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Last Updated: 02/13/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/19/2016

File Folder USSR (5/18/84-5/21/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25

SKINNER

396

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172451	MEMO	D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE RE MORE ON THE SOVIETS AND IRAQ (W/ADDED NOTES)	2	5/18/1984	B1
172452	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-2-8	1	5/21/1984	B1
172453	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-3-7	3	ND	B1
172454	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE PHONE CALL TO DOBRYIN ON SAKHAROV R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-4-6	1	5/18/1984	B1
172455	TALKING POINTS	RE TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYIN R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-4-6	1	ND	B1
172456	REPORT	RE SOVIET ACTIVITIES	13	5/18/1984	B1
172457	MEMO	J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR HOUSING AGREEMENT (W/ADDED NOTE)	4	5/31/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172458	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE U.S.-USSR HOUSING AGREEMENT	1	ND	B1
172459	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE U.S.-USSR HOUSING AGREEMENT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-8-2	1	6/1/1984	B1
172460	MEMO	C. HILL TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN HOUSING R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-9-1	2	5/21/1984	B1
172461	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN HOUSING (W/ADDED NOTE)	1	5/29/1984	B1
172462	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S. ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIETS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-11-8	1	5/23/1984	B1
172464	PROFS NOTE	FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING NOTE FROM MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK	1	5/21/1984	B1
172463	MEMO	J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S. ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIETS	2	5/29/1984	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172465	REPORT	U.S. PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TOWARD THE USSR SINCE EARLY JANUARY	5	ND	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-13-6			
172466	TALKING POINTS	RE U.S. INITIATIVES TOWARD USSR	3	ND	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-25-46-13-6			

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8490597

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 18 MAY 84 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 18 MAY 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

IRAQ

SUBJECT: MORE ON USSR & IRAQ

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

MAY 22 1984

Mcfarlane noted

DF

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

cu
2
System # II
Package # 90597

10 P 1 33

1168

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>MAY 22 1984</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

84 MAY 18 P 1: 47

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172451 MEMO

2 5/18/1984 B1

D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE RE MORE ON
THE SOVIETS AND IRAQ (W/ADDED NOTES)

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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5
ID 8490605

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 19 MAY 84 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

1/19/16 *CD* DOC DATE 18 MAY 84

KEYWORDS. USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SAKHAROV

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 19 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

RAYMOND

KIMMITT

COMMENTS ** URGENT STAFFING ACTION REQUIRED TODAY ASAP

REF#

LOG 8490499 8490585 NSCIFID

(B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>McFarlane</i>	<i>X</i> MAY 19 1984	<i>Pres for information</i>	
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP</i> MAY 21 1984	<i>information via POB</i>	
	<i>C</i> MAY 21 1984	<i>Pres noted</i>	<i>Jul</i> ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

5A

Weyherst

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

II

90605

MAY 19 P2:51

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	✓	
John Poindexter	3	✓	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt		B	
NSC Secretariat	6		✓
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

0930 Item for Monday

In PDB

84 MAY 19 P 2: 57

DECLASSIFIED

90605

7

NLRR 748-25-46-2-8

BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

172452

May 21, 1984

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Sakharov

George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are now underway.

George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.

Attachment:

Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

RR

A

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90605

9

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1984 10:59
MAY 18 10:59

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Next Steps on Sakharov

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-48-3-7
3Y 608 NARA DATE 4/8/0

Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike. According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr. Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.

The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the Sakharovs:

-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with Dobrynin).

-- The Department has released two public statements condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.

-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third World capitals to request the help of host governments and international political organizations in convincing the Soviets to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have already responded, and there is a possibility that Mitterand may precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's case.

-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.

-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow will not take place as planned.

-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~
~~2 -~~

posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.

-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of an upcoming trip to the USSR.

Action Plan for Additional Efforts

In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.

-- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response, both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation. The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on Sakharov.

-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international nature of concern about the Sakharovs.

-- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation short of tragedy.

~~SECRET~~

11

~~SECRET~~

~~- 3 -~~

-- We will also be going privately to other governments who have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their part to trade for Sakharov.

-- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.

-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

May 19, 1984

Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2000
BY NIA 1008 1/9/16

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Next Steps on Sakharov

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.

It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you send it to the President for his information.

unavailable
Walt Raymond concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984

~~SECRET~~
Declassify: OADR

Seen by President 13
Camp Haric
5/19

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

14

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

2

IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/19/16 CCOB

DACOM #

RELEASER

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PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG

182346Z MAY 84

ROUTINE

TTY #

FAX #

65

FROM/LOCATION/

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT//CAMP DAVID

TOR/

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

11 MAY 84 10 25 AM
J. B. D. 11

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CLASSIFICATION

15

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-4646
BY ICDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

~~SECRET~~

177454

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Phone Call to Dobrynin on
Sakharov

As you know, Andrei Sakharov is beyond the two-week point in his hunger strike. I had an idea, which I have discussed with George Shultz, who agrees, which might make a difference in Soviet thinking. Basically, we propose that you call Dobrynin (as opposed to a meeting which would attract attention) and make a plea for the Soviet leadership to reconsider. I have worked up talking points (attached). If you agree with this, the sooner you have an opportunity to do it, the better. No one, and I stress no one, knows about this except George and me. It seems to me best that it stay that way.

Attachment

SECRET
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

172455

16

NLRR 748-25464-6

BY Q005 NARA DATE 4/9/77 TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN

-- Anatoly, I would have asked you to come and see me, but I know what I have to say touches on a delicate subject, and I thought it best to give you a call so we don't risk any press attention.

-- Would you let Chairman Chernenko know that I'm very concerned over the situation that has developed with Mrs. Bonner and Sakharov.

-- I've been careful not to make any public statements, because I don't want anyone to get the idea that I am bringing public pressure on your government.

-- But, you know, if a tragedy occurs, it could have the most serious implications for our relationship. I wouldn't be doing my duty if I didn't point this out while the situation can be resolved.

-- The fact is that the American people will never be able to understand why a sick woman shouldn't be allowed to travel abroad to get an operation. And if either of the Sakharovs dies under present circumstances, that will make a lot of things more difficult than they are already. I think you will agree that relations are bad enough as it is.

-- So I hope you'll pass these thoughts on to Chairman Chernenko. Let him know also that I consider this a purely private conversation. If he makes a humanitarian decision, he can be sure that I won't mention this conversation in public and I certainly won't try to claim any credit or use it politically.

-- You know, I had really hoped that our relations could be improved. We have some real problems, but I've made a number of decisions which I hoped could start us on a better road.

-- Right now I'm puzzled by your government's actions. I just don't understand why we can't get down to business and settle some of the problems between us.

-- Let your people know that I'm still willing to try to settle our problems if they are. I keep being asked to make some new gesture, but every time I make one, they slap me in the face. And, you know, I could ask the same. But we'll never get anywhere if we keep up this "Alphonse and Gaston" act.

~~SECRET~~

The ~~resident~~ 17
has seen
21 May 84

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172456 REPORT

13 5/18/1984 B1

RE SOVIET ACTIVITIES

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

RECEIVED 21 MAY 84 17
DOCDATE 21 MAY 84 31

KEYWORDS USSR

PIERCE, S

SUBJECT: SEC PIERCE PROPOSAL FOR REJUVENATING US - USSR AGREEMENT RE HOUSING

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 25 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8412777

LOG 8309315

NSCIFID

(MD)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
MCFarlane	x 5/29	For decision	5/30	
	C 6/19	Mcfarlane noted w/ comment		✓
DISPATCH		W/ATTCH	FILE	(C)

National Security Council
The White House

1189

gF

System # I

Package # 4107 add on

31 P5:09

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4/7</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>6</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>7</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie / Esther</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

- ① Please attach to original package
- ② Corrections Tab I (# 4107)

Bud.
I think you saw a copy of this
but I'm not certain. [Signature]

84 MAY 31 P 5: 15

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172457	MEMO J. LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR HOUSING AGREEMENT (W/ADDED NOTE)	4	5/31/1984	B1

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172458	MEMO R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE U.S.-USSR HOUSING AGREEMENT	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID 8404107

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 21 MAY 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

1/19/16 CDS

DOC DATE 21 MAY 84

MATLOCK

29 MAY 84

LENCZOWSKI

31 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

PIERCE, S

SUBJECT SEC PIERCE PROPOSAL FOR REJUVENATING US - USSR AGREEMENT RE HOUSING

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 30 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8412777

LOG 8309315

NSC/FID DR830290 (MD)

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
McFarlane	X 6/1	For Decision		
Matlock	S JUN 01 1984	for redo		
	C 6/2	Thompson Sec Memo		1A, 1L, 1T

DISPATCH

6/1/84

W/ATTCH FILE

PA 10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

38

6/1

Jack Matlock,

Please modify both
Kinnitt - Hill memos to
provide direction that
the Sakharov linkage is
not to be made explicitly to
the Soviets but only used
as an internal US
restriction. Then give to
Paul Thompson to sign out. John

National Security Council
The White House

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134



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System #

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Package #

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39

8 MAY 29 P 6: 05

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	✓	
John Poindexter	3, 5	✓	
Tom Shull	1 ↑		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	4		A
Bob Kimmitt	8		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
MATLOCK	6		

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Bud,
Since this is our initiative and not the Soviets, I don't see that the Sakharov affair linkage will provide any leverage (not that any was intended). Therefore memo to State should specifically direct that no linkage

be made in discussions with
Soviets. The linkage should
be purely internal U.S. We can
just be slow in setting dates.

J

National Security Council
The White House

cm

System # I

Package # 4107

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48

11 P7:07
SEQUENCE TO

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y

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A

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Tom Shull

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

2

D

Situation Room

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N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

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41
4107

NLRR 748-25-46-8-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

BY (C) NARA DATE 4/8/12

172459

June 1, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Rejuvenating the U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in Housing (C)

Your memorandum of May 21, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this subject has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception to the Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint US-USSR Steering Committee on Cooperation in Housing and other Construction has been approved. (C)

Preparations should be initiated on an interagency basis for a future meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, and the Soviets should be informed of our willingness to hold a working level meeting to prepare for a formal session of the Joint Steering Committee. We should, however, refrain from setting a date for the Joint Steering Committee meeting in view of the situation currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Timing of other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation into account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov situation should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the Soviets. (C)

Paul B. Thompson for
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR



DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25-46-97

BY ICDB NARA DATE 4/8/13

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 21, 1984

172460

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., has written to Secretary Shultz requesting that activities under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction be strengthened. Since the last meeting of the bilateral housing committee (known as the Joint Steering Committee) in September 1978, the Housing Agreement has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January 1980 decision by President Carter to impose a sanction against high-level US-Soviet contacts which has precluded further meetings of the Committee. In the absence of these meetings, no new programs have been approved under the Agreement and older ones have not been extended when the first phases were completed. The Housing Agreement has, therefore, begun to atrophy.

Secretary Pierce points out that, following a positive assessment of the program which noted in particular the support by the US business community, the Administration decided to allow the Agreement to extend automatically for a third five-year term effective June 1984. However, the sanctions policy has resulted in a substantial reduction of the exchange program. In addition, setting of policy guidance has been impeded by his inability to deal directly with his counterparts. To resolve these problems, Pierce proposes that he be allowed to convene a meeting of the Joint Steering Committee to address major substantive and administrative issues necessary to achieve a more effective collaborative program.

The Administration's decision in late December 1983 to extend the Housing Agreement was based on the extensive private sector involvement and support of activities, the technical benefits to the American participants (particularly in the areas of construction in permafrost regions, earthquake-zone construction, fire-preventive coatings for wood and other fire-resistant techniques, and the use of large-scale research models), the future commercial potential for export of American goods and services to the Soviet housing industry, and the

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DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2-~~

intelligence gain to the USG from the regularly-filed trip reports. Furthermore, experience with the program has shown that the potential for undesirable technology transfer has been minimized.

Building up the activities under the Agreement would supplement what the Administration has undertaken in agricultural cooperation and other areas. Reactivation would also demonstrate to the private sector participants the Administration's support of their efforts and encourage them to continue their input to the program.

The letter from Secretary Pierce is the fourth in a series of letters from heads of US Government agencies (Mr. Ruckelshaus - Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Block - US Department of Agriculture, and Ms. Heckler - Department of Health and Human Services) which conform to the White House agenda of a steady improvement in US-Soviet relations. This agenda, which receives Ambassador Hartman's strong personal support, remains in place despite recent strains.

The Department considers that in this case continued application of the Afghanistan sanctions does not advance US interests and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Pierce's proposal as an exception to that policy.

For Mr. Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172461 MEMO

1 5/29/1984 B1

J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-USSR
AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN HOUSING
(W/ADDED NOTE)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/1

Dear Mr. [unclear],

Thank you very much
for the [unclear] - I did not know the
previous conditions that
the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
not to be made especially to
the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
as an [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
restriction. Then [unclear] to
Paul Thompson - [unclear]
to [unclear] out. [unclear]

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 21 MAY 84 18

TO

MATLOCK

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 21 MAY 84

46

KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: US ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS W/ SOVIETS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 21 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

LEHMAN, C

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (MD)

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MCFARLANE	X 5/23 MAY 24 1984	For information Mcfarlane noted	5	SM-

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The White House

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8 MAY 23 P 3: 32

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Tom Shull

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

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A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

This is in response to Bud's PROFS note of 5/21.

84 MAY 23 P 4: 00

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

172462

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

May 23, 1984

INFORMATION

NLRR 748 2546118

MEMORANDUM FOR

BY ~~KDB~~ ~~PARA DATE 4/8/84~~

RCM HAS SEEN

~~ROBERT C. MCFARLANE~~

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

U.S. Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets

I am working with State on the unclassified checklist of actions we have taken in regard to the Soviets, and will be consulting with Chris and Ron Lehman on the list before I send it up.

However, I believe we should think through the timing and manner of our release of this information. It will get far greater attention if we work it into a Presidential speech at an appropriate time. If we feed too much out so that it is reported piecemeal, then we may fall victim of the Scylla of attracting too little attention, and the Charibdis of having many react to a Presidential statement as "nothing new." Still, we must stay in front of the power curve in our public diplomacy.

My initial thought is that it will be useful to start citing some of the facts to Congress in private briefings, but that we should hold off on trying to attract publicity for a couple of months still. Otherwise, we risk the charge this fall that we gave up too soon, and may find ourselves on the defensive more than necessary as the campaign heats up. I think a record at this time of patient quiet effort can in fact pay dividends in September and October.

One upcoming occasion for a Presidential announcement covering part of our package is the planned meeting of institutions involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges the last week in June. A message to that group from the President could lay out what we have been attempting in this area, and if we want to maximize media attention, the President could even invite the group to the White House for a short meeting. (The fly in this particular ointment is that the Sakharov situation has prevented us from moving ahead as we had intended in formally proposing a cultural exchanges agreement and steps to reactivate some of the cooperative agreements.)

If you can find time, it would be useful to discuss some of these thoughts.

cc: Chris Lehman
Ron Lehman

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Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

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04 MAY 21 P 2: 37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>IC</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Stuff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Achm Matlock
Cmt R. Lehman
 C. Lehman

Memo to RCH due 5/21.

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172464 PROFS NOTE

1 5/21/1984 B1

FROM R. KIMMITT, FORWARDING NOTE FROM
MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 21 MAY 84 18

TO MATLOCK

FROM MCFARLANE

DOCDATE 21 MAY 84 *50-A*

MATLOCK

23 MAY 84

MATLOCK

29 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT US ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS W/ SOVIETS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

LEHMAN, C

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (MD)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Matlock</i>				
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>5/31</i>	<i>For Decision</i>	
	<i>C</i>	<i>9/8</i>	<i>Mcfarlane approved</i>	<i>SM</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

HA
(C)

Bob K. M 5/31

Bud has more
than enough
to get through
before he leaves.

Suggest you take 51
this and give it to
him enroute. J

National Security Council
The White House

24

System # I 52

Package # 4113 A/O

1191

MAY 31 AIO: 00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>+</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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(Date/Time)

84 MAY 31 P12: 11

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F03-002/5

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172463 MEMO

2 5/29/1984 B1

J. MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE U.S. ATTEMPTS
TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIETS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MLR 748-25-4613-6

BY EDR NARA DATE 4/8/13

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

55
172465

U.S. PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TOWARD THE USSR
SINCE EARLY JANUARY

General: The President's January 16 speech signaled a major effort to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. It was forward-looking, non-polemical, and designed to demonstrate to the Soviet leadership his desire to move ahead on a wide range of issues. Secretary Shultz, in the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm two days later, affirmed our interest in negotiations on the entire range of agenda items between us. Vice President Bush met with General Secretary Chernenko at Andropov's funeral and, in a useful exchange, emphasized the importance we attach to the President's approach and our hope for progress. The President has sent Mr. Chernenko four letters, laying out his view of the relationship and identifying concrete steps that could be taken to mutual benefit in all four areas of our agenda. Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hartman have had several meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss the various items on the agenda in some detail. Overall, and with the notable exception of nuclear arms issues, the Soviet response was wary willingness to work with us on the issues we had identified, and progress seemed possible. However, the Soviets have recently quite obviously sought to put off individual decisions and stall the whole process, replacing their earlier enthusiasm for "small steps" arrived at through confidential discussions with delaying tactics in private and shrill propaganda for public consumption. Below are specific proposals that the U.S. has made since the President's speech:

Arms Control:

-- INF: In addition to urging the Soviets to return to the INF negotiations, we also told them we are ready to listen to any other ideas they may have on the INF issue, and that we are prepared for discussion not only in formal sessions at Geneva, but also in more private channels. They have steadfastly refused to discuss any aspect of INF.

-- START: As in INF, we said we were prepared to discuss these issues not only in formal negotiations but also in private channels. We told them we have some new ideas on START in which the concerns of both sides and differing U.S. and Soviet force structures could be taken into account, and that we are willing to discuss them at any time. In this connection, we continue to refine and develop our positions in the interagency process in order to have new proposals available the moment the Soviets are ready to talk. The President asked Brent Scowcroft to carry a letter to Chernenko and engage in

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- 2 -

a high-level exchange of views on the basis for getting talks on nuclear issues going again. The Soviets offered Scowcroft a third-ranking official, and have been unresponsive to all our efforts, refusing either formal or informal talks on both START and INF.

-- Chemical Weapons: In addition to tabling a draft CW treaty at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on April 18, we suggested bilateral discussions to help move the negotiations forward and resolve some of the verification issues. All the Soviets have done to this point is to denounce our draft treaty.

-- MBFR: In addition to tabling the new Western proposal on MBFR that substantially modified the Western stance on data, we have suggested intensive bilateral discussions in Vienna on MBFR issues. Again, the Soviets quickly denounced our initiative without taking time to study it carefully.

-- CDE: With the Western CBM proposals designed to reduce the risks of surprise attack tabled at Stockholm, Ambassador Goodby initiated private discussions with his Soviet counterpart in an effort to move the meeting ahead. Goodby later invited Ambassador Grinevskiy to Washington for confidential discussions during the recess. When the Soviets said they preferred to meet in Moscow, Goodby went there for talks. In these meetings, we emphasized our readiness to discuss their proposals as long as they are ready to discuss ours.

-- Space Arms Control: Over a year ago, we offered to discuss the implications of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative with the Soviets in START as well as in the Standing Consultative Commission. More recently we proposed a special working group in the SCC on these issues. In response to Soviet proposals for ASAT negotiations, Secretary Shultz offered private discussions to review the entire question of space arms control. In addition, the Secretary invited Soviet Academy of Sciences Vice Chairman Velikhov to discuss space issues with him or other knowledgeable officials during his April visit. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets have been unwilling to pick up seriously on any of these offers.

-- Confidence Building Measures: The United States has long taken the lead in suggesting confidence building measures to improve the atmosphere between the superpowers and decrease the danger of conflict. We have recently taken the following steps:

- Following up on our proposals for advance notification of missile launches and major nuclear exercises we have offered in START and INF, we volunteered advance notification to the Soviets of this spring's GLOBAL SHIELD exercise.

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- 3 -

- We proposed a draft agreement to upgrade the Hotline, and a team of U.S. communications experts went to Moscow in late April to work out the technical details.
- We also proposed talks on amending the 1971 Accidents Measures Agreement to include consultation in the event of a nuclear terrorist incident.
- We put forward once again our proposals to establish a Joint Military Command Center and upgrade embassy communications in both countries.
- The President proposed to Mr. Chernenko that we institute regular, high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military personnel.

With the exception of the Hotline, the Soviets have not shown any interest in our CBMs proposals.

Non-Proliferation Talks: Secretary Shultz first proposed on-going bilateral consultations on non-proliferation issues in the fall of 1982. The third round of these consultations met in February in Geneva at U.S. initiative and with the U.S. acting as host. Again, at U.S. initiative, we scheduled the next round for December.

Regional Issues: We have emphasized our willingness to address regional issues of interest to the Soviets as well as issues of interest to us in bilateral talks. We have recently discussed the Middle East on several occasions. At our initiative, we also discussed the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf issues. The United States has proposed a special meeting between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin that would include high-level experts on the area from both sides. On other regional areas, we have in the past had three useful meetings between Assistant Secretary Crocker and his Soviet counterpart on Southern Africa. We recently suggested another meeting to discuss events in the area. However, the Soviets have not responded either to this offer or to the proposal for a special Middle East meeting.

Human Rights: Human rights is always a subject raised by our side. In the past few months we have encouraged progress on emigration and cultural freedom, turned over representation lists, raised prominent cases, and, in particular, made high-level requests for improvement in the Sakharovs' situation. In the wake of the KAL tragedy, we proposed concrete measures, such as the installation of radar beacons on Soviet territory along the Pacific air corridors, to help make recurrence impossible. So far, the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Soviets have not been responsive on the human contacts issue nor willing to move forward on the navigational aids.

Bilateral Issues:

-- People-to-People: Despite other broad political concerns, we have supported an improvement in people-to-people contacts between the two countries including the following:

- We proposed the negotiation of a new official exchanges agreement to increase and regularize exchanges between the two countries.
- We have identified areas for increased activity and high-level meetings in fields of particular benefit to our peoples -- the environment, health, housing, and agriculture.
- The U.S. suggested a date for consular review talks designed to improve certain visa and travel procedures.
- We initiated talks on opening consulates in Kiev and New York to facilitate visits between the two countries and improve our official representations.
- We proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a combined exercise in space simulating a rescue mission of personnel from a malfunctioning spacecraft.

-- Economic and Other Bilateral Issues:

- We have renewed our bilateral economic agreements expiring this year, and in the case of fisheries proposed that the agreement be extended for eighteen months rather than the normal one year.
- We suggested a compromise formula to settle the Pacific maritime boundary dispute between the two countries, hosted a round of talks in January, and proposed a follow-on session.
- We proposed discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue procedures be scheduled for this summer.
- The United States Government made a major effort to ensure the success of the U.S.- Soviet Trade and Economic Council's

5?

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- 5 -

May meeting in New York by sending two Deputy Secretaries and a Deputy Assistant Secretary to speak and welcoming the leader of the Soviet delegation to meetings at the top levels of the State Department, Commerce Department, and the NSC.

-- Rhetoric: The Soviets continually complain about the supposed anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Administration. President Reagan signaled in his Time Magazine interview at the start of the year that he did not intend to engage in harsh polemics with the Soviets. In his major January 16 address, the President emphasized his desire for constructive cooperation in the relationship. The Soviets, however, instead of responding in kind by lowering their own rhetoric, have greatly stepped up their polemics and anti-Administration propaganda. Most recently, their rhetoric has reached a disgusting level -- comparing the President with Hitler, saying the Secretary of State was acting like a "dimwit" and calling Assistant Secretary Burt "a petty snooper and provocateur" -- that would be ludicrous if it were not coming from a major world power. Clearly the Soviets have been unwilling to carry out the lowering of voices that they so strongly advocated in public and private.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

172466

TALKING POINTSU.S. Initiatives Toward USSR: Talking Points Used
with Allied and Friendly Governments

The President's January 16 speech established the framework for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship.

In that speech, the President cited the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but stressed the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

The President also elaborated on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relationship with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. He emphasized that the U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

- Following up on the President's January 16 speech, in recent months the U.S. has sought to engage the Soviet Union in just such a productive dialogue aimed at finding practical solutions in three broad areas: arms control and security, regional problems, and bilateral issues. We have of course also made clear that gestures in the humanitarian field would lead to significant improvement in the overall atmosphere of our relationship.
- The most pressing arms control and security issues undoubtedly are START and INF. We have underscored our readiness to return to the negotiating table, without preconditions, and to be flexible in renewed negotiations. We have made clear our readiness to discuss the substance of the START and INF negotiations at any time and any place the Soviets choose. We have also made clear that we understand negotiations must be a give-and-take process in which the concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of the two sides must be taken into account. Both countries made adjustments in their positions before negotiations were broken off, and we are ready to resume this process, but thus far the Soviets refuse to engage in such discussions.

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- We recently tabled a new draft chemical weapons treaty at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. We hope the Soviet side will reconsider its initial negative reaction to the U.S. initiative. As Chairman Brezhnev once advised us with respect to MBFR, "Let us taste the wine."
- The same also still holds for MBFR itself. The U.S. and its Allies have introduced a new initiative at the MBFR talks in Vienna. That proposal attempts to build upon constructive elements of the East's latest proposals, and to find a creative way around the long-standing dispute over data. As with our chemical weapons proposal, we hope the Eastern side will, upon reflection, respond in a constructive fashion.
- Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), U.S. delegation Chief James Goodby consulted with his Soviet counterpart in Moscow late last month to explore the possibilities for moving forward and particularly to permit full discussion of Eastern proposals for specific confidence-building measures.
- U.S. and Soviet communications experts also met in Moscow last month to discuss improvements in the "hotline" linking our two capitals. These talks concluded April 27, with agreement reached on most technical aspects. We feel we should be able to resolve the few remaining technical and procedural difficulties in short order if the political will is there on the Soviet side.
- On regional issues, we have discussed with the Soviets consultations on Southern Africa as well as a more intensive diplomatic dialogue on the Middle East, and we are ready to proceed with such exchanges. We have long made it clear to the Soviets that we are prepared for any bilateral exchange of views which might contribute to a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan.
- With respect to bilateral issues, we have begun proposed exchanges concerning arrangements to open new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and are awaiting a Soviet response. The U.S. side is also prepared to negotiate a new U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Agreement.
- Annual talks pursuant to U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement will take place in Moscow at the end of May.
- The U.S. side has proposed resumption of talks to review a number of smaller consular problems of mutual interest. This would resume discussions that began last May.
- The two countries have had several rounds of negotiations concerning depiction of our maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, and we would like to see another round take place in the not-too-distant future.

- Finally, those bilateral cooperative agreements that were to expire this year have been renewed, and the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council will meet in ¶New York later this month. It will involve the participation of senior U.S. Government officials, and senior Soviet participants will be appropriately received in Washington as well.
- This is by no means an exhaustive list. But it serves to illustrate that the United States is indeed making a concerted effort to enhance our bilateral dialogue with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet response in many cases has been negative or they have not responded at all. We are not sure why, but the authorities in Moscow do not seem prepared for constructive dialogue at this time.
- Their decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics was completely unjustified. The U.S. was bending over backwards to meet Soviet concerns -- and we had met them. This decision surprised and clearly dismayed even their closest allies.
- They have responded harshly to the expressions of concern not only from the U.S. but from many other nations over the health of Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner.
- Regardless of their behavior, however, the United States is steady and patient. Our agenda remains on the table.