I KNOW YOU HAVE TOUGH JOB IN MOSCOW, AND I GET NOTHING BUT GOOD REPORTS ON EMBASSY'S FINE PERFORMANCE. PLEASE LET YOUR STAFF KNOW WE REALLY APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE DOING FOR US THERE.



42

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 28, 1984

for The President of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Robert McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, American Ambassador to Soviet Union
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing

Requested by Rachel C. Ashley

Room No. Oval Office

Room No. 368 Telephone 5112

Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m.

Date of request March 27, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

RECEIVED 28 MAR 84 18 ^{A3}

DOCDATE 28 MAR 84

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/14/16 KOO

KEYWORDS: USSR INTL TRADE STAPLETON, JEAN
VISA COLTON, BARBARA
LAVROV, KIRILL Y

SUBJECT: VISIT OF THREE SOVIET NATIONALS TO ACTORS EQUITY ASSOC DURING 5 - 9
APR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 29 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK <i>Lenczowski</i>	LENCZOWSKI ROBINSON	MCMINN FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8409308 LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>MCFarlane</i>	<i>ix 4/19</i>	<i>For info</i>		
	<i>MAY 07 1984</i>	<i>Powdexter noted</i>		<i>Jly</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* *(cc)*

AK

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172363

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

April 18, 1984

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-25-39-13-4

BY KD NARA DATE 4/8/13

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Visas to Soviet "Trade Unionists"

After first deciding to deny visas to two Soviet Trade Unionists, State has granted them visas after learning of Lane Kirkland's apparent indifference on the subject. State's memoranda (Tab I) reveal that it is acting on the basis of public pressure (or lack of it, in this case) rather than on the basis of the principle involved: namely the undesirability of admitting Soviet officials travelling under false pretenses.

Attachment:

Tab I State's memoranda of March 28 and April 4.

cc: Jack Matlock
 Roger Robinson
 Doug McMinn

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR



DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-39-13-4

BY CAF NARA DATE 4/8/03

8409308
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2590

March 28, 1984

172364

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Three Soviet Nationals to the Actor's
Equity Association

Actress Jean Stapleton and Barbara Colton, Vice-President of Actor's Equity, have invited an actor (Kirill Y. Lavrov) and two trade union officials (Mikhail V. Pashkov and Sergey I. Seliverstov) from the Central Committee of Cultural Workers to make a social visit to the New York City area during the period April 5-April 9. The proposed visit during this five day period consists of a visit to a television studio, meeting with theater students, a reception at the Actors' Fund Home in New Jersey, shopping at Macy's and evening trips to the theater.

For decades the AFL/CIO has taken the position that Communist trade union officials seeking entry into the U.S. at the invitation of a U.S. labor organization should be denied admission and has, in this instance, registered its opposition to visa issuance for the two recognized trade union officials.

Except during the period when such officials were included in the McGovern Amendment provisions, all Administrations have accepted this position and denied entry to any official of a communist-dominated labor union seeking entry into the U.S. to meet with U.S. labor organizations. In light of this existing policy, the Department has denied entry to the two trade union officials and authorized entry to the Soviet actor.

Denial to the two Soviets will undoubtedly result in calls to the White House from Actors Equity since the Soviet actor will, in all probability, decline to make the visit alone.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary



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Washington, D.C. 20520

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Add-071

DECLASSIFIED

April 4, 1984

NLRB 748 25-39-13-4

34 APR 4 10:38

BY COB

DATE 4/8/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Three Soviet Nationals to the Actor's Equity
Association

In my memorandum of March 28 I informed you of the Department's decision to deny entry to two recognized Soviet trade union officials in light of the AFL/CIO's objection to their entry.

We have now been informed that Actor's Equity has taken the matter up with Lane Kirkland personally and that Kirkland has expressed himself as being indifferent on the subject. This represents a significant change of position since the AFL/CIO had initially registered its objection to the entry of the two officials.

While all Administrations for many years have accepted AFL/CIO objections to such visits, we find no reason to deny entry in such cases in the absence of such an objection. The only other basis for denying entry to the two is their affiliation with communist organizations, and that ineligibility normally is waived unless the purpose of the visit threatens national security or specific U.S. interests. In this case the purpose appears to be social.

Accordingly, we have reconsidered our original decision and have now decided to seek the normal waiver from the Department of Justice and to authorize the entry of the two trade union officials.

Corey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary