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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 1/25/2016

File Folder USSR (8/3/84) (5)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 25A

SKINNER

412

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
172759	REPORT	THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE: THE NEXT FOUR YEARS	14	ND	B1
172760	REPORT	STRENGTHENING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES	7	ND	B1
172761	MEMO	P. RODMAN THROUGH UNDER SEC. ARMACOST TO SECRETARY OF STATE	7	6/27/1984	B1
172762	MEMO	R. FAIRBANKS TO P. RODMAN RE INITIATIVES 1985	3	5/26/1984	B1
	R	6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-15-4-9			
172763	MEMO	C. CROCKER TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE AFRICA BEYOND NOVEMBER	7	7/2/1984	B1
	R	6/5/2013 CREST NLR-748-25A-15-5-8			
172764	MEMO	P. RODMAN THROUGH M. ARMACOST TO DEPUTY SECRETARY RE LIBYA	1	5/25/1984	B1
172765	REPORT	LIBYA: POLICY ISSUES OVERVIEW	16	5/25/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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ATTACHMENTS TO
PETER RODMAN'S MEMO
AT TAB II OF
DON FORTIER'S PLANNING
MEMO OF 3 AUG 84.

Donna, 8/3
Take this to
Bud. Rest of
package is being
DACOM'D. R

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C

EUR paper on East-West Relations

-- Prepared but not yet cleared by
Assistant Secretary Burt

-- To be forwarded upon clearance

D

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172761 MEMO

7 6/27/1984 B1

P. RODMAN THROUGH UNDER SEC. ARMACOST
TO SECRETARY OF STATE

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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NLRR 74825415-4-9

BY 16013 NARA DATE 6/5/0

172762

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 26, 1984

To: S/P - Mr. Peter Rodman

From: S/SA - Richard Fairbanks R7

Subject: Initiatives 1985

As with other matters requiring attention by the Chief Executive, in foreign policy the number of issues which can successfully compete for the President's attention are limited. Herewith (not in rank order) is my list of the four essential agenda items for the second term:

- 1) Arms Control/Soviet dialogue
- 2) Central America
- 3) Middle East
- 4) Pacific Basin

The Pacific Basin Initiative

DO NOTHING WRONG. A trite tautology perhaps, but apropos with regard to our efforts to build stronger ties with the countries of the Pacific Basin. We must learn from the mistakes of the Japanese and Australians by firmly resisting the temptation to force or direct too strongly what must be an evolutionary process.

The relative stability in this area over the past thirty years has relegated security interests to a lesser position behind economic development. As a result, countries in the region have focussed almost exclusively on internal development, financed by a favorable trading relationship with the west, especially the United States. What we have to offer the nations of the region is simple: access to our market.

For the near term, our objective should be to thicken the process of cooperation which has begun to manifest itself in Southeast Asia. The upcoming ASEAN post-ministerial conference will provide us an opportunity to gauge the pace and extent to which ASEAN is prepared to move forward.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

It is essential that our initial efforts be low-key, informal, and directed to the economic concerns of the countries in this area. At present there is a division of opinion over the United States' role, and we must take necessary steps to allay concerns of those who fear the United States will dominate the process and who would rather have it abort than "undermine their sovereignty" (or ASEAN itself). The fact that this would be neither our intention, nor the result, in my view, of increased cooperation, does not negate the perception.

To move forward effectively (and subtly, as required in Asia), we need to show the countries of the region what we have to offer. Some of the possibilities which have emerged from our initial round of discussions with business, government and academic leaders are the following:

- We should stress to the countries of the region (particularly ASEAN) that near-term cooperation should be informal (non-bureaucratic) and economic.
- The United States can best contribute to the intra-regional networking process by encouraging and aiding private sector initiatives. Governments should stay out of the way, recognizing that the strength and dynamism of current economic development stem from private initiatives.
- Nonetheless, by early in the second term, through either the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council or the Asean post-ministerial dialogue, we should have an intra-regional economic forum in place.
- We should encourage a small but highly effective group of leaders from these countries to exchange information and ideas on the entire range of problems which confront us. Such an "establishment" will aid in a further thickening of the cooperative process, and permit another development to which we can point with pride.
- We should consider working on a high visibility and relatively low cost package to strengthen exchange across the Pacific in both directions: a) to raise the level of Pacific literacy in the United States, stressing educational exchanges and improved language training; b) to tie the next generation of the Pacific establishment to the U.S., increased attention to drawing promising scholars from the region's countries to schools here.

- We should explore the prospects of using the evolving intra-Pacific dialogue on economic questions to arrive at a common or at least complementary position at the next GATT round.
- We should encourage and to a deliberately limited extent actively participate in the formation of a United States national committee to attend the next Pacific Economic Cooperation Council in Seoul in 1985. Formation of the committee is underway and should be completed by the fall.
- If we can continue to thicken the economic cooperative process, we may be able to build toward a summit conference of Pacific Rim leaders to make the concept of Pacific cooperation a visible reality. (An interim step toward that goal might be a U.S.-Canadian-Mexican Summit focused on Pacific matters.)



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United States Department of State

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NLRR 748-254-15-5-8

Washington, D. C. 20520

BY GOB N ATE 6/5/83

172763

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~INFORMATION~~ MEMORANDUM
S/S

JUL - 2 1984

TO: The Secretary
FROM: AF - Chester A. Crocker *CAC*
SUBJECT: Africa beyond November

Background

The Administration has chalked up an impressive record of action on behalf of peace and development in Africa. This record is getting increased recognition from Africans as well as in the U.S. Our allies increasingly pay tribute to our efforts in the region. Not only in Europe but in the Middle East and Japan there is growing awareness that instability in Africa can jeopardize the western position beyond the continent. Now is the time however to look ahead to those tasks and challenges which will face us in the next four years in order to build on this record. An early post-election trip by you to Africa would offer an opportunity to highlight our record and to underscore the Administration's continuing interest in the continent.

Major Issues

Southern Africa. The Administration's painstaking systematic efforts to reverse the cycle of violence in Southern Africa and offer an alternative to Soviet arms and South African intransigence are paying off. In the Nkomati Accord, the tangible reality of a peaceful alternative has now been made clear, and it is having a profound impact on the thinking of all Africans concerned with this region. Equally clear is the unmistakable relevance of the U.S. to regional solutions, compared to the total inability and/or unwillingness of the USSR to play any sort of constructive role. We still have a long

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~~- 2 -~~

way to go, on Angola and Namibia, in making a success of the Nkomati Accord, and in the continuing task of shaping regional detente (e.g., regarding Zimbabwe and Botswana).

As of now, the Angolan/South African Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) remains 40 kilometers inside Angola. Further progress toward the border is stalled by the inability of the two governments to reach agreement on the terms of what will follow the disengagement. Pretoria has proposed a joint peacekeeping commission to replace the JMC. The Angolans say they do not want to agree to a follow-on mechanism until they get a commitment from South Africa on implementation of UNSCR 435. The South Africans made it clear during Prime Minister Botha's recent European trip and in his conversations with Chet Crocker in Rome that they continue to insist on an Angolan commitment on Cuban troop withdrawal before Cuban implementation of 435.

In the coming months, we will be continuing to orchestrate steady pressures for a major movement on the Cuba issue. We will do this by encouraging South Africa to make step by step progress in the negotiating process, and by making clear to all parties, including the MPLA, that delaying tactics on the Cuban troop issue will serve noone's interest.

This reinforced diplomatic initiative on our part will take place in an environment in which there will remain many voices arguing that our real agenda is the imposition on the region of Pax Pretoriana, not peaceful change in South Africa and independence for Namibia. We thus have both an opportunity and a challenge to shape wholly new approaches by Africans to the problem of apartheid in South Africa and cross border-violence regionally. The stale model of support for ANC violence ("the armed

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3 -

struggle"), on the one hand, and South African adherence to confrontation against the "total Marxist onslaught", on the other hand, must be firmly destroyed. This is a tall order, but one which could affect the region for decades to come.

Economic. On behalf of development, the Administration has been a stern but sympathetic voice in calling upon Africans and donors alike to face up to the harsh realities of policy reform and austerity measures if there is to be any hope of halting the long decline of Africa. At the same time, with the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI), our position on increasing Africa's share of IDA, our strong role in the replenishment of the African Development Fund, our success on the IMF quota increase, our outstanding record on emergency food aid, and our leadership in calling for more coordinated international programs of support, we have earned respect and gratitude in Africa. In spite of our being only one of several key donors in Africa, we are playing a lead catalytic role in coordinating and focusing resources on the real problems. We have also implemented vigorous actions to promote private sector opportunities in Africa. Specific private sector strategies for 17 countries are in operation. In addition all U.S. agencies engaged in trade and investment are now part of an interagency group, chaired by AF, to ensure coordination in Africa.

But the African economic crisis is deepening as drought across the continent, north and south, takes a greater toll than ever before in modern history. Continued low commodity prices make reforms all the more difficult and their implementation less likely to reverse the downward spiral in Africa's development. Debt problems are now plaguing individual African countries on a scale and with an impact that threatens our interest in successful adjustments and investment promotion. Our current "debt strategy" is, in our view, based on assumptions that do not clearly reflect Africa's special circumstances. Zaire, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya and Ivory Coast are examples of good friends in Africa who have taken important reform steps but who will be facing very serious difficulties in this regard in the years ahead.

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- 4 -

In summary, we have set the agenda but we are still only at the beginning in developing the instruments and obtaining consensus with both Africans and donors for a lasting solution. Economic problems will continue to undermine all our political and strategic objectives in Africa if not brought under control.

Security. We have an excellent record of timely support to our best friends in Africa. Twice we have come dramatically to Sudan's defense. Our military assistance to security partners is up nearly 100% over three years ago, concentrated in Northeast Africa. We have strengthened our capacity to base out of Africa into the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, e.g., from Sudan, Kenya, Somalia. We have provided emergency financial assistance to key friends such as Senegal and Kenya to keep their reform programs on track and to strengthen their stability. We have worked the French hard and encouraged their effort to check Qadhafi in Chad and thereby in Central and West Africa as a whole.

However, we continue to be confronted by the deep internal weaknesses of several of our most strategically important partners. This is especially apparent in the Horn of Africa where we are confronted with a set of interlocking, complex problems. Sudan's Nimeiri has embarked upon an Islamic purification campaign and a disdainful approach toward the south that endangers both political stability and economic recovery. Human rights violations that flow from these policies could undermine support for Nimeiri in both the Congress and with our Allies, weakening support for aid programs and endangering our strategic assets there.

At risk in Sudan are our considerable strategic interests in the country and the Nimeiri regime's importance as a supporter of Egypt and a foe of Libya. There appears to be no logical replacement for Nimeiri nor do we perceive our policies as evolving in a direction which would encourage one to emerge. The task which confronts us in Sudan is not a unique one. We must find a way to have a government essentially friendly to our interests modify its policies before those policies

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~~- 5 -~~

thoroughly erode both its domestic and foreign support. There has been a general consensus in Congress that Sudan, because of its strategic importance and its support for the Camp David process, warrants continued American assistance. However, we have already seen, e.g., the letter to you from Representatives Fascell, Dixon, and Wolpe, a growing sentiment that we should "distance" ourselves from Nimeiri. Absent improvement in the domestic situation in Sudan, we can expect this approach to gain further ground in Congress and elsewhere both before and after November.

In Somalia, tribal jealousies and outdated thinking threaten the early promise of economic reform and give Ethiopia continuing opportunities to exploit internal dissatisfaction. Somalia remains almost totally indefensible militarily. Even in Kenya, tribal tensions threaten stability and inhibit commitment to economic reform. Our efforts to turn Ethiopia away from its role as willing surrogate for Libyan and Soviet objectives in the Horn have not borne fruit. We need to assess the implications of all these problems for our position in southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean as well as in Africa.

There are other areas for which we have yet to develop adequate strategies and instruments of policy and which will provide continuing challenges after November.

--Nigeria is a principal case in point. Here, a troublesome giant in Africa and a major supplier of oil to the U.S. market is stumbling. The Nigerians have now rejected the possibility of a significant upfront devaluation which the IMF had deemed a necessary prerequisite to the creation of an IMF program. With IMF talks stalemated, Nigeria will likely attempt to muddle through by holding down imports, by looking for increased oil revenues, and perhaps by seeking to reschedule short-term debt guaranteed by official creditors without an IMF arrangement. We do not intend to reschedule in these circumstances. European creditors may be under pressure to weaken on this point, but HMG tells us it will not reschedule in the absence of an IMF agreement.

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- 6 -

However, we are aware that economic disaster, political instability and maybe dangerous radicalism could occur if further coups take place. We have yet to develop sophisticated instruments of political-economic influence that can preserve vital U.S. interests.

--Liberia remains an expensive yet central symbol of U.S. prestige in Africa; beyond political symbolism, vital facilities remain hostage to the political and economic gyrations of Liberia's immature military leader. We have invested considerable time and effort as well as resources in pushing the Doe regime towards a peaceful transition to civilian rule. So far, Doe has grudgingly gone along with the process, though he has dragged his feet and delayed progress. Outside of East Africa, Liberia is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Another coup or a governmental slipping off the tracks to civilian rule, both of which are possible before or after November, would provide us with a major policy problem.

--In the poorest countries of the Sahel our economic programs are imperfect and blunt instruments to protect these moderate francophones from Libyan subversion and internal disintegration. French staying power remains of critical importance; the projection of Arab influences and divisions into the fragile Sahel zone further complicates our task.

-- The more or less passive approach we have pursued to the Western Sahara conflict in recent years may no longer be serving our interests well. The death of Sekou Toure of Guinea robbed King Hassan of his strongest black African supporter. At its next summit, which may take place in Addis in November, Africa's sense of exasperation over the western Sahara may lead to the seating of the Polisario as a member of the OAU. Morocco would then most likely walk out of that organization, but the precedent set by the OAU could provide a rationale for additional, non-African, assistance to Polisario and propel the issue back into the United Nations where Morocco and its friends would find themselves greatly outnumbered. It is in our interests to help Morocco avoid international isolation. We have begun discussions with NEA about alternative U.S. postures that could energize a negotiations track and remain consistent with our Moroccan and broader regional interests.

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4

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- 7 -

Conclusion and Recommendation

In summary, we have set an impressive agenda and made a solid start on strengthening U.S. interests in Africa. We have charted courses in Southern Africa and on economic issues that could have a major impact on the direction of events there for decades to come. We have caught both the Africans' and allies' attention with our practical leadership on difficult problems. Nevertheless, our "solutions" are incomplete, our credibility is on the line to fund our economic initiatives (EPI is not yet funded), and there are agendas where we are stalled or ill-equipped (the Horn, Western Sahara, Nigeria).

We believe we are relatively well postured to plan a trip by you to Africa in the fall. On such a trip you could point to our achievements, note your sense of African dynamics, and build on existing foundations with key friends and partners.

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172764 MEMO

1 5/25/1984 B1

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