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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/25/2016

File Folder USSR (7/19/84-7/23/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

405

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172665	PROFILE SHEET	SYSTEM II	1	7/20/1984	B1
172639	MEMO	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN	1	7/21/1984	B1
172642	MEMO	W. RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN	2	7/19/1984	B1
172640	MEMO	EDITED DRAFT OF DOC #172639 (R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN)	1	ND	B1
172644	NOTE	TO J. POINDEXTER RE ATTACHED REPORT	1	7/20/1984	B1
172645	REPORT	RE SOVIETS	5	7/16/1984	B1
172646	MEMO	D. FORTIER, R. ROBINSON, AND D. WIGG TO MCFARLANE RE EXTRATERRITORIALITY (W/ADDED NOTES)	6	7/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172647	CHRONOLOGY	SELECT ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY	1	ND	B1
172648	MEMO	R. KIMMITT TO C. HILL RE EXTRATERRITORIALITY R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-8-5-6	1	3/13/1984	B1
172650	MEMO	R. ROBINSON TO MCFARLANE RE RENEWAL OF U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION (W/ADDED NOTES)	2	4/17/1984	B1
172651	MEMO	B. LINHARD, R. LEHMAN, J. MATLOCK, AND S. KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONDING TO SOVIET PROPOSED "AGREED STATEMENT"	2	7/23/1984	B1
172652	TALKING POINTS	DRAFT TALKING POINTS	2	ND	B1
172653	RESPONSE	NSC DRAFT RESPONSE (W/EDITS)	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172655	MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO REAGAN RE RESPONSE TO SOVIET STATEMENT ON VIENNA TALKS R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-8-8-3	1	ND	B1
172656	REPOSNE	PROPOSED U.S. RESPONSE R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-8-8-3	1	ND	B1
172657	STATEMT	POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL SENTENCE R 6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-8-8-3	1	ND	B1
172658	MEMO	TO REAGAN RE ATTACHED REPORT	1	7/23/1984	B1
172659	MEMO	(ATTACHMENT TO DOC #172658)	2	7/23/1984	B1
172662	STATEMT	DEPARTMENT STATEMENT (DRAFT)	1	ND	B1
172663	ARTICLE	FBIS 022 R 1/13/2012 CREST 748-25A-8-10-0	1	7/23/1984	B3

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172665 PROFILE SHEET

1 7/20/1984 B1

SYSTEM II

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172639	MEMO	1	7/21/1984	B1
	R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN			

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National Security Council
The White House

1263

System #

II

Package #

90802

ED

8 JUL 20 P 4: 28

3

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	✓		
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	5	K	ad
NSC Secretariat	6	hg	BT
Situation Room	7	BT	DACOM

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)

Recommend we DACOM Ref at Camp David
responsible for US role.
Done 7/21/84

1944 44

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172642 MEMO

2 7/19/1984 B1

W. RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE
SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN

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172640	MEMO EDITED DRAFT OF DOC #172639 (R. MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN)	1	ND	B1

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172644	NOTE TO J. POINDEXTER RE ATTACHED REPORT	1	7/20/1984	B1

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

172645 REPORT

5 7/16/1984 B1

RE SOVIETS

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~~SECRET~~
~~OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION~~
1/25/16 CDR

RECEIVED 23 JUL 84 07

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ROBINSON

DOCDATE 21 JUL 84

FORTIER

21 JUL 84

WHITFIELD, D

21 JUL 84

12

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS

USSR

OECD

SUBJECT. EXTRATERRITORIALITY & US - USSR ECONOMIC WORKING GROUP MTGS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 24 JUL 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(CL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C JUL 23 1984	Mcfarlane approved both		RO, DE, DW
DISPATCH			W/ATTCH	FILE SA (C)

85

National Security Council
The White House

1265

System #

I

Package #

5572

13

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull	2		
Wilma Hall	3		A
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	4		A
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

P4.0

14

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2		
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action			

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

This memo suggests to me that you need to have a meeting this week with Baldrige, Regan, and Shultz to underscore the need to handle these issues in a coordinated, objective fashion. Cap and Casey could also attend and would surely support such an approach. I feel we are just nibbling at the edges of a larger problem and the real path toward resolution is to put Cabinet officers on notice of our concern.

P

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7-21-84
3:35 p.m.

15

Bud:

Don Fortier mentioned he sent you a note recommending you look at the issues covered in this package prior to the start of what is sure to be a "high velocity" week for you in general.

Many thanks.


Roger Robinson

P.S. Congratulations on a ten-strike with Secretary Regan Friday!
You can be confident we will be self-effacing and very low-key.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

84 JUL 23 AM 1:48

16

July 23, 1984

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
1/25/16 WDB

MEMO FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

John:

As this went in on Saturday and has already been reviewed by Bud (prior to your return), I merely wish to ensure that you have an opportunity to focus on it for a host of reasons that will be obvious. Hopefully, we can nip this in the bud before we have a full-fledged disaster on our hands. Many thanks,


Roger Robinson

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Imp - I passed orig
of this pkg to you.

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172646 MEMO

6 7/21/1984 B1

D. FORTIER, R. ROBINSON, AND D. WIGG TO
MCFARLANE RE EXTRATERRITORIALITY
(W/ADDED NOTES)

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172647 CHRONOLOGY

1

ND

B1

SELECT ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY

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From Wallis paper of July 3, 1984
distributed for SIS-IEP review
on July 12 (postponed) 24

The coordination is intended to assist the agency in considering the foreign interests, laws or policies, alternatives to unilateral action, and means to minimize difficulties.

D. Coordination procedures should ensure against undue operational burdens^{4/} or delays, duplication of existing arrangements and the introduction of improper considerations into the administration of the responsibilities of the respective agencies. The normal minimum time for notification should be five working days in advance of the proposed action.

E. Agencies will notify the Secretary of State or his designee, or the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, of investigative activity proposed to be carried out by U.S. officials or agents in a foreign jurisdiction for which the consent of the foreign government has not yet been obtained.

F. Such coordination will not affect the legal responsibilities and authorities of the notifying agencies.

→ * II. NOTIFICATION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

A. The United States will implement the understanding on notice and consultation regarding U.S. actions which impose conflicting requirements on multinational enterprises, reached

(continued) of largely de minimis potential for creating extraterritoriality problems, such as export license pre-clearance inquiries or tax inquiries mailed to a person abroad. Meaningful coordination may be limited or precluded, in certain cases, by: grand jury, tax information and other legal secrecy requirements; concern for human life or safety; time constraints and the need to avoid disclosures which might prejudice litigation, investigation, or sensitive sources and methods.

^{4/} For operational reasons, the Department of Justice would not set up procedures to identify for coordination criminal law enforcement matters handled outside of the Department in Washington, but would identify for coordination matters handled or considered in Washington, such as the Export Administration Act, including its anti-boycott provisions, munitions control, IEEPA, Trading with the Enemy Act, neutrality laws, anti-trust (under existing procedures), and the enforcement of off-shore subpoenas for documents in jurisdictions likely to object to such actions.

within the O.E.C.D., and will apply the same general considerations and practical approaches to other U.S. actions which have significant potential for raising extraterritoriality concerns in friendly nations.

B. The United States, accordingly, is prepared to:

1. Develop mutually beneficial, practical and appropriately safeguarded bilateral arrangements, formal or informal, for notification to and consultation with other friendly governments.

2. Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests for notification and bilateral consultation on an ad hoc basis by a country which considers that its interests may be affected by a United States measure with extraterritorial effect.

3. Inform the other concerned O.E.C.D. countries as soon as practicable of new legislation or regulations proposed by the Administration which have significant potential for conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of those countries and for giving rise to conflicting requirements being imposed on persons or firms in their territory.

4. Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests by friendly countries for consultations under multilateral arrangements in appropriate cases.

5. Give prompt and full consideration to proposals which may be made by other countries in bilateral or multilateral consultations that would lessen or eliminate conflicts.

C. Under arrangements for notification or consultation through the Department of State regarding action of another agency, the consent of that other agency will be required.

D. Where appropriate, notice and consultation arrangements would be negotiated in the context of efforts to secure enhanced cooperation with foreign governments in meeting U.S. objectives. In particular, it is the policy of the United States to seek mutual assistance arrangements in law enforcement and to further that policy through the inclusion of bilateral arrangements for notice and consultation.

7

PRESS/A(84)28

Paris, 18th May, 1984

COMMUNIQUE

1. The Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development meeting on 17th-18th May at Ministerial level, agreed upon policies required to strengthen the international trading and financial system, and to extend economic recovery into durable employment-creating growth.

36. Noting the growing importance and scope of problems arising from the imposition by Member countries of conflicting requirements on multinational enterprises, Ministers agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral co-operation in this area in order to avoid or limit the scope of such conflicts. Accordingly they endorsed a set of general considerations and practical approaches to these problems as set out in paragraphs 23-33 of the Review Report. Ministers also noted the concern over the impact of unitary taxation on international investment and the importance of achieving an early resolution of the problem.

Report on the 1984 Review of the 1976 OECD Declaration
and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises

2. CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

23. Issues arising from conflicting requirements imposed by Member countries on multinational enterprises were considered by the drafters of the 1976 Declaration and Decisions. Of particular relevance are paragraph 11 of the Introduction to the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and paragraph 5 of the Revised Decision of the Council on Intergovernmental Consultations Procedures on the Guidelines. In this context, paragraph 7 of the Introduction to the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is also recalled.

24. Concerns arise in particular when a country's legislation or legal requirements with extraterritorial reach conflict with legislation or policies in other countries and affect, for instance, the operations of entities of multinational enterprises located in these countries. The importance and scope of such problems has tended to grow in recent years, this trend reflecting, inter alia, the increasing interdependence of OECD economies. Conduct abroad has an increasing impact on national economies and on the possibilities for avoidance of national laws. Some countries have attempted to control or counteract such developments through the adoption, modification or application of laws and regulations having an extraterritorial reach, whereas some of the countries affected have adopted blocking legislation or have taken blocking actions.

25. All in all, the risk of conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises by Member countries is viewed to be increasing, the effects of this on the investment climate tending to become more significant.

This is why the CIME has come to the conclusion that bilateral and multilateral co-operation should be strengthened in that area, to avoid such conflicts or to limit their scope, in the interest of, inter alia, promoting and safeguarding an international environment favourable to the development of trade and investment.

26. For these reasons, the CIME has agreed to the general considerations and the practical approaches set out in paragraphs 27 to 30 below, which Member countries should take into account whenever they consider the adoption, modification or application of laws or regulations which may lead to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises.

a) General Considerations

27. In contemplating new legislation, action under existing legislation or other exercise of jurisdiction which may conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of another Member country and lead to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises, the Member countries concerned should:

- i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law;
- ii) Endeavour to avoid or minimise such conflicts and the problems to which they give rise by following an approach of moderation and restraint, respecting and accommodating the interests of other Member countries (21);
- iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law enforcement and other interests of other Member countries;
- iv) Bear in mind the importance of permitting the observance of contractual obligations and the possible adverse impact of measures having a retroactive effect.

28. Member countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as an alternative to unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting requirements and problems arising therefrom. Member countries should on request consult one another and endeavour to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to such problems.

b) Practical Approaches

29. Recalling paragraph 5 of the Revised Decision of the Council on Intergovernmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Member countries also recognised that in the majority of circumstances, effective co-operation may best be pursued on a bilateral basis. On the other hand, there may be cases where the multilateral approach could be more effective.

30. Member countries should therefore be prepared to:

- i) Develop mutually beneficial, practical and appropriately safeguarded bilateral arrangements, formal or informal, for notification to and consultation with other Member countries;
- ii) Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests for notification and bilateral consultation on an ad hoc basis made by any Member country which considers that its interests may be affected by any measure of the type referred to under paragraph 27 above, taken by another Member country with which it does not have such bilateral arrangements;
- iii) Inform the other concerned Member countries as soon as practicable of new legislation or regulations proposed by their Governments for adoption which have significant potential for conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of other Member countries and for giving rise to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises;
- iv) Give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests by other Member countries for consultation in the CIME or through other mutually acceptable arrangements. Such consultations would be facilitated by notification at the earliest stage practicable;
- v) Give prompt and full consideration to proposals which may be made by other Member countries in any such consultations that would lessen or eliminate conflicts.

c) Future Work

31. The CIME will continue to serve as a forum for consideration of the question of conflicting requirements, including, as appropriate, the national and international legal principles involved.

32. Member countries should be prepared to assist the CIME in its periodic reviews of the experience with the practical approaches described in paragraph 30 above.

33. The Committee shall periodically invite the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) to express their views on matters relating to conflicting requirements.

34. In view of the importance attached to the foregoing considerations, it is proposed that Ministers, in endorsing the conclusions and recommendations of the present Report, make specific mention of the general principles and practical approaches described in paragraphs 27 to 30 above. It is also proposed that the Council Decision on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, already referring to the subject of conflicting requirements imposed on multinational enterprises, be amended to reflect some of these results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8768

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 13, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-254-8-5-6

BY 657 NARA DATE 6/5/13

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Extraterritoriality in U.S.-Canadian
Relations *let*

Secretary Shultz wrote the President concerning emerging foreign policy problems associated with the overall issue of extraterritoriality (S/S 8336532). The Secretary also urged greater interagency coordination and international consultations on this complex matter. Subsequent to the Secretary's memo, the SIG-IEP began active consideration of the overall question of extraterritoriality, which includes an effort to better integrate interagency views. In this regard, we would encourage the Department to ensure its current views and concerns on extraterritoriality are reflected in the SIG-IEP's recommendations, which will be forwarded for Presidential consideration after interagency review. *let*
(C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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172650 MEMO

2 4/17/1984 B1

R. ROBINSON TO MCFARLANE RE RENEWAL OF
U.S.-USSR AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC,
INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
(W/ADDED NOTES)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Tenneco Inc

Tenneco Building
P. O. Box 2511
Houston, Texas 77001
(713) 757-2811



Jack H. Ray
Senior Vice President

32

25 June 1984

Mr. William Martin
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506

Gentlemen:

Tenneco Inc is a widely diversified, multi-national company headquartered in Houston, Texas. Tenneco's primary strengths are in its energy divisions particularly offshore oil and gas exploration and production. Some years ago we worked very hard at trying to put together a viable project wherein we could buy Soviet natural gas to be transported to this country in the form of LNG. That project never came to pass because of the political realities of the day. However, several months ago Soviet officials with whom we had become well acquainted in the previous negotiations requested that we submit a proposal to them for the provision of "management services" for offshore oil and gas exploration in the Barents Sea.

I have discussed this with my Chairman, Mr. Ketelsen, who indicated a willingness to pursue this project only under the condition that the President and the National Security Council are fully appraised and are agreeable to our participation. It is for this reason I am writing to request your consideration of the project.

I should point out that at the time of my discussion with the Soviet officials, I was aware that a consortium of Norwegian companies had already agreed to assist the USSR in a similar manner. Subsequently, in discussions of other matters with Kongsberg's Executive Vice President R. E. Rolfsen, I learned that he was Chairman of the Norwegian group. We discussed the matter at some length and he suggested that Tenneco should join with the Norwegian consortium. This would make sense in that all the Norwegian companies have particular products to sell into the project while Tenneco would bring the offshore management skills to the team. There the matter rests. There has been no agreement between us.

Tenneco Inc

25 June 1984

Page 2

33

In regard to the project itself, discussions with the Soviets indicated the total project would consist of three phases: 1) a general planning and study of the state of the art, examining the options available, 2) a more specific planning and evaluation phase culminating in a detailed plan, and 3) execution of the plan.

Our discussions with the Soviets focused only on phases 1 and 2. Under this proposal, Tenneco (perhaps through a foreign subsidiary) would provide its technical and business "know-how" as it relates to planning and developing an offshore exploration venture under the harsh conditions prevalent in the Barents Sea. At present, we would be precluded from on site technical involvement.

Therefore, in general terms, the first two phases would likely include the following:

1. Detailed study of options for developing Barents Sea hydrocarbon reserves;
2. A recommended overall project schedule;
3. An estimate of the overall cost of bringing Barents Sea reserves "on line";
4. A study of the services and equipment required;
5. A plan for contractual services; and
6. An accounting plan, possibly including specific recommendations on project financing.

Tenneco is, of course, not unique in its ability to provide the requested services. Not only are the Norwegians under contract and able to provide these services, there are several other countries who have similar capabilities and might become involved in the Barents Sea project. These organizations would include: British Petroleum (UK), Shell (Netherlands), Saipem (Italy), Statoil (Norway), Elf Aquitaine/Total (France), and Dome Petroleum (Canada). It is readily evident that the Soviet Union has already initiated its program in the Barents Sea and that they will follow it through to a conclusion, whether or not U.S. companies are involved. All equipment and services required are available "off the shelf" in numerous countries. The project can be done with or without U.S. equipment or U.S. involvement.

Tenneco Inc

25 June 1984

Page 3

34


On the other hand, the general information that would flow from the project through the involvement of Tenneco would be quite useful in assessing Soviet energy potential. There is little doubt but that the Soviets believe the entire North Coast is geologically attractive. This is the beginning of their effort. It would seem to be a grand opportunity to participate with them in order to be aware of the magnitude of the potential and the effort required to utilize hydrocarbons from such remote and hostile areas.

I certainly do not believe that the information and services we would provide to the Soviet Union would violate the intent of Congress as expressed in the Export Administration Act of 1979.

I do not know whether or not a license would be required to enter into a "service contract" with the Soviet Union. Since it relates to the development of hydrocarbon resources it may be required; however, I feel certain we can make a good case for approval.

I will be pleased to discuss this with you further at your convenience.

Yours very truly,



Jack H. Ray

aw

cc: Roger Robinson
File

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8490812

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/25/16 CDR

RECEIVED 23 JUL 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 23 JUL 84

LEHMAN, R

23 JUL 84

3

MATLOCK

23 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT RESPONDING TO USSR PROPOSED AGREED STATEMENT

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

JUL 23 1984

C JUL 23 1984

Mcfarlane disapproved #2

Mcfarlane approved #1 & #3

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

II

Package #

90812

23 P3:20

36

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1		
Bob Kimmitt	2		
John Poindexter	3		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	4		I
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5	B	N
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Bud,

This arrived too late for
your meeting but you were
aware of all of the staff positions
J

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172651	MEMO B. LINHARD, R. LEHMAN, J. MATLOCK, AND S. KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONDING TO SOVIET PROPOSED "AGREED STATEMENT"	2	7/23/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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172652	TALKING POINTS DRAFT TALKING POINTS	2	ND	B1

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172653	RESPONSE NSC DRAFT RESPONSE (W/EDITS)	1	ND	B1

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TAB B

5

DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

45

NLR 748254-8-8-3

BY KDB NARA DATE 6/5/13

SECRET

172655

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Response to Soviet Statement on Vienna Talks

The Soviet draft statement given to us on Saturday could be an opening by which we could reach mutual agreement on the basis for the Vienna talks. At the same time, the Soviets evidently intended this statement for propaganda purposes; TASS has already carried a gist of the Soviet statement. To protect ourselves with public opinion, while advancing our position for the talks, we need to respond to the Soviet formulation promptly, today if possible.

We have prepared a proposed counterdraft, attached at Tab 1, which protects our position. In our draft, we have included three alternative formulations for the definition of the talks, any one of which would enable us to discuss the full range of issues we want to address.

In addition, we have considered the possibility of adding a reference to a moratorium, both for public relations purposes and to pick up the Soviet statement on a moratorium. The formulation attached at Tab 2, on a two-year moratorium on testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons and related systems beyond those already tested or deployed, would enable us to continue with testing of our MV system, since it has already been tested. The two-year duration of the proposed moratorium would not interfere with any planned US test programs, in either ASAT or SDI.

SECRET

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-254-8-8-3

BY 1006 NARA DATE 6/5/83

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

46
172656

Proposed US Response

As a result of exchanges through diplomatic channels between the Governments of the USSR and the USA, agreement has been reached to begin talks on the limitation of (a) the militarization of outer space, or (b) antisatellite weapons and related subjects of mutual interest, or (c) weapons related to space, including antisatellite weapons. The talks will begin on September 18, 1984 in Vienna at the level of specially-appointed delegations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-ZSA-8-8-3SECRET/SENSITIVE

172657

BY COBATE 6/5/13Possible Additional Sentence on Moratorium

It has also been agreed that beginning with the date of the commencement of the talks in Vienna, a mutual, two-year moratorium on the testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons and related systems, beyond those already tested or deployed, will be established.

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172658 MEMO

1 7/23/1984 B1

TO REAGAN RE ATTACHED REPORT

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172659 MEMO

2 7/23/1984 B1

(ATTACHMENT TO DOC #172658)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DEPARTMENT STATEMENT (DRAFT)

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172663 ARTICLE

1 7/23/1984 B3

FBIS 022

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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EFGHIJKLMN OPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^
FBIS 022

52

TASS NOTES SOVIET EFFORT TO «CLARIFY» SPACE TALKS PROPOSAL

172663

LD231241 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1215 GMT 23 JUL 84

(+IT IS HIGH TIME TO CLEAR UP THE MATTER+ -- TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW JULY 23 TASS -- THE AMERICAN SIDE IS CONTINUING ITS ATTEMPTS AT PICTURING THINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS IF THE UNITED STATES HAS ACCEPTED THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL ON THE TALKS TO PREVENT THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE. BUT, AS A MATTER OF FACT, WASHINGTON IS SPEAKING OF QUITE DIFFERENT TALKS, THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

TO CLARIFY COMPLETELY THE SUBJECT OF THE POSSIBLE TALKS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS OFFICIALLY PROPOSED THE OTHER DAY THAT A JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE BE PUBLISHED EXPLICITLY STATING THE CONSENT OF THE USSR AND THE USA TO OPEN TALKS IN ORDER TO DRAW UP AND CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING COMPLETE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND ON CONSENT TO IMPOSE A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF OUTER SPACE WEAPONS COMMENCING ON THE DAY OF THE START OF THE TALKS.

THE ANSWER FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL SHOW WHETHER WASHINGTON IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, I.E. WHETHER IT IS READY FOR TALKS PRECISELY ON THE PROHIBITION OF OUTER SPACE WEAPONS OR IT INTENDS TO CARRY ON A DECEITFUL GAME AROUND THAT ISSUE.

23 JUL 1316Z KEH

DECLASSIFIED (RE-10150)
NLRR NIR-748-2a-8-100
BY CN NARA DATE 1/13/12