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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/21/2016

File Folder USSR (7/3/84-7/7/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

402

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172574	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO C. WEINBERGER AND W. CASEY RE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-1-3	1	8/30/1984	B1
172575	MEMO	D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES	3	7/3/1984	B1
172588	REPORT	RE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES	51	10/1/1983	B1 B3
172576	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE BREAKFAST MEETING WITH AMB. DOBRYNIN R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-3-1	3	7/3/1984	B1
172577	TALKING POINTS	RE BREAKFAST MEETING WITH AMB. DOBRYNIN R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-3-1	2	ND	B1
172578	CABLE	MOSCOW 8459 R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-4-0	12	7/5/1984	B1
172579	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE JESSE JACKSON AND SAKHAROV	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172580	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO R. MCFARLANE RE ANNUAL U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-6-8	2	7/6/1984	B1
172581	MEMO	STEARMAN TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY R 5/30/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-7-7	2	5/18/1983	B1
172582	MEMO	STEARMAN TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-8-6	1	2/3/1983	B1
172583	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-9-5	1	3/2/1981	B1
172584	REPORT	OBSERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT - WILLIAM L. STEARMAN R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-9-5	2	ND	B1
172585	MEMO	K. DAM TO REAGAN RE CHERNENKO'S RESPONSE TO YOUR JULY 2 LETTER R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-10-3	3	7/7/1984	B1
172586	LETTER	CHERNENKO TO REAGAN (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-11-2	2	7/7/1984	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172587	LETTER	CHERNENKO TO REAGAN (COPY OF RUSSIAN ORIGINAL)	2	7/7/1984	B1
		<i>R 5/29/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-5-11-2</i>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 09 JUL 84 14

DOC DATE 03 JUL 84

DEFENSE POLICY

DUE: 11 JUL 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR INFO

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C	AUG 30 1984	Mafadone spl		index, CW, WE, PR
DISPATCH	✓ [Signature]	(6/31) dispatched as per TDCW.		RA (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

172574
4868

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: President's Annual Report on U.S. and Soviet
Forces (U)

For several years, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have prepared an annual illustrated report on U.S. and Soviet weaponry. OSD/Net Assessment was given the overall responsibility for this project. (U)

Since that time, this report has been prepared, and it is a thorough, well executed document providing the President with comparisons of U.S. and Soviet weapons. Preparation of the report absorbs the time of many specialized talents at Defense and the CIA. (U)

While the document has been useful, we have also found that we normally and steadily receive information in other documents that duplicates the contents of this report. In particular, when decisions are required, special reports are prepared giving the relevant force comparisons in more detail than a general document like the President's report can reasonably be expected to provide. (C)

In the interest of freeing up the talent and resources utilized in the preparation of this report, we have therefore determined that it need no longer be prepared for us. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

CRF
NLP-740-25A-5-1-3

CIVILIAN DATE 1/13/12

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I
Package # 4868

84 AUG 30 P 2: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>/</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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But: The attached was found in your
read file. Did you intend the memo
at Tab I to be dispatched?

yes

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 1800

10 A10:48

1242

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y		<u>4</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>10</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

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Handwritten notes and signatures:
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mease
my

84 JUL 10 P12: 58

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # I

Package # 4868

1239 5

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>		
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>X</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>X</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>X 4</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Further</u> <u>Steve Rosen</u> <u>5</u>			<u>A</u>

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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84 JUL 9 P 1: 03

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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172575 MEMO

3 7/3/1984 B1

D. FORTIER TO R. MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S
ANNUAL REPORT ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]****B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]****B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]****B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]****B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]****B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]****B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]****B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]****C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
172588	REPORT RE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES	51	10/1/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8490760

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11/21/16 KDB

RECEIVED 05 JUL 84 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 03 JUL 84 8

KEYWORDS: USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF BREAKFAST MTG W/ DOBRYNIN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

VICE PRESIDENT

COMMENTS ~~ORIGINAL RETAINED BY POINDEXTER, CY SENT 4 JULY PDB~~

REF# 8419027

LOG 8490757

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 7/18/84 Pres note

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System # II
Package # 90760

84 JUL 5 12: 01

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		A
Situation Room	5		
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p>① System II, copy to Matlock, share w/</p> <p>② Copy to Situation Room</p> <p>③ Original to me</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p><i>done 7/5</i></p> </div> </div>			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>I = Information</div> <div>A = Action</div> <div>R = Retain</div> <div>D = Dispatch</div> <div>N = No further Action</div> </div>			

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

in 4 July PDB

RECOMMEND we send to President in Residence, copy to Bud and VP, with Matlock and Linhard to read over here. *Copy to him to share with Linhard & Zelman.*

Also, have we begun to think about our negotiator? Schultz's words to Dobrynin talk of "mound-gauged" negotiators -- I have some ideas in that vein, if we are not there already.

SUPER SENSITIVE 8419027

10

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~~~SENSITIVE~~

July 3, 1984

172576
RR
7/4/84

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject: Breakfast Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Following a relaxed breakfast, I gave Dobrynin your letter, and elaborated on its contents by running through the agreed talking points (attached). Dobrynin read your letter carefully and promised to deliver it to Chairman Chernenko tomorrow.

Dobrynin professed not to grasp how we intended to proceed with the September meetings in practical terms. The Soviets, he said, had raised one issue (the demilitarization of space), and we had raised another (resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems) which they regarded as unacceptable. Did we, he asked, plan to simply register our views on such matters as START and INF, and then proceed to address arms control in outer space? Or did we intend to continue to refer back to the issues on our agenda? In his quest for clarification, he claimed the negotiators needed a precise understanding of the agenda; that the delegations could not be left simply to talk about "the cosmos;" and that without clarity regarding the scope of the talks further misunderstandings could burden our relationship.

In response I emphasized that we were prepared to meet in September without preconditions. I said that we are ready to discuss the issues the Soviets have raised, but that we have issues of our own to discuss as well. I noted that they say they wish to talk about "the demilitarization of space." We have our own definition of what that means, and intend to relate our presentation to that definition. They did not have to agree to discuss the issues we were raising in order for us to show up.

I noted that, in every negotiation there is a preliminary sorting out of issues. As the conference proceeds, and as a variety of subjects are discussed, some ideas may appear susceptible to negotiations. Others will not be. On the subject of verification, for example, we have doubts that some arms control proposals in outer space are verifiable. The Soviets may have a different view. We are ready to listen and

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NLRR 7/28-2 SA 3-2-1

BY 601 NARA DATE 5/29/03

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-2-

perhaps we can learn something. We have an open mind. We think there are some possibilities for negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations. Perhaps others can be identified.

While Dobrynin did not indicate acceptance of this concept, I believe he understands our intentions more clearly. Obviously the Soviets would prefer to restrict the talks to their agenda, but he could not deny the logic of our position that since weapons in space affect nuclear deterrence, limitations of arms in outer space and limits on offensive and defensive nuclear systems are conceptually connected.

I urged Dobrynin to push the discussion of this subject back into diplomatic channels. I noted that the USSR had made a proposal and publicized it. We consequently publicized our response after notifying the Embassy. Now, I said, you are writing confidentially to Chernenko to confirm that we accept the Soviet proposal without preconditions. But we want them to know that there are some additional things which we expect to discuss. This is not in the nature of a precondition, but rather a statement of our intent.

I emphasized that since our systems are different, and that won't change, we think it is important to take steps to stabilize our relationship. We consequently have laid out a broad agenda of "smaller" and large issues, - arms control proposals, regional issues, bilateral matters, concerns about human rights. Now, I said, the Soviet government has made a proposal. We believe we need to look at that proposal in a broader context to get something moving. We are prepared to discuss that either in September or following our elections, if the Soviets prefer. The timing is a matter of indifference to us, since we surely need no help from them in the elections. I underscored the fact that our purpose was merely to push our relationship in a constructive direction.

Dobrynin asked whether we conceived of the September conference as directed toward merely sorting out issues or conducting negotiations. I said we could envisage a variety of possibilities. When our delegations showed up in Vienna in September, led by broad gauged negotiators. they could take one of several approaches. They would, I presumed, examine the broad subjects that each government had raised with an eye identifying those subjects susceptible to early negotiation. As subjects were identified, they could either negotiate them seriatim, divert those issues to special negotiators while continuing themselves to address the broad issues at the main

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-3-

table, or confine themselves to the task of isolating negotiable issues, while leaving actual negotiations until later. I told Dobrynin that we envisaged further private discussions -- at the Assistant Secretary level -- to work out the modalities for the September conference.

Dobrynin was noncommittal, but he indicated that we could expect an official response from the Soviet government. He indicated that at this stage he could not say that the Soviets accept our acceptance, reiterated some distaste for a loose agenda, and implied that further clarification will be sought.

While Dobrynin did not tip his hand, I feel we have framed a response that his government will find difficult to handle. Eventually I suspect they may be forced to take yes for an answer.

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NLRR 748-254.5-31

BY 16013 NARA DATE 5/29/13

172577

11-A

- I think that you gathered last night a first-hand sense of the President's seriousness about getting substantive arms control talks moving forward.
- He carefully studied Mr. Chernenko's last letter and has prepared this letter today in reply. It does not try to address all of the issues between us, but concentrates on a problem Mr. Chernenko focused on -- what he called the "militarization of outer space."
- The President confirms what we indicated to your Embassy last Friday night. We accept your proposal of earlier that day to meet September 18 in Vienna.
- As we have indicated in our statement on Friday, the militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed.
- We have noted what you wish to discuss in Vienna. We will be prepared to address those issues. We have identified issues we plan to raise as well.
- As the President notes in his letter, we anticipate that we will come to Vienna with constructive suggestions both on the question of resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear systems and on negotiating approaches to ASAT limitations.
- I wish to make one point very clear: contrary to initial press commentary, we have set no preconditions for these talks in September.
- The U.S. and the Soviet Union need not agree to any common agenda on those talks. The U.S. is prepared to meet at the time and place the Soviet Union has proposed, and to address all the issues the Soviet Union has raised, in addition to which, the U.S. side will raise other issues.
- The U.S. believes that it is important to consult privately on more detailed preparations and groundwork for this meeting in order to ensure that it is fruitful.
- As the President has indicated, we see this meeting as a valuable opportunity for businesslike and constructive exchanges through which we might work out mutually acceptable approaches to arms control negotiations. We are serious about taking advantage of this opportunity to make progress.

- Thus, we are prepared to refrain from any further public comment on these discussions if you will do the same. Our preference is to pursue this question quietly through private diplomatic channels.
- I would further note that on several recent occasions, the Soviet government has stated that the upcoming U.S. Presidential election has no bearing on its policies in this regard. I can confirm to you the same holds true for us. As the President's letter indicates, if the Soviet side wishes to hold these talks after the election in late November or December as opposed to September, that is acceptable to us as well.
- I hope that in your consultations in Moscow, you will personally underscore the seriousness and positive manner in which we are seeking to handle your proposal.

+ ADDI

172578

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NLRR 748254-5-40

SECRET

FRP: .2, .4, .6, .8

BY COJ NARA DATE 5/30/13

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/AF/C1, ALA/AF/C2-2, ALA/AF/DC1,
 ALA/AF/DC2-2, ALA/AF/RI1, ALA/AF/RI2, ALA/AF/RI3, ALA/AF/S1, ALA/AF/S2-2,
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 ODI/ACIS, OGI/ISI/CA, OIA/CFWP, OIA/MSDB, OIA/MSPB, OIA/MSTB, OIA/TWSS,
 OSWR/CIG, OTS, SA/NPI, SAG/LIB, SAG/ME3, SAG/PPB-2, SECUR-2, SOV/TFN,
 STD/PPC, STD/STG, STD/STL, (93/W)

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0061

INFO RUFHLC/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7863

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3427

RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 6387

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8721

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5996

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7348

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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7250
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2766
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0336
RUFHMB/USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2528
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2470
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4411
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1185
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8024

BT

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 08459

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USCD, STOCKHOLM FOR CDE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, FR
SUBJECT: HOWE'S MOSCOW TALKS

REF: A. MOSCOW 8385
B. MOSCOW 8249
C. LONDON 14358

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A TOUGH SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE, CHERNENKO AND GROMYKO REACTED WITH SKEPTICISM AND HOSTILITY TO APPEALS THAT MOSCOW TEST THE SINCERITY OF THE WEST'S DESIRE FOR BETTER EAST-WEST RELATIONS. GROMYKO TURNED ASIDE HOWE'S ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. HAS SET NO PRECONDITIONS FOR SPACE ARMS TALKS, INSISTING THAT WASHINGTON HAS NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO STUCK TO TOUGH, IF NOW SHOPWORN, ANTI-U.S. RHETORIC AND SHOWED NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY ON ARMS CONTROL, EAST-WEST, OR REGIONAL ISSUES. HE DID NOT RESPOND TO HOWE'S RAISING SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, POLAND, AND AFGHANISTAN. HE CRITICIZED THE REVITALIZATION OF THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION FOR FUELING FRG REVANCHISM AND LEADING TOWARD GERMAN ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BOTH CHERNENKO AND GROMYKO DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL OF US LRINF MISSILES FROM EUROPE BEFORE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS

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NEGOTIATIONS. CHERNENKO SEEMED TO HAVE LESS TROUBLE BREATHING THAN DURING HIS FEBRUARY MEETING WITH THATCHER, BUT LOOKED PALE, SPOKE POORLY AND WITHOUT CONFIDENCE, AND GENERALLY GAVE AN UNCONVINCING PERFORMANCE.
END SUMMARU

3. THE BRITISH EMBASSY IS CHARACTERIZING THE HOWE VISIT AS UNREMARKABLE EXCEPT FOR THE EXCHANGES WITH CHERNENKO AND GROMYKO ON THE ISSUE OF SPACE ARMS TALKS. THE BRITISH FELT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO USE HOWE AS A CONDUIT TO THE UNITED STATES TO CONVEY A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND ANGER ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN DEALING WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. THE BRITISH BELIEVE THAT BY HEWING TO A HARD LINE THE SOVIETS HAVE MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT IN EAST-WEST AND BILATERAL AFFAIRS. AS A RESULT, THE BRITISH BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF PROGRESS OVER THE NEXT YEAR.

LONG MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO, CHERNENKO, GORBACHEV CALL

"NOT POSSIBLE"

4. BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE'S TWO-DAY WORKING VISIT TO MOSCOW--THE FIRST BY A BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY IN THAT CAPACITY SINCE 1977--WAS MARKED BY TWO MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO WHICH TOTALED FIVE HOURS AND AN EIGHTY MINUTE SESSION WITH CHERNENKO. THE BRITISH HAD SOUGHT TO ARRANGE A CALL ON GORBACHEV PEGGED TO A PARLIAMENTARY INVITATION TO GORBACHEV TO VISIT THE U.K. IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE UNION. THE SOVIETS WAITED UNTIL AFTER HOWE'S ARRIVAL BEFORE RESPONDING THAT SUCH A CALL WAS "NOT POSSIBLE."

5. THE BRITISH HAVE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR'S JULY 3 LUNCHEON FOR HOWE WAS POORLY ATTENDED, DRAWING ONLY SMALL FRY INCLUDING ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE PRESIDENT VELIKHOV, IEMSS DIRECTOR BOGOMOLOV, AND USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR ZHURKIN.

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GROMYKO DISCUSSIONS: EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

6. HOWE'S FIRST SESSION WITH GROMYKO ON THE MORNING OF JULY 2 WAS DEVOTED TO EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. HOWE STRESSED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT HE WANTED TO CONVEY A MESSAGE OF WASHINGTON'S SINCERITY IN ITS EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET

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UNION AND SEEKING SECURITY AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS. HE ALSO STRESSED THE CONSISTENCY OF PREVIOUS BRITISH MESSAGES TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, BY VIRTUE OF MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ AND REAGAN, THE U.K. IS CONVINCED OF THE U.S.'S SINCERITY IN SEEKING A DIALOGUE. HOWE URGED GROMYKO TO TEST WESTERN SINCERITY AND STRESSED THAT THE LONGER START AND INF ARE LEFT UNRESOLVED, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE TO ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION.

7. GROMYKO'S RESPONSE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE BRITISH AS AN EIGHTY MINUTE ANTI-US MONOLOGUE. GROMYKO STRESSED THAT THE U.S. CANNOT BE TRUSTED AND THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP KNEW FROM THE FIRST DAY OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DO BUSINESS WITH IT, AND NOTED THAT NATO AND THE U.S. HAD REPEATEDLY BLOCKED SOVIET PROPOSALS. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S REAL APPROACH TOWARD EAST-WEST RELATIONS WAS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S WESTMINSTER "CRUSADE" SPEECH RATHER THAN HIS JANUARY 16 ADDRESS.

8. GROMYKO CONCLUDED HIS LECTURE BY CRITICIZING THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET SPACE ARMS PROPOSAL AS SHOWING THAT THE U.S. IS NOT SERIOUS IN ENGAGING THE SOVIET UNION

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IN TALKS ON SPACE. HOWE TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE SOVIET REACTION WAS "FRANKLY SURPRISING." MOSCOW HAD ASKED FOR A RAPID RESPONSE, GOT IT, AND IS NOW COMPLAINING THAT THE RESPONSE WAS TOO HASTY. HOWE DENIED THAT THE U.S. RESPONSE ESTABLISHED ANY PRECONDITIONS TO TALKS AND URGED THAT THE SOVIETS USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO CONTINUE SOUNDINGS.

CDE, HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

9. HOWE FOLLOWED UP THE DISCUSSION ON SPACE BY TOUCHING ON A NUMBER OF MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS. HE URGED THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WESTERN INITIATIVES ON MBFR, CW, AND IN STOCKHOLM. ON CDE, HOWE TOLD GROMYKO THAT THERE ARE TWO ISSUES WHICH ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM DIFFICULT. THE FIRST WAS THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF ANY DIALOGUE IN POLAND. THE SECOND WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S FAILURE TO RESPECT ITS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS AND THE EFFECT OF THIS ON WESTERN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS. HOWE RAISED SEVERAL SPECIFIC CASES IN THIS CONTEXT: SAKHAROV, BONNER, KORYAGIN, SHCHARANSKIY, AND YAKUNIN. GROMYKO OFFERED NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE ON HOWE'S HUMAN RIGHTS POINTS; HE SIMPLY TURNED RED IN THE FACE AND LOOKED AT THE CEILING.

SECOND DAY DISCUSSIONS: GROMYKO REPLIES ON ARMS CONTROL POINTS

10. THE SECOND DAY OF HOWE'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR A DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL MATTERS. INSTEAD, GROMYKO BEGAN THE MEETING BY RETURNING TO EAST-WEST ISSUES RAISED BY HOWE:

-- MBFR: THE WEST'S POSITION IS SIMPLY TO "KILL TIME" AT THE TALKS. PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT LOOK DUBIOUS. GROMYKO CALLED INTO QUESTION THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS, CITING THE REACTIVIZATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AS A SIGN THAT "CERTAIN COUNTRIES" ARE MORE INTERESTED IN REARMAMENT

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THAN DISARMAMENT.

-- CDE: SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NO FIRST USE

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OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NON-USE OF FORCE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT PROPOSALS BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. HE NOTED, "WITH SOME CHEEK" ACCORDING TO THE BRITISH, THAT BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTED SOVIET PROPOSALS WHILE THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE WEST WAS ATTEMPTING TO REPLACE CBM'S WITH "ORGANIZED ESPIONAGE" BUT DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL MATTERS. DISCUSSION OF CBM'S SHOULD PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS AND SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PACKAGE, HE SAID.

11. IN A REPLY THE BRITISH CHARACTERIZED AS "PRETTY BLUNT", HOWE TOLD GROMYKO THAT SOVIET EAST-WEST POLICY HAD LOST CREDIBILITY. IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD QUESTION REASSURANCES OF WESTERN SINCERITY COMMUNICATED TO THE SOVIETS DIRECTLY BY A PARADE OF WESTERN STATESMEN. SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE COULD ONLY RAISE RISKS TO THE SOVIET UNION. HOWE CONTINUED THAT HE HAD CHECKED OVERNIGHT WITH WASHINGTON AND COULD SAY AUTHORITATIVELY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD SET NO PRECONDITIONS TO TALKS IN SEPTEMBER IN ACCEPTING MOSCOW'S JUNE 29 PROPOSAL.

12. APPEARING "EMBARRASSED AND UNCOMFORTABLE", GROMYKO REPLIED THAT WHAT HOWE HAD SAID WAS "NOT TRUE". "WE KNOW FOR A FACT", HE CONTINUED,

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THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD ACKNOWLEDGED IMPOSING PRECONDITIONS IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND THAT ITS REPLY HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. 'DON'T FORCE ME TO EXPLAN' HE ADDED OBSCURELY WITH A HINT OF THREAT IN HIS VOICE.

13. HOWE RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPEARED DETERMINED TO IGNORE THE FACTS AND WAS "REFUSING TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER." HE REPEATED HIS APPEAL TO TEST THE WEST'S SINCERITY AND NOT TO DISMISS THE U.S.'S RESPONSE ON SPACE ARMS PREMATURELY.

MIDDLE EAST

14. TURNING AT LAST TO REGIONAL ISSUES, HOWE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ARAB STATES SHOULD DEVELOP A UNITED STAND IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POSSIBLE ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. HE URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO ENCOURAGE SYRIA TO JOIN AND TO PROMOTE AN ARAB CONSENSUS. IN A RESPONSE THE BRITISH FOUND "ABSOLUTELY USELESS", GROMYKO SAID THAT MOSCOW COULD NOT ANSWER ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB STATES. THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS MUST SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. THE PRIMARY PROBLEM IN THE REGION IS ISRAELI AGGRESSION WHICH WAS MADE POSSIBLE BY AMERICAN SUPPORT. GROMYKO DID NOT PRESS THE IDEA OF A MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE.

THE GULF WAR

15. HOWE TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE U.K. AND THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED TO SHARE COMMON OBJECTIVES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, INCLUDING GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND PREVENTING AN IRANIAN VICTORY. THE U.K.'S AIM, HE EXPLAINED, IS TO PRESS FOR FREEDOM OF GULF NAVIGATION BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. IF THIS PROVES INADEQUATE, GREAT BRITAIN WOULD

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CONSULT THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTLY, SINCE LONDON'S ACTIONS WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS.

16. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT IRAN IS TO BLAME FOR THE "USELESS WAR" IN THE GULF. APPARENTLY REFERING TO THE RECENT MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE IRANIAN MFA, GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIETS HAD SPOKEN RECENTLY WITH THE IRANIANS AND FOUND THAT IRAN HAD TAKEN THE OPPOSITE VIEW FROM THE USSR. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE WEST HAD NOT FULLY EXPLOITED ITS INFLUENCE WITH IRAN TO BRING AN END TO WAR.

AFGHANISTAN

17. HOWE VOICED THE U.K.'S SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD MEET SOVIET INTERESTS. HE URGED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE THE "STATESMANLIKE ACT" OF WITHDRAWAL. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND.

CENTRAL AMERICA

18. GROMYKO'S LIST OF REGIONAL ISSUES WAS HEADED BY CENTRAL AMERICA ON WHICH HE PRESENTED A "CLASSIC ANTI-US DIATRIBE". ALL THE ELEMENTS IN HIS PRESENTATION WERE FAMILIAR FROM SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH GROMYKO

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WAS MORE POINTED IN ACCUSING THE U.S. OF CONDUCTING "STATE TERRORISM" IN THE REGION. HOWE TOLD GROMYKO HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE U.S.'S CONCERN OVER REGIONS ADJACENT TO ITS BORDER IN LIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN EXPERIENCE. HOWE DREW ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH COSTA RICAN AND SALVADORAN OFFICIALS IN EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE AGGRESSION FROM NICARAGUA. GROMYKO CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WERE "POLES APART".

•
SOUTH AFRICA

19. GROMYKO CRITICIZED THE U.K.'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND CALLED ON LONDON TO RAISE ITS VOICE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA MORE STRONGLY. HOWE RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS "HAD IT ALL WRONG", NOTING THAT TWO MEETINGS WITH BOTHA ENABLED THE BRITISH TO CONVEY THEIR MESSAGE DIRECTLY. HOWE OBSERVED THAT DE CUELLAR APPEARED TO FEEL THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD LIKE TO GET OUT OF ANGOLA; AT THE SAME TIME ARRANGEMENTS FOR NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE WERE GOING FORWARD.

•
JAPAN

20. GROMYKO DREW HOWE'S ATTENTION TO AN ALLEGED TREND TOWARD MILITARISM IN THE JAPANESE LEADERSHIP. THE COMMON SENSE OF THE PAST THIRTY YEARS IS NOW GIVING WAY TO A DESIRE TO REARM. THIS BEARS CAREFUL WATCHING IN VIEW OF JAPAN'S HISTORY.

EXDIS

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GROMYKO SOLICITED HOWE'S VIEWS. HOWE RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR THE JAPANESE THEMSELVES TO DECIDE. THE U.K. UNDERSTANDS, HOWEVER, HOW JAPANESE SECURITY CONCERNS COULD BE AFFECTED BY SOVIET MILITARY IMPROVEMENT IN THE AREA. GROMYKO POINTED TO JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WILLIAMSBURG AND LONDON CONFERENCES AS EVIDENCE OF JAPAN'S DESIRE TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

21. IN DISCUSSING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, HOWE INVITED GROMYKO TO VISIT THE U.K. GROMYKO APPEARED TO ACCEPT, BUT SAID THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE BEFORE THERE COULD BE A FORMAL REPLY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE REPLY, WHICH WOULD BE CONVEYED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, WOULD BE POSITIVE. THE QUESTION OF A FUTURE THATCHER-CHERVENKO SUMMIT WAS NOT DISCUSSED.

HOWE'S CALL ON CHERNENKO

22. THE BRITISH HAVE TOLD US THAT PRAVDA'S ACCOUNT OF CHERNENKO'S REMARKS TO HOWE REPRESENT A FAIRLY FULL RENDITION. CHERNENKO'S REMARKS TOOK AN "ORTHODOX ANTI-US DIRECTION." CHERNENKO RESTATED THE SOVIET "STATUS QUO ANTE" FORMULA ON INF IN ITS STARKEST FORM: THE ONLY WAY TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IS TO HALT DEPLOYMENTS AND WITHDRAW THE MISSILES THAT HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

CHERNENKO ON SPACE NEGOTIATIONS

23. CHERNENKO TOLD HOWE THAT THE US REPLY ON

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SPACE ARMS TALKS WAS "HYPOCRITICAL IN FORM AND NEGATIVE IN CONTENT. RATHER THAN REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE OUTRIGHT," HE SAID "THE US HAD LINKED TALKS TO ISSUES WHICH ARE DEADLOCKED. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, REMAINS IN FORCE."

WEST EUROPEAN UNION

24. CHERNENKO TOLD HOWE THAT REINVIGORATION OF THE WEU WILL STRENGTHEN REVANCHIST TRENDS IN THE FRG. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT BONN COULD GAIN INDIRECT ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

25. IN HIS REPLY, HOWE TOLD CHERVENKO THAT IT IS PARADOXICAL THAT EAST AND WEST APPEAR TO SHARE THE SAME AIMS ON ARMS CONTROLS AND OTHER ISSUES, BUT FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS. THE SOVIET UNION FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTANDS U.S. POLICIES. FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE U.S. HAS EVER CONTEMPLATED WAGING NUCLEAR WAR AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT AS TO WESTERN SINCERITY IN SEEKING PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE BROKEN OFF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN INF DEPLOYMENT HAD ARRIVED AT THEIR DECISION BASED ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND NOT UNDER U.S. PRESSURE. HOWE TOLD CHERNENKO HE HAD BEEN DISMAYED BY GROMYKO'S "CARICATURIZATION OF U.S. POLICY."

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USCD, STOCKHOLM FOR CDE

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26. HOWE TOLD CHERNENKO THAT HE HAD CONSULTED

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WASHINGTON ON SPACE ARMS TALKS AND THAT THERE ARE NO PRECONDITIONS. CHERNENKO RESPONDED LAMELY AGAIN THAT THE BASIS OF THE U.S. REPLY WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE SOVIET OFFER. GROMYKO AT THAT POINT INTERVENED AND SAID THAT BY "BRACKETING" NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH SPACE, THE U.S. HAD INTRODUCED PRECONDITIONS. THE U.S. INTENTION WAS TO PROVOKE A SOVIET REFUSAL. GROMYKO PUT IT BLUNTLY TO HOWE: IF THE U.S. HAD SAID THERE WERE NO PRECONDITIONS, "COULD THE USSR TAKE HOWE'S WORD THAT THE U.S. IS WILLING TO TALK ABOUT SPACE AS A SEPARATE SUBJECT?"

27. HOWE IN RESPONSE SIMPLY REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT LET THE INITIATIVE DIE BECAUSE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND ADVISED THE SOVIETS TO FOLLOW-UP THE INITIATIVE THROUGH THEIR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. CHERNENKO REPLIED TO THIS THAT REPORTS FROM DOBRYNIN CONTRADICTED HOWE'S ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. POSITION. HOWE ATTEMPTED ONCE MORE TO PURSUE THE SPACE ARMS ISSUE WITH GROMYKO AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. GROMYKO RESPONDED IN A SIMILAR NEGATIVE VEIN THAT IF THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOWED UP FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER, IT WOULD HAVE ONLY ITSELF TO TALK TO.

LEADERSHIP IMPRESSIONS

28. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT CHERNENKO SEEMED TO HAVE LESS TROUBLE BREATHING IN HIS MEETING WITH HOWE THAN HE HAD WITH THATCHER IN FEBRUARY. HE NEVERTHELESS LOOKED PALE, SPOKE POORLY AND WITHOUT CONFIDENCE, AND GENERALLY GAVE AN UNCONVINCING PERFORMANCE. GROMYKO, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS CONFIDENT AND SMOOTH THROUGHOUT; SHOWING NO RETICENCE TO TAKE THE BALL FROM CHERNENKO WHEN, AS ON SPACE, HE SEEMED TO BE OUT OF HIS DEPTH.

HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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NSC/S PROFILE

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

ID 8405190

RECEIVED 05 JUL 84 18

TO

POINDEXTER

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 05 JUL 84

KEYWORDS . USSR

MEDIA

JACKSON, JESSE

SAKHAROV

SUBJECT: JACKSON ATTEMPT TO SECURE SAKHAROV RELEASE

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE: 09 JUL 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P JUL 06 1984</i>	<i>decision</i>		
	<i>7/6</i>	<i>Pres Noted</i>		
	<i>C 7/9</i>	<i>Orig Retd in Pres File</i>		<i>FM</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA *per*

National Security Council
The White House

JF

System # I

Package # 5190

D

26

4 P 5: 08

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>DACOM</u>
Situation Room			<u>TO KIMMITT</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

84 JUL 5 P 6: 12

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

July 5, 1984

Sec 3.4(b) 50 USC, as amended
 White House, Sept 11, 2003
 BY NARA *100* J. L. IE *1/21/16*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: |

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.

I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.

WL | *unavailable*
 Walt Raymond, ~~Kenneth Small~~ and Bob Sims concur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve *f*Disapprove Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Suggested Talking Points

Bob,

The memo to the President may be OBE, but use it if you feel it is appropriate. The talking points are still valid.

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Declassify on: OADR

7/6/84

Passed to RR the talking points, which he returned.

RMH

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Sec. 34(0), E.O. 12958, as amended July 5, 1984
 White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
 BY NARA 12013, DATE 1/21/16

ACTION

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W2 Walt Raymond, *vs* Karna Small and *unavailable.* Bob Sims concur.

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Attachments:

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172579	MEMO R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE JESSE JACKSON AND SAKHAROV	2	ND	B1

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

Q. Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?

A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.

-- What is important is that such private efforts be conducted in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues such as this one with matters which are properly subject to negotiation between governments.

-- That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act. Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this particular problem solved, and if it can be done without involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

1/21/16 KDD

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1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ROBERT KIMMITT/SAN ANTONIO

TOR/05 2300Z

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 06 JUL 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM STEARMAN

DOC DATE 06 JUL 84

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KEYWORDS USSR

SUBJECT ANNUAL US - SOVIET SUMMITS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 09 JUL 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (DW)

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DISPATCH

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt	2		
John Poindexter		✗	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3	✓	
Bud McFarlane	4	M	I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room			

Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR 748-25A-5-6-8

INFORMATION

BY LCB NARA DATE 5/30/13

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Annual U.S.-Soviet Summits

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July 6, 1984

Bull
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RCM HAS SEEN

As pressure mounts for a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, one might consider proposing regular, annual summits during each UN General Assembly -- beginning with the next one in September 1984. This would render summitry more routine and thereby would decrease popular expectations and reduce the possibility of Soviet exploitation.

Summit meetings -- especially with the Soviets -- are singularly ill-suited for negotiations or even for serious in-depth discussions; therefore, they probably ought to be viewed primarily as opportunities to form acquaintanceships. Ideally, U.S.-Soviet summits should generally be avoided altogether for reasons explained in the memoranda at Tab I (which the President read), but that no longer appears to be a realistic option. Given current realities, annual UNGA summits would probably be the least harmful to U.S. interests, and our readiness to regularize such meetings could even redound to our benefit. The drama of a U.S.-Soviet summit could, in the UNGA context, be further diminished by scheduling summits with friends and allies during the same period.

The Soviets would probably reject annual UNGA summits because they would be more difficult to exploit (and Chernenko might not be able to travel this far); nevertheless, if we made such a proposal, we would be on solid ground and should be able to fend off counterproposals. The UNGA forum should appeal to U.S. public opinion, and the UN members would love to be on the fringes of a U.S.-Soviet summit; ergo other countries might even welcome the idea.

The President took the right tack on June 14 in seeming to drop the "carefully prepared and prospect for success" requirements. Such prerequisites could only ensure heightened expectations and subsequent disappointment and criticism (directed against the President as well as Chernenko). We gain more (or lose less) if summit talks are regarded as only a general exchange of views with no concrete results expected or sought.

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Declassify on: OADR

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Zbig Brzezinski and others have, as you know, proposed annual summits; so the basic idea is not new. I do not, however, know if anyone has proposed annual UNGA summits and therefore thought the idea might warrant some consideration.

Attachment:

Tab I Memoranda dated May 18, 1983; February 3, 1983 and
March 2, 1981

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

May 18, 1983

5/19 President has
seen. p
Stearman 38.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Summitry

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NLRR 748-254-5-7-7

BY 6015 NARA DATE 5/30/13

172581

We can expect continuing pressure for a Reagan-Andropov Summit from State, our allies and others. So far, the President has wisely resisted a summit until the Soviets demonstrate better intentions through concrete, positive actions. He should continue to hold the line for reasons explained below.

The President is, in a way, emulating Eisenhower's wise example. After Stalin's death in 1953, Eisenhower stated he would go to a summit if the Soviets agreed to: A German Peace Treaty, an Austrian State Treaty or significant arms control measures. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty in 1955 and a summit took place in Geneva a few months later. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" reinforced a Soviet detente campaign which was beginning to weaken NATO until detente ended with the Hungarian Revolution. At least Eisenhower made the Soviets pay a price for the summit.

The record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David, on the other hand, bought us valuable time needed to toughen our position on Berlin.

The 1961 Vienna summit illustrates a principal danger in summitry. There is bound to be an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations. This danger is further compounded by the fact that summits are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore, the serious and complex subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed.

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The Soviets presently feign disinterest in a summit; however, they would probably leap at one were it offered. Summits help them promote detente and "peace" campaigns, provide a convenient propaganda platform, and are regarded by the Soviets as necessary reaffirmations of their co-equal status as a "super power." U.S. participation in a summit may temporarily buy the Administration some domestic and foreign political advantages, but can also backfire when unrealistic expectations are dashed by the usual absence of concrete results -- for which the U.S. may be blamed as much as the Soviets (or even more). Of course, this would not be the case if a summit only ratified agreements already concluded -- which is the only circumstance under which I feel a summit is warranted at all.

cc: John Lenczowski

CONFIDENTIAL

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National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90129

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			<u>6/2</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>sent to Pres in</u>		<u>PDB</u>
Sit Room	<u>folder</u>	<u>✓</u>	

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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COMMENTS

PDB. look
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 3, 1983
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-25A-5-8-6

~~SECRET~~

BY CA NARA DATE 5/29/13

RCM HAS SEEN.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Thoughts on U.S.-Soviet Summitry

The President's "letter to Europe" was exactly the right approach to summitry: Do something concrete and significant, and then we'll meet. We should not, however, leave it at this. We must persist in publicizing and promoting this approach, because pressures are going to build here and abroad for a summit. It is clear from Andropov's reply to the President's letter that the Soviets still want a summit for political and propaganda reasons. (See text at Tab A.)

At Tab B are Dick Pipes' and my thoughts on summitry which went to the President early in this Administration. You might find them useful in countering pressures for a summit. I would add to my earlier comments the additional observation that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations that can result from U.S.-Soviet summits. It was precisely this, for example, that produced the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962.

Attachments

Tab A Andropov reply
Tab B RVA memo to the President dtd March 2, 1981

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Declassify on: OADR

*See: Please Review & Revise
"Soviet" memo -
WLS*

~~SECRET~~

ANDROPOV REPLIES TO REAGAN DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

LD011636 Moscow TASS in English 1632 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS -- The newspaper PRAVDA for February 2 publishes the answers by Yuriy Andropov to questions by its correspondent.

Question: What is your attitude to the U.S. President's letter to the people of Europe, in which he proposed that the USSR and the United States sign on American terms an agreement on the elimination of medium-range land-based missiles?

Answer: First of all, I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about -- and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of -- is the same "zero option". That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognised. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category.

It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure.

As I have already said, the U.S.S.R. will not agree to unilateral disarmament. If things are carried to the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, we shall answer this in a due way. But this would not be our choice.

In so far as
The Soviet Union is for a different road. It would be best, and we suggest this, not to have in the European zone nuclear weapons at all, either medium-range or tactical weapons. And seems [as received] the United States does not agree to this, we are prepared also to such a solution under which the Soviet Union would have no more missiles than NATO already has in Europe. At the same time an arrangement should be reached on cutting to the equal levels by both sides of the number of aircraft capable of medium-range nuclear weapon delivery. Thus, there would be complete parity in missiles and aircraft, and the parity at a far lower level than now.

The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such an agreement. Is the President of the United States prepared to sign such an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security?

Question: The U.S. President suggests meeting with you to sign the agreement which he proposes. What can you say on this score?

Answer: We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe and to the whole world.

But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

[Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 2 February carries on page 1 the above interview with Yuriy Andropov. The interview in PRAVDA, entitled "Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's Replies to a PRAVDA's Correspondent's Questions" has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version and minus the TASS dateline and introductory paragraph has been found to be identical except for the following variation: Paragraph six, line three reads in PRAVDA: ...In so far as the United States... (substituting "in so far as" for "and seems [as received]")]

U.S.-USSR INF DELEGATIONS HOLD MEETING 1 FEB

LD011202 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States held a plenary meeting here today at the talks on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe.

DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE SESSION OPENS IN GENEVA

LD011135 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS -- The 1983 12-week session of the Committee on Disarmament opened here today. The priority items on the agenda of the current session are talks on termination of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the problem of prevention of the arms race in outer space, an all-embracing programme of disarmament, a ban on radiological weapons, and the strengthening of guarantees of security for non-nuclear states.

The Committee on Disarmament is an important component of the international mechanism of multi-lateral talks on disarmament. (The) committee consists of five nuclear states (the PRC, the USA, France, Britain, and the USSR) and 35 other states including Algeria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Japan, Cuba, the GDR, Mongolia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Sweden and the FRG.

Israelyan Remarks on Session

LD011440 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 Feb 83

[Text] Today the Disarmament Committee renewed its work at the Geneva Palace of Nations. Here is what Viktor Levonovich Israelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation at the committee said to our correspondent:

[Begin Israelyan recording] The session of the Disarmament Committee has opened in an aggravated international situation. The military preparations of the United States of America and its NATO allies have reached a huge scale.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen

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~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

March 2, 1981

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NLRR 748-25A-5-9-5
BY ECS NARA DATE 5/29/13172583
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(3/9/81)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Brezhnev Proposal for a Summit

Richard Pipes and William Stearman of the NSC Staff have provided a short analysis of the Brezhnev proposal for a summit, and conclude that it is not advisable.

While I concur, I thought you would benefit from the interesting historical framework which these two experts use to evaluate the matter.

Attachments

- Tab A - Observations on a Summit - William L. Stearman
- Additional Comments - Richard Pipes

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 72584 15
OBSERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT -- WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

Brezhnev wants a summit meeting in order to resurrect detente and to slow down US and NATO defense improvements. If the President wants a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower's example and put a price tag on it.

Early in Eisenhower's Administration, he was faced with the issue of meeting with the post-Stalin leaders of the USSR. Churchill, for one, was pushing for a Four Power summit at this time. On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower made public a list of specific actions the USSR would have to take before the US would agree to a summit. These included arms control measures, a German Peace Treaty, and an Austrian State Treaty, any one of which would pay the price of admission. After eight years of stalling, the Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955 and resulted in the Geneva Summit that summer.

Actually, the record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was largely responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David turned out to be useful in stalling off Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no "missile gap" which encouraged us to take a tougher stand on Berlin.

The Soviet leaders have looked upon summits as an essential element of their "detente" campaigns. The "Spirit of Geneva," the "Spirit of Camp David," the "Spirit of Glassboro" were touted as evidence of a "relaxation of tensions" (i.e. detente) and were designed, among other things, to lull the West into a false sense of security. A principal goal of Soviet detente moves has been to encourage NATO to decrease arms expenditures. They have usually followed periods of Soviet-induced tension which have resulted in increased Western defense efforts: 1949, after the airlift defeat of the Berlin Blockade and after the first SAC deployment to Europe; 1955 (actually beginning in 1953), after our huge Korean War buildup; 1963, after the failed Cuban missile caper and in recognition of the enormous US strategic advantage; 1971-72 to control US MIRV and ABM advantages and to gain increased access to Western technology and financing (among other things). Brezhnev's opening speech at the 26th CPSU Congress makes it quite clear that the Soviets want badly to resurrect detente in order to delay or fend off the announced US military buildup and concomitant strengthening of Western European defenses through TNF modernization, etc. Brezhnev's avowed eagerness to parley with us is the clear result of a tougher US stance vis-a-vis the USSR and an increased US defense budget.

Apart from providing the Soviet leadership with a convenient propaganda platform, summits present other intrinsic problems. They are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore the serious and complicated subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed. This, in turn, can lead (and has led) to misunderstandings and miscalculations.

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Review on February 24, 1987

NLRR 74825A-5-9-5
BY 6208 NARA DATE 5/29/13

Despite the pitfalls of summit meetings with the Soviets, 'it is probably unrealistic to expect the President to avoid them altogether. Since we established relations with the USSR, every US President has met with his Soviet counterpart (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). Presidents can scarcely resist the urge to size up their main opponent. In addition, I would imagine that our European allies, who live under the shadow of Soviet power, would not want us to reject Brezhnev's summit proposal out of hand.

If Eisenhower's example is followed, a number of summit price tags could be announced, for example:

- Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan (if we wanted to avoid a summit altogether);
- Withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia;
- No Soviet assistance, direct or indirect, to revolutionaries in this Hemisphere;
- No direct Soviet military intervention in Poland;
- Conclusion of a satisfactory SALT III Treaty.

It goes without saying that any approach to the Soviets on a summit should be carefully worked out on an interagency basis here and then with our allies. For the time being, our public position on Brezhnev's proposal should remain strictly noncommittal.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS - RICHARD PIPES

I concur in general with Bill Stearman's assessment of Brezhnev's initiatives and his options. The Soviet leaders have shown every sign of exasperation with the Reagan Administration's casual attitude toward negotiations with them: in part, because such behavior deflates their global image as a "superpower" which the USA is required to take into account in all its foreign policy initiatives, and in part because it deprives Moscow of an opportunity to size up the new U. S. Government.

However, because the "negotiating process" is popular among left-of-center groups in Western Europe, it would not be prudent to dismiss Brezhnev's summit suggestion out of hand. "Interesting," "worthy of consideration" should be the U. S. reactions. In practice, the proposal should be shelved. There is no need for a summit, at any rate now or in the foreseeable future. Should the President nevertheless find a purely negative stance politically ill-advised, he may want to pose very high preconditions: sufficiently high ones to preclude a cosmetic concession on the part of Moscow which would look like a genuine peaceful gesture and make us look bad if we did not wind it up with a summit.

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NLRR 748-25A-5-10-3

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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BY 19013 NARA DATE 5/24/0

WASHINGTON

172585

July 7, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

SUBJECT: Chernenko's Response to Your July 2 Letter
on the Vienna Talks

Soviet Chargé Isakov came in to see Rick Burt Saturday afternoon under urgent instructions from Moscow to hand over a reply from Chernenko to your July 2 letter on the Vienna talks. An unofficial translation, as well as the Russian original, are attached.

Chernenko's letter stresses the following points:

-- It insists that you have not yet given a positive response to the Soviet proposal to negotiate on preventing "the militarization of space" in September, and that "the American side" is still talking about some "conference" without a definite agenda.

-- It very forcefully makes the point that nuclear negotiations are frozen, and that linking them to negotiations on outer space is therefore a recipe for deadlock on outer space too. The resulting arms race in space would accelerate the arms race on earth as well, Chernenko says, and would make it harder to limit and reduce armaments in general.

-- As a result of these two factors, the letter goes on, "it is necessary to come to a clear understanding as to the subject of these negotiations" before our delegations meet at the negotiating table. If it is hard for us to agree to such negotiations in September, they will "take that into account."

In response, Burt first recalled that it was we who had suggested beginning talks later if the Soviets preferred. He said we would study the letter and reply soon, but stressed that both you and the Secretary have told the Soviets we are prepared to come to Vienna with clear substantive ideas on outer space arms control. At the same time, we believe that if we are going to address this topic we must also discuss related issues like offensive nuclear weapons. In any event, however, we are prepared to enter into diplomatic discussions of the agenda for talks, and Burt invited the Soviets to begin such preparatory discussions without delay.

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Isakov replied by asking again whether we are ready to negotiate on "preventing the militarization" of outer space. If we were making an announcement, would we be willing to say that, he asked. Burt said that in discussing the agenda for a Vienna meeting, we could address the issue of what any announcement might say. Isakov concluded that he would report the exchange, and the specific question of initiating a discussion of the Vienna agenda, to Moscow.

On the way out, Isakov commented to the State Department official accompanying him that the Soviets are offering the Administration a political "bumper harvest" if negotiations on outer space begin in September; all that was being asked was that the agenda be fixed before the two delegations sat down. The official replied that you do not need Soviet help to get reelected, and that the Administration is approaching the talks on the assumption that they must be to mutual benefit, without regard to such considerations.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

Drafted: EUR: RBurt^{RB}
7/7/84 1124M

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DECLASSIFIED

Translation from the Russian

NLRR 748-251-5-11-2

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

BY 610 NARA DATE 5/29/13

172586

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully read your letter of July 2, 1984. Let me say frankly that I was looking in it for a positive response to our proposal to hold Soviet-American negotiations this September on preventing the militarization of outer space. Regrettably, there is no such response in the letter.

One has to reach such a conclusion despite the fact that you express readiness to start negotiations in Vienna. For from your letter it clearly follows that the U.S. is not agreeing to participate in the kind of negotiations which the Soviet side proposes and in which it is prepared to participate.

Let me recall that the Soviet Union favors the adoption of urgent measures which would enable us effectively to block all channels for extending the arms race into space. This can be done by banning all space attack systems, which is precisely what we propose to have negotiations about, and by establishing a moratorium, simultaneously with the start of negotiations, on testing and deployment of such systems.

The American side essentially is talking about conducting not negotiations on space, but some sort of "conference" without a definite agenda, i.e. there would be a conversation about everything and about nothing specifically.

We are far from underestimating the importance of questions of nuclear armaments, which in your letter are linked with the problem of space. You know our position with regard to how to solve these questions. But as before, nothing points to the readiness of the American side to take into account this position and open the way out of the present impasse. Banning space weapons is a problem of great importance in its own right. To tie it to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, which are in fact currently blocked, would be to put negotiations on space attack weapons into a stalemated position as well. At the same time, the deployment of space attack weapons would inevitably lead to a sharp escalation of the arms race on earth too, and would complicate all the more the possibility of undertaking effective measures for limiting and reducing armaments in general. We are convinced that such a development of events would serve nobody's interests.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

As for space weapons themselves, the emphasis here should, of course, not be on studying something. It is necessary to reach agreement on practical measures in order to prevent the appearance of space attack weapons of any kind. This is also what determines the concrete questions put forward by the USSR for negotiations, in order to resolve the problem in all its aspects and in a radical way.

We approach these negotiations seriously and responsibly, and we expect the same attitude from the American side. If, however, for some reason it is difficult for you to give consent to such negotiations at the time we suggested, we would have to take that into account. It is important that we be in agreement that such negotiations are necessary, and that we will conduct them without unjustifiable delays.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the main point once again. There cannot be any doubt that it is more sensible to exclude space from military competition in advance, rather than trying later on to eliminate the otherwise inevitable, serious and perhaps even irreparable damage to stability and security. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to look at this whole problem once again from this perspective. I would like to hope that you could give a positive reply to our proposal, which remains in force.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko.

Moscow
July 7, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

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Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. Рейгану
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
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Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я внимательно прочитал Ваше письмо от 2 июля с.г. Скажу откровенно, я искал в нем позитивного ответа на наше предложение о проведении в сентябре текущего года советско-американских переговоров о предотвращении милитаризации космического пространства. К сожалению, такого ответа в письме нет.

Приходится сделать такой вывод, несмотря на то, что Вы сообщаете о готовности приступить к переговорам в Вене. Ведь из Вашего письма ясно следует, что США согласны участвовать не в тех переговорах, которые предлагает и в которых готова участвовать советская сторона.

Напомню, что Советский Союз выступает за принятие срочных мер, которые позволили бы надежно перекрыть все каналы распространения гонки вооружений на космос. Сделать это можно, запретив все космические ударные средства, о чем мы и предлагаем провести переговоры, установив одновременно с их началом мораторий на испытания и развертывание таких средств.

С американской стороны говорится о проведении по сути дела не переговоров по космосу, а какой-то "конференции" без определенной повестки дня, то есть разговор был бы обо всем и ни о чем конкретно.

Мы далеки от того, чтобы недооценивать значение вопросов ядерных вооружений, которые в Вашем письме увязываются с проблемой космоса. Нашу позицию насчет того, как решать эти вопросы, Вы знаете. Но по-прежнему ничто не указывает на готовность американской стороны учесть эту позицию и открыть путь для выхода из нынешнего тупика. Запрещение космического оружия - самостоятельная

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проблема большой важности. Пристегнуть же ее к фактически заблокированным сейчас вопросам ограничения и сокращения ядерных вооружений означало бы поставить и переговоры по космосу в тупиковую ситуацию. В то же время развертывание космического ударного оружия неизбежно привело бы к резкому скачку гонки вооружений и на земле, еще более осложнило бы возможность принятия действенных мер по ограничению и сокращению вооружений вообще. Мы убеждены, что такое развитие событий не отвечало бы ничьим интересам.

Что касается собственно космического оружия, то акцент здесь должен, конечно, делаться не на том, чтобы что-то изучать. Нужно договариваться о практических мерах, чтобы не допустить появления ударного космического оружия любых видов. Этим и определяются те конкретные вопросы, которые СССР выдвинул для переговоров, с тем чтобы проблема решалась во всех ее аспектах и радикально.

Об этом, а не о чем-либо ином, мы предлагаем вести переговоры. И прежде чем наши делегации встретятся за столом переговоров, нужно четко условиться о предмете этих переговоров. Этого требуют важность и актуальность проблемы.

Мы подходим к этим переговорам серьезно, ответственно и ждем такого же отношения с американской стороны. Если, однако, для Вас по каким-то причинам затруднительно дать согласие на такие переговоры в названное нами время, мы вынуждены были бы с этим считать-ся. Важно, чтобы у нас было согласие, что такие переговоры нужны и что мы будем их вести, причем без неоправданной затяжки.

В заключение еще раз хочу подчеркнуть главное. Не может быть сомнения в том, что благоразумнее заранее исключить космос из сферы военного соперничества, чем потом пытаться устранять неизбежный в противном случае серьезный, а может быть и непоправимый ущерб стабильности и безопасности. Я призываю Вас, господин Президент, еще раз взглянуть на всю проблему под этим углом зрения. Хотелось бы надеяться, что Вы сможете дать позитивный ответ на наше предложение, которое остается в силе.

С уважением,

К. ЧЕРНЫШЕНКО

Москва

7 июля 1984 года