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**Collection:** deGraffenreid, Kenneth E: Files  
**Folder Title:** Technology Transfer Meetings  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 8/29/2016

**File Folder** TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MEETINGS  
(WEISS/MANFREDI)

**FOIA**

F02-0083/01

**Box Number** 28

PRADOS

2811

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179848	FOLDER	MEMOS AND NOTES	6	1/28/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

T/H weddy  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

## Computer Espionage Unit Delayed

SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 27 (UPI)—A federal task force aimed at stamping out espionage in the computer industry will have to wait until a crackdown on drug smugglers is organized, U.S. Attorney Joseph P. Russoniello said today.

Russoniello said a new narcotics task force announced by President Reagan last week is getting primary attention, and will postpone the formation of the technology task force

temporarily.

"The No. 1 priority in law enforcement must be narcotics," he said. "Critical technology is No. 2."

The narcotics program will place task forces in 12 U.S. cities, including San Francisco.

The Critical Technology Task Force was described last month by Russoniello as a "mini-government" that would move into the area around San Jose known as Silicon Valley because of its concentration of computer industries.

The task force will be staffed by CIA, FBI, Customs and other federal agents and supervised by seven prosecutors from Russoniello's office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*T/T weekly mtg*  
2

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

US TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY (U)

Introduction (U)

The Administration does not now have its comprehensive written policy on West-East technology transfer, including provision of protection of US technology from illegal acquisition and transfer to the Soviet Bloc. The most recent effort along these lines was PRM-31, completed in 1978. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for an interagency study to develop a current and comprehensive national technology transfer policy. (U)

Objective (U)

The objective of this study is to conduct a national-level policy review of the US Government's efforts to stop the transfer of strategic technology to Communist countries.

The study will lead to a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) with options as appropriate, establishing a comprehensive US technology transfer policy. It will also make recommendations for implementation of the objectives of the NSDD throughout the Government, to include legislative, regulatory, security and administrative changes. (C)

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: *DIAGNOSIS* *TRAC* *NSC 3/15/95* *NSDD-83*  
BY *WOT* NARA DATE *8/29/16*

Scope (U)

The study will embody a comprehensive review of the policies, procedures, objectives, organization, capabilities and priorities of the US Government's efforts to stem the loss of Western technology to potential adversaries. (C)

The study will review related directives and studies, and incorporate their analysis and recommendations as appropriate. These shall include:

- PRM-31, Export Control of US Technology
- PD/NSC-24, Telecommunications Protection Policy
- Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-1988, which responded to NSSD-2
- The August 1982 report of the Strategic and Military Task Force of the PFIAB (S)

The study will also take note of related studies now underway. (C)

The interagency study will produce an NSDD and supporting report, for consideration by the National Security Council, which will address, at a minimum, the following:

1. Broad USG technology transfer policy
2. USG structure to integrate and implement policy, and for oversight
3. Procedures to identify and protect critical technology, including classified DOD & Defense contractor proprietary technology related to military systems.
4. Role of the Intelligence Community
5. How technology transfer policy affects other economic, security, and foreign policies and objectives.

6. Public awareness of the problem, to include industry and academia

Administration (U)

This study will be conducted by an interagency group, ~~chaired~~ <sup>under</sup>

~~the~~ SIG ~~by~~ \_\_\_\_\_ . It

should include representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce and Energy, the US Trade Representative, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Office of Policy Development, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, (U)

This study and draft NSDD will be completed for consideration by the National Security Council not later than May 31, 1983

An outline and timetable for the study will be provided to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by FEB 4

1983 (U)

Sec 2  
White  
BY NAME

4/29/83 NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

T/T Weekly Mtg. 5  
ID 8300652

RECEIVED 26 JAN 83 16

TO CLARK FROM BALDRIGE, M  
WEISS  
WEISS  
DOCDATE 26 JAN 83  
27 JAN 83  
27 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS CHINA P R  
EXPORT CONTROLS COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF PRES PRC EXPORT CONTROL POLICY / HYBRID COMPUTER CASE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 07 FEB 83 STATUS X/S FILES

FOR ACTION		FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
WEISS	LAUX	SIGUR	RYE	
	BAILEY	ROBINSON	DEGRAFFENREID	
			KIMMITT	
			CHILDRESS	

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8300284 NSCIFID ( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	2	1/28 Rec'd CIA Comments		
Weiss	5	1/28 Prepare Memo for Clark	7/7	Same

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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Jack Anderson

# High-Tech Pipeline To Moscow

The Soviets have developed a variety of ways, legal and illegal, to get their hands on U.S. technical know-how. Once obtained, this know-how saves the Russians the cost and time of research and development. When adapted to military use, it can also give them an arms advantage that may cost us billions to overcome.

When a U.S. firm sold the Soviets ultra-precise ball-bearing grinders, for example, they used them to make bearings for their SS19 missile-guidance systems. The improved accuracy achieved through those guidance systems is a major reason why the United States is considering a multibillion-dollar MX missile system.

Now a secret Pentagon document has detailed the full range of high-technology items that our intelligence community believes the Soviet Union has bought, borrowed or stolen from the United States.

A classified chart lists what are believed to be "Notable Successes" in 13 "Key Technology Areas." This list, shown to my associate, Dale Van Atta, is treated by the Pentagon as highly sensitive. Here are a few of the high-tech secrets that have reached the Kremlin:

- **Electro-optic sensors:** Through clandestine means, the Russians have acquired "information on U.S. reconnaissance satellite technology." And through illegal trade links, they have obtained "laser range findings for tanks."

- **Radar:** Air-defense radars and antenna designs for a missile system have fallen into Soviet hands. The document also conjectures that the Soviets have discovered other U.S. breakthroughs through "exploitation of captured terrain-following and airborne-intercept radar."

- **Anti-submarine devices:** Somehow the Soviets have acquired "underwater navigation and direction-finding acoustic sensors" vital for anti-submarine warfare.

- **Propulsion:** The Russians have obtained "missile case filament-winding technology

through legal and illegal trade, some ground-propulsion technology (diesels, turbines, rotaries) through illegal trade."

- **Materials:** The Russians have acquired "Western titanium alloys and welding equipment" designed to make nuclear missiles and vital weaponry from the hardest possible material.

- **Energy Storage:** The Soviets have acquired, through legal means, high-tech Western "superconducting energy storage systems and associated cryogenic equipment."

- **Navigation:** The Soviet coup here includes: "legal and illegal trade acquisitions of navigation receivers; illegal acquisitions of advanced inertial guidance components, including miniature and laser gyros; captured equipment, including terrain-following radars, anti-radiation missiles, and fire-control systems; acquisitions of cruise and tactical ballistic missile guidance subsystems."

- **Directed energy:** The Soviets have had alarming success in obtaining technology that could make a critical difference in space warfare. That technology covers the "directed energy" field, including lasers and charged-particle weapons. The Russians have secured "metal foils and optical components through legal and illegal channels, including special optical mirrors and mirror technology capable of withstanding high-power laser radiation and suitable for future laser weapons."

- **Production:** The Soviets have also obtained "automated and precision manufacturing equipment for electronics, materials, and possible optical and laser weapon components; acquisition of information on production technology related to weapons, ammunition, aircraft parts, turbine blades, computers, and electronic components."

- **Signal processing:** In this super-secret field, which involves decoding the signals the United States gets from its own and Russian satellites and receivers, the Soviets are believed to have acquired "processing equipment and know-how" through "illegal trade" efforts (secretly obtaining it from a country that bought it from the United States or by somehow diverting the shipments).

- **Micro-electronics:** In this field, the technology acquired by the Russians through "legal or illegal trade channels" includes: "complete industrial processes and semiconductor manufacturing equipment."

- **Computers:** Here the document cites "legal and illegal" acquisitions of complete systems, hardware and software, including a wide variety of Western mini-computers for use in military systems; [and] exploitation of captured avionics" and weapons fire-control systems.

A separate Pentagon document lists 19 ways the Soviets obtain U.S. military and industrial secrets. Legal methods range from studying patent applications to joint ventures with Western firms to buying entire factories and copying them piece by piece.

Illegal methods span the spectrum from outright theft by KGB agents to industrial espionage to "end-user diversions." The last refers to using legally purchased U.S. technology for military purposes in direct violation of the purchase agreement.

*"Once obtained, this U.S. know-how saves the Russians the cost and time of research and development."*

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

1/14/83 9

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
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Initials—Date

1. Mr. Kenneth deRooy

2. DSC

3.

4.

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
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Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
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Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

Renewal of the Export Administration  
Act of 1979

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