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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EX	ECUTIVE SECRETA	RIAT, NSC: COUNTRY	FILE	Witl	hdrawer
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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NLRR 748-25-42-2-2 April 21, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Shifts in China's Foreign Policy: The US and USSR

Attached is a brief analysis of some of the fundamental shifts that have taken place in China's global perception over the past several decades. The Secretary promised this analysis to the President during a conversation that took place April 17.

Charles Hill Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

SECRET/SENSITIVE (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE without attachment)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFING PAPER

SHIFTS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE U.S. AND THE USSR

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China's foreign policy has undergone great change over the past three decades. It was generally in concert with the Soviet Union in the '50s. It became more isolationist during the Cultural Revolution in the late '60s but maintained a strong revolutionary bent. From the early '70s, China turned increasingly toward the West--US, Europe, and Japan--in its foreign policy views and for assistance with its modernization goals. China's interest at that time in exploring new relations with the US was driven primarily by the need to contain Soviet

China's interest at that time in exploring new relations with the US was driven primarily by the need to contain Soviet pressures. China was alarmed by the Soviet move on Czechoslovakia in 1968, by Sino-Soviet border skirmishes in 1969, and by open Soviet discussion of preemptive military action against China. During President Nixon's visit in 1972, a major theme of the discussions was the Soviet threat. Normalization in 1979 took place just before China's war with Vietnam, a period of high tension with the Soviet Union. Through 1980, China pounded on the Soviet theme. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping expressed strong reservations about US efforts to seek detente with the Soviets. During Kissinger's visit in 1975, Deng criticized the US for squandering its advantage over the Soviets in areas such as strategic weapons and technology. Disagreement on this and the Taiwan issue acted as a drag on US-China relations during this period.

The Chinese also reacted badly during Vance's visit in 1977 to his proposals on normalization and to his "relaxed" view of the Soviets, including a strong emphasis on arms control. In May 1978, Deng warned Brzezinski against Soviet aggression and alluded to the strategic benefits of normalization in seeking to contain the "polar bear". Only when Brzezinski assured the Chinese that the US had made up its mind to proceed with normalization did a new momentum begin to develop. His forceful anti-Soviet presentation and hints of possible US-China security ties also had a positive effect on the Chinese.

Our high-level exchanges following normalization, including Deng's visit in January 1979, continued to focus on strategic matters. These took on added significance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and China urged a "united front" against the Soviets. US willingness (expressed during Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit in spring 1980) to help China in areas of dual-use technology and military industry, and to engage in strategic cooperation, reflected our common purpose.

During the subsequent impasse over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, China began in 1981 to focus strong criticism on the US approach to Taiwan and to downgrade our common strategic interests. Our agreement in August 1982 established a framework

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for dealing with this issue, but Chinese suspicions over US policy remained. At its 12th Party Congress in September 1982, China announced an "independent foreign policy". Principal changes involved a reemphasis on a foreign policy independent of both the US and the USSR; establishment of a less acrimonious (but still adversarial) relationship with Moscow; and increased rhetorical attention to China's Third World role.

These changes were more tactical than substantive, however, and do not alter China's strategic objectives. They are designed to maximize China's leverage with the superpowers and to improve its international image. Chinese leaders continue to stress that the Soviet Union is the major threat to China's security. Premier Zhao stated openly during his visit here in January that China does not stand "equidistant" between the US and the Soviet Union. China still perceives fundamental common interests with the US, including the need to counter Soviet expansionism, and US-China relations have turned sharply upward since May 1983. While reluctant to engage in open strategic cooperation with the US, China seems prepared to cooperate against Moscow in some areas and to resume forward movement in US-China relations, including weapons purchases.

At the same time, China seeks to reduce tensions with Moscow in order to focus on economic modernization, enhance its independent image, improve ties with East European countries, and remind the US that it cannot be taken for granted. Vice foreign ministers from both sides have held four rounds of talks since fall 1982. First Deputy Premier Arkhipov will visit Beijing in May for economic talks. Sino-Soviet trade has quadrupled in two years (but is still less than one-third of US-China trade). Non-political exchanges have also become more frequent. However, China's demand for Soviet concessions in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and border forces (including SS-20s) will impede any significant advance in Sino-Soviet relations.

Apart from the US-USSR dimension, China has also moved toward a much closer relationship with Japan -- its principal foreign trading partner. In addition, China has begun to play a more active role on Korean issues, including expanded trade and non-political exchanges with South Korea. It has improved its relations with the ASEAN countries in opposition to Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea. And it has upgraded its exchanges with Soviet-bloc countries and its support of African countries to provide an alternative to Soviet dependence.

In sum, China's tactical shift permits it both to support our military buildup against Soviet expansionism and to attack superpower rivalry as the major cause of global tension. As a result, China is able to pursue parallel strategic interests with the US and, at the same time, to strengthen its relations with what it perceives to be an ascendant Third World bloc.

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FBIS TRENDS -- 25 APR -- USSR-U.S.

NA252241 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS

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SUMMARY

DESPITE SOME INITIAL SIGNS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNDER GENERAL SECRETARY CHERNENKO MIGHT RESTRAIN CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION, AS HAD HAPPENED AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEATH, AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET STATEMENTS NOW ARE ECHOING THE UNVIELDING ANTI-U.S. POLEMICS OF YURIY ANDROPOV'S FINAL MONTHS. MOSCOW'S INFLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY CLEAR IN ITS FAILURE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO RECENT U.S. ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES AND CALLS FOR INCREASED BILATERAL COOPERATION. SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF RDMINISTRATION MOTIVES IN AN ELECTION YEAR AND CONCERNED TO AVOID AIDING THE PRESIDENT IN HIS REELECTION BID.

SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF ANDROPOV'S DEATH IN FEBRUARY SEEMED TO PROMISE A MORE MODERATE APPROACH TO THE UNITED STATES. THE LEADERSHIP AVOIDED DIRECT CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON IN SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS AT THE TIME OF ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL AND AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM THAT ELECTED CHERNENKO GENERAL SECRETARY. CHERNENKO HIMSELF MAINTAINED THIS MODERATE PUBLIC STANCE THROUGH HIS 2 MARCH ELECTION SPEECH, IN WHICH HE DUTLINED A SPECIFIC AGENDA FOR EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND OFFERED A LESS ALARMING VIEW OF U.S. INTENTIONS THAN HAD BEEN PRESENTED BY DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV IN A 23 FEBRUARY PRAVDA ARTICLE AND BY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN HIS 27 FEBRUARY ELECTION SPEECH.

THE SIGNS OF MODERATION ON CHERNENKO'S PART DISAPPEARED WITHIN WEEKS, HOWEVER, AS HE GRADUALLY HARDENED HIS ASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY:

-- AT A 29 MARCH DINNER FOR VISITING ETHIOPIAN LEADER MENGISTU, THE GENERAL SECRETARY ACCUSED PRESIDENT REAGAN OF POSTURING AS A "LOVER OF PEACE" IN ORDER TO "CAMOUFLAGE" A POLICY OF "STATE TERRORISM AND INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN STATES." TO SUPPORT HIS POINT, HE CHARGED THE ADMINISTRATION WITH CONDUCTING AN "UNDECLARED WAR" AGAINST NICARAGUA AND ATTEMPTING TO "IMPOSE ITS WISHES" ON THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. -- IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 9 APRIL, CHERNENKO OFFERED A BROAD INDICTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES AND A PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AT LEAST FOR THE NEAR TERM. HE CLAIMED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IN HIS 6 APRIL SPEECH AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HAD REAFFIRMED A POLICY OF GAMBLING "ON MILITARY FORCE, ON THE ATTAINMENT OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY, AND DN IMPOSITION OF (THE U.S.) ORDER OF THINGS ON OTHER PEOPLES." ALTHOUGH HE DISMISSED THE IDEA THAT THE USSR IS STALLING ON SERIOUS TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES UNTIL THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE OVER, HE INDICATED THAT MOSCOW DOES NOT EXPECT AN EARLY RETURN TO MAJOR BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT RECENT U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT "NO POSITIVE CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE" IN THE U.S. POSITION ON THE "CARDINAL QUESTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL."

OTHER SOVIET LEADERS HAVE OFFERED SIMILAR ASSESSMENTS IN A NUMBER OF RECENT STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS STATEMENT READ BY PREMIER TIKHONOV AT THE 12 APRIL SUPREME SOVIET SESSION, ALTERNATE POLITBURO MEMBER DOLGIKH'S 20 APRIL SPEECH COMMEMORATING LENIN'S BIRTH, AND GROMYKO'S 23 APRIL SPEECH AT A LUNCHEON FOR VISITING ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI. GROMYKO, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMED THAT WASHINGTON IS "PREACHING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND "ALMOST DAILY" PLACES ORDERS FOR NEW MILITARY PROGRAMS "PREPARING FOR WAR AGAINST EVERY LIVING THING ON EARTH."

BACKGROUND

THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF RESTRAINT IN POLEMICS. AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AFTER ANDROPOY'S DEATH CONTRASTS WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN RECENT YEARS AFTER A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN EITHER COUNTRY. AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS ELECTED IN NOVEMBER 1980, SOVIET LEADERS EXERCISED RESTRAINT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, EXPRESSING HOPE THAT HIS ELECTION WOULD REVERSE WHAT THEY VIEWED AS ANTI-SOVIET POLICIES PURSUED BY HIS PREDECESSOR AND PLEDGING RECEPTIVITY TO ANY U.S. GESTURES FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, BREZHNEY, IN MID-NOVEMBER 1980 ASSERTED THAT HE WOULD NOT "DWELL ON" WHAT THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT HAD SAID "IN THE HEAT OF THE ELECTION STRUGGLE" AND THAT "ANY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP" TAKEN BY WASHINGTON WOULD "MEET WITH & POSITIVE RESPONSE." ANDROPOV'S ACCESSION IN NOVEMBER 1982 BROUGHT A SECOND, MORE TENTATIVE, MODERATION IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP REMARKS ON THE UNITED STATES. ANDROPOY HIMSELF AVOIDED SHARP POLEMICAL ATTACKS ON THE ADMINISTRATION UNTIL 2 FEBRUARY 1983, WHEN HE RESPONDED IN A PRAVDA INTERVIEW TO AN OPEN LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN READ PUBLICLY BY VICE PRESIDENT BUSH DURING A VISIT TO WEST BERLIN.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 May 23, 1984

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR<u>148-25-42-4-0</u> BY_EOD NARA DATE 4/8/

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT:

Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship (C)

Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov. ACT

In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in light of present circumstances? (R)

Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question, , the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt

Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 May 23, 1984

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR/48-25-42-4-0 DATE 4/8/13

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

SUBJECT: Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship

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Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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
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8412440 XR 8412439 United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 172408 April 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE

THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship

The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months, through December 31, 1985.

The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC unable to attend) considered the following three steps:

--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter. This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can only process U.S.-caught fish;

--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S. fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no overriding security problems;

--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.

The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to restore the fisheries relationship and that the current sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing industry:


-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint

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new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet performance.

It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this step under review should political conditions permit our moving in that direction in the future.

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We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the President for his review of all the options and decision.

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Bonct mles bon Charles Hill Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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June 1, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL Executive Secretary Department of State

DECLASSIFIED 1 NLRR74825-42-7-7 BY <u>ECO</u> NARA DATE

SUBJECT: Proposed Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental Cooperation Agreement (C)

Your memorandum of April 30, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this subject has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception to the Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint US-USSR Committee on Environmental Cooperation has been approved. We also concur that it is appropriate for EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus to assume the position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. (C)

Preparations should be initiated, within the US Government and on an interagency basis, for a Joint Committee meeting in the future, and the Soviets should be informed of our willingness to hold a working level meeting to prepare for a formal Joint Committee session. We should, however, refrain from agreeing to a date for the Joint Committee meeting itself in view of the situation currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Timing of other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation into account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov situation should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the Soviets.

Robert M. Kimmitt Executive Secretary

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1724	10 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.SUSSR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT	2	5/29/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL	1, D. Dorman
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MEMORANDUM FOR	BY COM NARA DATE 4/8/13 ROBERT C. MCFARLANE	
FROM:	JOHN LENCZOWSKI JV	HOM HAS SEEN (72462
SUBJECT:	Reactivation of U.SUSSR Envi	ironmental Agreement

Once again another U.S.-Soviet agreement is up for reactivation or renewal. Once again the issue appears all by itself and out of context. Renewal of such an agreement seems innocent enough. It does not appear to pose the risk of a technology transfer hemorrhage, nor does it appear to pose a significant hostile intelligence threat. Its political impact seems relatively insignificant: not too many people pay attention to meetings between environmental officials at the Under Secretary level.

The problem with this is that it is part of a pattern of a wide variety of agreements that are appearing before us for renewal one by one. The real policy question here is whether this is a pattern to which we want to subscribe at this time. Other issues which form the pattern include: the reactivation of U.S.-Soviet Health agreements, the U.S.-Soviet Fishing relationship, the Agricultural Cooperation agreement, the agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation, the Consular agreement, the Exchanges Agreement and others. (The ones listed are only those which have appeared in recent weeks.)

Taken together, these add up to a relationship of wholesale cooperation with the Soviets that amounts to a revival of the "detente" relationship established by President Nixon. These types of agreements were to help diminish the fundamental political tensions between the two systems not only by their intrinsically cooperative nature, but because they formed a web of relationships which were organically linked so as to provide a system of incentives for the Soviets to behave in a more moderate fashion. Fully recognizing that we had more to offer the Soviets in these various fields than vice versa, the threat of U.S. withdrawal from these accords was to serve as the stick accompanying the carrots. Even though it was recognized that these agreements were not truly reciprocal, it was nevertheless part of the price we were willing to pay to supply both the positive and negative incentives of a "linkage" policy so as to encourage in particular Soviet good faith in arms control.

If somebody is articulating the philosophy behind the current renewal of U.S.-Soviet agreements, I have not heard it. Perhaps the strategy underlying this has appeared in secret documents which I have not seen. What I have been able to see is a rather underarticulated policy of "intensified dialogue." But, this expression cannot explain an entire foreign policy strategy.

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Is the current policy a repetition of the Nixon policy of "linkage" and incentives? Or are we willing, as it appears, to give more and more carrots to the Soviets regardless of their external behavior?

Today they are conducting a major escalation of their attack on the innocent people of Afghanistan. Yet the reactivation of the Environmental agreement as well as others involves lifting of Afghanistan sanctions which, though imposed by President Carter, we have chosen to retain for three and a half years. The Soviets are harassing the Sakharovs with new intensity. They have rejected countless of our good-faith efforts to get them to return to several negotiating tables in spite of their dubious record of treaty compliance. On top of this, their policy seems pointed, as much as ever before, toward an open attempt to take sides in a U.S. presidential election. How else to explain their decision to pull out of the Olympics?

Under these circumstances, I believe the entire package of agreements should come under review and should be postponed until such time as the Soviets are willing to take even a few steps -much less move halfway -- toward reaching some kind of mutual code of behavior with us.

Unless we begin to treat these agreements more directly as part of the entire strategic relationship with the USSR, and in doing so link them to Soviet external behavior in a way that establishes a coherent system of incentives, the Soviets will interpret our actions as signs of weakness and will have no incentive to mitigate the various types of aggression which they and their proxies are currently conducting around the world. Clearly we must continue our efforts to demonstrate that we in fact want peace, but the challenge we face in trying to do so involves avoiding adopting the position of a supplicant for Soviet good will.

From a variety of indications, the Soviets appear to believe that they can paint the President as a warmonger to assist his electoral defeat and by tarring him this way, induce him to make concessions in symbol if not substance. They are looking to see if we are conscious of the nature of the signals we send them and if those signals are ones of strength or weakness.

Renewing agreements in the absence of a clearly defined and articulated strategy will only be seen as a sign of weakness -especially a sign that we fear their anti-Reagan propaganda campaign so much that we are willing to reach even for Environmental agreements in hopes of mitigating it.

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MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental Cooperation Agreement

EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus has requested Secretary Shultz's views on his proposal (attached) to take several steps to increase activity under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection. Under the sanctions imposed by President Carter in 1979 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan US agencies administering bilateral cooperation agreements with the USSR have been forbidden to have high-level contacts with Soviet counterparts or to hold meetings of the US-USSR Joint Committees which set directions for cooperative programs. They have been allowed to continue programs under way at the time sanctions were instituted, but not to develop new programs.

Mr. Ruckelshaus points out that this Administration found the Environmental Agreement of sufficient value to extend it in May 1982 for an additional five-year term. Inability to hold Joint Committee meetings and have contacts with Soviet counterparts at the policy-making level are, however, constraining the substantive benefits to be obtained from the agreement. To reinvigorate the cooperative program he suggests it might be appropriate for him to assume the now-vacant position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee and initiate planning for a meeting of the Committee to revise the agreement's largely outdated agenda.

The Environmental Agreement has been one of the more successful and less controversial of the bilaterals on science and technology cooperation. As continental, heavily industrialized countries the US and USSR share many environmental problems, on which cooperation can have major benefits for both parties. The potential for undesirable technology transfer is minimal. Encouraging increased activity under this agreement can provide a useful supplement to what we

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are currently trying to do in certain other areas. It should also encounter considerable Allied and public support and private sector involvement. The Soviets would find the onus on them for failing to respond or responding negatively.

The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanctions runs counter to US interests and recommends NSC approval of Mr. Ruckelshaus' proposals as an exception to that policy.


Charlestiel

Charles Hill Executive Secretary

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March 29, 1984



THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable George P. Shultz Secretary of State Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

For some time now I have been concerned about the management and implementation of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection.

As you may know, the Administration decided to extend the Environmental Agreement for a third five-year term effective May 1982. This action was based on a positive assessment, on the part of EPA and the other participating USG agencies, of the Agreement's substantive merit and humanitarian nature. At that time, we were charged, in effect, to continue those activities which were found to be beneficial and which our limited resources would permit us to support, all subject to case-by-case review by the State Department and the National Security Council. At the same time, however, the ban on highlevel contact with Soviet counterparts, imposed by the previous Administration in the wake of events in Afghanistan, was left intact. This meant that the position of U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, a post traditionally held by the Administrator of EPA, was left vacant.

It has been brought to my attention recently, both by my own staff and by Ambassador Arthur Hartman, that this leadership vacuum has come to interfere in a significant way with the implementation of the Agreement. It is constraining more and more the substantive benefit which this cooperative relationship should bring us. We believe that if this program is worth continuing, as seems to be the case, it is worth doing properly. The professionals of this Agency, and of the other participating organizations both public and private, should not be expected to commit their valuable time, talent, and resources to this or any international program without benefit of a genuinely supportive administrative framework and a clear sense of purpose. Under these circumstances, and in the spirit of the President's January 16 address on US-Soviet relations, I wonder whether it might be appropriate for me to assume the position of U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. I would be prepared to do so on the understanding that the extent of my personal involvement would be limited by my very full range of domestic concerns, and that my designated representative would be filling in for me much of the time. Nevertheless, the weight and authority of the Administrator's office must be brought directly to bear if we are to engage the Soviets in revising the Agreement's largely outdated agenda and to restore sound management and effective leadership on the U.S. side. Accordingly, we would expect to initiate planning at an early date for the ninth meeting of the Environmental Joint Committee.

Please advise me what your views and wishes are on this matter.

Sincerely, Will S

William D. Ruckelshaus

National Security Council The White House SHE. AV System # Package # 3466 add 6 1. 29 P4: 11 SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION Dep. Exec. Sec'y **Bob Kimmitt** John Poindexter Tom Shull 4 Wilma Hall 5 A **Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt** 6 **NSC Secretariat** Situation Room MATLOCK 0 I = Information A = Action) R = Retain D = Dispatch -N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) On this also I don't think we should explicitly link this with takk may a should be internalone